HC Deb 11 March 1901 vol 90 cc1251-76

"The Daily Mail learns that the communication to the Press relative to the request for General Colvile's resignation did not emanate from the War Office.

"The request was, of course, made with the full acquiescence and authority of the Secretary of State for War after minute and full inquiries had been instituted into the affair at Lindley as well as that at Sanna's Post.

"No further investigation is considered necessary by the authorities, who fully recognise the gravity and importance of the step they have taken.

"General Colvile will, despite his attitude on the matter, have to bow to the inevitable, and, though naturally considerable sympathy will be felt for an officer who has served his country in several campaigns, the decision is irrevocable.

"The General's pay ceased from the date on which the notification reached him, and no action on his part can affect the decision which has been arrived at by the Secretary of State and his advisers."

If that be not a communication which comes from the War Office, then a miracle must have happened, and if it had so happened it was not with the knowledge of General Colvile, and he was entitled to assume that that article came from the War Office. Even apart from that, I shall presently show the House that there was most grievous provocation. In the meantime, I shall only say that I believe that what General Colvile did he did in anger; his action was not calculated or premeditated; it was brought about by the most justifiable resentment aroused by gross insult and intolerable wrong. And, again, what other course was open to him? What other appeal had he? None whatever. The right hon. Gentleman, in answer to the hon. Member for Chester, the other day gave the following reply— No officer has a right to appeal to a court martial, but to the Commander-in-Chief and to the Sovereign in accordance with Section 42 of the Army Act. Precisely. Having been condemned by the right hon. Gentleman in consultation with Lord Roberts, he is graciously allowed to appeal to Lord Roberts in consultation with the right hon. Gentleman.

The case I have to submit to the House is not the propriety of publication. It is not the action of the War Office in placing General Colvile on retired pay, although I admit that I have a natural curiosity to learn by what series of irregularities the right hon. Gentleman arrived at the amount of, what has been euphemistically called, a "special pension." although the pleasant phrase hardly does justice to the fact that it is £100 a year less than General Colvile was entitled to receive. I want to know what went before that. It is said that General Colvile was put out of court by what he did in making a public statement. I do not admit it. But if he were, we are not out of court. We are still entitled to consider the right hon. gentleman's management of our army.

Now, Sir, I am very much confirmed in my belief in the necessity of some inquiry by the extraordinary ignorance lately displayed by the Secretary of State for War as to certain matters nearly affecting General Colvile's claim to consideration. I think he adopted a view which we all endorse when he explained lately in the case of Sir George White and others that their general service was to be taken into account in estimating any particular defect of theirs. I submit he was bound to do that in General Colvile's case. The right hon. Gentleman told the House, in answer to a question, that General Colvile had sent on to the Commander-in-Chief no report on the battle of Paardeberg. The fact is that he did send in such a report, but the right hon. Gentleman did not know even a few weeks ago that any report was sent to Lord Roberts. That report is here. I can give it to the right hon. gentleman. I have evidence of its being written at the time, the evidence of the officer who wrote it to dictation from General Colvile, and the evidence of a letter from Lord Roberts's secretary, who wrote requiring some little alterations in it—of no importance— and this despatch bears so closely on General Colvile's services in this war that no judgment of his case can possibly be complete or final until it is taken into account. But the case itself amply justifies the demand for inquiry. Consider the steps by which this matter has reached its present unhappy position. On the 29th of June Lord Roberts had an interview with General Colvile at Pretoria, an interview which lasted a quarter of an hour. At that interview the affairs at Sanna's Post and Lindley were discussed. Lord Roberts said he was dissatisfied, and that he had broken up General Colvile's command; and he asked him what he would like to do. General Colvile said he wished to go home, and Lord Roberts assented. He reached this country in July, and gave Lord Wolseley a detailed account, ver- bally and in writing, of what took place at Sauna's Post and Lindley, After this General Colvile received a memorandum from Lord Roberts on Sanna's Post, dated 21st of May, and I offer that to the right hon. Gentleman as an interesting specimen for his museum of military delays.

Now, General Colvile had up to this point no official intimation that an inquiry was being made, and he was never given an opportunity of making an official defence. When he had his interview with Lord Roberts he did not know that he was on his trial. Between the 9th and 31st of August, however, a report from Lord Roberts was at last received by the War Office, and on the 15th of September General Colvile received the following letter, dated from the War Office;— Sir,—I am directed by the Secretary of State for War to inform you that the Commander-in-Chief has approved of your resuming the command of the Infantry Brigade at Gibraltar from the 1st of October next to complete your period of service therein, exclusive of the time you were serving in South Africa, and I am to request that you will hold yourself in readiness to embark in time to take up the duties on the above date. Please acknowledge the receipt hereof, and return enclosed family form to this department. I am, Sir, Your obedient servant, (Signed) H. C. B. FARRANT, A.A.G. for A.G.

