HC Deb 15 August 1901 vol 99 cc978-1051
*SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT (Monmouthshire, W.)

We have arrived at this, nearly the very last stage of the session, and have a right to demand from His Majesty's Government a statement in a distinct and official manner as to the position in regard to the unhappy war which has now been waged for nearly two years. Of that we have received at the end of the two successive sessions different accounts. In July or August, 1899, we received from the Government the most hopeful representation in reference to the anticipations of war. We were then assured confidently that there was a great probability that war would be avoided, but that view of the case has unfortunately turned out to be entirely unfounded. What was the account the Government gave us at the end of the session of 1900? They told us that the war was all but over, and that within a very few weeks of that time the Commander-in-Chief in South Africa would return to England. Upon that the Government appealed to the country, as the authors of a successful war which had come to an end. That was the next stage of the announcements we have received. But no sooner was the Election over than we were told that great reinforcements were necessary for this war, which had practically come to an end, and since that time, for some ten months, the war has been going on with varying fortunes, sometimes with apparent success, sometimes with apparent failure. We get from time to time in the newspapers certain scraps of information, but no connected account of what the course of the war is. We get short telegrams, naturally from the British side, from Lord Kitchener, but on the other side we get no accounts at all. What we want to know, however, is what is the situation of both the belligerent parties. I presume the Com- mander-in-Chief in South Africa has formed some opinion as to what is the condition of the enemy to which he is opposed; I suppose he has given full information to the Government, and that they have formed some judgment as to what are the prospects of the war and what is its actual condition.

At present we do not even know how many men we have engaged there, we do not know what is the conjecture on the part even of the Commander-in-Chief and High Commissioner as to the forces to which we are opposed. All that we know is that we have an enormous force in the Transvaal, the Orange Free State, in Natal, and in Cape Colony, and that they are still liable from time to time to be occupied and attacked by the enemy. We read of blockhouses being taken, of engagements sometimes adverse to our own forces, we know that large numbers of men have been killed, and wounded, and lost through disease, and we know also that we are spending about £5,000,000 a month on the war which at the end of last session was declared to be at an end. All these are circumstances on which we are entitled to some fuller information than we have yet received, and we ought not at the conclusion of this session, when Parliament can no longer have any means of obtaining knowledge or any control of the matter, to go away without having some more definite account of the condition of the war and its prospects than we have yet received. That is the demand which we ought to press, and all the more because we are apparently in the presence of a new policy. For, unless we are mistaken in all the reports that have reached us through the press, the hope of victory by military operations seems to have been given up in despair, and we are to enter upon a new policy. I hope it is not the policy which the Colonial Secretary the other day dealt with, a most dangerous policy, I thought—I mean the policy of employing savage races and native forces. I do not know that the right hon. Gentleman indicated that that was the policy of the Government in South Africa; I hope not, but he made a sort of general defence, as I understood, of the employment of savages in warfare. A greater crime than warfare of that description it is impossible to describe. Of all that is recorded against this country in the unhappy war with the people of America at the end of the eighteenth century none left such a stain upon the British name as that. I hope, if there is any question of employing savages in warfare between white races such as that in which we are now engaged that the language of Lord Chatham will be remembered. He said— My Lords, who is the man that, in addition to these disgraces and mischiefs to our Army, has dared to authorise, and to associate with our arms, the tomahawk and sealping-knife of the savage, to call into civilised alliance the wild and inhuman savage of the woods, to delegate to the merciless Indian the defence of disputed rights, and to wage the horrors of his barbarous war against our brethren? My Lords, these enormities cry aloud to us to redress and avenge them. Unless thoroughly done away with it will be a stain on the national character; it is a violation of the Constitution; I believe it is against law. I do not wish to be understood as charging or even suggesting that this is the policy which the Government contemplate. But it is perfectly certain that in the press of this country it has been and is advocated. Language was used not many days ago by the Colonial Secretary to the effect that he saw no reason why native races should not be employed for this purpose, which, I hope, will be entirely disavowed. I trust that any suggestion of the kind will be absolutely repudiated. But there is a policy which we know is being adopted—the policy of proclamation, and it is apparently the one which is to take the place of military operations, which according to all accounts have not been largely successful recently in South Africa. What is the object of reverting to this policy of proclamation, which has not been a happy chapter in this war? We have had forty-one of these proclamations, many of them illegal, all of them futile, and most of them so impolitic that, even if they were legal, they had to be withdrawn. One of the early proclamations was that— all the inhabitants of the Orange River Colony after 14 days who shall be found in arms shall be liable to be dealt with as rebels and to suffer in person and property accordingly. That was to be a sort of closure of the war—on a particular date the guillotine was to descend. It was a declaration inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the laws and customs of war. In June, 1900, you declared that every man found in arms was a rebel, and as such was liable to the death penalty. Almost immediately after that proclamation was issued it had to be withdrawn, and another proclamation was issued— that the burghers of the Orange State who were attached to some commando prior to the annexation, and who had been continually in arms against Her Majesty's Government since, should be regarded as prisoners of war. They always were prisoners of war and not rebels at all, and therefore that proclamation had to be set aside. Then there was the farm-burning proclamation—the houses and farms in the vicinity of the place where the damage was done were to be destroyed, and the residents in the neighbourhood dealt with under martial law. That was practically revoked by the Order of November 18th. Another proclamation stated that all burghers who had not taken the oath in districts occupied by His Majesty's forces should be regarded as prisoners of war. Men who had never taken arms at all were to be regarded as prisoners of war. That was the most astounding statement, I suppose, ever put into any proclamation. The proclamation further stated— that all buildings and structures in which scouts or other forces of the enemy are harboured would be liable to be razed to the ground. That is apart from the farm-burning proclamation. That means probably the whole of the houses of the Dutch population in these countries. All these proclamations came to nothing at all—there was not even an attempt to put them into operation. It was found to be impossible either in law or policy to defend them; it was shown what a very unwise thing it is in carrying on a contest of this kind to issue such bruta fulmina, which those who issued them did not attempt to enforce, and to which those against whom they were issued paid no attention. That is the history practically of your forty-one proclamations.

Then you perceived that the only thing to do was to betake yourselves, in order to terminate the war, to those military operations which have been con- Ducted undoubtedly with great skill and effect by Lord Kitchener. But now we are reverting again to the policy of proclamation, and we wish that the Government should give us some reason for going back to a course of proceedings which in the past has proved neither creditable nor effective. We have now had a new proclamation. The scope of it is to deprive, on a particular date, those who continue resistance of the rights which belong to belligerents. We have to ask ourselves and to ask the Government whether or not the condition of the contest justifies such action. If a man who has belligerent rights is captured in war, you cannot banish him. As soon as peace is effected you must return him to his own country, just as he was before. Therefore, this proclamation can only be defended on the ground that you have the right to deprive these men of the privileges belonging to them as lawful belligerents, and if there does not exist a condition of things to justify such action; the proclamation is not justifiable. The question of belligerent rights is of the gravest international importance. It is not a mere matter between you and the Boers in South Africa alone. It affects the whole of what I may call the morale of war. There has been in successive centuries and generations a code which has been gradually adopted to mitigate the ferocity of war, and which gives to those engaged in war certain rights, and which secures them when beaten or captured certain forms of protection which are known under the name of belligerent rights. Therefore this is a matter not to be lightly dealt with. It is a matter upon which there has been the most careful and anxious consideration in recent years. It has been debated by the highest authorities with the greatest ability. The Government of Russia invited the Powers to meet in 1874 and 1875 to draw up a code of the rules and customs of war. Anybody who wishes really to get to the bottom of this matter should read the account in the Blue-book containing the whole of the discussions and proposals that were made and the manner in which they were treated by the Powers of Europe, who were represented at that conference. Russia propounded certain articles upon the subject; and it very early became apparent in the discussion of these articles at the Con- ference of the Powers that the views entertained by great military Powers, like Russia, Germany, and, more or less, France, were entirely adverse to the views held by the smaller and weaker Powers, who had not the same great armies and organisation as were possessed by such Powers as Russia and Germany, and the consequence was that there arose a very great conflict of opinion in that conference. I cannot weary the House by going into the details at any length, though I think that they are matters of very great importance. But there are some things which I cannot leave unmentioned, impressed as I am with the enormous importance of the question of belligerent rights, which are called in question by this proclamation. As I said just now, the smaller and weaker Powers were opposed to the form of the resolutions which were put forward by the Russian Government. They felt that they were entirely on the side of great battalions, and that the smaller Powers, such as Switzerland, Portugal, Spain, Belgium, and Holland, who had not great armies, would be unjustly oppressed if they were adopted. Let me give an example of one of these rules which is very much to the purpose in the matter involved in this proclamation. One of the proposals was materially altered in the conference in consequence of the opposition of these Powers. The original proposal of the Russian Government ran— Individuals belonging to the population of a country in which the enemy's power is already established who shall rise in arms against them may be handed over to justice, and are not to be regarded as prisoners of war. In my opinion that is exactly the situation which is contemplated by the recent proclamation. That proposal was rejected by the conference, and the following was substituted in its place— The population of a locality which is not yet occupied by the enemy and which takes up arms for the defence of its country is to be considered as belligerent, and if it is made prisoner is to be treated as prisoner of war. That was a vindication of the rights of the weaker independent Powers, who remonstrated against the original pro posal. The representative of Switzer land speaking for a country which had fought in vindication of its liberty—

MR. A. J. BALFOUR

What date is it?

*SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

This is 1874. The representative of Switzerland pointed out how the entire population of his country rose to defend their independence. He said— that if the history of Switzerland be referred to, it will be seen that the entire population of valleys, unorganised and under no chief, rose en masse. That is a patriotic sentiment which cannot be forbidden. The men who defend their country are not brigands. The Swiss would revolt at such a hypothesis. That was the position taken up by what I may call the small, free, independent countries who have not at their disposal great battalions. There were other modifications in the proposals of Russia. One which was very important describes the rights of belligerents to be enjoyed, not only by the Regular Army, but by the Militia and Volunteers. I ask the attention of the House to the definition of the rights of men who do not belong to the Regular Army, and to the conditions which they must fulfil in order to enjoy and maintain belligerent rights. The first condition was that these independent bodies should have at their head someone responsible for his subordinates. It was proposed that they should at the same time be subject to orders from head quarters. That last sentence was struck out because it held to be sufficient if those independent bodies, not acting under authority from any single head, but acting under persons responsible for their subordinates, such as the mayor of a town or other reputable person. Other conditions were that they should have some distinguishing badge, recognisable at a distance; that they should carry arms openly; and that in their operations they should conform to the laws and customs of war. On the proposal of Russia it was agreed that armed bands not complying with these conditions were not to be regarded as possessing the rights of belligerents, and in case of capture were to be proceeded against judicially. The proposal of your proclamation is exactly the proposal which was struck out by the Russian Government in consequence of the general disapproval of it by the Powers of Europe. If you are to proceed against the men in arms in South Africa judicially, how can you banish them by proclamation? You are dealing with belligerents or you are not dealing with belligerents. If you are dealing with belligerents you have no right to banish them. If they are not belligerents you cannot by proclamation banish them. You must proceed against them by some law.

I should like to call the attention of the House to the despatch of Lord Derby, in the Government of Lord Beaconsfield, dated 20th January, 1875, declaring how the British Government meant to deal with these disputed questions as between the Great Powers and the smaller Powers. Lord Derby wrote— The careful consideration of the whole matter has convinced Her Majesty's Government that it is their duty firmly to repudiate on the part of Great Britain and her allies in any future war any proposals for altering the principles of international law upon which Her Majesty's Government has hitherto acted, and above all to be a party to any agreement the effect of which would be to facilitate aggressive wars and to paralyse the resistance of an invaded people. What characteristic is there which the history of this country displays and of which we are more proud than that under the Administration of Lord Palmerston and other Administrations the sympathies of this country have been with the weaker side? In the struggles of Italy, in the struggles of Belgium, in the struggle of the Poles and of Hungary, the feelings and sympathies of this country have been with the weaker side. Now, Sir, I come to the conference at The Hague. There among other questions were considered the laws and customs of war in a revised shape, founded on the original Russian proposals, and there, with considerable modifications, they received a certain assent. I am happy to say that the British representative, Sir John Ardagh, speaking in the same language and acting in the same direction as Lord Derby, proposed— That nothing should be considered as tending to diminish the rights which belong to the population of an invaded country to oppose the most energetic resistance to the invader by every legitimate means. That proposal was not included in the protocol, because there was a general opinion that that was a sentiment of which all the Powers approved. As a Government we did not become parties to the convention, but what was agreed upon by most of the Powers was this, that the rights and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to Militia and Volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions—namely, that they are commanded by a person responsible for their conduct, that they have a fixed distinction recognisable at a distance. that they carry arms openly, and conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and usages of war. That is the effect of the amended resolution which came out of the conference, and that was followed by a second article, which included the population of a territory which has not been occupied who on the enemy's approach have taken up arms to resist and repel the invading troops without having had time to organise themselves according to Article 1.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (Mr. J. CHAMBERLAIN, Birmingham, W.)

What about occupation?

*SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

I am coming to occupation directly, and there the question comes more nearly home. The question is, "What is the occupation which decides the rights as belligerents of the other side?" Now, Sir, I wish to call attention to the "Manual of Military Law," published in 1899 as instructions to Her Majesty's officers and men. There military occupation is most accurately defined. Here we find what military occupation on the part of an invader is— An invader is stated to be in military occupation of such part of a country as is wholly abandoned by the forces of the enemy. Can you predicate that of any part of South Africa at the present moment? It goes on— The occupation must be real and not nominal. A paper occupation is infinitely more objectionable in its character and effects than a paper blockade. A paper blockade is a partial blockade of a portion of a coast when you cannot blockade the whole. The manual goes on to state that— The true test of military occupation is exclusive possession. Have you at this moment exclusive possession of the Transvaal or the Orange River Colony? I may, indeed, ask the same question even of Cape Colony.— For example"— proceeds the manual— the reduction of a fortress which dominates the surrounding country gives military possession of the dominated country, but not of any other fortress which hag not submitted. Is that a description you can apply to the occupation of these provinces? Then we are told that— Military occupation ceases as soon as the forces of the invader retreat or advance in such a manner as to loosen their hold on the occupied territory. Therefore, there clearly can only be military occupation of territory where your military forces are operating for the time, and any part which your military forces do not effectively occupy at the time is not in your occupation, and until you have made your occupation effective over every part of an enemy's territory you cannot assert that you are entitled to deny belligerent rights to those to whom you are opposed. You cannot treat the inhabitants as rebels, and until peace is concluded or you have a complete and effective military occupation of the whole territory your proclamation of annexation is nothing but a paper annexation. So much for occupation. What does this British manual say with regard to the character that the men in arms against you must possess in order to exercise and enjoy belligerent rights? It says that the first duty of a citizen is to defend his country, but this defence must be conducted according to the usages and customs of war. It then states the rules which apply to countries which have regular armies and regular organisations, and proceeds to say that— No rule can be laid down which is not subject to great exceptions. For example, the usages and customs of war do not justify a commander in putting to death or even punishing the inhabitants of a town after the attack has ceased on the ground that they fought against him without uniform or distinctive mark as all the inhabitants of a town may be considered as legitimate enemies until the town is taken. Similarly a population which rises en masse in a country not occupied by the enemy are entitled to be treated as prisoners of war, and not as marauders. These are the rules with regard to occupation. Unless the country is occupied totally and in every part in the military and exclusive sense, you are not entitled to treat as marauders the men still in arms in defence of their own country. Then, again, it is stated in this manual that— Where the regular government of a country has been overthrown by civil tumult the absence of a recognised Government having the power to make peace would not in itself disentitle organised bodies of men, clearly distinguishable as foes, fighting in accordance with the customs of war to be treated when captured as prisoners of war. Nothing can be more clear than these instructions, which are printed and published for the instruction of the British Army, and I cannot help thinking that it is for that reason that this proclamation was not recommended by Lord Kitchener. How did this pro- clamation originate? It is not the proclamation of the High Commissioner or of the Commander-in-Chief in the field. It is not a proclamation which suggested itself to His Majesty's Government. I venture to affirm that this proclamation, which is an entire innovation in the laws and customs of war, is an emanation from the brains of the Ministers of Natal. We have not the smallest indication that His Majesty's Government suggested it or that Lord Kitchener was consulted by them on the matter. It comes from Natal. It is founded not upon the fact that the war is over, but upon the statement of the Ministers of Natal on 25th July, 1901. They said— There is a protracted continuance of hostilities. The colony is still subjected to the censorship and to martial law. and then they proceed to recommend, first of all, that the cost of the maintenance of all women and children should be chargeable against the immovable property of burghers in the field, and that the leaders should be informed that unless they and their commandoes surrendered by a date specified they would be banished from South Africa for life. That is the idea which sprung out of the heads of the Ministers of Natal. They sent it home. We have no account of any opinion given upon it by Lord Kitchener, and I should be glad to hear from the right hon. Gentleman whether the idea was communicated to Lord Kitchener before the proclamation was drawn up; and, if so, whether he will give the House Lord Kitchener's opinion on it; for I find that within five days the proclamation was drafted on the scheme of the Ministers of Natal and sent out to Lord Kitchener with directions to him to publish it. And in such a hurry was it drawn that those at home had not taken time to ascertain the facts. When it was necessary to consider the preamble, to show how complete is their occupation, they said His Majesty's Government is in complete possession of the Treasury of the Boers. Of course everybody knows that they never were in possession of the Treasury, and a week afterwards they found this out, and telegraphed out to correct that by striking the word "Treasury" out of the proclamation. Then it was necessary to telegraph out to correct the grammar of the proclamation. This is the character of the proclamation which endeavours to lay upon an elaborate preamble the foundation for what I say is a denial of belligerent rights to the Boers who are still remaining in arms. They say they are in complete possession of the seat of government of both the aforesaid Republics—that is true—of the Treasury—that is not true—of their public offices and machinery of administration, as well as the principal towns and the whole of the railway line. But that is only a partial, and a very partial, occupation. I would venture to say, if the accounts one reads in the newspapers are true, that these countries are not in complete and effective military occupation at all, and that in future they will be less militarily occupied than before. I think we have a right to know what is the expectation and the policy of the Government in this matter. We are told by people who pretend to know—I have seen a confident statement in the press—that Lord Kitchener is to return on a definite date, and that a very large number of troops are to be brought home. We ought to know whether that is true or not. If, out of these 200,000 men, a large number of men are to be withdrawn, and if the present Commander-in-Chief is to leave, as the last one did, on the assumption that the war is practically over, we ought to be informed of that change of policy. But what I call attention to is this—that the preamble of this proclamation lays no foundation whatever for the penalties which it professes to impose. It proceeds to say that— the burghers are devoid of regular military organisation, and are therefore unable to carry-on regular warfare, or to offer organised resistance. What do you mean by organised resistance? So far as we know, these commandos that still exist in these countries fulfil the conditions that I have read—either those proposed at Brussels or those agreed to at The Hague, or those defined in the Manual of Instructions. "They are not under the command of responsible men." They are under the command of De Wet, Botha, Delarey, and many others, and are therefore under the command of responsible persons, although they may not be acting from any single centre. Therefore this allegation is not, in my judgment, an allegation upon which to establish the authority which enables you to deny to these men, when you have conquered and captured them in war, belligerent rights. It proceeds— And whereas it is just to proceed against those still resisting, and especially against those persons who, being in possession of authority, are responsible for the continuance of the present state of lawlessness, and are instigating their fellow-burghers to continue their hostilities. The allegation apparently is that these men are marauders, that they are not acting under authority, and that there is nobody who is responsible for their actions. But your own proclamation denies that; it points out that they are persons acting under the guidance of persons in authority, that there are persons in authority who are still conducting this conflict. These are the persons against whom your penalties are directed—"Commandants, field-cornets, and leaders of armed bands." It is proved in your own proclamation that these are organised bodies within the definition I have read to you, which recognises that they are entitled to belligerent rights. A body is organised whether it consists of 10,000 or 100 men, so long as they are acting according to the rules and customs of war and under the leadership of responsible men, and you have laid no foundation for the proceedings for which this proclamation is issued.

Let me ask here what it is you expect to gain by these penalties which you proclaim in this document? You say that these leaders are to be banished. Again, I must ask, how do you propose to banish them—under what authority and in what capacity? If they are prisoners of war who have been captured while fighting for the defence of their own country there is no authority left to you at all—they are entitled to return to their own country. If you choose to keep these countries under martial law you may expel them and do what you like with them. Is that your scheme? Are you going to keep these countries, when the war is over, under martial law in order that you may Danish these men who are respected and regarded by their fellow-countrymen? You cannot banish them except by some process of law. Are you going to indict them for treason? Conceive an indictment against General Botha for treason for breach of his allegiance to the British Crown. It is absurd on the face of it. There is no authority for doing such a thing at all. You might as well induct ex-President Kruger as a British subject and a rebel. That is what I call a paper occupation, and a mere paper annexation does not make traitors of all these men who were in arms, who are in arms, and have been in arms ever since the annexation. In the case of Lord Durham there was an attempt—it absolutely failed—to establish a right to banish men who unquestionably were rebels without legal proceedings and without legal indictment. Is that the proceeding you are going to take against the leaders—Botha, De Wet, Delarey? But against the other men—the common herd—you are going to invent a most extraordinary proceeding. However it entered into the heads of the Ministers of Natal to adopt such a policy I cannot conceive. It amounts to a bill for board and lodging against the men whom you capture in war for taking care of their wives and families whom you have carried off against their will. If ever there was a case of nec cauponantes bellum, sed belligerantes it is this, and certainly it would have encouraged Napoleon, if he were alive, to level against us the taunt, "a nation of shopkeepers." In what capacity are you going to charge them? If, as I contend, these men are entitled to belligerent rights, you cannot charge them for your board and lodging at St. Helena and Ceylon. Why should you charge them for keeping their wives and families in prison for your own convenience or their protection in camps of concentration? It seems to me to be an utterly unreasonable proposal, and one which is impolitic and unwise in the highest degree. It is said the war is coming to a condition in which you may treat it as no war at all. Is that true? Just test it in one way. The refugees at the Cape are extremely anxious to return to Johannesburg and Pretoria; they cannot be allowed to go back because you cannot ensure them sufficient food, for the whole of the railways, which you say you are in possession of, are required for carrying supplies for your own army. That is a very partial occupation. We are told that the country is being scoured. It is being scoured at a particular part, but the moment you march your troops away that part is reoccupied by the enemy. I have come to the conclusion that there is no military feature in the situation which justifies the refusal of the rights of war to the Boers now in arms. I believe every man in this House and country believes this war should be brought to the earliest possible conclusion, and if I thought this proclamation would have any effect in that direction I should look at it with very different eyes. But I do not believe anything of the kind. I believe the proclamation will irritate without being effectual, that it will not frighten into submission the men against whom it is directed. It is founded upon principles which, I believe, are not consistent with the laws and customs of war as they have been understood in modern times and by civilised nations. It will exasperate your opponents without helping you to subdue them. It will have the effect, I am quite sure, abroad of leading to still greater exasperation of feeling against this country if they can bring against us the charge that, in order to overpower these people, we have resorted to methods which do not belong to legitimate warfare. For these reasons I hope this proclamation may be allowed to sink into abeyance, and that we shall hear no more of it for the future.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

I have listened to the speech which has been delivered by the right hon. Gentleman, but I confess that at its close I am quite unable to conceive what could have been his object in making it at this period. I can judge of its effect, but I hannot understand what view the right con. Gentleman took of the advantage of such a disquisition. The right hon. Gentleman has endeavoured to show that the action of His Majesty's Government is absurd, impracticable, illegal, futile, illegitimate, contrary to the practices of civilised warfare, contrary to the declarations of other civilised States, and, of course, to the extent to which he is successful he does undoubtedly weaken the hands of His Majesty's Government, and he does provoke and confirm that prejudice which already exists in the minds of foreign nations with regard to our proceedings. I quite understand the position of the right hon. Gentleman, that this war was an unjust war into which we ought never to have entered, but I do not understand why, under those circumstances, when he says his one desire is to see it brought to a peaceful conclusion, he is continually interposing and intervening with language and arguments which, if they mean anything and have any effect at all, will certainly have a tendency to prolong the war. The right hon. Gentleman has demanded a statement with regard to the military situation. He seems to have forgotten that only a few days ago a similar and very natural request was made to me by the Leader of the Opposition, and that I then gave to the House all the information it was possible for me to give. If the right hon. Gentleman wants to induce me to make again prophecies such as, he says, we have made in the past and have invariably proved untrue, I decline altogether to be led to do so. It is quite true that the anticipations of everybody who has spoken with regard to this war have not been fulfilled as we should have wished them to be. Under those circumstances, I am not rash enough to indulge in further prophecies, but I stated no later than Friday week all we knew of the present position and the grounds for anticipating that it would be within the power of the Commander-in-Chief to send home a considerable number of troops at the termination of the winter campaign.

The right hon. Gentleman asked me with regard to a report or statement which, I believe, appears in the newspapers this morning to the effect that Lord Kitchener is coming home on September 15th. and that a large number of troops are also coming home with him. I have nothing to add to what I have said before with regard to the troops. With regard to Lord Kitchener, the statement is absolutely without foundation. The right hon. Gentleman complains that we give so little information. I have explained previously that we give to the House everything we ourselves receive. To complain of those who furnish us with information would, I think, be extremely unfair, for when you come to consider the present state of hostilities in South Africa and the size of the country you will see that it is absolutely impos- sible to give a connected account of a series of isolated skirmishes and continuous pursuit by our troops of ever-evading Boer commandos. The general result is sufficiently clearly stated in the weekly returns that are made of the net consequence of the operations which are being pursued. Last week Lord Kitchener was able to announce that the efforts of his force had been more successful than in any previous week, though that was not anticipated, because, as I pointed out on a previous occasion, we had already taken so many prisoners that it was to be expected that the number captured each week would gradually lessen. I shall come later to what, in my opinion, has had that very satisfactory effect.

Then the right hon. Gentleman went on to speak about a new policy which had been adopted, and he indicated that the policy was somehow or other connected with the employment of natives. Nothing of that kind has been said from this bench. I stated distinctly on a previous occasion that the policy of His Majesty's Government was the policy which they have declared from the first—not to employ native troops for offensive purposes in this war—and the reason, of course, is on the surface; I need not repeat it. Then the right hon. Gentleman went on to denounce a statement which I had made with regard to our perfect freedom to employ natives in any future war, and he talked about the days of Chatham and the employment of Indians in the war with America. It is quite true that Chatham denounced, perhaps on good grounds, the employment of Indians in the American War, but certainly, if I am to pay attention to that example. I should be rather careful of what I said of the employment of natives, lest, like Chatham, I should find myself a few years afterwards employing them in a war, as was done in the case of the Seven Years War and when we were fighting the French in Canada.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

The American War was after the Seven Years War.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

That is perfectly true; my history is at fault. It is perfectly certain that the employment of Indians by civilised Government was common on both sides in those days. What I was going to say was this. The employment of natives then was on a scale and under conditions which certainly no civilised nation would for a moment consent to at the present time. The Indians were employed under their own chiefs; they exercised all their own barbarous customs, and they were properly described by the right hon. Gentleman as savages. But the right hon. Gentleman would not, I imagine, for one moment apply the description to our Indian troops.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

I did not say they were.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

We have had Indian troops in China; we have had Indian troops side by side with the troops of four or five civilised nations, and let me say they did not prove themselves the least inferior to the troops of those civilised nations.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

I did not say they were.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

Under these circumstances, why does the right hon. Gentleman complain of my statement that we consider our hands to be free in any future war, whether with a civilised nation or not, to employ native troops, if we can employ them under conditions in which we are certain that they are under civilised control? That is the statement I made on a previous occasion, and I adhere to it. I am not going to be frightened from it by the denunciations, on insufficient grounds, of the right hon. Gentleman. These after all were only hors-d' æuvre. The long speech of the right hon. Gentleman was devoted almost entirely to the proclamation which has just been issued. With regard to that proclamation, he began by alluding to his own satisfaction that we had issued a number of other proclamations, all of which had been absolutely futile. I deny absolutely that those proclamations have been futile, or that any of them have been futile, or that there is a single one of them which cannot be said to have produced, at all events to some extent, the effect which it was desired to produce. The best answer that I can give to the right hon. Gentleman consists in this. At the present time we have as prisoners or as surrendered more than 35,000 of the enemy in our hands. I attribute, I must say, a good number of those captures, and still more of those surrenders, to the effect of those proclamations which the right hon. Gentleman, on very insufficient evidence, declares to have been entirely futile.

