HC Deb 12 March 1901 vol 90 cc1357-409

Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Amendment to Question [11th March], "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

And which Amendment was— To leave out from the word 'That,' to the end of the Question, in order to add the words in the opinion of this House, the public interest requires that a complete and immediate inquiry be made into all the circumstances connected with the removal from his Cummand at Gibraltar of Major General Sir Henry Colvile, K.C.M.G., C.B.; instead thereof."—(Mr. Charles Douglas.)

Question again proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

*COLONEL BLUNDELL (Lancashire, Ince)

I have no knowledge of Sir Henry Colvile's case or of the case of the Secretary of State for War, beyond what I heard last night. The reason why I wish to make a few remarks is that this is, in my view, a case of an officer invited to resign his appointment for one thing only, when, in reality, he is removed for something else. In my view the false or incomplete issue upon which Sir Henry Colvile was called upon to resign has wrecked his career by inducing him to write to the press. He was invited to resign upon the Lindley affair, but the whole facts of that affair had been gone into before he was reappointed to the command at Gibraltar. Whether Colonel Spragge made a good or a bad defence could not affect the question whether Sir Henry Colvile should have gone on when he got Colonel Spragge's message. The fateful moment for General Colvile was when he decided to go on and not to go back to Lindley. Sir Henry Colvile's decision, which was either right or wrong, was made anterior to Colonel Spragge's defence. I venture to think that he was recalled for the reasons stated in the speech of the right hon. the Secretary of State for War, which I will read. Lord Roberts stated that, in his opinion on two occasions in the field General Colvile had shown a want of forwardness, of enterprise, and of sound judgment which are essential qualifications for a command. He considered that in twice leaving a body of cavalry in difficulties he set an example which, if followed, would be fatal to an army in the field. Other circumstances had come to Lord Roberts's notice in which General Colvile's relations with his subordinates and the absence of sufficient control and supervision in his command were such as to seriously impair the confidence which troops should have in their leaders. I make that statement by Lord Roberts's desire. Now, to suggest resignation upon the Lindley affair, which had already been decided, was what no man who was prepared to stand a court-martial about the Lindley affair could possibly accede to. I venture to think that, in such a complicated case, it would have been better to have recalled Sir Henry Colvile direct. He need not have been employed again unless the views of the authorities changed. But they might have changed, for it must be recollected that at Paardeberg it was the action of part of his division—the Canadians and the 7th Company of the Engineers, supported by the Gordon Highlanders—in pushing forward at three in the morning, and entrenching themselves within eighty yards of Cronje's defences, which finally forced on the surrender of the Boer commander. This act showed resource and an appreciation of the conditions of modern warfare which we do not always find; now the question arises, ought General Colvile to have the credit of this? I think so, because I recall that he advocated the same system at Maggersfontein. Thus General Colvile had a great deal to his credit, even if he had other instances to militate against it. I think the action of the War Office has been very fitful in this matter, and that it does not tend towards the interest of discipline as it used to be regarded in the Army.

*MR. LAWSON WALTON (Leeds, S.)

The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War pointed out in his speech last night that he was not influenced in his view of this case either by the social position which General Colvile occupies, or by the newspaper clamour which he told us had been raised in support of it. If that declaration was made by the right hon. Gentleman in order to assure the House of his impartiality and of his firmness the House needed no such assurance. But if the observation sprang from a feeling that a reflection could be made upon the character of this attempt to secure for General Colvile some hearing by a competent military tribunal, then I venture to ask the House to believe that those of us who are taking an interest in this subject entirely disclaim any such motive. We approach the case in no partisan sense. It involves a great public question relating to the status of military officers and the steps that ought to be taken before they are deprived of their position in His Majesty's service. So far as I am personally concerned, the issue of this discussion is a matter of indifference. Except that I have had placed in my hands some papers by my hon. friend the Member for North-West Lanark, who drew attention to the subject, and that I have had the opportunity of a general explanation from General Colvile, that officer is a complete stranger to me. What we ask the House to establish by the acceptance of the Amendment is that a military officer before he is deprived of high command shall have his conduct investigated by a competent military tribunal, before which he may be heard in his defence. The most fundamental principle of justice is that an accused person should be heard before he is condemned. There is no jurisdiction so barbarous as not to be founded on that principle; there is no system of jurisprudence which fails to be arbitrary if that principle is not observed. I think that in a very few minutes I can satisfy the House that General Colvile, an eminent officer, has been compulsorily retired without ever having had an opportunity of even hearing the materials upon which the charges against him are founded, or of offering to any competent military tribunal an answer to these imputations.

What is the case against him? It resolves itself into two charges. The first is an indictment connected with Sanna's Post; the second connected with the surrender at Lindley. The right hon. Gentleman fully appreciated the relative importance of these two accusations and he put in the forefront the conduct of General Colvile in relation to Sanna's Post. What is the accusation It is that General Colvile, when a short distance removed from General Broad-wood, communicated with General Broadwood, who was in action with the Boers, and invited General Broadwood to neglect the immediate duties which devolved upon him in connection with the command of his troops, and travel a distance of two or three miles in order to hold a personal interview with General Colvile. The second charge is that General Colvile, instead of proceeding to capture or rescue the lost guns, withdrew his troops in another direction. The right hon. Gentleman made these charges against an officer of tried capacity, and, led the House to believe that these constituted an accurate statement of facts, which had been accepted by General Colvile. Now, so far from General Colvile accepting that satement as accurate, he has all along strenuously contested all of these allegations, and therefore it is obvious, in the interests of justice and fair play, that a case has arisen for inquiry. General Colvile's argument is that, so far from having called upon General Broadwood to join him while General Broadwood was engaged in military operations, he issued that summons hours after the military operations had concluded; and that, so far from withdrawing his troops and avoiding his duty of rescuing, or capturing the lost guns, he withdrew his troops in order that by a flank movement he might intercept the Boers, and so secure the guns. If that allegation is founded on fact, surely General Colvile is entitled to have his view presented for consideration before a properly constituted military tribunal.

*THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (Mr. Brodrick,) Surrey, Guildford

The whole case was put by General Colvile to Lord Roberts and considered by him before any action was taken.

*MR. LAWSON WALTON

I should like to know—and I hope the right hon. Gentleman will give us the information—in what form, where, and on what occasion General Colvile ever presented for the consideration of the present Secretary of State for War or the Commander-in-Chief the statement of his case. If the right hon. Gentleman will only bear with me for a moment, I think I will make it clear to him that the only statement ever made to Lord Roberts by General Colvile was a statement briefly made in the course of an interview of a few minutes, before any charge had been formulated against him and when there was no opportunity of framing an accusation which he might have challenged or answered. A statement was put into writing by General Colvile at a later stage, and that statement was submitted to the Army Committee at the War Office, consisting of the predecessor of the right hon. Gentleman, Lord Lansdowne, and Lord Wolseley; and that statement was considered so entirely satisfactory that they approved of' General Colvile resuming his command at Gibraltar. That statement, so far from leading to censure, established General Colvile's acquittal from the charges made against him. In regard to Sanna's Post, I say that there is on the part of General Colvile a complete answer; and what is more important, until last night, Sanna's Post has never been relied on by the right hon. Gentleman in supporting the action taken against General Colvile. It has never before been put forward as a ground for this distinguished officer being removed from his command.

Let me establish that proposition. The first reference to Sanna's Post appears in the despatch which Lord Roberts wrote and sent to the War Office. In that despatch he describes General Colvile's operation of withdrawing his troops in order to intercept the Boers and guns by a flank movement as not quite an error of judgment, because the phrase used was— It would have been better if General Colvile, instead of seeking to rescue the guns by a flank movement, had operated directly upon the position where the guns were, and from which the Boers were transporting them. That is a qualified and indirect reflection on the exercise of judgment on the part of General Colvile. Later a letter was written to General Colvile, when he was at Gibraltar, explaining to him the grounds upon which—and in which the right hon. Gentleman concurred with Lord Roberts—it had been decided to withdraw him from his command. That letter was written on 16th December last, and stated that the gravamen of the ease against General Colvile was in connection with the Lindley affair alone. It runs as follows:— The Secretary of State having discussed by telegraph the incidents of the surrender of No. XIII. Imperial Yeomanry battalion, concurs with Lord Roberts that you were mainly responsible for the surrender, and has reluctantly come to the conclusion that you cannot be permitted to retain your command. I am directed to request you will hand in your resignation to General Sir George White on receipt of this letter, and quit Gibraltar. If Sanna's Post was relied on on 11th December as a ground for the peremptory withdrawal of General Colvile from Gibraltar, why was it not mentioned in that letter? The right hon. Gentleman intimated last night that the history of Sanna's Post had gradually developed, and that new light had been thrown on that unfortunate affair; but as late as 21st February in the present year the Secretary of State alleged as the only ground for the measure against General Colvile the Lindley surrender. Sanna's Post was not mentioned at all. What reliance can, be placed upon the case which rests mainly on General Colvile's conduct at Sanna's Post, when no inquiry on that affair has ever been held, when General Colvile has never had an opportunity of hearing the statements made to Lord Roberts in regard to it, and when no mention has been made of it until last night, and it has never been put forward as one of the reasons?

*MR. BRODRICK

The hon. and learned gentleman is speaking from a brief supplied to him by General Colvile. I am therefore surprised he does not know that there is a memorandum by General Colvile dealing with the whole question of Sanna's Post.

*Mr. LAWSON WALTON

I fail to appreciate the force of the right hon. Gentleman's interposition; the only motive apparently was to indulge in a cheap sneer at my expense, which will not serve the right hon. Gentleman. The point I understand him to make is this, that with regard to the story of Sanna's Post, General Colvile has had an opportunity of clearing himself. The right hon. Gentleman gave us what he said was the story of Sanna's Post, but what was the source of inspiration from which that story came? What are the historical data upon which that version rests? They were supplied by Lord Roberts, and I have no doubt were conscientiously believed in by Lord Roberts and by the right hon. Gentleman himself; but where does Lord Roberts get these statements? He got those statements through various officers from information derived from various persons and through various channels, and General Colvile has had no opportunity of checking those statements or of cross-examining those persons who made them. Lord Roberts is put into possession of a version of these incidents through statements made behind the back of the officer involved, who has had no opportunity of giving his answer to them. Yet, when those statements are put forward, it is said that they are the result of an inquiry in which General Colvile had every opportunity given to him for defence, and therefore he is not injured in that matter, having had a full opportunity of putting his case before his judges.

Now, I shall show the House in a moment that all that has ever been produced by General Colvile was a memorandum which was sent to the War Office when his conduct was under investigation after the Sanna's Post affair and the Lindley disaster, and when that explanation was regarded as satisfactory by those who were qualified to express an opinion. Before going further, let me first touch upon the Lindley case. What was the Lindley case? It was that General Colvile failed to go back eighteen or twenty-two miles in order to rescue Yeomanry in difficulties. That, in the opinion of the right hon. Gentleman, was a most inhuman proceeding. He implied it rather than said it, because he told us of other officers who had travelled twice the distance and succeeded in rendering important service to the Yeomanry. But he did not tell the House that General Colvile did not follow their example because he was under orders to go elsewhere, The other officers were under orders to go to Lindley. General Colvile was under orders to go to Heilbron, and, according to those orders, he had to be at Heilbron the next day, and he could not go back to the rescue of the Yeomanry at Lindley without disobeying the specific orders which he had received. I do not suggest to the House that this is a matter which we can investigate, but it is a matter which should be investigated. I say that General Colvile has a case with regard to the Lindley disaster which should be tried, a case upon which a competent military tribunal should express some verdict. Now Lindley is in a different position from Sanna's Post, because, while there never was an inquiry into the affair at Sanna's Post, with regard to the Lindley disaster there were two, the one which most nearly approached a judicial inquiry being directed by the right hon. Gentleman himself. When General Colvile returned to this country from South Africa he was told that Lord Roberts had criticised his action, and was asked to furnish an explanation, which he did: but the right hon. Gentleman fails to see the distinction between an answer to an accusation framed and an explanation given by an accused person before he knows the charge made against him. General Colvile told his own version, and shortly after a despatch was received from Lord Roberts, and a Committee consisting of Lord Lansdowne, the then Secretary of State for War, and Lord Wolseley investigated the matter, and they approved of General Colvile taking up his command at Gibraltar. That took place in August. In the month of December the right hon. Gentleman succeeded Lord Lansdowne at the War Office, and Lord Roberts succeeded Lord Wolseley as Commander-in-Chief. Last night the right hon. Gentleman told us that the decision of that Committee was arrived at without the knowledge of Lord Roberts.