Now I submit that that is a decision on General Colvile's case and conduct. I know from a personal letter that the case had been considered on the basis of Lord Roberts's report and General Colvile's statement. I know the decision was arrived at three and a half months after the Lindley incident, and two and a half months after General Colvile's conversation with Lord Roberts at Pretoria and after Lord Roberts's report to the War Office. I think we are entitled to assume that what Sir H. Colvile did in connection with the loss of the Yeomanry at Lindley was considered in the decision arrived at by Lord Wolseley. Therefore the case was tried and decided by those who had a full statement before them from both sides. Lord Roberts, when he was in Africa, had no written statements in answer to any charges. He had only the despatch of the march from Wynburg to Heilbron. He had no other statement in writing, only his recollection of the very short conversation which took place between him and General Colvile at Pretoria. Now his case having, as I say, been considered, the House will easily imagine the surprise with which General Colvile received a letter some months after marked "Confidential," but which I do not now treat as a confidential letter for several reasons, which will be apparent to the House when I read it. In the first place, it was the only official intimation which he received of his having been deprived of his command; secondly, it contained the only statement of the grounds on which he was removed; thirdly, a copy was sent to Sir George White; and, fourthly, that the letter was subsequently referred to in official correspondence. Such a letter as this I cannot, having passed, treat as confidential. The letter runs as follows— War Office, 16th December, 1900. My dear General, In the temporary absence of the Military Secretary, an unpleasant duty devolves on me. The Secretary of State having discussed by telegraph the incidents of the surrender of No. XIII. Imperial Yeomanry battalion, concurs with Lord Roberts that you were mainly responsible for the surrender, and has reluctantly come to the conclusion that you cannot be permitted to retain your command. I am directed to request you will hand in your resignation to Sir George White on receipt of this letter and quit Gibraltar. I am sending a copy of this letter to Sir George, but do not propose to write through the usual channel, as it may be less vexations to you if the resignation appears to be voluntary. Yours truly, (Signed) EVELYN WOOD, A.G. That letter was subsequently, and, I venture to say, inaccurately described in a letter of the 19th January last, in which occurs the following— Towards the end of December last you were informed in a confidential letter from the Adjutant-General that the Secretary of State, concurring with the recommendation by telegram from Lord Roberts, had reluctantly come to the conclusion that you could not be permitted to retain your command, and you were given the opportunity of resigning it.

In the first place, I want to call attention to the slight discrepancy—it may be nothing more—between the two statements which I want explained. The first letter states that the Secretary for War has come to the conclusion that General Colvile cannot be permitted to retain his command, and the second letter states that the Secretary of State concurs in the recommendation by telegram from Lord Roberts. Did the recommendation come from Lord Roberts and the right hon. Gentleman concur, or did the right hon. Gentleman receive a military criticism from Lord Roberts and initiate the recommendation? A simple question to which I desire an answer is, Did Lord Roberts know or did he not when he arrived at Gibraltar that General Colvile had been removed? There is a very gross inaccuracy in the second letter in the statement that "you were given an opportunity to resign." The real fact appears to be that General Colvile was not given any opportunity to resign even if he chose. He saw Sir George White and said he refused to resign, and Sir George White's reply was that his command had become vacant, and that his instructions were that General Colvile must quit Gibraltar immediately. If that is voluntary resignation I do not know what compulsion is, unless it means that General Colvile was to be taken home by force. If there had been any doubt in General Colvile's mind that he had been compulsorily and finally removed it would have been put an end to by the inspired article which appeared in the Daily Mail.

I need say nothing more of the provocation under which General Colvile took the action he did. I do not defend that action, but I say the Government gave him great provocation—provocation that was boundless and unpardonable. I want the explanation. Why was the case of General Colvile re-opened? Why was the decision of the Commander-in-Chief reversed? Why was General Colvile removed from his command without an opportunity of meeting any charges whatever? It will be noticed that the ground of his removal was explicitly stated in Sir Evelyn Wood's letter—his failure to relieve the Yeomanry at Lindley. That was the charge on which General Colvile had been condemned. He knew of no other. Other charges had, indeed, been referred to. His action at Sanna's Post was criticised. What was wrong with it has never been stated in definite and I clear terms to him since this first inquiry took place. I am quite prepared to meet what is said on that point. Another charge has been spoken of outside this House, and a statement has been attri- buted to those who stood high at the War Office that General Colvile was deprived of his command on a charge of cowardice. I will not stoop to meet that charge until it is made, but I cannot altogether ignore it. In view of these rumours about a charge that ought never to have been made behind a man's back. I think I am entitled to ask the right hon. Gentleman either to make that charge with evidence, if it is to be made, or else to do General Colvile justice, as I am sure he will, by disclaiming any intention of making the charge. That is all I ask. Let us, at all events, have all the charges before us, and have done with all the mystery that has been accumulating about this business. Let us have all the cards on the table, so that we may know what to think and how to act.

