HC Deb 14 March 1901 vol 90 cc1605-69

Older read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Main Question [12th March]. "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

Question again proposed.

SIR H. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN (Stirling Burghs)

The Estimates which are to be submitted when we go into Committee are of exceptional importance, and I think it would not be too much to say that the discussion of them may be almost characterised as momentous. I am confirmed in that opinion by the fact that the hon. Member for Great Yarmouth, speaking with the authority of one whose letters are admitted to the columns of The Times, the other day invited me and my hon. freinds to speak now or for ever be silent. The hon. and gallant Gentleman is perfectly right. This is an occasion on which we are bound to take exception, if we see it right to do so, to these great Estimates.

Now, last year the excess of the normal Estimates of the year over the preceding year ran to five millions; on this occasion they only, if I may use that word, amount to three and a half millions, In previous years of the present Government's administration they have built up the ordinary Estimates of the Army from eighteen millions to the figure at which they How stand—namely, twenty nine millions. The Secretary for War said with great truth that we had become inured to these huge figures. We have been accustomed to them and do not realise what they are. It may be asked why, seeing that the actual increase is not so great as the increase last year, we did not make our protest last year. For that I think I can give two or three very excellent reasons. There are considerable differences between our position this year and last year. Last year our criticism was overborne by the fact of the emergencies which existed. I am not speaking at all of war expenditure. There has been no impediment placed upon any expenditure for the purposes of the war in order to bring it as soon as possible to a satisfactory and triumphant conclusion. I am speaking only of the normal Estimates. Last year we could not with a calm mind discuss the increase in the Estimates, because we were overborne by the consciousness of a great emergency, and the proposals of the Government were, by their own admission, of the nature of shifts and expedients to meet that emergency. The House, therefore, exercised great reserve, and many of us who had something to say held our peace. Now we are free from that necessity. I am not going to say that the war is over, or is on the eve of being over, but the great emergency, at all events, is over for the present. The hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Essex the other day referred to one of two of the proposals which have been carried out by way of increasing the military strength of this country, and I think he very properly raised a smile, almost, on the face of everyone who listened to him when he spoke of the Reserve battalions—the stout elderly gentlemen of whom they are composed— and when he described the process- which has been going on quite recently of hurrying on board ship at Southampton horseless and saddleless Yeomanry, who may be anything in the world, but are certainly not Yeomen.

Following the example of the lion, and gallant Gentleman. I think we may feel ourselves more tree than we were to discuss some of these matters, but it is my intention in this debate to avoid as much as possible questions of detail, and to confine myself to the larger questions of military policy which have arisen, Another thing which makes a difference between this year and last year is this—that this year's proposal has been announced as a great epoch-making reform. It has been heralded by receiving a prominent place in the gracious Speech from the Throne, ft was heralded before that by a good many speeches at the time of the General Election—that General Election, which will be an inexhaustible topic, for all those who wish to understand the methods of the present Government. It is an object-lesson which we are not likely soon to forget. Success does not always justify the methods that are used to obtain it. We were told that if the country would only place confidence in the right hon. Gentleman opposite there, would be a permanent solution of the great military problem. Does any one see an element of finality or permanence in the proposals that are now brought forward? It is true that the right hon. Gentleman has only been three or four months in office, but as we are all aware lie is perhaps more familiar than any other individual among us with all questions of military policy, and the accident of his having been engaged in another department for a year or two does not prevent him from being in all respects most excellently qualified to deal with the problem. His principal adviser, the Commander-in-Chief, has, however, only been in office for a few months. We have the most intense admiration for and gratitude to Lord Roberts, and there is probably no man at the present moment to whose opinion on ordinary military subjects the country would be more willing to bow. At the same time, I must make this observation —that I think Lord Roberts's name and fame are a little too largely invoked. There is a rule of this House prohibiting hon. Members from introducing into debate the name of the Sovereign; I almost think, sometimes, that we ought to extend that rule to include the Commander-in-Chief. Even Lord Roberts's great services and career ought not lo dazzle ns and blind ns to such obvious mistakes, it they exist. I am aware that occasions may arise when the opinion of a leading military expert may be quoted in substantiation of that which a Minister stales in this House. I remember one occasion when I adopted that course myself; but the judgment which I quoted from my principal military authority was scouted as of no effect whatever. Here it is a little worse, because the authority of the Commander-in-Chief is constantly being brought in, and I venture to say it is neither fair to Lord Roberts himself, nor is it altogether proper in relation to Parliament. We must remember this, that the Commander-in-Chief has passed nearly the whole of his military life in India, in what I may call dealing with the finished article. He is an immense authority on everything connected with the use of troops; but, from the necessity of the case, he has had as yet no experience, no individual personal knowledge, if the peculiar difficulties that are found in this country in furnishing the raw material out of which the finished article is made, the precise force we have to maintain, the social and local susceptibilities we have to consider, and the sensitive market from which that raw material is drawn. All these matters an officer, however distinguished, who has been all his career in India can have no acquaintance with. Lord Roberts has just come home from a great command, where he has greatly added not only to his fame, but also to his knowledge of the British Army. But I think that if we are to be guided by what we call the lessons of the war great caution must be used. The conditions of tins war are in many respects must exceptional— exceptional in the demands made upon us. exceptional in the nature of the warfare. Where else are we likely to be called upon to light, not an army, but a whole population, with all the manhood of the people skilled in the use of horse and rifle and well found in both? Where shall we find a country at all similar to the scene of operations? We shall therefore incur risk of being warped and vitiated in our whole military system if we frame it to meet a series of repetitions of this war in South Africa. There are, of course, numbers of lessons to be drawn, and no one is more capable of suggesting them to the right hon. Gentleman than the present Commander-in-Chief— I mean in regard to the efficiency of our weapons, in regard to our mobilisation and transport arrangements, the character of our equipment, and the training of officers and men. On those and kindred subjects Lord Roberts can very rightly advise us, but we must not proceed on the supposition that any future war will be similar to this one, and I think we should do well to look with suspicion on any proposal that bears a trace of that error.

Another circumstance gives special importance to these Estimates. It is this—that this is a new departure; this is a new declaration of policy. In the first place, the Government proposes to add an army corps to the scheme of the Army, and that army corps is destined not to the domestic defence of these islands, but to be sent abroad. And, in the second place, the right hon. Gentleman took up an ominous attitude with regard to compulsory service, because he let us see plainly that, although he objects to compulsion, yet, if voluntary recruiting fails to furnish the men required for his scheme and if the scheme therefore comes into conflict with the right hon. Gentleman's objections, it will not be the scheme that will be made to yield, it will be his objections. There is much shaking of the head now over the possibility of the exhaustion of our military recruiting resources. By and by there will be much shrugging of shoulders when we are told that that eventuality has actually occurred. This has been plainly indicated by the right hon. Gentleman, and it marks a totally new departure from anything that has gone before. I take exception to the proposals of the right hon. Gentleman and of the Government on both grounds I hold that no adequate justification has been offered for this new army corps, and I hold that conscription in any form will not be endured by our people, and ought not to be imposed upon them; and, further, if it were imposed, it is inapplicable to the peculiar military requirements of our Empire. What reason does the right hon. Gentleman offer for this new army corps for foreign service? He discards the idea that a wise foreign policy may keep us out of trouble. Our neighbours, he says, have an eye to our wealth; the goodwill and forbearance of foreign Powers are a mere quicksand to the right hon. Gentleman. And he says this, remember, on behalf of his Majesty's Government. I am quoting his own words. There are two continents besides Africa in which he says we have great "commitments"—great interests to defend. I should like to have a little more information about this; and then he speaks of European "entanglements." Entanglements is not a nice word. The last time we, heard of it was at Ladysmith, and it arose in some degree, at any rate, on that occasion from a rash promise made by the Imperial Government, and it is the same Government now which again speaks of entanglements. The right hon. Gentleman says— We cannot suppose that, if ever we should unhappily become entangled in European complications, we could fulfil our engagements to our allies by limiting our operations solely t o the action of our Fleet, keeping our soldiers in barrack's at home. What is all this cloudy talk about entanglements and commitments and allies? We have a right to know before any of this money is voted. Here is a great additional burden proposed to be put upon the taxpayers, and as a matter of fairness to the taxpayers they ought to be informed. If we do not ask for this now we shall be told afterwards that we were consenting parties. This air of "I could an' if I would" say something will not do in a matter so grave I believe that either such hints are serious, and in that case they should be made more explicit, or they are mere mischievous trifling. Some readjustment of the units of the Army is a trifle, neither here nor there, but these indications of Imperial necessities are momentous. Indeed, if I were to guess at what is indicated when we hear of one continent after another where we have great commitments, it is not three but thirteen army corps that would be required. Let me say this. As we are here within four walls and nothing can get outside, we can afford to talk with perfect frankness and sincerity. What is an army corps in this country? Sir the expression "army corps" is like the great word Mesopotamia —it is a blessed Word. It deludes the earnest and it imposes oil the simple. But in this case "army corps" has another feature. In tins country an army corps is a pure fiction. It is convenient for purposes of administration; it is a useful thing—to use the regular phrase—to work up to, but it has no other value. No army corps was ever put on board ship to leave this country, and I doubt if it ever will be.

*SIR HERBERT MAXWELL (Wigton)

We have sent out six to South Africa and we had two at Waterloo.

SIR H. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

In the form of an army corps? The right hon. Gentleman says with perfect truth that during this war Ave have, sent out to South Africa the equivalent of six army corps, but not a single army corps constituted as such. In other countries it is quite different. In Continental countries the army corps has a reality it can never have here. There it is localised and stereotyped: and, as they have no drafts and no reliefs to send to foreign garrisons, it can be maintained rigidly, and. when the necessity comes, marched off to the trout. Let the House never forget this—ours is necessarily what I should call a fluid Army. The units must be interchangeable and elastic. The composition of the force which leaves this country will have to be adjusted to the necessities of the particular climate of the country and campaign in which it will be employed. That is not so in the case of Germany or France, where the army corps have to march over the frontier into a. country homogeneous with their own and in all particulars familiar to them. Therefore the alarming proposal is not the creation of a new army corps, which has no terrors for me, knowing the nature of the word; it is not the mere fact that some military units are in future to be known by another name; the alarming thing is the recognition shown here of some great military purpose. But the right hon. Gentleman did not stop there He quoted the saying, I think, of Lord Palmerston, "We are not a military nation, but a fighting people." I think ho attributed it to Lord Palmerston.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (MR. BRODRICK,) Surrey, Guildford

I have since been told it was Mr. Gladstone who said "We are not a military people," and Mr. Disraeli replied, "But we are a martial race."

SIR H. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

The right hon. Gentleman then went on to say— "We may be a fighting race, but it is only by accident that we are a military nation; we have to consider how we can turn that accident into a permanent fact." Therefore it is not only entanglements and commitments that we have before us, but a transformation of the national character. I venture to say this is running counter to the whole genius and traditions of our people. Our position in the world has been made and is held by commerce and peace and amity; it must be maintained in the same manner, and not by the stirring up of the military spirit. Moreover, if ever there was a, moment less desirable than another when the energies of our people should be diverted into a military channel, it is now, when it will require all the energy and enterprise of out people to maintain our predominant and pre-eminent position in the industry of the world.

