HC Deb 24 February 1902 vol 103 cc914-61

Order read for resuming adjourned debate on main Question [21st February], "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair. "

Question again proposed.

(4. 10.) MR. KEARLEY (Devonport)

said that when the debate stood adjourned at midnight last Friday, he was about to call attention to the question of the loss of the "Cobra, "and he would now ask the House to consider the circumstances which surrounded that catastrophe. He did not think lie was overstating the case when he suggested that there was a considerable feeling of uneasiness throughout the country as to the loss of that vessel. He proposed to put before the House certain statements that came out in the Court of Inquiry, which would, he hoped, enable hon. Members to form a very accurate judgment as to who was responsible for that most serious disaster. The ship was built on the Tyne by the Armstrong firm. She left that river on September 17th, at five p. m., and at 7.30 the next morning she foundered, no fewer than sixty-five lives being lost. The vessel practically parted asunder near the Outer Dowsing Shoal. The weather during the first watch was fine, and she steamed at the rate of seventeen knots per hour. In the middle watch, no doubt, the weather was rougher, and the ship rolled a good deal. That was explained at the inquiry by the statement that the engines were priming, owing to salt water getting into the boilers. At seven o'clock the next morning the vessel was two miles off the lightship near the Outer Dowsing Shoal, and her commander gave instructions for her to be steered in a little closer, so that he might verify his position; it was while this operation was going on that she, practically without any warning whatsoever, broke in halves.

He thought they were entitled to ask what caused the vessel thus to part in two, and, in order to arrive at a decision, it would be necessary to relates the history of the building of the "Cobra," and of its purchase by the Admiralty. The vessel was built as a speculation by the Armstrong Company, in 1899, and she was constructed for a very worthy purpose, no doubt, as was explained by the constructor of the building firm. He said he foresaw that there would be a demand for these very speedy vessels, and it was desired to keep the workmen au courant with that class of work. Mr. Philip Watts, then the designer for the Armstrong Company, and now Director of Naval Construction at the Admiralty, stated that he had built two vessels for the Admiralty, the "Sword-Fish" and "Spit-Fire," and in building the "Cobra" he based it on their general structural arrangements. He desired to invite the attention of the House to a comparison between the standard taken by Mr. Watts and that applied to the "Cobra." In the first place the "Sword-Fish" was 200 feet long and the machinery in her weighed 110 tons; while the "Cobra" was 223 feet long and the machinery in her weighed 183 tons, as originally designed. In addition to that there was an unusal structural arrangement consisting of a cross coal-bunker which carried 35 tons of coal, so that it was necessary to add 35 tons to the additional weight of the machinery. Thus they saw that the "Cobra" was supposed to be designed on the plan of a shorter vessel, and yet she contained over a hundred per cent. more weight. With regard to the cross-bunker he would remark that it was placed between the two boiler rooms, and this much decreased the strength of the vessel at a most vital spot. But the point he wanted chiefly to make clear was that the "Cobra" was the longer of the two vessels, and that she contained double the weight of machinery without any provision being made to render her stronger than the "Sword-Fish. "Mr. Watts, in his evidence, made some startling admissions; in fact, all the witnesses, including the Admiralty officials, did that. Mr. Watts admitted that no provision was made to carry this additional weight, and that the scantling to support the hull of the ship was just the same as the scantling which supported the hull of the "Sword-Fish." He also admitted that the machinery put in was 30 tons or more greater than the weight for which the ship was designed, and that there was no additional margin made for it "beyond the ordinary margin which was usual in all ships." Of course, they all understood what a margin was. It was not a thing to be impinged upon. It was there for the safety of the ship, yet, in this particular case, it was impinged upon to the extent of 30 tons, as the designer of the ship had admitted.

He would remark that be had no intention of attacking either the designer of the ship, who held a first-class record as a competent man, nor the builders. All he could say was that if designers and builders liked to project and buildships that would "turn turtle, "or break in halves, that was their affair. It would soon find its own remedy, because they would lose the confidence hitherto reposed in them, and would soon find their business leaving them. But what were they to say about the Admiralty, with its enormous experience, and its responsibility to the country in these matters What were they to say to them if, as he would be able to show, they deliberately bought, with their eyes wide open, jerry-built coffin ships I That, no doubt, was strong language, but he believed he would justify it before lie had finished. Let them turn to the history of the purchase of the vessel. What did they find? It was offered to the Admiralty in December, 1899. Negotiations were carried on for some time, and it was finally agreed to purchase, subject to certain conditions specified in a letter written in March, 1900, which formed the basis of the contract. They had not had that letter published in full, but an extract from it was laid before the. Court of inquiry, and that would be sufficient for his purpose of proving that it was part of the contract under which the Admiralty bought the ship. The extract on which he relied was as follows— That, the arrangements of girders and machinery space were not satisfactory as regarded longitudinal strength, and would require considerable alteration and some modification. Everybody knew that that was a matter which affected the stability of the hull. Yet, after a lengthened survey, this ship was finally accepted by the Admiralty officials, and he thought he was doing them no injustice if he put before the House two points for its consideration. He would put them in the shape of questions. First, did the Admiralty know, at the time they laid down their terms and conditions of purchase, that the "Cobra" was deficient in essential strength? Secondly, did they take care that such strengthening as was essential to make her safe was carried out before they took her over? Those were two very reasonable and practical questions. The reply to the first was that they knew perfectly well, at the time they negotiated the purchase of the "Cobra," that she had not the essential structural strength. Their letter, which formed the basis of the contract, proved that. As he had previously remarked, they had not had the advantage of seeing the letter in full, and he would ask the Secretary to the Admiralty, when he came to reply, to state whether he would agree to lay it on the Table of the House, so that they might know what it contained, and exactly where they stood. With regard to his second questions the reply was that they did not take the care he suggested they ought to have done. In the first place they failed altogether to enforce the very conditions that they had laid down in their contract letter, that the longitudinal strength of the vessel should he made efficient, and consequently they knowingly took the risks. Therefore they must have made up their minds to chance the matter.

He was making a very serious charge when lie declared that they were responsible, in consequence, for the loss of the ship and for the loss of lives. He believed that charge was capable of proof. He had already quoted what was said by Mr. Watts before the Court, that no provision was made to carry the additional weight, and that the ordinary scantling to support the bull was just the same as that in a vessel which carried 100 per cent. less weight of machinery. Let them see how the Admiralty were advised by their own official, who went down to make surveys from time to time, and how that advice was acted upon. Mr. Deadman, the Chief Constructor to the Admiralty, was a witness at the inquiry, and he there stated that he made a Report on the "Cobra" before the Admiralty wrote the letter of March, 1900. He advised the Admiralty, in the first place, that the structural arrangements of the vessel were unsatisfactory, and that they were inferior to what was being taken by the Admiralty from other makers, "because the scantlings were lighter than those of other vessels. "He also said that the "Cobra" after the alterations were made was not as strong as other destroyers of the same date. There was, in fact, nothing to compare the "Cobra". with, for she was longer than other vessels; her engines were built for far greater speed, and, consequently, no fair comparison could be drawn between her and vessels of that date. The witness, in fact, tried to excuse the transaction by saying that at the time the Admiralty agreed to purchase the "Cobra" they had had no experience of any vessel of her dimensions that had to carry so much weight. He did not think that that was quite accurate, for they would all remember that the "Viper" was a vessel of similar speed, but, of course, very much stronger. Therefore it was hardly fair to say that the Admiralty had had no experience. Even supposing, however, they had had no experience, would not that be all the more reason for them to exercise the greatest care in taking over a vessel that might be deemed to be a new departure? Mr. William Pine, another Admiralty official, and an assistant constructor, also gave evidence before the Court of Inquiry at Portsmouth, and he likewise made some damaging admissions. He stated that the duty was delegated to him to survey the "Cobra" before the Admiralty entered into this contract. Apparently his survey was of a very happy-go-lucky kind. He said that he had surveyed the "Viper" when she was built, and consequently he was thoroughly acquainted with her in every detail, and when he surveyed the "Cobra," he took the "Viper" as his standard. Then he admitted that In making his suggestions with regard to the alterations to the 'Cobra, ' he did not suggest that she should be brought up to the Viper's' standard. Thus they had Mr. Watts saying that he had taken a certain standard which he did not work up to, and the Assistant Constructor to the Admiralty also admitting that he took the "Viper" for his standard, but did not work up to it. Under these circumstances he failed to see what the word "standard" meant. An important Admiralty official went down to survey a vessel which was known to the Admiralty to be weak, and having made up his mind that he would work up to a certain standard, he practically disregarded that standard altogether, with a result with which the House was painfully familiar. Mr. Pine further stated that he made out a list of recommendations, which, in his evidence, he referred to as Schedule A. He said, further, that there was another list made out, which he referred to as Schedule B, and which contained a much more comprehensive list of requirements than Schedule A. Both those lists were sent to the contractors, and they were invited to make their proposals in regard to them.

What was finally done to the "Cobra"? Mr. Watts admitted that, although this vessel was known to the Admiralty to be longitudinally weak, the hull was not strengthened, but that the additions made were chiefly to strengthen the upper deck. Mr. Perritt, the head of the Naval Designing Staff at Elswick, was called in and was asked what was done; and he pointed out that though this vessel was longitudinally weak, all that was done was that a couple of angle-bars were introduced between the keel and the upper deck. No other alterations were made in consequence of the letter. Attention was called to the fact that the scantlings were very weak, and he said that he was prepared to accept these scantlings for a length of 235 feet, provided he were allowed to increase the depth of the vessel to 16½ feet, which would give 50 per cent. greater strength than they had in the "Cobra. "That was an admission that these scantlings were not strong enough. He thought that they ought to have some information from the Admiralty as to how it was that, when the original negotiations were entered into, and when this ship was found to be too weak and defective, they took her away from the builder without having the hull strengthened, as their own competent advisers suggested should be done. He admitted that his charges were rather strong, but the verdict of the Naval Court Martial held on board the "Victory" was that they found that the loss was Due to structural weakness of the ship; that the Cobra ' was weaker than other de- stroyers; and in view of that fact, it is to be regretted she was purchased into His Majesty's service. That was a very strong condemnation; he did not know that a stronger could have been given. The reason he had raised this question that day was that we were on the verge of paying a tremendous national penalty for this great neglect of the Admiralty. The Secretary to the Admiralty made a most momentous statement on Friday, the importance of which he thought had hardly been realised.