The matter of Lindley has been definitely alleged as the ground of General Colvile's removal, and therefore I am compelled to deal with it very shortly. I do not, of course, offer any opinion on the military questions involved. The Mouse would properly regard such opinions as worthless; but the view has been put forward that then1 was that in General Colvile's action which rightly created prejudice against him—prejudice not against his military judgment and ability, but against his character as a man and a soldier. And in that connection I am hound to say something about this incident, for we require of a soldier, not only that he should be skilful and have foresight and personal courage, but that he should be chivalrous—that he should be ready to help other men and be willing to take risks on their behalf, and that he should not fight for his own hand, but in loyal comradeship with other men, and direct his efforts to the end of a victory common to him with them. I must, therefore, submit a few facts to the House. Now, what happened so far as General Colvile was concerned in connection with the Lindley episode was this. On May 19th of last year the Chief of the Staff telegraphed to General Colvile to say that the 12th Division was arriving at Wynburg, and that he should therefore join the remainder of his division at Ventersburg; that he should wait at Wynburg for a battery of Field Artillery; that he would be joined by some Eastern Province Horse on the 21st; and that the 13th Battalion of Yeomanry was to meet him on a day to be announced. On 20th May the Chief of the Staff sent the following cipher telegram:— From Ventersburg the Highland Brigade march to Lindley, and thence to Heilbron. Brigade will be concentrated at Ventersburg 23rd, reach Lindley 26th, Heilbron 29th. Those, it will be observed, were very precise instructions as to places and times. Later, on the same day, he received a second telegram from the Chief of the Staff:— Only two companies of 13th Battalion of Yeomanry, and possibly one company of Lovats Mounted Corps, will be able to join at Ventersburg, but other two Yeomanry companies will follow as soon as possible. The House will, therefore, see that General Colvile was despatched to his destination with such haste that he was not allowed to wait for his full complement of mounted men, although they were, essential to his safe progress. On 22nd May he left Wynburg. On the 23rd he arrived at Ventersburg; on the 24th he left. On the 26th, after some hours fighting, he arrived at Lindley, and on the next morning, 27th May, he marched from Lindley. He was engaged almost all day, and bivouacked in the evening north of Rhenoster River, twenty-three miles out from Lindley and nineteen miles from Heilbron, which place he had the strictest orders to reach the next day. The enemy were in front of him in numbers superior to his own, and they were also behind him and to his right. He was in that position when he received this letter— Colonel Spragge to General Colvile.— Found no one in Lindley but Boers; have 500 men, but only one day's food. Slopped three miles back on Kroonstad road. I want help to get out without great loss. It was in such circumstances that General Colvile took the decision for which he has been visited with so appalling a punishment—the termination in disgrace of his career as a soldier. Let me invite the House to consider the facts as he knew them, and his conception of the circumstances. He had definite orders to be at various places on certain days. He was told above all to beat Heilbron on 29th May, audit was never explained to him why. He knew he was hurried away from Ventersburg without waiting for the necessary mounted men; he knew that the first line of the army was within striking distance of the Vaal River; he knew that Heilbron had been occupied by General Ian Hamilton; he knew it was the depot for General Bundle's force, and he knew that he himself was only rationed to arrive at Heilbron. It was natural to suppose from the precise orders which he had received, and from the peremptory haste with which he was sent off, that he was acting in a concerted and definite movement of which his force formed a part, and it was also natural that he should suppose that General Hamilton would be detained at Heilbron until his arrival, just as he himself had been detained at the precisely similar depôt and railway terminus of Wynburg in precisely analogous circumstances. It was natural to believe that, and the proof that he did believe it, if proof be needed, is that he sent a message from Lindley to Heilbron asking that the mounted men whom he believed to have gone there should be sent to him, as he was in need of them. That message never reached Heilbron, because General Colvile's supposition was wrong. He was not taking part in a combined movement. General Hamilton had left Heilbron, and when General Colvile got near it it, was occupied by the Boers. Still I submit that his was a natural supposition. No doubt a general is expected to exercise discretion in carrying out his orders, but he can only exercise discretion if he is given material for doing so. He cannot exercise discretion if he is not told what general plan is being followed, and to what result he is contributing. If he is given the orders of a subaltern ho can only act as a subaltern. In the second place, I think it will be, recognised that, in the absence of any contrary instructions or intimation, General Colvile had a knowledge of facts which compelled him to regard it as necessary that he should be at Heilbron on the 29th May whatever it might cost, because everything pointed to the necessity of his being there if Lord Roberts's plans were to be carried out. It was impossible for him to be there on 29th May if he went back to Lindley. As a matter of fact, he only reached Heilbron late in the evening of the 29th, after a good deal of fighting. It must be remembered that his force of infantrymen had only two days' rations, that they were provisioned only to Heilbron by direct route, that his ambulances were overflowing, that his ammunition was short, and that his oxen were dying on the road. It may be possible to take the view that he should have compromised the safety of his own force by going to the assistance of valuable mounted men, because mounted men were recognised by everyone as of the greatest importance. Granting that, however, I think the House will come to the conclusion that the view he had formed was perfectly intelligible and just, and I believe would commend itself in all the circumstances to military men. Moreover, in view of the circumstances and of what he believed to be Lord Roberts's intentions, he was bound to lead his force out, and that was his decision. He wrote to Colonel Spragge explaining his position, and advising him to retire on Kroonstad. Colonel Spragge had not said that he could not retire, but that he could retire with loss. It was General Colvile's view that he could retire, and he sent a message advising him to do so. I do not know whether that message ever reached Colonel Spragge or not, we know so little of the circumstances. Three messengers were sent to carry the message, but they were intercepted by the Boers, and a fourth messenger got to the railway in the evening, but whether Colonel Spragge actually received the message or not I do not know. As I have spoken of the Yeomanry I should like to say, in case there might be any misunderstanding, that I, for my part, do not wish to impute any blame to the Yeomanry who surrendered. The circumstances were fully stated in a manner very gratifying to the House by the right hon. Gentleman. It must be remembered that they were summoned to Lindley, and that they believed that General Colvile had telegraphed for them. They received a telegram asking them to come to Lindley, a telegram which was afterwards proved to have been forged by the Boers, because it purported to have left Lindley before General Colvile arrived there. They believed they had been summoned to Lindley; they were therefore perfectly entitled to expect help, and they were bound to remain. I do not pose as a military expert, but it should be remembered in any judgment formed of the Yeomanry that they surrendered, not because they could not in the first instance have escaped, but because they would not escape, as they considered that that would mean that they had failed to do what had been expected of them. I desire the House, however, to believe that this action of General Colvile's is not merely a case of a selfish, callous, unchivalrous disregard of other men. I submit that hon. Members should remove from their minds any erroneous impression of that kind which would prejudice them against the demand for an inquiry.

