THE GOVERNMENT'S NAVAL PROPOSALS,

HC Deb 21 March 1901 vol 91 cc767-811

MR. EDMUND ROBERTSON (Dundee)

My principal object in rising now is to place before the House and the country the view which I believe is taken by those who sit on this bench and on this side of the House—certainly, I believe, by those with whom I had the honour to act on a former Board of Admiralty—of the large proposals now made by the Government.

The first point upon which I wish to speak is the controversy with regard to Belleville boilers. That controversy began seven years ago, at the instance of my hon. friend the Member for Gateshead. At that time the then Board of Admiralty extended on a large scale for the first time the adoption of the water-tube boiler, which had already been adopted on a comparatively small scale by the previous Administration. My hon. friend challenged our action on, that occasion, and it fell upon me to explain the views of the Board. Last session the then First Lord of the Admiralty announced the appointment of an Expert Committee to examine the whole position. That Committee has now reported, and I wish to call the attention of the representatives of the Admiralty to the position in which they find themselves in face of that Report. I do not think the hon. Member for Gateshead has any reason to be dissatisfied with that Report.

MR. WILLIAM ALLAN (Gateshead)

No. I have not.

MR. EDMUND ROBERTSON

Because, although perhaps not in an unqualified manner, it does find against the Belleville boiler to a large extent. As representing the Admiralty of 1893, I have no reason, to, be dissatisfied with the Report either, because in one paragraph the Committee declare that— at the time the Belleville boiler was introduced into the Navy in the' Powerful and' Terrible' it was the only large tube type of water-tube boiler which had been tried at sea on a considerable scale under ordinary working conditions. The Committee therefore consider that there was justification for them regarding it as the most suitable type of water-tube boiler for the Navy. I do not think I could envy the position of an Admiralty face to face with a Report such as this. I do not for one moment begrudge any praise that may be due to the Expert Committee, which gave its time, experience, and talents to the consideration of this serious question, but I cannot at present conceive what line of policy the Admiralty ought now to adopt. The findings of the Committee do not appear to be clear or consistent one with another. In the first place they find in favour of the water-tube boiler in general. They declare that it— would be more suitable for use in His "Majesty's Navy than the cylindrical type of boiler, and go on to give reasons for that opinion. They specify the most important requirements from a military point of view, and they declare that— these requirements are met by the water-tube boiler in a greater degree than by the cylindrical boiler, and are considered by the Committee of such importance as to outweigh the advantages of the latter type in economy of fuel and cost of up-keep. Having said that, the Committee say a number of other things hardly consistent with it.

But I pass from that commendation of the water-tube boiler principle in general to what the Committee say about the Belleville boiler in particular. When we adopted that policy in 1893, in continuation of the policy of our predecessors, we always declared that while the Belleville appeared to us to be the best boiler for the moment of that type, we were in no way committed to it. This Committee speak in a very peculiar way about the Belleville boiler. They— do not consider that the Belleville boiler has any such advantage over other types of water-tube boilers as leads them to recommend it as the best adapted to the requirements of His Majesty's Navy. That is their statement. But what is their recommendation? They make a recommendation which it appears to me can only cause embarrassment to the present Board of Admiralty. As regards new ships, and what I may call "infant"ships—that is, ships just begun — they recommend the Admiralty to discard the Belleville boiler altogether. As regards finished ships and ships under construction which are beyond the engine stage, they recommend its retention. These are curious recommendations, and they become all the more curious when the Committee go on, in answer to queries put by the Admiralty as to what they would recommend in place of the Belleville, to specify four kinds of water-tube boilers, of which they suggest that some or all types should be taken. These four types are all, in the first instance, to be experimented upon. As to the first two —the"Babcock and Wilcox" and the "Niclausse"— the Committee recommend that certain sloops and cruisers should be expedited in order that the value of these types of boilers for naval purposes may be ascertained at the earliest possible date. Having already discarded the Belleville type and recommended these as substitutes, they go on to say that the first thing to be done is to ascertain what their value is for naval purposes. So it is with the other two specimens. They are also to be experimented upon with a view to seeing what their real value is. That is a recommendation which I think the Admiralty will have some difficulty in acting upon.

Further, after specifying certain advantages connected with the Belleville boiler, the Committee go on to say— The additional evaporating plant required with Belleville boilers, and the greater coal consumption on ordinary service as compared with cylindrical boilers, has hitherto nullified to a great extent the saving of weight effected by their adoption, and in considering the radius of action it is doubtful whether any real advantage has been gained. That is, I understand, any real advantage over the cylindrical boiler. Having previously stated that military requirements—which, of course, are paramount in this question—condemn the cylindrical boiler, and support the water-tube type, they make that remark about the Belleville. They then say— The Committee are not prepared without further experience to say to what extent this may not apply to other types of water-tube boilers. I confess I hardly know what conclusion to draw from this Report, and my difficulty is not lessened -when I find this remarkable paragraph following the passages to which I have already referred— To obtain satisfactory results in the working of the Belleville boilers, in face of the defects named in paragraph (9), more than ordinary experience and skill are required on the part of the engine-room staff. It appears, however, from the evidence placed before the Committee that the engineer officers in charge of Belleville boilers have not been made acquainted with the best method of working the boiler, and that which experience has shown to be the most effectual in preventing pitting and corrosion of tubes. It would be invidious for me to go any further into the conclusions of this Report. It appears to me to be a most embarrassing document for the Admiralty, and I do not envy the Board which, having appointed this Committee, is now face to face with a Report so inconclusive, and so far from clear, and so inconsistent as this Report is in many respects. And my difficulty in knowing what the Admiralty can possibly do is increased by the statement of the hon. Gentleman himself. In his remarks the other night about the Belleville boiler I understood him to declare that the ships fitted with the type are working satisfactorily now, and have been for years in foreign navies. What is the result to be? I do not know what those who advised the Admiralty to adopt the water-tube boiler in principle and the Belleville boiler by preference have to say to this Report. Our then technical advisers are still the advisers of the Admiralty: one of our colleagues (not mentioned here) on the Board of Admiralty of that day is in office now, namely, the First Sea Lord. He was a party to the adoption of the water-tube principle and the Belleville boiler by the Board of which I had the honour to be a member. I should like to know, before coming to a conclusion, how the opinions of our experts, and those who advised us, and whose advice we were bound to take, are modified by the conclusions arrived at by this Committee. The alternative placed before us was this—"Foreign navies are adopting the water-tube boiler. You must accept either the water-tube boiler or inferiority in an essential military requirement, and the best type of boiler is the Belleville." That was our position when we entered upon the large experiment in 1893. The hon. Member for Gateshead will admit that his original criticism against our policy was directed not so much against the particular type of boiler, or perhaps even the water-tube principle itself, as against our taking a large step-in advance without further experiments. That position I defended at the time, and I need only say in defence of it now that we fitted two cruisers with the type best known, and which had been experimented upon under conditions which we were advised offered a guarantee of its suitability. In making that statement I am not in any way casting a reflection upon the action of the succeeding Board of Admiralty, which carried our policy to a point much further than we had done. We should very likely have done exactly as they did, but I wanted to make clear how this controversy originated, and what the share of our Board in it was. Having said that I will pass from this subject with the-observation that this Report, able as the members of the Committee may have been, is of such a character that it does not take away from the Admiralty one single ounce of responsibility. They must go back to the expert skill with which the Admiralty is so admirably endowed. This is an incident only in the history of this very important question, and we shall look to the Admiralty on its own responsibility of skilled advisers to decide now, as if no such Report had been issued, what their policy in the future should be.

The next point in the programme to which I should like to direct attention is the adoption of submarine boats for the first time in this year's programme. I have given a good deal of attention, both while I was in the Admiralty office and since, to this question, and, having supported this experiment in this House and out of it, it may seem somewhat ungracious for me to cast any reflection upon what the Admiralty are going to do. But there are some things that ought to be said, for it appears to be a serious thing. France has fifty-six submarine boats, and the chief-constructor of the American Navy is one of the warmest advocates of submarine boats. As this is only a matter of experiment I do think it might have been introduced upon a somewhat smaller scale. If its value is purely conjectural I should have said that one boat would have been enough to experiment with. Two should have been quite enough, but we generally do things on a large scale, and after having refused to say one word for many years about submarine boats we now find the Admiralty launching out into quite a little fleet of them. I think it was the hon. Gentleman the Civil Lord who was asked a question not long ago about submarine boats. He gave the answer which has been repeated from time immemorial, and he added that a statement would he made in the Estimate, and no policy was announced. We find now that in regard to these five submarine boats some of them were ordered in the year 1000. We have travelled far and fast in this country in some ways, but what has become of the control of the House of Commons? What has become of that control when the Admiralty of the day having refused to tell us their policy come forward shortly afterwards and say they will build five of these boats? Lord Goschen, to whose zeal, firmness of purpose, and devotion to the interests of the Navy I desire to be allowed to pay a tribute, carried things pretty far in the last Parliament. He came down at the end of the session not to propose a Supplementary Estimate, but to mention to us on another Vote that he intended to build a certain number of extra ships which were not provided for in the original Estimate. The Member for West Monmouthshire protested against that course as an abuse of the position of the Government, and said that they had no right to build any ships except upon an Estimate submitted to and approved by the House of Commons. I cannot help protesting against this, for a new departure of this nature ought not to have been made except with the sanction of the House, and at the very least it ought not to have been done without being divulged to the House.