What is the true military policy for this country which has been pursued by all wise statesmen of the past? In the first place it should be a complete defence of our shores. There is the Navy, of course, everybody knows that, but behind the Navy there must be an adequate Army for home defence. For this purpose nothing will be grudged, no demand will be refused. Therefore, the first thing is to increase the efficiency of the defensive force. It by no means follows that you must increase its number. I am not sure that in some parts of it a little pruning away of numbers would nut be advantageous, provided the remainder was increased greatly in efficiency. In that case, I should be glad to support anything the Government proposes for such a purpose as that, admitting that we have been found rather deficient in proper provision in this respect, as the last few months may be said to have shown. The second thing we have to do is to provide adequate garrisons for the Empire where they are required. The right hon. Gentleman makes two proposals in regard to this. In the first place he speaks of twelve battalions being a sufficient garrison for South Africa. I should be very glad to be able to take so hopeful a view. If twelve battalions are sufficient for that purpose it will show that our policy of settlement after the war had been based on the proper and wise foundation. But I think it is rather a sanguine proceeding deliberately to speak of twelve battalions as the normal military force for South Africa. Then he proposes to hand over from the Army to the Navy certain coaling stations. I am one of those who, looking at the matter mainly from the point of view I have been most accustomed to—namely, the interests of the Army—have often expressed adhesion to that policy. But the Navy almost to a man are in deadly opposition to it, and I do think the right hon. Gentleman had no right to come here and speak of that as a feature of his scheme when he tells us at the same time, that the Admiralty has not yet agreed to it. I was taught in the earliest days of my public official life that the last thing you should do was to support your own Department by compromising another. If, for instance, a Minister thinks that something should be done and the Treasury imposes obstacles, he should never —is it allowable to use the word "round"? [laughter]—he should never "round" upon the Treasury by exposing that tact, but should accept t he responsibility and be loyal to the other Departments. But I cannot say that in this matter the right hon. Gentleman has acted up to that high standard The last point in sound military policy is that we must have a sufficient force, properly equipped to reinforce our garrisons, and for any emergency wherever an expeditionary force is required. This is the point, undoubtedly, upon which opinions will most differ as to the strength of the force which it is desirable to maintain for these purposes; but all I say is this, on what possible ground should you In this matter base yourself upon (he experiences of this exceptional Boer war? Why should you expect to have such a demand made upon us again as has been made during the last two years? The proper thing to do is to avoid the necessity of sending large forces abroad; to trust more to judicious diplomacy; and I am bound to say that for the last five or six years we have seen one occasion after another where that course has not been followed. Now I come to the great question which is really the crux of the whole matter. The right hon. Gentleman proposes to raise a certain force in skeleton. How is that force to be maintained? How is he to secure that recruits will be forth coming for it? I am rather surprised that there was very little said on this subject in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman. I am rather surprised that the right hon. Gentleman gave, us no information whatever as to the number of recruits required for the several branches of the service. Surely he must have thought it out and fortified himself with an actuarial calculation as to the recruits. That should present no difficulty to bun because my experience leads me to believe that actuarial calculations can be made to prove almost anything. Let us have next an actuarial calculation of the number of recruits. There is no difficulty whatever in procuring plenty of recruits in time of war. The enterprising spirit is rife enough then to induce men to go to the front, and we will always obtain them. It is the listless, dull, anxious, irksome duties of the soldier in time of peace which fail to attract. I do not think there is any Member of the House or any man outside the House who has devoted much attention to this subject who does not see that the whole of our future system depends upon the possibility of obtaining recruits. What, then are we to do? If the scheme of your Army is too great for your resources, then you have two things that you can do—pursue a less aggressive policy abroad and at the same time offer greater attractions to recruits. But do not flatter yourselves that you have safe ultimate resource the application of compulsory service. I am not going I to recite the well-known arguments against compulsory service upon the grounds of political right and social convenience. Nor will I dwell upon the strain on the industrial resources of the country which would necessarily conic from the employment of it, because that strain is not easily assessed in figures. I take a. much less ambitious view. Putting aside all questions either of principle or convenience, I ask is a compulsory system practicable in this country? In the first place it is inapplicable to the whole portion of our Army stationed in foreign peace camps. The German force in China is composed entirely of volunteers; not a single man is there because he is a conscript. There may be some justification for taking a man away from his home and family and occupation and making him serve in some barracks in order that he may be trained into an effective defender of his country. That we can understand. But you can never send such a man to the plains of India, or the veldt of South Africa, or even to the Rock of Gibraltar, in time of peace. You can do it for home defence only, and that brings me to the proposal that there should be a ballot for the Militia. Those who talk-about a ballot for the Militia should read up the history of the subject and they will see what happened in regard to it in past years. We have only to look up the text-books to see its anomalies and its inequalities, and the difficulties necessarily placed by it in the way of recruiting for the Regular foreign going Army. The system has been tried and abandoned. I am speaking, of course, of the Militia ballot—that is to saw the system of taking one man and leaving another. One man is to be chosen by some process of luck, and he is to be made to serve, while his neighbour escapee. Perhaps the man who is taken away is the very man who docs not want to go, and perhaps the man who is left behind is the very man who would like to go. The old way was that you allowed the man chosen to purchase a substitute. That is where the system came into conflict with the recruiting for the Regular Army. I ask can anything be more grossly unfair than the system of purchasing substitutes? How is the; poor man, to whom it is just as great a hardship—perhaps greater— as to the well-to-do man to be taken away, to purchase a substitute, while his richer neighbour is well able to do so? There must be universal Compulsory service if you have it at all.

Let us think for a moment what com pulsory service means. The first objection to universal military service is that it would give you a vastly larger number of soldiers than you could possibly require or employ. We are not in the position of Continental nations. Continental nations, whether it be Switzerland, Austria, Germany, or any other, are surrounded by other nations with huge armies, who could in the case of war be hurled across the frontier—an almost interminable crowd of armed men. Therefore each of these countries must put every man. It can possibly lay hands upon into the ranks. But we are in a different position altogether. We have the sea; and our command of the sea depends upon our Navy. If the Navy is destroyed, what then? I will not pursue that further. No defensive army you could ever have could save you from disaster. But supposing the Fleet is inveigled away to the West Indies, or somewhere else, as in the old days, or supposing it meets with some disaster so that the shores of the country are left practically undefended for some days. Why, skilled soldiers and sailors will tell you exactly the number of men who could be landed upon our shores in these circumstances, and they will proceed further to tell you the smallest number of men that you must have to deal with those who are landed, so that there is a limit to the number of soldiers you can profitably employ in these circumstances; and if you have a great mob of untrained men, or even of efficiently trained men, they would only be treading on each other's heels and would not be required for a purpose of that nature—the purpose of defence. Therefore, on all grounds, it seems to me that if you look quietly at it you will see that the system of conscription is totally inapplicable, as well as politically intolerable, in this country; and in. so far as, not so much the proposals of the Government as the hints and indications of the right hon. Gentleman pointed to such a future policy, I must say that I will reject it and abjure it in advance.

The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State is postponing the thorny question of the constitution of the War Office. The War Office has a curious effect upon some minds. For instance, the hon. and gallant Member for the Chelmford Division of Essex attributes every evil thing to the War Office. I should like to ask him whom does he mean by the War Office I You must have a War Office of some sort. What is the particular habitat of the ogre the hon. and gallant Gentleman finds in Pall Mall? There are three elements in the War Office. There are distinguished officers and their subordinates, there are a number of civilians, and there are a few political officials. Which of these elements is objectionable? The soldiers are presumably the best that can lie found in the Army. They are men who have come to the front, and I will say boldly that for the last ten or twenty years you will not find anywhere men more qualified for their positions than the soldiers who have held high posts in the War Office. How they arrange their duties among themselves is a question which may be postponed to a more convenient season, especially as, I believe, it is going to be threshed out, or, to borrow a word from the hon. and gallant Member for the Chelmsford Division, washed out tomorrow in another place.

Now I come to the civilians. I have often heard it said. What chance has the Army when the whole thing is governed by a pack of civilians at the War Office? But it is an odd thing that it has always been so. There has always been a large number of civilians employed in the administration, and especially in the financial business, of the War Office. It was so in the Duke of Wellington's time, and he has held in passages which have come down to us that it is the proper constitutional system. It has always been considered desirable—and I put this very strongly to the House—that the Secretary of State should have a number of men trained and experienced in their duties, which are in no sense military duties, but, at the same time, independent of prejudices and inclinations of a military kind, and ready to point out when occasion offers any encroachment on the civil rights of the people. It is not only a question of good administration. There is also a constitutional question in it. and although the right hon. Gentleman seems to be setting himself to diminish the influence of civilians in the War Office, I venture to say that that is a departure from the old constitutional system which satisfied the Duke of Wellington, and which, having satisfied him, may very well satisfy those who come after him. Those clerks in the War Office do not take notice of any military duties; they deal with military subjects it is true, but only the civil aspects of them. In this war, so far as I have observed or been informed, nothing but admiration is deserved by the civilian branches of the War Office for the manner in which all the purchases of supplies and stores and everything else that was required have been conducted. Some, indeed, among them ought, I think, to be placed on a higher pedestal. Some of them obtain great experience and knowledge of military subjects, quite as great as any distinguished military officer can have.

The right hon. Gentleman referred, very justly, to the reforms introduced and carried out by Lord Cardwell, and. being a survival of that effort, I thank him on behalf of the memory of my friend Lord Cardwell for the way in which he spoke of his work. But those reforms were not allowed to sleep in the meanwhile. They were sympathetically developed by the father of the noble Lord opposite, the present Lord Derby, and by Mr. Stanhope, and I would mention especially that Mr. Childers was the author of that territorial connection of the Auxiliary Forces which, I believe, has, almost more than anything else, created the zeal and enthusiasm which we have seen in this country during the past year or two. It is to them that we owe what has been done—the sending of this great force to South Africa. There is now leaving the War Office at the close of his career a civilian clerk. Sir Ralph Knox, to whom, perhaps more than any one man, the institution and success of that whole scheme of reform is due. I remember seeing a paper written by him in the early days of 1870, before the scheme had ever been considered by the higher authorities within the War Office, itself, in which he marked down, with a nicety and exactness which is perfectly mar- vellous, all the ramifications of the proposals and everything connected with this great scheme of localisation and organisation for adding to the efficiency of the Army. That was done by a civilian clerk. Now I come to the political officers. What about them? I would suggest to the hon. Member for the Chelmsford Division that he should direct his sarcasms against the political officers instead of denouncing that abstract entity the War Office, which may mean anybody or nobody, and apply his epithets to the Minister who undoubtedly is responsible, and who, as we know, is not one to refuse responsibility; and here, at all events, in the House of Commons, the Minister must lie made answerable. For my part, while reserving any detailed criticism of the plan now unfolded, I must announce my dissent from it on the broad grounds that it indicates a departure from the prudent policy formerly pursued, and the introduction of a military spirit and military system which would fatally alter the character of our nation and Empire.

*COLONEL WARDE (Kent, Medway)

said he wished to make a few remarks on that branch of the military forces in which, for the time being, he was more intimately connected. He meant the yeomanry cavalry. He should be doing scant justice to that force if he did not frankly acknowledge the considerate and consistent support it had received from the War minister for some years past, sometimes when it was very much underrated by the country. He could only suppose that the Yeomanry cavalry had always done its work so modestly that the county had not realised their value. He would remind hon. Members of what happened last year. In the beginning of last year it was suddenly discovered that the war could not be carried through successfully without a large force of mounted infantry. The Government offered a very modest sum to the officers of the Yeomanry, and they provided for the country a force of 12,000 men fully equipped. He need not remind the House of the services that were rendered by that force. He congratulated his right hon. friend the secretary of state for war on the speech he made expounding the alterations which were proposed in the organisation of the Army. It was true that there was no reference in it to the absurd system of brigading two regiments together in order to make one adjutant do the work of both, and thereby effect an economy of staff. The right hon. Gentleman did not say whether an annual course of musketry was to be included in the training, or what, if any, place the Yeomanry were to have in the army corps now being brought into existence. These, although perhaps important questions, were more or less matters of detail.

The question that must most affect the future of the force was its divorce from that branch of the service with which it had been hitherto connected—namely, the cavalry. The first recommendation of the Committee of Yeomanry Officers, the formation of which his right lion, friend had himself asked for, was that the force should continue to be called the Yeomanry Cavalry or the Imperial Yeomanry Cavalry. In the first statement of the right hon. Gentleman made with regard to this new force, he utterly ignored the first recommendation made by the committee. In the opinion of the hon. and gallant Member, "the was more I experience of the South African War" was a hobby that was being ridden to death. No doubt we had a great deal to learn from the South African War. We had never in the history of the Empire had to conduct such a war before, in a country devoid of enclosures, where the rifleman's range was only limited by the power of the eye, and in an atmosphere where the eye could discern objects double the distance possible in a European climate. They might never have to conduct such a campaign again. The Yeomanry had never been called upon to take part in a campaign abroad before, and might never be again. It might be that at some future period we might find ourselves at war with a European Power, and the country might be denuded of cavalry altogether, and in that event the Yeomanry would be our only cavalry reserve. A distinguished officer some years ago stated that if the country was at war, and one ship laden with grain was captured by the enemy, the panic would be so great in the City that bread would go up in price 500 per cent. In such a case it was possible that the Yeomanry might be called upon to suppress bread riots. Of what avail would a rifle be then? In his humble opinion the best weapon that could be used for such a purpose was the sword. Cavalry could always be converted into mounted infantry, but mounted infantry could not be converted into even indifferent cavalry. The experience of the war had proved this. Most of the cavalry regiments that had gone to South Africa had been armed with rifles instead of lances, but be doubted whether any War Minister or Commander-in-Chief would ever admit that we could do away with cavalry on all occasions. There was no other cavalry reserve except the Yeomanry, and it would be a mistaken policy to divorce it from that branch of the service. The country did not realise how valuable the Yeomanry were, but from his experience he fell confident that if they were out for six months in the year, that force would be able to march round most regiments of Regulars. It would be found that the Imperial Yeomanry in South Africa had been used more for cavalry than mounted infantry purpose. At any rate, the Yeomanry had now established a claim on the country; they had vindicated their existence; and he hoped the right bon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War was not going to desert them. He earnestly urged the right bon. Gentleman to inquire carefully before committing himself to a policy which, in the opinion of a great many experienced Yeomen, would go far to destroy a force which, in the present war, had so fully earned the gratitude and approval of the Empire at large.