Now, what was going to be the result of the new policy of the Admiralty? Talking about the new torpedo boats and of what the Admiralty were going to do in the future, the hon. Gentleman said— We have taken a measure which I think is a reasonable one. We have decided to make use of the comparatively less excellent boats for peace exercise, and to keep our new boats in reserve so as to save them from the changes and chances which appear to overtake so many of these boats during peace exercises. All this arose from the loss of the "Cobra"! These boats were not to be used, not to have their qualities tested until the fateful day of national emergency! And if the "Cobra" had been placed under this rule she would have been put into the reserve and would not have been tried. The new destroyers would cost a lot of money, and, as we were now informed they were not to be used, he hoped that the Chancellor of the Exchequer would insist on their being sent round the country on land to show them, so as to obtain some exhibition money to pay for their keep. He could not imagine anything more opposed to the interests of the country than that these new destroyers were, in peace time, to be put on the shelf only to be brought down when war time arose. There was a feeling of great anxiety throughout the country. The hon. Member the Secretary to the Admiralty admitted on Friday night that he was aware of that, and that he welcomed it, because, he said, he was sure it would beget criticism. Well, he had not hesitated in bringing this matter forward, because, in many respects, the public memory was very short, and there had been great neglect on the part of the Board of Admiralty; and he thought it would be most injurious to our interests if, because of those catastrophies to the "Cobra" and the "Viper," the Admiralty reverted, in the case of new destroyers, to a much slower speed. The effect would be that we should be out-distanced by foreign Powers, because they could build or buy in this country torpedo boat destroyers which would go, as many already had done, from the Thames to Japan, at a speed of from 30 to 33 knots per hour. If that was possible, why should we reduce the speed of our boats? Simply because of the neglect, of the Admiralty in taking over a class of destroyers which were structurally deficient. The country ought to protest against being landed in that position. We were entitled to obtain for our destroyers the same structural safety and the same speed as those built by or for other nations. It had been proved that it was possible to produce them in this country, with sufficient strength to meet any seas; and they ought to be reassured by the hon. Gentleman that the Admiralty had not come to the fixed determination to pursue the policy of reducing the speed of the new destroyers, and, above all, that these were not to be put aside into the reserve until required for war service. These boats ought to be always in use, so that the men should have confidence in them when they came to be employed in active warfare. He might say that there was the greatest uneasiness in the Navy as to the safety of those boats. [Cries from Ministerial Benches of "No, No. "] He thought he had as much opportunity as hon. Gentlemen opposite of ascertaining the feelings of seamen in regard to those boats. He did not suggest that the seamen were nervous, but when our seamen saw that these boats failed, time after time, they had not that confidence in them which they ought to have. We had lost, in the course of the last eight months, four ships and destroyers—the "Viper, "the "Cobra," the "Sybil, '' and the "Condor. "Those disasters followed on the miscalculations in relation to the royal yacht, regarding which his hon. friend had been actually accused of disloyalty in raising the question. There had been a great deal of concealment in regard to the facts connected with the royal yacht; although they all knew that Sir William White, although technically, was not actually responsible for that disaster. But as to the "Cobra, "the House should have full information. He had no desire to create any bad feeling against the Admiralty, but he thought that this was a matter that should be ventilated in the House; and he hoped that the hon Gentleman would give such information as would reassure the House and the country in regard to it.

(4.42.) MR. JAMES HOPE (Sheffield, Brightside)

said he wished to express his satisfaction with the reference made by the Secretary to the Admiralty to the good work done by the great contractors for the Navy, and he could himself bear witness to the conscientious and patriotic spirit in which these contractors had done their work. He should like to refer to one other point, and that was how very desirable it was that the work given out by the Admiralty should be evenly distributed throughout the year. He did not think he need enlarge on how very undesirable it was that there should be an alternation of overtime and slacktime. Undoubtedly, during the course of the year, there had been considerable apprehension and some distress felt at the very late period at which the tenders for new ships had been got out. He knew that this matter had been brought before his hon. friend, and that he had been able to find some temporary expedient whereby the mischief of that situation was, at any rate in some part, alleviated. But he hoped that in the future the hon. Gentleman would take such steps as would prevent a period of spasmodic overtime followed by a period of slackness.

(4.44.) MR. EDMUND ROBERTSON (Dundee)

thought that the House would agree that his hon. friend the Member for Devonport had been thoroughly well justified in bringing before the House the strong statements he had made in his speech. It was one of the most valuable speeches which had been delivered in the House for some time. He only proposed now to make such few observations as had been suggested by a, comparatively slight study of the Estimates and the accompanying statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty. First of all, he would like to refer to an incident which took place in this House on the last occasion on which the Naval Works Bill was discussed. That Bill was brought in in the closing days of last session, although they had been calling for it for some time before. That Bill contained, to their astonishment, new proposals of great magnitude, and his hon. friend the Member for West Islington moved an Amendment, proposing to limit the Bill to the old works—an Amendment which he had supported. The Secretary to the Admiralty did not reply to him on that occasion, because the hon. Gentleman understood that he was only speaking on his own personal behalf, and did not represent his colleagues in the matter. The incident occured in his absence, and as a matter of personal explanation, he wished to say that the impression of the hon. Gentleman was incorrect, and that no one could have any authority for making such a statement. In the course he had taken, he had acted after consultation with his noble friend under whom he had served at the Admiralty. He thought it only due to himself to make that explanation. He wished to direct attention to the fact that the Naval Works Vote was still very large, notwithstanding the great amount that was being spent under the Naval Works Acts. The Naval Works Vote proper amounted to £1, 100, 000. A considerable proportion of that sum consisted of repayments under the Naval Works Acts, and if any explanation of it were to be given at that stage of the proceeding, which he did not press for, he assumed the House would be told something also of the state of affairs at Wei-Hai-Wei, for which money still continued to be taken. He should like to associate himself, and he was sure he could speak for his colleagues also, with what the hon. Gentleman said about Sir William White. He was in close personal communication with Sir William White during his tenure at the Admiralty, and he fully concurred with all that had been said in his praise, and he was extremely glad that there was, in the Estimates, a special grant of £5, 000 for him. He should have very great pleasure in supporting that grant. He did not know anything about Sir William White's successor, but he had no doubt that the Admiralty had made a good appointment. He would suggest, however, that the emoluments of that most responsible official were not quite equal to his responsibility. He thought it would be an advantage if a change were made in connection with the office. The pension and the emoluments ought to be enlarged. He further thought that when a vacancy occurred in the office the Admiralty ought not to be compelled to search the engineering works of the kingdom for a successor. There ought to be a second in command at the Admiralty who would be capable at any moment of taking the chief place, should it become vacant.

He proceeded to more disputable ground. He once again called the attention of the House and the country to the enormous figures in the Estimates. The net Vote was £31, 255, 000, and to that amount should be added at least £2, 000, 000 for expenditure under the Naval Works Acts, and they might also reckon on Supplementary Votes for a considerable amount. The result was that practically the House was called on to provide for naval expenditure a sum which he would put at no less than 33½ millions altogether. There was one thing which he regarded with perhaps illegitimate satisfaction, and that was, that the Vote for new construction showed only a small increase—a few thousand pounds over last year. The present Vote for £9, 058, 000 might be regarded as practically stationary, though he did not know whether he could hope that that was the culminating amount. He did riot grudge any expenditure that might be necessary, but he did grudge unnecessary expenditure, and it would be a satisfaction to him if he could find that the Admiralty had reached the summit in the matter of expenditure. The total of Vote 8, including new construction, showed an increase of half a million, and was now £15, 140, 000 or thereabouts. At present, the Shipbuilding Vote stood in relation to the total estimates as 1 to 3, but even if the Shipbuilding Vote were to remain unincreased, there would necessarily be other automatic increases which would bring the Naval Estimates to a far higher figure than at present. There was an increase in practically only one Vote—that for men. About 4, 000 men had been added to the Navy, but that was purely an automatic increase following the increase in the number of ships. Other Votes would increase as well. The non-effective services would call for more and more money, and even if the Shipbuilding Vote were not increased by a penny they would be face to face with Navy Estimates exceeding £40, 000, 000. When there was a large increase last year he asked for an explanation of it. He did not venture to challenge the increase last year, and did not challenge the present increase. That explanation was not, however, given last year by the Secretary to the Admiralty, except in the vaguest sort of way by a comparison with foreign Navies. He was not going into that comparison now. The necessary information for making it was not in the hands of hon. Members, but a Return published on the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the Forest of Dean contained a great deal of information which might interest hon. Members on that point.

Take one bare fact. Nine years ago our naval expenditure was £14, 000, 000, and the naval expenditure of France and Russia combined—the two Powers against whom the standard was aimed — was £16, 000, 000. What was the case last year? Our expenditure was £33, 000, 000, whereas the expenditure of France, Russia, Germany, and Italy combined—the four greatest European Naval Powers—was only £4, 000, 000 more. Last year, therefore, our naval expenditure was nearly equal to that of four first-class Powers. Take another point. Last year the First Lord of the Admiralty stated that a third of the battleships on the ocean belonged to Great Britain. He had worked out a calculation of the new ships, and he found that practically the same proportion obtained in regard to them. He would not pursue the comparison further, but he wished for information on one point. He had often asked whether any comparison could be made between the active service lists of the British Navy and the active service lists of foreign Navies. He had obtained figures on the subject six or seven years ago, but they had since been challenged by a gentleman who wrote with great authority, and who produced figures showing a much larger number on the active service lists of foreign Navies. He called attention to the matter now, because the language used by that gentleman implied that he had received his information from the Admiralty, who had refused to give the information to the House. He could hardly believe that information would have been given to an outsider which had been ref used to the House, and he might be wrong in his assumption that the Admiralty authorities were responsible for it, but he hoped the hon. Gentleman would make the point clear, and let the House know whether the Admiralty had any information as to the comparative standards of the active service lists of the various fleets of the world. If that were done it would be a valuable addition to their knowledge of the subject. He frankly admitted that even if he had a stronger objection to the present proposals of the Government than he could pretend to have, he could not regard the present as suitable for pressing for a reduction of the Vote. The hon. Gentleman alluded to the war in South Africa, and he spoke about 250, 000 men being locked up in that country, and lie said that without a strong Navy they could not have been taken there, nor could they be brought back. The hon. Gentleman also alluded to the expenditure of other nations. He entirely concurred. The fact was that they had been pursuing, for some time, an international policy which had estranged and embittered the other nations of the world; and in face of that he should be sorry to press for a reconsideration of the proposals of the Government. But he thought they were entitled to urge that if the present proposals were accepted, they ought not to be regarded as normal. When the war was over, which he trusted would be soon, and when they resumed their normal condition, internationally and otherwise, the time would come for a revision of the whole of their present naval policy and a determination of the standard which ought to be their normal standard.

Before passing from the subject of naval expenditure, there was one point to which he desired to refer. He thought the hon. Member for West Islington had done a great service to the country and the House in raising the question who ought to bear the burden of this enormous expenditure, and who bore it. The whole Empire, the self-governing Colonies included, was served by the British Navy just as much as the United Kingdom, but the United Kingdom alone, practically alone, bore the whole of the expenditure; the Australasian contribution was almost infinitesimal. The Cape alone, voluntarily, of its own accord, offered a small contribution, but that example was not followed, and he thought the people of this country ought to know— and he was sure they did not know—that it was they who provided for the naval defence of all parts of the Empire; including the Australasian Colonies. The people of the United Kingdom paid £3 per family per year in order to give the service of the Navy to people who were as rich or richer than they were themselves. Upon one occasion, when this question was raised, the Chancellor of the Exchequer had said that this thing could not go on, but his colleagues in the Government did not appear to agree with him, for the First Lord the other day had treated as an insult the proposition that the self-governing Colonies should share the expenditure made on their behalf as well as ours. That was a view with which he did not agree. How the question was to be raised he did not know. He did not desire to see the Colonies taxed, but he certainly thought that both the Colonies and our own people should know that what we were doing now we were doing at our own cost, and the benefit accruing was as much theirs as ours. He hoped before the debate closed some information would be given to the House with regard to the Australian Agreement, which it was understood was about to expire, and with regard to which they had been told during the last two sessions that the matter was in a state of transition.