I have very little more to add, and I apologise to the House for having troubled it at such length. The question I submit is whether in the case that I have laid before the House there is not something that demands inquiry. I fully admit the right of the Commander-in-Chief to control the discipline of the Army, but that is a right which, like every other right, is to be exercised subject to the control, the criticism, the censure of this House. The responsibility for its exercise rests primarily and finally with us, because it is a right which is derived from those whom we represent in this House, and I am bound to say that I think that the House cannot rid itself of the responsibility for seeing that justice is done to the soldier whose honour and fortunes are placed in its hands to-night, without any reserve or doubt or hesitation. I ask hon. Members to consider whether it would be in accord with our best sense of justice and equal rights to re-try a man already acquitted, to condemn a man on an accusation of which he was never informed, and to punish him on evidence which, he has allowed to challenge. It must be remembered that this is not merely a case of disciplinary regulation of the Army. It is not merely a ease of not offering employment to a general out of employment. This is the removal of a soldier from his command, and that is punishment—punishment which it is impossible for any words of mine to exaggerate. What greater punishment could you inflict on a man? You take from him in one act his career and his reputation with every circumstance of contumely and disgrace. He has worked all his life for his profession and the goodwill of his fellow countrymen. You deprive him of both without even the form of a trial. Who is this man? He is a soldier who has given to the arms of this country thirty years of brilliant service. He served you in the Nile campaign in 1884, and his name will be found mentioned to his honour in the despatches on El Teb and Tamai. On many occasions he was the only white man in charge of black troops on difficult expeditions, and twice he was sent single-handed to deal with mutinous or doubtful black troops. He fought in Burma and in the Toka expedition, and he rendered to the Imperial policy of this country in Uganda services of which I have heard those who were in charge of the foreign affairs of this country at the time speak in terms of grateful admiration. He is a scientific soldier who was appointed only a few years ago as umpire at the manœuvres on Salisbury Plain. [An HON. MEMBER laughed.] I am merely showing that to a man who had a first-rate position in the Army is being meted out punishment which could not be given to a common soldier in the ranks. Only once in these thirty years has he been the subject of an accusation. In 1885 he was accused by Major Kitchener of murdering six natives. The charge was investigated and was found to be devoid of foundation. Consider what his record is in the present war. He was sent to South Africa in charge of the Brigade of Guards. He served under Lord Methuen at Belmont, at the Modder River, and at Magersfontein, and he was referred to in despatches again and again in terms of the highest praise. Lord Methuen writes in one of his despatches (to select one case only out of many); "Major-General Colvile has already gained my entire confidence; nothing-is ever likely to shake his coolness." Lord Roberts appointed General Colvile to command the Ninth Division, and during the following three weeks he was actively engaged in the operations which culminated at Paardeberg. In relation to that victory his countrymen are under a debt of gratitude to General Colvile, of which, I believe, they are not sufficiently aware, for I have the high authority of Lord Roberts for urging that it was General Colvile who counselled and devised the brilliant attack of 27th February, by which a doubtful and critical position was turned into a decisive and fruitful victory. This is the man whose counsel and decision won the battle of Paardeberg—the greatest and most comprehensive victory in the campaign—and the right hon. Gentleman has devised for him a fitting reward

Is it well that this officer should fie punished untried? That is the question which I place before the House. I am bound to say that I feel myself completely justified in having raised this question, when I reflect on the confusion and uncertainty which have been displayed—the vacillation of the War Office and then its blundering precipitancy—the puzzled consternation with which the country has regarded the right hon. Gentleman s proceedings, and the dismay with which the Army has viewed the somewhat rudimentary conception of justice which he has lately unfolded with so much simplicity. Let me repeat once more that tin; discipline of the Army must be despotic, but I submit that the more despotic the administration the more necessary is it that your actions should he wise and just. I am not so foolish as not to recognise the difficulty of challenging a decision arrived at by a brilliant and experienced Minister, especially when it is supported, as we are given to understand it is supported, by a Commander-in-Chief whom the people of this country regard with a gratitude and an admiration of which I shall not presume to say more than this—that they have been earned over and over again not only by his heroic services, but by the noble example of his life. Yet I do so appeal in this Mouse of Commons from this exercise of their despotic authority, to a despotism that is above all despotism, and an authority that is over every authority—to the great necessity to which the mind of every man in this House will bow, that justice and fair play shall guide our decisions and govern our actions.