CAPTAIN NORTON (Newington, W.)

No one could have listened to the lucid and comprehensive statement of the Secretary of State for War with greater interest than I did for two reasons. In the first place, to all Service Members and Army reformers it was interesting to find that almost every suggestion which we have been for years past offering to the War Office, and which have been rejected with scorn, have now been tenderly embraced by the Secretary of State. In the next place, I was much interested to notice the skilful manner in which he concocted what I may call the new military organisation "soup." It reminded me of our own Gaelic neighbours, who are so skilful in the culinary art, who when they are short of provisions make a soup which consists of fried onions, milk, hot water, and certain condiments, but meat is altogether absent. So it is with the scheme of the right hon. Gentleman. The basis of his scheme is wanting. He cannot bring his scheme to a successful conclusion without dealing with the question of recruiting. He told us lie was about to ask the House for £88,000,000, of which £29,000,000 were practically the Army Estimates for the year, thus showing that upon I be present war as much within £9,000,000 has been spent as upon the great Crimean War. But although this great Imperial Army, and this great charge is due to a great war undertaken for Imperial purposes, not one hint is foreshadowed that any call would be made, either for men or money upon any other portion of the Empire, but the whole cost is to be borne by these islands in the home seas.

In speaking of the future of the Army he asked. Is it in strength and character capable of fulfilling its proper functions? To that he gave no reply, although over and over again we have pointed out that the defensive forces of the Empire were not adequate for the purpose. After a well-deserved eulogy of Lord Cardwell's scheme, he said that that scheme gave us now 100,000 Regulars in South Africa. But Lord Cardwell's scheme was never carried out. After it had been in operation for a short time there was a sort of semi-return to the long service system. What has this combination of the two schemes produced? We may have 150,000 in South Africa, but we have not three army corps. It was a mob of 150,000 men we sent to South Africa. Then the right bon. Gentleman said— I have over and over again endeavoured to persuade the House that it is necessary for us to organise our forces on the principle of being able to send two army corps abroad. He attempts to cast the blame on the House. Why this House has never denied the right bon. Gentleman or his predecessor anything he asked for the Army, On the contrary, the Service Members appealed to his predecessor over and over again to increase the artillery and the number of trained horses with the troops, in order that we might have two complete army corps to send to South Africa. Therefore no blame whatever is to be attached to the House of Commons.

The scheme goes on to provide for 155,000 Regulars in this country, and 115,000 Regulars to garrison India and our dependencies beyond the seas. I feel confident that neither the right hon. Gentleman nor any other man who has had experience of these matters believes for a moment he will be able to provide sufficient recruits during the next few years according to the scheme, and with the advantages laid down, seeing that some 15,000 men are at present serving in India, beyond their time, and that recruiting is almost certain to fall. Towards the close of the Crimean War we paid as much as £20 per man for recruits, and we are now employing what I may call emergency men at five shillings a day to do duty which the trained cavalry soldier is obliged to do for a little over one-fifth of that amount. The right hon. Gentleman was good enough to admit that the artillery was insufficient. What greater condemnation of those who sit on the Treasury Bench could there be than that admission, seeing that year after year the deficiency has been pointed out? Furthermore, we are told that a much larger body of mounted troops is required. These are the very two points which the sixty or seventy military Members of this House brought to the notice of the right hon. Gentleman. If sixty or seventy Members interested in, say, the textile trade were to have brought before the Government the fact that certain reforms were necessary in that industry, would they have been treated with the scorn and contempt with which we have been treated? I think we are justified in making it clear that we did our duty, and we are in no way responsible for the terrible fiasco of this war.

The right hon. Gentleman referred to the great success of recruiting during the past year. He stated there was an increase of 46,000 men in the Militia, He used the word "men," but for the most part they were boys and weaklings. Of those 46,000 not one-fourth would be fit even to garrison India, let alone to go to fight in South Africa, lie points to the 10,000 Yeomanry, but they were obtained under great pressure, and in consequence of the war. He spoke also of 56,000 additional Volunteers, and the grand total is made up to 140,000. But at what cost were those men procured? A great deal of this £88,000,000 was paid to procure them; and in order that he may have a sufficient supply in the future, what are the advantages held out? Instead of sleeping in a barrack room the recruit is to sleep in a cubicle; he is to have a little less sentry-go, but not one farthing more pay. Seeing that recruits are usually drawn from pretty much the same class, is it likely that these inducements will enable the right hon. Gentleman to obtain sufficient recruits for an extra army corps for foreign service in addition to those necessary for the 115,000 troops we are obliged to keep beyond the seas? The right hon. Gentleman said he would be pusillanimous if he did not make further proposals to the House in the event of recruiting not being a success. I was about to say that the right hon. Gentleman was inclined to be somewhat dishonest in placing this scheme before the House, because he must know from the statistics at his disposal that he cannot by any possibility obtain the men to make his scheme a success? The Militia alone gives 14,000 recruits, or one-third of the total number, to the Line. That being so, and if he is going to increase the Militia by 50,000, how can the right hon. Gentleman suppose that he is going to recruit enough for the Militia on the one hand, and for the Line on the other, seeing that he offers no special incentive for men to join? He says the Army is to be no longer a paper force. I am disposed to think that a very large proportion will be a paper force, for, in addition to the matters I have stated, discharges have been suspended for eighteen months, and there will be something like 30,000 men going out of the Army at the close of this year. Inducements will be held out to them to remain, but those inducements will not be sufficient. Referring to the army corps,' the right hon. Gentleman said. "This is an organisation which cannot be called an organisation at all." That is precisely what we have been saying for many years past; and I am disposed to think that the organisation of the future, although it may be slightly better, will be practically of very much the same character. These army corps, with the exception, perhaps, of the one at Alder-shot, will be patched-up army corps. The right hon. Gentleman spoke of the stores being massed for each army corps in the army corps district. It must have occurred to him that vast barracks and buildings will be necessary, and that there will be an immense initial cost for transport, lie has therefore not been frank with us in placing these Estimates before the House, and leading people to believe that £2,000,000 will be the entire cost. If the scheme is carried out in its entirety, and the force is not to be a paper force, it will cost nearer £10,000,000 than £2,000,000.

Then I go to the employment of Militia and Volunteers, and here we have a case of the largest force being the least efficient. The fourth, fifth, and sixth army corps are to be mainly composed of Militia and volunteers. When the glamour of the war is over, the majority of those who find it irksome to serve in the Militia or Volunteers, having to undergo a more severe training and to have a heavier strain placed upon them, will begin to ask why they should take this undue share in the defences of the country unless they are to obtain some corresponding advantage. If those corresponding advantages are given it will increase out of all proportion the demand which the right hon. Gentleman makes upon the taxpayers of the country. How are the Volunteers and Militia to be trained, and where are the officers to be found? A certain proportion will be drawn from the Regular Army, but tin' Regular Army is not only to be kept up to the present standard, but there are to be three army corps instead of two. Then the Volunteers are to be given field guns. If the Commander-in-Chief is going to rely upon field guns worked by Volunteers for the defence of the country in case of naval mishap, those who are to work the guns must receive a very much higher training than Volunteers at present receive.

To go to the question of the eight reserve regiments which it is proposed to form, consisting of men of fourteen or, in some cases, twelve years regular service, I understand that existing reserve regiments are to be drawn on in order to encourage some of the men to volunteer for the proposed new battalions. When the late finder Secretary of State proposed embodying these men and said he expected to get between 45,000 and 50,000 men, I was bold enough to say he would not obtain half that number of efficient men. A matter of fact, he obtained about 23,000, and I venture to think that three out of every four were men who, although fitted for one year's home service, were certainly not fitted to do even garrison service in the Mediterranean. If these garrison regiments are formed, probably not more than one-eighth, or one-fourth as the maximum, provided that the medical officer is not too strict, can be drawn from the reserve battalions. Therefore they must be drawn from the Regular Army, notwithstanding the fact that we are to increase the Army by one whole army corps. The army produced will be a stage army. The same men will be paraded over and over again. The incentive to the men to continue their service is 6d. per day, with 1s. 6d. as an old age pension at sixty-five years of age. No more ridiculous proposal was ever put forward. Very few men drawn from the working classes, especially old soldiers who have seen foreign service, reach the age of sixty-five, and they will not give you a "thank you" for such a pension offer. At present a man can serve for twenty-one one years, leaving the service at the average age of forty, and obtain at once a pension of 1s. 1d. per day, so that the new offer is no incentive at all.

As regards the substitution of five battalions to garrison certain stations in the tropics. I gladly admit that that is a very sensible proposal. I infer from the right hon. Gentleman's remarks, however, that the whole cost will fall on the Home Exchequer, but I do not know whether the necessary sum is included in the Estimates. When we come to the coaling stations we find a strange state of affairs. I always understood that the fixed principle of our policy was that the Navy was our first line of defence, and that the greater part of the Army was required only for the defence of India and our other dependencies, the remainder to he, as it were, a feeder to the other, and that we relied to a great extent on our Volunteer forces for the defence of the Empire in case of mishap to the Navy. But here, in order to bolster up our Army, the system of robbing Peter to pay Paul is again adopted, and by this scheme we are going to render our Navy less effective. We are told the First Lord of the Admiralty has not yet seen his way to give a final decision. I should think not. He very naturally wishes to keep the first line of defence in the best possible condition, and if he is to take over the coaling stations he must furnish the equivalent of five battalions of Marines, as I do not suppose the right hon. Gentleman meant that the Admiralty should use bluejackets for this purpose. The Marines are, without exception, the finest force in the country, they are picked men, but they are also very highly paid men. I wish to know whether the cost of those men is be borne by the Army or by the Navy. If by the Army, the sum put down by the right hon. Gentleman must be increased, while if it is by the Navy then a greater sum must be demanded by the Navy. In either case it is the same to the unfortunate taxpayer.

With regard to distribution, I have only this one remark to make about those twelve battalions. They must be the same as the men we send out to India. Where are these seasoned old soldiers to come from, and what are the inducements held out to both non-commissioned officers and men to take a turn at this, after service in South Africa? I have dealt with the Militia problem, but I omitted to point out that no incentive is given to the Militiaman, although the right hon. Gentleman has undertaken to make this scheme perfect, and add 150,000 men in the Militia. To do this, he will be obliged to raise straight away 80,000 men. As a rule they are 30,000 men short, and the right hon. Gentleman requires 50,000 more, and I am at a loss to see where they are to be got from, inasmuch as they are to receive only an extra 3d. per day and £3 a year as an incentive to join. I think that will not be sufficient to induce the large number of men he requires to conic forward for the Militia. The Militia Reserve are to receive 4d. a day and £6 a year, but that Reserve cannot be drawn upon like the late Militia Reserve was drawn upon, because it is only to be liable for home service. The Militiamen who have done ten years service and Linemen who have done fourteen years service with the Reserve are to form the new Militia Reserve, and they have to do fourteen days musketry. It is extremely unlikely that, when a man has done ten years in the Militia and has probably married and settled down, he would be willing to spend fourteen days every year at musketry.

Now I come to the Yeomanry. It is proposed to raise 35,000 Yeomanry, of whom some 10,000 are supposed to exist already. I hope it will not be thought that because I am an old cavalry officer I wish in any way to disparage the Yeomanry, but what I say is that we have always been given to understand —and all the great Continental nations agree in this—that the minimum time required to make an effective infantry soldier in the case of a highly cultured man is one year. When you get a man of a lower grade it takes two years, but it has always been held that it takes a much longer time to make an effective cavalry soldier. If the only cavalry we are to have to defend these shore's are to be Yeomanry, I ask whether that is not a, bogus mounted force so far as these three army corps are concerned? If one division of foreign cavalry were landed upon these shores and jutted against these 35,000 half-made cavalry soldiers, I believe that the foreign division would sweep them all away. Therefore, I say that it is deluding the country to lead people to believe that 35,000 Yeomanry will be anything like an effective mounted force for these three army corps. They are to serve eighteen days, fourteen of which will lie obligatory, and the privates are to receive 5s. a day. That will be rather an expensive price to pay for these doubtful Yeomen, because no one believes that the right hon. Gentleman will get men of the real Yeoman class. You will no doubt get a number of the better class young men who now serve in the Volunteers. This new force, will he highly popular, but highly inefficient. I notice that the Government are about to provide horses. They will obtain men who, for the most part, are unaccustomed to horses, and the fact that the horses with which these men are supplied will be horses of which they know nothing will render the difficulties of the officers who have to train them very great indeed.