The next point I come to is that mysterious expedition to Gibraltar, which has lately been sanctioned. I do not know what lies behind that adventurous voyage of the hon. Member for King's Lynn and his colleagues. When it was first mentioned we took no exception to an inquiry, and the House has probably now forgotten what a remarkable kind of investigation it was to be. We now know that there is to be a Committee and no Commission, no common reference and no connected Report, and all we know is that a certain number of gentlemen—of whom the hon. Gentleman the Member for King's Lynn is not more than one—are to be appointed and are to be asked to investigate some questions. Who the colleagues of the hon. Member for King's Lynn are we have not yet perfectly ascertained, but that appears to me to be a very curious sort of inquiry to propose into a matter so tremendously grave as the question of the state and defences of the public docks at Gibraltar. I would repeat in regard to this matter what I said about the boilers, that, whatever letters or Reports these gentlemen severally or collectively may write as to the position of the docks and defences at Gibraltar, nothing can take away the direct responsibility of the Admiralty for the future policy on this question. The Admiralty through its own officers has been working nearly seven years at these docks. They were first sanctioned nearly seven years ago, and a great staff has been engaged upon the work. To suppose for a moment that after such an investigation as that which I have just described such a Committee as I have sketched can add anything to the information of the Board of Admiralty on the subject appears to me to be trifling with the question. I look to the Admiralty and its own officers for the determination of the policy which we are to pursue in reference to the docks at Gibraltar.

I come now to another point. The hon. and gallant Member for Great Yarmouth will, I think, sympathise with this view—I refer to what we have been told about the policy of the Government in regard to coaling stations, which is a problem of most tremendous difficulty, but one of the most important which has engaged the attention of the Admiralty and the War Office for many years, and upon which there is a direct conflict of opinion between naval and military experts. The Secretary of State for War in describing the programme which we have not yet sanctioned, and which is to be submitted for further discussion at a later date, told us that in dealing with the Army he proposed that certain of the coaling stations should be handed over to the Navy. He further hinted that he did not know what the opinion of the Admiralty was on this question, and he indicated that they had not yet consented to the proposal he had made. That was a most astounding thing for any Minister to do. The Secretary to the Admiralty has stated that this was only the personal opinion of the Secretary for War. That explanation appears to me to make matters worse, for what right has a Minister in this House, while defending the policy of the Government, to express his own personal opinion? See the astounding position in which we find ourselves. We find one Minister committing his Department to something without knowing what the opinion of the Admiralty is. I think that is very improper, whether it is his own personal opinion or not. People say that the authority of the House of Commons is diminishing, and that the power of the Cabinet is increasing, but it appears to mo that the authority of the House of Commons and the Cabinet are both disappearing. What kind of a Cabinet is it that allows a Minister to express a personal opinion which advocates one policy one night on Imperial defence and a totally different policy the next night? What becomes of that famous Joint Committee of Defence? What becomes of the Joint Committee pressed for by the President of the Council, when such a declaration is made by the Secretary for War upon a matter which is not the least important among all the questions concerning our Imperial defence?

Those who look at the Navy Estimates will notice that Vote 16, which deals with the flotilla in Australian waters, has disappeared altogether from the Estimates. Again and again during recent years I have asked the Government what was going to happen in regard to this question, and I was refused information upon it. The House has now before it Estimates in which the Vote has disappeared altogether, and no information is given. I hope the hon. Gentleman will tell us what is the present position of this arrangement, and why it is that no provision has been made for it in the Estimates. Perhaps he may also be able to explain a mysterious paragraph in the memorandum about the South Australian ship "Protector," which has been lent to His Majesty's Government. I understand that this comes, under an Act of 1865, which has been adopted by an Order in Council, as a British man-of-war. I should like to know upon what conditions the ship "Protector" has been lent to His Majesty's Government.

We were also told that the scheme of merchant cruisers was to be largely extended this year, but the vote for that has almost disappeared, and only three new companies have been added. No provision is made as to arrangements with the great companies who furnish these merchant vessels. The hon. Gentleman also spoke of the delay in construction in recent years, and spoke of it as being due to the engineers' "strike." That was a lock-out, and I have always held that the weakness of the Admiralty in not enforcing its penal clauses in their contracts has led to their own embarrassment. This has attracted the attention of foreign naval constructors, and they cannot understand why the Government have not the courage to enforce the penal clause in their contracts.

My last point is with regard to the Royal yacht. I do not know when the House of Commons, while considering Naval Estimates, ever had before it a story so distressing as the history of the Royal yacht. I, for one, can take no blame to myself about it, because I was one of the few Members of this House who from the beginning did not like this project for the Royal yacht. We suggested that it should have been built like the new German yacht: that it ought to be serviceable not only as a toy and a pleasure yacht, but that it should be so constructed as to be useful in time of war. If that had been done she might very safely have been entrusted to the Admiralty staff and the dockyard staff. Then the Admiralty would have had a ship which they knew all about. Otherwise, it would have been wiser to send her to a private yacht builder, whose particular business it was to build yachts, and not give this delicate piece of workmanship to a staff which had never built a yacht before. We have never pressed in this House for much information about it, and I am not sure that my hon. friend the Member for Gateshead has not given us more information than the Admiralty upon it. I think it is high time that the full dockyard history of this unhappy adventure should be laid before the House of Commons. We started out with the proposal to spend something like £300,000 on this yacht, and surely that was enough for what was going to be a private yacht, even for the Sovereign. This year the total Estimate for this yacht exceeds £500,000. Surely, in any other country, such an event as this would be regarded financially as disgraceful to the administrative capacity of the Department responsible for it. But we have at least still got the control of the purse, and we should demand to know how it is that the original amount of £.300,000 for a mere pleasure yacht has mounted up in three disastrous years to something like £521,000. I trust that that information will not be refused us, and that we shall have a full history and all the reasons which have led to this unhappy result. We should also like to know whether she is going to have Belleville boilers or any other kind of water-tube boilers.

In conclusion, I want to call the serious attention of an indifferent House, and, so far as I can, of an indifferent country, to the enormous magnitude of the proposals contained in these Estimates. Some years ago Mr. Goschen apologised for the Estimates of the day, and admitted that they were colossal. Certainly they wore colossal as compared with any previous year, but they were pygmies compared with the Estimates which we have before us to-night. Many people do not appear to have the faintest notion of the magnitude of this programme. I want to bring before the House the real magnitude of the programme we are asked to express general approval of. This year the total Navy Estimates amount to nearly £31,000,000 in round numbers. I add to that amount what will be required this year, and for many years to come, under the Naval Works Acts, the sum of £2,000,000, and putting these together I call the attention of the House to this fact, that the Govern- ment this year is asking for £33,000,000 sterling for naval purposes. I cannot separate the Army from the Navy so easily as the Secretary of State for War, and I must add to this gigantic total the huge figures we were discussing the other day. Roughly speaking, the normal Army Estimates are about £30,000,000, and I add to that the amount for military loans, which I take it this year will be about £1,000,000. That gives us a total for the Army of £31,000,000. This shows that the military expenditure of this country in time of peace amounts to £64,000,000 sterling for this one year. Surely, these figures are awful amounts to arrest the attention of the House and the country, more especially when I remind the House that these proposals have been laid upon the Table almost without a word of defence or explanation. I know there have been explanations of minor points, but on the whole they have been dumped down upon the Table, and not one word of the First Lord's Memorandum would lead you to suppose that they were in any way extraordinary. Let the House remember that this £64,000,000 is our war expenditure in time of peace, and takes no account whatever of the Supplementary Estimates or the cost of the war in South Africa. This is simply our own British expenditure to which I am referring. I thought when I was responsible for the biggest Estimate that had been introduced up to that time that the more we spent on our Navy the less we should have to spend on the Army—I should like to arrive at the figure which we can afford to spend on both these Services, and after spending all that is wanted for the Navy leave the rest for the Army. But the reverse has been the case. The more the expenditure on the Navy has gone up the greater has been the demand for expenditure on the Army. The increase of these Estimates began in the year 1893, and up to that point the Naval Estimates of Great Britain had reached a normal standard of about £14,000,000 per year. Later our attention was called to the fact that the next two great naval Powers of France and Russia between them were spending more upon their navies than we were. France and Russia in 1893 spent jointly on their Navies £1(1,000,000 as against our £14,240,000. That was a balance which we determined to redress, and that was why our Naval Estimates were increased.