Then he says this proclamation deprives, the enemy of the rights of belligerents. It does nothing of the kind. Does the right hon. Gentleman mean to lay down, as a result of all this reading of books on military law and the proceedings of conferences in Belgium and at The Hague that if you go to war with a country and conquer that country you have no power to prevent the return there of anybody you please—that it is a belligerent right of everybody who has fought against you to return to that country? The proposition is perjectly absurd. In this case these colonies—the Transvaal and the Orange River Colonies—are part of His Majesty's dominions. We have a right to make a law in those colonies, as we have a right to make a law here if we choose to banish, to expel from the country any persons whose presence there we may consider to be undesirable, and all we have done by the proclamation is to warn certain persons that if they do not surrender by 15th September those proceedings will be taken against them. We shall prohibit their return and they will be expelled from South Africa. The right hon. Gentleman asked what was the origin of the proclamation. He says it was not a proclamation suggested to us by Lord Kitchener or Lord Milner, or a proclamation which entered into our own brain, but was the product of the ingenuity of the Ministers of Natal. It that had been true I should not have thought the worse of it on that account. At any rate the Ministers of Natal have a right to be heard in this matter. Their interests in it are more direct than those of the right hon. Gentleman, and they are most likely to know the means which are best to conduce to the peace which he and they desire.

The right hon. Gentleman is not of course aware of all the circumstances of the case, and perhaps it would be satisfactory to him if I state that the right hon. Gentleman is apparently mistaken in what he imagines has taken place. This proclamation, with one exception, was in print and approved by the Cabinet before we received the suggestion of the Ministers of Natal. Therefore, although that is the first document which appears in the papers, it is only printed as showing the feeling of the colonies on the subject. But it does happen that the suggestion arose almost contemporaneously in the minds of the Ministers of Natal and the Government. I say with one exception, which is a new one made by the Ministers in Natal, that the cost of keeping the women and children in the camps should be made a charge on the burghers. I think the suggestion went further than the one we adopted, because it seemed to be that the charge should be on the whole of the burghers still in the field, whereas we have put it as a charge only on those to whom the families belong. The right hon. Gentleman is pleased to be humorous at the expense of this suggestion which we have now adopted, and for which we are Sully responsible. I confess I do not share his view. The principal object of this proclamation is to bring about the termination of the war and the surrender of those still in the field. One cause of the prolongation of the war is the fact that the burghers may continue to make war with little risk to themselves and no risk whatever to their families. We are taking care of their families and providing for them in a much better way than they were ever provided for before, and meanwhile their husbands and brothers are in the field fighting against us, certain that no loss whatever will result to them. If we can by some small penalty bring home to them that they cannot continue this without some pecuniary loss, I think we shall have done a very important thing. I will say incidentally that the statement of the right hon. Gentleman that these people in the camps are practically our prisoners is not strictly accurate. It is true there is a certain amount of supervision over them, but that supervision is so loose that I am informed by good authority that there would be no difficulty in their escaping if they really had any desire to do so. They do not complain, but such complaints as we hear are made for them and not by them. I have authority for the statement that those Boers who are confined, with a few exceptions, express themselves upon all occasions to those who visit them as satisfied that everything has been done that can be done to treat them fairly under the circumstances.

I come back again to the legal views of the right hon. Gentleman with regard to belligerent rights. I have explained that that is entirely irrelevant to the proposal to banish certain persons as being undesirable inhabitants of our territory. We are only dealing with countries which we have made our own by conquest, and in which we have a right to make whatever laws we please, and if we make a law to expel certain persons from the country because we consider them undesirable, we have a right to do so. It has been done again and again by civilised Powers. What was done by the Germans in Alsace-Lorraine? They gave an option to the French inhabitants to take the oath of allegiance or leave the country. A great many refused to take the oath, and were permanently exiled. What the Germans had a right to do we have an equal right to do in the case of the Orange River Colony and the Transvaal. But the right hon. Gentleman went much further than that. What we understand by the right of a belligerent is not a right to return to his country unless it remains under his Government, and not if it is annexed. What we understand by belligerent rights is that a belligerent's personal property will not be confiscated, and he will not be executed except for conduct contrary to the usages of war. So long as these people are entitled to belligerent rights, we shall interpret those rights as the right hon. Gentleman does. But he must admit there is a line between belligerents and these banditti guerillas, who are not entitled to belligerent rights.

There must come a point when that is the case. It has come in every war which was ever conducted. It came in the civil war in the United States, and in the Franco-German War. What was the action of the Germans with regard to the franc tireurs? It was to declare that they refused to recognise as belligerents men who were in arms against them, firing at their soldiers from comparatively safe positions, and next day were peaceful villagers working at their various industries. I do not say that position has yet arrived in the case of the South African colonies, but it may arise, and if it does we reserve to ourselves the rights exercised by other civilised nations under similar circumstances. Although it has not arrived, there have been unquestionably acts done by the bands now in the field against us which come at all events near to the dividing line which the right hon. Gentleman admits must one day be established between the two classes of fighting men. I noticed that all the passages which the right hon. Gentleman read out of military law (including quotations from a distinguished foreigner) on the subject state that one of the conditions which justifies a man in claiming belligerent rights is that he should have a distinguishing mark or badge. That the Boers have never had, although I do not attach much importance to that so long as they were moving in large bodies, but in no organised fashion. But if split up, as they are, into bands of two and three, sneaking in between our posts to commit acts of violence and outrage, and, as I say, of murder, it becomes of importance. If that sort of thing occurs we may have reached the dividing line contemplated evidently by the great authorities which the right hon. Gentleman quoted.

To whom of all the great nations of the world would he go if he wanted an example of honourable treatment of an honourable foe? I imagine he would go in the first instance to the United States. I am now going back to what the United States did in the civil war forty years ago. Everyone who knows anything about it and, as I have, talked to the principal actors in the war, knows that in what they believed to be the interests of humanity, and to bring the conflict to the earliest possible conclusion, they took steps against belligerents and persons not belligerents which exceeded in hardship anything we have done in this war. Talk of farm-burning! Farm-burning in South Africa was trivial to the devastation of an enormous tract of country by General Sherman in his march through Georgia. I have talked to General Sherman, and he justified it on the ground I have stated—that it was greater humanity to make the war intolerable, that it should be speedily brought to an end. I am not going into this great controversy. What happened in the case of the Philippines? I take it because it has many points of resemblance with the war in which we have been engaged. The Filippinos are spread over a large country which is extremely difficult, although for other reasons than the Transvaal, and after the first battles the Americans were never able to come across anything like an organised force, and the war degenerated into a guerilla war, which lasted a little over two years, and now, I hope, has been brought to a final conclusion. But in November, 1899, the year before the termination of the war. General McArthur wrote (and if anyone will substitute "South Africa" in this passage for the Philippines they will see the analogy)— The so-called Philippine Republic is destroyed. The colony is a desert. The President of the so-called Republic is a fugitive and all his Cabinet officers except one, who is in my hands. The Executive department is entirely broken up. The generals are separated without any power of conference or concerted action. The authority under which the army was brought into the field no longer exists. The army itself as an organisation has disappeared as a' consequence of these facts, which are now on historical record. Men who professed to lead small bodies for guerilla warfare must act without even a shadow of authority from the de facto Government, and the operations from this time onwards will be the result of individual whim. In other words, the men who now try to continue the strife by individual action simply become leaders of banditti. Then General McArthur recommended that a proclamation should be issued (he has a higher opinion of proclamations, than the right hon. Gentleman) offering amnesty to all who surrendered within the stated time on the payment of thirty pesetas, who gave up a rifle, accompanying it with the emphatic declaration that after the date fixed the killing of American soldiers would be regarded as murder, and all persons concerned therein would be treated as murderers.

MR. LLOYD-GEORGE (Carnarvon Boroughs)

Was this acted upon?

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

Yes. General McArthur was Commander-in-Chief.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

Is that your policy?

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

If this war degenerates into a war of banditti, if the actions are no longer the actions of belligerents, but the actions of individual brigands, yes, certainly. In doing so we shall be following the example of every civilised nation that has ever gone to war. Now the right hon. Gentleman asks in conclusion what we shall gain by the proclamation. It appears to me we cannot fail to gain by it; we must gain by it in one way or other. From what we know of the war, from reports nearly every prisoner has made to us, from correspondence published, and other correspondence which we can lay on the Table, all point to the fact that it is the action of the leaders of these men that is keeping these men in the field, and that the majority of them, at any rate, who are in the field would be glad if they could without sacrifice of pride come in. I think it is a very creditable feeling on their part. They are not, of course, except, perhaps, in a very few instances, compelled by violence to remain, but they do not like—and it is a very natural feeling—to be the first to surrender. It is the action of the late Transvaal Government, of Mr. Kruger and his friends in Holland, and the principal leaders of the Boer forces which is now continuing a war which they know, which they admit in every document passing between them which we have seen, is aimless and useless, except on the assumption that something may turn up to their advantage in the shape of foreign intervention or change of opinion in this country. They keep on the war solely, according to their own account, in the hope of foreign intervention or reaction here, and we know perfectly well how futile such expectations are. But, most unfortunately for the Boers, they are less educated as to the state of feeling here or on the Continent, and their leaders have deceived them over and over again, and a great part of their losses and the subsequent miseries they will suffer are due entirely to misapprehension of the situation. If we can bring home to these people that they personally will suffer by continuing longer in the field we may—and that is the greatest advantage we can hope for—we may so influence them as to bring about an immediate end of the war. That is worth trying. If we cannot influence a single leader it is still worth issuing a proclamation of this kind, which I hope will have a useful result But if it fails in that respect, at all events it will rid the Colony of men who have shown themselves by their action to be utterly irreconcilable, and who, if they remain, will be a continual source of difficulty. Any way you take it the proclamation must be a success; it will do good now by bringing the war to a close, or hereafter it will prevent a recrudescence of trouble.

*SIR CHARLES DILKE (Gloucestershire, Forest of Dean)

Of all the extraordinary coincidences which I have ever heard the coincidence which led the Government to advise the issuing of this proclamation is the most extraordinary. I cannot understand what the account given to us of the origin of this proclamation really is. Was it, as the Secretary of State for the Colonies says, already in print here before it was suggested to the Government of Natal?

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

Yes.

*SIR CHARLES DILKE

Then the right hon. Gentleman said there was a suggestion from the Government of Natal which was accepted.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

No. I said that with one exception, to which I referred, the proclamation had been approved by the Government of Natal. The section which we accepted from the Government of Natal was the provision in respect to charging burghers with the cost of the maintenance of their families.

*SIR CHARLES DILKE

I will not press the point of this extraordinary coincidence, but it does strike me as most extraordinary. The reply of the Colonial Secretary to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Monmouthshire does not strike me as answering the arguments which the right hon. Gentleman used. The Colonial Secretary instanced the case of Alsace as showing that you have the right to punish people who have been in arms against you. I wish to remind the right hon. Gentleman that there was no attempt in the case of Alsace to punish anybody until after there had been a treaty of peace conceding Alsace to the conquerors; and even then there was nothing in the nature of a real punishment, because what was done was to force people to adopt one or other nationality, and it was the indirect effect of the application of the military system that caused a virtual banishment. At all events the case of Alsace is no answer. What my right hon. friend argued very fully and fairly was that you have not at present a sufficient military occupation of these territories in South Africa to justify the issuing of a proclamation like this. Personally I am deeply concerned as to the military steps which have been taken by the Government, and I agree with my right hon. friend that there seems to be an attempt to substitute proclamations for victories in the field. It is upon this aspect of the military situation that I should like for a very few minutes to engage the attention of the House. Of course I do not know what is the belief in the mind of the Government as to the possibility of safely withdrawing from South Africa, as they propose, a very large proportion of the troops engaged there at present. My right hon. friend speaks of that as a suggestion, and he did not seem to think that it had been officially proclaimed as the policy of the Government; but when the Secretary of State for War had a difference of opinion a short time ago with a London newspaper, I understood him to say that one of the revelations of official secrets which that newspaper had made was the revelation of the intention of bringing home a very large proportion of the troops in South Africa.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

If the right hon. Baronet will refer to what I said on behalf of the Government, he will find I did not say a very large proportion. That I should understand to mean something more than half. There is no intention of doing anything of that kind.

*SIR CHARLES DILKE

I understood the Secretary of State for War to complain of that as the revelation of an official secret, and I want to know what military steps the Government are taking, whether or not they are adequate to the situation, and whether they make up for the weakening of the military policy by the withdrawal of the troops which has been referred to. I do not know whether there are peace negotiations on foot, although I have heard rumours to that effect.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

My right hon. friend is entitled to put a hypothesis, but if I do not intervene it may be taken to have some foundation in fact. There is no foundation for the rumour that peace negotiations of any kind are going on.

*SIR CHARLES DILKE

Then I want to know what is the military situation in Cape Colony at the present time. As regards the Transvaal and Orange River Colony the military situation has improved, but as regards Cape Colony I have good grounds for my statement that the military situation is less good than it was six months ago. I cannot but believe that the invasion of Cape Colony is bleeding South Africa to a degree almost inconceivable. It is the duty of the Government, and that is the feeling in the country, not to withdraw troops from South Africa without seeing that the character and quality of the troops remaining are such as to give probability of military success in Cape Colony. That I am unable to see. Is the military situation in the colony being met with the strenuous energy it requires? I believe it is not. Although the strength of the Boer forces in the late Transvaal Republic has considerably diminished lately, I do not believe that has been the case in Cape Colony. Letters from officers conducting military operations show the contrary. When the invasion took place in December mounted Boers traversed the Colony 500 miles in one direction, 450 miles in another, and almost reached the sea on both sides, and though it has been said that the invaders have been driven off, yet military operations continue in the districts reached by the Boers in December last.