THE SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY (Mr. ARNOLD - FORSTER, Belfast, W.)

was understood to say that the Agreement was still in force. One part of the Agreement had expired, and that related to the annual contribution to the capital fund for the Navy. The Australian contribution for the up-keep of the ships on the Australian station was still continued.

MR. EDMUND ROBERTSON

said he certainly understood that the Agreement had come to an end or that it would come to an end. He only referred to the matter because he saw by a reference to the newspapers that Mr. Barton, the Prime Minister of the Federal Parliament of Australia, had been making statements upon the subject which had reference not to the Australian flotilla, as it used to be called by a certain section, but to a certain bargain with regard to the Australian squadron. What Mr. Barton meant probably the hon. Gentleman did not know any more than anyone else, but he only referred to the matter in order that it might be brought to the hon. Gentleman's mind.

He had read rather carefully the document presented to the House by the First Lord of the Admiralty, which was a new departure in the proceedings of the Admiralty in this matter. He did not know why some parts of that document had been printed at all; he had read some of them with surprise and nearly all with disappointment. On page 9 of the Statement the First Lord spoke in vague and misty general terms of the distribution of the fleet. He said— The distribution of the commissioned fleet among the stations of the globe is a product time, and so he proceeded in that general way. The origin of the present principle of distribution was in a period when wind, not steam, was the motive power, and then he went on to say— With the change brought about by steam and the electric telegraph, the actual distribution has gradually changed, and adaptibility to the needs of the time and not finality was the spirit in which the question must be viewed. And there the noble Lord had stopped. He naturally supposed the noble Lord was going on to deal with the new principle. If he were not, what was the use of uttering these truisms? When this question was before the House of Commons in the previous summer upon a discussion initiated by an hon. Member below the gangway, who was supported by the Navy League in the principles he asserted, the heresies of the Navy League on the subject of distribution were pulverised by the debate which took place, but one operation of these crude and misty references of the First Lord might suggest the adoption of those Navy League principles in this matter. Distribution was a question which only the Admiralty in common with other Departments could decide. They only could decide at any moment what the distribution of the Fleet should be, and he should be very sorry to see that control of the distribution of the Fleet taken from them.

There was another passage which he was afraid would excite some feeling when it came to be read, as it would be, by the officers of the Fleet. The paragraph to which he referred was on page 1, and dealt with promotion. Again the First Lord commenced with vague and general observations, the meaning of which he failed to grasp, and then proceeded— The sole responsibility for promotions rests with the First Lord, who, however, in the performance of the difficult and invidious, but most necessary, task of selection, is accustomed to consult his naval colleagues. Of course. Then the statement proceeded— I mention this because the average age of captains on promotion to the rank of rear-admiral has considerably increased of late years, and I consider that the absence from the flag list of a due proportion of younger officers is a matter of serious moment, and because I recognise that I am specially responsible for devising a remedy for the future. One would naturally expect the First Lord to go on and say what the remedy was, and how it was to be worked out, but he did nothing of the kind. If it was left to the hon. Gentleman opposite to give the explanation, nobody was more competent to give it; but on this question of promotion grave dissatisfaction existed in a very important branch of the Navy. The navigating officers, or navigators as they were called, thought that they did not get promotion in accordance with their merits. In the four years from 1896–1899 inclusive, out of sixty-five captains appointed only six had been navigating officers, which was only ten per cent., and these officers did not regard that as being a sufficient recognition of the legitimate claims of the navigating officers themselves or their service to the Navy. He would be glad to know whether the hon. Gentleman admitted that there was anything approaching a grievance on the part of these men, and, if there should be, whether it had been called to the attention of the Admiralty. The promotion of officers in the Navy was not so difficult a matter as the promotion of officers in the Army. He hoped the Navy would always be snore free from the money influence that was so bad in the Army. There were money barriers in the way of promotion in the Army which he hoped there would not be in the Navy. All such harriers ought to ire removed; they ought not to be tolerated. Every officer who joined the service should be adequately paid, and no one should be allowed to perform national service at his own expense.

He was, unfortunately, not present on Friday, and therefore was unaware whether anything had been said with regard to the new proposals put forward in the statement of the First Lord, but he hoped the hon. Gentleman would be able to give a more intelligible explanation with regard to the new proposals than he at least had been able to gather from the statement of the First Lord.

There was only one further point on which he would touch, and that was with regard to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. If it were possible, desirable, and safe, the House would probably be interested in having from the Government a statement as to the value they attributed to that Agreement from a naval point of view. There was no doubt that Japan had made enormous strides as a Naval Power. Last year she had three new battleships on the stocks, one of winch was a vessel of over 14, 000 tons, and he should imagine that the Japanese Navy was in a condition to make the alliance worth something from a naval point of view. He was inclined to think that in this unprecedented alliance with a Power like Japan we had an accession of strength, and that, but for the Agreement, larger proposals in the way of new construction would have been put forward. He would say nothing about the possible loss of alliance with Italy, or about the set off of the one alliance against the other, but perhaps the Secretary to the Admiralty would say whether this addition to our naval resources had counted for anything in the programme now submitted to the House. If the answer was in, the affirmative, he should be inclined to think the Admiralty had acted wisely, and, whatever might be said of the alliance from other points of view, he agreed that so far as that of the Navy was concerned, it was an addition to the resources of the country.

(5. 19.) MR. YERBURGH (Chester)

desired to join in the congratulations to the Secretary to the Admiralty on the speech with which he had introduced the Estimates, and expressed the belief that everybody was delighted that the hon. Member's services were at last at the disposal of the Government. It was a happy omen for the future that on Friday night important Members, representing to some extent the Liberal Party, should have declared that the day might come when even more money than was at present being spent would have to be voted for the Navy. He would not follow in detail the hon. Member for Devonport in the matter of the "Cobra," as that question would doubtless be fully dealt with later on, but he would remind the hon. Member that whatever loss there may have been, the country was the gainer by seeing, from the noble courage displayed by the commander of that unhappy vessel, that the British officer of the present day was true to the traditions of the past. With regard to the destroyers, he was astonished to hear the hon. Member declare that officers regarded their appointment to the command of those vessels with feelings of considerable apprehension. During last summer he met various officers commanding torpedo boats, and so far from there being any feeling of apprehension, these officers had every confidence in the boats they commanded, and there was a general concurrence of opinion that the best thing that could happen to a young officer was to be appointed to the command of one of these torpedo destroyers. That was the view of practical experience which might be set against the theory advanced by the hon. Member The hon. Member for Dundee appeared to agree practically with the views set forth in the Amendment of the hon. Member for West Islington. Various figures were thrown at the House by the mover of that Amendment. He was not able to follow them, but, if he had been so able, he should have agreed with those who said that figures could be made to prove anything. Broadly speaking, the expenditure on the Navy for the present year represented, in the way of insurance, about 2½ per cent. on the whole of the sea-borne commerce of the Empire, or 3½ per cent. on the total sea - borne commerce of the United Kingdom. He had looked up the records of expenditure during the last great naval war, and he found that in 1800, in comparison with our then trade, we were paying about 18 per cent., and in 1814, 28 per cent., which percentages in the present day would be represented by something like £157, 000, 000 and £240, 000, 000 respectively. Everybody agreed that the great lesson to be taken to heart from the South African War was that this Empire depended on its sea power. Even the hon. Member for West Islington admitted that we must have the two-Power standard. But there were other risks than those concerned with commerce against which we had to insure. A war, even if successful, would throw an enormous burden on the country. The Franco-Prussian War was estimated to have cost the two countries engaged £500, 000, 000. It had also to be borne in mind that in a contest for the mastery of the sea with two great naval Powers, even if successful, we should be deprived of a very large portion of our Fleet. But the question had also to be looked at from the point of view of insurance against an unsuccessful war. That was an issue no one cared to contemplate, but if the views of the hon. Member for West Islington prevailed, such a prospect might be opened up. This expenditure was an insurance of our commerce and of our Empire against war of every kind; even against an unsuccessful war; and looked at in that light, it could not be said we were spending too much on the Navy. If it were alleged that too much was being spent on the Army, common ground might possibly be found, but, so far from that being the case with the Navy, he was of opinion that not enough was being spent. He fully agreed as to the necessity for the most careful supervision of every item of expenditure; that was sound doctrine to which exception could not be taken.

The House had been told, in effect, that the Navy now reached the two-Powers standard. That standard had been abandoned by the First Lord of the Admiralty, but, even taking that standard, would the Navy, at the present time, if engaged in a war with, say, France and Russia, be up to it? Numerical equality was not sufficient, we must have a superiority in numbers. According to the Report of the Admirals on the Naval Manoeuvres of 1888, to maintain an effective blockade it was necessary for the blockading ships to be to the ships to be blocked in the proportion of five to three. If our Navy had such a duty to perform, would they be strong enough for it? Further, on the principles laid down in that Report, had we enough responsible officers for the destroyers if such a crisis arose? Those were plain questions. He had perfect confidence in the hon. Gentleman in charge of the Estimates, and would accept Ids reply as accurately representing the situation, but after careful study, he had come to the conclusion that of late years we had not reached the two-Powers standard. That standard had never been arrived at. Therefore he did not hesitate to say that until we had arrived at that standard, we were not spending the amount of money on the Navy which we ought to spend.

Another consideration which he would put before the House was, that, under the new conditions of naval warfare, we could not afford to capture the enemy's vessels, and use them in our own Fleet; neither could we improvise battleships. We would find that, in the next great naval war, we would have to rely upon the ships in our hands at the time we engaged in war. It should also be borne in mind that in nearly all our great naval battles we had had superior numbers on our side. There had been, he was aware, notable exceptions, when we had had some great heaven-born genius to command our Fleet, and that had, in such cases, been sufficient to neutralise the superior numbers on the other side. In considering what was the proper standard, the House must remember that up to the present, England had always had superior numbers, and we must get rid of the notion, once for all, that one Englishman was as good as three foreigners. The extraordinary advance made by Germany in shipbuilding had to be considered. The fact that men of light and leading-in naval administration in Germany regarded as quite within the bounds of possibility, in the distant future, a contest for the commercial supremacy of the world, had to be taken into account, and we must dismiss from our minds the somewhat worn-out doctrine that the two-Powers standard was enough. We could not, in the interests of national safety, leave out of consideration the fact that Germany was building a magnificent Fleet, and her officers and men were undergoing the severest possible training. The time might come, therefore, when Germany might be able to challenge this country's. supremacy of the sea. In those respects he ventured to say that the programme of the Government fell lamentably short of what was expected. The statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty breathed a spirit of reform, and showed that we were marching with the times. Criticisms had been made against the doctrines of the Navy League, but he thought the League could claim credit in one direction at least. What the League urged last year was that the Mediterranean Fleet, upon which the safety of the Empire so largely depended, was not strong enough in battleships, cruisers, and destroyers. What were we told in the First Lord's statement? We were told that the Mediterranean Fleet was to be strengthened. Therefore, so far from the Navy League being convicted of heresy, he thought subsequent events had shown that they were absolutely right.