Now I come to one of my complaints of the whole system. This war has conclusively shown that the mounted man, as compared with the dismounted man, is of the highest advantage, more especially in the face of modern weapons? discharged at such a distance that the infantry man rarely sees the man to whom he is opposed. I think that one of the main defects in the scheme is the inadequate provision of mounted forces. It has been one of the main defects in the late war, as will be seen from the, Report published by the Intelligence Department. Referring to South Africa, that Report says— It is of all countries perhaps the most dangerous in the world for infantry to operate in without a screen of mounted troops in their front and on their flanks. Although we advocated that in this Mouse over and over again, our Army was sent out to South Africa without sufficient mounted men. At Graspan, Modder River, and Magersfontein our infantry were mown down, and a famous Scotch Brigade was sacrificed because they were led into traps which they would never have been led into had they possessed a sufficient force of cavalry scouts. It has been said by the Leader of the Opposition that we must not draw our deductions from the South African campaign. With that I entirely agree, because if we did it would be argued that the soldier of the future was a little man on a little horse with a long rifle and a big spade, and that troops of no other calibre were required. I do not suppose that we shall ever be drawn into a great Continental war in which we shall have to put such a vast army into the field, because in such a war in which we may be engaged the Navy will do the bulk of the work, and the only thing the Army would have to do would be to send a sufficient force abroad to act as a threat to our opponents by seizing some of their colonial possessions. Therefore we should only require a limited force, but it would have to be of the highest character, and if we happened to he operating in any portion of northern Europe, north of the Pyrenees and the Alps, it would be imperatively necessary to cover that territory not with Yeomanry, but with thoroughly trained and skilled I cavalry. It was conclusively proved in the war of 1870 that the whole success of the German troops lay in the fact that they had a thoroughly effective cavalry, properly trained to cover the advance of the army.

As regards the Volunteer reforms, I notice that they are to receive 5s. a day, and that we are to have 225 battalions, necessitating an increase of 57,000 men, and that they are to do duty for thirteen days. Hut. after taking what I call the cream of the Volunteers for Yeomanry purposes—and the incentive offered will bring about that result— is it to be supposed that you will be able to fill up that gap of 35,000 men and at the same time get fresh men to the tune of 57,000? What about the employers of labour? It has. perhaps, not dawned upon the right hon. Gentleman that when he begins to put the pressure on these Volunteers, to give them the necessary training, the conditions under which they serve will be that each man when he finds the undertaking to be, irksome will have nothing to do but to pay a small fine, put on his civilian clothes, and walk off. The scheme resembles a fairy tale. I shall be told, probably, that we have a large number of trained men of different categories in South Africa, and that we have, these men to draw upon. Out of the sweepings left from South Africa you may have a number of men, but I think that the vast number of the men fighting out there will take the earliest opportunity of returning to civilian life.

I now come to a point upon which most Service Members feel very strongly — namely, the question of the artillery. The right lion. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War admits its weakness, but shelters himself behind the Commander-in-Chief. He is made to say with reference to our artillery— It has accuracy, it has moderate weight behind the teams, all of which are important elements in artillery. He goes on to say— The open country and clear atmosphere in South Africa have shown that as regards range and power an improvement is necessary. That has to a certain extent been effected during the war by the provision of slow-burning cubes. As regards rapidity of tire some improvement is certainly necessary, and the matter is now under consideration. Therefore this artillery of ours is defective in range, in power, and in rapidity of fire. If this is so, then I ask what on earth is it good for? I often think with what qualms in his heart the present Commander-in-Chief made this admission, when we reflect that the loss of his gallant son was due to the fact that the range of our artillery was defective. We have pointed out before the fact that our artillery was defective in range, and that a neighbouring nation had the very guns which we desired. Hut what was done? The Financial Secretary told us that he was about to spend some £200,000 in order to make what I will call some gimcrack arrangement in connection with the laying of t he gun and the carriage in order that we might fire a little more rapidly. On the occasion of the battle of Colenso, what was the officer in charge of the guns to do under the circumstances? Why, he was bound to do what the whole course of his training had taught him. He had either to remain in the rear, subject to the fire of the enemy's guns, or else thrust his gnus right under the rifle fire of the Boers. He did what every British officer was bound to do, and now the unfortunate Commander-in-Chief who lost his only son in this way actually tries to whitewash the Government.

MR. BRODRICK

The remarks which the hon. Member is making are totally unjustified by the facts.

CAPTAIN NORTON

The right hon. Gentleman says the remarks I am making are totally unjustified by the facts, f am amazed. I say that our guns were defective in range, and had nothing like the range of the Boer guns.

AN HON. MEMBER

Is the hon. Member speaking of guns of position or field guns?

CAPTAIN NORTON

I am speaking of field guns. The hon. Member must know that we had no guns of position in South Africa until we drew on the Navy. Reference is made here to out-Horse Artillery guns, and the report says:—"Our Horse Artillery guns need improvement in several respects." Now I come to the question of the training of officers. What is to be done is that professional acquirements must rank first. If the intention is to do away with the social status of the British officer, seeing that it is the fact that it is the social status that causes him to desire to be an officer—if you sweep that away, I have strong doubts as to whether you will get a sufficient number of officers., and you certainly will not get the right class of men unless you are prepared to pay them adequately for their services. What is the incentive to be given to the British officer in order to induce him to devote himself to his profession, and how does it compare with other professions where many prizes are to lie gained? Prizes are very few indeed in the British Army. The incentive offered is that the officer is to be allowed to buy his uniform at cost price from the Government establishments; but I have yet to learn that the expense connected with, uniform, even in the most expensive cavalry regiments, is a very large item in an officer's expenditure. The right hon. Gentleman said that the Government would shrink from no difficulties-and from no criticism. You are offering to the British officer the sum of 36s. 9d. per week, if you were to go into my constituency amongst the printers you would not get a single printer to work for 36s. 9d. per week, for he draws 40s. per week. And while you offer the British officer this immense sum, you put forward as an incentive that he will be able to buy his uniform at a cheaper rate, and you think that is sufficient to attract to the ranks of the officers of the Army a class of men who will be prepared to give themselves up to professional duties, and who, if they were to seek employment in other learned professions, would get at least ten times as much money.

The right hon. Gentleman finished up with the question of cost, and he put the entire cost of this bogus scheme at something like £2,000,000. As I have said before, my contention is that it will cost £10,000,000, because you have to include transport, reforms in the Army Medical and the Army Veterinary Departments, the building of barracks, and the establishment of training grounds, without which the troops will be absolutely useless. I suppose no hon. Gentleman here will contend for one moment that the recent South African War has been a success. When we carry our minds back to those terrible days in December, 1899, I ask whether there is a single man in this House or in the country who did not feel himself covered with shame when he read of those great disasters; and even at the present moment what must be our feelings when we reflect that we have now got the equivalent of six army corps in South Africa, and that all this effort was necessary in order to subdue two petty Republics whose total population was not equal to one large London parish? I say that military men in this country are covered with shame, because we have nothing to show in this war except that all our men and officers have behaved with unparalleled bravery; but so far as the management of the Army is concerned we have all condemned it. We were not able to land in South Africa two complete army corps in proper fighting form, and we have had to keep drafting an afterwards all sorts and conditions of troops who were a drag upon the transport, and who were not really fighting men. When we get these training grounds and a sufficient number of guns for the six army corps, and the garrison guns for the defence of our ports, then I say that the amount of money required will be more like £10,000,000 than £2,000,000, and that is what the country has to face. It is for the country to consider whether they are going to allow a similar state of things to occur if ever we are drawn into other entanglements.

The whole scheme resembles the well-known story of the Irish tourist in the train running on a single line. When the train stopped at a station the man called out, "Has the So-and-so express passed yet?" The reply was, "How should I know?" And then the guard said to the driver, "Drive on, Patsy; in God's name we will chance it."

Attention called to the fact that forty Members were not present. House counted, and forty Members being found present—

MR. GRIFFITH BOSCAWEN (Kent, Tunbridge)

said he did not claim to treat this matter as an expert in military matters. He was not an old soldier, nor had he had the advantage of the experience of some lion. Members who had served in South Africa during the last year, but as a civilian who had had the honour of serving in a garrison as a Militiaman on a station abroad, he would like to say a few words upon the subject of the very important scheme which had been submitted to the House by the Secretary of State for War. The right hon. Member for Stirling Burghs objected to the scheme because it went too far, but the only objection which he could see was that it did not go far enough. The right hon. Gentleman was terribly afraid of adding an army corps to those troops who were to be ready at a moment's notice to go abroad. His objection was that there were not three or four army corps to be added instead of one. We had learned by the South African War the absolute necessity of this country having a large force ready to embark at a few moment's notice for service abroad. As the Empire has grown so enormously during the last twenty years, so the Army must grow pari passu, with the Empire. The Empire had entirely outgrown the Army, and a scheme involving an increase £3,000,000 on the normal expenditure of for the purpose of organising an army corps to go abroad was, in his opinion, much too moderate a scheme. The right hon. Gentleman spoke very strongly upon this subject because compulsion had been hinted at; for his part, he would welcome any scheme of limited compulsion that would give recruits to the Army. He congratulated his right hon. friend the Secretary of State on the scheme which he had submitted, but he was doubtful whether he would get the recruits to fill the ranks of the Army. At the present moment, no doubt, the war fever was high and recruiting was brisk, but in the future, when the war fever had disappeared, where were the recruits to come from? There were only two alternatives—either to increase the pay of the soldier and the officer at a cost of something like £10,000,000 a year to the country, or to introduce a scheme of limited conscription. Some such change, in his opinion, was absolutely necessary, because we had reached the limit of recruiting, arid had been compelled to enlist what were termed specials, who were men under the ordinary standard. In 1898 we enlisted no less than 34 per cent, of specials as against 18 per cent, in 1886. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Stirling Burghs entered into a long tirade against conscription, which was rather useless, because his right hon. friend the Secretary of State for War had not proposed conscription. He was sorry he did not; the country now would tolerate it, and whether it liked it or not it would have to come to it in the end. The right hon. Gentleman spoke of having conscripts and sending them abroad. What we ought to have was an Army enlisted on the voluntary system, and some scheme of home defence by means of some large extension, of the Militia, and that was a thing we should have to come to if we were to have the very moderate scheme which had been brought before the House. His right hon. friend had not proposed any compulsory system. He had said, let us give the voluntary system a chance, and as he had done that, we must be grateful for the reform he had initiated.

There were two things which the country was in great earnestness about at the present moment. One was a widespread opinion that our Army, excellent as were the men who composed it, splendid as were the officers who commanded it, was not run on business lines. The country wished to see it run in a more businesslike manner. As a nation of, perhaps, the most businesslike people in the world, there was something very unbusinesslike in our Army; and the unbusinesslike methods upon which it was run did a great deal of harm, and if the Army was to be put on a businesslike footing we should have to begin reforming the head and reform the War Office itself. Was there anything more unbusinesslike in the world than the pay sheets with which the officers had to make themselves conversant? He was reading a short time ago in The Times of a very curious arrangement of the Army Pay Department. A regiment had been engaged in the Orange Free State, and the officers had been sleeping out in the open on the veldt. Now it was well known that any officer who lived under canvas was entitled to field service allowance, but when these officers applied to the authorities for their field service allowance they were told they were not entitled as they had not been sleeping under canvas. His right hon. friend had alluded to the fact that the training in the Army was not up to date. He quite agreed that there had been too much barrack drill, too much ceremonial. According to one Army Order, the first thing that a soldier had to learn was the sword exercise, and yet the same week that that order was issued a paragraph appeared in the papers to the effect that the General Commanding in South Africa had prohibited the sword ever being used at all. Our present system of training was not suitable for troops in the field. Under the scheme of training provided in the Kings regulations, one month in the year only was devoted to field training and two periods of a fortnight devoted to musketry exercise.

MR. BRODRICK

That has all been altered now.

MR. GRIFFITH BOSCAWEN

said he was glad to hear that statement from his right hon. friend and hoped that it was part of the scheme before the House. Musketry practice under the present system commenced at 200 yards, and at 200 yards it was carried out standing. He asked who would stand up 200 yards from an entrenched enemy. His view was that soldiers should be trained to do their duty in the field, and he suggested that a simple Manœuvres Act should be passed so that in every year a large tract of country might be taken and the soldiers go anywhere. He believed if that were done and adequate compensation given to the farmers of the country taken, they would be perfectly willing for the manœuvres to take place over their land, and so far as the landlords and sporting tenants were concerned he was perfectly sure they would not stand in the way of allowing soldiers to go over the land in order that by so doing the Army might lie perfected for the field. He understood that the Militia was to receive better treatment in the future than it had in the past. He hoped this was so, fir the Militia had proved itself to be as useful a force as any in the Army, though it had been neglected in the past. The idea of a Militia Reserve was simply ridiculous, seeing that it only consisted of a number of men who, having taken the bounty, were willing to take the risk of being called out. He expressed his entire approval of the abolition of that Reserve and the creation of Royal garrison regiments. He cordially supported the scheme, which he thought would be to the benefit of the Army.

*SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT (Monmouthshire, W.)