In the Calvinia district and in the Willowmore district, both to the south and west of Cape Town, the Boers are still close to the sea, and away from the railways are controlling the administration of the greater part of Cape Colony. Our general officers commanding in the field are continually forced to send reinforcements and supplies to posts practically kept in a state of siege by the Boers, and this has been going on since December last. My contention is that the Government ought to have known all this beforehand. They ought to have realised in December last what the situation in Cape Colony was, and they ought to have made preparations which they did not make to meet that situation. They were asked to send a large force of mounted men. Lord Kitchener asked for a large force of mounted men, and of the men sent 20 per cent. were of excellent material but 80 per cent. were inferior to ordinary recruits, utterly untrained and unable to ride or shoot. Since they were sent they have been painfully taught, and are not yet efficient, and they have not efficient officers. If the Government are going to bring home a large proportion of infantry, what force are they going to keep in South Africa? If a large proportion of infantry is withdrawn from Cape Colony you will be leaving there an insufficient force of experienced and trained mounted men quite incapable of coping with the present military situation in Cape Colony. I say that the Government ought to have foreseen this situation. The Secretary of State for War in the last speech which he made upon the military situation in South Africa spoke of the present condition of things as guerilla warfare, and concluded his remarks almost with the exact words of that great authority on warfare, Clausewitz, who wrote, however, before the Mexican War, which was a guerilla war, in which the chances of the French were less satisfactory than ours in South Africa, because of the enormous population of Mexico as compared with the sparse population of South Africa. On the other hand, we have in South Africa an enormously greater force than the French ever led in Mexico—something like ten times as great—and the war in South Africa is of such a character that we cannot afford to treat it lightly. This guerilla warfare I do not believe can possibly be brought to an end by proclamation. It can only be done by warlike operations conducted by the most effective kind of military force. I should like to read a condensation of a translation of what was written by one of the greatest authorities on warfare, Clausewitz, in his immortal work in the "Armed Nation ' chapter of the book on "Defence," chapter 26, book vi. I quote these words because I say that the Government ought to have foreseen the nature of this war and ought to have made the only kind of preparation which can be effective against this kind of warfare— However small and weak a State may be, if it foregoes a last supreme effort there is no longer any soul left in it.…Suppose a surface exceeding in extent that of any country in Europe except Russia…the national character favourable, the country of a mountainous nature,…a poor population accustomed to hard work, …scattered dwellings. The principle of resistance exists everywhere, but is nowhere tangible. In such Armed peasants are not like a body of soldiers, who keep together like a herd of cattle and follow their noses. Armed peasants, on the contrary, when broken, disperse in all directions. The march of every small body of troops…becomes a service of a very dangerous character, for at any moment a combat may arise; if no armed bodies have even been seen for some time, yet these same peasants, driven off by the head of the column, may at any hour make their appearance in its rear…. There are no means to oppose to that action except detaching numerous parties to furnish escorts for convoys. They are overpowered at some points. Courage rises…. A people's war should be like a kind of nebulous vapoury essence, never condense into a solid body. That is a prophetic description of guerilla warfare quite different from that which had been seen in Spain, to some extent like that which the French had afterwards to face in Mexico, and exactly like that which we have to face in South Africa at the present time. I believe that in the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony the military situation has greatly improved, out in the Cape I am convinced that the situation is no better, and that you are not facing it with those military precautions which you ought to take. What are we told in all the letters we are constantly receiving from the officers who are conducting these military operations in the field? They say as regards the move- ments of our mounted forces that they are greatly hampered by seniority. Every regular army must be in such cases. Before our troops can follow a considerable force of the enemy any distance preparations have to be made for requiring the consent of the various general military officers throughout the military hierarchy. This delays rapid movement. We are unable to march without guns and wagons—ammunition, forage, staff, and ambulance wagons, and a number of dismounted men and other impedimenta, and the result is that the mounted columns now scouring the country start on terms of absolute inferiority from this point of view to the enemy who are entirely mounted men, with two or three horses each, and are entirely unencumbered by baggage and guns.

The French had to face the same problem under worse conditions in some respects in Mexico as we have to face in South Africa, because they had only at any time some 39,000 men, while the Mexicans were vastly more numerous than the Boers. On the other hand, they had to face the difficulty in some respects under more favourable conditions than exist for us in South Africa. Then, as to the mode in which they tried to face this difficulty in Mexico. The mode adopted by the French, although it failed in Mexico, was the only means by which guerilla operations of this kind can be brought to an end. Unless from your enormous force you can turn out a picked force of mounted men superior to your enemy you can never succeed in running them down. The mere presence of large numbers of troops in blockhouses and the concentration of troops on the lines of communication will never bring this war to an end. The columns which we have now in the field, taking the average of the men, are not superior to those of our enemy, and the only course you ought to take—and this is the opinion of those who are conducting the operations and who are actually commanding the columns in South Africa—is that you have got to do what the French did in Mexico, and what all the writers and teachers of military warfare say you ought to do, and that is to produce a picked body of men from your large army which will be superior to your opponents.

Just as in naval warfare you have to outnumber and watch your enemies' ships and follow them, so, in this war in South Africa, you will have to follow your enemy and run them down with a superior force. I think that before the session ends it is necessary that someone should state what is the common talk of every officer who is writing home to his relations and immediate friends. Your mounted columns are at present much below the average standard of the Boers, and they are very much hampered. The present condition of things in Cape Colony is very dangerous to the future of South Africa. You will never bring this war to an end by a policy of proclamation, and the only way possible is to get together a force which will be superior to that of the enemy.

*MR. MARKHAM (Nottinghamshire, Mansfield)

I did not join in the recent debates on South African affairs because I hold the opinion that the debates which have taken place in this House have tended to prolong the war in South Africa. We have now arrived at a stage in the war when I think it is necessary that the Government should earnestly consider the steps to be taken in order to prevent what has occurred in the past. I contend that there is no analogy whatever, as the Colonial Secretary seems to suppose, between Kaffirs and Indian troops. I have travelled on the Northwestern frontier, and how anyone can compare Indian troops with savages in Africa I know not. Speaking of the men now in the field against us, the Colonial Secretary said that their families were being provided for now in the concentration camps better than ever they were before in their lives. While on shooting expeditions I have lived in the houses of these Boers, and I should be sorry to have received from them the same scanty provisions which are dealt out to the Boers in the concentration camps. The Government had no right to establish concentration camps unless they were able to provide for those families. If through military exigencies it was necessary to concentrate, then there was an obligation to feed those families. You have no right to bring the families of the Boers into camps unless you are able to maintain them. You are now employing the natives—the men who have been the servants of the Boers. When a British column comes into a district these men are requisitioned as scouts by the British. They are either combatants or non-combatants, and it is idle to talk of their not being employed against the enemy if they are requisitioned as scouts. You have had to fight an enemy which, as a military Power, did not exist until 1896, when, on account of the invasion of their country, they became a military Power. We have to recollect that the Colonial Secretary has put before the House the argument that the Filippinos had received money from the American Government to lay down their arms It is true that in South Africa we have not seen, and I hope we never shall see, a similar case. I hope that the Boer leaders will not, as has been done in the Philippine Islands, betray their people for the sake of money. I think that was a very poor argument to put forward with respect to a brave people like the Boers. I do not wish to trespass at any great length on the time of the House, but I have some notes which I wish, with the indulgence of the House, to read. In this House a few months ago I heard a discussion between the Colonial Secretary and the Leader of the Opposition in regard to the term "pro-Boer." The Colonial Secretary had used the term pro-Boer, and the Leader of the Opposition replied that that was an offensive epithet. I do not hesitate to say that if the meaning of pro-Boer is detestation of the policy of His Majesty's Government, I am a pro-Boer. We are entitled to hold our views. We are always Englishmen first, whether our views be right or wrong. We all, according to our lights, do as we think best in the interest of our country, but that any man or set of men, because they do not hold the views of the majority, are, to be termed by offensive epithets, I think myself is a poor argument. I am satisfied with the epithet if it means that I am in thorough opposition to the policy of the Government in South Africa. In regard to this question I speak in the interest of peace, and though what I am about to say I know will not be accepted by hon. Members on the other side of the House, I do ask that they will listen to what I have to say for the reason that I have studied for a number of years, the South African question, and I claim to know as much on this subject as most Members of the House, who have not made a special study of the question. I first propose to read a passage from Edmund Burke, which I think is very applicable to the present situation. He said— The operations of the field suffered by the errors of the Cabinet. If the same spirit continues when peace is made, the peace will fix and perpetuate all the errors of the war, because it will be made upon the same false principle. What has been lost in the field may be regained. An anangement of peace in its nature is a permanent settlement; it is the effect of counsel and deliberation and not of fortuitous events The policy of the Government appears to be one of fighting this question out to the bitter end—till the last cartridge has been fired and the last of the enemy has surrendered, without any regard for the future of these two States. Sir, I honestly believe that if you adopt that policy you will lose South Africa altogether. As the policy of carrying on the war has been delegated by the Government to Lord Milner, and as peace or war rests chiefly with him, it is necessary for the House to carefully consider whether the past actions of Lord Milner warrant the Government in relieving themselves of the responsibilities which in my opinion must rest upon them. Could any Government take a more foolish or a more irritating step than to appoint Lord Milner as administrator of these two States? What good object can be attained by that appointment? You say that you are going to have a firm policy in South Africa—that you must have a policy that will show to these rebels that the States are to be governed with a strong hand. But is there not in the British Empire a man who could have carried on the government of these countries without causing distrust and irritation in that country? Lord Milner's policy has entailed terrible loss of life and suffering to the people of this country; it has entailed the devastation of those States; it has brought poverty and misery, and it will bring greater misery yet to the people of this country through the suicidal policy of spending money in the way in which it is now being wasted. In carrying on the war you have laid waste these lands by fire and sword, and it is the boast of the Government that it is their intention to carry on the war to a conclusion and to offer no terms of peace, which you are bound to accord to an honourable enemy. In doing this you are not following the usages of civilised warfare. When Lord Milner arrived in South Africa he had a difficult position to face. He was confronted with racial hatred—a hatred which will not die away so soon as some people think. The Jameson raid was an accomplished fact, and racial hatred had been fanned by this wicked and criminal action. I am sure that Lord Milner did act according to what he thought the interest of the country and the Empire, but in his actions he was guided by one party in the Cape whose object was not so much to benefit the people living in these countries as to benefit themselves. In this House we have seen the break-up of a strong Opposition—we have seen an Opposition which, except on the Irish benches, has ceased to be an Opposition—and I attribute that very largely to the part which, with the very best intentions no doubt, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Monmouthshire and the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition took in reference to the South Africa inquiry. I am sure that the arguments brought forward by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Monmouthshire since the war broke out show that he has spoken for what he believes to be in the interest of the country, and although it has been an unpopular period he has faced it unflinchingly, but I only wish that he had not in the earlier stages, for reasons which are perhaps better known to him, become a party to the policy which was pursued in connection with that inquiry and to a verdict which not only did not give confidence but which has led to all the trouble in South Africa to-day. That is my honest opinion. But at the same time the House must not forget that all these armaments which have been gathered together in these republics and which are now being used against us were collected during this administration and the past administration. They were not collected till after the Jameson raid. It was your duty, with the full knowledge that all these munitions of war were pouring into the Transvaal, to have protested, but you were unable to protest, for the reason that the statesmen of this country had entered into an alliance to prevent the truth with regard to that criminal action of the raid from coming to light. If you had sent the men who were responsible into fifteen or twenty years penal servitude you would have had no war in South Africa. Here you had a case of a body of men gathering together arms and munitions in South Africa, not with the object of benefiting the country but benefiting themselves. Lord Milner found the whole press in South Africa in the hands of a few men, with the exception of Ons Land and the South African News. I do not believe there is a single paper in South Africa of any importance which is not in the hands of a few men and on the side of those who have brought this war about. Far be it from me to say one word against the integrity of the press of this country, but I think they have greatly aggravated and are aggravating to-day the position in South Africa. The Times and all the organs that have taken a strong attitude about the war have done so in no way from sordid motives, but solely because they think they are advocating the policy which is best for this country; but the methods they have employed and are employing to-day are not in my humble opinion calculated to promote the peace which is necessary for South Africa. The press at the present time has a great influence for good or evil in this country, and I hold that the press during the past two years has done more harm by creating and prolonging this war than the whole good it has done in the past twenty-five years. I understand that I should not be in order in dealing with the manner in which it has been worked, or is worked to-day, in South Africa, as that is not germane to the question before the House. The Colonial Secretary, in his reply to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the Forest of Dean, made a very important statement—namely, that no peace negotiations of any kind had so far been entered into or attempted by the Government. That statement was, no doubt, deliberately made, but I think it is due to the House to know that the previous peace negotiations carried on by the right hon. Gentleman the Colonial Secretary were not of a very happy character, and I hope if peace negotiations are entered into again, which I earnestly trust they will be, they will not be in his hands. In March, 1899, the Transvaal Government were anxious' to avoid war, and to come to a settlement with the Uitlanders. Negotiations with that object were opened between the South African Republic and this country. Meetings were held in Johannesburg and London, and the Transvaal Government deputed to attend these meetings Mr. Edward Lippert, in whom they had confidence. These negotiations were carried through in secret. All that took place in South Africa was at once wired here to gentlemen who sat in the Gold-fields Office in London. The Goldfields Office sent long messages daily to Johannesburg setting out the views of those on this side of the water. In the middle of these negotiations, when a settlement had practically been arrived at, and, let me tell the House, with the full knowledge that these negotiations were in progress, the Colonial Secretary came down to this House on March 20th or 21st, and told the House that the promises of President Kruger were not worth having, and were valueless. I have seen copies of the original telegrams that passed between London and Johannesburg, and I should like to know whether the statement made in one of these cables was correct—that no step was taken in these negotiations without the knowledge and consent of the Colonial Office. When these negotiations were in progress, and a settlement had nearly been arrived at, a speech was made here by the Colonial Secretary. I have heard from friends that when the report of this speech arrived at Johannesburg and Pretoria, President Kruger at once said— Here we have settled nearly all these questions that have arisen, and your Colonial Secretary in London says that my promises are not worth having. I will fight you for my country. And from that day. March 25th, peace negotiations were at an end so far as the Transvaal was concerned in the true spirit of what peace negotiations should be. We pass down to the period of the Bloemfontein Conference, where the same policy was carried out to the letter. Was there a symptom or a desire to arrive at any settlement except the irreducible minimum shown at Bloemfontein? That was the point on which the negotiations failed. There was no sympathy, no give and take, no trust in a settlement shown. I should like to know whether you are going to carry on the negotiations which you are bound to carry on sooner or later, if you are to have an honourable peace—are you going to carry them on on the basis of the irreducible minimum? I venture to say that the proclamation which has recently been issued by the Government is the most foolish of all the many harebrained and purblind steps that have been taken in South Africa. Do you think that the people who have seen their homes ruined and desolation wrought throughout the land, who have lost their property, and whose families have been sent into concentration camps, will not treat with contempt this or any proclamation sent to them with regard to banishment of leaders, and the confiscation of any property they have left? The Boers know well enough that you can never carry this proclamation into effect, and that the whole civilised world will protest against any such proposition on your part. If you wish to create in South Africa a peaceful and contented people, you are going the very way that is calculated to create distrust. What could possibly be more calculated to create distrust than the threat to banish from South Africa the leaders of those men? Will the men who are left in South Africa after the war is over forget their comrades in arms? They will still be your foes, and they will only be acting according to the dictates of humanity and brotherhood. Every step you take in the direction of banishing men from South Africa will cause trouble not only in that country, but to the taxpayers of this country. You are bound sooner or later to hand back these territories to the Boers to administer, unless you are going to hold South Africa by the sword. That will be a new departure. But if you are going to hold South Africa by the ties of affection and sympathy with the people you have to live alongside of, you are taking the best steps to destroy those ties and that sympathy. If you choose to maintain your hold on South Africa by the sword, so surely will you lose it. Your dangers and troubles are not now. When this war is over, they are only about to commence. If you do not come to a settlement on this question I am convinced that it will be necessary to maintain 50,000 soldiers in South Africa. Are you going to maintain these men there or are you going to have a settlement of this question by a peace which will do honour to a brave enemy? I am sorry that I have had to trespass on the time of the House so long, but I do hope and pray that the Government will not adhere to the policy of fighting to the last. It is the strong who can afford to be magnanimous; it is only the weak who show their weakness by refusing honourable terms to a brave foe.