In the year 1900, the last of which I have a record, the estimates of France mounted up from £10,000,000 in 1893 to £12,000,000, and those of Russia rose proportionately from £5,000,000 to £9,000,000. In other words, while we were spending £14,000,000 in 1893, against £16,000,000 spent by France and Russia, in 1900 the joint expenditure' of France and Russia amounted to £21,000,000, to which our answer was an expenditure of £33,000,000. Therefore, instead of being £2,000,000 behind, as in 1893, we are now £12,000,000 ahead of them. These enormous Estimates, which arose out of an attempt to keep us upon an equality with France and Russia, have resulted in proposals which have put us £12,000,000 ahead, and that has been done without any explanation on the part of the Admiralty. I am aware that France is no longer in this respect the second nation, but the second nation is now the still greater friend of our own. The expenditure upon the United States Navy has leaped up from £3,000,000 to £15,000,000, but I do not need to discuss a fact like that. I have supported big Navy Estimates before, but these increases are so vast and, to the best of my belief, bound so far beyond the standard aimed at in previous years, that they ought not to be submitted to this House except upon a full declaration of what the object is, and why it is necessary to put such enormous demands before the country. Unless there has been a very great change lately I believe if you take the Estimates of last year of the four largest European navies you will find that the total is equalled by the Naval Estimates of Great Britain. That is a matter which demands some explanation. The men asked for in 1893 included a large addition which had become necessary on account of the additional ships built under the previous Naval Defence Act; and so the figure I am going to quote is not the normal figure, but part of the new increase. Well, in 1893 the number of men asked for was 76,700. This year the Government is asking for an active list of 118,635 men. That is an enormous increase. Here again I do not say that it wants justification, for I think it is justified. I am giving these figures as a measure of the enormous increase which the British Navy has undergone. I maintain that this increase of the personnel is absolutely necessitated by the increase of the fleet; but it is a significant thing that in these seven years, having already begun to increase, we added 42,000 men to the active list of the Navy. About five or six years ago I obtained from the Admiralty a most interesting Return, which you will not get from. Brassey's Naval Annual, but which throws useful light on this question. That was a Return of the men on the active list of all the Navies of Europe. I remember being astounded that, even then, our active list, with a much stronger fleet, was more than equal to those of all the other European nations combined. I hope the Admiralty will not neglect any opportunity they have of finding out the active list of other navies, so that we may compare the active personnel as well as expenditure and other points.

The biggest Vote on the Navy Estimates is always the Shipbuilding Vote. It has reached portentous dimensions— £14,676,000. This is a net increase over last year of £9,274,500. Of this enormous total we are told in the First Lord's memorandum that provision for new construction alone amounts to £9,000,000. I believe I am right in saying that this is the largest total for new construction ever proposed either in this House or in the country.

*MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER

Do you say it is too much?

MR. EDMUND ROBERTSON

I am not saying it is too much. That is another question altogether. But it is so great that I cannot accept the hon. Member's word for it that it is not more than enough, following, as it does, on the enormous increase of last year. We are entitled to have an explanation of its necessity; nay, more, I venture to say, a defence of the magnitude of these figures. The hon. Member asked me if it is enough or not; and again I refer to the measure of the two Powers. I never committed myself to any limitation of this measure. It was a practical rule of thumb measure which was adopted by successive Admiralties and by the House of Commons. I never said I was dissatisfied with that measure, or that, in a given case, I should not ask for something larger; but I ask the hon. Member to listen to this: This £9,000,000, which we are asked for for new construction, is to be set against the provision made last year in France and Russia, the two Powers in question. The new construction provided for in France in 1900, but which is not likely to be fulfilled, for I am quite sure they do not build up to their programme as we do, was £4,200,000; and in Russia £2,400,000; or a total of £6,600,000. I dwell upon this Vote of the Estimates, as I have ventured to do on similar occasions before, because I regard it as the master-Vote of all these Navy Estimates; it is the Vote upon which everything else depends. The more you swell this Vote the more you swell all the other Estimates. The serious thing for this country is that our liability is not to be measured by the £31,000,000 in this year's Estimates. I have examined the proportion between the Shipbuilding Vote and the total Navy Estimates for many years, and I find that, as regularly as possible, in normal times the proportion is as one to three. Suppose you do not increase the Shipbuilding Vote at all, what will be the consequence? You will have the Navy Estimates very soon up to £42.000,000 a year, instead of £32,000,000. When the hon. Member challenges me to say whether these Estimates are too much, my answer is that they are so vast that they ought not to be submitted to the House or accepted by the House until a full explanation of all the reasons making them necessary has been given. I say that no such information has been vouchsafed in the Estimates themselves, in the statement of the First Lord, or in the speech of the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty. We have not yet had what we are entitled to have; the House has no right to sanction such expenditure as this without further information. The other day the Army programme was hung up as a consequence of an arrangement made by both sides of the House. I cannot believe that, in the limited time at our disposal, we can make a complete investigation of the proposals of the Admiralty; and some similar device will have to be resorted to in regard to the Navy Votes.

I put this question to the hon. Gentleman and to others who may sympathise with him. Is there to be no limit to these Estimates of our naval expenditure? Are you to go on increasing your Navy and your Army expenditure—because I refuse to separate them? Is there to be no limit to this vast military expenditure in time of peace, because the present war has nothing to do with it? No doubt the tax-paying powers of the country will some day set a limit; but, even apart from that—and here I appeal to the hon. and gallant Member for Great Yarmouth—even if our resources were illimitable, as they are obviously coming to a limit, at least all the authorities tell us so—I deny that it is the right or the duty of this country to go on, unaided, bearing this tremendous Imperial burden of naval expenditure. Why, in the First Lord's statement there is a paragraph about the gunboat "Protector," which the South Australian colony placed at the disposal of His Majesty's Government for service in China. That has been made an enormous deal of, just as all the other assistance given us by the colonies and individuals has been. But this Government seems to blind itself to the fact, and the country also knows it not, that this noble Navy of ours, which I want to see always the strongest on earth, and always in the hands of a Government which will use it for justice—that this noble Navy is as much the servant of our self-governing colonies—I say nothing of the others—as it is of the people of England, Scotland, or Ireland. The people of Ireland complain, to my mind not quite justly, of being overtaxed. Their complaint. so far as it is well founded, may be made also by all the poorer districts in this country, including the poorer parts of London. But Ireland has a much better ground of complaint than this. Ireland is notoriously poorer than the rest of the Empire—poorer that Canada or Australia, man for man. But Ireland, out of its poverty, is compelled to pay for the naval defence of these great and prosperous colonies of Canada and Australia. And what is an Irish griev- ance is also a grievance to Scotland. The poorest mill girl who drinks tea in my constituency has to pay for the free naval defence of the millionaire squatters of Australia and the millionaire timber-men of Canada. [HON. MEMBERS: Oh, oh.] Yes; the Secretary for the Admiralty has admitted it, and it cannot be denied. The hon. and gallant Gentleman—the highest authority in this House, and there are not many equal to him out of it—has shown us the true meaning of naval defence, and I could quote words of his own in support of the proposition I have made. When the hon. Member challenges me to say whether these Estimates are too high, I challenge him to say whether we are going on for ever adding to the expenditure for the Navy without making the faintest suggestion that these great self-governing colonies might contribute from their wealth to the Navy, which now is supported by the farthings of the poor as much as by the pounds of the rich in the United Kingdom.

*SIR JOHN COLOMB

The question raised in the latter part of the hon. Gentleman's speech is one that requires the fullest measure of consideration and discussion. I may frankly say that I feel very strongly, and have done so for more years than I care to reckon, that in looking to the future and to the responsibilities cast upon us, we have approached a time when we must ask this question—"Can we go on indefinitely paying for the defence of an Empire which covers all parts of the world out of the resources of an island in but a corner of it?" I am a true Imperialist—I have always been that; but I hate the Imperialism which perorates about the Empire and refuses to face the real question of making the arrangements for its common security a matter of practical and united action of all its parts. I am strongly tempted to say more on this point, but I will not. Nor will I dwell on the way in which we work Imperial defence so far as the United Kingdom is concerned, on a system of water-tight departments. It is not only a wasteful but a pernicious system. We have Army Estimates brought forward one night, and we are told to exclude all considerations of the Navy on these War Estimates. Then we have on another night a Vote of £31,000,000 presented to be spent on the Navy, but you must not take that in relation to the expenditure on the Army. All this will not be remedied until we have a Minister responsible for the general principles of defence of the Empire, saying what is necessary to be spent by the Army and the Navy.

Leaving that question aside, a strong sense of duty and of responsibility to all ranks of the naval service compels me to ask the indulgence of the House while I endeavour, as briefly as I can, to refer to a question of paramount importance, and which is rending opinion in the Navy in twain—I allude to the training of the personnel of the Fleet. Within a period of time as short as half the lifetime of a man an absolutely complete transformation has taken place in our ships, and in everything that affects the personnel. Owing to the advance in mechanical science, and the application of electricity and steam to ships and to everything appertaining to them—the science of engineering being cosmopolitan—all nations have been brought to the same level. Therefore, we ought to assume that, all these things being equal on the surface of the sea, and producing the same effect, success or failure, when the conflict comes, will depend upon the adaption by a perfect training of character, and in professional knowledge—the perfect training, in fact, of what my right hon. friend the Member for Forest of Dean has called "the human element."