I think the importance of discussing this question cannot be exaggerated. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War said the other night that he had made proposals such as never had been made and which he hoped never will be made again. The first part of that statement was unquestionably true. Whether the latter part rests in hope only I know not. At the rate at which our Estimates increase I. fear that that hope may be disappointed. We are asked to-day to Vote Estimates for £88,000,000, a thing. I believe, that has never been asked in this country, or any other country, before. But this history of the growth of our Estimates is comparatively recent. I think that this Administration, in the course of five years, has increased the normal Estimates of the Army and Navy by £25,000,000; they stood at £35,000,000 in the year 1895, and to-day they are £60,000,000. That is a matter which f think deserves the attention of the House of Commons. The industry and labour spent in this country in cultivating the war spirit, partly by responsible Members and greatly by the press, give us little hope that we shall enter soon upon a different course. These Estimates are, of course, largely with reference to the war in South Africa. The right hon. Gentleman told us that five years ago he apologised, in his own person, for normal military Estimates that amounted to eighteen millions. To-day they are twenty-nine millions—a growth of eleven millions in the normal military Estimates of this country. Is there any reasonable probability that these Estimates have reached high-water mark? On the contrary, I consider that there is a prospect of indefinite increase. The Estimates are vague and uncertain. They depend to a great degree upon the price which you are going to pay for these voluntary recruits. In the future I suppose the Government will come forward, as they come forward to-day, and speak, with contempt almost, of these miserable Estimates as they do of those of three or four years ago.

That is the commencement of the speech of the Secretary for War. He concluded with a scheme which he described as involving a military force of 650,000 men. The conclusion was as formidable as the commencement of his speech, lie says that the Estimates of 1896—that is. his first Estimates—of eighteen millions, were received with perturbation, and the Estimates of to-day are accepted with relief. I cannot say that that is exactly the sentiment with which these Estimates inspired me, and the appearance of the Secretary for War in the character of a relieving officer is certainly a curious part for him to have assumed. W e have not yet come to the Budget under which these Estimates will have to be paid for, and I doubt very much whether the sentiments of the taxpayers of this country will be sentiments of relief when they see the consequences of the Estimates laid on the Table. I do not propose to go into details. I should be quite incompetent if I were to attempt to do so. But I do ask to examine what is far more important than any details, and that is the spirit and the policy on which these Estimates are founded. The Secretary of State invited us to look at the large and increasing figures of the War Estimates under our normal military equipment. Yes, Sir, I accept his invitation, and what is the policy that underlies it? A memorable saying of Mr. Disraeli's was that expenditure depends on policy; and the secret of the present expenditure is to be found in the policy by which it is inspired. It is that part of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman which is most important, and in my opinion, to use the phrase of the right hon. Gentleman by my side, the most momentous, because I look not so much at the figures—they are the figures of to-day—but I look at the policy which is declared in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, speaking for the Government, as I understand, for he would never have been so rash or so indiscreet as to indicate that policy if it was not the policy of the Government as a whole. What is that policy? Hitherto our armaments have been on a comparatively moderate scale, because I think it may be said on the whole, certainly in the nineteenth century, that the policy of English statesmen has been a policy of peace. Under the favourable auspices of peace we have achieved in this country an unexampled prosperity in the health and wealth of this people. At the commencement of the last century we had a people depressed by the consequences of a great war; this was followed by a long peace, by a great development of prosperity, and has been crowned by a contented people. That has been the policy of the nineteenth century, interrupted only by the fatuous episode of the Crimean War. What is going to be the policy of England in the twentieth century? I confess that to have the twentieth century inaugurated by such Estimates as these gives us little hope that this is the policy to be pursued in the future.

Let us see how far we can divine the policy of the Government from the statements of the Secretary of State. It is something very different from that which we have been accustomed to hear from responsible Governments, certainly during the last fifty years. I cannot say that I see in what is called "the new diplomacy" omens of peace. They are omens of a different description. They do not breathe the spirit of "peace on earth and good will towards men." They are inspired rather in the language of a poet of our time, "War with a thousand battles and shaking a hundred thrones"—thrones which, I may observe, are, from time to time, treated to occasional menace. You may pay the lip service of hypocrisy to the cause of peace at The Hague and then proceed to illustrate it by the object-lesson of arming 250,000 men in South Africa. It is those who have the most acquaintance with war who are the most willing to cultivate the arts of peace. That happened to the Tory Government which was in power after the great war in 1815; and it is a well-known fact, constantly quoted, that the lowest Army Estimates ever known in this country were the Army Estimates of the Administration of the Duke of Wellington. Why was that? It was because the consequences of war were alive in the minds of the people who had suffered from the consequences of war, who had seen the people distressed and starved, and trade ruined. The result was that you had a new epoch of economy and of peace. The British people had learned what the consequences of war were, and the people to-day have yet to learn the consequences which this war will in its outcome bring upon them. There was another thing learnt from that great war, and it was the lesson that England, above all things —and this has been what I may call the traditional policy of her statesmen—was to avoid as much as possible European complications, and alliances, holy or otherwise, were to be strictly abjured. These may be described as the leading principles of the peace policy of almost the whole of the 19th century. What is indicated—what is more than indicated — I say revealed—in the speech of the Secretary for War in bringing forward these Estimates? He felt that these Estimates were so enormous that it was necessary to put forward emphatically principles of the policy that should justify the enormity of the sum that was I demanded. I am not, in spite of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman, without hope that the bitter experiences of this war while it was waged, and, I fear, still more the experiences which will be found in the peace which is to follow it, will inspire a soberer sentiment in the people of this country, and that the time will come when the melodies of the music-halls and the Mafeking mobs will not be regarded as the true exponents of English statesmanship. I hope that may be the case, and then at all events, the experience of this war will not have been suffered in vain.

Nothing could be more false than the pretence that great armaments are a security for peace. Were the great armaments of Germany and of France in 1870 a security for peace? Every man knows that they were the main things that provoked the war, because each of the parties relied on the victories their armaments would secure for them. Do not let us therefore be told that great armaments procure peace. There is nothing so easy as to manufacture inevitable wars. We have seen that process very recently; and in the eyes of the nations who make wars all wars appear to them to be just and necessary, and they only want the means of carrying them out to make them think that they are politic. Therefore do not let us pretend that these great armaments are any security for peace. As King John said: How oft the sight of means to do ill deeds Makes ill deeds done. That is as true of armaments as anything can be. I know how unpatriotic is the protest of a preference for peace. I know that war is considered the only true badge of patriotism to-day. [No.] The hon. Member who says "No" cannot read his daily newspaper. I do believe that we are standing to-day in a situation when the nation at large will recognise that after all there are some advantages in peace. [Ministerial cheers.] Yes, I mean a peace that is a real peace.

MR. BARTLEY (Islington. N.)

Not a Majuba peace.

*SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

The Majuba peace kept peace. [Several voices on the Ministerial side: "And made war"; "You made war."] It was not the people who made the peace of Majuba who made this war. But I will not enter in to that controversy now. I will follow the lead of the Secretary for War, and pursue as closely as I can his argument and his defence of the Estimates. The right hon. Gentleman said that there was no time when the Army was weaker than between 1860 and 1870. I mentioned just now that the lowest Estimates known in this country were the Estimates of the Duke of Wellington. It is quite true that the Estimates were moderate between 1860 and 1870. That was the period immediately succeeding the Crimean War. The British Parliament, British statesmen, and the British nation were determined after the conclusion of the Crimean War that, peace being made, there should not be a war establishment. Was that the doctrine of the despised Manchester school? ["Hear, hear" from the Ministerial side.] I was waiting to hear an illustration of the knowledge of the history of that period possessed by some hon. Gentlemen opposite. I will tell you who the author of that policy was— the main and principal author. It was one whom I am sure you will respect. Mr. Disraeli in 1857 on the Budget of that time stated his intention of moving resolutions against the continuance of war taxes in time of peace. I will only quote one sentence, but it is worthy the consideration of the House, He said— If these resolutions are carried we shall witness some beneficial changes in the financial system of the country. I think we shall give a great impetus to salutary economy, and shall in the most significant manner express our opinion that it is not at present advisable that England should become what is called a great military nation. I will call attention presently to the doctrine of the Secretary of State upon that subject, but I think that is a very valuable sentence, and I recommend that it should be hung up in letters of gold in the habitations of the Primrose League. I think it might be useful if it was inscribed on the wreaths which about Budget time will be laid on the statue in Parliament square. That would be extremely valuable to the taxpayers of this country. The right hon. Gentleman. I was glad to hear, passed a deserved eulogium, as did Lord Wolseley, on Lord Cardwell. I had the honour of entering Parliament as a colleague of Lord Card-well in the representation of Oxford, and I am glad to — See nations slowly wise and meanly just To buried merit raise the tardy bust. It has taken thirty years for people to recognise a great Army reform, which was at the same, time a well-considered and an economical reform, because the creation of the Reserve by Lord Cardwell was a peace measure. It did not provide for keeping on foot a large armed force ready to be launched on the Continent at a moment's notice. At that time the Estimates were some £16,000,000 or £17,000,000. What is the policy of these Estimates of £29,000,000? The Secretary of State has told us extremely frankly, and I would like to revert to the sentence to which my right hon. friend referred. He said— I hear it sometimes boasted that we are by nature a fighting race. I can only say that may be so, but it is only by accident that we are a military nation. Now we have to consider how we can turn that accident into a permanent opportunity. That sentence I remember very well. It was Lord Palmerston's, but he did not use it as if he desired that this should be a military nation. He said that we are a fighting people, but not a military nation. That is not the view of the Secretary of State. He desires that we should be a military nation; and found his opportunity, he says, in the accident which has made us a military nation—that happy and glorious war we are now waging, and he hopes that fortunate accident will give us the happy opportunity of becoming a military nation. That is the revelation of the meaning of these Estimates and of their magnitude. They are intended to convert England, which has never yet been so throughout its history, in the ordinary sense of the word, into a great military nation. That is the first thing: and of that I venture to say that, so far as L can, I protest against this revolution in the policy of this country—against this attempt to convert England into a great military nation. That is the exact opposite of all that has hitherto been desired by the succession of British statesmen who have deserved the confidence of this country.

The Government look forward to the conclusion of the war as an opportunity for increasing our military forces and turning this into a military nation. As I have shown, the policy of Mr. Disraeli was when a war was concluded, to reduce establishments, and not to increase them. Other nations, no doubt, in peace have been, and are, compelled to keep up vast armies, but why is that? It is because they have great vulnerable frontiers, and these frontiers must be constantly defended by their arms. But our frontier is the sea. [Cheers and Ministerial cries of "No."] Is the lion. Member who sits below the gangway not aware that England is an island?

COLONEL BROOKFIELD (Sussex, Rye)

The British Empire is not an island.

COLONEL KENYON-SLANEY (Shropshire, Newport)

India is not an island.

*SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

I may put a further question—Are hon. Gentlemen not aware that a frontier is that which surrounds a country? When you put these two things together I do not think my proposition—

SIR JOHN COLOMB (Great Yarmouth)

The right hon. Gentleman seems to be individualising me. I would ask him—Is he aware that the land frontiers of the Empire are greater than the diameter of the earth?

*SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

I should say that the greater part of the Empire has the sea for a frontier. I might mention a small portion of the Empire which is called Australia. That. I think, has the sea for a frontier, and a great part of India is bounded by the sea. I will say, if he will allow me to say so, that, after all, the great defence of our frontier is the Fleet, and that the Fleet should be made sufficient for the necessary defence of our frontier at whatever cost has always been my doctrine; and it is because the greater part of the frontier of our Empire is the sea, and that its defence is the Fleet, that we are not called upon to maintain great military forces in the sense that Continental countries are called upon to maintain them. That is a reasonable proposition.

Then, Sir, I want to point out another principle which underlies the speech of the Secretary of State. He warns us that we are not to build up our military policy on the quicksands of the good will and forbearance of foreign powers. Yes, but it is a new feature in modern statesmanship that on every occasion the j Government thinks it necessary to come forward and warn us that we are the best hated people in the world. If an individual had to make such a confession some people might think that he himself had something to do with his being hated, and it is by the authors of this new diplomacy that we are constantly told that we are the best hated. people in the world. It certainly was not necessary in this country in former times to make that disagreeable announcement On the contrary, it has been the habit in Speeches from the Throne to inform us that we were on the best possible terms with the other nations of the world. It has been left for this Government to make it the favourite theme of their policy that they cannot count upon the goodwill of other nations.