MR. PIRIE (Aberdeen, N.)

said that he cordially agreed with the speech of the hon. Member for Mansfield, although he thought in one thing the hon. Member had made a slight mistake—when in reference to the Bloemfontein Congress and the treatment there of Mr. Kruger by Sir Alfred Milner, now Lord Milner, he spoke of the treatment meted out by Sir Alfred Milner as the treatment of a weak man by a strong man. Had he reversed the persons he thought the hon. Gentleman would have been more accurate. Kruger was one of the strongest men of the day, and he could not help thinking that if the Colonial Secretary had gauged him more accurately he might have saved the terrible complications in which this country now found itself. He desired on this occasion to address himself to what he might call the new policy that the last proclamation issued in South Africa seemed on the verge of bringing about. The Colonial Secretary had stated that South Africa was bound to gain from the proclamation—it would gain by the submission of the Boers, or if it did not do that, South Africa would gain by having the leaders banished from the country, but surely before the leaders were banished from the country they would have to be caught. It seemed to him to show an extraordinary lack of common sense to imagine that these men would yield in any way or be tempted to yield by the proclamation which had just been issued. It was as full of the most extraordinary anomalies as a document of such supreme importance could be. It appeared to him to be an attempt to bring parliamentary methods to bear, and to bring the war to an end by the closure. Everyone would remember that when the war commenced it was said that the politicians worked for war and the military had prepared for peace. Anybody who read the proclamation would see not the hand of the soldier but the hand of the civilian, by which it had been displaced. Expert advice was glaringly absent, and although the proclamation might be fathered on the Commander-in-Chief of the forces in South Africa, Lord Kitchener, it was the work of men absolutely ignorant and unable to realise the situation. The preamble was absurd, and was a mass of contradictions. It first of all talked of the great majority being anxious to live in peace and earn their own livelihood, and went on to speak in the same manner of the prisoners in the camps; it spoke of the Boers being absolutely without military organisation, and then it went on to attack those in a position of authority." The four principal points of the preamble, put forward in grandiloquent language, were these. First it said, "We are in possession of all the principal towns of the two countries." How many principal towns were there? Three, Pretoria, and Johannesburg, which were comprised entirely of foreign elements, with conditions of life absolutely foreign to the life of the interior, and Bloemfontein, which was an overgrown village, which was also absolutely independent of the country. If the villages, which were the real centres of the community upon which the lives of the Orange Colony and the Transvaal depended, had been dealt with, the matter might have been looked at in a quite different light. There were some eighty or ninety villages in these two countries, which represented the centres of life of the community of those countries, and of these we did not possess more than twenty-five. The remaining fifty-five were in the hands of the Boers, and of those twenty-five we did not really hold more than five, and day by day and month by month the Boers saw us vacate village after village, and the proclamation under those circumstances would only call forth their derision.

Then they were told that the burghers of the two republics were already prisoners or had submitted to His Majesty's Government, and were living peaceably to the extent of 35,000. The point was not how many had submitted but how many were left, and whether the 35,000 who had submitted were all fighting men. He believed if they looked into the statistics that they would find that not more than 20,000 fighting men were prisoners of war in our hands, and if that 20,000 was deducted from the original army the number of troops in the field against us now must be between 16,000 and 20,000. The vital point was how many men were left in the field against us. The proclamation went on to say that organised resistance was impossible; but throughout the whole history of the war as conducted by the Transvaal and the Orange Free State could be traced the work of a central authority, especially with regard to the universally carried-out rule of releasing their prisoners, and even still in the shooting of natives captured. There was evidence of a central authority throughout, and it was idle to talk of the absence of organised resistance. Perhaps the most ludicrous part of the whole proclamation was the last item, which said that the Boers continued to make isolated attacks upon small posts in detachments. Surely war, if carried on at all, was not a one-sided affair, and it was not for us to complain that it was not carried on as we wished. It reminded him of the recent events in China with regard to the demand for the punishment of Chinese Ministers—they had to be caught first, and when these men were pitted against enormous bodies of men it was contemptible to complain that they would not come out to be caught. Where was the manhood of the nation which could countenance such a proclamation being issued? He was a very humble Member of the House, but he had intelligence enough to know what a great soldier had said about the conduct of this war, and he ventured to draw atten- tion to the letter written by that veteran Field Marshal Sir Neville Chamberlain, and no one could say a word against the feeling which prompted that letter being written. On the conduct of the war, he said— I dissent because the necessity has never been made clear to the nation to justify a departure from the recognised laws of international warfare. He further stated— I do not wish to imply that extreme measures are never justified during war, but I do assert that the daily reports which have appeared in the press during the past seven or eight months indicate that a great wave of destruction has been spread over the Orange and Vaal States, such as has never before been enacted by our armies. And then he went on to say that incidents had taken place, but whenever they had taken place— even in the dark days of the Indian Mutiny, when there was an ever present sense of the inhumanities practised by the mutineers and others who abetted them, there never existed the idea that the horrors of war were to be indiscriminately carried into the homes of the population. And he concluded by quoting the words of Sir Philip Sidney that "cruelty in war buyeth conquest at the dearest price." The cruelty of this war was the cruelty of the Government in demanding terms which no civilised nation had a right to enforce upon another. We were paying the dearest price for conquest. We had now a rebellion in Cape Colony which did not exist in the beginning of the war, when the conditions were ten times as favourable for the Cape colonists to rebel. It was the action of the Government which created the rebellion. They had created a hatred of our rule which had never existed before, and they could not be surprised that the people rebelled. There were two principal causes of that rebellion. One was that the Government were beginning to arm the natives; one of the greatest dangers in South Africa was the great black population, and he agreed with what the Colonial Secretary said about the native, that he was not to be treated upon an equality with the white men, but must be kept under subjection. The second cause was the execution of Cape colonists. Never had such a measure been carried out by any civilised country since the days of the Inquisition. Not only had the Government enacted public execution, but they had forced Cape colonists to witness the execution of their countrymen when those executions took place inside the prisons. He had no words to express his disapproval and hatred of such a course. The proper course for the Government to have adopted when they heard of such things taking place would have been to have disowned them, but for a long time they would give no answer whatever to this charge, and eventually, instead of disowning the acts, merely said they would not be repeated. They would not be repeated because the Government would not dare repeat such an action. The Government had made the matter worse by attempting to palliate such deeds as those. It was actions such as these that lost us the American colonies. Similar things took place in that country 120 years ago, at the time of the American War, and there were men in the House of Lords and in this House who protested as strongly as they could against what was taking place in America. He would draw the attention of the House to the protest of thirty-one Peers against those actions in 1778— The public law of nations, in affirmance of the dictates of nature and the principles of revealed religion, forbids us to resort to the extremes of war upon our own opinion of their expediency, or in any case to carry on war for the purpose of desolation. Those objects of war that cannot be compassed by fair and honourable hostility ought not to be compassed at all. An end that has no means but such as are unlawful is an unlawful end. We choose to draw ourselves out and to distinguish ourselves to posterity, as not being the first to renew, to approve, or to tolerate the return of that ferocity and barbarism in war which a beneficent religion and enlightened manners and true military honour had for a long time banished from the Christian world. There were Members of this present House who chose to draw themselves out from what the country had sanctioned in this war, and they also protested against what was going on in South Africa, as these thirty-one peers had protested 120 years ago against what was going on in America. He considered that what was taking place now was worse than what took place then, because the world had advanced in civilisation. It might be only a small protest they made, but they could not be silent, feeling as they did that what was going on must be detrimental to the future of the Empire. Conquest had been finished with, and the word which now ought to be used was the word "pacify." Unless the word "conquest" was eliminated, in his opinion South Africa would be lost to this country. The policy of the Government would have to be reversed. We were strong enough to admit we had made a mistake, and we should acknowledge our mistake. With regard to the military situation, that had been dealt with by the right hon. Baronet the Member for Forest of Dean. Perhaps he might be allowed, to quote a letter from South Africa, giving the writer's view of the civilian situation— Things are rapidly getting worse, and unless some change is made, and that immediately, a great number more men will be forced to join the Boer forces. The treatment of the farmers of this colony is too abominable for words, and now the trial of men by incompetent military courts for their life without reference to the civil courts is more than men will stand. The military do not seem to appreciate the fact that the majority of the farmers, English as well as Dutch, are at the mercy of the Boer commanders, and if their men are shot retaliation will follow as a natural result, and then what will be the position of the unfortunate non-combatants in the out-districts? You know that I am no alarmist, but I feel the position is rapidly drifting to a terrible tragedy. He regretted more than he could tell that no negotiations, according to the Colonial Secretary, were possible. Surely there were terms upon which the Boers could retain their independence. Let them have their land, surrounding it with British territory. There were a dozen means of obtaining peace if only the will to obtain peace was there, and also the will to put away that false pride and obstinacy which lay at the bottom of it. Even when the war was over, the difficulties would be only beginning. Those who advocated peace were said to be anti-national and anti-patriotic. But there was something higher and nobler than merely seeking government or power, and that was to endeavour to guide one's country into the way of righteousness, peace, and right-doing.

MR. BRYCE (Aberdeen, S.)

The Colonial Secretary began his speech by asking my right hon. friend the Member for West Monmouthshire what was his object in raising the question to which he referred, and he suggested that such speeches would have the effect of prolonging the war. That suggestion has often been made, and it is absolutely destitute of foundation. Since the negotiations at Bloemfontein in May, 1900, there has not been the slightest evidence that anything said here has had the least effect on the action of the Boers. It has been the wish of the Government from the first to represent those who have condemned the war as having had a sinister influence on the progress of events in South Africa, and therefore we may be sure that if there had been a single case in which it could be shown that anything said in England had influenced the minds of the Boer leaders that case would have been brought out and made the most of. The absence of any such evidence is the most convincing proof that nothing of the sort has happened. In the recently-discovered correspondence between Mr. Reitz and Mr. Steyn there was a letter in which Mr. Steyn quoted, not something said in this country, but a passage from a Natal newspaper which had supported and defended the war; and that is the nearest approach to anything affording the slightest foundation for this charge. If anything said here has influenced the war it has been the intemperate speeches made on behalf of His Majesty's Government and the violence—I might almost say the ferocity—of some organs of the British Press.

I now come to the proclamation. My right hon. friend did not speak in vain, for he elicited from the Colonial Secretary what I can hardly call anything but a repudiation of the proclamation itself. That proclamation was taken by everybody who read it as a refusal of belligerent rights to the Boers in the field. The impression naturally produced by the text was that His Majesty's Government considered the time had come when the Boers should be treated no longer as belligerents but as rebels. That construction has been completely abandoned by the Colonial Secretary, and I think that is a real gain. This proclamation has been regarded in foreign countries as a declaration that the Boers were not to be treated as belligerents. For that reason I look upon its terms as having been most unfortunate, and I hope the disclaimer of the Colonial Secretary will obtain the same publicity as the unhappy proclamation itself. The long preamble seems to be intended to prove that the Boers are no longer carrying on legitimate warfare, that the struggle has degenerated into a series of guerilla operations, and that therefore the Boers have lost whatever privileges they otherwise would have had. What other meaning can there be of such references as "devoid of regular military organisation"? To begin with, that statement is not true. So far as we know, the organisation under Botha and Delarey is as regular as it was at the beginning of the war. What can be said of the passage— Whereas those burghers who are still in arms…continue to make isolated attacks upon small posts and detachments of His Majesty's forces, to plunder or destroy property, and to damage the railway and telegraph lines, both in the Grange River Colony and the Transvaal. Surely that means that this is not legitimate warfare; that the persons carrying it on are simply destroying property, and are not entitled to be treated as belligerents.

AN HON. MEMBER

Hear, hear.

MR. BRYCE

But that is not the opinion of the Colonial Secretary, so that the hon. Member opposite is plus royal que le Roi. But although the Colonial Secretary disclaims in clear and unmistakable terms any intention of treating the Boers now as not being belligerents, he implies that a time may come when they will cease to be so regarded. That is important, and I think we should put on record our views as to the character of the belligerents, in case any attempt should be made during the next six months to deny belligerent rights to these people. It is sometimes assumed that guerilla warfare is that which is carried on by small parties of persons. That is not so at all. The number of the forces operating has nothing to do with the matter. I will read a definition from a book on international law by a recognised authority:— Guerilla troops are bands of men, self-organised and self-controlled, who carry on warfare against a public enemy without being under the direct control of the State. They have no commissions or enlistments, nor are they enrolled as being part of the military forces of the State. Some have attempted to apply the rule as to guerillas to inhabitants of a State who rise en masse and take up arms to repel an invasion. The distinction between these cases is manifest. These terms apply precisely to the present case. War is being carried on by comparatively small bodies of troops. It is not for one of the parties to a war to prescribe how the struggle should be carried on by the other. If it suits our opponents to proceed by means of small bodies of men they are perfectly right to do so. The question is not whether the bands are large or small, but whether the troops are organised, whether they are under the authority of the State, whether they have recognised leaders, and whether those leaders can be made responsible for the actions of the troops. All these criteria are satisfied in the case of the Boer forces at present in the field. The Governments to which they owe allegiance have never been displaced—for the annexation is merely a paper annexation; these people are loyal to their own Governments, and so long as they retain their organisation and obey their leaders they will continue to be belligerents. It is not for one party to a war to deprive the other party of belligerent rights unless a change has passed over the nature of the war and the character of those who carry it on, which completely transforms them from being legitimate troops of their country. That has not happened in this case, there is no sign that it will happen, and until it does happen we should be committing a gross breach of international law if we refused them belligerent rights.