*MR. BRODRICK

What I said was that the committee of inquiry with regard to the Lindley disaster was brought to my knowledge by Sir Evelyn Wood, and by me referred to Lord Roberts, who had not been previously consulted.

*MR. LAWSON WALTON

But even so, supposing that the right hon. Gentleman's predecessor Lord Lansdowne and the late Commander-in-Chief had come to the conclusion that they might restore General Colvile to his command at Gibraltar without consultation with Lord Roberts, surely, if the Secretary for War for the time being and the Commander-in-Chief for the time being had investigated the circumstances of an officer's conduct and come to a decision upon it, there ought to be an end to the matter. How long was an officer to hold his command subject to the change of the political Minister at the War Office, subject to the review- of a more vigorous and sweeping Secretary of State with reforms in prospect and a new Commander-in-Chief with different ideas of discipline? Without any intimation to him of any sort or kind, without any new charge being brought against him, that decision in his favour was cancelled, and he was withdrawn from the command which he had been allowed to take up. The right hon. Gentleman was quite correct when he said that a new fact came to his knowledge, namely, the report of the inquiry in South Africa with regard to the Lindley disaster. Let us assume for a moment that the court in South Africa did investigate the cause of the Lindley disaster—that investigation was behind General Colvile's back; he was not there either personally or by representation; there was no one to sift the evidence on his behalf, and no one to establish conclusions which might tell in his favour. Yet the right hon. Gentleman proceeds to act upon that report without calling the attention of General Colvile himself to it or even sending him a copy of it. The action taken by the right hon. Gentleman in this case is an action taken upon the report of an inquiry at which General Colvile was not present, and he acted upon it without asking General Colvile whether he had anything to say with regard to it. I suggest that the action of the right hon. Gentleman was absolutely unfair, and I submit that the right hon. Gentle man has failed to show any new facts in view of the decision which was arrived at by his predecessor and Lord Wolseley, who had a statement before them on which they acted, and which, so far as I know, is the only statement General Colvile has published with regard to this matter. No one can feel a higher respect for Lord Roberts than I entertain, but he is but mortal; he was not himself an eye-witness of the conduct of General Colvile either at Lindley or Sauna's Post. He only derived his impressions of these incidents from versions given by others. Lord Roberts never pretended to have conducted any independent investigation at which General Colvile had an opportunity of being heard, and therefore the fact that Lord Roberts had formed this impression upon ex parte statements and evidence never submitted to cross-examination was not sufficient ground for the Secretary of State for War to review the action of his predecessors in removing him—General Colvile—from his command.

The question rests, as I have said, upon this, that Sauna's Post has never been a subject of inquiry at all, and with regard to Lindley there has been no inquiry at which General Colvile has been present, or with regard to which his defence has ever been heard. Let not our view be clouded by General Colvile's unfortunate communication to the press. I am not here to approve or disapprove that action, it falls altogether outside the scope of this motion, because all the motion asks is that General Colvile's conduct in South Africa, upon which his withdrawal from South Africa was founded, should be the subject of investigation. So far as the communication to the press is concerned, though it may be blameable, there is a good deal to be said in extenuation of it The action of the Secretary for War in regard to General Colvile s communication to the press only illustrates the arbitrary way in which the War Office acted even towards officers in high command. After that paragraph appeared in the newspapers General Colvile received a short letter from the War Office asking him whether it was published on his authority. He was not invited to otter any explanation of the circumstances which might in some degree have extenuated his conduct. He was simply asked if it was published by his authority. He replied in the affirmative, and then he was compulsorily retired, and his retiring pay permanently reduced. That may be right or it may be wrong, but before the War Office judges a man and metes out punishment to him, they ought to investigate the circumstances under which his conduct took place. As my hon. friend said, General Colvile had received the greatest possible provocation; he had received a letter from his superior in command that he must resign his command forthwith and immediately return home. After thirty years brilliant service in the Army, to be withdrawn from his command and bade return by the next mail steamer because of action in South Africa mouths before, after a favourable opinion had been expressed of his conduct by the War Office, was conduct calculated to provoke a man to an act which in calmer moments he would not be guilty of. One must remember, too, that General Colvile was a half-pay officer, and he was entitled to communicate with the press and sit in this House and to stump the country and point out the mode in which military matters have been or are being conducted, and I say with regard to this matter, although his defence and vindication may fail on inquiry, he ought to be allowed a hearing, and that the circumstances ought to be investigated by the War Office and receive that consideration which they appear to warrant.

So much for that part of the case which the right hon. Gentleman has made; but part of the case of the right hon. Gentleman has been abandoned. The right hon. Gentleman stated on the 21st of February that General Colville had been deprived of his command owing to inefficiency in the field. If the right hon. Gentleman meant to rely only upon the misconduct of General Colvile on the two occasions to which he referred I understand his answer, but a very large proportion of this House are under the impression that Lord Roberts was expressing a general opinion with regard to General Colvile in connection with his capacity as a commanding officer. The past record of General Colvile as regards South Africa is that he has received on four occasions the commendation of his commanding officer. First of all, at Belmont and Magersfontein. Despatches sent to Lord Wolseley by Lord Methuen both refer in complimentary terms to General Colvile; next in regard to Paardeberg and Poplar Grove, he had the commendation of Lord Roberts himself. In that campaign General Colvile was mentioned favourably by his superiors on four occasions. There were these two blots, and in regard to those he has never been heard. No materials have ever been supplied to show the grounds of this action by the War Office, and all that General Colvile asks by this motion is that ho shall have the satisfaction of knowing that his case has been heard, before his career in the public service is finally ended. The right hon. Gentleman has said that this remedy is useless to General Colvile, because he would be no better off after that inquiry has been held; that, in fact, he would be in a worse position than if he was condemned unheard. That was always the view of the prosecution before the trial takes place, but it is no answer to a man who asks to be fairly tried to say so. At all events, that is a line which I hope we shall never follow in this country when a military case arises for consideration. That was the logic which influenced the French War Minister when the case of Captain Dreyfus arose, but by a British Minister of War no such argument can surely be put forward. All that General Colvile asks is that he may have the satisfaction of learning what the materials were upon which this action was taken, so that he may be able to put before the country the answer which he seeks to make to the accusation. I submit that it is a small requital for thirty years of brilliant public service to yield to an officer the small demand that his case shall be heard before his condemnation is finally recorded.

*SIR J. DICKSON-POYXDER (Wiltshire, Chippenham)

In a portion of his remarks last night the right hon. Gentleman stated that he was in favour of bringing officers before courts-martial, but that if the House of Commons is not prepared to accept the decision of such distinguished officers as Lord Roberts, Lord Kitchener, and Lord Wolseley, there is very little likelihood of their accepting the views of any subordinate officers. No one has a deeper and more profound respect for the opinion of such a distinguished man as our Commander-in-Chief than myself, and in saying that I believe I am echoing the opinion of every one in this House; but at the same time I cannot help feeling with the hon. Member who has just sat down that when the case of a very distinguished general, who for the last thirty years has given distinguished services to the country, is brought before the bar of public opinion it should not be subjected to individual opinion, but should go through all the military machinery possible for the law to give. It has been clearly shown that in the case of General Colvile, judging from the view of courts-martial, there has not been a complete case presented on the side of General Colvile, and in coming to a decision like that which the Commander-in-Chief has arrived at they have come to it not through hearing evidence on both sides, but by hearing the evidence for the prosecution only.

There is no better instance of this than in the case of the Lindley disaster and Sauna's Post. It is upon the Lindley affair that General Colvile has been condemned practically to expulsion from the Army. I was not an officer in General Colvile's column, nor in the 13th Yeomanry; I was not actually on the spot when the matter occurred, but I was next door to it. I was an officer in Lord Methuen's column, which came with great, but, unfortunately, not sufficient, despatch to try to relieve Colonel Spragge's Yeomanry. From the remarks of the right hon. Gentleman last night one would have thought that Lord Methuen's column being at Kroonstadt and General Colvile's between Lindley and Heilbron, and messages being sent to both, they were each in a position to proceed, and that Lord Methuen's column did proceed, with the greatest possible despatch, to the relief of Colonel Spragge's Yeomanry at Lindley. That, however, is not the fact. The fact is that sitting at Kroonstadt as we Were, after a very tedious march through the whole of the western portion of the Orange River Colony, we had not been there for more than thirty-six hours before an order came to Lord Methuen to proceed with the greatest despatch to the relief not of Colonel Spragge,. but of General Colvile. The House might have supposed that General Colvile, moving aimlessly and quietly along to Heilbron, received a message that Colonel Spragge was in dire distress and yet refused to return. But the case is that General Colvile immediately he left Lindley was attacked most severely for two days by a large Boer force, so much so that a message was sent to Lord Methuen to follow the Heilbron road to assist General Colvile. Therefore, when the latter received the message from Colonel Spragge he was in an extremely difficult position himself. General Colvile and Lord Methuen were each in command of a column, but it is as well to scrutinise how those columns were composed. Lord Methuen was in command of a column of 1,200 mounted men with several guns and a brigade of infantry, while General Colvile when ho left Lindley was in command of a column consisting only of a brigade of infantry and fifty mounted men, with possibly a battery of artillery and two naval guns. It is difficult for the House to appreciate the position, but anybody who has been in South Africa will bear me out that such a force as General Colvile's was altogether inadequate to go through that extremely difficult country when opposed by a large body of Boers. The artillery itself, useful and indispensable as it may be, is a great encumbrance to a general going through such country, and a force of considerably more than fifty men was needed to adequately protect the guns alone. Three days after Lord Methuen arrived at Lindley he was ordered to proceed to Heilbron, thus going through much the same country as General Colvile had traversed, but, in spite of his much larger force, Lord Methuen for two days met with severe opposition from the Boers. It was most difficult country to operate in; without an adequate supply of cavalry it would be very hard for a force to get through, and practically impossible for a brigade of infantry to attempt any turning movement against the enemy. My conten- tion is that in the interests of a distinguished general the case is really worth sifting. General Colvile may have been wrong not to return to Lindley, but at any rate he has a very good answer for not so doing in the facts I have described. I may be presumptuous in making a remark upon a military point, but this is worth considering. Had General Colvile decided to return to Lindley, what would have happened? There were 2,000 Boers around him. The moment he attempted to retire with his inadequate force, the Boers, as we have seen in several instances, would have become much more venturesome, and he would have had the greatest possible difficulty in finding his way back. If he had succeeded in getting back, he would have found an immense force of Boers surrounding Colonel Spragge, and it is quite a question whether, with the force at his disposal, General Colvile would have been able to relieve the Yeomanry.

