§ I shall be asked what is the cost of all these concessions. The cost to Great Britain will be about £1,048,000 a year, and to India £786,000 a year. That undoubtedly is a heavy charge; but it is not a net increase in the yearly Estimates. In the first place, our present Estimates, or the Estimates of last year, were calculated on our full strength. Until we reach our full strength, obviously the new pay will not oppress us, and the additional pay will not come into operation for two years. The net total of the present Army Estimates is swollen owing to large purchases for stores. These purchases will largely come to an. end before the new charge which we are now proposing accrues. But I believe these changes will have a more far-reaching effect. I suppose every one anticipates a time when there will be a reaction in this House, and possibly in" the country, against continuing to spend £30,000,000 a year on the Army services. I have lived through periods of excitement in the War Office, when the cry of retrenchment was raised, in which either we had to push forward the house or were pulled back ourselves. I have no doubt whatever that, when the war is over, possibly when this Party has left office and hon. Gentlemen opposite come into power, they will have to face a 389 strong agitation in which all those who want something out of the public purse for objects in which they are interested will unite in an unholy alliance to decrease the Army Estimates. Educational enthusiasts and social reformers will probably unite with the Arbitration Committee and the Navy League, and urge that in the Army Estimates may be found a scope for retrenchment, by which funds may be secured for the particular objects they have at heart. The policy I recommend to the House is to establish a large reserve, so that we may have the minimum on the active list with the maximum power of expansion. If a time of retrenchment comes, I believe it will be possible, if you get your larger Reserve and at the same time a better class of men, for you to keep some of the corps, especially the Artillery, at a lower level than could otherwise be the case, and to retrench upon the active list, well knowing, as this war has proved, that you can absolutely rely upon the efficiency of the Reserve.
§ There is one other aspect of the subject of which I wish the House to take notice, and that is that the possession of a larger reserve will enable the bargain made between the soldier and the State to be carried out more sympathetically than has been possible up to the present time. If a man wants to leave the colours somewhat earlier, or wants to return to them after a short absence, it will be in the power of the War Office to do more in that direction.