I do entreat the indulgence of the House if I endeavour to bring before hon. Members the condition to which the personnel of the Navy has come in the opinion of its own officers, under the conditions forced upon it by the transformation to which I have referred. We must remember that the senior naval officers of to-day imbibed their ideas of training and methods of fighting from conditions that no longer exist, but have entirely passed away. That is to a large extent the reason for the extraordinary differences of opinion which exist in all sections of the Navy at the present time in regard to this important question. I wish to explain that I am not approaching this question as a captious critic. One of the reasons why this question of training has been neglected, is that we have had to alter our naval machinery and keep it running at the same time. I do not wish to hold this Admiralty or this Government, or any other during the last thirty-five years, responsible for the fact that our naval training is at present exceedingly confused. And for this reason, that both the political officers and the naval lords at the Admiralty are so pressed with the routine work in keeping the machine going that they have not time to think out the great problems, or to do more than keep abreast with current business. Admiral Sir John Hopkins, a very distinguished officer, a late Controller of the Navy, and Lord of the Admiralty, has declared within the last two or three months that— Those who administer the Service have quite enough to do without initiating reforms. Nor can their energies he better occupied than in dealing with the multifarious daily duties devolving on them, which, I can assure you, I have found, from some personal experience at the Admiralty, leave little or no time for initiating reforms or improvements in the many subjects dealt with. Every naval officer who has had the pleasure of a personal acquaintance with Admiralty administrators knows that twenty years ago these were overworked in keeping up the current business; and I wish to draw attention to the fact that they are overworked now, and have not time to give adequate consideration to the problems facing us. Fifteen years ago the Admiralty Board consisted of eight—political officers and naval Lords. Since that time the personnel of the Navy has doubled, the annual expenditure on the Shipbuilding Vote has tripled, you have added vast responsibilities in connection with naval works and the arrangements for carrying them out, and what have you added in the way of help for the transaction of all that accumulated business? What have you done? You have simply added one private secretary to the staff of the First Lord of the Admiralty. What has happened under these circumstances is that your present system of training the Navy can be only described as a patchwork plan rather than any system at all. That is the result.

I daresay that hon. Members are fully aware that in the Press this question of the training of the Navy has been much argued, but it has been entirely confined to one branch, and that is the executive branch, which represents only one-fourth of the whole force. There are four branches—the executive branch, the marine branch, the engineer branch, and the civil branch. The civil branch embraces three sub-divisions—the medical, the chaplains, and the accountants and stores. The conditions of naval construction and the changes which science has rendered necessary do not affect the medical or the chaplains sub-divisions, or the method of keeping accounts and stores. Therefore I will eliminate the civil branch and consider the three remaining branches. The great change of conditions from the old state of things, to new machinery has had the effect of approximating the duties of the seamen to that of the marines. These changes have accentuated and extended the possible scope of marines' work and their responsibilities in a ship of war. The education and training of the Marine Artillery and Infantry officers is costly and elaborate, but specially designed to unfit them to keep watch or do general ships' duties. That was foretold forty years ago to a Commission, not by a naval expert, but by Mr.Lindley, who said that the Admiralty were shutting their eyes to the consequences to the personnel of steam machinery. That advice was not attended to and we have gone on up to the present time without fully recognising that fact. But the supreme question at the bottom of all this naval training is the relation of the executive and engineer branches to the working of the ship and to each other. That is a question of supreme moment. The old duties of the executive were really to operate through and by manual labour, organised with the highest skill, in order to drive the ship through the water, and to use effectively all the weapons and appliances of the ship. Now the executive officers simply turn a handle or call down a voice tube to the engineer, whose machinery does the work. The real duty now of the executive branch is simply to direct and apply with courage, with promptness, and complete skill the sum of all that is provided by steam, electricity, and the machinery of the engineer's staff. When you come to consider the tremendous increase in the cost of a ship and the very much greater factor each ship is than it was before in a nation's Navy, the question of the education and training of the men who are to manage that ship is a much more serious one than it ever was before; and this greatly intensifies the importance and the gravity of the selection and training of the executive officers who have to wield this enormous power. The captain who wields that enormous power provided by the engineers and the machinery must be fit to be a captain while he is full of vigour both in mind and body; the probability is that if you cannot produce that man before he is thirty competent to do the work you will never produce him at all. When you remember the limits of age, the short period you have in which to select the raw material in the shape of the boy, and train him up to the finished article, with all the experience and aptitude and knowledge that is necessary for a captain, you can, see at once how enormously important is the question of the sort of training you should give to the executive officer who is to handle your ship in the day of battle. The important thing to bear in mind in regard to the difference between the education problem of the executive officers and of the engineers is that in the case of the executive branch it is a question of the readjustment of the training suited to old conditions to the new conditions. The problem of the training of the engineer is different, and it is now really a question of how to develop and improve the character of the training to conditions which have not changed, but are constantly advancing.

The question of executive training has been brought to an issue by the putting out of commission, owing to the exigencies of the South African War, of what was called the Training Squadron in October, 1899. That was a squadron of ships fully rigged, with auxiliary steam power, and it was kept in commission up to October, 1899, as a necessary education for producing in your executive officers qualities which were considered essential to command a ship. That was the object of this Training Squadron which has now been put out of commission. I want to know if we are going to be left without that Training Squadron? What is the policy of the Admiralty on this question? Is this valuable process of developing the faculties of the executive officer to go by the board or is it to be resuscitated? I should like to show what importance has been attached by many officers to this question, and I will give some very brief extracts upon this subject. Lord Charles Beresford writes— Training under masts and yards is valuable for the qualities produced. It makes men thinking beings instead of well-drilled machines. Commander Nicholson says— I entirely disagree mast and yards are gone. I think we cannot do without them. Commander Napier, a brilliant officer who has been selected to command a torpedo destroyer flotilla, gives it as his opinion that— Seamen who have undergone mast and sail training are undoubtedly superior men to those who have not. Maximum of efficiency should be aimed at. British seamen should be finest form of seamen afloat. Then we have Admiral Sir Frederick Richards, who retired a short time ago, saying— I hope soon to see the companies returning to their proper ships (old Training Squadron). You have got an established system. You impart by sea-going training ship qualities of nerve, steadiness of head, and quickness of eye which you can impart in no other way. On the other hand, you have Admiral Sir John Hopkins saying that such training is "not one whit necessary." Then you have Admiral Sir Anthony Hoskins, a most able officer, late Lord of the Admiralty, who says— I do not see how naval officer is going to exist without it. Admiral Sir Michael Culme-Seymour gives his opinion as follows— Surely the natural way to train men is to train them in the ship in which they are going to serve. All my commands have been in masted ships, but conviction forced upon me that masts and sails are gone for ever. Admiral Sir Gerard Noel, a very distinguished officer, writes— Discipline of masts and sails must not be relinquished until equally effective substitute is found. On the other hand, Captain Henderson says— Firm conviction all mast and sail training must be abolished. Only modern seamanship should be taught—helm, compass, and lead, boat, anchor and cable work, splicing and seizing of hemp and wire, fitting, rigging, and of sheers, derricks, coaling appliances, etc. Admiral Noel writes— In sailing ships younger officers are in really responsible positions. Admiral Sir Vesey Fitzgerald says that it is not even desirable to have seamen as of old. Sir Anthony Hoskins says— The whole thing (question training squadron) ought to be worked out in the most careful way by the strongest Committee that the Admiralty can institute. I think that gives sufficient evidence to the House from the highest authorities you can get in the Navy as to masts and yards training. The conflict rages, but the Admiralty do not toll us or the service whether they mean to resuscitate the training squadron or not. I think we are entitled, in view of the opinions I have read, to demand a specific answer to this question—is the policy of the Admiralty that the training squadron shall be revived, or is it not? If the Admiralty are unable to make up their mind it would be bettor to have a Commission upon it to hear both sides. What I say is that the abolition of that squadron has suddenly brought the Admiralty and the service to the parting of the ways. If this training is necessary to cultivate the qualities in the men who are to command your ships, then you have no business to withhold it. It was in the year 1870 you had your first Committee on the higher education of naval officers, and it resulted in the great extension of the academic and theoretical side of education. It is a strange thing that you never touched the education of the higher officers. The great problems of strategy and tactics have never been touched upon at all until this year. The German and other foreign navies take care to educate their senior officers in the study of naval history and naval strategy, and all their studies are based upon British naval history and strategy. I can hardly congratulate the Admiralty upon the extent of the step they have at last taken by providing £200 a year for this purpose. There was another Committee appointed in 1875 and again in 1886, and only last week a Report was issued on the training of young naval officers. Then follows a new order from the Admiralty which has been long wished for, and agitated for, to secure more sea experience for the young officers. I find that amongst the important changes which have been made the Admiralty have taken out from the seamanship examination for young officers all reference to masts and yards and rigged ships. I presume from that that the policy of the Admiralty is to abolish the training squadron. I also notice that, before an officer will be allowed to act as a lieutenant, he must serve six months as a sub-lieutenant at sea, and receive a certificate from the captain that he is as fit to take charge of a watch at sea as a lieutenant, and to perform the duties of that rank. The gist of the complaints of the Navy is that the training is too academic and theoretical, and not sufficiently practical. I will just give two or three opinions upon this point. Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, who is now going to take command in Chinese waters, is strongly against the present system, and he protests against the young men being kept on shore so much learning mathematics. He says— Problems of navigation require very moderate amount of mathematical knowledge. Rely on tables. I have never met a naval officer whose mental faculties were strengthened by course of mathematical study. Necessary to put a stop to making proficiency in the 'courses' a passport to promotion. Lieutenant Carlyon Bellairs, who acted as a correspondent for one of the papers during the Naval Manoeuvres, and no mean authority, writes— It is judgment and eyesight wanted, not nursing and academic education. In last manoeuvres we never sighted a torpedo boat, yet in ten days the B. fleet sunk one of its own destroyers, the' Minerva' fought an action with three phantom torpedo boats, and we were reported by our own signal stations as enemy's cruisers, torpedo boats, and so on. Admiral Sir Edmund Freemantle says that— our naval officers are somewhat deficient in technical scientific knowledge"; and Admiral Sir Vesey Hamilton says— Admiral called on to support diplomatist more likely to do so effectually from knowledge of history and foreign languages than mathematics. Admiral Fitzgerald says— Midshipmen instead of spending best hours of day in school room should be on deck and boats learning to command men, etc. That shows the question on the academic side. The fact is that there is too much shore work, and not enough sea work, in the education of our naval officers. Admiral Hopkins declares— To make seamen is to make the seaman's home the ocean. He ought to be moving about it. Admiral Bridge's opinion is that "shore imitations of weapons and equipment is not training men in ships they will have to fight" Admiral Sir N. Bowden Smith thinks "men-of-war's men are, as a rule, the worst boat sailors in the world." Lieutenant Bosanquet, a promising young officer of great scientific ability, says, in referring to the deterioration of the young officer of the present day— He is dry nursed for five years and receives complex education in gunnery and seamanship, but does not have schooling in sailing ships. Only question of time for deterioration now apparent in officer to be apparent in man. Admiral Vesey Hamilton's opinion is— I say the system of harbour time is certainly a scandal and disgrace. I will sum up with two or three words. The controversy in the service over its own training is the result of the conservative instinct of one service clinging to what is old, and being very suspicious of what is new. The controversy may be put in a nutshell in three questions. (1) What is a seaman now? (2) What is the work he has to do? (3) And how is he to be trained to do it? The traditional seaman we all know. We know what he had to do, and how splendidly he did it. But the training which is declared to be necessary by distinguished naval officers is wholly different from that now in vogue. Admiral Fremantle says— Modern seamen must more and more merge in mechanics. This means entire change in training system. Admiral Fitzgerald says— Battling with the elements is done by-engineers and stokers. Captain Henderson declares— Blue jacket should be trained to be rough mechanic. Admiral Hoskins says— You cannot teach all men to be excellent shots, and you cannot get ammunition to do it. The man behind the gun is employed principally in working winches and levers. These opinions seem really to mean that the executive branch must gravitate towards the engineering branch. It may be true as regards the men, but it cannot possibly be true with regard to the executive officers. The training in the engine-room will be no training to produce those necessary characteristics in the men who are required to command our ships. Keen eyesight in light and darkness, promptness of decision in the presence of the unexpected—these are the qualities essential to the captain of a warship, and they must be cultivated by constant practice and observation on the bridge, and not in the engine-room. In regard to the training of these officers, I trust I have said enough to show that it requires more attention than it seems to receive at the hands of the Admiralty. Admiral Henderson was more than justified when he said— I think our training system throughout wants revision. Admiral Bowden Smith surely takes the true view when he declares— I do not see how you can consider the training of seamen apart from the rest of the ship's company. In any case the perfect adaptation of the "human element" to the present conditions of sea warfare is vital to the existence of our Empire. This is a question of the system of selection and training, and it concerns the whole Navy,. and not merely one particular branch of it. If it is true that the Lords of the Admiralty have no time to look into so momentous and grave a question as-this, and if the adaptation of the "human element" to modern conditions is a question which the Admiralty cannot find time to settle, then I think it ought to be referred to a Royal Commission.