My only reason for rising was to bring this point before the House, because in these matters a little local colour is needed. When Lord Methuen's force arrived at Lindley and found that Colonel Spragge's column had surrendered, the general opinion was against General Colvile. But after we had proceeded to Heilbron and had the opportunity of appreciating the local incidents, circumstances, and difficult conditions under which General Colvile had laboured between Lindley and Heilbron, I am prepared to say, perhaps not the universal, but certainly the prevalent opinion in Lord Methuen's column was that General Colvile was absolutely exonerated from all blame with regard to the Lindley surrender. There is at any rate a sufficiently good case for a thorough investigation. Therefore, though it is with the greatest reluctance I have risen, recognising the public obloquy and, disgrace under which a general with such y distinguished past has been placed, without, in my judgment, having had due consideration or a proper opportunity of defence, I feel under the circumstances I must associate myself with the hon. Gentleman who has moved this motion. My right hon. friend says that the practice of introducing these questions into the House of Commons may militate against the discipline of the Army. I have no such fear. I rather believe if you are to have discipline on its surest basis it must be built upon the most equitable and just foundations, and it is because I feel that, whether General Colvile is right or wrong, there has not been the fullest investigation of all the circumstances which surround this matter, and of the difficult conditions in which that general was placed, that I associate myself with the motion before the House.

Attention called to the fact that forty Members were not present. House counted, and, forty Members being found present—

COLONEL NOLAN (Galway, N.)

said that when he read in the newspapers ok the dismissal of General Colvile from his command at Gibraltar, ho thought that he must have behaved very badly indeed, because if half-a-dozen men had been ordered to go and shoot the general it would have been a, punishment but very little more severe than that of dismissing him from the Service without trial and practically without inquiry. When he read General Colvile's statement in the press he came to the opinion that he had a good deal to say for himself, but that it could not possibly be true, otherwise he would not have been dismissed. He was, therefore, greatly astonished to find on the previous evening that General Colvile had spoken within the truth, and that the only difference of opinion was as to whether he was eighteen or twenty-three miles from Lindley. The affair at Sauna's Post revealed the weak spot in the staff' administration. The staff were very badly informed. The Boers were much stronger and more mobile than the staff fancied. When this country was last engaged in a big campaign—at the time of the Peninsular War—there was a Quartermaster's Department, which looked after the marching of the troops, settled the routes, and generally saw that the general's ideas were carried into effect. That Department was now practically abolished. There was a Quartermaster General, but he was little more than a commissariat officer. There was no specialised staff to look after the marching and location of the troops or the general conduct of the war, and in the absence of such a specialised staff the general staff had to discharge those duties. The Germans had such a body of officers. There had been many failures during the war in consequence of the bad condition of the staff—

MR. SPEAKER

The hon. Member must keep to the question of General Colvile.

Colonel NOLAN

explained that he was trying to prove that General Colvile was a victim of the bad staff. That to a Certain extent was admitted, and he was attempting to relieve the members of the start by throwing the blame on the system. At Sauna's Post the staff left the right flank in a very weak position, and that the Boers were very strong was proved by the ease with which they swept Colonel Broadwood in. That their strength was unknown to the staff was shown by the very weak force which guarded the waterworks, because the retention of the waterworks was essential to the health of Bloemfontein. from the debate of the previous evening one who had read nothing about the matter would have supposed that General Col-vile was, in some indirect way, mixed up with the disaster at Sauna's Post, and had somehow lost guns, prisoners, horses, and men The tact was that General Colvile was nowhere near the place and had nothing to do with Colonel Broad-wood at the time the losses were experienced. As soon as General Colvile's troops were felt to be near, the attack on Colonel Broadwood ceased, and so far as concerned the main purpose for which General Colvile was sent out, the object was achieved As to saving the guns, it was impossible for an infantry force to overtake fully-horsed artillery, and even if they could have caught them it would have been a, matter of a very few minutes for the Boers to have destroyed the guns and left them mere masses of useless steel.

He contended that General Colvile did everything he was able to do in order to save General Broadwood at Sauna's Post, and that he exercised a proper discretion in not following an ambuscading force of Boers into a spruit in a time of tropical heat. In his judgment the staff did not do their work well on the right flank at that time; they undervalued De Wet's forces, and the staff did not like the prospect of an inquiry into the affair at Sauna's Post. Sir Evelyn Wood never alluded to Sauna's Post, and General Colvile was not dismissed for that mistake. The message which General Colvile received from Colonel Spragge at Lindley was not a very urgent message, and the Yeomanry, besides, appeared to have been summoned by a false message, which, in some way not explained, was not in cipher. Any common sense man would have ordered General Colvile to have stayed at Lindley for a day until the men rallied, and there was no common sense in leading 500 men by themselves. If Colonel Spragge's message had stated that his force was in danger of being destroyed, then General Colvile might have decided to return at all hazards to try to save him. It was said that the Yeomanry were summoned by a false message, but it so how were they summoned, and how did Colonel Spragge act on such a message? Colonel Spragge in his opinion was the man who should have gone through all this trouble, and should have been brought to a court-martial. If this were done he did not think Colonel Spragge would get out of it with honour. Why they had fastened upon General Colvile was difficult to understand. He should be very much astonished if the debate in the House did not produce a very great effect upon public opinion in favour of General Colvile, who had served the country very honestly and bravely as a general. He obeyed all his orders and saved Colonel Broadwood at Sanna's Post, and he brought his force safely through a difficult country, although he was not able on every occasion to rectify the errors of his staff.

MR. PIRIE (Aberdeen, N.)

said it was the exception which generally proved the rule, and in this case the exception was the speech of the hon. Baronet, whilst the rule consisted in the impossibility of imagining a court of appeal more unfitted than the House of Commons to sit as a military tribunal. This House could not be worse constituted to form a decision upon a military question like this, and it ought not to be asked to form such a decision. Whether from the point of view of Members of this House or the Service, this was a most important and grave question, and he begged the House not to run away from the main point at issue, which was not whether General Colville was to be dismissed from the Army, but whether he was entitled to a court-martial or a court of inquiry. That was the wording of the resolution, and it was only a minor point that night as to his military conduct. He agreed with the hon. Baronet opposite, that ultimately, as a last resource for the military discipline of the Army, this House should be referred to, but before cases came before this House they should be threshed out by evidence at a military court of inquiry, and then the verdict of this House could be asked for. To say that they were in a position to debate this question from the point of view as to whether an officer was efficient or not was quite a mistake. He took the view that the Army system of such condemnation as in the present case was wrong. Every officer before dismissal was entitled to the same justice which a private soldier was entitled to, and which he had a right to demand.

During the five years he had been in the House no less than at least four cases presenting the same features as this one had come before the House. He would not recall them at any length. There was an unspeakably painful case in 1896, in which a gross crime had been condoned and an injustice had been done, and where no court of inquiry had been held, and it was brought up in the House on account of that reason, the House giving most unfortunately a distinct party vote on what was in no way a party question. The following year there was another case in connection with the disbandment of a Volunteer battalion, where had there been a court of inquiry by the military authorities the matter would never have come before the House of Commons. In the year before last he himself brought up a very painful case where an officer had been denied an inquiry, and this preyed on him so much that his mind was unhinged and the unfortunate man committed suicide. It was imperative that the House should guard itself against the repetition of such cases by insisting that in all such cases a court of inquiry or a court martial should be held. In this case the Government were shrinking from publicity, while General Colvile courted it. He would, not go into the military aspect of the question, but he thought this man should have a fair trial, and his defence in vindication of his action should be heard, and more especially so in view of the condoning of General Colvile's conduct to a great extent by his reappointment to Gibraltar on his return front South Africa. He regarded the communication made to the press by General Colvile as indefensible and subversive of all military discipline. He could not be oblivious of the fact, however, that General Colvile considered himself, and, legitimately so, in his opinion, to be on half-pay when he issued his statement to the press. Another palliation of that action was to be found in the unhappy precedents which were set by other British generals who had come from South Africa, and whose first object on reaching home seemed to be to let their views be known to the press. There was the case of Sir Charles Warren and of others who communicated their views to the press. In palliation also of General Colvile's action the very fact of leakage of statements regarding him, from the War Office must have been, very trying in his particular case, and this matter should receive strict investigation from the Secretary of State for War. A great parade of leniency had been made by the right hon. Gentleman in dealing with General Colvile, and he said he had acted out of consideration for this general and had let him down lightly. He accepted the statement, but he considered that a brave man did not want leniency but wanted justice. There was naturally a desire on the part of the House that there should, be no leniency and no favour shown when they remembered the great disasters which had happened in South Africa, but all they should ask themselves was whether this man was getting fair play and justice. In granting a court of inquiry they would be adopting a severer course than the Government themselves had adopted, and yet they would be acting in accordance with the views of the Secretary for War himself, for he had already stated that he was in favour of bringing an officer before a court martial whenever it was possible. Why was it not possible in this case? He hoped the Government would see that justice was done to General Colvile. The Secretary of State for War said he bad no assurance that if there was a court-martial the House would accept its verdict any more than the present decision. But if the decision of the court-martial came before the House it would come with the evidence for and against it, and that was a very different thing.

Mr. BRODRICK

What would happen if, after hon. Members had read the evidence, their opinion was different to that of the court-martial?

*MR. PIRIE

said that in such a ease the House would be in a very much better position to judge. It must be plain to everybody that after a fair trial by a court-martial, naturally the House would not differ nearly so readily with the decision of such a court as it would with the decision of one officer, no matter bow highly placed. The right hon. Gentleman had said that be would not yield to favouritism or to backdoor influence. He thought this showed a loss of a sense of what was seemly and right, that the Secretary for War should think it necessary to take credit for such action as that; it was on a par with his famous statement that no high appointments for service in the field were to be made but of men of tried capacity in war; that any other system should have existed reminded one forcibly of the analogy of China, already alluded to in another place. He had also stated that if appointments in the field were undesirable for certain men, then appointments at home for the same men were also undesirable. He would remind the right hon. Gentleman it was only too well known that there were already certain appointments which had been made at home and given to generals who had left South Africa because their appointments in the field were considered undesirable, and that what was wanted in all cases was stern even-handed justice and nothing else. The Secretary for War made a very just point against his conduct being called into question, seeing that be was called upon to act on the advice of high military authority. He agreed with that view, but for this very reason he urged more strongly than ever a court-martial in this case, as such cases would constantly recur and continue coming before this House, to the detriment of discipline in. the Service so long as the present system of arbitrary dismissal existed. He begged to support the Amendment of his hon. friend.

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL (Oldham)

Those who have not themselves had any actual experience of war may have some difficulty in understanding in what way the occurrence of a disaster may affect the character of a general responsible for it. I would like, so far as I may be permitted to do so, to clear that difficulty out of the way. Hon. Members asked, very naturally, why, if a certain general was removed for this disaster, a certain other general should not be removed for that disaster, and indeed why all generals should not be removed for all disasters? War is a game with a good deal of chance in it, and, from the little I have seen of it, I should say that nothing in war ever goes right except occasionally by accident. The fact of a successful or an unsuccessful action being fought does not appear to be any accurate measure of the capacity or military character of the general officer who was in command. It is quite possible that in an unsuccessful action a general may show qualities of courage and resource for which there would otherwise have been no scope. General Broadwood, for instance, was responsible for the command of the convoy at Sanna's Post. Such, however, was his bearing and conduct, and the high reputation which he had held and which he still holds in the Army, that after the disaster at Sauna's Post, General Broad-wood s position was even more secure than before—he was even more trusted by his superiors and his men. On the other hand, there are general officers who have been responsible for no particular disaster, but who even in their success, or I should perhaps rather say their immunity from failure, have gained a most unenviable reputation. General officers or officers in high command in the Army ought not to be broken merely because they are responsible for disasters, but only if those disasters throw a light on their incompetency or inefficiency. When it is known by a competent superior officer that an officer-is not a good officer, though he was not responsible for any disaster, there may be good grounds for removing him from his command, or appointing him to another command.