This confession that we have contracted the odium of mankind is brought forward as one of the topics—I might call it one of the principles—which is to justify these increased Estimates. And it is quite true. You cannot expect goodwill when you cultivate a blatant jingoism which is regarded as the true badge of patriotism, and which defies and insults your neighbours. [No, no.] That is not a policy, or one likely to secure the goodwill of other nations. The Secretary for War told us truly that "a wise foreign policy may keep us out of foreign enterprises and entanglements" I should have thought that such a, policy would mitigate the universal hatred with which it is said we are regarded. But as we are asked to arm against this universal hatred I can only draw the conclusion that in the mind of the right hon. Gentleman the foreign policy of the Government has not been a wise one, because if it were it would have kept us out of these difficulties and dangers. Here, again, we see the natural outcome of the new diplomacy. It leads to enormously increased armaments. But I come to a still more serious matter. I hope I am dealing accurately with the statements of the right hon. Gentleman. I have taken great care to verity them, because they are of the deepest importance as regards the future of this country. The right hon. Gentleman, having told us that we were compelled to send the equivalent of six army corps to South Africa, passed at once to another very significant requirement. I beg to be excused if I again read a passage which my right hon. friend has already quoted, because I think we ought to have a most definite statement from the Government upon this subject, which, I venture to say, will have most serious consequences throughout the world. The right hon. Gentleman said— Africa is not the only continent on which1 we have great commitments. I suppose the right hon. Gentleman knows what "commitments" means. I do not. It is not an English worth I wanted to understand what that word "commitments" meant I consulted many dictionaries and I could not find that "commitment" was a word ever used for anything but committing a man to prison. But at last I found a dictionary of a more modern character, and discovered in it the word "commitments." The authority quoted for it was the money article of the Daily Telegraph on 10th October, 1877. and it is said to mean "engagements." Now I know what it means. I understand it belongs to the jargon of the Stock Exchange. The right hon. Gentleman went on to say that we had commitments and interests on two other continents besides Africa, which we were bound to defend. Asia, no doubt, is one of the continents. I understand that, as we have there India and also China. But I do not know what these great commitments are on the other continent. I do not suppose you are going to send six army corps against the United States. It remains, therefore, that there are European commitments upon which we are to arm as a military nation. That is a very important matter, upon which we ought to hear a great deal more from the Government. I cannot conceive that this is a bugbear invented by the right hon. Gentleman only for the occasion. I imagine it must be the declaration of the Cabinet as the ground for proposing this gigantic Army plan and these enormous Army Estimates.

The right hon. Gentleman went on to say— No man in this House will be so hold as to say that in any circumstances we can keep ourselves free from European entanglements. So the "commitments" end in "European entanglements" Further— Nor can we suppose, if we ever become unhappily entangled with a European country, that we can limit our enterprises solely to the extent of our own possessions. Therefore it is to be "commitments" and "entanglements," and they are not to be in defence solely of our own possessions. Then what are they to be in defence of? Then he goes on to say— It stands to reason that if we have allies —mark the word "allies," because that is very important; it does not says whether it is a triple alliance or a dual alliance— if we have allies none of them will be prepared to turn out every man they can muster and allow us to rest at home. We ought —mark these words; they are the conclusion of the argument— to have ready at any moment three army corps to send abroad—practically 120,000 men. Is that for the purpose of satisfying European allies? The "enterprises not limited to the extent of our own possessions."

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL (Oldham)

Treaties.

*SIR WILLIAM HARCOUBT

That is just what I am asking. Have you made these treaties? You are to have 120,000 men ready for the purpose of alliances—let us know what these alliances are. I rejoice at the frankness of the Secretary for War, endorsed by the ardour of the Member for Oldham. But I venture to say that 120,000 men are about as inadequate for the performance of that task as the 10,000 men you sent to conquer the Boers. One hundred and twenty thousand? Why, you wanted 250,000 to fight the Boers, and if you are going to join in the great military combinations of Europe, I venture to say that co-operation is quite as dangerous as opposition. We have now Estimates for £88,000,000. But if you go in for a policy of this kind you may have to present Estimates twice or three times £88,000,000. That is why it is necessary at this stage of the debate, before we go into details, that we should know what is the policy upon which the Government are proceeding which leads to Estimates such as those which are laid on the Table of the House. Can there be anything more dangerous or more childish than the proposal to keep ready 120,000 men in order to launch them at any moment upon the Continent so as to satisfy your allies? We know very well that allies make it a condition of their alliance that you shall keep a certain number of men always ready for their purpose, and I think you will find that they will require you to keep a great many more than 120,000 men always ready. When your 120,000 men who are to be always ready to be launched on the Continent fail you, or want to be reinforced, what have you got? You send your three army corps, and you have got your three home army corps, but what do they consist of? That is exactly what we do not understand. It is to be a sort of omnium gatherum medley, a fortuitous concourse of voluntary atoms. What are these three army corps for your home defence to consist of when your first three army corps to satisfy your European commitments have proved insufficient? I venture to quote again an authority which I hope will have the respect of hon. Members opposite. It is a passage from the speech of Mr. Disraeli at the close of the Crimean War. He said— :I am not in favour of any new and still mysterious military system"— he must have foreseen this very plan— great, I am afraid, beyond proportion, and of which we have heard it said that it could at any time in ten days land an army on the Continent. Do you agree at all with the opinion or the policy of Lord Beaconsfield? Here is his emphatic condemnation of the very plan which is now before the House.

When we are on this question of alliances, I would remind the House that we had this doctrine first in a speech at Leicester not long ago. Alliances were solemnly propounded; they were then proposed, but they were received with a chilling attitude and declined with thanks. But you may be more successful in the future; and the new diplomacy may come down and say, "Well, at last my proposals for alliances have been accepted, and here they are, and we have got 120,000 men ready to launch on the Continent at any moment." It is with these resources as a new-born military nation, and under the auspices of this diplomacy, that we are going to enter into competition with the great military States of Europe. That is a policy I understand: but it is a policy to which I, for one and I hope everyone who sits on this side of the House, will offer a determined and constant resistance. I do not know, you have never told us, how many Regulars you expect to get. You have got these 120,000 men always ready to start on to the Continent but how many more have you got in your home army corps? There is to be a small number of them, apparently in the three home army corps, but besides that there is to be a great number of Volunteers, of Militia of Imperial Yeomanry, and so forth: but we have never been told what the proportions of these are, so little has this plan been developed.

MR. BRODRICK

I gave all the figures.

*SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

I beg pardon. I must have missed them. But I do not pretend to go into these different military figures. I am endeavouring to examine the policy, and not to argue upon the figures or military details. But whatever the figures are the right hon. Gentleman has very little faith in his voluntary recruits. He says— We have added to our regular forces in the last three or four years 50,000 men. We have, I think, —this is most important— under existing conditions almost reached the limit of our recruiting power. He "thinks," and I think he thinks rightly. The only resource he has are a few battalions from the garrisons, and they are to come home, and then some elderly gentlemen are to volunteer to occupy all the unhealthy, disagreeable parts of the world. That is the only cure for the failure of the recruiting power of this country. I want to know when you say, after all your experience, that you are going to garrison South Africa with twelve battalions, what the exact figure is of Baden-Powell's police, and at what you estimate the cost of that force? If there are 10.000 men, as we have been told, at £250 apiece, as you have informed us, that amounts to £2,500,000 more; and if there are 15,000 men, as has been said, and as seems more likely in a territory more which you have to add to your Esti- mates. That must appear upon some Estimate, or are they for the present to be paid by the gold miners in the Transvaal? I expect not. For their 5s, a day and all found they would like to have some better security than that—namely, the British Treasury.

The right hon. Gentleman says that 140,000 men have come forward voluntarily in the course of this war. That is a thing we must all be proud of, and of the spirit that has been shown. But that has been under, to use the right hon. Gentleman's own words, "the influence of the war fever." He does not feel confident that he will always be able to keep up the war fever. Indeed, I think he is rather of the opinion that the thermometer is already sinking and that before long it may perhaps be pronounced to be sub-normal, and when that time arrives he does not seem to have the same confidence in the number of his voluntary recruits. I applaud the frankness with which the right hon. Gentleman has developed his policy in support of this scheme, He will not, he says—and this is perhaps the most important point of all—"win cheap cheers by a proud declaration of adhesion to the voluntary system." I know the gallantry of the right hon. Gentleman; he will never "win cheap cheers by a proud declaration of adhesion to the voluntary system." but I do not know what the price of the cheers will be for conscription. At what figure will they he quoted when the war fever has evaporated? I should venture to predict that they will be very cheap cheers. He has declared his very slight adhesion to the voluntary system. He says his adhesion to the voluntary system is strictly limited.

MR. BRODRICK

Strictly limited by what?

*SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

Strictly limited by his own opinion of what he is likely to do.

MR. BRODRICK

It depends upon our having sufficient defence at home.

*SIR WILLIAM HARCOUET

Strictly limited by the necessity of having 650.000 men, at a cost of twenty-nine millions sterling, or whatever the cost may be. He asks us to fix the minimum, I suppose, at 650,000 men, or he would not have asked for it, and he estimates the cost at twenty-nine millions sterling. How much it may turn out to cost when the war fever has collapsed, how much a day his Volunteers will require, he does not know and nobody knows. But he says that, if the war fever collapses and the recruiting and volunteering fall off, the Government "would be pusillanimous if they did not make further proposals. They will exhaust every means before they come forward with that proposal." I should be sorry to see the right hon. Gentleman pusillanimous. It does not belong to his character at all. I should say of him, C'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la guerre. But when he says he will exhaust every other means, I think before he comes to that he will have exhausted His Majesty's Government. He will find that the confidence of the country has collapsed also, as well as the war fever, and that their adhesion to his conscribing aspirations are also very strictly limited. I think that that will probably be the final result of the policy thus revealed.

Now, this jumble of a scheme that has been laid before us, concocted, as the right hon. Gentleman tells us in four months of office, with the assistance during only two months of the Commander-in-Chief, is not what the country has expected as a great scheme of Army reform. What they looked for was something very different from this precipitate project flung upon the Table of Parliament to fulfil the pledges of a precipitated election. That is not what we want, or what the nation requires. We require a deliberately conceived and carefully worked out scheme of Army reform. My right hon. friend says. How is it possible that Lord Roberts, who has been Commander-in-Chief for two months, has had time? The right hon. Gentleman, in apologising for the time he had been able to bestow upon the scheme, said, and it was quite true, that he was pressed with many other occupations, in this House and elsewhere. I say that this scheme bears upon its face all the marks of haste and of an undigested conception. It is a business which requires far more time than the right hon. Gentleman or the Commander-in-Chief has been able to bestow upon it. I do not find fault with either of them, but I do not know whether the Government themselves appreciate all the bearings of this scheme. I am sure if they do nobody else does. But in his peroration the right hon. Gentleman said that his extraordinary scheme is to be lasting monument to the memory of the thousands of gallant men who have fallen and suffered in this ill-omened war. Well, I confess that I foresee in South Africa consequences of this war which will be more deplorable even than the conflict itself. That you have acquired and maintained this great Empire by voluntary arms has been a proud tradition, a proof of your greatness and your strength, and if the outcome of the war shall be that it has inflicted upon the British nation the curse, of conscription, then I say that the monument that this measure will erect will be a monument not of your glory, but of your decay.

THE FIRST LORD of the TREASURY (Mr. A. J. BALFOUR,) Manchester, E.

My right hon. friend near me has been the mark for a great many shafts hurled at him by two very important Gentlemen upon that bench—the present Leader of the Opposition and the late Leader of the Opposition. They have combined their forces, and have made an attack on the same lines against my right hon. friend and his scheme. Yet, on the whole, I think my right hon. friend may take comfort from the speech to which he has just listened. After all, the authority to whom the right hon. Gentleman opposite chiefly appealed was the late Lord Beaconsfield, and of the quotations from Lord Beaconsfield, which he gave us in considerable quantity, the date. I think, of the most recent was forty years ago, and, probably, of the less recent of them about fifty years ago. I think it is possible that in forty or fifty years some Radical gentleman upon that side of the House may look to my right hon. friend and quote his speech also upon Army reform, as the right hon. Gentleman has quoted the leader of the party to which he is opposed. The right hon. Gentleman is now apparently exactly where Lord Beaconsfield was before the German army reached its present perfection, before the war between Germany and Austria, before the war between Germany and France, before the war between Russia and Turkey, before the war between China arid Japan. The state of mind of the right hon. Gentleman in regard to military matters is exactly where it was before all the great developments of military power. And that is what it is to belong to the party of progress!

I have not much to agree with in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman, but there is one part of his speech which I do heartily agree with. I certainly do think that the growth of the Estimates is a very serious matter. The increasing magnitude of the burden thrown upon us by our responsibilities is not a pleasant fact; but it is a fact that we have not attempted to disguise, a fact that flows directly from responsibilities cast upon us through no aggressive spirit of ours, through no corrupt or vulgar ambition on our part, but by the general movement of the world's history, and not the least by the growth of great military and naval Powers, which have magnified their forces by both land and sea to a degree never contemplated by our forefathers, and necessarily have imposed on us obligations which, however onerous, are not to be disregarded, and which would become very serious indeed if we repudiated them. The right hon. Gentlemen opposite occupied great parts of their respective speeches in telling us how large a space might be filled, how great an effect might be produced by the efforts of diplomacy as a substitute for military power. But, Sir, diplomacy never was a substitute for military power. What diplomacy can do, what diplomacy has done, and what I hope it constantly will do is to prevent the use of military power, to prevent the actual clash of opposing forces, the fatal collision of nations in arms. That diplomacy may do. But the idea that, by dexterous language, soft words, and smooth promises you can make up for a strong army and effective navy is a fantastic suggestion which history has shown to be ludicrous in the extreme, and which, if any nation adopted it as a permanent policy, would certainly land that nation in final ruin and calamity. Of course, it is possible by rash and unthinking diplomacy to land your country in complications and difficulties.