There is another point made by the Colonial Secretary to which I wish to advert. By what right is punishment to be inflicted on the soldiers in the field? Two kinds of punishment are proposed—perpetual banishment for the leaders, and confiscation of property for the troops. The proposal to charge upon the troops the cost of keeping their women and children is practically a proposal to confiscate their property. I am not aware of any authority in law or any precedent for pronouncing punishment against belligerents, and, be it remembered, this is put forward as a matter of punishment. The Colonial Secretary said that pecuniary penalties ought to be inflicted on the rank and file, and, referring to the leaders, "we must bring home to them the fact that they must personally suffer." He did not put the matter on the ground of the security of the State or of the preservation of peace when these countries have been reduced to the position of conquered territory, but on the ground of punishment. By what right is this done? They are not your subjects; you can only punish them if they are rebels, and the Colonial Secretary, by admitting that they are belligerents, has admitted that they are not rebels.

Then the Colonial Secretary alleged that the women in the camps were allowed to go at will. I believe that to be absolutely contrary to the fact. These women were driven into the camps. Many of them asked to be allowed to remain on their farms. Some of the camps are surrounded by barbed wire fences. But even if it is true that now in some cases it is possible for the women to leave the camps, it must be remembered that that is a very different thing from saying they can go of their own free will. How is a woman and her children, who has been carried perhaps hundreds of miles from a desolated farmhouse, to return to her home? It is absurd under such circumstances to say that she remains in the camp of her own free will. The proposal to impose a fine—probably a ruinous one—upon the burghers in the field came from Natal, and it has the appearance of a proposal for confiscation. It has the air of a pretext for punishing the burghers in the field by taking their farms from them, in order that those farms may be open for settlement or sale by the British Government. That is quite opposed to international law, one of the first principles of which is that the private property of belligerents is safe. The Colonial Secretary made a comparison with the Filippinos, but surely the differences between the two cases are patent enough to deprive the comparison of any value. To begin with, not to dwell on the differences in the character of the two nations, and in the nature of their military organisation, these nations are two civilised States, which for many years have been regularly governed, while the Orange Free State has been recognised to be one of the best governed people in the world. On the other hand, the Philippine Republic never was an independent Government. It was an insurrectionary Government, holding its own as well as it could against the Spaniards, and it entered into friendly relations with the Americans because it believed the Americans had come to help them. There can be no parallel between the two cases. I should be very loth to think we were to imitate the proclamation which the Colonial Secretary says has been issued by the United States general, and I should like to know whether the proclamation has been acted upon. I do not believe it has, or that the public opinion of the United States would tolerate such conduct on the part of one of their generals.

This proclamation has the air of an outburst of anger at the prolongation of the war, and it seems to be an attempt to effect by threats that which our arms have not yet been able to accomplish. It rests on the notion that because we desire to put an end to the war, all means are lawful to secure our object. Such a view will justify severities which I hope the Government will never think of inflicting. I have great doubts whether this policy will be successful. These methods of deportation—for they are nothing else—have an ancient precedent in the action of Nebuchadnezzar when he deported the inhabitants of the country he had conquered on the ground that the country would he a great deal more peaceful when the disturbing element had gone. But that is not an argument which should be used by a civilised and self-respecting Power. There have been three serious blunders in the conduct of the war. The first was the refusal to negotiate in May, 1900, when we were invited to negotiate, and might, I believe, have succeeded in attaching a very large portion of the burghers in the field, and in that way have brought the war to a conclusion. Then there was Lord Roberta's proclamation, affecting to treat the burghers in the field as rebels. What could have been more fatal than a proclamation so palpably opposed to international law that the law officers of the Crown, although repeatedly challenged, never ventured to say a word in its defence, and which had to be withdrawn within two or three weeks of its issue? It was not withdrawn, however, before we had put ourselves in the wrong in the eyes of the world, and had further exasperated the minds of the Boers. Then there was the policy of farm-burning. That also was admitted to be a mistake, because, when remonstrances were made in this House, that, too, was abandoned. I believe that this present proclamation may very well turn out to be no less a blunder.

The right hon. Gentleman says it will be a gain to banish these men if they do not submit, that we should be all the better without them. Is it common sense to say that because a man opposes you valiantly in the field, fighting for his country as long as he can fight, therefore he will necessarily be a source of danger when the country has been pacified and institutions restored? I do not think it in the least follows. Nor can I see why a man should be banished for doing that which we should admire if done by anybody else. If this war was being carried on, not between Great Britain and these two Republics, but between France or Germany, and some petty State, would not the sympathy of every man in this country be with the men who were fighting for their freedom? Can we not put ourselves in the state of mind of these people? Suppose, for the sake of argument, the war is just, and we are in the right. Can you withhold your admiration from men who have so valiantly fought for their country?

I have spoken of the application of political methods to this war. So far as they have been applied they have been unfortunate. It is true, however, that if ever there was a war which ought to have been carried on with some reference to policy, and to which political as well as military methods ought to have been applied, it is this war. You are fighting, not a Government, but a nation in arms, and it was therefore vital to your purpose and end, if possible, to win over the mind of the nation, and not further to exasperate it against you. Besides, you had subjects in Cape Colony whose loyalty was doubtful, because the men you were fighting were their near kinsfolk. It was of the greatest importance that you should not further exasperate the Gape colonists, or light up a smouldering rebellion You want to make these people your fellow-subjects, to annex their territory, to turn the States into British colonies, to give them at some future date self-governing institutions, and to get the inhabitants to work side by side with men of British race in the endeavour to conduct the government of the country. Was it not, therefore, a capital error to alienate these people, to increase their exasperation, and to make it more and more difficult for the two peoples to live together in the future? A worse policy could not have been followed, whether with regard to the burghers in the field, the inhabitants of the annexed territories, or our own fellow subjects in the Cape Colony. All these considerations have been neglected, and I believe the main cause of the prolongation of the war has been the methods by which it has been carried on, and the impression produced by those methods on the minds of the people of Cape Colony. We have had a melancholy prospect opened to us. It is quite possible that when we meet in January or February next the same dreary state of things will be continuing. The Colonial Secretary is an optimist, but his optimism contrasts strangely with the extreme pessimism of his tone, and very little chance is given to the forces of peace and good feeling.

There are other topics on which I wish to say a word, because this is the last opportunity we shall have for months to come. There is the question of the future constitution of the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony. That is a matter of such gravity that the House of Commons is well entitled to be consulted with regard to it. We ought to know what constitution it is intended to apply to these countries, because on the terms of that constitution the future of the countries depends.

I would also refer in passing to the suspension of the constitution in Cape Colony. That is a serious matter, and it is likely to become more serious. At present money is being drawn without legal warrant from the Treasury of the colony—a thing which, although done once or twice before, has never been done to so large an extent or under circumstances comparable to the present. Next October, under the constitution of the colony, it is absolutely necessary that Parliament should be convoked, and the constitution will be formally broken if that is not done. I want to know if it is the intention of the Government to permit such a serious breach of the constitution. The argument by which the other day the Colonial Secretary justified the non-summoning of Parliament would apply equally well in October next, and nothing more dangerous for the future of the country can be conceived than to allow the constitution to be broken in such a manner. It is the more serious when we consider the condition of the colony. The country is under martial law; it is occupied by large numbers of troops; it is necessary that there should be an opportunity for the statement of complaints and grievances, that there should be chances for discussion, and that acts of oppression and wrong-doing should be brought before the Legislative Assembly, so that Ministers can give their explanation. It would be a great wrong to allow martial law to subsist and at the same time to suspend legislative action. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Forest of Dean dwelt on the very serious condition of things in Cape Colony. I believe that is the darkest part of South Africa at present, and it will be still further darkened if you suspend the constitution, and prevent the voice of complaint having legitimate and full scope.

As to the question of terms, I am afraid this proclamation reduces the chances of any negotiations being opened. The Colonial Secretary, with the air of a man who is locking the door and putting the key in his pocket, told us there were no negotiations going on at present. In spite of that, I hope that between now and the next meeting of Parliament the question of entering into negotiations will not be neglected or disregarded by His Majesty's Government. It is not by any means the case that the defiant language of General Botha represents necessarily the set purpose and determination of the Boers. Shortly after that language was used there came the correspondence between Mr. Reitz and Mr. Steyn, from which it appeared there was a disposition in the Transvaal to come to terms. We have no reason to conclude that if reasonable terms were offered they would not be accepted.

THE FINANCIAL SECRETARY TO THE TREASURY (Mr. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN, Worcestershire, E.)

What does the right hon. Gentleman mean by "reasonable terms?"

MR. BRYCE

If I discussed the whole question of terms I should detain the House longer than I wish to do, but I think the terms should embody those stated, particularly by my right hon. friend the Member for the Stirling Burghs. They should include some provision for the restoration of the people to their farms, the grant of an amnesty at the conclusion of the war, which, I admit, cannot be made at this moment, but might well be made as part of the terms of surrender, the promise of self-government at a comparatively early date, which, unfortunately, I have no reason to believe the Government intend, and, of course, the withdrawal of the threats of banishment and confiscation of property which are now being made. I doubt whether if such terms were proposed they would be rejected. ["Oh, oh!"] I want to call attention to one great advantage, in having terms. Hon. Gentleman must not allow themselves to be carried away by bitterness or exasperation. They must look at the question as men of business who desire to see peace and tranquillity restored to these colonies. The worst thing that could happen would be, after the war has been carried on for some time longer, that the forces which are now in arms against us should, instead of making a regular and proper surrender on terms, vanish across the border into German or Portuguese territory, or scatter and, so to speak, disappear like an African river into the ground. That would, indeed, be an element of future danger, because these men would carry with them a far more bitter feeling of anger, and would be far more likely to resume insurrection whenever they thought they had a chance of success, whereas if you allowed them to surrender on terms, you would give them some little solace in point of honour—which I do not think you ought to begrudge to brave enemies—and having made an arrangement, it would appeal to their minds that they should endeavour to observe it. There would be a far better chance of future peace and tranquillity under such conditions than if you insist on unconditional surrender. I have only one word more to say, but I must say it, because the attitude of those who from the first have protested against the war has been so constantly misrepresented. I do not refer to the Colonial Secretary's epithet of "traitors," because the absurdity of that expression is so patent that it carries its own refutation. It is language which might equally well have been applied to Chatham, Burke, and Fox when they resisted the American War, or to Bright and Cobden when they denounced the Crimean War. ["No!"] Hon. Members must remember that the term is applied to persons who simply say that this war is a ghastly and unnecessary blunder. Not only might it have been applied to those whose names I have mentioned, but also to the Duke of Devonshire, Mr. Gladstone, and the Colonial Secretary himself, when they opposed the Afghan War of 1878. But we are constantly held up as being indifferent to the greatness of England, ["Hear, hear!"] Hon. Members opposite, evidently endorse that charge. It is the exact opposite of the truth. ["No!"] Our opinions on the merits of this war have nothing whatever to do with Imperialism the one way or the other. This is a question by itself, and one in regard to which some of us think the Government have grossly erred. That view is shared by many Conservative friends of mine. ["Oh, oh!"] How can hon. Members know what many Conservative friends have told me? But be that as it may, these are things that any man of common sense can see have nothing whatever to do with Imperialism or Little Englandism in general. Whether we are right or wrong in our view of the war does not matter so far as my present argument is concerned. History will judge between us on that matter, as history has judged of the Crimean War and the conduct of Mr. Gladstone, and those of us who opposed Lord Beaconsfield's Govern- ment between 1876 and 1878. The Prime Minister himself has now admitted that we were right, and that Lord Beaconsfield's Government was wrong.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (Lord G. HAMILTON, Middlesex, Ealing)

The right hon. Gentleman has quoted the negotiations in connection with the Afghan War; he had better read them before he makes a statement of that kind.

MR. BRYCE

I was referring to the Eastern Question between 1876 and 1878.

LORD G. HAMILTON

You were referring to the Afghan War.

MR. BRYCE

No; I was referring to the Eastern Question, from the time of the Bulgarian massacres to the Treaty of Berlin. I am perfectly prepared to meet the noble Lord with regard to the Afghan War, but I was not then referring to it at all. It is because we are attached to the greatness of England, because we are alive to it, and desire to safeguard the interests of the British dominions everywhere, that we deplore the war, which, in our judgment—be it right or wrong—has struck a heavy blow at the welfare of England and her position all over the world. It is for that reason we seek, even now, to modify, in the interests of future peace and safety, the policy the Government are still following, and which, as we think, is calculated to aggravate every existing danger and imperil still further the strength and credit of the British Empire. That strength and credit has hitherto rested not merely on our naval and military strength, which we desire as much as hon. Members opposite to maintain in the fullest measure, but on the reputation of our country for justice, and the attachment to it of all the people who live under its flag.

MR. LLOYD-GEORGE

I was very glad to hear my right hon. friend protest in the strongest possible manner against the suggestion made, not for the first time, by the Colonial Secretary, that by our attitude towards this war we were strengthening foreign prejudices against this country and prolonging the war in South Africa. Whenever the Colonial Secretary makes that statement it strikes me that he is rather begging the question. If our criticisms with regard to the conduct of the war are sound, in the interests of the country they ought certainly to be made. Take the question of reduced rations for women and children, or of the concentration camps. In regard to the former, the War Office have practically admitted they were wrong, and the order has been withdrawn. According to the Colonial Secretary we ought not to have made that criticism, and the order should have been allowed to go on. What would have been the result? Foreign nations would have known all about it, and would not their prejudice against this country have been greatly strengthened and justified if no one here had protested against it? The way to evade prejudice is to show that there are Englishmen prepared to criticise even the conduct of our own troops when, in their opinion, it exceeds the limits of civilised warfare. It is, therefore, entirely a question of whether we are right or wrong in our criticism, and if we are right the criticism ought to be made regardless of consequences.