We have listened to two very effective Speeches—one from the hon. and learned Member for South Leeds, who put the legal aspect of the question as powerfully as it could be put, and the other from the hon. and gallant Member for North-West Wilts, who made a contribution to the debate which was most striking, from the fact that it came from one who had personal experience of these events. The hon. and learned Member for South Leeds has put the legal aspect of the question; but soldiers are not lawyers, and their methods will not always bear the strict scrutiny of those who have given their life to the study of the law and the study of words. So long as the House is satisfied of the motives by which military officers have been actuated, it ought not to lay too great stress on technical or legal detail which may appear to have been neglected. The substance of the charge against General Colvile is the case of Sauna's Post. There may have been occasions before Sanua's Post—I do not say there were—when the conduct of that gallant officer did not give entire satisfaction. But it is upon Sanna's Post almost entirely that the rights and the wrongs of this question stand. I venture to say that a more damning case than the one laid by the Secretary for War before the House last night, on the subject of Sauna's Post—if the representations and statements were correct—was hardly ever preferred against a general officer in this House. The hon. and learned Member for South Leeds has disputed the facts. If it came to a question of balancing the evidence, I am much inclined to pin my faith to the decision come to by Lord Roberts. As to the Lindley affair, I wrote a long time ago to the War Office giving my humble opinion, having personally collected information on the spot. If the Lindley affair had been the only case against General Colvile, that would not have been worth pressing, but it must be considered together with the affair of Sanna's Post. These affairs had a cumulative aspect which rendered them much more significant. They were complicated, difficult, and technical matters, and we must trust to the men on the spot. In this case the military expert on the spot was Lord Roberts, who has been trusted, not in vain, in the greatest crisis of our history, with the largest army we have ever sent beyond the seas.

The hon. and learned Member for South Leeds made a point against the Government, which I feel is a very legitimate and valid point. He said, if it be true that General-Colvile made a fault, why was it that the official despatch, published since, did not make any reference to that faultor point out the blame he incurred? Perhaps it will not be entirely agreeable to many of my friends on this side of the House if I say that I have noticed in the last three wars in which we have been engaged a tendency among military officers—arising partly from good nature towards their comrades, partly from the dislike of public scrutiny—to hush everything up, to make everything look as fair as possible, to tell what is called the official truth, to present a version of the truth which contains about seventy-five per cent. of the actual article. So long as a force gets a victory somehow, all the ugly facts are smoothed and varnished over, rotten reputations are propped up, and officers known as incapable are allowed to hang on and linger in their commands in the hope that at the end of the war they may be shunted into private life without a scandal. On whom does the responsibility for the continuance of the system rest? When Lord Roberts went out to South Africa he struck out a new and true line. The truth, the whole truth, was to be told to the country frankly and fairly. The House will remember the publication of the Spion Kop despatches and the reception that that publication met with from hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite. That settled the policy of candour in military matters, for some months to come at any rate. That is why the despatches contained no in- criminating matter in regard to General Colvile. General Colvile was retained in his command, but it was reduced; he was put in the second line, placed practically, if not actually, in an inferior position to a general a very long way his junior in rank—General Ian Hamilton. It was no doubt thought be would be able to get out of the matter without any scandal or disturbance arising. But at length it became impossible to keep up appearances any longer. At length the crash came. Lindley was piled on Sauna's Post, there was a stormy interview, the Ninth Division was broken up, and its commander returned to England, complimented certainly, cleared in the despatches, but ruined for ever in the field. It seems to me it does not lie in the mouths of those who attacked the Government so vehemently in respect to the publication of the Spion Kop despatches to complain that now, and since that occasion, a very judicious discretion and diplomatic reticence has been practised by the War Office and the military authorities. There is some apparent misconception as to the method of removing officers from the Army, and that is because there are two ways of doing the thing. In the first place, there is the process of a court of inquiry and court-martial, and in the second place, there is the process of selection. Suppose an officer has committeed no specific fault, but it is a matter of common knowledge that he is an incapable officer, would it be right that that officer should be given the command of a large body of troops? Surely it would be wrong to employ such an officer in time of peace if be was not thought good enough to employ in time of war. I have always been an enthusiastic advocate of selection. for I hold most strongly that the more nearly we can make our methods of promotion in the Army approximate to the methods employed by business firms, the more efficient the Army will be and the less soldiers we would have killed and captured in time of war.

Lord Roberts and the right hon. Gentleman did not care to take the responsibility of appointing an officer to a peace command when he had just been found unfit for an important command in the field of war. I understand that hon. Members opposite, including the hon. and learned Member for South Leeds, differ from that view, and think it is an improper and vicious mode of procedure. Their argument is that once General Colvile was appointed to the command in Gibraltar anything that had happened in South Africa was condoned. But what a bout the brigade? Were 3,000 British soldiers forming the efficient part of the garrison of our greatest Mediterranean fortress not to be considered? Had they not a right to expect to be commanded by as good an officer as those best qualified to judge could get? Of course some reasonable assurance of fixity of tenure must be given to subordinates; but the paramount principle which must be held before our eyes is that the Service exists not for the benefit of individuals, but only for the advantage and security of the State. Under the process of selection mistakes are made and, unwittingly, injustice done; but the process is at work not only in the Army, but in every branch of commerce, in every walk of life, and it is nowhere more essential and more vital to efficiency than in the military service. We have to look no further than the House of Commons to see the principle of selection working in all its glory. We know that sitting around there are Members just as able, just as conscientious, quite as intelligent, as any who now adorn the Treasury Bench, but no one would think it worth while to urge the claims of anyone who has not been preferred. Selection is the only hope for increased efficiency in the Army, it is the only way in which we can prevent the upper ranks being clogged with incapable men. The principle of selection is challenged, and would be destroyed if a Commission were appointed in this case. I have been told by a distinguished general officer that, in consequence of the outcry which has occurred, already several persons against whom it had been proposed to take steps have been screwed back into their places. In regard to the selection of officers, the House ought not to interfere in any particular instance except for grievous reason. Personally, I have no hesitation in expressing my firm support of the attitude of the Secretary of State for War, and I exhort the right hon. Gentleman, not only for the sake of the Army, but also in the interest of the House, not to budge an inch from the position he has taken up.

MR. YERBURGH (Chester)

said he entirely endorsed every word which had fallen from the hon. Member for Oldham on the question of the efficiency of the Army. Every Member of the House was with him when he said that what we had to do was to secure that efficiency, and that officers should be selected from the best men in the ranks of the Army. It was not because he and his friends took any other view that they were urging this enquiry upon the Government. The point at issue was not the question of selecting proper officers, but whether they were to give a man who was charged with a specific want of efficiency in his duty on evidence which he had not had an opportunity of testing, the chance of having the evidence placed and tested before a properly constituted military tribunal. Whether a mistake had occurred or not had nothing to do with the question. He contended that more efficiency would be secured if a rule was laid down that a man who was in the position of General Colvile at this time should have an opportunity of putting his ease plainly before the authorities. That in no way controverted the view of securing efficiency in the Army.

It had been said that the whole of the indictment against General Colvile rested upon Sanna's Post, which was the damaging point against General Colvile. That being so, it became necessary to deal with some detail in regard to that affair. Certain specific statements were made by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, to which General Colvile took exception. His right hon. friend had stated that when General Colvile arrived at Bushman's Kop at 11 o'clock the guns had not yet been moved off; that they were not removed until between 12 and 1 o'clock; that the troops with General Broad wood were still in touch with the enemy; that firing was still going on; that no effort was made to come into touch with General Broadwood; and that no steps were taken to find out what General Broad-wood wished General Colvile to do. The facts of the case as stated by General Colvile were that he arrived at Bushman's Kop about 11.15 a.m.; that firing had ceased with the exception of two guns which were filing from a position held by the British troops; that when his aide-de-camp arrived at Broadwood's position he found that that General had formed up his troops; that they were out of touch with the enemy and were absolutely safe; and that, as a matter of fact, the engagement had ceased. The problem which Ceneral Colvile had to face was not that of giving assistance to General Broadwood's troops, but that of seeing whether he could secure the guns. Ceneral Colvile having arrived at Bushman's Kop, a high elevation from which he could survey the country with effect, he invited General Broad-wood to come up and take a survey of the country, with the idea of securing the guns. General Broadwood did not come. General Colvile, after surveying the country from Bushman's Kop, and giving his troops refreshments, decided to move on Waterval Drift. The Secretary for War told the House last night that one of his brigadiers advised General Colvile to advance straight upon the Waterworks in order to recover the guns. But his hon. friend did not tell the House, what was stated by General Colvile, that his other brigadier. General Smith-Dorrien, gave the opinion that General Colvile was perfectly right to advance on Waterval. After he had moved on he received a heliogram from Lord Roberts stating that the enemy would be in the spruits.

*MR. BRODRICK

What was the hour at which that heliogram was sent?

MR. YERBURGH

The message was received at 3.38.

*Mr. BRODRICK

Exactly four hours afterwards.

MR. YERBURGH

said that was not the point—that General Colvile having arrived at Bushman's Kop, and finding the troops under General Broadwood were perfectly safe, was faced by the problem of how to recover the guns. He decided that the right way was to take the Waterval Drift, for the reason that between him and the Modder River there were two spruits to be crossed, which he believed to be occupied by the Boers, and the taking of which would have entailed serious loss on his troops. In the other route there were no spruits to cross, and General Colvile thought that if he could cross the Modder at Waterval Drift he would be able to seize a point which would give him a commanding position. That was the decision at which he arrived, and that decision was supported by his brigadier general, Smith-Dorrien, and it was the very decision which was afterwards suggested by Lord Roberts in his heliogram.

The right hon. Gentleman had said that General Colvile had left the men he had been sent to assist without any assistance, but as a matter of fact, judging from the orders sent by the Chief of the Staff, General Colvile, was not sent to assist 'General Broadwood at all; it was not true that, as alleged, he went "blundering about the country." In proof of this contention the hon. Member read extracts from the despatches and from a letter written by a prisoner, and said that if the cavalry had arrived as promised General Colvile would have been in a position to launch them against the enemy. Who was responsible for the disastrous delay an the arrival of the cavalry? That was a matter for inquiry, but they must not in the meantime place the blame on the head of General Colvile. If that commander had been properly supported he might have dealt a blow at the Boers, and probably have recaptured some, if not all, of the guns. General Colvile made his report to Lord Roberts, whose reply was. "You have made an excellent inarch, and it is rather a pity that I did not send you the day before." It was perfectly obvious that had General Colvile been sent the day before the result would have been very different. He would have arrived in ample time to assist General Broadwood. Nothing more was heard about the matter until about ten days afterwards, when General Colvile heard that Lord Roberts was very angry with him, because he was held responsible for the loss of the guns. He at once wrote to him to say he was not to believe any idle rumours, but if he had any complaint against him he should make it to him personally. For ten days after Sanna's Post no charge whatever was made against General Colvile, the soundness of whose judgment was demonstrated.

In conclusion the hon. Member said that he had put before the House various points that commended themselves to him as an outsider. So far as he could do so, he would assist his right hon. friend against any corrupt influence. He had no personal acquaintance with General Colvile until being asked to look through the Papers he did so, and, thinking General Colvile bad a good case, he supported it in the public interest. With regard to Lindley there were, two questions to be considered —first, whether he was right in going back at all; and second, whether he was able to go back. The second question had never been put to the House until it was brought forward by the hon. Member for the Shipley Division, who told the House that it was not possible for General Colvile to go back to the assistance of the Yeomanry. The telegram from General Colvile fully described his position, and the question was, Would he have been justified in going back? His right hon. friend said this was a small point.