With regard to promotion to flag rank —looking forward to the enormous responsibilities which would in the future be placed upon those in command of ships, and looking at the hazards of war under present-day conditions — he thought the House would agree with him that we must have younger men, whose nerve had never been shaken, for we ought to have men in the prime of life to command our battleships. He was glad to see that the question of victualling had been referred to in his hon. friend's statement. This was a grievance which had been keenly felt by the men, and it was satisfactory to everybody to know that the hours had been altered, and that they would not, in future, have to go from four in the afternoon to six next morning without something to eat. All those were very necessary reforms, but he wished to know from the Secretary to the Admiralty whether it would not be possible to institute those changes earlier, for by doing this, he would be granting something which every well-wisher of the Navy would like to see. With reference to the appointment of Admiral Fisher, everybody who was acquainted with the career of that officer and who knew his great services during his command of the Mediterranean Fleet, which he improved to a marvellous state of efficiency —everybody who knew his earnestness, and thoroughness, and his devotion to his profession, would feel delighted to hear that that distinguished Admiral was coming straight from the Navy to take part in the administration of the Admiralty.

(5.39.) MR. CAINE (Cornwall, Camborne)

said he did not desire to pose as an expert upon guns and ships, but he took it for granted that our naval architects were as good as any others in the world, and that a ship built in one particular year by this country was as good as another similar ship built in the same year by any other Power. He would take France and Russia, the two likeliest Powers to find themselves operating together in case of a European war. A comparison of the naval forces of Britain with the combined fleets of France and Russia gave the following figures—

Nation. Number. Tonnage Total Tonnage Average
Battleships—Britain 68 798, 000 11, 600
France 35 330, 000 9, 400
Russia 22 236, 000 10, 700
Total, France and Russia combined 57 566, 000 10, 000

That showed that Britain had a margin of eleven battleships over and above the combined fleets of France and Russia. He thought those figures ought to be sufficient to dispel the statement made by the hon. Member for Chester and other hon. Members that Britain was not up to the two-Powers standard. When he came to deal with cruisers, the overwhelming power of Britain was visible at a glance. The figures were—

Number. Tonnage Tonnage
Total Average.
Britain 161 800, 000 5, 000
France and Russia combined 99 500, 000 5, 000

These figures showed a surplus to Britain over both Powers combined of 232, 000 tons of battleships and 300, 000 tons of cruisers. He called that a very respectable advantage, and taking into account the superiority of their ships and their naval strength in other ways he thought Britain was nearer to a three-Powers standard than two. They found the same supremacy as to the personnelof the Navy. Our men had long service—25 years—and in five or six years of that time they might become expert fighters. They could handle a cutlass with anybody and they were handy men for all kinds of duty. As fighting men they were equal to any the world could produce. They were greatly superior to those of the French, Russian, German, or any other Fleet, except, perhaps, the American. Roughly speaking, we had 110, 000 men, France and Russia combined only 70, 000, so that both in point of quality and numbers we were very much better than these two Fleets. There were many other ways of estimating the two and the three - standard Power. For instance, Mr. J. Holt Schooling, who was acknowledged to be a competent statistician, had prepared some careful tables, and, whatever might be thought of his conclusions, they might rely upon his figures and draw their own conclusions. Mr. Schooling took the figures of fighting tonnage given in Government Returns, and discounted them according to the age of the men-of war. His estimate was— The 1895–1899 ships were worth 100 per cent. The 1890–1894 ships were worth 80 per cent. The 1885–1899 ships were worth 60 per cent. The 1802–1884 ships were worth 40 per cent. Before 1880 ships were worth 20 per cent.

If they took these figures and applied that percentage to France and Russia our supremacy was brought out in a stronger manner than in the statement just quoted. Taking the Admiralty returns for 1900 the hon. Member found the following statistics—

Percentage of Total
Tons. tonnage.
Great Britain 821, 605 39.4
France 339, 599 16.3
Russia 262, 912 12.6
Italy 193, 004 9.3
Germany 191, 259 9.2
United States 184, 144 8.8
Japan 92, 420 4.4

After the tonnage had been depreciated on account of the age of the ships the figures were—

Percentage of Total
Tons. Tonnage.
Great Britain 604, 141 38.3
France 220, 635 14.0
Russia 221, 988 14.1
Italy 112, 899 7.1
Germany 152, 929 9.7
United States 176, 708 11.2
Japan 88, 088 5.6

On the basis of these figures we had not only a double-standard but a treble standard power. Our Fleet had a fighting strength equal to that of any three nations that could combine against us. He was very glad that it was so, but on the other side hon. Members sometimes spoke as if they had a monopoly of patriotism. Hon. Members k on the Opposition side were just as desirous of maintaining the Fleet at full strength, in order that it might be ready to take the seas against any combination that could be brought against us. Board of Admiralty after Board of Admiralty for the last twenty years had kept up the wholesome principle of maintaining our Fleet at a point of undoubted supremacy, and he should feel inclined to support any vote of confidence which could by any possibility be brought. He wished to say a word in regard to the percentage in the cruiser class of ships, which he thought were of greater importance age in the cruiser class of ships, which even than the battleships. After the tonnage had been depreciated on account of the age of ships the figures were—

Percentage of Total
Tons. Tonnage.
Great Britain 650, 799 46.5
France 255, 351 18.3
Russia 111, 063 7½9
United States 120, 379 8.6
Japan 103, 141 7.4
Germany 81, 626 5.8
Italy 76, 958 5.5

Our cruisers, therefore, and that of our new ally, Japan, were stronger than the Fleets of all those other nations. To assume a pessimist view of the Navy was a very great mistake. If the actual tons of fighting weight were taken we still came out supreme. The statistics were as follow—

Tons of Fighting Weight, 00 omitted, Taking the Navy of Japan as the Unit of Strength, the Degrees of Strength are:
Great Britain 1, 347 6.38
France 543 2.57
Russia 397 1.88
United States 349 1.65
Germany 282 1.34
Italy 218 1.03
Japan 211 1.00

It would be seen from a mere casual examination that we might possess our souls in patience and confidence. It was clear that Great Britain possessed 100 tons fighting weight to every 70 tons of France, Russia, and Germany combined.

MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER

said it was impossible for him to reply to the many points of great interest which had been raised in the course of the debate until the Speaker left the Chair. He suggested that the Vote might now be taken.

(5. 54.) THE EARL OF DALKEITH (Roxburghshire)

said that although many questions had been raised in relation to the Navy, solutions had not been put before them. He thought they were entitled to rather more information than the Secretary to the Admiralty had given in regard to some of the points raised in previous speeches. He should like to impress on his hon. friend what had already been alluded to, namely, the necessity of giving extra assistance to the Lords of the Admiralty. The First Lord in his statement referred very strongly to the danger of centralisation, and gave some information as to how lie proposed to carry out decentralisation. They would like to know whether it was intended to impose more responsibility on the commanders, and also on those in charge of foreign stations. They wished to know further whether it was intended to increase in any way the Naval Staff of the Admiralty. The Intelligence Department had also been criticised. He should not like to say whether it performed its duties efficiently or not, but certainly it had not a very large staff. It had often been said that the Naval Lords of the Admiralty should have special assistance. He did not think that any one could say that the Intelligence Department was too large for the work it had to do. Referring to the Constructor's Department, the noble Earl expressed his agreement with what had fallen from the hon. and learned Member for Dundee. The development of our Navy had proceeded so enormously, and the number of ships laid down was now so very much larger than before, that the question of salaries should be re-considered. It was more than one man could do to design such a large number of ships, and vet at present that was work for which the Chief Constructor was entirely responsible. He believed there was a certain amount of misapprehension in regard to the Engineering Department. There was no doubt that the boilers and the engines of the Navy had not been entirely satisfactory. That was shown very much in the statement, because, although a large number of boilers had been criticised, and some had been condemned, the First Lord was unable to name any particular boiler which he would recommend as solving the question of what ought to be introduced in future. Dealing with the dissatisfaction prevailing amongst the engineering class of the Navy he said that, without expressing an opinion one way or another on the merits of the complaints, it would be admitted that when so important a branch of the service showed signs of considerable dissatisfaction it might be taken as an indication that the conditions with respect to pay and duty were not such as they should be, or else that the responsible heads of the Admiralty had not properly considered the matters brought before them. He hoped the House would receive an assurance that the Admiralty would do what they could to meet the case of the engineers.

As to the question of personnel, they might assume that the Admirals were too old for the work they had to perform and that it was desirable to have younger men. They were all glad to find that the First Lord intended to do everything he could to improve gunnery as much as possible. There was one way of securing greater efficiency in gunnery in the future than in the past, and that was that the commanders and first lieutenants of ships which had the best gunnery record—rather than the best record for polishing brass—should be selected for promotion. The First Lord had said that in the education of young officers, proficiency in foreign languages required further encouragement. He would suggest that more satisfactory progress might be made in foreign languages if these young officers were relieved of certaim irksome and comparatively needless duties while their ships were in harbour. However excellent the personnel of the Navy might be, that would be of no use unless our ships were up to the mark. He was glad to see that several cruisers and battleships were to be rearmed with heavier guns. He did not know whether that policy was to be carried out in regard to the ships which had been laid down before the present Board took office. The new ship "Monmouthshire, "which was 400 tons larger than the sister ship of the same class, had two guns less, although he admitted that her guns were 7.5 inches instead of 6-inch guns in the latter. On the whole, he thought that the House had every reason to be satisfied with the Navy Estimates and the statements made in exposition of them; but he hoped that when they came to discuss the Estimates in detail the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty would be able to dispel some of the doubts which had arisen in regard to the policy of the Admiralty in the future.

(6.8.) SIR JAMES JOICEY (Durham, Chester-le-Street)

said he welcomed the intervention in the debate of the noble Earl who had just sat down; because he spoke from personal experience in the Navy. He only wished that there had been in the House some naval expert who had been accustomed to deal with modern ships and modern guns, and who could advise the House on many of these questions. He hoped that disadvantage would soon be remedied; and that some naval men, whether Liberal or Conservative—men, for instance, like Lord Charles Beresford or Captain Lambton—would be able to assist them in their deliberations in the House.