*MR. WILLIAM ALLAN

I rise for the purpose of saying a few words upon the Boiler Committee's Report. L felt sorry that such a Committee should have been appointed, and that such a Report should be issued upon the British Navy. Nevertheless, the Report is there, and it contains a most damning story of the condition of the British Navy at this moment. Why was that Committee necessary? When the Admiralty entered into the idea of substituting water-tube boilers in their magnificent ships I said, and I say now, that they were, ruining their ships, and the Report, I am sorry to say, has verified the view. Why did they do that? Why did they enter into this arena of exploded engineering? Water-tube boilers are no new thing. They were a primitive mode of raising steam in bygone years. Does any engineer in this House or in Great Britain think that if the old fathers of engineering— the Napiers, the Scotts, the Dennys, the Elders, and all our great engineering galaxy—had seen any advantages in water-tube boilers they would not have adopted them? They certainly would. The water-tube boiler is a primitive article indeed. If the Admiralty officials — I am not imputing any blame, I shall leave the responsibility to be brought home to them by the House at some time to come—had exercised a little wisdom and caution, and had inquired into what the water-tube boiler had been for marine purposes, they would have had a story something like what I shall tell you in a few brief words.

I shall mention to the House just a few of the attempts to introduce water-tube boilers into the mercantile marine, and I think it is well that the House should know that when this new-fangled notion —I call it nothing else, for it is not pure engineering—was adopted by the Admiralty it was not a thing of the present day. About forty or fifty years ago Mr. Rowan, a great engineer of Glasgow, had the idea that water-tube boilers were the boilers. He fitted them into a vessel called the "Propontis," and what was the result? The boilers exploded and killed many men, and many were scalded. [Laughter.] This is not a laughing question at all. This is a national matter. This is not a party matter. This is a matter that should go to the heart of the British nation, which has to pay millions of money for ships and boilers which you cannot depend upon. What is the use of your ships? Do not let me see any hon. Member laughing. This is a serious matter. I come now to the vessels I saw myself. I come to the "Mark Anthony" and the "Fairy Dell"—vessels which were built thirty-two years ago. They were fitted with what was considered the best water-tube boiler of the day, known as Howard's boiler. There they are again —men scalded, and boiled and injured The owner of the "Mark Anthony was brought to grief and ruined. I shall give another illustration from the history of water-tube boilers. I come now to the late Guion Company of Liverpool. Their superintending engineer had the idea that water-tube boilers should be introduced, and they were fitted in the "Montana" and the "Dakota." They Were large American passenger-carrying boats. What happened? They were both absolute failures. The boilers were taken out of the vessels with disastrous results to the Guion Company, financially and otherwise. I shall come still further down, and take the "Norman Isles," a boat which was built at Sunderland not-long ago. I believe the builder of the boat is an hon. Member of this House. She was 0,000 or 7.000 tons. She was fitted with Babcock and Wilcox boilers. What happened? She did not complete her first voyage. She had to come home to England. I tendered for the new boilers of the type so much condemned by hon. Gentlemen opposite. The Babcock and Wilcox boilers were taken out. and cylindrical boilers were fitted in, with the result of greater economy, safety, and efficiency being obtained. I come now to the Belleville type. It is a very old-fashioned type of French boiler. There is not much difference in the whole lot of them. That boiler was much lauded in this House in former years by Secretaries and First Lords of the Admiralty. That boiler was fitted into a vessel called the "Ohio." That vessel left Hull for America. What happened? Several tubes burst and some men were scalded. The boilers were taken out of her and others put in and she has been doing her work splendidly since.

I shall now come down to what occurred a few weeks ago. What do we find now? I blush—I think shame—to read the list of the Admiralty vessels that are now lying in our dockyards crippled and useless, and although the hon. Member who represents the Admiralty says the word scrap-iron should not be used, I would ask, What do you call the stuff from the "Hermes"? Is not that scrap-iron? What about the "Europa"? What about all your expense and your vessels lying crippled? If you do not understand 'what scrap-iron is it is time you went into a shipyard to sec what it means. Why has this great calamity befallen the British Navy? I call it nothing else than a great calamity. I, as an old engineer, can fully realise the great calamity that has overtaken our fleet by the generators that are therein. I will show you in a minute exactly why it has arisen. I have here the Boiler Committee's Report. The Committee sat in 1892. and the Report was issued in 1893. I want to bring this home to the country from one end to the other, and I want to know the reason why this has taken place. I want the House to note clearly that the Report was issued in 1893, and then you can apportion the responsibility on whom you may. The Committee recommend the fitting of tubulous boilers in vessels for experimental purposes. Then mark this, for it is the crux of the whole question— It is considered that only those tubulous boilers that are tilted with straight tubes, arranged so as to be readily cleaned and examined, should be considered as suitable for trial with the view, if found satisfactory, to their being fitted in the larger class of warships. That is the recommendation of the 1893 Committee. "So as to be readily cleaned and examined!" Where is the water-tube boiler which you can clean and examine readily? I know of none. You can't do it. You can't do it in the Belleville or the Babcock and Wilcox boiler. I defy any engineer to say how he can examine it. This Committee guarded itself in a very scientific way. My point-is this—Why was that Committee's Report ignored? I believe that at that time the orders were actually given out for Belleville boilers for the "Powerful" and the "Terrible." After the boilers were put into these cruisers they found what they were worth in the results of both ships. The Committee recommended strongly what was to be done, but what do we find? We find that, instead of Proceeding cautiously, there is a continuous ordering of French boilers. We find not only that, but also that orders came from Admiralty officials that firms tendering for cruisers and battleships and engines had as a sine quá non to fit up machinery to make these water-tube boilers. I never heard the like of it in all my engineering experience, extending over half a century. The firms were put to an expense of £10,000 or £12,000 to provide machinery for the making of these boilers which this Report condemns.