*MR. BRODRICK

If I might interrupt the hon. Gentleman, I did not say it was a small point. I am afraid I must have been misheard in the gallery. What I did say was that it was more a point to be left to military men.

Mr. YERBURGH

said this was an illustration of the disadvantage of the discussion in the House instead of the inquiry asked for. General Colvile had received direct orders to be at certain places on certain days, and naturally supposed be was taking part in a combined movement. Was be, at the bidding of a party of Yeomanry of whom he knew nothing, to turn back and perhaps sacrifice the result of a great movement? Hon. Members were not competent to pronounce an opinion on such a question; it was a question for military judgment. The court of inquiry reported at Lindley, apparently, adversely to General Colvile, but before that court Colonel Spragge was defendant, not General Colvile; and it appeared to him that the right course to pursue when the court exculpated one man and inculpated another man was to hold another inquiry for trying the other man. But the right hon. Gentleman did not do this; he took the verdict of the court, before which the other man had no chance of appearing, the evidence of which he did not know—he took that as establishing the case. It appeared to him that the right hon. Gentleman entirely denied the right of General Colvile to establish his defence. If Colonel Spragge had the right to be heard, why not General Colvile? At the court of inquiry his hon. friend said there was the evidence of certain generals whom he named.

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL

said that he never mentioned the names of any officers who gave evidence; all he said was that Lord Roberts could have availed himself of the evidence of three distinguished general officers whom he bad mentioned by name.

MR. YERBURGH

said that if he had in any way misrepresented his hon. friend he apologised. What he would like to know was who were called to give evidence before the court of inquiry, and, after the speech of the hon. Member for Chippenham, whether any of the relief column of Lord Methuen were called? Who were the people who gave evidence? They did not know. General Colvile did not know, and he had no means of knowing. He had practically been tried by a court before which he had not appeared. The hon. Member asked the House to understand that he did not wish the hushing up of charges against any officer. Let the charge be openly made, and put the man on his trial. He heard the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War say the other night that he was in favour of courts-martial. He asked nothing more. Give a court-martial, and that would satisfy every shade of opinion in the House.

*Mr. MUNRO FERGUSON (Leith Burghs)

We have heard excellent speeches on both sides of the House, and I am reluctant to intervene in this debate. But there are one or two points to which I should like to call attention. The question of Lindley has been dealt with by the hon. Member for the Chippenham Division in a speech in which he put forward a powerful claim for the trial of General Colvile; and the question of Sanna's Post has been effectively dealt with in the speech to which we have just listened, and also in the interesting speech of the hon. Member for Oldham, in which he gave us his own experience. In reply, I should like to say we are not here engaged on a question of holding a trial upon efficiency. It is a question of holding a trial for alleged inhumanity and callousness shown by a general in the field, who is accused of not going to the relief of others when he had the opportunity of doing so. That is really the charge, and it is upon that we hold that an inquiry should take place. As to the principle of selection, there is no principle that I should adhere to more myself, but this is not a question of selection. General Colvile had been appointed to the command at Gibraltar, having been sent home from South Africa. He was reinstated there by the Commander-in-Chief. There is therefore before us no question of selection. It was for Sanna's Post. I have always heard, that General Colvile was "broke." but the inquiry into that incident has. I believe, been wholly inadequate to enable him to state his defence. It is upon that ground that I maintain a court-martial should have been held. I believe he has never yet had a fair opportunity of stating his case.

I have noticed that everyone who has spoken in the last half-dozen speeches has disclaimed any acquaintance with General Colvile. It seems to be imagined by the Secretary of State for War that hon. Members who have spoken in this case have been hounded on by "smart society" to put pressure on the War Office. I cannot say that myself even know smart society. It is twenty years since I knew General Colvile, when we happened to be brother officers in the same regiment, and all I have seen of the case are two notices in the press—one a statement which seemed to me to bear obvious signs of being an official record of the circumstances under which General Colvile was being recalled from Gibraltar, and the other a statement by General Colvile himself. I thought General Col-vile's statement impermissible. I thought the other statement as to the reason why General Colvile had been recalled from Gibraltar showed a leakage somewhere at the War Office. It would not be difficult to trace where the leakage occurred. I think that was serious provocation to General Colvile, and he also, suffered considerable provocation in the way he has been dealt with in having been tried and retried for the Lindley case, I am myself entirely against public inquiries into these personal questions. The pledge given by the Government with respect to that was much too wide. I am quite prepared to support the Government it they could, by some more successful means than they adopted the other night, get clear of their pledge. But what I do think a safeguard against public inquiry is to have that system of courts of inquiry and courts-martial which the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War so ably described the, other night. A court of inquiry, which is secret, should be held first, to be followed if necessary by a court-martial. The right hon. Gentleman stated that a court-martial might be fatal to an officer, and therefore it was more humane to have a court of inquiry first. What could be more fatal to an officer than the course you have pursued with respect to General Colvile? After having two secret courts on the accused, trying him behind his back, and after refusing him a court-martial, where he could defend himself, it is unfair to tell him that he would have been less well treated if he had been tried by court-martial. We all know General Roberts's kindness of heart. I do not believe there is a kinder hearted man in the world, but to suggest that General Colvile was more likely to gel off easily in the way he has been dealt with than if he had been tried by court-martial is, as I have said, an unfair assumption. These matters should be settled in the Army, by the Army, and by the Army alone. [Cheers.] Hon. and right hon. Gentlemen cheer that, although they have given no opportunity for military trial in this case. I take part in this discussion with great reluctance. I do not know that I have ever undertaken a more distasteful duty than the present one. I think, after the services Lord Roberts has rendered to the Empire at a time of the greatest emergency, there could he no more ungracious task than seeming to dispute a decision at which he has arrived. It is because I believe that I am following the path of justice in this matter that I support the plea of my hon. friend.

There is one matter to which I should like to refer for a moment, and that is the various insinuations made against General Colvile, which from my knowledge of him I do not think fair. The right hon. Gentleman last night said— I will say, first, that Lord Wolseley by no means exonerated him when he allowed him to go hack to Gibraltar, Lord Roberts stated that, in his opinion, on two occasions in the Held General Colvile had shown a want of forwardness, of enterprise, and of sound judgment which are essential qualifications for a command. He considered that in twice leaving a body of cavalry in difficulties he set an example which, if followed, would he fatal to an army in the field. Other circumstances had come to Lord Roberts's notice in which General Colvile's relations with his sub-ordinals and the absence of sufficient control and supervision in his command, were such as to seriously impair the confidence which troops should have in their leaders. I have received one or two letters, which I should like to read very shortly, and if I am challenged I shall give the names of the officers by whom they were written, but I shall not mention them unless I am challenged, because I do not consider it desirable to bandy about names here. An officer who was by General Colvile's side in all his hottest engagements during the war has written to him expressing indignation at what has taken place about him in this Reuse. He says— If ever there was a libel it was in the word 'inefficiency.' I can only tell you that we and your stall' bad the most absolute confidence in you if it came to a tight place, and I think it will lie allowed that your stall' are the people to judge. It has been said that there was cowardice on the part of General Colvile, and although my hon. friend the Member for North-West Lanarkshire asked about that matter, the charge has not been repeated here. I have heard it in every possible form, and I mention it merely because I think it has very much prejudiced General Colvile's case in the general estimation. An officer who served under General Colvile wrote that every man who had been with him under fire could testify to the absolute absurdity of the charge. Another officer who was with General Colvile at Belmont. Magersfontein, Paardeberg, and Poplar Grove, said he had never hesitated to go where the bullets were flying thickest. He wrote that no one could have been more cool under musketry fire, and he could not believe that such a base slander could be brought against a brave man. I feel entitled to read these letters. I will only repeat that General Colvile has not had a fair opportunity of defending himself. I cannot see how in a quarter of an hour's interview with Lord Roberts, although I have no doubt the case against him was tersely put, he on his part could have sufficient time to make his defence. I do not dispute for a moment the unrivalled capacity of Lord Roberts and other generals for investigating cases of this kind, but the question is whether they knew all the facts. Both as regards Lindley and Sauna's Post the decisions of the officers who judged the cases were come to on imperfect evidence. General Colvile's removal from the command at Gibraltar was, under the circumstances, wrong. If General Colvile cannot prove his case before a court-martial, let him be disgraced and let him suffer all the penalties you can put upon him. We have endeavoured to give the reasons why he should have a trial. We appeal with confidence to hon. Members. I do not believe that any lover of British fair play can be altogether deaf to this appeal. I am quite aware that this motion is not a thing to be lightly undertaken, but under the circumstances in this case it had to be done, and I therefore cordially support the motion of my hon. friend the Member for North-West Lanark.

The FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY (Mr. A. J. BALFOUR,) Manchester, E.

I can well understand that the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down and my hon. friend who has spoken on this side of the House in the same sense are animated by nothing but the desire to see what they describe as fair play being carried out in the case of General Colvile. Nothing I shall say in the course of the few remarks I shall address to the House will impugn the motives with which they have acted. I believe those motives to be wholly disinterested; and if I take a different view from that which they take, if I even go the length of saying that the policy which they advocate, if carried out, would impair the functions of this House and destroy the Army, it is not because I in the least question the excellence of their intentions or their desire in this case to see justice done, quite irrespective of persons or parties What have we been asked to do by several hon. Gentlemen, some of them very good friends of mine on this side of the House, in the course of yesterday's and to-night's debate? We have been asked to constitute ourselves into an amateur court for the purpose of deciding on various difficult and delicate questions of fact. ["No, no."] I hear loud cries of dissent from that view. If that is not true, all I can say is that most of the speech of my hon. friend the Member for the Ince Division, the whole of the speech of the hon. Gentleman opposite, the whole of the speech of my hon. friend the Member for Chester, and the whole of the speech of my hon. friend the Member for Chippenham, though excellent speeches in themselves, were entirely beside the point, because they dealt wholly and solely with questions of strategy.

Mr. LAWSON WALTON

Will the right hon. Gentleman read the notice of motion?

Mr. A.J. BALFOUR

I hope the hon. and learned Gentleman will allow me to answer the speeches. I shall come to his speech directly. He also joined the crowd of amateur strategists, though he imported into his speech in addition the distinct flavour of the lawyer. I am now dealing with the speeches that have been made, and very excellent speeches they were. I listened with great admiration and pleasure to the speech, among others, of my hon. friend the Member for Chippenham. What was the substance of that speech, excellent though it was? He narrated admirably, as I think, his own experiences over the field of operations. His defence of General Colvile consisted in the demonstration, or attempted demonstration, that when General Colvile refused to attempt to relieve the Yeomanry at Lindley he was forced into that course by strategical and tactical considerations which showed him that, had he attempted the task, he would have attempted the impossible, with the natural result not improbably that he also would have had to surrender with, his brigade in addition to the, Yeomanry who ultimately underwent that disastrous fate. I am sure my hon. friend will not think that I have misinterpreted the main consideration of the his speech.

*SIR J. DICKSON-POYXDER

I only brought that forward as a point for the defence, and as a case for inquiry.