He congratulated the Secretary to the Admiralty on the manner in which he had introduced the Estimates. He had noticed for many years his clever and able criticisms on naval affairs from below the gangway, and like many other Members he was glad to find that he was now in a position of responsibility. He was looking forward to some of the fruits of the hon. Gentleman's labours as dictated in his criticisms when below the gangway. He was sorry to say that as a rule, whenever an independent Member got on to the Treasury Bench and became responsible for the work of a Department, the Department, like a huge octopus, wound its arms around him, and practically crushed out his individual view. He trusted that the hon Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty would be able to assert himself and bring his views to bear on the Admiralty with effect. He had listened with great pleasure to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Fife. Although that right hon. Gentleman's criticisms were general, lie believed they were right in every respect. There was not a man on either side of the House who was not anxious to have a strong and powerful Navy, and so far as he had been able to gather the opinion of the locality which he represented —he spoke with regard to Tyneside, which was a great commercial shipbuilding part of the country—he was satisfied that no amount of money would be refused by the country to Government which showed that it was necessary in order to bring the Navy up to the requisite strength to protect the vast interests we had. When he considered the great increase of our territory, the vast increase of our commercial interests in various parts of the world, and, what was more important still, the large increase in the navies of other countries, he thought the country was quite aware that it was absolutely necessary that we should not spare any expense with regard to the Navy. He knew from experience that there had been a good deal of anxiety on this question. One point of anxiety was as to whether our ships were numerous enough and strong enough to keep off any combination likely to be brought against it. He was not an expert on this question, and was quite prepared to leave it to those who had made a study of it and were well able to handle it. But there was another point on which great anxiety had been shown, and that was as to the efficiency of our ships. When they found that after the Royal yacht was launched it was unable to stand upright, it made one think there was something seriously wrong at the Admiralty. Then again, recently'the "Condor" had disappeared, and statements had been made by men who knew perfectly well what they were talking about; that our ships were not sufficiently stable to carry the great weight of guns that the Admiralty were putting upon them. Why had the "Condor" disappeared? They were unable to learn, and it gave some colour to the statements that our ships were not sufficiently stable, and that in case of a severe storm they would be found top-heavy and capsize. Another ship, the "Wasp, "had disappeared in the same way. In our commercial yards co-efficiency had been made greater, whereas in the dockyards co-efficiency had been made less.

With regard to boilers, he did not pretend to be an expert, but he knew something of them as a very large boiler owner both on land and sea, and he confessed that he looked with a great deal of alarm on the present state of things when he found that the Committee appointed to go into the question of boilers stated in its Interim Report that the particular boiler adopted by the Admiralty—the Belleville boiler—was not suitable for our ships. And yet we had had a building programme for five years presented to the House, and the hon. Gentleman had not said a word as to w hat boiler was to be adopted for the new ships. The lion. Gentleman said that the Babcock and Wilcox boilers were to be tried; but were the Government going to continue putting in Belleville boilers which had been condemned by a Committee appointed by this House? He could not understand why they had had no Report from the Boilers Committee in order to help the House to form a right opin on upon this subject. He wished to know whether that Committee had reported, and if so, why had the Report not been laid upon the Table. Surely, when they were dealing with a, question involving the expenditure of millions of pounds, the House had a right to every information upon the subject. Had the Government come to the conclusion that the Babcock and Wilcox boiler was suitable for our ships or not? He should like to have an answer to that point. Surely, if a certain boiler had been condemned, it was best when building new vessels to put in such boilers as we had tested and known for years to be suitable for the Navy. Commercial men were very much alive to their own interests, but had we seen any large development in our mercantile vessels of either the Belleville or the Babcock and Wilcox boiler? They did not see commercial gentlemen ordering for their vessels of great speed and size such boilers as these. What was the reason? Was it that the Admiralty alone were able to judge what a good boiler was? It was a very serious matter; and he was very anxious before they went any further into this large expenditure that they should have the Report of this Committee in order to give them some guidance upon this question.

He was very glad to hear that the Admiralty were taking the advice of his hon. friend the Member for Gateshead, and were putting heavier guns upon their ships. That was a very good thing, provided their ships were capable of bearing the extra weight, but the House must not forget this fact—that those ships were not designed for heavier guns than they possessed at the present time, and he wished to know why heavier guns were not provided when the ships were built if it was considered safe to put them on board. He was afraid that heavier guns would be likely to make them top-heavy, and he asked the Admiralty to be very careful in putting this additional weight upon the ships. It was all very well to satisfy the demands of this House by putting on heavier guns, but he wished to be satisfied upon the point that the ships upon which they were putting those guns would be as capable of being properly managed in a rough sea as they would be with a less burden upon them. Those were questions which he should like the Secretary to the Admiralty to answer. The hon. Member opposite had stated that the only test for the Navy was a test of war, and he hoped such a test would never take place. He differed from his hon. friend altogether upon that point. Tests in the Navy were common enough, for it was easy to test them in heavy seas to see whether they could fire their guns with some degree of accuracy, and whether the ships were adapted to the purpose for which they were intended. They could test ships pretty accurately without having a war. He knew that war opened their eyes upon many questions, but he repudiated the idea that vessels could not be thoroughly tested to see that they were capable of doing what was expected of them in a state of war. The statement made by the hon. Member for Devonport rather alarmed him when he said that it was not the intention to test these vessels. Surely that could not be correct, because such a course would not be adopted by any commercial firm. They must test their ships before they were actually required for warfare.

Referring to Sir William White, he denied that in the remarks which he made last session about the Royal yacht he had intended any personal attack upon the late Chief Constructor. He did not then know who was responsible, and lie was glad to find that Sir William White was not personally responsible. He thought, however, it was unwise to put the whole responsibility for the designs of our ships on one pair of shoulders. This was not done in other countries, and surely we had enough shipbuilding capacity in this country to make up a board of supervision or inspection which would be useful to guide the Admiralty in coming to a decision. Had it come to this, that the safety-of this country and the stability of our vessels and our power to command the seas were to depend upon one man, and that man very poorly paid for a position of such responsibility? He knew something about commercial salaries, and, considering the vast responsibilities put upon their Chief Constructor of the Navy, it was a perfect scandal to pay him such a mean and contemptible sum as that which he received from the Government. A man who came to a position of this kind from some of our leading private shipyards should not be called upon to make such a great personal sacrifice. Such treatment prevented the country getting the best men, for how could we expect a man to come to work for the Admiralty at less salary than he was getting in other large shipbuilding yards? He hoped that the present Chief Constructor would be paid a salary which was commensurate with his ability and responsibility.

He was very glad to hear the Secretary to the Admiralty state that there was going to be some improvement with regard to the food of our sailors. As a matter of policy it seemed a very strange thing that at a time when we had such difficulty in getting competent sailors, and when other countries were giving large bounties to mercantile ships to train sailors for the Navy, that this country should be stinting British sailors in their food. He would have thought that that would have been the first thing the Admiralty would have looked after, and he was surprised that it was even considered necessary that they should have to go into that question. If we wanted men for, the Navy, we must not only pay them I well, hut we must also make the conditions of their life as comfortable as possible. He was very glad that the Government were now beginning to realise their responsibility in this matter. He also understood that something was going to be done for the mechanical engineers, and it was a very extraordinary thing that something had not been done before. Great changes had come over the methods of manipulating ships, and one was very much surprised to find that the mechanical engineer had not had more consideration. Unless our ships were well manned with engineers they would be practically useless, and he asked the Admiralty to consider this matter very carefully. He wished to know if the Government were going to do anything to make the position of mechanical engineers better on board ship. He thought they ought to take higher rank, and lie could not understand why mechanical engineers should have any lower rank than the gentlemen who sailed our ships. If these men were competent to do the work he would find no fault with them, but he thought it was wise to improve the position of the mechanical engineers in order to draw into their ranks capable workmen with not only a practical but a scientific training. He was sure that if the Government did this it would be found to be greatly in the interests of the Navy. He repudiated in the strongest terms any suggestion that hon. Members sitting on those Benches were not as anxious to see a strong Navy as lion. Members sitting in any other part of the House, and lie was certain that whatever demands might be made by the Government for money, either to build ships or supply more men and guns which were considered to be necessary for the safety of this great Empire, the House would readily vote all that was asked for.

(6.30.) MR. MACDONA (Southwark, Rotherhithe)

drew attention to the fact that the wants of the Navy with regard to men might be, to a large extent, supplied from the watermen and lighter-men working on the Thames. Many of these men were sailors, and used to navigating their barges across the Channel to Boulogne and other places, and, in his opinion, they ought to be utilised. In May last a large number of them gathered together and offered to volunteer to protect the Port of London if they were treated in the same manner as other men of their class in the other ports of the Kingdom, but strangely enough the Port of London had been excluded from the privileges conceded to other ports. These men were trained to this life and had been working on the river for generations past, and the knowledge they had acquired of every nook and cranny of the river was historical. It was only common sense that these men should be utilised, and the Government had the opportunity to use them. One of the disused men-of-war now lying at Portsmouth, anchored off London Bridge, and used as a training ship, and another one or two anchored lower down the river to serve as a home of rest for these men and for sailors coming home from abroad, would not only tend to make the Navy more popular, but tend to give it a good supply of the class of men it so badly needed.

MR. POWER (Waterford, E.)

said that during the time he had been in the House he had seen all the Estimates rise enormously, the Navy Estimates among the rest. It was not many years ago since the Navy adopted the standard of a fleet equal to that of two other Powers, but he noticed that they were not now satisfied with that standard, because according to the figures they were now trying to exceed the naval strength of any three Powers. Many hon. Gentlemen favoured the naval expenditure from a British point of view, but he could not look at it from a British point of view. No doubt from the British point of view it was necessary to vote this large expenditure, bemuse for the protection of the commerce of Great Britain it was necessary that she should remain master of the sea, but from the Irish point of view there was little force in that contention. It had been truly said that this expenditure was, to some extent, an insurance fee for the safe transit of goods, and he knew that the bulk of British trade was large, and that the money paid for the Navy only came to a small percentage on the amount of trade, hut, if the people were to be charged in these Navy Estimates, who derived the advantages given by the Navy? He failed to see why the Colonies should not be called upon to pay a share. Ireland had no trade to protect—England had taken good care that she should have none, because she killed the trade of Ireland by her laws, and her commerce by differential treaties. Ireland was called upon to pay largely in excess of the amount she ought to pay, and he thought in this matter she had been wrongly treated. But he rose principally to call attention to the way Ireland was treated in a matter that might be of small importance to this country, but of great importance to Ireland herself. Again and again he had pressed the Chief Secretary for Ireland to apply to the Admiralty for a few small gunboats to protect the Irish fisheries. The Admiralty had steadily refused to grant that request. They hid ships to send abroad, but none to protect the few industries left to Ireland. What had been done in the case of Scotland? The Scotch Fisheries Board had boats of their own, but in addition to those the Admiralty had placed three gunboats at their disposal to patrol the coast to endeavour to preserve the fisheries from the harm the steam trawlers did. Twelve years ago a Bill was passed, which prevented steam trawlers coming to the coast of Scotland, and consequently the trawlers had now gone to Ireland. All sorts of promises had been made by various Chief Secretaries of Ireland upon this matter, but they had all been forgotten, and he now wanted to know what the Admiralty were going to do. They were asking no favour of the Admiralty; making no ad misericordiam appeal. They only asked in this matter to be treated like other parts of the Empire. As things stood, they had to pay too large a proportion of the Naval Vote, and in return got no benefit at all. The Admiralty was pledged in this matter, yet for the last 14 years they had left the coasts of Ireland without any protection whatever, with the net result that the fisheries, which were fairly prosperous in the past, were in a dreadful condition, whilst in many places rod fishing had been destroyed altogether. He hoped the hon. Gentleman would be able to give a satisfactory reply to his appeal.