MR. WILLIAM REDMOND (Clare, E.)

Birmingham diplomacy.

MR. A.J. BALFOUR

Who doubts that? Who has ever doubted it? It is a lesson written large on the pages of history, and, indeed, it does not require history to tell us that must be so. But where is the nation that has found successful substitutes for brave soldiers and expert sailors in soft speeches and cunning diplomacy? The right hon. Gentleman objects to the "new diplomacy"; but, whatever be the merits of the new diplomacy, at all events it has never, any more than the old diplomacy, claimed to be a substitute for well-disciplined armies and well-equipped fleets. The real question before us is not the almost childish problem how we may substitute diplomacy for military preparations; but whether the military preparations suggested by my right hon. friend are or are not sufficient for our needs; whether they are or are not calculated to maintain their object. The right hon. Gentleman objected to the word "commitments." He and the right hon. Gentleman near him, the Leader of the Opposition, appeared to think that in the phrase used by the Secretary for War lurked some obscure indication of new obligations, new and secret obligations, entered into by His Majesty's Government, which would carry in their train as the necessary and logical consequence a great increase in our military force. That is all fancy, all that is illusion; there is no foundation for it whatever. But we know we have great colonies and dependencies to defend, we know that some of these colonies and dependencies are in contiguity with the possessions of great Powers, and that possibly—I hope it may never be, but it may possibly be—the neighbouring Powers may be at war, or threaten war with us.

MR. WILLIAM REDMOND

What colony?

MR. A.J. BALFOUR

It is simply a geographical question. Anybody who gets out a map can see where our colonies lie and their geographical relation to the colonies of other Powers. This is a responsibility that will be denied by no man. It will not be denied by the right hon. Gentleman.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

The Secretary for War put forward the defence of our colonies as a separate reason. He also said we had commitments on the Continent as well.

MR. A. J. BALFOUR

I quite understand the right hon. Gentleman's interruption, and will leave that part of my subject, for I understand he does not dwell on our defensive responsibilities, our obviously defensive responsibilities; he bases his attack on my right hon. friend on the supposed obligation to deal with quarrels not immediately our own. There are treaties in existence, not made by us or by our immediate predecessors, but which are still binding; and who can say, in the changes and chances of mortality, in the moving kaleidoscope of European politics, how soon we may not be called upon to fulfil our treaty obligations? Not secret obligations, but obligations which are there on the face of all the text books, with which the right hon. Gentleman is as well acquainted as I am myself. It is conceivable, and it is, I presume, a contingency which my right hon. friend had in view, that if Britain were attacked, even if Britain had to fight a defensive war, she might have allies in that defensive war. The right hon. Gentleman, though he repudiates any special military knowledge, must be well aware that if we had allies in such a war they would properly expect our assistance in operations which, although in ultimate intention defensive, might be immediately offensive. Are we to render ourselves absolutely helpless in any case to give assistance by any military power of ours?

But I frankly admit that though this is an important consideration, it is not the main or governing consideration in the policy which my right hon. friend has put forward. I do not think that this contingency, which I have mentioned as possible, is in any sense probable, but though not probable, it is one that we, should not forget. But let us just consider what it is that has brought down upon my right hon. friend the charge of this military ambition—the accusation that he is encouraging the military spirit; that he is attempting to create a huge, hitherto new, and unthought of force, a force which none of our predecessors ever contemplated. The right hon. Gentleman could not have followed my right hon. friend's figures. Anybody looking at those figures would see that whether it be or be not well contrived—and I think it is admirably contrived—the great effect of the scheme is not to increase the absolute number of our troops, but to make that number efficient for the purpose for which they exist. I understand that the right hon. Gentleman has no objection to the existing number of our Regular troops. That number is not increased by my right hon. friend, except for the garrison regiments. The right hon. Gentleman does not object to the present number of Reserves. That is not increased. I do not suppose he objects to the number of Miltia which, according to the law, we ought to have. That number is not increased. It is perfectly true that we ought to have 150,000, and that we have now only 100,000. I do not think the right hon. Gentleman will consider it a very aggressive scheme to raise the 100,000 to the 150.000. There are 250,000 Volunteers in the scheme. That is not an increase; and the only increase in the present numbers are the 10,000 garrison veterans, and the increased numbers of the Yeomanry—25,000 more Yeomanry. Is it credible that on such an increase as that, we should have such accusations hurled at our heads? What the right hon. Gentlemen opposite object to, is not the numbers of our troops, but their efficiency. We shall have, when this scheme passes, 680,000 men. We have now over 600,000, and it is that increase apparently which frightens the right hon. Gentlemen. They appear to lay it down as an axiom that, whatever else the British Army is to be, it is not to be an organised and efficient army.

The Leader of the Opposition in the speech he made early this afternoon, told us that it was nonsense to talk about army corps, that an army corps was a convenient ideal to be nominally worked up to, but that there was no such thing in the British Army as an organised army corps, in the sense that there is in the German, French, and Russian armies. I think that is very true. But the object of my right hon. friend is to produce army corps; that is the object he has in view. He does not think that we ought to remain in the hugger-mugger condition defended by the right hon. Gentlemen opposite. He does not think our army corps are to be mere miscellaneous and unorganised forces of men. The essence of this scheme is that the army corps with which we have got to deal, shall be army corps in reality as well as in name—army corps with their proper complement of generals, officers, and staff; army corps with their proper complement of cavalry; army corps with their proper complement of artillery; army corps organised as military units which can meet the invader, if invasion we have to fear, without being re-embodied by combination with other half army corps, strong regiments, casual military elements, before they form an organised and united force. That is the object of my right hon. friend. That is the object which right hon. Gentlemen opposite think we ought not to try for. I cannot agree with them. Where this country is chiefly at fault is not so much in the number of its troops as in their organisation, and it is not so much the number of troops that my right hon. friend proposes to add to, as the organisation which he proposes to perfect and complete.

What has the right hon. Gentleman got to say on the other side? I listened with amazement to the attack of the right hon. Gentleman on my right hon. friend. I think it was at the end of his speech that the Leader of the Opposition talked about the General Election and all the interesting lessons which the General Election taught, and all the morals which could be drawn from the speeches made at the General Election and all the unforgetable lessons which the General Election instils into us and our children and grandchildren. I think that one of the topics which next to ardent enthusiasm for the war filled the speeches of hon. Gentlemen opposite, and right hon. Gentlemen opposite, was equal ardour for Army reform. I remember being very severely taken to task by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Fife because I said in the course of the election cam- paign that the party opposite, so far as I remembered, had hardly contrived to produce the smallest beginning of Army reform for more than a generation; indeed, not since Lord Cardwell's great change in 1870. I remember the Member for East Fife, though I do not think he mentioned any great change either in the number, discipline, or equipment of the troops, did say that during their tenure of office the Luke of Cambridge had resigned, and another Commander-in-Chief had been appointed. That was the contribution which he pointed out. I venture to say that even before the war we had endeavoured, both by augmenting the numbers and in other ways, to improve the condition of the British Army. We were laughed at. Now what do we see? These gentlemen here, dressed high for the war whilst the election was going on, are now talking about the temperature of the war fever sinking to a sub-normal point.

These gentlemen who talked so glibly about Army reform, their capacity to carry it out, our incapacity to carry it out, have nothing to say about my right hon. friend's system, either in its outline or detail, except that it encourages the military spirit. This is surely playing with a great problem. Everybody admits that the task of the War Minister in this country, who has got to deal necessarily with a voluntary Army, who has got to find troops for innumerable foreign stations, many of them very unhealthy, is one of extraordinary difficulty and perplexity—a problem such as is not presented to any foreign statesman, whether French, German, Russian, or Italian. My right hon. friend has made a serious attempt to deal with the difficulties of that problem. I do not think that any critic of the Government will doubt that; but in attempting to do so under exceptional difficulties, how is he met? On one night he is attacked because he attempts to raise the efficiency of the British officer, because he refuses to promote those whose inefficiency has been demonstrated, He is attacked on the next night, forsooth, because he has not put off his Army reform for another year, because he has inflated the military spirit. I can hardly extract from the cloudy fumes of the oratory of the right hon. Gentlemen what is the essential accusation they bring against my right hon. friend; but if my right hon. friend's scheme is carried out, as I earnestly trust it will be, he will at all events have used to the utmost the forces we have at our disposal, he will have organised for the defence of our fortresses those materials useful for little else, but most useful for that purpose, He will have freed for operations in the field troops who are now used and in part wasted in fortress work. He will have organised these army corps, not for wanton aggression, but for home defence, He will have made the best of ail the military elements at his disposal; and though he is attacked now, as military reformers have before been attacked, though he is made the target for the criticisms of right hon. Gentlemen who a few months ago, speaking in the country, were such ardent Army reformers, and a few months hence will probably be such ardent financial reformers, though he has incurred hostility, my firm belief is that the time will come when he will be pointed to, as some of the greatest of his predecessors have been, as one who has inaugurated a new era in the British Army, who has made that Army efficient for all possible purposes of home defence, and probably purposes of foreign war, and who by so doing has done more than even the most dexterous diplomacy can hope to do to secure that peace which is our first interest, and which never can be secured unless we have the respect of those Powers which are our friends, in some respects our rivals, and which might under certain circumstances be our enemies. If my right hon. friend has contributed in this way, as I think he has, to the cause of peace, if he has done something material to put our Army upon an organised and firm footing, then I think he will rank not only as a great Army reformer, but as one of the greatest and most effective friends of peace which this country has ever produced.

*SIR CHARLES DILKE (Gloucestershire. Forest of Dean)

said that if those Members of the House who had advocated Army reform were able to recognise in the scheme of the Secretary of State for War that which the Leader of the House had claimed for it the right hon. Gentleman would find in them warm defenders, instead of critics of that scheme. While he agreed that the country had been invited by many hon. Members of both sides of the House to consider Army reform as the main question which was to be discussed in the House in the present session, he confessed he could not, criticising, he hoped honestly, the scheme of the right hon. Gentleman, find in it the elements of hope for the great reform of the British Army in the future which they had been led to expect in the past. The right hon. Gentleman who had just resumed his seat had himself shown one of the greatest blots of principle on the scheme. He had claimed for the scheme that there was in it—at first he had said no increase, and then had modified his words and said only a small increase in our forces. That was one of the attacks which he made upon the scheme. The increase of expenditure had been enormous. As the right hon. Gentleman tin Member for West Monmouth had pointed out in his speech just previously, although the normal peace expenditure had grown rapidly from £18,000,000 to, what was now called £29,000,000, but what in reality was £31,000,000, with loan money, to which there must be added the enormous expenditure of India, and of the Civil Service Estimates in relief of the Army—in spite of the gigantic expenditure which was continually increasing there had been no appreciable increase in the normal peace Army of the country. As one who considered that a mobile and effective force was of more value and more importance to the country for the efficiency of Imperial defence than mere numbers, he failed to see in the present scheme, as he had failed to see in previous scheme, marked as they were by great increase of expenditure, that increase in the number and efficiency of the mobile Army of this country which they had been led to expect. The right hon. Gentleman then quoted the numbers of our normal forces, and had spoken of the 600,000 men that we had already, and of the 650,000 that we might have under the scheme. We had 1,000,000 of one sort or another in the land forces of the Empire. The one charge which he had always made against the system, and which ought still to be made against the scheme, was that the Government had not made a small effective mobile Army out of the enormous number of men for which the country paid.

The First Lord of the Treasury had claimed for the Secretary of State for War that that right hon. Gentleman had created real army corps, He desired to show the House how little those army corps would stand the test. Where were the cavalry for the army corps? The right hon. Gentleman had not increased the cavalry by a single man. The right hon. Gentleman had a scheme for the gradual increase of the Yeomanry which he might or might not obtain, but they were not cavalry. The right hon. Gentleman did not increase the cavalry by a single man. He denied that there was regular cavalry for three army corps, let alone the six army corps which were claimed as a, reality under the scheme. When the right hon. Gentleman spoke of these army corps, composed partly of Regulars, partly of Volunteers, and partly of Militia brought from all parts of the country, he was speaking of men who might take their discharge at any moment.

MR. BRODRICK

Not at all.