Mk. A. J. BALFOUR

Precisely; my hon. friend and I are entirely agreed. My hon. friend brings forward these strategical considerations, as other hon. Gentlemen have brought them forward, to show that there was a strong prima facie case which required the intervention of the House, in order that there might be a court-martial or some other form of inquiry. Is that accepted? [Hear, hear.] Very well. Then this House is to resolve itself into a grand jury on questions of strategy, in order to say whether there is—[Cries of "Agreed."] Perhaps hon. Gentlemen will allow me to speak. This House is to resolve itself into a grand jury in order to determine whether or not the ease should go to a common jury in the shape of some military court of inquiry which is to reverse or endorse, as it thinks fit, the verdict the Commander-in-Chief has come to. What does that mean? It means that this House of Commons is to be a court of supervision over all questions of promotion in the Army. There have been numberless officers superseded in the way in which General Colvile has been superseded. They have not the means he possessed of bringing their cases before the House. But if General Colvile is to have the right to occupy two nights debate in order to consider whether the Commander-in-Chief is or is not justified in the course which on his responsibility has been adopted, why is this House not to take equal cognisance of the cases of even the humblest of those men who in the ordinary course of promotion have been thought unfit for higher commands and have been superseded by those who were otherwise their juniors? I said just now of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Leeds that, in addition to the position of amateur strategist, which he had adopted in common with many other Members of the House in the course of the debate, he has added to his speech a strong flavour of the lawyer. I said that in no disparagement to the great profession to which he belongs, but in the distinct belief that the hon. Gentleman, in common with many other Members, has fallen into the extraordinary blunder of supposing that in the action taken in regard to General Colvile there is some analogy, it may be distant, but real, to the action a court of law takes when it condemns a criminal for some offence which he has committed. I think it is conclusive proof that I have not misrepresented the hon. and learned Gentleman when I say he has fallen into this legal blunder. The hon. and learned Gentleman actually suggested the Dreyfus trial as affording some parallel to the action taken by the Commander-in-Chief. What was the Dreyfus trial? Of the merits of it I do not pretend to know anything, but it was a criminal trial for a criminal offence, held before a court recognised by the law, and dealing with a man charged with a breach of trust.

Mr. LAWSON WALTON

Dreyfus was tried for a purely military offence by a purely military court.

Mr. A. J. BALFOUR

I did not say he was not tried by a military court. I said he was tried by a court recognised by the law for a crime, and the crime was treason and betrayal of confidence. I do not know whether these were the technical phrases.

MR. LAWSON WALTON

He was tried as a spy, for communicating military information to the disadvantage of his own country.

Mr. A. J. BALFOUR

I suppose the hon. and learned Gentleman is a great authority on criminal matters. I am not. But I should have thought that to betray the secrets of your country to a foreign Power was a crime, and that a man, tried for that before a court recognised as a legal court, was tried for a crime before a court. At any rate, I am trying to make it intelligible to the House. I venture to say there is no analogy whatever, even of the most distant, remote, and shadowy kind, between trying a man either for betrayal of trust or for treason, as was the ease with Captain Dreyfus, and trying a man on a specific charge like cowardice, which may well happen on certain occasions in war; and discretion must surely be vested somewhere in deciding who are competent persons for great military employment. That is the real point which the hon. Gentleman, misled by his great legal training and position, has entirely failed to see. It is not a question whether General Colvile was guilty of a crime, or could be brought before a court-martial on a specific charge. The question, and the whole question, is whether he showed himself by his action in South Africa to be an officer who ought to be placed in a position of great military responsibility in the Army of this country. And who is to judge of that? Is it to be the Commander-in-Chief, or is it to be the amateur strategists guiding this House? I think the hon. and learned Gentleman himself, certainly other hon. Gentlemen, pointed out that a case of a sort could be made out for every action that General Colvile took, either in refusing to assist the Yeomanry at Lindley, or in refusing to communicate with General Broadwood, or in refraining from action during all those critical hours after Sanna's Post. Of course. For what action in this world will not somebody be found to find an ingenious excuse if it comes to discussion?

The point, and the only point, we have to determine to-night is this: Are we the best tribunal, or the only tribunal, to discuss military appointments in this country, or ought the responsibility of judging the competence of officers to be left with those who have seen them actually at work, and who know, as only those on the spot can know, whether they have risen to the height of the great responsibility which has been entrusted to them? I should like to ask the House. Do they think that we in this country err by too great severity in our judgment of military officers in the field? Is it our practice to judge too harshly of their performances? Do we allow too little for the inevitable failure which, of course, must occur even to the best officer? Do we attach too small a value to the claims of seniority? Who will answer that series of questions and will not agree with me in saying that if we have erred in the past, if we are likely to err in the future, it is not by excessive severity, but by excessive leniency? Those responsible for the conduct of the war have been denounced in the last eighteen months for the failure of this general, incompetence of that general, folly of this appointment, for the un- justifiable character of the other appointment. And yet, Sir, as soon as the Commander-in-Chief ventures to touch a man who has at his command some influence with the press or with the House, a storm of indignation rises and a flood of turgid criticism is poured forth which, unless we are prepared to show that, in the words of the hon. Gentleman, it is the Army which is to judge these Army questions, will not only lead this House into an interminable series of profitless debates, but will undermine and destroy the discipline of the Army. Are we to have an Army? That is the real question here. One of the proposals of my right hon. friend the Secretary for War, in his great speech on Friday night, was that at the head of the army corps of this country should be placed only those officers who, in the opinion of competent military judges, were officers who could lead those army corps in the field should the occasion arise. I do not know what criticisms are to be passed on my light hon. friend's scheme as a whole; I will not anticipate them, but this I say, that on that particular part of the scheme no criticism will be passed from any quarter of the House. And yet how is that scheme to have even the shadow of a hope of success if the Commander-in-Chief, after seeing an officer at work, is not to be allowed to pronounce an opinion upon that man's competence for high military office? The thing surely does not bear argument. Gentlemen who support this motion are asking for a trial in a case which is not a case for a trial at all. It is a case in which a judgment of the competence or incompetence of a man can only be reached adequately in military as in private life by an impartial examination into a multitude of details which cannot be embodied in a distinct proposition, which cannot be formulated as charges or excuses, but which, nevertheless, as we all know, are the real grounds upon which we form our estimate of a man's power or incompetence to carry out the duties entrusted to him.

Mr. YERBURGH

I desire to point out that the Lindley judgment is the result of a trial.

Mr. A. J. BALFOUR

My hon. friend is mistaken. I have really put the case in its true light. My hon. friend the junior Member for Oldham, in his most able speech to-night, hit the nail exactly on the head when he said that this was a question—to quote a phrase that is sometimes used and sometimes abused—of managing public affairs on business principles. As my hon. friend pointed out, what would the head of a great firm say if the promotion of a subordinate could never take place or never be refused without a formal trial—without the charges being elaborately stated with all the pomp and circumstance of a hearing in a public court? The thing is absurd. That is not the way to judge competence or incompetence. That is the way you punish faults or crimes. But there is no crime alleged against General Colvile. What is alleged against him is that he has shown himself on critical occasions incapable of carrying out the duties which we expect of British generals in high places of command; and the man who has expressed that opinion is the Commander-in-Chief. We have been told by almost every speaker on the other side that the Commander-in-Chief arrived at his judgment without having heard what General Colvile had to say. That is entirely untrue. There is not a vestige of foundation for the statement. General Colvile had every opportunity, both in writing and speech, of bringing before the Commander-in-Chief his view of the military episodes in question.

Mr. DALZIEL (Kirkcaldy Burghs)

Was he told the charge against him?

Mr. A. J. BALFOUR

I have already told the House there was no question of a formal charge. The only question is. Was General Colvile a proper man to be put in command at Gibraltar or not [Several Hon. Members: Who put him there?]; and was he—and this point came first—a proper man to be retained in high command in South Africa? Lord Roberts, the only proper and adequate judge of military questions of this kind, having had a full opportunity of hearing General Colvile's statement, decided, in the first place, that General Colvile was not a proper officer to be retained in high command in South Africa; and, in the second place, that the interests of the British Army would not be furthered by retaining him in high command at Gibraltar.

I venture to tell the House very respectfully that we have before us to-night a decision of far wider scope and far greater import than the treatment of any general officer, be he who he may. If the House were to decide, as I do not for a moment anticipate that it will, that the Commander-in-Chief in exercising his discretion in this matter has been guilty of doing an injustice to an inferior, it would not only decide the particular case but it would lay down a permanent rule, governing our Army, that every case of promotion should be reviewed by the House. Every appointment which was not exactly in accord with seniority might be made the occasion of lengthened debate and division. I venture to tell the House that, it they come to a decision like that, the immediate result of disposing of one particular Commander-in-Chief and one particular Government, as they most certainly would dispose of them, would be the smallest and the most insignificant result of so fatal a decision, and they would for ever undermine and destroy the high discipline of the British Army.

Mr. ASQUITH (Fifeshire, E.)

There is one observation, and one only, in the speech to which the House has just listened, which, I think, will command universal assent, and it is this, that we are not engaged to-night in the discussion of the merits of an individual case; for as regards the bulk of us General Colvile is an absolutely unknown person, in whose fortune and fate we have no reason to take any interest whatever, and the interest which has been evoked by this debate on both sides of the House, and which is amply testified to by the crowded state of our benches, would never have been excited by a purely personal question; but it results from and is the expression of a belief that we are dealing here with a large question of administrative principle. The right hon. Gentleman—I do not know whether he has read the motion—has strangely misconceived the proposition actually submitted to the House. He has represented it as if it were a question of this House sitting in review as amateur strategists upon a decision of experts on a question of military discipline. If that were the proposition I should be the first to say—and I doubt whether there would he a dissenting voice—that no more incompetent tribunal could be selected for the review or reversal of a question of military discipline than this House. The parties are not before it, the evidence is not before it, or, at least, it is only before it in a very imperfect and incomplete state. The tribunal itself is constantly shifting. We have not the advantage of the arguments which might be presented in a complete shape by either one side or the other; and just as I have often said, and will always say, that if it were a question, for instance, of reviewing a decision of the Home Secretary in a matter of criminal justice, no tribunal could be less well equipped than this House, so I will say that, if it were a question of reviewing the decision of a military tribunal, we are absolutely incompetent to undertake the task. That is not the case here.

Let me clear away another misconception into which the light hon. Gentleman fell—namely, that the interest which has been excited about this case—the genuine, deep-seated, widespread interest—is the result of some kind of social influence or social pressure exercised in behalf of an officer in high command, which would not have been felt or, at least, manifested in the same degree if it had been a humble officer or a member of the rank and file. Sir, I entirely repudiate that view. I do not care who it is, whether it is a field-marshal, a general, a colonel, or a private, if the House of Commons is satisfied, if prima facie evidence is brought before the House of Commons, that any man in His Majesty's service, whatever be his rank, has been deprived of the opportunity of continuing to serve his country on insufficient evidence, or, what is more important, by a denial of the canons and rules of natural justice, it is the bounden and imperative duty of this House to interfere. The right hon. Gentleman asked the question, Where is the Army? Let me ask another question in return. Where is the House of Commons? This is not a personal matter—a question of General Colvile, of A, B, C, or D—it is a question whether or not in a specific case and upon specific evidence those rules which we always recognise, not as a matter of technical legal procedure but as the expression of the natural instinct of justice, have in a particular case been observed.