That is all I have to say, I thank the House for its consideration, and perhaps I may be allowed to submit one request to it. I am sure that in the minds of some hon. Members there must be some doubt as to the propriety of my action in raising this matter, and it is still more certain that by the manner in which I have done it, I may have given offence to those whom I would not willingly offend; well, let all that be my business. I beg hon. Members not to allow any mistakes of judgment on my part to prejudice them against the gallant and distinguished soldier whose case I have laid before the House.

MR. GKETTON (Derbyshire, S.)

I cannot keep silent when an appeal has been put before the House to obtain justice for a distinguished constituent of mine. We appeal for a full and a fair inquiry. I pass by the professional questions, which may be more fittingly referred to the court of inquiry which we are appealing to the House of Commons to support us in demanding, and I will only call attention to the very anomalous position in which the whole question is placed by the fact that it had already been investigated by the right hon. Gentleman's predecessor and the distinguished officer who recently held the position of Commander-in-Chief. A decision was arrived at by these two distinguished gentlemen. Then there was a change in the officials of the War Office, and with that change there came a practical reversal of the decision, without any reference to the man chiefly affected. I appeal to this distinguished assembly to support us in asking for this inquiry. We do not want to prejudge the case, but I think with the hon. Gentleman opposite that there is a prima facie case for a full, fair, and open inquiry. If the decision of the right hon. Gentleman is proved to he correct, then the country will be satisfied, and if it is proved to be wrong an injustice will be removed from a distinguished officer, and the House will have the satisfaction of knowing that justice has been done. The case has raised a great deal of feeling outside the House. In my own constituency petitions have been very largely signed asking for an inquiry, and in many parts of the country doubts have arisen as to the justice of the decision of the War Office. I appeal to hon. Member to listen with fair and calm minds to both sides, and to judge without prejudice, and I think they will see that there is a strong case indeed for an inquiry.

Amendment proposed— To leave out from the word 'That,' to the end of the Question, in order to add the words in the opinion of this House, the public interest requires that a complete and immediate inquiry be made into all the circumstances connected with the removal from his command at Gibraltar of Major General Sir Henry Colvile, K.C.M.G., C.B.,' instead thereof."— (Mr. Charles Douglas.)

Question proposed, "the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

*MR. BRODRICK

Mr. Speaker. I am sure that those who have listened to the two speeches of the hon. Gentlemen in support of the Amendment on this very delicate subject will be glad that the question has fallen into hands at once so capable and so moderate, because I think it is wry important that we should discuss questions of this kind with the dignity which befits an assembly like the Mouse of Commons. I confess that my own feelings in the matter are partly feelings of relief and partly of regret—relief because of opportunity of connecting a great many statements which have appeared about this case, and from what the hon. Member has said apparently a considerable amount of misapprehension prevails; but much more of regret because the motion which has been made makes it necessary for me to say things which I would rather have left unsaid about an officer who in the past has had an honourable career in Her Majesty's service. I do not say it in any way as a reproach to the hon. Member's, but it is noticeable that this case should have fallen into the hands of two hon. Members neither of whom has any special knowledge of the campaign in South Africa, and neither of whom has any military experience; and I note that the more because the House of Commons has a large number of Members at this moment who fulfil those conditions. I am sure the House will not complain if, as I am forced to discuss the question, I tell the House the truth, and the whole truth, with regard to it. As far as I am concerned, I have nothing to apologise for in the course which has been taken by the War Office with regard to the late proceedings against Sir Henry Colvile.

I should like to clear away two misconceptions which have not found their way into the speeches this evening, but about which a great deal has been said, and therefore if I did not contradict further misconception might possibly he produced. The first is that in this reconsideration of Sir Henry Colvile's case I acted on my own initiative and responsibility, without the advice of the military authorities who are bound to advise me in the circumstances. I shall show that this is absolutely the reverse of the fact. The second point, which I would not have referred to if it had not played a part in the statement of General Colvile himself, is the suggestion that the particular corps which was the subject of the Lindley inquiry—namely, the Yeomanry—had some special form of influence which it brought to bear, and which had in some way affected the decision. I think it due to that corps to say—I should not think it necessary to say it on my own behalf to the House—that no member of the corps, any friend of the corps, or any one directly or indirectly connected with the corps had ever in any way approached me—or, so far as I am aware, any member of the War Office—on the subject. They suffered severely in action. They felt, as all Englishmen would feel, the fate which fell upon them acutely; and they took their beating and subsequent hardships like soldiers. They never, so far as I am aware, attempted to get any interference on their behalf or' airy consideration of their case except such as the military authorities would naturally give to it.