My sole interest in this matter is what I call the national interest. I have always looked upon this question, as both sides-of the House will bear me out, as free entirely from party politics, and as it affects the safety of our Empire, the strength of our first line of defence. But it may be asked, Why did the Admiralty adopt these boilers? Why did they plunge so eagerly in and tit sixty or seventy vessels with these boilers at a cost of hundreds of thousands of pounds? They relied on M. Belleville, in Paris. I do not blame him. He is a smart business man, who came over to this country with his tempting wares, and for want of a little caution and inquiry to get to the bottom of the whole thing on the part of the Admiralty, he has exploited John Bull to the tune of a quarter of a million for royalties, let alone the cost of making the boilers, for they are-far dearer than the old ordinary boilers which have given such satisfaction in the mercantile marine all over the world. Ships with the ordinary boilers have run thousands of miles in storm and shine and have never come to grief. You cannot do that with your water-tube boilers. I challenged the Admiralty years ago to run a cruiser over the Atlantic- at full speed, and they would not do it. I shall tell you why. If they had attempted to fire the whole of the water-tube boilers at one time, and to take the maximum power out of the engines, the boilers would have come to grief before the ship had been ton hours at sea. Now, forsooth, we are brought face to face with this sorrowful: document. I don't wish to be too technical. I am speaking to gentlemen— some of whom are engineers, but the majority, I daresay, are not. Some time ago I wrote a little paragraph to enlighten hon. Members that the cause of the failures of these boats I have enumerated in bygone years is exactly the same as now in connection with the warships. I stated in that paragraph that the principle of these boilers is opposed to perfect circulation, and that no fittings, automatic or otherwise, will conquer the natural law of danger inherent in their design. I sincerely hope that I have not been too technical. I say briefly that the water-tube boiler for marine purposes cannot work. You cannot get circulation to ensure safety. The Report of the 1892 Committee says exactly the same thing. The Committee which recently inquired into the subject brought a great amount of engineering science and practical knowledge to bear upon it, and here is their first objection to these boilers— The circulation of water is defective and uncertain, because of the resistance offered by the great length of tube between the feed and steam collectors, the friction of the junction boxes, and the small holes in the nipples between the feed collector and the generator tubes, which also are liable to be obstructed, and may thus become a source of danger. That is the crux of the whole thing. The Committee also say:— The water gauges not indicating with certainty the amount of water in the boiler. This has led to serious accidents. And so they go on to condemn the boilers. I don't want to labour the subject. I come now to this point: What is to be done to get these ships of ours into first-class steaming condition? It is a patent fact, known to all the world, that you cannot steam your ships full speed. You may creep along at 7, 8, 9, or 10 knots or you may even get up a spurt of 15 knots, but what is the use of designing a boat for 22 knots if you cannot take 15 out of her? That is playing with engineering. The Boiler Committee has unequivocally condemned the boilers. I am not going into the question of who is to blame for it, but I am going into this question. It may be said, rightly up to a certain point, "Oh, we cannot take the boilers out of those ships they are in. It would entail such a delay to our ships, and cost such a lot of money!" All these excuses will be brought forward, no doubt. I ask this question, Is the Board of Admiralty justified in using boilers that have been condemned by their own Committee? I am now coming to the practical point of view, and I am going to speak more directly to the hon. Gentleman who represents the Admiralty. If I were in his position I would come down to this House, and I would stand up there like a man. I would take the House into my confidence, I would frankly admit that we had made a huge blunder, and I would tell the whole story from beginning to end. If you want to be successful when you are in difficulties, all you have to do is to grasp the nettle. I have had my difficulties and mishaps, but I did not run away from them. I did not shelter myself behind a piece of paper or anything of that sort. I have great faith in the hon. Member the present Secretary to the Admiralty. I believe he will do good work. I want him to grasp this water-tube boiler question in a practical way for the safety of the country. I want him to take ship after ship and have the boilers taken out. It would not take so much money as you imagine. I say take these boilers out of His Majesty's Royal yacht first. For the sake of King and Queen that boat must not go to sea with condemned boilers. I sincerely hope the Admiralty will rise to the occasion, and frankly admit that they have made a colossal mistake. Come down to the House and ask for the money to repair the blunder. We are always generous to the Navy. We vote you millions. Do you expect us to be satisfied with ships which cannot steam, and which have boilers that burst? No, you want the best for your money, and you have not got it, I am sorry to say. I warn the House, and I warn the hon. Member the Secretary to the Admiralty that if you experiment more with these water-tube boilers you will come to grief again. You will burn twice the quantity of coal, and you will require 30 or 40 per cent. more firemen, as the Committee found when on board the Cunard s.s. "Saxonia" the other day. That vessel's steaming was an object lesson to the Admiralty.

In conclusion, I say to this House— for the sake of our Navy, for the sake of our first line of defence, for the sake of the protection of our great mercantile marine—we must have the best ships that can be obtained, ships which can be depended upon to steam at their full speed, or to go slow as may be wished. But don't let the amour propre of any individual or body of individuals imperil the national safety.

*MR. FITZALAN HOPE (Sheffield, Brightside)

I hope I may be excused for touching on a matter which is not purely naval, but I feel that in doing so there are several difficulties in the way. The subject I allude to is the relationship between the Treasury and the Admiralty. I would rather say the bearing upon the Admiralty of the present financial system of the country. The difficulties I feel are these. In the first place, I quite admit that the Admiralty is less subordinate to the financial system of the country than is the War Office, owing to the fact that the great constructing works are largely exempt from the ordinary financial system of the country. In the second place, when we have in power a Government like the present, that knows its duty and does it, the evils of a bad system are minimised; but surely what we should like is not so much a system that is bad bolstered up by the ability of individual Ministers as a system that can support whatever Minister may be in power. I should like to read a few words to the House, although they are familiar already to a large number of Members:— There is the Treasury, and I say that the exercise of its powers in governing every department of State is not for the public benefit. The Treasury has obtained a position in regard to the rest of the Departments of the Government that the House of Commons obtained in the time of the Stuart Dynasty. It has the power of the purse, and by exercising the power of the purse it claims a voice in all decisions of administrative authority and policy. I think that much delay and many doubtful resolutions have been the result of the peculiar position which through many generations the Treasury has occupied. I understand that by the rules and customs of the House I may not say who uttered these words, or in what place they were uttered, but they wore uttered at a time of great national emergency and peril as an excuse for and an explanation of the deplorable situation in which the country found itself some fifteen months ago.

I do not know that the public in this country at all realise what Treasury control means. I remember having read in a novel of a club started by certain young men with the express object of I combining parsimony and profligacy. That exactly represents the present financial system of this country. Take any Department you wish, and in one branch of it you will find everything at a standstill. The work necessary to be done has been too much for the original Estimate, and no Supplementary Estimate can be obtained. In another branch of that Department you will find officials tumbling over one another in order to get rid of their balance before the' 51st March. What is the result? The result is to deaden responsibility and crush out initiative even on the part of the very best officials. No man in charge of a branch of any Department in the State has any incentive to economy, because he knows if he saves, his work and the work of his Department will not benefit, and that the only result will be an infinitesimal reduction of the National Debt. On the other hand, in some other branch you will find another official who knows from sad experience that he can get no more money and he makes no attempt. He spends what he can get, then throws up the sponge and makes no further effort. Individual cases may not be very serious. It does not matter very much, for example, whether the lavatory accommodation at some public office is not based on the most modern system, but when money is asked for an experiment which may decide the result of a very great war, and when it is denied, that is a matter to which the House and the country should not be indifferent. You cannot, of course have Departments submitting uncontrolled or unchecked Estimates. If that were to be done a reaction would set in. The Chancellor of the Exchequer should be able to check the total for each Department, and I would earnestly submit—and my opinion is shared by those who know much more about the subject—that the practical control of the Chancellor of the Exchequer should be confined to the totals only, and that, at any rate, the heads of the great spending Departments should have practically a free hand in spending the money given them by Parliament to the best of their judgment and according to the advice of their experts. Of course, if anything of this kind were to be carried out it would be an enormous change, but in the meantime I venture to submit three suggestions.