Let us come to the actual case which the right hon. Gentleman has dealt with. He referred to the decision of the Commander-in-Chief and the military authorities as regards the promotion or degradation or dismissal of a military officer on military grounds as not a matter with, which this House would lightly or properly interfere. But what is the case before us? We have the case of a general officer—I do not lay any stress upon that—but an officer who admittedly has rendered great service to the Crown during a long and honourable career. In the course of this present war his name has been selected no less than four times by the Commander-in-Chief for special mention on the ground of distinction in the field. That officer comes home. Certain charges are brought against him, which when they are examined resolve themselves into one accusation, in respect of one single incident—namely, the incident at Lindley, because Sauna's Post is an afterthought. [Several Hon. Members: No.] I say deliberately Sanna's Post is an afterthought. [Mr. A. J. Balfour: No.] The right hon. Gentleman says. "No." I will read once more the letter from the Acting Commander-in-Chief, dated Kith December. It is addressed to an officer who had returned to this country in August, whose case had then been examined by the Secretary of State and by the Commander-in-Chief, and who, after the examination of his case by these, the only competent authorities able to pronounce on a matter of military discipline, had been formally reinstated in his command at Gibraltar. Having been at Gibraltar from September, on 16th December this letter is written to' General Colvile— The Secretary of State having discussed by telegraph the instance of the surrender of No. 13 Imperial Yeomanry Battalion, concurs with Lord Roberts that you were mainly responsible for the surrender, and he has reluctantly come to the conclusion that you cannot be permitted to retain your command. I am directed to request you to hand in your resignation to General Sir George White on receipt of this and to quit Gibraltar. What does this mean? There is no allegation of general incompetence, which indeed would be sufficiently refuted by the testimony of the Commander-in-Chief: there is no allusion to Sauna's Post. That is why I say that Sauna's Post is a pure afterthought, brought in after the event to bolster up a decision. There never was a clearer case in which, upon the authority of the War Office itself, an officer was required to send in his resignation not on general grounds, but on one single and specific ground—namely, the Lindley incident. Is that contradicted? [Several HON. MEMBERS: Yes.] The hon. Member for South Leeds in his admirable and convincing speech earlier in the evening pointed out as a reinforcement, if reinforcement were necessary—and I do not think it was—of that argument that, as lately as 21st February—less than a month ago—in this House the Secretary of State was questioned on this matter. The only incident to which he called attention and on which he based his decision was "the case brought to my notice in December last by the Acting Commander-in-Chief, Sir Evelyn Wood, on receipt of the finding of the court of inquiry into the Lindley disaster." Am I not right therefore? This is not a party question; but I appeal to the general sense of justice in the House when I say that the reversal of the decision deliberately arrived at and authoritatively pronounced by the Secretary of State and by the Commander-in-Chief in August or September last was based entirely—[Several HON. Members: No.] I do not understand that interruption. I have read the letter of the Acting Commander-in-Chief and the answer of the Secretary of State given in the House. It was based entirely and specifically on the Lindley incident alone.

I am not an amateur strategist—I do not know anyone who is. All we have said is that the evidence brought forward is such that in any other case or in any other walk of life it would entitle a man to demand an inquiry. But here is a general officer of great distinction who has taken part in the operations in South Africa. We have had these operations presented to us in the authentic and authoritative account of the campaign since General Colville was superseded in Lord Roberts's despatches describing these events. Some reference has been made to his despatch about Sauna's Post, and I leave it out of the case; but I have read most carefully, and read with an absolutely open and unprejudiced mind—I must in view of the insinuations which have been made add my disclaimer to the many others which have been put forward—having no kind of knowledge or acquaintance with General Colvile or the persons connected with him—the account given by Lord Roberts of the incident at Lindley. It was written two months after the event. It does not contain one word of censure of General Colvile's proceedings on that occasion. The case of General Colvile is considered by the Secretary of State and the Commander-in-Chief, and all the information we may assume to be then available was brought before these authorities. He was deliberately reinstated in his command. The Secretary of State tells us that in the early days of December he receives the report of a court of inquiry, apparently a second or subsequent court of inquiry, which had been held into the Lindley disaster, and on the strength of the finding of that court, and on that and that alone, this letter is written to General Colvile at Gibraltar.

I ask the House, disregarding technicalities of procedure, to treat this matter as if it were a mere matter between the humblest civil servant and the State which employs him. Here is a man who has been acquitted, who has been reinstated, as to whom, after he has been acquitted and reinstated, a court of inquiry, held behind his back, at which he is not represented, of the evidence of which we have no knowledge whatsoever, for it has never been made public, of the charges preferred at which neither he nor we at this moment have any idea—and this man is told on the strength of the verdict of that court of inquiry that he is to be superseded, without having any opportunity whatsoever either of considering the evidence, of presenting his own case, or of submitting it to the review of any military tribunal whatever. I do not think any man would dismiss a servant on the grounds so stated. I express no opinion whatever, and have no opinion, as to whether General Colvile did or did not perform his duties as a general or an officer, either at Sauna's Post or Lindley; but I do say this—and this is really the only point that interests the House of Commons—that when a general, having performed ill or well—I care not which—his functions in the field—having been exposed to censure for the manner in which he has performed them, having had that censure carefully discussed, examined, and reviewed by the then only competent authorities in this country, has been reinstated in his post, he ought not, according to the rules of justice, the traditions of fair-play, and the practice which, prevails in every department of life—social, political, or business—in this country, to have that position reversed, that acquittal set aside, and the status into which he has been put taken away from him, without at least some opportunity of answering the new charges and discussing the evidence. That, and that alone, is my view of the issue before the House. It is not a question as to General Colvile or anybody else, it is not a question of military discipline as against the jurisdiction of the House of Commons—it is a question of whether in this specific case a man who has been acquitted upon a charge—[Some HON. MEMBERS: No.]—yes, acquitted in the only way in which a man can be acquitted, because he was reinstated in a position for which he would manifestly have been unfit if that charge had been proved against him—

*MR. BRODRICK

I beg pardon; I stated last night distinctly that he was not exonerated by Lord Wolseley from the charge.

MR. ASQUITH

I suppose there was no verdict, or finding, or anything on paper—if there was, we should be very glad to see it. All we know is what Lord Wolseley did; and if General Colvile was actually responsible either for the disaster at Sanna's Post or for the surrender of the Yeomanry at Lindley—if there was even a prima facie case against him, he ought not to have been reinstated in his command at Gibraltar, and it is the most serious impugnment of the judgment of both Lord Wolseley and Lord Lansdowne. It is not I who am responsible for making it, but those who have succeeded them in office who make this insinuation against them. That is the simple issue before the House. It is not a question of censure or military discipline. It is a question of whether we ought to apply in the administration of the Army those principles of ordinary and natural justice to which every one of us would conform in the ordinary relations of life. For my part, having the very strongest view that this House is an unfit and incompetent tribunal to revise the decisions of our military authorities, being one of those who would never either in civil or military matters countenance for a moment the establishment of what I conceive to be an unconstitutional and revolutionary practice, and because I think that in the specific circumstances of this particular cases there is prima facie ground to believe that the ordinary rights of justice and fair play have been violated—for that reason only I ask the House to accept the Amendment.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (Mr. J. CHAMBERLAIN,) Birmingham, W.

From the very earnest but somewhat vehement speech to which we have just listened, I think it is clear that, in spite of what I thought was the lucid exposition of my right hon. friend, the right hon. Gentleman opposite does not agree as to the issue which is before the House. It is perfectly clear from his speech that we take a totally different view from him as to the matter which is now before us for decision. I was very glad to bear the light hon. Gentleman say that this was in no sense a party question. I hope that is the case, and I hope that the division may show it. But it is a, case which evidently has excited the greatest possible interest in the House, and that, perhaps, is not unnatural, for what is it that is at stake? In the first place, there is the position of a general officer of considerable reputation, of high position in the British Army. It is not his character that is at stake. No charge whatever has been made against that, but it is, no doubt, his competency for high military employment—a matter to him of the most intense concern, and in connection with which there would be always a natural sympathy. But there is something else at stake. There is the character of the Government, so far as we have responsibility for what has taken place; there is the character of the Commander-in-Chief. [Several HON. MEMBERS: Which one?] Let me call the attention of the House to the language which the right hon. Gentleman has used. He said that if we support the decision of the Commander-in-Chief we are false to the principles of ordinary and natural justice to which we should all conform in our private life. He has said that the incident of Sanna's Post was brought in to bolster up a decision arrived at on different grounds. By whom does the right hon. Gentleman suggest that the incident of Sauna's Post was brought in, to use his very strong and offensive language, to bolster up a decision previously taken by the Commander-in-Chief? [An HON. MEMBER: By Brodrick.] The right hon. Gentleman I do not think will say so; at all events, I defy him or his supporters to escape from the logical conclusion to be derived from his winds. It is not my right hon. friend—who has told the House that he has acted upon an opinion given to him by the Commander-in-Chief—it is not he who brought in Sauna's Post to bolster up a, decision previously arrived at, and therefore hon. Members cannot refuse to accept the fact that in this issue which is now presented to the blouse it is not the character of General Colvile, but it is the character of the Commander-in-Chief which is involved. The right hon. Gentleman said no one would dismiss a servant upon such evidence as has been presented in the case of General Colvile.

Mr. ASQUITH

Without giving him an opportunity of being heard.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

That does not touch in the least the point that I am going to make. He was heard—but that is not the point. No one, says the right hon. Gentleman, would dismiss a servant upon such evidence without giving him an opportunity of being heard. Who dismissed him? The Commander-in-Chief. I say that throughout the speech of the right hon. Gentleman—take it from point to point—he asks the House to condemn the present Commander-in-Chief in order to exonerate General Colvile.

I only bring that forward because I want the House to see the importance of the issue. The issue is this. It is independent even of the position of the present Commander-in-Chief. The present Commander-in-Chief was appointed with the full confidence of his countrymen to his present position, and almost his first executive act is criticised and questioned in this House by hon. Gentlemen who do not like being called amateur strategists, and on a question of military discipline this House is asked to condemn the Commander-in-Chief. As I say, it is not merely a question of the position of the present Commander-in-Chief. Of course the result of such a decision as the right hon. Gentleman asks for must be evident and plain to the House; no man with any respect for himself, no Government with any respect for itself, could submit to such a resolution and continue to hold their office. That is almost a platitude, and, of course, there are Members on the other side, although this is not a party debate, who would not he at all sorry to see that result. But that is a matter of small importance compared with the question how the British Army is in future to be organised and administered. What is the position in which we stood a few days ago, before, this debate was raised I Why, we were being criticised in every paper of the Opposition, and in some of our own papers, for too great leniency, for allowing men to remain in command with the lives of soldiers depending upon their action—allowing them to remain after they had shown incompetency. Incompetency is a matter of opinion, and as long as we have a Commander-in-Chief it is the opinion of the existing Commander-in-Chief, whoever he may be, that we have to accept as the final judgment. If the principle endeavoured to be established by the right hon. Gentleman were accepted by the House, it would not matter which Government was in power or who was Commander-in-Chief—there is no Commander-in-Chief and no Government under those circumstances who would dare to dismiss any officer unless they were prepared to bring against him a charge of positive crime. If cowardice were alleged, if treason were alleged, it would, no doubt, be a simple matter to bring the accused person to trial and to punish him according to his deserts. But, as I have pointed out, incompetency is not a matter which can be brought to trial. Is a court-martial to try whether General Colvile is incompetent? What is a court-martial? It is a court consisting of officers lower in rank than Lord Roberts, Sir Evelyn Wood, and Lord Kitchener. Lord Kitchener, Lord Roberts, and Sir Evelyn Wood have pronounced their opinion that General Colvile is not capable and ought not to be again employed in high military office; and we, forsooth, are to institute a court of appeal against the highest administrator's in the Army, a court of appeal of their subordinates. It seems to me it is perfectly absurd, absolutely inconsistent with all the criticism which we have previously heard from the party opposite. I agree with my right hon. friend when he said that, if the House of Commons were to pass a resolution of this kind, it would not only destroy the Government, it would not only secure the resignation of the Commander-in-Chief, but it would destroy the British Army.