I will mention as briefly as I can what were the points which brought Lord Roberts's censure on General Colvile. The first was the action at Sauna's Post on 31st March last year. I will recapitulate in a few words what the position was at Sauna's Post when Genera] Colvile and his command arrived there. General Broadwood, with the cavalry brigade and horse artillery, had been attacked by the enemy in the neighbourhood of Thaba Nehu, about twenty miles to the cast of Sauna's Post. General Broadwood on the day before the action at Sauna's Post was warned about eleven o'clock that a force of Boers was advancing upon him. His outposts were about seven miles out, and they were told to hold the Boers as best they could. He telegraphed to Lord Roberts that he intended to fall back on the waterworks, and he proceeded to hold the Boers at a distance while his convoy got into line of march and fought its way to the waterworks at Sauna's Post. The effect of that was that the convoy arrived there during the night, and General Broadwood and his cavalry found his way to bivouac at three o'clock in the morning of the 31st. Before dawn came, however, the Boer guns opened on the whole bivouac and from the neighbouring hills. I have never myself been in such a position, but hon. Members who have been are aware that whatever may be done extreme confusion is certain to result—shells bursting among a number of natives and horses and mules stampeding. The consequence was that General Broadwood's convoy was in the greatest confusion; he despatched two batteries of horse artillery and mounted infantry to protect the convoy, and himself went with the cavalry to make head against the enemy. Without General Broadwood's knowledge the Boers had seized a spruit which had to be crossed by the convoy. They seized the convoy as it came across, and they seized one gun after another, and a most desperate struggle ensued. The horse antillery managed to get out somehow and save five of their guns by an amount of hard fighting, perseverance, and courage which I do not suppose has been surpassed in any action in the war. But General Broadwood, when he fell back, found the remnant of his horse artillery and mounted infantry in dire difficulties. He had himself to fight his way across the spruit, going some miles down, and after a very serious further opposition from the enemy he made his way to the near side of the spruit at Bloemfontein and began to draw up his scattered forces. That was at eleven o'clock on the 31st. General Broadwood had then been marching and fighting without intermission, except for an hour and a half, from eleven o'clock on the preceding day. His horses and his men had not been fed since four o'clock on the previous day and were all in a state of exhaustion. They had lost about one-third of their strength, seven of their guns, and the whole of their baggage. That was the moment when General Colvile's com- mand, consisting of about 4,000 fresh troops, arrived at Bushman's Kop, situated about two and a half miles from the post where General Broadwood was then drawn up. I am not now talking of anything that is in dispute, and anything that I have to state to the House, either as to this action or that at Lindley, will not be, so far as I am aware, of a character that is disputed by General Colvile. I propose to lay on the Table of the House, after I have quoted from it, the explanation which General Colvile himself gave. General Colvile arrived at Bushman's Kop at about eleven o'clock. At that moment tin.' position was as I have stated, but what remained of General Broadwood's force was then within two and a half miles of him, and also on the Bloemfontein side of the spruit. At that moment the guns which had been taken had not yet been moved off, and (is far as I myself can make out, from what I have read and heard officially on the subject, (hose guns were not removed until between twelve and one o'clock, in the day.

MR. YERBURGH (Chester)

I am very sorry to interrupt my right hon. friend, but he said that he was not making any statement disputed by General Colvile. But General Colvile distinctly traverses the statement that these guns were not removed until between twelve and one.

*MR. BRODRICK

I extremely regret that I have to make this admission—General Colvile did not take the means to ascertain where t he guns were, and I he evidence I am obliged to give on that point is that of the other officers, who were in a position to give it. I was aware that General Colvile disputed that those guns had not been removed, but I was not aware that he disputed that they were not removed until between twelve and one.

MR. YERBURGH

I think it is in his evidence.

*MR. BRODRICK

General Colvile's own explanation was, that on arriving at Bushman's Kop he was informed that General Broadwood s brigade was then forming up about two miles to the east- ward. He at once sent his Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, Captain Ruggles-Brise, to General Broadwood with a message that he wished to see him. On his return Captain Ruggles-Brise reported that General Broadwood replied that he was too tired to come. "Under ordinary circumstances." said General Colvile, "I should have taken serious notice of such an answer, but as I gathered that under the circumstances in which he found himself, General Broadwood appeared to be completely broken down and incapable of co-operation, I thought it better to let it pass." Lord Roberts subsequently had occasion to comment on what appears to me to be an extraordinary narrative. The general whom he had sent to relieve General Broadwood and assist him, being himself two and a half miles from the scene of action, sent to General Broadwood an order to leave his troops, which were still in touch with the enemy, while there was still firing going on, in order to come two and a half miles to the rear to confer with General Colvile as to what was to be done. Lord Roberts thought it an action which was in itself a mistake, and be thought that in the situation in which General Broadwood found himself he was amply justified in refusing to leave his troops. I would sooner not have to inform the House what followed. General Colvile appears to have taken, as his own words show, serious exception to General Broadwood's behaviour. Even in his own account to Lord Roberts he practically takes credit that he did not immediately call to account from a disciplinary standpoint the officer who was commanding these hungry and wearied men still fighting with the enemy. But it is almost impossible to realise the state of mind which caused General Colvile to take the action he did after eleven o clock that day. At a moment when information as to the enemy's position was of the highest value, when he himself has admitted that it was imperative that he and General Broadwood should come together, on General Broadwood's explaining that he was unable to leave his troops General Colvile made no further effort whatever to come into touch with him. At an hour of the day when every moment was of importance with regard to the rescue of the guns, General Colvile, by his own account, waited till nearly two o clock without taking any steps in any direction whatever. At the moment when it was of the utmost importance that by bringing forward these fresh troops he should do what he could to restore confidence, he left General Broadwood's shattered force severely alone; and finally, without receiving any further indication from General Broadwood as to his situation, he marched his troops in another direction. General Colvile states that he had no intimation of the suggestion which Brigadier General Broadwood reports, that a direct advance on the spruit offered the best chance of assistance. Whichever way that statement cuts, it cuts, I fear, against General Colvile. General Broadwood states that he made that intimation. If he did not make it, then General Colvile neither knew what General Broadwood wished him to do, nor took pains to find it out. As between two generals in the field within two and a half miles of one another, one of whom possessed information but the other did not, that conduct seemed to Lord Roberts, and will seem, I think, to the House, very extraordinary. The result—the net result of these operations was this, that, after having left the men he had been sent to help without assistance. General Colvile blundered about with his force—when I use that word I mean he moved without proper guidance to show him where to go—until dark, when his men were wearied out; and alter they had marched twenty-three miles evening came on, and in the meantime the Boers had carried off the guns quietly and unmolested. Lord Roberts considered that he had shown a want of enterprise in this matter, which had the worst possible effect on those whom he bad to lead and those whom he had to relieve. One at least of the brigadiers finally endeavoured to get General Colvile where be ought to have marched—straight up to the enemy.