In the first place I would submit that a department should have the power of meeting a deficit in one branch out of a surplus in another, I know that in the Admiralty and the War Office this may be done, but only by the authority of the Treasury, and I venture to suggest that instead of the authority of the Treasury it should be done by the Order of the King in Council. Secondly, I would venture to suggest that the First Lord of the Admiralty as well as the Secretary of State for War should have some power of meeting an expected expenditure during the recess on their own responsibility. Either you might vote a sum unappropriated which they might on their own responsibility appropriate during the recess, or you might under certain conditions give them the power to raise a certain sum under certain strict conditions. In the third place I would submit that the unexpended balances on all works of construction should be carried over from one financial year to the next. I made this suggestion to a gentleman of great experience, and his answer was. "Young man, you are laying hands on the Ark of the Covenant." Well, Germany has got rid of the Ark of the Covenant altogether and is not a bit the worse. In Germany, in all non-recurrent expenditure as well as in many items for recurrent expenditure, the balances are carried over from one financial year to the next, and in that way those responsible for the management of the department can watch the markets, and buy the right thing in the right way at the right time, and bring to the service of the State the ordinary business methods by which commercial concerns prosper. I know I shall be met with the argument of the constitutional control of Parliament, but what does that control now amount to? Of course there is the Public Acts Committee, but that represents consideration of money that has been expended, not control over money to be expended. If we take the theory and compare it with the practice, we will find that while the theory is complete in practice, the very last thing that is ordinarily discussed is finance. Attacks are made on the responsible heads of departments on the Estimates, but if any attempt were made to argue the Estimates on financial grounds it would be resented by a large number of hon. Members eager to disburthen themselves of all sorts of ideas which have nothing to do with finance. The German system preserves full and adequate control. The accounts show the amount of the Vote of the previous year, the amount brought forward, the amount required for the year out of the revenue of the year, and every information that may possibly be required, and if it is found that the system is being abused, and that large balances are being improperly accumulated, the remedy is simple, namely, to cut down the Vote for the next year. In offering these remarks to the House I must disclaim any idea of an attack on the permanent officials of the Treasury. We have every reason to be proud of them with all their long traditions, their unsullied probity, and their whole-hearted devotion to the State. It is the fault not of the men, but of the system, although in time of war men rise and overcome the system. It is not what is refused in time of war, but the parings and the clippings in times of peace that make the mischief. Many a hundred pounds denied in 1894 meant thousands spent in 1900. The officials live in an atmosphere of their own. They never get directly into touch with the men and things about which they have to decide, and the Treasury officials are two removes from the men and matters they have to decide. The system they have to administer is permeated with the traditions of the Manchester period, and in the course of continual refusal they have become a kind of embodiment of the universal negative.

I venture to submit these suggestions to the House as palliatives only. In my humble opinion we shall not have adequate security for the administration of the Navy until we trust the First Lord of the Admiralty to spend the money that Parliament gives him as his judgment and conscience think fit, in his own way and in his own time.

MR. KEARLEY (Devonport)

My hon. I friend the Member for Dundee stated that the sum of money taken this year for new expenditure is larger than ever, but at all events it is some consolation to us to know that the greater portion of it is going to be spent on the completion of work already in hand. As regards the remainder of the sum which represents what is called the new programme, it only amounts to half a million, and I think we need not pay any serious attention to that programme. There are thirty vessels contemplated in it; but this policy of putting down before the House of Commons a number of vessels to be built that will not be touched —and the Admiralty know it—at the end of the year no longer misleads anyone. We have become thoroughly accustomed to it. It will be time enough to consider the new proposals when the keel plates have been laid down. Two of the ships voted last year were only laid down ten days ago.

Now I wish to say a word about these arrears. The hon. Gentleman who is now responsible for the Admiralty in this House, and of whom we have great expectations, frankly admitted the state of affairs when he told us that of the twenty-three battleships voted since the completion of the "Majestic" class only five had been completed. I believe it is true that four are commissioned, but one certainly is not. If we consider the dates when these various ships were laid down, it is certain that there ought to be five more of these battleships completed before the end of the present year, and there ought to be added to our Navy ten valuable first class battleships, all of which have been delayed. This delay does not only extend to battleships. The hon. Gentleman has told us that since the completion of the "Diadem" class thirty cruisers had been voted, and a great many of them ought to be ready by now. We get the same explanation year by year. Mr. Goschen one year took refuge in the engineers' strike, which was undoubtedly a factor at that time, but it is trotted out again by the hon. Member as being still a factor. I think the strike ought now to be struck off the effective list, because, whatever effect it may have had in 1897, we are now through other causes going from bad to worse, and the delay which might be considered valid in the cir- cumstances of 1897 has now become absolutely chronic. This delay applies to all kinds of material and to all ships, whether they are being built in His Majesty's yards or elsewhere. It applies to armour, machinery, guns, and hulls. The other evening the hon. Gentleman informed us that armour was mainly responsible for the delay. We know that in recent years there have been three changes in armour, but it must be I said that the Admiralty themselves are! mainly responsible for the existing delays. They do not give their specifications out until months after a ship has been laid down, and consequently the armour manufacturers have no opportunity to complete the armour in such a time as would be necessary to enable the ship to be finished at the earliest possible moment. Therefore the Admiralty are not entitled to say that all these delays are attributable to the contractors. Many of them are due to the methods— or rather the lack of method—of the Admiralty.

The hon. Gentleman endeavoured to console us with the statement that we still hold our lead in expeditious shipbuilding. In 1894 we did pride ourselves that we could build battleships quicker than any other nation. That was then true, but that disadvantage has altogether disappeared, and we are lucky indeed to-day if we can get a battleship completed within four years of its being laid down, whereas in 1894 we turned out two of our finest ships, the "Majestic" and the "Magnificent," in two years. At the present moment Germany is rapidly giving us the go-by, and if we drag along in this way I am confident that in two or three years time we will find that Germany has gone ahead of us. Germany has ample resources and also the determination to put things through in a practical, businesslike manner. Russia, which we do not take to be a nation of enormous energy, has turned out a cruiser, the largest ever launched, in thirty months. We are not able to turn out a cruiser of such magnitude in thirty months. We would want three or four years. We are told that it is the English contractors that bring about all these delays, but it is curious that a British contractor can build for foreign nations ships of almost identical size in two years. The Japanese have had completed in this country by contract two of the finest battleships afloat, and they were delivered in a little over two years. Why cannot we get similar work from the contractors? It is not that they are not patriotic; it is the Admiralty themselves that are mainly responsible. They will not put orders for machinery in hand until the hull has been building for a long time, and they delay their specifications for armour and so on. Howover, it is a very simple matter if the contractors are at fault. It is the easiest thing in the world to make the date on which a ship is to be delivered part of the contract. What is the difficulty in the way of doing that? At all events the danger is fully recognised in the country. Supposing we are suddenly plunged into a naval war, would it not be a great reflection on the Admiralty when the country realised that they were short of probably ten battleships which ought to have been in existence? That would jeopardise the whole position. Again, we know very well in these critical times that on our foreign stations we have ships that are obsolete in the sense that they are not the very best ships we are capable of producing, whereas our competitors have the very best ships they have been able to produce. Another danger is that in the Mediterranean we are wofully short of cruisers. The Admiralty may say that they have these cruisers in our yards and can commission them at short notice, but a ship commissioned at short notice is less effective than a ship which is already in commission.

How do the Government propose to deal with these arrears? They are going once more to resort to the expedient of appointing a Committee to advise them as to the cause of the delays and how they can be obviated. They are going to call into a great public Department outside experts to tell them how to manage their business. Sir Thomas Sutherland and other men of great experience are on the Committee. But it is humiliating that the Admiralty, with all its traditions and all its opportunities for obtaining experience, have to invoke outsiders to explain to them what has happened, and to prevent it happening again. I hope we shall not always be subject to outside experts' information on these matters.

As to the personnel, we are going to vote a greater number of men than ever before, an increase of nearly 4,000. It would be interesting to know how many of the men voted last year are borne at present. I see there was a deficiency of 2,600 at the beginning of the year, and I have no doubt the hon. Gentleman will be able to tell us as to the actual number now borne. There are many of us who hold the opinion, despite the large numbers we have been voting for the last year or two, that we will not have enough men to man the ships which will be finished within the next twelve months. It is estimated that ten ships will be completed, and they alone will exhaust 7,000 men, apart from the cruisers altogether, and it is estimated by some of us that there will be a deficit, in one direction or another, of at least 10,000 men, that there will be no margin to meet a large addition to the Fleet. I will illustrate what I mean by taking the First Lord's own statement. Last year we recruited 2,630 men for the Marines, but at the same time we lost 2,165, so that the net gain was only 465 men. Again, it is notorious that we are unable to secure the number of skilled ratings we require, the reason being that we are trying to get them at a lower rate than the market justifies. The result is that we not only do not get the quantity, but what we do get is not of a high quality.

The alternative presented by the hon. Gentleman to a large increase of the active list is the strengthening of the Reserve. At the present moment the Royal Naval Reserve is not popular. There has been a serious decrease in that service, and if we want to make it popular and to increase it we will have to make friends with the shipowners. We turn our backs on the shipowners, who are the only men who have it in their power to give us the sort of young men we require. If we can induce the shipowners to help then we will rehabilitate the Reserve and make it as it used to be —something worth talking about. The whole system brought forward by Mr. Goschen about two years ago has absolutely broken down. He told us that we had a paper Reserve, but that he was determined, come what might. to give us a trained Reserve. He called on men to go to sea compulsorily for six months in the first year, and when we were anxious in the following year to know how that worked out we were told that it was working very successfully, although some of us did not think so. Now, however, it is admitted that it has broken down. The real reason why it has broken down is that you cannot expect men to give up their shore occupations and go to sea for six months. We are now told that the six months period has been abandoned, that three months has been substituted, and that even that will not be compulsory. The Admiralty have now started a new Reserve altogether, to be called the Fleet Reserve. The Fleet Reserve is a new experiment, but whatever happens to it every man in it will be a trained man. We are told that the Admiralty expects to have 7,000 men in this Reserve. That is very misleading, because you are transferring 5,000 men from the Seamen's Pensioners Reserve, which consists of men who have served their full time.

MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER

I explained that clearly, and stated the number that would be transferred.