(6.45.) SIR FORTESCIJE FLANNERY (Yorkshire, Shipley)

thought the hon. Gentleman in charge of the Estimates had no reason to complain of the manner in which the debate had been conducted, for, although one or two local matters had been introduced, the discussion had, in the main, been confined to the broad questions of Naval sufficiency. The hon. Member for Dundee—whose speeches were of some importance in these debates, as he was the only representative of the Naval administration of the last Government—had asked how far the alliance with Japan had affected the Naval programme for the present year. He ventured to say that any Government which allowed its programme to be reduced by a single ship or a single man because of an agreement extending over five years would be worthy of the severest blame. Whatever might be the reply of the Admiralty to those who had complained of the smallness of the present programme, he felt sure the Japanese treaty would have nothing to do with it. The hon. Member for Dundee had also repeated his colourless criticism of last year as to the sufficiency of the Estimates. He had asked this year, as last, whether the Estimates were sufficient or excessive, and he had pointed this year, as last, to the remarkable growth of the Estimates as compared with ten years ago, but he had not ventured, nor did he last year, to allege that the Estimates were excessive.

He desired in the most emphatic manner to associate himself with what had been said as to the clearness and lucidity with which the Secretary to the Admiralty had introduced the Estimates, and he believed that the same spirit of independent criticism and energy which the hon. Gentleman had previously displayed would continue to actuate him, notwithstanding the trammels of officialism to which he was now subjected. The Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty had been referred to in very uncomplimentary terms, but those criticisms, he believed, were of no importance whatever. In common with many other Members, he had read and studied that Statement most carefully, and found in it evidence of mastery of detail, of an earnest desire to understand the whole of the matters for which the noble Lord was responsible, and a clear indication that he was anxious for the advancement and improvement of every detail of the Navy under his care.

The debate had been made remarkable by the speeches of the right hon. Gentleman for East Fife and the hon. Member for Haddingtonshire. Those gentlemen had declared themselves in favour of a strong Navy. That apparently was the first declaration of the new Party, and the first writing on the clean slate. If ever there was justification of full debate in the House and of agitation outside, it was to be found in the present Estimates looked at in the light of the complaints made a year ago. No less than seven particular faults then found in regard to the Mediterranean Fleet had been remedied, or a promise given that they should be. There were to be distilling ships, hospital ships, repairing ships, training ships, depot ships, a torpedo base for destroyers, and no less than 24 destroyers added to the Mediterranean Fleet. In fact, substantially all the demands as regarded that Fleet, based on the highest authority, had been met or satisfaction promised.

The broad question with which the House had to deal in the present debate was whether sufficient naval preparation for safety was being made. The Secretary to the Admiralty had said that there were 49 ships put into the water during the current year, and then went on to say there were GO in the building, and 27 to be added under the Estimates now introduced, making altogether 87 ships that would be under construction in the coming financial year. That was a large sounding statement. If it went forth officially to the country that 87 ships were to be under construction, what possible chance could there be for the suggestion that sufficient naval preparations were not contemplated by the Government? But the 49 ships put into the water were again mentioned amongst the 87.

MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER

said the hon. Member was quite mistaken. He spoke of the ships that were completed or would be completed during the present financial year, and he spoke of them quite apart from the ships that would be under construction next year.

SIR FORTESCUE FLANNERY

said that of course he accepted his hon. friend's correction, but he supposed he would not allege that those 49 ships were finished and that none of them would appear in the 87 ships.

MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER

I should have said ships that would be or have been completed.

SIR FORTESCUE FLANNERY

said if that was so it was pleasing to find that the programme on that point was so much larger than would appear from the way the numbers were set forth in his hon. friend's speech. But there was yet another point. How many of those forty - nine and eighty-seven ships were ships of a large class, and how many were destroyers? He suggested that at least thirty-nine of the vessels named were destroyers, and, without in the least degree desiring to undervalue the importance of destroyers, he would point out that any statement, to be regarded as fairly setting forth the details of naval preparations, should distinguish between vessels of large size and destroyers.

MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER

said the hon. Member would find all the details in the First Lord's Statement.

SIR FORTESCUE FLANNERY

said he found them in the Statement, and also in the Navy Estimates, but when it was stated that so many vessels were under construction, the House, or those Members who did not read the Navy Estimates, should not be allowed to suppose that battleships and destroyers had the same value; and they should not be lumped together without any classification. There ought to be a distinction between battleships and destroyers in the enumeration. A battleship took four years to build; a destroyer could be built in a year, or even in nine or ten months. A battleship cost £1, 000, 000; a destroyer cost perhaps £80, 000. In time of emergency or stress a destroyer might be built, even after the outbreak of war, in time to be of use, but to do the same with a battleship was impossible. How many battleships in the present Navy Estimates had been added to the fleet? The First Lord's Statement said that it was not so much the date on which the ships were commenced, as the date on winch they were completed and ready for commission that was important. It was for that reason that he ventured to draw so broad a distinction between small vessels completed, and large vessels which would not be completed for three or four years. He complained of these Estimates as being insufficient, because they did not attempt to bring up the admitted leeway of new construction in past years. Lord Rosebery admitted that in 1897, 1898, and 1899 there had been very serious deficiencies in construction. He did not think he was exaggerating those deficiencies when he said that for those years they amounted to something like £4, 000, 000. It was not suggested that anything like that additional amount had been provided for new construction in the present Estimates. The First Lord of the Admiralty, in his Statement, suggested that the difficulty of finding and training the best officers and men limited the rate at which new construction could proceed. The late First Lord of the Admiralty limited new construction on the ground that it was physically impossible to push on faster with the ships, and the present First Lord now suggested that he could not get the men and officers for the ships, even if he built them faster. It seemed to him that there would be no difficulty in finding the most highly trained men and officers for the Navy if the ships were ready for them, and the suggestion that they should in any way reduce the speed of the construction of ships out of regard for the difficulties of training officers and men, was one which he thought would not commend itself to the House or to the country generally.

He had analysed the rate at which ships had been added to the Navy during past years. According to his calculation, in the financial year which was just closing, five battleships, six cruisers, and thirty-seven smaller craft had been added to the Fleet, and it was estimated that five battleships, seven cruisers, six smaller craft, and ten destroyers, would be added to the fleet in the coming financial year. Reference had been made to Germany, and there had been an important debate upon naval affairs in the German Parliament. In Germany a great amount of excitement had arisen over the publication of a confidential document which disclosed a naval expansion which was never dreamt of in this country. That document disclosed that it was the intention of the German Government in future to supply to the German Navy two battleships and four cruisers each year up to the year 1910. Then they saw the United States adopting an entirely new policy as regarded the Mercantile Marine and the American Navy. It was a matter of very grave concern to this country that so many of our mercantile fleets were being bought up by United States capitalists. This was part and parcel of an entirely fresh policy which was being adopted by America, and which was increasing the importance of the American Navy. The whole position of matters had changed as compared with the time when the two-Power-standard was set up in regard to France and Germany, and still more in regard to Germany and the United States, and he ventured to say that the safety of the country was not sufficiently provided for, unless we extended the two-Power-standard and made it nearly, if not quite, a three-Power-standard. His hon. friend seemed to half promise that something of this kind might be done in the Supplementary Estimate, and he hoped that the expressions of opinion which had come from both sides of the House would have the effect of pushing on those Supplementary Estimates, so that they might be brought before the House at an early date. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Fife had made his declaration, and so had the hon. Member for Haddingtonshire and the right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean, and it was perfectly evident that there was a large section of hon. Members opposite, as well as hon. Members on this side of the House, whose profound conviction was that we must enlarge our naval preparations if this country was to be considered safe. There were many other subjects which had been touched upon in the debate, but there would be further opportunities of discussing them. There were the questions of scouts and destroyers, the final completion of vessels in the contractors' yards, the new system of designing ships by contractors instead of being designed at the Admiralty, and the lamentable retirement of Sir William White, and the appointment of his successor. There was the question of the new type of water-tube boiler which was being adopted, and also the important question of the engineers. All those matters were waiting to be dealt with, and he did not doubt that they would be dealt with thoroughly in Committee.

(7. 15.) MR. THOMAS O'DONNELL (Kerry, W.)

said he could quite understand why English Members were anxious to increase the strength of the Navy and why they were anxious to have a larger amount of money spent upon building war vessels. In Ireland, however, they had not the same interests in such expenditure. The House was now asked to vote a sum of £30, 000, 000 for the Navy, and Ireland would be asked to contribute something like £3, 000, 000 to that sum. He wished to know what Ireland was going to get in return for that sum of money, for £3, 000, 000 was a large amount for a poor country like Ireland to contribute towards the Navy. They had a right to ask what Ireland would get in return in. the shape of protection to her commerce or in satisfying the very moderate demands which had been made by his hon. and learned friend the Member for Waterford. Every man who knew Irish history knew that Ireland possessed a good trade before its connection with England, but that trade had now been destroyed, and consequently the Navy was absolutely useless to Ireland. A demand was made last year by the Irish representatives, and that demand had been repeated this year, that the Admiralty should send in return for the money contributed by Ireland to the Navy two or three ships to protect the Irish fisheries along the sea coast. Last year they got a promise from the Chief Secretary for Ireland that he would use his influence in this direction with the Admiralty. Some vessels had been sent to the Scotch coast to protect the fisheries there from foreign trawlers, but in Ireland no vessels had been sent for this purpose. The only vessels which were protecting the fisheries were those sent, paid for and equipped by the Irish Board, and they were paid for out of Irish money. Therefore he could not see what advantage Naval expenditure could be to Ireland, for their trade and commerce was now absolutely non-existent. Canada and Australia, which had a large and ever increasing commerce all over the world, were protected by the British Navy, but they were never asked to contribute a penny towards the expenditure which was yearly laid out on the Navy. On the other hand, Ireland, a poor country, whose poverty was caused by the action of the British Government, was asked to contribute not alone an equal and fair share, but according to British experts enormously beyond what ought to be its share. The Irish people were told to consider the great advantage it was for a poor country to be linked with a rich a rid powerful country. They knew what the advantage was.

MR. SPEAKER

The question before the House only covers matters relative to the Navy Estimates.

MR. THOMAS O'DONNELL

said he was simply reasoning as to what the advantage of the Estimates would be to Ireland.

MR. SPEAKER

The hon. Member is considering the financial relations between Ireland and England, which is not in order.

MR. THOMAS O'DONNELL

said he would pass on to the next subject. A few days ago they discussed the treatment meted out to the chaplains in the Navy. He did not intend to go into that at present. The efficiency of the Navy considerably depended on the class of men they got to enter the Navy. When Irishmen knew the treatment they were to receive when they entered the Navy, and when they further knew that the moderate demands Irishmen made from these Benches were not listened to, he hoped that instead of spending their genius and energy in the Navy they would find some more honourable and patriotic employment.