MR. YERBURGH

What was the opinion of the other general with Sir Henry Colvile?

*MR. BRODRICK

I do not think, Sir. I am in possession, of the other general's opinion. I have seen in General Colvile s own handwriting, in a letter that was not marked private, that he was not in the habit of taking the opinions of his subordinates. As the result of what happened, General Colvile lost Lord Roberts s confidence. Lord Roberts had not an opportunity for some time of hearing all the facts. General Broadwood's report did not reach him for three weeks afterwards. General Colvile's reply to General Broad wood did not reach him for a much longer period, and meantime Lord Roberts thought the best course was to take General Colvile away from the division and send him further back with a less command; and he awaited, with that moderation which has always distinguished him, the full knowledge of the event before be finally dealt with General Colvile's case. Unfortunately, before that occurred a fresh incident had taken place. I do not want to labour any of the incidents. General Colvile says he did know the Yeomanry were coming, and that he himself started on his inarch in the firm belief that his duty was simply to confine himself—

*MR. CHARLES DOUGLAS

I do not think I said, and I did not intend to say, he did not know the Yeomanry were coming. What he did not know was that they would come by that route. He expected, reasonably, that they would go by another route.

*MR. BRODRICK

All these questions of the telegrams are quite immaterial to the case I have to present to the House, which is of the simplest character. General Colvile marched from Lindley on 27th May. When he had got to a point which the hon. Member calls twenty-three miles off, but is called by others eighteen miles, he received this message from Colonel Spragge, which he himself quotes: Colonel Spragge to General Colville.—Found no one in Lindley but Boers. Five hundred men and only one day's food. Have stopped three miles back on the Kroonstad road. We want help to get out without great loss.—(Signed) B. SPRAGUE, Colonel. General Colvile received that message early on the morning of May 28th. As to whether General Colvile should have gone forward or back, that is a question with which I think military men are more fitted to deal than any of us who have not military experience. But I can say only this—that General Colvile was eighteen, twenty, or twenty-three miles from the scene of action, that he got this demand from a body of troops undoubtedly in difficulties, and that he had no means of knowing that they could get out of them without surrender. Other generals took a different course from his. Lord Methuen, who was forty-four miles away, marched forty-four miles in twenty-seven hours in trying to relieve the Yeomanry. General Rundle, who was forty-five miles off, threw himself on the Boers in front of him in an attempt to draw them off Lindley. He incurred a loss of 150 men, and even then he could not get through. The one man who sent back a message to this earnest appeal that Colonel Spragge was to find his way out of his difficulties as best he could was the only [officer in the Army who twice within eight weeks left a body of troops in difficulties without making the slightest effort, to relieve them. There is a French; maxim to which the great Napoleon expected his generals to conform Marcher toujours an feu. That is the maxim of our Army for all time. It has always been the maxim of our Army that when a body of your own troops are in difficulties you must go straight for them.

I will state as briefly as possible why, when he had come home in consequence of these operations. Lord Roberts found it necessary to raise the question again. Lord Wolseley looked; into the question and made a recommendation to Lord Lansdowne. He thought that General Colvile should be allowed to return to Gibraltar. But there were two points which had altered. The first was that when the court of inquiry with regard to Lindley came before me at the beginning of December it was clearly proved that Colonel Spragge's surrender was not due to any default of Colonel Spragge himself; that he could never have got out of his own difficulties; that he had done all that man could do, and that he and those who were with him were guiltless of any lack of military talent in having to surrender. But there was another point. As far as I was concerned, I did not take up this question, as has been suggested, as a mere question of seizing on something and then framing a charge against an officer already tried. The result of the inquiry was brought before me by the acting Commander-in-Chief, Sir Evelyn Wood, who made various recommendations, I saw by the official Papers that though Lord Wolseley had made a recommendation to Lord Lansdowne, and had before him an official report as to General Colvile's conduct in the field by Lord Roberts, yet Lord Wolseley had never communicated with Lord Roberts, and had never asked his opinion as to whether the employment of General Colvile in the field being deemed to be undesirable, his employment at home was not also undesirable. It seems to me that there was no opinion on that point so important as the opinion of Lord Roberts, under whom Genera Col vile had served. I was asked by the hon. Member to say directly, did Lord Roberts know, before he arrived at Gibraltar, that General Colvile was to be removed? Most unquestionably he did. On Sir Evelyn Wood's making this recommendation, I telegraphed to Lord Roberts and mentioned to him that the effect of the court of inquiry at Lindley seemed to bear upon General Colvile's position, and I asked him for his opinion. He stated his opinion unhesitatingly in agreement with that of the Acting Commander-in-Chief, that General Colvile should not be allowed to retain his position at Gibraltar. I had no alternative in the matter. I know that I took a responsibility in regard to it; but I put it to the House, should I not have taken a much greater responsibility if, in face of the recommendations of the man under whom General Colvile had served and the officer who advised me at home, I had retained him in a command which, in their opinion, it was not desirable he should fill? The Secretary of State has the power, of course, of over-riding all his military advisers; but I do not think that the House of Commons will hold that, as a, rule, in such cases, he would be wise in doing so. What I did was to direct that, in the circumstances. General Colvile should be communicated with quietly and should be given an opportunity of resigning. The hon. Member said that was compulsory resignation. It may have been; but it would have proceeded from General Colvile himself; and it would not have been necessary to call public attention to it. If General Colvile had intimated his desire to resign his command at Gibraltar, no further notice of any kind would have been taken.