MR. DALZIEL

The speech of the right hon. Gentleman reminds me of a cartoon which was issued during the elections, called "Hiding behind Bobs." This was not a party question until the right hon. Gentleman rose to address the House, but he appealed to the supporters of the Government, and declared that if the division were against them it would settle the fate of the Government and of

the Commander-in-Chief. The right hon. Gentleman has no business to make this a party question. The question before the House is not the question of Lord Roberts or of Sir Evelyn Wood. It is whether this House will grant an inquiry into the case of General Colvile. If the decision in his case be right, why are the Government shirking an inquiry? How is it that every unofficial Member who has spoken from the opposite benches has differed as to the reason why General Colvile was dismissed? The hon. Member for Oldham said that the Lindley affair was no charge at all, and that it was for Sauna's Post that General Colvile was dismissed, whereas another hon. Member said that he was dismissed because of the Lindley affair. It seems to me that there is a case for inquiry, and I have no doubt if the House were allowed to exercise its free judgment to-night that it would be in favour of the Amendment. Every soldier has a right to have the opportunity of examining the evidence on which he is convicted, and therefore I will vote for the Amendment of my hon. friend.

Question put.

The House divided:—Ayes, 202; Noes, 148. (Division List No. 60.)

Hamilton, Rt. Hn. Lord G. (Mid'x Maxwell, Rt. Hn. Sir H E (Wigt'n) Round, James
Hamilton, Marq. of (L'nd'nd'ry Maxwell, W. J. H. (Dumfriessh. Royds, Clement Molyneux
Harmsworth, R. Leicester Meysey-Thompsoh, Sir H. M. Russell, T. W.
Harris, E. Leverton (Tynem'th Middlemore, J. Throgmorton Sackville, Col. S. G. Stopford-
Harwood, George Milton, Viscount Sadler, Col. Samuel Alexander
Haslam, Sir Alfred S. Milward, Colonel Victor Samuel, Harry S. (Limehouse)
Haslett, Sir James Horner Molesworth, Sir Lewis Sassoon, Sir Edward Albert
Hay, Hon. Claude George Montagu, G. (Huntingdon) Saunderson, Rt. Hn. Col. Edw. J
Heath, Arthur Howard (Hanley Montagu, Hon. J. Scott (Hauts.) Scott, Chas. Prestwich (Leigh)
Heath, James (Staffords, N. W. Moon, Edward Robert Pacy Scott, Sir S. (Marylebone, W.)
Helder, Augustus Moore, William (Antrim, N.) Seely, Charles Hilton (Lincoln)
Herman-Hodge, Robt. Trotter More, R. Jasper (Shropshire) Seton-Karr, Henry
Higginbottom, S.W. Morgan, Dav. J. (Walthamstow Sharpe, William Edward T.
Hoare, Edw. Brodie (Hampst'd Morrell, George Herbert Simeon, Sir Barrington
Hobhouse, Henry (Somerset, E. Morris, Hon. Martin H. F. Sinclair, Louis (Romford)
Hope, J. F. (Shef'ld, Brightside Morton, A. H. A. (Deptford) Skewes-Cox. Thomas
Hoult, Joseph Mount, William Arthur Smith, Abel H. (Hertford, East)
Howard, Capt. J. (Kent, Favers. Murray, Rt. Hn. A. G. (Bute) Smith, HC (North'mb Tyneside
Jeffreys, Arthur Frederick Murray, Charles J. (Coventry) Smith, James Parker (Lanarks.
Jessel, Captain Herbert Merton Murray, Col. Wyndhsm (Bath) Smith, Hon. W. F. D. (Strand)
Johnston, William (Belfast) Myers, William Henry Spear, John Ward
Johnstone, Heywood (Sussex) Nicholson, William Graham Stanley, Hon Arthur (Ormskirk
Joicey, Sir James Nicol, Donald Ninian Stanley, Lord (Lancs.)
Jones, William (Carnarvonsh. Norton, Capt. Cecil William Slock, James Henry
K ennaway, Rt. Hon. Sir John H. O'Neill, Hon. Robert Torrens Stone, James Henry
Kenyon, James (Lancs., Bury Orr-Ewing, Charles Lindsay Stroyan, John
Kenyon-Slaney, Col. W. (Salop. Palmer, George Wm, (Reading) Strutt, Hon. Charles Hedley
Kimber, Henry Palmer, Walter (Salisbury) Talbot, Lord E. (Chichester)
King, Sir Henry Seymour Parkes, Ebenezer Thorburn, Sir Walter
Knowles, Lees Pease, Herbert Pike (Darlingt'n Thornton, Percy M.
Lambton, Hon. Frederick Wm. Penn, John Tollemache, Henry James
Law, Andrew Bonar Percy, Earl Tomlinson, Wm. Edw. Murray
Lawrence, William F. Pilkington, Richard Tufnell, Col. Edward
Lawson, John Grant Platt-Higgins, Frederick Valentia, Viscount
Lecky, Rt. Hn. Wm. Edw. H. Plummer, Walter R. Vincent, Sir Edgar (Exeter)
Lee, Capt AH (Hants. Fareham) Powell, Sir Francis Sharp Warde, Lieut.-Col. C. E.
Legge, Col. Hon. Heneage Pretyman, Ernest George Warner, Thomas Courtenay T.
Leigh-Bennett, Henry Currie Pryce-Jones, Lt. -Col. Edward Wason, John Cathcart (Orkney)
Leveson-Gower, Fredk. N. S. Purvis, Robert Welby, Lt.-Col. ACE (Taunton
Long, Col. Chas. W. (Evesham) Randles, John S. Welby, Sir Charles G. E. (Notts.
Long, Rt. Hn. Walter (Bristol, S. Rankin, Sir James Wharton, Rt. Hon. John Lloyd
Lonsdale, John Brownlee Basch, Major Frederic Carne Whitmore, Charles Algernon
Lowe, Francis William Ratcliffe, R. F. Williams, Colonel R. (Dorset)
Lucas, Col. Francis (Lowestoft) Reid, James (Greenock) Willox, Sir John Archibald
Lucas, Reginald J.(Portsm'th.) Remnant, James Farquharson Wills, Sir Frederick
Lyttleton, Hon. Alfred Renshaw, Charles Bine Wilson, A. Stanley (York, E. R.)
Macdona, John Cumming Renwick, George Wilson, Fred W. (Norfolk, Mid.
Maconochie, A. W. Richards, Henry Charles Wilson, John (Glasgow)
M'Arthur, Charles (Liverpool) Ridley, Hn. M. W. (Stalybridge Wortley, Rt. Hon. C. B. Stuart
M'Killop, James (Stirlingshire) Bidley, S. Forde (Bethnal Green Wrightson, Sir Thomas
Majendie, James A. H. Ritchie, Rt. Hn. Chas. Thomson Wyndham, Rt. Hon. George
Malcolm, Ian Robertson, Herbert (Hackney) Young, Commander (Berks, E.)
Manners, Lord Cecil Rolleston, Sir John F. L. TELLERS FOR THE AYES—Sir William Walrond and Mr. Anstruther.
Markbam, Arthur Basil Ropner, Colonel Robert
Martin, Richard Biddulph Rothschild, Hn. Lionel Walter
NOES.
Abraham, Wm. (Cork, N.E.) Bunton, Sydney Charles Dickson-Poynder, Sir John P.
Abraham, William (Rhondda) Caldwell, James Donelan, Captain A.
Allan, William (Gateshead) Campbell, John (Armagh, S.) Doogan, P. C.
Allan, Charles P. (Glou., Stroud Campbell-Bannerman, Sir H. Duffy, William J.
Ambrose, Robert Causton, Richard Knight Duncan, James H.
Asquith, Rt. Hon. Herbert H. Cawley, Frederick Dunn, Sir William
Barry, E. (Cork, S.) Clancy, John Joseph Edwards, Frank
Beaumont, Wentworth C. B. Cogan, Denis J. Elibank, Master of
Bell, Richard Colville, John Emmott, Alfred
Blake, Edward Condon, Thomas Joseph Evans, Sir Francis H. (Maidst.
Boland, John Craig, Robert Hunter Farquharson, Dr. Robert
Brigg, John Crean, Eugene Farrell, James Patrick
Broadhurst, Henry Cramer, William Randal Fenwick, Charles
Brown, G. M. (Edinburgh) Cullinan, J. Ferguson, R. C. Munro (Leith)
Brunner, Sir John Tomlinson Dalziel, James Henry Ffrench, Peter
Bryce, Rt. Hon. James Davies, Alfred (Carmarthen) Field, William
Burke, E. Haviland- Delany, William Flavin, Michael Joseph
Burt, Thomas Dewar, John A. (Inverness-sh. Flynn, James Christopher
Foster, Sir Walter (Derby Co.) M'Govern, T. Roche, John
Fowler, Rt. Hn. Sir Henry M'Hugh, Patrick A. Samuel, S. M. (Whitechapel)
Fuller, J. M. F. M'Kenna, Reginald Sinclair, Capt. J. (Forfarshire)
Gilhooly, James M'Laren, Charles Benjamin Soames, Arthur Wellesley
Gladstone, Rt. Hn. Herbert John Milner, Rt. Hon. Sir Fredk. G. Soares, Ernest J.
Goddard, Daniel Ford Mooney, John J. Spencer, Rt. Hn. CR (Northants)
Grant, Corrie Morton, E. J. C. (Devonport) Stevenson, Francis S.
Gurdon, Sir W. Brampton Murnaghan, George Sullivan, Donal
Guthrie, Walter Murray Murphy, J. Taylor, Theodore Cook
Haldane, Richard Burdon Nannetti, Joseph P. Tennant, Harold John
Hammond, John Nolan, Col. J. P. (Galway, N.) Thomas, F. Freeman- (Hastings
Hayden, John Patrick Nolan, Joseph (Louth, South) Thomas, J. A. (Glam., Gower)
Hayne, Rt. Hon. Chas. Seale O'Brien, Kendal (Tipper'ryMid Thomson, F. W. (York, W. R.)
Healy, Timothy Michael O'Brien, Patrick (Kilkenny) Tomkinson, James
Hemphill, Rt. Hon. Chas. H. O'Connor, James (Wicklow, W. Trevelyan, Charles Philips
Holland, William Henry O'Connor, T. P. (Liverpool) Tully, Jasper
Hope, John D. (Fife, West) O'Donnell, John (Mayo, S.) Wallace, Robert
Horniman, Frederick John O'Donnell, T. (Kerry, W.) Walton, John Lawson (Leeds, S.
Jordan, Jeremiah O'Dowd, John Walton, Joseph (Barnsley)
Joyce, Michael O'Kelly, Conor (Mayo, N.) Wason, Eugene (Clackmannan)
Kearley, Hudson E. O'Malley, William Weir, James Galloway
Kennedy, Patrick James O'Mara, James White, Luke (York, E. R.)
Kinloch, Sir John George S. O'Shaughnessy, P. J. Whiteley, George (York, W. R.)
Kitson, Sir James Partington, Oswald Whitley, J. H. (Halifax)
Lambert, George Pirie, Duncan V. Wodehouse, Hn. Armine (Essex
Langley, Batty Power, Patrick Joseph Woodhouse, Sir JT (Huddersf'd
Layland-Barratt, Francis Priestley, Arthur Yerburgh, Robert Armstrong
Leamy, Edmund Reckitt, Harold James Young, Samuel (Cavan, East)
Levy, Maurice Reddy, M.
Lough, Thomas Redmond, John E. (Waterford) TELLERS FOR THE NOES— Mr. Charles Douglas and Mr. Gretton.
Lundon, W. Redmond, Willam (Clare)
MacDonnell, Dr. Mark A. Roberts, John Bryn (Eifion)
M'Dermott, Patrick Robertson, Edmund (Dundee)

Main Question again proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

It being after midnight, the debate stood adjourned.

Adjourned debate, to be resumed tomorrow.