MR. DAVID MCIVER (Liverpool Kirkdale)

said he wished most strongly to urge the desirability of a close relationship and good feeling between the Royal Navy and the higher branches of the mercantile marine. He regarded as a worthy scheme what was sketched out in Lord Selborne's statement in regard to shipbuilding. In busy times it took three or four years to produce a war ship, though in times like the present it could probably done in a shorter period. He had seen a good deal on board ships both of officers and men, and he could state that whether we took the naval officers or the bluejackets there were no finer men in existence. He did not regard Lord Selborne's scheme as quite adequate in regard to the future policy for the training of officers and sailors. While other nations of the world believed in the usefulness of destroyers, he did not think it was our duty to build battleships and destroyers too. He looked with a great deal of doubt on the power of the Navy being able to accomplish all that was claimed for it. He doubted, for example, whether the ships of the Navy would be able to protect convoys laden with grain intended for home ports, for in his judgment our mercantile traders were better sea-going ships than those of the Navy. He did not think we were right in placing too much reliance on the Royal Naval Reserve. He was far from saying that there should be no reliance placed upon it, but if the men were wanted we should find many of them at the other side of the world. It was a very good system, but we ought not to expect to get so much out of it as many people expected. He believed the naval volunteers would be of real value for the purposes of defence. He called attention to the fact that foreign nations, especially Germany, maintained a very close association between their Mercantile Marine and Navy. The German Government encouraged the building and the use of very fast vessels, and such vessels as the "Deutschland" were far more useful than torpedo-destroyers. This country ought to do more to encourage our great mail companies by placing them in the possession of as much revenue as similar companies in Germany enjoyed from their Government.

(7. 25.) THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Sir M. HICKS BEACH, Bristol, W.)

I would appeal to hon. Members to allow the discussion to close and to permit the Speaker to leave the Chair. The discussion began on Friday, when a division was taken upon what may be called the main principle of the Estimates, and it has been continued for several hours this evening. My hon. friend desires to reply to many of the criticisms which have been made, but he cannot do so until the opportunity is afforded in Committee on Vote A.

MR. NANNETTI (Dublin, College Green)

rose to continue the discussion, when

*SIR M. HICKS BEACH

rose in his place, and claimed to move, "That the Question be now put. "

Question put, "That the Question be now put. "

The House divided:—Ayes, 179; Noes, 95. (Division List No.43.)

AYES.
Acland-Hood, Capt. Sir Alex. F Fergusson, Rt. Hn. Sir J. (Manc'r More, Robt. Jasper (Shropshire)
Anson, Sir William Reynell Finch, George H. Morgan, David, J. (W'lthamstow
Arnold-Forster, Hugh O. Fisher, William Hayes Morrell, George Herbert
Atkinson, Rt. Hon. John Fitzroy, Hon. Edward Algernon Morrison, James Archibald
Bagot, Capt. Josceline FitzRoy Flannery, Sir Fortescue Morton, Arthur H. A. (Deptford
Bailey, James (Walworth) Foster, PhilipS. Warwick, S. W. Murray, Rt. Hn. A. Graham(B'te
Bain, Colonel James Robert Galloway, William Johnson Nicol, Donald Ninian
Baird, John George Alexander Gardner, Ernest Pemberton, John S. G.
Balfour, Capt. C. B. (Hornsey) Gibbs, Hn. A. G. H(City of Lond. Penn, John
Balfour, Rt. Hn. Ger. W. (Leeds Godson, Sir Augustus Frederick Platt-Higgins, Frederick
Banbury, Frederick George Gordon, Hn. J. E. (Elgin & Nairn Plummer, Walter R.
Beach, Rt. Hn. Sir Michael Hicks Gore, Hn. G. R. C. O'msby-(Salop Powell, Sir Francis Sharp
Bignold, Arthur Gorst, Rt. Hon. Sir John Eldon Pretyman, Ernest George
Bigwood, James Goulding, Edward Alfred Pryce-Jones, Lt. -Col. Edward
Blundell, Colonel Henry Greene, Sir E. W. (B'ryS. Edm'ds Purvis, Robert
Boscawen, Arthur Griffith- Gretton, John Pym, C. Guy
Bousfield, William Robert Hare, Thomas Leigh Rankin, Sir James
Bowles, Capt. H. F. (Middlesex Harris, Frederick Leverton Rasch, Major Frederic Carne
Brodrick, Rt. Hon. St. John Haslam, Sir Alfred S. Reid, James (Greenock)
Brookfield, Colonel Montagu Haslett, Sir James Horner Renwick, George
Bull, William James Hatch, Ernest Frederick Geo. Ridley, Hon. M. W. (Stalybri'ge
Butcher, John George Heath, Arthur Howard(Hanley Ritchie, Rt. Hon. C. Thomson
Carson, Rt. Hon. Sir Edward. H. Heath, James (Staffords. N. W. Robertson, Herbert (Hackney)
Cautley, Henry Strother Heaton, John Henniker Rolleston, Sir John F. L.
Cavendish, R. F. (N. Lancs.) Henderson, Alexander Ropner, Colonel Robert
Cavendish, V. C. W. (Derbyshire Hoare, Sir Samuel Royds, Clement Molyneux
Cecil, Evelyn (Ashton Manor) Hogg, Lindsay Russell, T. W.
Cecil, Lord Hugh (Greenwich) Hope, J. F. (Sheffield, Brightside Sackville, Col. S. G. Stopford-
Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. J. (Birm. Hornby, Sip William Henry Sassoon, Sir Edward Albert
Chamberlain, J. Austen (Wore'r Hoult, Joseph Sharpe, William Edward T.
Chaplin, Rt. Hon. Henry Houston, Robert Paterson Shaw-Stewart, M. H. (Renfrew
Chapman, Edward Hozier, Hon. James Henry Cecil Smith, Abel H. (Hertford, E.
Charrington, Spencer Hudson, George Bickersteth Smith, JamesParker (Lanarks.
Churchill, Winston Spencer Jackson, Rt. Hon. Wm. Lawies Smith, Hon. W. F. D (Strand)
Clare, Octavius Leigh Jessel, Captain Herbert Merton Spear, John Ward
Coghill, Douglas Harry Johnston, William (Belfast) Stanley, Hn. Arthur(Ormskirk
Cohen, Benjamin Louis Keswick, William Stanley, Edward J. (Somerset)
Collings, Rt. Hon. Jesse King, Sir Henry Seymour Stanley, Lord (Lancs.)
Colomb, Sir John Charles Ready Knowles, Lees Stock, James Henry
Colston, Chas. Edw. H. Athole Lambton, Hon. Frederick Wm. Stone, Sir Benjamin
Compton, Lord Alwyne Lawrence, Wm. F. (Liverpool) Stroyan, john
Corbett, A Cameron (Glasgow) Lawson, John Grant Talbot, Lord E. (Chichester)
Corbett, T. L. (Down, North) Lee, Arthur H. (Hants., Fareh'm Talbot, Rt. Hn. J. G. (Oxf'd Univ
Cox, Irwin Edward Bainbridge Legge, Col. Hon. Heneage Thornton, Percy M.
Cross, Alexander (Glasgow) Leveson-Gower, Frederick N. S. Tomlinson, W. Ed. Murray,
Cross, Herb. Shepherd (Bolton) Lockwood, Lt. -Col. A. R. Tritton, Charles Ernest
Crossley, Sir Savile Long, Col. Charles W. (Evesham Wanklyn, James Leslie
Dalkeith, Earl of Lonsdale, John Brownlee Warr, Augustus Frederick
Dalrymple, Sir Charles Lowe, Francis William Wason, JohnCathcart(Orkney)
Davies, Sir HoratioD. (Chatham Lucas, Col. Francis (Lowestoft) Whitely, H. (Ashton-und. -Lyne
Denny, Colonel Lucas, ReginaldJ. (Portsmouth Wilson, John (Falkirk)
Dickson-Poynder, Sir John P. Lyttelton, Hon. Alfred Wilson, John (Glasgow)
Doughty, George Macdona, John Cumming Wodehouse, Rt. Hn. E. R. (Bath
Douglas, Rt. Hon. A. Akers- MacIver, David (Liverpool) Wortley, Rt. Hon. C. B. Stuart-
Duke, Henry Edward Majendie, James A. H. Wylie, Alexander
Durning-Lawrence, Sir Edwin Manners, Lord Cecil Wyndham, Rt. Hon. George
Dyke, Rt. Hon. Sir William Hart Massey-Mainwaring, Hn. W. F. Yerburgh, Robert Armstrong
Egerton, Hon. A. de Tatton Maxwell, W. J. H. (D'mfri'sshire
Elliot, Hon. A. Ralph Douglas Molesworth, Sir Lewis TELLERS FOR THE AYES—
Fardell, Sir T. George Montagu, G. (Huntingdon) Sir William Walrond and
Fellowes, Hon. AilwynEdward Moore, William (Antrim, N.) Mr. Anstruther.
NOES.
Abraham, William(Cork, N. E.) Campbell-Bannerman, Sir H. Delany, William
Ambrose, Robert Causton, Richard Knight Dewar, John A. (Inverness-sh.
Bell, Richard Channing, Francis Allston Dillon, John
Blake, Edward Craig, Robert Hunter Doogan, P. C.
Boland, John Crean, Eugene Douglas, Charles M. (Lanark)
Broadhurst, Henry Cremer, William Randal Farquharson, Dr. Robert
Caine, William Sproston Cullinan, J. Ferquson, R. C. Munroe (Leith)
Caldwell, James Dalziel, James Henry Ffrench, Peter
Campbell, John (Armagh, S.) Davies, Alfred (Carmarthen) Field, William
Flynn, James Christopher Murphy, John Rickett, J. Compton
Gilhooly, James Nannetti, Joseph P. Roberts, John Bryn (Eifion)
Goddard, Daniel Ford Newnes, Sir George Roberts, John H. (Denbighs.)
Grey, Sir Edward (Berwick) Nolan, Col. John P. (Galway, N Runciman, Walter
Hardie, J. Keir (MerthyrTydvil Nolan, Joseph(Louth, South) Shaw, Thomas (Hawick B.)
Harmsworth, R. Leicester Norton, Capt. Cecil William Sheehan, Daniel Daniel
Hayne, Rt. Hon. Charles Seale- Nussey, Thomas Willans Sinclair, John (Forfarshire)
Hemphill, Rt. Hon. C. H. O'Brien, James F. X. (Cork) Spencer, Rt. Hon. C. R. (NHants
Hobhouse, C. E. H. (Bristol, E.) O'Brien, Kendal (Tipperary, M. Stevenson, Francis S.
Joicey, Sir James O'Brien, Patrick (Kilkenny) Strachey, Sir Edward
Joyce, Michael O'Brien, P.4. (Tipperary, N.) Sullivan, Donal
Kearley, Hudson E. O'Connor, James (Wicklow, W Thomas, DavidAlfred(Merthyr
Leyland-Barratt, Francis O'Connor, T. P. (Liverpool) Thomas, F. Freeman-(Hastings)
Levy, Maurice O'Donnell, T. (Kerry, W.) Thomson, F. W. (York, W. R.)
Lewis, John Herbert O'Kelly, James(Roscommon, N. Walton, JohnLawson, Leeds, S
Lundon, W. O'Malley, William Warner, Thomas Courtenay T.
MacDonnell, Dr. Mark A. O'Shaughnessy, P. J. White, Luke, (York, E. R.)
M'Arthur, William (Cornwall) Pease, J. A. (Saffron Walden) Wilson, Henry J. (York, W. R.
M'Govern, T. Pickard, Benjamin Wilson, John (Durham, Mid.)
M'Hugh, Patrick A. Power, Patrick Joseph Young, Samuel
M'Killop, W. (Sligo, N.) Price, Robert John
Mooney, John J. Rea, Russell TELLERS FOR TILE NOES—
Morgan, J. Lloyd(Carmarthen) Reddy, M. Sir Thomas Esmonde and
Moulton, J. Fletcher Redmond, John E. (Waterford Captain Donelan.