*MR. CHARLES DOUGLAS

My point is that that is not voluntary which one is compelled to do.

*MR. BRODRICK

The question is whether a public stigma would have been put upon General Colvile. That is what I wished to avoid. After that General Colvile's action cannot be defended by anyone. He left for England. He did not avail himself of his right of appeal to the Commander-in-Chief. He made no representation to the War Office. He immediately published what he called a justification, but which consisted rather of an attack upon the staff officers in the Transvaal; and which also included, I regret to say, what appeared to be some ungenerous sneers against the cavalry whom he had found it impossible to relieve. And obviously it is impossible that officers, whether on the Full-pay List or the Half-pay List, should be allowed to make reflections on their superiors as General Colvile did. He was placed on retired pay, and any officer who follows his example will necessarily share the same fate.

I will just say distinctly what is Lord Roberts's opinion with regard to General Colvile's position. I will say, first, that Lord Wolseley by no means exonerated I him when he allowed him to go back to Gibraltar. On the contrary, he stated his view in regard to Sauna's Post, that whether he could have captured the guns or not he ought to have tried. Lord Roberts stated that, in his opinion, on two occasions in the field General Colvile had shown a want of forwardness, of enterprise, and of sound judgment which are essential qualifications for a command. He considered that in twice leaving a body of cavalry in difficulties he set an example which, if followed, would be fatal to an army in the field. Other circumstances had come to Lord Roberts's notice in which General Colvile's relations with his subordinates and the absence of sufficient control and supervision in his command, were such as to seriously impair the confidence which troops should have in their leaders. I make that statement by Lord Roberts's desire. Under these conditions Lord Roberts felt that the retention of General Colvile in his command at Gibraltar, being in principle indefensible, would have a prejudicial effect on the army in South Africa, and, in agreeing that he should not be retained in command, Lord Roberts considered that even then he would be dealt with much more leniently than would have been the case had he been brought to a court-martial for his conduct at Sanna's Post and Lindley. I am myself strongly in favour, where possible, of bringing an officer to a court-martial; but I am not at all convinced that, if this House does not accept the views of Lord Roberts, Sir Evelyn Wood, Lord Kitchener, and other officers of that character, it will more readily accept the views of officers of less distinction who may preside over the court-martial.

I would like to say one word as to my own action in the matter. I have had to remove a considerable number of officers on different grounds. Those officers mostly have no high connections, no powerful friends, no access to the press, but their career is every bit as important to them, and the tragedy of the loss of their position is every bit as great as that of the highest placed officer in the Army. In this case there is no private pressure which could be exerted upon me which has not been exerted. There is no degree of false statement in the press which has not been made in certain organs; there has been a continuous stream of attempts to influence, corruptly as I consider, the judgment of those who Mere forced to come to a decision against a general who had this distinction only as compared with other officers—that he had occupied the unique position of commanding the Brigade of Guards. I am willing to take any odium on myself in such matters, but I will not give way to this sort of clamour. I will not accept the view that because a man has powerful friends he is to be retained in a command for which nearly every man who served in South Africa, knowing that he had been sent home for incapacity in the field, considered him unfit. To that I will stand, whether I am attacked or applauded, whether I am criticised or encouraged, whether I am followed or not followed. So long as I hold the position I now hold these things shall not be done with impunity. Lord Roberts has received every distinction that a man can receive from a grateful Sovereign and from his fellow-countrymen, but all those decorations that have been so fitly worn and all those high titles so nobly won would be as travesty and tinsel if they are not to be accompanied by the confidence of his fellow-countrymen with respect to his decision as to comrades with whom he has served in the profession to which he has given his life. It is for that reason that I earnestly beg the House to put confidence in the Government in these matters.

I hope the hon. Member will not think it necessary to divide on this motion. I should regret the acceptance of it more than any motion that could be put before the House at this moment. I ask the House to have some confidence in the Commander-in-Chief, and not to open the door more widely to proposals of this character, and to remember that if these decisions are to be made the subject of continued discussion in this House, they must militate against the discipline of the Army, and are, not likely to add to the credit of the House of Commons.

It being midnight, the debate stood adjourned.

Debate to be resumed to-morrow.