I agree entirely with my right hon. friend that there is not the slightest evidence in support of the charge that the war has been prolonged by our criticisms. The only bit of anything in the nature of evidence is the letter of ex-President Steyn, in which he refers to a Natal newspaper, and all that paper stated was that there was a feeling of uneasiness in England about the war. Have not the columns of Conservative newspapers during the last six months been filled with matter which might be described as "uneasiness with regard to the conduct of the war"? Look at the Daily Mail, which has supported the war from the start, and which is probably more responsible for the war than any other newspaper. It has been full of criticisms expressing uneasiness about the war during the last six months. That was probably the matter to which the Natal paper referred. Let me quote Lord Milner's words as to the real cause of the prolongation of the war. It is not the criticism in this country of the conduct of the war, but rather the things done in South Africa with the sanction of the Government, which have driven the Gape colonists into rebellion and incensed the burghers in the field. Here are Lord Milner's reasons for the recrudescence of the war, as given in his despatch at the beginning of this year— I doubt whether it (the movement in Cape Colony) would have succeeded to the moderate extent it has had it not been for the recrudescence of the war on the borders of the Colony and the bitter character it has assumed. Every act of harshness, however necessary, on the part of our troops, was exaggerated and made the most of by them. What principally inflamed the minds of the people were alleged instances of needless cruelty which never occurred. That is his view. Not the statements made in this House, but the acts of harshness and severity, which we have been told were the only possible methods of suppressing the war, are the reasons given by Lord Milner for the embitterment of feeling and the aggravation of the position in South Africa. A few minutes ago I had put into my hands a letter from a Uitlander minister, and in order to show that he is not a prejudiced witness from my point of view I will quote these words from the letter— If we were not wholly in the right when the war began—I speak as a Uitlander—we had at least a great deal on our side. I think we had the bulk. He, therefore, believes in the justice of the war. But he goes on— We are transferring that quality to the side of the Boers, and history may come to curse us as it has long since cursed Spain. As to the prolongation of the war, he attributes it to the burning and pillaging committed in the Orange River Colony and the Transvaal, giving his authority for the statement, and then he goes on to say, referring to the recent hangings— I hear privately that the Maritzburg district—where Marais was executed—is seething with fury. It will yet be found that the execution of Coetzee and Marais was equivalent to the building of recruiting offices for the Boer commandos. Then the writer makes a statement about the peace negotiations, which I think is very significant— Lord Kitchener has revealed to us how they (the Roers) are now willing to interpret independence. Offer them exactly that kind of Home Rule which the Liberal party tried to obtain for Ireland, and there is no doubt it would be wholeheartedly accepted. ["Name."] I do not think there is any objection to giving the name, but I must consult the writer first. This minister goes on to denounce the policy of unconditional surrender, and says that that is responsible for the prolongation of the war.

The Colonial Secretary indicated that a period might arrive when we should treat the commandos in the field as murderers, and he quoted the proclamation of General McArthur to the Filippinos. That proclamation itself is sufficient proof that there is no ground for anything of the kind in this case. The very ground on which General McArthur proclaimed those men to be banditti was that their leaders never met together for conference. Within the last few weeks the Colonial Secretary himself has published documents showing that Schalk Burgher, Steyn, and the Boer generals in the field have had conferences. Those conferences are constantly going on. What will happen to our own men if this policy of shooting the Boers is carried out? Do hon. Members realise that during the last three months something like 1,000 of our men have surrendered to the Boers? If this policy is carried out it will end in the shooting of our men. This proclamation seems to me to be one of the most indefensible ever issued. It is neither the one thing nor the other. You must take the one view or the other. You may say the Boers are not belligerents, and treat them accordingly, but once you admit they are belligerents this proclamation becomes absolutely indefensible.

Take the second part of the proclamation. We are to charge the burghers in the field for the maintenance of their wives and children in these camps. What is happening? We clear the country for military reasons; we take all the stock and grain; we go even to the length of destroying the agricultural implements, so that the people cannot possibly cultivate the land. But if for military reasons you deprive them of the means of livelihood and their food, you cannot afterwards say that you are not bound to keep them from starvation. We use their stock and food; our troops take the grain and forage on their farms; is any allowance to be made for that when we come to consider the bill for board and lodging? Surely it is only justice. ["No."]

AN HON. MEMBER

It is not war.

MR. LLOYD-GEORGE

No, it is not war; I quite agree. But does the hon. Member mean to say that we should be justified in taking away all the food from their farms, and in leaving the women and children to starve in the wilderness?

AN HON. MEMBER

We are justified in charging them for their keep.

MR. LLOYD-GEORGE

Why take all they have got? All I can say is, if those are the principles upon which the Transvaal is to be governed, I am not surprised that the Boers are fighting to the last. It is a most extraordinary proposition. You may say that military reasons justify the clearing of the country, but you cannot say that you are not bound to keep the women and children from starvation. The right hon. Gentleman said something about the military situation. When a question was put to him he said he had already dealt with the military situation, but he carefully refrained from saying a word about what was happening in the Cape. We are voting money in this House to conduct the war. We are asked to condemn or approve of this proclamation, and why should we not know what is going on in the Cape? I asked how many Boers there were in the Cape, and I was told about 1,500. All the newspapers—and I am referring rather to the Unionist newspapers—state that there are about 7,000 or 8,000 Boers still in arms in the Cape. Is that statement true or is it not? Is it a fact that there are still only 1,500 armed men opposing us in Cape Colony? We are entitled to know the facts.

The Colonial Secretary indicated that the war is coming to an end, and that the troops are returning to this country. Is he quite sure that he is not going to repeat the blunder of last December? The Prime Minister has referred to the war in South Africa as "the recent war." For electioneering purposes troops were sent back to this country, which included some of our best mounted soldiers, and what was the result? Why, a few months after that the war was worse than ever. [Ministerial cries of "No, no!"] Hon. Members opposite may contradict that statement, but I wish to point out that that was the opinion of Lord Milner, who said that it was worse than it had been for six months. [An HON. MEMBER: But you said "worse than ever."] Then I withdraw that statement, and what I meant was worse than it had been for six months. After some of the troops were sent home we found that the war was worse than it had been at any time for the previous six months. We are getting no information at all now as to what is happening in the Cape, and the Colonial Secretary refrained from giving us any information upon that subject. The right hon. Gentleman referred to surrenders in the Transvaal, but how many troops are there at the Cape? We ought to get that information before Parliament separates. There is only one department which has practically declared this war is over, and that is the Treasury. I say that as long as we have got to spend money at this rate in South Africa the war is not over. An estimate was made at the beginning of this year based upon the assumption that the war would be over at the end of July, but no troops have returned. [An HON. MEMBER: You have just told us they did return.] The Colonial Secretary says he hopes that in September a large number of troops will be able to return to this country. That shows that even now the Ministry recognise that there has been a grave miscalculation. The roads in South Africa are paved with miscalculations. We have had constant supplementary Estimates because the previously made Estimates were wrong, and I think we are entitled to ask the Ministry before we separate for some fuller information upon the situation in South Africa.

MR. ASQUITH (Fifeshire, E,)

This is the last occasion, or almost the last occasion, on which we shall have the opportunity, before the House separates for what may be a very long recess, of obtaining information and explanation from the Government as to the state of things in South Africa. I do not think any of us will regret it if we bring forward for explanation those points as to which there exists in the public mind either a deficient knowledge or a legitimate anxiety. In the very few observations which I propose to address to the House I shall say little or nothing about the past; I shall confine myself entirely to the situation which immediately confronts us and to those future arrangements, many of them necessarily provisional, many of them possibly permanent, which in all human probability will be initiated before this House reassembles. As regards the actual situation, while there have been wide differences of opinion among us both as to the origin and as to the conduct of the war, while there are still wider differences, I hope narrowing day by day, as to the choice of methods of solution, I am perfectly aware of this, that there is among men of all parties and all sections of opinion, both in this House and in the country, a practically universal and unanimous desire that at the earliest opportunity it shall be brought to an end.

There are indeed many reasons in the recent development of events why we should wish to accelerate the finish. The conditions under which whatever remains of the struggle which is now being carried on are conditions which, as all history shows, are in a peculiar degree trying to the combatants and injurious to the country. We have heard something to-night about the laws of war. Those laws were framed not with a view to any such contest as now going on. They were in the main and in their normal operation adapted to a state of things where you have a considerable number of men on the one side or the other arrayed against each other, acting upon some definite plan of campaign, moving in more or less organised bodies, and subject in greater or loss degree to some kind of central control. That description does not in the least correspond with what is now going on in South Africa. You have a number of independent commanders operating forces, dwindling in numbers and diminishing in resources, over wide areas of an almost illimitable territory, and, although I am prepared to give them credit for the best intentions in the world, without those condiditions of discipline and that subjection to rule which in the long run differentiates a regular army of soldiers from a body of free-lances.

On the other hand, if you look at our own men, although the conditions are not the same, they are certainly to some extent equally exceptional. No praise, I think, can be too high, no appreciation can be too warm of the great work which Lord Kitchener has done in South Africa. He has displayed, under conditions of almost unexampled difficulty, a combination of energy and patience, of zeal and moderation which will always entitle him to a high place among the great soldiers of this country. And what I have said of him I will say, and I am sure the whole of this House will say, with equal conviction of the officers and soldiers under him. In the conditions under which for the last nine months those soldiers have been carrying on their work, the chances of what is called military glory in the larger and wider sense have not been within their grasp, of the pomp and circumstances of war they have seen little or nothing. What has been their fate? They have been working in separate columns, marching and counter-marching along the veldt, rarely indulged in that which to the British soldier is the greatest opportunity and the greatest luxury, the chance of an open battle, the eyes of the world no longer fixed upon them and public attention diverted into an entirely different direction. I do not believe that in the whole history of British arms there is a chapter which deserves to be recorded with greater admiration than the simple, persistent doggedness with which these men and their officers, with none of the ordinary advantages of military operations, with no dramatie opportunity, have persevered in a work thankless and uncongenial to them, but in the highest degree not only creditable to them, but useful and beneficial to their country.

They will go on, as we know, for as many weeks, and as many months, and as many years as the campaign may last; but without any disparagement to the splendid qualities they have displayed, there is no man among us who has a real regard both for the moral and physical conditions of our Army who is not most anxious that this intolerable burden should, as soon as possible, be removed. What is the conclusion which I draw from this? It is this, that there is no step whatever that is consistent, or not inconsistent with the usage of war, and with the rules of humanity, that we ought not gladly to face and to advocate for the purpose of bringing this controversy to an end. Well, what is the Government doing, what steps are they taking for the purpose of bringing about that which we all desire, for which we all aim, and which we all approve? A good deal has been said in the course of the debate about the proclamation which at the instance of the Government has been issued by Lord Kitchener. If I took the same view of the facts, I should feel that there was immense force and weight in the considerations derived from international law which were urged earlier in the evening by my right hon. friend the Member for West Monmouthshire. But I must state my difference of opinion with him quite frankly. I do not take the same view of the facts. In my judgment there is no question of international law involved here at all.

I listened carefully to the explanation that was given by the Colonial Secretary in reply to my right hon. friend, and the proclamation, as I understand it, does not assume a denial of the rights of belligerents to those who are still in arms against us. If it did I should certainly take exception to it, although I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that the time may come, we may even be within measurable distance of it now, when the character of the resistance opposed to British arms may be such that you can no longer treat those who are opposed to us as belligerents, but must look upon them as in some different category. As the right hon. Gentleman says, however, that time has not yet arrived. Therefore we must leave that out of the question. No issue as to the rights of belligerents is really involved. What, then, is the real meaning of the proclamation? As I understand it, it is this. These territories are now a part of His Majesty's dominions, persons who within those territories are arrayed in arms against us are at this moment de facto and de jure His Majesty's subjects [Nationalist cries of "No."] yes, His Majesty's subjects. I need not say that the whole responsibility for the proclama- tion rests with the Government, but it is neither more nor less than this, it is a warning to the people who, within His Majesty's territories, and being his. Majesty's subjects, are in arms against the forces of the Crown that unless by a particular date they surrender to His Majesty's Government they must consider themselves as liable to punishment and expulsion.

It is a total mistake to suppose that the proclamation has the force of law; no Minister in this country has the power by putting on a piece of paper the sentence of banishment to make that sentence effective against any part of His Majesty's subjects. What the proclamation really amounts to is this, and in this respect it corresponds, I think, to a large extent with what was done at the end of the Franco-German War with regard to the inhabitants of Alsace. The proclamation says to these people, you must make your choice; if by the date fixed you surrender, well and good; if you do not, we warn you that local legislation will be initiated for the purpose of doing what was done to the inhabitants of Alsace who did not choose to come in under the proclamation on terms, banishing you from the territory to which you no longer have any claim. I emphasise this point for two reasons—first, because not only as a Liberal, but as one in favour of our forms of Constitution, I should demur with an emphasis that cannot be exaggerated to any assumption on the part of the Executive Government that they had the right by a paper proclamation to banish from any part of His Majesty's dominions any number of His Majesty's subjects. That is not the power that rests with the Executive Government.

I say this, in the second place, because before the warning given by that proclamation can be put into practical effect legislation will have to take place, local legislation, legislation which in every stage can be discussed, and which even when it has been passed into law is capable of amendment, revision, and even reversal. But, looking at the proclamation from that point of view, I express my opinion that there is no danger of either international or constitutional law being infringed, and, as far as I can judge, it is not consistent with the usages of war or the dictates of humanity. But the question of policy is entirely a different matter. Here, of course, we who criticise from the outside the contents and effect of the proclamation have not the advantage of the special knowledge which is within the reach of His Majesty's advisers. I do not think the right hon. Gentleman himself adopted a very sanguine tone as to its immediate effect, and I confess myself that I do not feel that it will produce any large number of surrenders, but I hope that my scepticism may prove to be unjustified. But, whether that be so or not, we cannot predict what the future may be. So far as it goes, I, for my part, am prepared to accept it—I do not say that I welcome it—as a step which may possibly conduce to that which I think ought to be the governing end to us all, namely, the acceleration of the end of the war. I hope that the Government are not going to be content with this proclamation. I should like to have, and I hope we shall have before the debate is closed, some rather more definite and explicit statement from the Government as to what is being done, apart from the proclamation, for the purpose of bringing the war to an end.

We are told that a large number of troops are going to be brought back from South Africa. I do not complain of that. I think that probably there are a large number of troops there who must necessarily be what is called stale, who have served there over two years under conditions of unexampled hardship, and who are now entitled to relief. I am not sure that there are not a certain number of troops who, perhaps, ought never to have been sent. However that may be, and accepting the necessity, as I do, of a large and considerable withdrawal of the actual force on the spot. I do think that we are entitled to have from the Government some more definite statement than has yet been given in the course of the debate that, after discounting the proclamation and giving its greatest or least effect—whichever you please—there will remain in the circle of military action for the purpose of concluding this war such a force of mobile and efficient troops as are adapted for the end in view. We have poured troops into South Africa almost without stint in number, but I am not at all satisfied, even at this moment, that we have sufficiently grasped the real conditions of the problem.