(7.38.) Main Question put accordingly.

The House divided:—Ayes, 223; Noes, 51. (Division List No.44.)

AYES.
Acland-Hood, Capt. Sir Alex. F. Cohen, Benjamin Louis Gore, Hn. G. R C Ormsby-(Salop
Allan, William (Gateshead) Collings, Rt. Hon. Jesse Gorst, Rt. Hn. Sir John Eldon
Anson, Sir William Reynell Colomb, Sir John Chas. Ready Goulding, Edward Alfred
Arnold-Forster, Hugh O. Colston, Chas. Edwd. H. Athole Greene, Sir EW(BurySEdin'nds
Atkinson, Rt. Hon. John Compton, Lord Alwyne Gretton, John
Bagot, Capt. Josceline FitzRoy Corbett, A. Cameron (Glasgow) Grey, Sir Edward (Berwick)
Bailey, James (Walworth) Corbett, T. L. (Down, North) Hare, Thomas Leigh
Bain, Colonel James Robert Cox, Irwin Edward Bainbridge Harmsworth, R. Leicester
Baird, John George Alexander Craig, Robert Hunter Harris, Frederick Leverton
Balfour, Capt. C. B. (Hornsey) Cross, Alexander (Glasgow) Haslam, Sir Alfred S.
Balfour, Rt. HnGerald W (Leeds Cross, Herb. Shepherd (Bolton Haslett, Sir James Horner
Banbury, Frederick George Crossley, Sir Savile Hatch, Ernest Frederick Geo.
Beach, Rt. Hn Sir MichaelHicks Dalkeith, Earl of Hayne, Rt. Hon. Charles Seale-
Bell, Richard Dalrymple, Sir Charles Heath, Arthur Howard(Hanley
Bignold, Arthur Dalziel, James Henry Heath, James(Staffords, N. W.)
Bigwood, James Davies, Alfred (Carmarthen) Heaton, John Henniker
Blundell, Colonel Henry Davies, Sir Horatio D. (Chath'm Hemphill, Rt. Hon. Charles H.
Boscawen, Arthur Griffith Denny, Colonel Henderson, Alexander
Bousfield, William Robert Dewar, John A. (Inverness-sh. Hoare, Sir Samuel
Bowles, Capt. H. F. (Middlesex) Dilke, Rt. Hon. Sir Charles Hobhouse, C. E. H. (Bristol, E.)
Brodrick, Rt. Hn. St. John Doughty, George Hogg, Lindsay
Brookfield, Colonel Montagu Douglas, Rt. Hn. A. Akers- Hope, J. F. (Sheffield, Brightside
Brown, George M. (Edinburgh) Douglas, Charles M. (Lanark) Hornby, Sir William Henry
Bull, William James Duke, Henry Edward Hoult, Joseph
Butcher, John George Durning-Lawrence, Sir Edwin Houston, Robert Paterson
Caldwell, James Dyke, Rt. Hn. Sir Wm. Hart Hozier, Hn. James Henry Cecil
Campbell-Bannerman, Sir H. Egerton, Hon. A. de Tatton Hudson, George Bickersteth
Carson, Rt. Hn. Sir Edwd. H. Fardell, Sir T. George Jackson, Rt. Hon. Wm. Lawies
Causton, Richard Knight Farquharson, Dr. Robert Jessel, Captain Herbert Merton
Cautley, Henry Strother Fellowes, Hn. Ailwyn Edward Johnston, William (Belfast)
Cavendish, R. F. (N. Lancs.) Ferguson, R. C. Munro (Leith) Joicey, Sir James
Cavendish, V. C. W. (Derbyshire Fergusson, Rt. Hn. Sir J(Manc'r Keswick, William
Cecil, Evelyn (Aston Manor) Finch, George H. King, Sir Henry Seymour
Cecil, Lord Hugh (Greenwich) Fisher, William Hayes Knowles, Lees
Chamberlain. Rt. Hn. J. (Birm. Fitzroy, Hn. Edward Algernon Lambton, Frederick Wm.
Chamberlain J. Austen(Wore'r Flannery, Sir Fortescue Lawrence, Wm. F. (Liverpool)
Channing, Francis Allston Foster, PhilipS. (Warwick, S. W Lawson, john Grant
Chaplin, Rt. Hon. Henry Galloway, William Johnson Leyland-Barratt, Francis
Chapman, Edward Gardner, Ernest Lee, ArthurH (Hants., Fareham
Charrington, Spencer Gibbs, Hn. A. G. H. (CityofLond Legge, Col. Hon. Heneage
Churchill, Winston Spencer Goddard, Daniel Ford Leveson-Gower, Frederick N. S
Clare, Octavius Leigh Godson, Sir Augustus Fred'rick Levy, Maurice
Coghill, Douglas Harry Gordon, Hu. J. E. (Elgin&Nairn) Lewis, John Herbert
Lockwood, Lieut.-Col. A. R. Price, Robert John Stevenson, Francis S.
Long. Col. CharlesW, (Evesham Pryce-Jones, Lt. -Col. Edward Stock, James Henry
Lonsdale, John Brownlee Purvis, Robert Stone, Sir Benjamin
Lowe, Francis William Pym, C. Guy Strachey, Sir Edward
Lucas, Col. Francis (Lowestoft) Rankin, Sir James Stroyan, John
Lucas, Reginald J. (Portsmouth Rasch, Major Frederic Carne Talbot, Lord E. (Chichester)
Lyttelton, Hon. Alfred Rea, Russell Talbot, Rt. Hn. J. G(Oxf'dliniv.
Macdona, John Cumming Reid, James (Greenock) Thomas, Alfred (Glamorgan, K)
MacIver, David (Liverpool) Renwick, George Thomas, David Alfred(Merthyr
M`Arthur, William (Cornwall) Rickett, J. Compton Thomas, F. Freeman- (Hastings
Majendie, James A. H. Ridley, Hn. M. W. (Stalybridge) Thornton, Percy M.
Manners, Lord Cecil Ritchie, Rt. Hn. Chas. Thomson Tomlinson, Wm. Edwd. Murray
Massey-Mainwaring, Hn. W. F. Roberts, John H. (Denbighs.) Tritton, Charles Ernest
Maxwell, W. J. H. (Dumfriessh.) Robertson, Herbert (Hackney) Walton, John Lawson (Leeds, S.
Molesworth, Sir Lewis Rolleston, Sir John F. L. Wanklyn, James Leslie
Montagu, G. (Huntingdon) Ropner, Colonel Robert Warner, Thomas Courtenay T.
Moore, William (Antrim, N.) Royds, Clement Molyneux Warr, Augustus Frederick
More, Robt. Jasper (Shropshire) Runcirnan, Walter Wason, John Cathcart (Orkney
Morgan, DavidJ. (Walth'mstow Russell, T. W. Webb, Colonel William George
Morgan, J. Lloyd (Carmarthen) Sackville, Col. S. G. Stopford- White, Luke (York, E. R.)
Morrell, George Herbert Sassoon, Sir Edward Albert Whiteley, H. (Ashton-und-Lyne
Morrison, James Archibald Sharpe, William Edward T. Wilson, Fred. W. (Norfolk, Mid
Morton, Arthur H. A (Deptford Shaw, Thomas (Hawick B.) Wilson, John (Glasgow)
Murray, Rt. HnA Graham(Bute Shaw-Stewart, M. H. (Renfrew Wodehouse, Rt. Hn. E. R. (Bath)
Nicol, Donald Ninian Sinclair, John (Forfarshire) Wortley, Rt. Hn. C. B. Stuart-
Nussey, Thomas Willans Smith, Abel H. (Hertford, East Wylie, Alexander
Pease, J. A. (Saffron Walden) Smith, James Parker (Lanarks.) Wyndham, Rt. Hn. George
Pemberton, John S. G. Smith, Hn. W. F. D. (Strand) Yerburgh, Robert Armstrong
Penn, John Spear, John Ward
Platt-Higgins, Frederick Spencer, Rt. Hn C. R (North'nts TELLERS FOR THE AYES—
Plummer, Walter R. Stanley, Hn. Arthur(Ormskirk) Sir William Walrond and
Powell, Sir Francis Sharp Stanley, Edwd. Jas. (Somerset) Mr. Anstruther.
Pretyman, Ernest George Stanley, Lord (Lancs.)
NOES.
Abraham, Wm. (Cork, N. E.) Lundon, W. O'Donnell T. (Kerry, W.)
Ambrose, Robert MacDonell, Dr. Mark A. O'Kelly, James (Roscommon, N
Blake, Edward M'Govern, T. O'Malley, William
Boland, John M'Hugh, Patrick A. O'Shaughnessy, P. J.
Broadhurst, Henry M'Killop, W. (Sligo, North) Pickard, Benjamin
Caine, William Sproston Mooney, John, T. Power, Patrick Joseph
Campbell, John (Armagh, S.) Moulton, John Fletcher Reddy, M.
Crean, Eugene Murphy, John Redmond, John E. (Waterford)
Cremer, William Randal Nannetti, Joseph P. Roberts, John Bryn (Eifion)
Cullinan, J. Newnes, Sir George Sheehan, Daniel Daniel
Delany, William Nolan, Col. J ohn P. (Galway, N.) Sullivan, Donal
Dillon, John Nolan, Joseph (Louth, South) Wilson, John (Durham, Mid.)
Doogan, P. C. Norton, Capt. Cecil William Young, Samuel
Ffrench, Peter O'Brien, James F. X. (Cork)
Field, William O'Brien, Kendal (Tipp'raryMid TELLERS FOR THE NOES—
Flynn, James Christopher O'Brien, Patrick (Kilkenny) Sir Thomas Esmonde and Captain Donelan.
Gilhooly, James O'Brien, P. J. (Tipperary, N.)
Joyce, Michael O'Connor, Jas. (Wicklow, W.)
Kearley, Hudson E. O'Connor, T. P. (Liverpool)
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