MR. KEARLEY

I am not in the least imputing anything to the hon. Gentleman, hut the fact remains that these 7,000 men are not new men. There is no particular feature about the A scheme except that you are admitting Marines for the first time, but that scheme will not be available until 1923, because it will be twenty-two years before boys entering the service now can pass to the Reserve. The inclusion in the Reserve of short service men who have only served their first term will have very far-reaching consequences, because in effect it is the commencement of a short service system in the Navy, and whether it will be beneficial or not, it is impossible to say. Navy men are strong advocates of doing nothing to encourage short service in the Navy, but this provision will undoubtedly encourage men to leave at the expiration of their first term of service instead of serving on for a continuous service pension. I think it will be bound to be attractive because the men are to be paid 3s. 6d. a week, and at fifty-five years of age will have a pension of £12 a year. You may benefit the Reserve, but you certainly will not benefit the long service system in the Navy. The Admiralty have, however, protected themselves to some extent by limiting the number of the B Reserve to 15,000. With regard to the artificers, if they are still to be part of the scheme I would suggest that there would be more needed in the dockyards. However, that is a matter which can only be tested by time.

I have just two questions to ask on matters relating to South Africa. As the hon. Gentleman is aware, the Government have announced that they intend to give pensions to the widows of the soldiers who have fallen in South Africa. Naturally that must be extended to sailors also. What I want to know is whether the Admiralty have considered the question, or whether they have decided to revive the Greenwich pensions, because the amount to be given by the Government is 5s. a week, whereas! the Greenwich pension is only 3s. 11d. The other question is with reference to the treatment of the warrant officers who I have distinguished themselves in South Africa. Their conduct has been testified to by commanding officers and generals in the field. I am not quite sure of the exact number of warrant officers concerned, but certainly five, if not more, were mentioned in despatches. All the soldiers and the naval officers who have been mentioned have received recognition, either by promotion or the D.S.O., but none of the warrant officers except one have received any recognition whatever. There is a difficulty in the matter I know, because the regulations governing the H.S.O. limit it to commissioned officers, and with regard to promotion there is a great dislike on the part of the warrant officers themselves to be made senior to those senior to them on the list. Still we are bound to give these men some recognition, and I would ask the hon. Gentleman to tell us what he proposes to do. He informed me the other day that the matter was under consideration. I know what that means in the ordinary way, but I hope that genuine attention is being given to this matter, and that the hon. Gentleman will be able to tell us that the regulations have been amended so that warrant officers may be included in the D.S.O. This is a matter affecting the whole of the lower deck, and I hope the hon. Gentleman will be able to give us some assurance regarding it.

MR. WILLIAM REDMOND said that he had put on the Paper an Amendment which he proposed to move with reference to colonial contributions to the Navy, but he now understood that he would not be in order in moving it. He would, however, direct the attention of the House to what he considered a most unjustifiable thing in connection with the maintenance of the Navy. As far as he could gather, the contributions of the colonies to the maintenance of the Navy were insignificant and altogether insufficient when the great services which the Fleet performed for the colonies were considered. He knew that Australia contributed a very insignificant amount, though he could not find what the exact sum was, and he would ask the Secretary to the Admiralty if he would be good enough to make a statement showing clearly how much was contributed directly or indirectly by any or all of the colonies towards the maintenance of the Navy. Ireland, which was called upon to pay a very large sum, received directly, at all events, very little return, and it was manifestly unjust that an impoverished country like Ireland should be called upon to contribute some millions to the Navy while rich and flourishing colonies were not asked to contribute practically anything at all, he maintained that Australia, Canada, and other colonies derived directly a great deal more profit and benefit from the existence of the British Navy than Ireland did. Australia had a large number of ships continually in her waters, and yet contributed practically nothing towards the Navy. He had heard the question of Imperial Federation mentioned, but whether Imperial Federation was good or bad, he would certainly say that they ought to have Imperial Federation to the extent that every colony desiring the presence and services of ships of the British Navy should in common fairness be called upon to subscribe towards the-maintenance of the Navy. They were told about the great devotion of the colonies to the Mother Country, and of the great services which colonials had rendered to the Empire in South Africa, but it was certainly extraordinary notwithstanding all that talk that these great self-governing colonies made no contribution to the Fleet on which they de- pended for the protection of their commerce. With regard to Cape Colony the matter was somewhat different. If he was not mistaken, Cape Colony contributed £30,000 a year, and it was an extraordinary coincidence that directly after Cape Colony, which had a Dutch majority, decided to contribute to the maintenance of the Imperial Navy, war was declared in South Africa. That was a bad return to make for the action of the Cape Parliament, and at a time, too, when a Dutch ministry was in power and there was a Dutch Prime Minister at the Cape. Was it fair that the already overtaxed people of Ireland. Scotland. England and Wales should be called upon to bear the whole cost of the Imperial Navy? He was surprised that the question had not been raised by some English Member of Parliament, as he thought it was a question upon which almost all parties agreed.

There was also another matter which he desired to mention. He had repeatedly asked questions in the House as to whether the Admiralty could not from time to time send a cruiser round the coast of Ireland to protect the fisheries from illegal trawling. He had asked Mr. Goschen—he thought he was Lord Goschen now, but was not quite certain, as the rapidity with which some people became ennobled was bewildering —but he refused to send a single ship to protect Irish fisheries. Last summer, in Wexford, where he was living, fishermen complained to him that steam trawlers were destroying their fishing grounds, and they wished to know whether the Government would do anything for them. He told them that he had asked questions on the subject, but got very little satisfaction. The fishermen said that, although the taxpayers of Ireland were paying a considerable amount towards the maintenance of the Navy, they hardly ever saw a battleship at all. Surely it was not too much to expect that the Admiralty would send some of their small ships to patrol the fishing grounds from time to time. Ho asked the Secretary to the Admiralty whether he could not undertake that this slight return might in future be given to Irish taxpayers in compensation for their contributions to the Navy. That was a demand which he thought every fair-minded man would support. He had heard hon. Members from Scotland making the same complaint as regarded Scotch fisheries, and he hoped there would be a change in the attitude hitherto adopted by the Admiralty. It was one of the things which made Irishmen dissatisfied with the system of Government in Ireland. They paid millions towards the Navy, but the great majority of the Irish people, even those living on the seaboard, never saw a ship at all. Of course, the stock argument was that the British Navy was to protect the coast of Ireland from invasion. That was absurd. If Ireland ever needed the protection of the Fleet it was simply because of her connection with England. If Ireland were left to herself no other country would interfere with her.

It being midnight, the debate stood adjourned.

Debate to be resumed To-morrow.

AYES.
Acland-Hood, Capt. Sir Alex. F.	Cecil, Evelyn (Aston Manor)	Elibank, Master of
Agnew, Sir Andrew Noel	Cecil, Lord Hugh (Greenwich)	Fellowes, Hon. Ailwyn E.
Arkwright, John Stanhope	Chamberlain, Rt. Hn. J. (Birm.)	Fergusson, Rt. Hn. Sir J. (Manc'r
Arnold-Forster, Hugh O.	Chamberlain, J. Austen (Worc'r	Fielden, Edward Brocklehurst
Arrol, Sir William	Chapman, Edward	Finch, George A.
Asher, Alexander	Cochrane, Hon. Thos. H. A. E.	Finlay, Sir Robert Bannatyne
Atkinson, Rt. Hon. John	Collings, Rt. Hon. Jesse	Fisher, William Hayes
Bagot, Capt. Josceline FitzRoy	Colomb, Sir John Charles Ready	FitzGerald, Sir Robert Penrose-
Bain, Colonel James Robert	Colville, John	Fitzroy, Hon. Edward A.
Balfour, Rt. Hn. A. J. (Manch'r.	Corbett, A. Cameron (Glasgow)	Fletcher, Sir Henry
Balfour, Rt. Hn. Ger. W. (Leeds)	Corbett, T. L. (Down, North)	Fuller, J. M. F.
Banbary, Frederick George	Cranborne, Viscount	Goddard, Daniel Ford
Bathurst, Hon. Allen Benjamin	Cubitt, Hon Henry	Godson, Sir Augustus Fredk.
Beach, Rt. Hn. Sir M. H. (Bristol	Cust, Henry John C.	Gore, Hon. F. S. Ormsby-
Bignold, Arthur	Dalrymple, Sir Charles	Goschen, Hon. George Joachim
Bill, Charles	Davies, Alfred (Carmarthen)	Goulding, Edward Alfred
Black, Alexander William	Davies, Sir H. D. (Chatham)	Gray, Ernest (West Ham)
Boscawen, Arthur Griffith-	Dewar, John A. (Inverness-sh.	Greene, Sir E. W. (Bury St. Ed.
Brodrick, Rt. Hon. Sir John	Dickson, Charles Scott	Grenfell, William Henry
Brookfield, Colonel Montagu	Dickson-Poynder, Sir John P.	Gretton, John
Bull, William James	Digby, John K. D. Wingfield-	Greville, Hon. Ronald
Bullard, Sir Harry	Douglas, Rt. Hon. A. Akers-	Groves, James Grimble
Butcher, John George	Duke, Henry Edward	Guest, Hon. Ivor Churchill
Caldwell, James	Duncan, James H.	Guthrie, Walter Murray
Cavendish, V. C. W. (Derbysh.	Durning-Lawrence, Sir Edwin	Hambro, Charles Eric
Cawley, Frederick	Egerton, Hon. A. de Tatton	Hamilton, Rt. Hn. Lord G. (Mid'x