*SIR CHARLES DILKE

Yes, the Volunteers could demand their discharge at a moment's notice, and to serve under any other conditions would do away with the volunteer service. That showed how ill thought out the scheme was which the Leader of the House and the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War had endeavoured to persuade the House was a reality. He recollected some years ago a scheme which provided eight army corps, which practically never existed, although for some years the regiments supposed to compose them figured in the Army list. After a time they became such a laughing stock that they were withdrawn from the Army list He confessed so far as they had gone at present he had not gathered from the Secretary of State for War or the Leader of the House any facts which led him to suppose that the three army corps mentioned in the scheme would be any more a reality than the eight army corps which everybody had so laughed at. He agreed with the Leader of the House that many gentlemen on both sides had shown what the right hon. Gentlemen called an ardour for army reform, and he was very glad they had done so. The noble Lord the Member for Bedfordshire had told the House that in South Africa he had learnt one thing, which was that in all those years that he had listened to the debates on Army reform in that House it was the reformers who had been right and the Government who had been wrong. The reformers now saw the Minister for War was—in all but the chief point—a convert to their views. He believed it was a fact that the most ferocious of the inquisitors in the old days of the Spanish Inquisition were the Cardinals, secretly of the ancient Hebrew faith, yet they had retained their Jewish religion through all the time of the Inquisition. What those who had pressed for Army reform now learnt from the Secretary of State was that during the ten years he had been connected with the War Office, and had ridiculed the reformers, he had agreed in secret with most of the reforms put forward.

He was not at this moment speaking of the details of the scheme, but of the principle, and any detail to which he should allude he should allude to very briefly, and merely as an illustration, but he should have to allude to some details, and that would make it unnecessary for him to speak again upon the subject in Committee. The first point in the speech of the Secretary of State for War on which he would dwell was one upon which the right hon. Gentleman had been unjust alike not only to the reformers but to the House itself. With regard to the manœuvres the right hon. Gentleman had said the Government were going to do that which they ought to have done in the past, and have annual manœuvres and test the troops in all parts of the country. Why had they not done it in the past? The right hon. Gentleman said they had not done it before because the House of Commons prevented them, "All our proposals," he said, "with regard to manœuvres were cut down by the House of Commons." He would not deal with the contention in detail, he would simply quote the speech of the right hon. Gentleman on the Manœuvres Bill to disprove it, Deputation after deputation had waited upon him to press the Bill.

MR. BRODRICK

I know that the right hon. Gentleman almost alone supported me.

*SIR CHARLES DILKE

On July 8th. 1897, the right hon. Gentleman said the Bill was brought forward at that late period of the session in consequence of the very strong encouragement which the Government had received from all quarters of the House, and he added that there had been indications of support "from almost every quarter" of the House. In fact, the opposition to the Bill was confined to a few Members of the House. It was an attack made upon the House of Commons. There were a few Members who were opposed to the Bill, but they were a very small minority of the House, and the pressure that was brought to bear upon the Government to bring forward and to pass the Bill was a pressure from all sides of the House. Another matter also—one, perhaps, of detail—also one to which he would briefly allude, one which was attracting a great deal of attention in the country, was that the right hon. Gentleman said the chief of the lessons of the war which the Government had learnt concerned the equipment of the Army with guns. He spoke of the necessity of adopting heavy guns for the Army; a matter which the reformers had pressed upon the House, but what was more important, he spoke of quick-firing guns, and he defended the gun supplied to the Army, which he said was accounted the "best field-gun in Europe" by experts "three or four years ago." No doubt that was said to the Government by one of their experts. But field guns of the old type were out of date, and the Government had been warned repeatedly by the House before the war had begun that we should have quick-firing guns, but what happened? In the ordinary sense our Army had not a single quick-firing gun in the country. The two systems of quick-firing guns which had now been adopted by the Government had been refused when the reformers brought the matter before the House on the "21st of April, and then again in June, 1899. The Government admitted that they had not a single quick-firing gun, but that they were experimenting in the matter. In that detail the right hon. Gentleman misled the House. The policy with regard to guns now adopted by the Government had been arrived at by the Government after the commencement of the war, from which they had learnt at last a lesson, and was a policy which had been pressed by the military reformers of the House several years ago. The principal staff officer of Sir Redvers Buller's force in Natal, who had previously been long in the Intelligence Department, had written of the war in South Africa that our guns in South Africa had "never been matched against quick-firing field guns of the latest type," The Secretary of State had adopted all the accessories of his scheme from the views put forward by military reformers in this House. He had even withdrawn the Guards from Gibraltar, and he had one so, so far as could be made out, on the ground that Gibraltar had contracted in size and that there was now less room there for the evolutions of the Guards than previously. He had also adopted the views of the hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite with regard to handing Sierra Leone and other stations over to the fleet, as he himself had said, against the opinion of the Admiralty, and he had thereby caused that unpleasant feeling between the two Departments, which had almost become a public scandal during the last few days.

But, continued Sir Charles Dilke, these are small matters compared with the much larger matters in which the right hon. Gentleman has very greatly changed his views, without, however, adopting a solid system which would give a good foundation to the future military institutions of the country. One of the lessons of the war which almost every officer who has returned home has impressed upon us is the need for mounted infantry as apart from our cavalry. The right hon. Gentleman has spoken of that need. Almost every officer who has spoken or written about the war has assumed that our present scheme for mounted infantry would be put an end to; that the best men would not he picked out of the infantry battalions, but that separate mounted infantry battalions would be established. I believe it was the universal opinion throughout the Army and the country that one of the reforms the Government would institute would be the creation of mounted infantry battalions. There is not a word about that in the scheme of the right hon. Gentleman, and when he says that it is necessary that we should be provided with a much larger body of mounted troops, I ask where are they to be found in the Estimates. There is nothing but the suggestion that the Yeomanry will be increased, but the Yeomanry are not a force available for foreign service or for India, or for any use outside these shores. They are a hypothetical force as to the future of which we know nothing at all.

There are many other points in the scheme on which the country has been profoundly disappointed. It had been almost universally accepted after the experience we have had of Colonial mounted infantry in this war that there would be some sketch, however faint, of the future constitution of an Imperial mounted infantry throughout the Empire. I know it is said that these suggestions should come from the Colonies, but they have come. You would not be forcing any such scheme on the colonies, but you would only be accepting an invitation already made. Suggestions have been already made by Canada and Australia, and in New Zealand a definite scheme has been proposed by the Government, and the country will be disappointed that no reference has been made to that scheme by the Secretary of War.

MR. BRODRICK

I made a distinct reference to it.

*SIR CHARLES DILKE

The point on which reformers in this House have always insisted, and the necessity for which has been terribly shown in the early stages of this war, is that we should not wait for war to make these preparations, but that an arrangement with the Colonies should be made in time of profound peace so that it might be in working order when war broke out, and not have to be made much too late to render all the assistance it would have rendered in the earlier stages of a war.

I will not dwell on the adoption by the right hon. Gentleman of the views of reformers in this House with reference to transport and the Army Medical Department. I remember debate after debate in which hon. Members called for the reorganisation of the Army Medical Department, and I think it is unjust that the responsibility should now he thrown on the House of Commons for having rejected Government proposals which were never made. I will not even dwell on the great change in the training of the Army for war referred to by the right hon. Gentleman, and which implies a severe censure on the War Office of the past. The words of the Secretary of State for War were grave words. They went as far as the words which have been used in public by a. distinguished officer who has the confidence of the present Commander-in-Chief, and who served as Adjutant-General to the Commander-in-Chief in India. He used these very serious words— There is no disguising the fact that the troops sent out from England to South Africa were not properly instructed in the duties required from soldiers in war. What a terrible condemnation of the War Office of the past that the Secretary of State should be obliged to admit that our soldiers—although only a small Army, which were we told would be more efficient than the conscript armies of foreign countries, both because of its voluntary system and its manageableness—are less efficient and less trained than the armies of other countries. I understood the Secretary of State to admit that. At all events the words he used I with regard to changes in the future were so strong that they appeared to me to carry that condemnation. The Secretary of State has theoretically adopted the views of reformers in this House, and, taking almost the words of the Service Members' memorandum circulated last year, he tells us that in the past we have had scratch corps and improvised staffs, but that in future we are to have corps trained in peace by the officers who are to command them in war, and that they are to be provided with peace staffs. He has applied these words not only to the three army corps for foreign service, but also to the three mixed army corps, which I agree with the hon. Member who has spoken are nebulous corps, because their constitution is of such a mixed description that it cannot be satisfactory. It is my belief that it will lead, in the event of war, to their being broken up again and not employed in the manner now contemplated. I believe that in the event of war you would pick out from these corps the regular troops, and that therefore they would have no real existence.

The right hon. Gentleman has explained that besides these army corps there will be left at home more than half a million of men prepared for defence, I confess I am one of those who hold that the command of the seas is the defence of this country. I agree with my right hon. friend the Member for West Monmouthshire (Sir W. Harcourt) that this House will cheer-fully vote whatever money is necessary to maintain that command, which is our real defence. I believe that the British Army exists mainly as a really efficient army for the reinforcement of the Indian garrison, and, if necessary, as the rudiment of that army which, in the event of a great war, would be necessary to secure peace by means of a, counter-stroke at the possessions of our enemy. I attach more importance to the smaller portion of the Army which is organised for the purpose of offence than to this enormous horde of men with rifles for home defence. Those men are mainly composed of Militia and Volunteers. I listened in vain in the proposal of the right hon. Gentleman for that reform of the Militia which I did expect. There was a plan for the creation of a Militia Reserves, but that is not the kind of reform we expected. There is a great deficiency of officers which applies not only to the Militia but still more to the Volunteers. There is nothing in the scheme to remedy that deficiency, and I cannot see how they are to be provided. And yet what can be the value of these picked and special detachments of Volunteers, to be put into an army corps, unless you have efficient and sufficient officers to command them. In reply to an interruption of mine with reference to the training of these officers, the right hon. Gentleman said that the matter was under consideration. I confess I cannot see that we have in this scheme that great measure of army reform which was promised at the last election. The right hon. Gentleman has, it is true, adopted the language and many of the measures proposed to him by reformers in this House. But when he went to the root of the subject I find a, great falling off. He paid lip service to the Cardwell system and spoke in high terms of it, but when he came to the substance of his scheme there was again a large increase in the long service portion of the Army, which is entirely opposed to the Cardwell system, whereas there was no corresponding increase in the short service portion of the Army. That is a side of the subject which I fear I cannot develop to-night.

The most important part of the whole question is, how are you going to make up the number of troops which are supposed to exist after the present war, depleted as the Army will be? The Leader of the Opposition said we had no statistical calculations before us. This is a point on which, at all events, calculations should have been given us. We know that there are three years drafts required for India at the end of this war, instead of one ordinary draft. There is also an enormous deficiency under many other heads which will have to be made up. How are you going to make it up? When the right hon. Gentleman talks of the Cardwell system he must remember that it has been greatly altered by both sides of the House in consequence of the difficulties always existing in the ease of India, and which are increased now, and will be much greater at the conclusion of the war. The original idea was a short service system, but it was soon found that that would not suit India. Then we proposed five year, then six years, and ultimately seven, and eight years for men discharged in India In 1883 a Government of which I was a member, and in which the Leader of the Opposition was Secretary to the Admiralty, was obliged to give the men the option of staying up to twelve years, and giving them advantages for doing so. That was a complete departure from the Cardwell system. The principle of the Cardwell system is sound, namely, that the Army could be extended for war, but it was not applicable to India. The right hon. Gentleman dealt with that matter the other day, but not, I think, very plainly. He pays lip service to the Cardwell system, but he is getting all his old soldiers to stay behind, which is an absolute reversal of that system. He is extendng the long service portion of the Army in this way, although he is not making any corresponding attempt to deal with the short service portion. Then again, there was an almost universal belief throughout the country that some attempt would be made to increase the pay of the private soldier. I believe every candidate at the general election on both sides was in favour of increasing the private soldiers pay, and I believe also the taxpayers are in favour of it. The subject is, however, merely referred to by the right hon. Gentleman, who tells us that it would be useless to increase the pay of the private soldier unless we made it something like double the present pay. Have you tried? I see nothing myself pointing at all in that direction. Have you tried even that elasticity of conditions of service which many think so desirable? What did your Inspector General of Recruiting tell you two years ago? He said you had never given the three years system a fair chalice. The right hon. Gentleman knows perfectly well the views of the present Commander-in-Chief on this subject, and the views of reformers in this House, and yet he says that the only question is, "Are we to have a separate army for India or not?" No one in this House has ever for a generation proposed a separate army for India. But what we have proposed is elasticity in the conditions of service, which would make recruiting far more easy than it is at present. The right hon. Gentleman has not told us what is the opinion of Lord Roberts on the subject of the conditions of army service.

It being midnight, the debate stood adjourned.

Debate to be resumed to-morrow.