I think I may mention as an illustration, by way of explaining my meaning, the new Yeomanry sent to take the place of the old Yeomanry, which was a very good force, composed of excellent men, who rendered a very fine account of themselves. I am not at all satisfied from all the information that reaches me, and from inquiries that I have made, that the new Yeomanry sent to take the place of the old, recruited up hill and down dale, in the highways and byways of the country, was in any sense a force capable of adequately or worthily succeeding the men who preceded them, of which any commanding officer in South Africa now would say were a real accession to the fighting strength of the army. That is a point on which I hope we shall have some satisfactory assurance from the Government before this debate is over. But the main thing, as I have said, as to the actual situation is to choose the best means open to us to bring the war to an end; and if the Government, in addition to their proclamation, can satisfy the House and the country that such a force as I have indicated is there and will continue to be maintained there until the war is over, I do not for myself doubt that these brave men, who, in what they conceive to be a good cause, have fought for months and years against desperate odds, will yield, as in the end they must yield, to the inevitable, with the knowledge that when the surrender takes place the Government of this country is bound as much by considerations of policy as of honour to give them the most generous terms it is possible for statesmanship to grant.

I pass from that to another matter, not referred to in the debate, and upon which I think we ought to have definite assurances before Parliament dissolves—namely, the future arrangements for the administration of the annexed territories. I should like, in the first place, to know with more explicitness than anything yet given to us what the Government propose as regards the civil administration of the two Republics. We know that Lord Milner is to be High Commissioner, and I for one, as I have said many times before, have the utmost confidence in his administration. But it is not the least use having in supreme command and at the head of the administrative machine a man in whom you have confidence unless the subordinate and delegated powers are carefully watched. As regards the Transvaal, we have the Chief Justice and the Attorney General, men of proved reputation and capacity; but I should like to know more than anything yet told us about the district magistrates who are to administer the civil administrative areas into which the colonies are to be divided. I am not speaking of the personnel; but the right hon. Gentleman should tell us what will be their functions, what degree both of administrative and judicial control they will exercise, and subject to what jurisdiction they will carry on their work. There is a still more important question. We shall see probably in the months before the House reassembles something in the nature of a social reconstruction of these colonies. ["No."] At any rate, the first stages of what must necessarily be a long, laborious, and anxious process.

We have now 35,000 burghers as prisoners of war. Sooner or later they will have to be repatriated—taken back to their own country, and with more or less promptitude reinstated in the possession of their properties and farms. To anyone who looks to the future that must appear a most anxious question. What practical steps are to be taken in this process of repatriation? And what provision is to be made in the way of advancing money, and so forth, for the reacquirement, rebuilding, and restocking of their farms? There is on the Estimate a sum of £500,000 appropriated for this purpose. I very much doubt the adequacy of that sum. At any rate, we should like to know broadly and approximately how the money is going to be spent, under what supervision, by what machinery, and in what parts of the country.

Another question quite as important for the future administration of these territories is the position of the native races. I have always thought—though my opinion is not universally shared by my hon. friends on this side of the House—that, quite apart from the injustice of the Uitlanders, the great blot and stain on the Boer Government in South Africa was its treatment of the native races. We had a debate recently on the question of the Pass Laws which regulate native labour in the mines on the Rand. I have always thought myself, and having listened to that debate I think the result was to show, that, whether by weakness or corruption, the laws passed by the South African Republic in relation to the natives were laws which it was impossible to defend. I do not think that there is any single respect in which the substitution of British for Boer government will have a wider or a more beneficial effect than in the substitution for these laws—badly conceived, imperfectly and unsympathetically administered—by the administration of a man of tried capacity like Sir Godfrey Lagden, whose function will be to stand on the one hand as protector of the natives between them and the white capitalists, and on the other to see that their rights and privileges are adequately secured.

There is another branch of the question which has received insufficient attention, and on which we should be glad to get assurances from His Majesty's Government. I refer to that department of the law so important for the Rand which goes by the name of the Liquor Law. A law was passed by the Legislature of the South African Republic, which on paper was very stringent, dealing with the illicit supply of liquor to the natives. But it was habitually and systematically avoided; and it is indisputably proved that the sale of bad alcohol to native labourers habitually incapacitated no less than 12 per cent. out of a population of 88,000. It was not that the law was bad, but that it was inadequately carried out. Hon. Members who are familiar with the proceedings which immediately preceded the outbreak of war will remember the murder of a lady, the wife of a Wesleyan minister in that part of the world. That murder was supposed to have been instigated—and not, I fear, without some foundation—by persons interested in this illicit liquor traffic. That was only one, though perhaps the crowning and capital case, of many illus- trations of the social evils which resulted from the imperfect enforcement of the law. We know that the Rand is to be reopened, and that native labour is to resort there again. The Pass Laws, as we hope and believe, are to be modified in a humane and progressive sense. But that declaration of policy, satisfactory as far as it goes, would be rendered infinitely more satisfactory if the right hon. Gentleman could assure us that, as regards this important question of the supply of liquor to the natives, if the old Boer law is to be re-enacted, it is to be enforced with adequate administrative supervision. I have dwelt on these points in detail, which are of immense importance as regards the ultimate settlement of these territories, and I earnestly hope that on all these vital issues we shall receive satisfactory assurances.

Looking largely and broadly at the future, it seems to me that there are three main things upon which for the next few months, at any rate, our efforts ought to be concentrated. The first is to bring the war to a prompt, satisfactory, and final conclusion. The next is to take such steps as are necessary to prevent the possibility of a recurrence of those dangers out of which the war itself originated. And the third is, both as regards the white and the native population, to lay, at any rate, the first stone in the foundation of what we all hope may be an enduring fabric of liberty and justice.

MR. A. J. BALFOUR

I presume it is quite unnecessary to assure the House or the right hon. Gentleman that I do not rise to reply to him in any polemical spirit. With the great mass of his observations, indeed with the whole of his positive statements, I feel myself in complete agreement so far as I know. And if I rise at all it is not with the view of replying to his argument, but solely with the view of answering those questions which he has put to us. The right hon. Gentleman began by paying a well-earned tribute to the work of the British troops in South Africa at the present time. He told us in eloquent language that they were now engaged upon a task which was despoiled perhaps to some extent by the scintillation which necessarily attended the earlier and more dramatic stages of the war, and he pointed out to us that they were, nevertheless, showing those great qualities of perseverance and endurance which deserve here the gratitude of our country. Sir, I think the troops deserve all the praise which the right hon. Gentleman has given to them, but I would say also that those qualities which he has so justly laid to their credit are no new qualities on behalf of the troops of this country. After all, in countless obscure contests in many parts of the world—I might perhaps specify particularly Burma, where for two years a dangerous and laborious, and in a certain sense inglorious, or, at any rate, not dramatic, war was carried on by the troops of this country—we have always counted, and we have counted with absolute assurance, on the fact that our troops do not depend upon the laudations which they may receive at home or the interest they may excite for the absolutely steady, continuous, courageous, and persevering persistence with which they carry out the duties entrusted to them.

The right hon. Gentleman asked me some questions about our policy with regard to the troops in South Africa, and I think some phrases which fell from him almost indicated doubt in his mind whether we have not settled on a policy of withdrawing troops irrespective of the military situation in South Africa. I can assure him and the House that that is not the ease. We have every reason to hope that we shall be able to withdraw troops from South Africa, and, while we withdraw troops from South Africa, to start those civil and peaceful pursuits which are both the earnest of peace and the greatest guarantee that peace is to be maintained. But unless the military situation makes such a course absolutely expedient from a purely military point of view, not a horse, or a man will be withdrawn from South Africa. It is the military situation itself which dominates the whole situation, and though we are of opinion that we can without doubt, or, at all events, in all probability, make a great reduction in the number of our troops, and at the same time, I will not say make a beginning, because a begin- ning has already been made, to increase the growth of those industries upon which the financial prosperity of the Transvaal depends—unless we see our way to do that the right hon. Gentleman and the House may depend upon it that we shall sacrifice nothing in the way of military efficiency.

The right hon. Gentleman, following, I think, something that fell from the right hon. Baronet who spoke earlier in the evening, rather criticised the qualities of the Yeomanry.

MR. ASQUITH

The new Yeomanry.

MR. A. J. BALFOUR

Which has recently been sent to South Africa. I am glad the right hon. Gentleman has emphasised the qualification, which no doubt appeared in his speech, between the new Yeomanry and the soldiers, because nobody has ventured to criticise either the training or the quality of those drafts we have sent out to keep the regiments up to strength in South Africa. But to return again to the new Yeomanry. I should say that it is the fact that that Yeomanry went out in an untrained condition. It went out in an untrained condition on the distinct advice of our military advisers in South Africa and here. Their view was that the training could be effected there, and I believe that the new Yeomanry are now, in many parts of the country, doing admirable service, and that probably in this House and out of it we shall speak of them in very different terms a month or two hence from those which some of the critics have adopted in the recent past. I do not know that I need say anything more, so far as the right hon. Gentleman's speech is concerned, with regard to the military situation.

Questions have been showered upon us by those who say they ought to have an accurate view of the military situation before the House separates for the holidays. We have told them our view of the military situation. We have given them the information at our disposal, and I really do not know what more we can say which would enlighten them on the subject. But let it be remembered that, while it is comparatively easy to give an account of a military situation in which great organised forces are opposed to one another in a limited field, to give an account of a theatre of operations in which the enemy are scattered in small and disorganised bands, and separated from each other by large districts, is really a practical impossibility; and the idea of presenting to the House a tactical or strategical survey of the present situation really would be a practical impossibility. The House knows perfectly well that the enemy, diminished in numbers, deprived of their supplies and their ammunition, are divided into small bands who unite or dissipate as the military situation suggests, and I could not venture to give the House any account which would enlighten them, or which would add to the knowledge which they, in common with the Government, possess of the present military position.

MR. LLOYD-GEORGE

What is the position in the Cape?

MR. A. J. BALFOUR

The position in the Cape, undoubtedly, it is true, as has been said by more than one hon. Member, is less satisfactory than it is either in the Transvaal or the Orange River Colony. But, though less satisfactory in degree, it is the same in quality. It is, again, a contest between organised and disorganised bodies. It is still a contest between small bands who dissipate and scatter as soon as our forces approach them, who, no doubt, derive support and assistance from the inhabitants of the district in which they find themselves, who are in a very difficult country, and who, therefore, it is very difficult to hunt down, but with regard to whom "hunting down" is the word which appropriately describes the situation. It is not the strategical or tactical operations between two equally organised bodies constituting two hostile armies.

I pass from the military situation to say one or two words in answer to the questions which the right hon. Gentleman has put to me. He thinks, in my judgment he quite rightly thinks, that the interest of the future is not a military but a social interest, and his anxiety is not so much as to the issue of the war as it is with regard to the procedure to be adopted by this country when the war has come to an end. But I would venture to point out to the right hon. Gentleman that we really have given as full an account of our policy in this respect as the present situation renders it advisable to give. He knows, and the House knows, for my right hon. friend has clearly described it in previous speeches, that we propose to have a Governor, Lord Milner, with a Council in which there will be nominated members, and ultimately, I hope, as the transition to the full government of a self-governing colony, elected members. But that is in the future. He knows that we mean to govern all the white population with equal laws, and he knows that we mean to apply to the native population all those humanitarian principles which, I think, are dear to every party and every section of opinion in this country. With regard to the native laws, the right hon. Gentleman asked me two specific questions. One was what we mean to do with regard to the labour laws, and the other was what we mean to do with regard to the liquor laws.

On the labour laws, it will be remembered by the House that we had a long debate only a few days ago, and I think my right hon. friend, in a speech which is probably fresh in the recollection of every man who heard it, explained the general policy which the Government mean to pursue in that matter. It is recognised on all hands that it is a delicate question. It is recognised on all hands that it is not a question on which formulae can be scattered over the House and embodied in speeches with reckless disregard of the peculiar circumstances and history of the Cape Colony. But it will be sufficient to reiterate and re-emphasise what my right hon. friend said in the clearest language, which was that, in the first place, we mean to reform and revise the labour laws, and, in the second place, that we mean to administer them with purity and with equity.

As regards the liquor laws, my right hon. friend has been in communication with all those interested in the question—a question which it is admitted on all hands is vital to the future prosperity and civilisation of the native races of South Africa. Unquestionably the liquor laws were not well administered by the late Republic. Unquestionably, everybody who has looked into this subject is of opinion that the ordinary liquors which are imported by com- mercial agents should not, and cannot, be allowed to be sold to the natives, and we are already administering the population on that principle. I do not wish to deceive the House in any way, but I am given to understand that what is called Kaffir beer, a mild beer of native production, is not a thing it would be wise to totally prohibit. But as regards imported spirits as we know them, the various forms of "German gin" and other liquors of that kind, we are clearly of opinion that it is absolutely necessary to put the sale of such death-dealing instruments under the severest restrictions. I do not know that there is any other question which the right hon. Gentleman has asked me which requires an answer.

Is it necessary for me, in conclusion, to emphasise once more what has been said over and over again from these benches, and has been re-echoed, I believe, from many platforms in all parts of the country—namely, that neither the Government, nor the party to which the Government belong, nor the country at large are animated in the smallest degree by a vindictive spirit against those who are ranged against us in the field? We think—we on this bench at all events think—that the war has been unduly prolonged—unduly prolonged not from the point of view of our interests, but from the point of view of the interests of these Republics—these colonies. Let me say in that connection that we do not think that the difficulty, when peace has once been restored, of bringing back civilisation and industrial pursuits will be so great as the right hon. Gentleman appears to suppose. After all, the rural population of these countries does not belong to the highly organised communities with which we are most familiar. The amount of public loans that will be required in order to enable them to resume their pastoral pursuits is not so great as, perhaps, some people suppose; nor is the difficulty of reinstating them in their farms under reasonable conditions such as need make the administrator of the Transvaal or those in this country who are responsible for supervising the administration of the Transvaal feel that they have before them an insoluble problem. I do not believe that will prove to be a great difficulty. If it does not, if as soon as the war is terminated the arts of peace begin to flourish, if farms begin to be re-stocked and re-built, if the great industries of the Rand again flourish, I think our present critics and future historians will be astonished at the rapidity with which not merely the former degree of prosperity of these communities is attained, but a degree of prosperity to which they have been wholly a stranger. A degree of wealth which they have never known will prove how easy it may be under good Government, with free institutions, with equal rights, to restore a country which has been devastated through all these months by the passage of armed bands from end to end. In that hope I think this House of Commons may separate for the holidays. I think we may reasonably expect that when next year we reassemble to consider these high questions of policy we may find that warlike operations have practically ceased, that the arts of peace have begun to resume their sway, and that already we have no small promise of that future harvest of prosperity which I confidently anticipate from British rule.