HC Deb 28 May 1900 vol 83 cc1561-8
MR. SWIFT MACNEILL (Donegal, S.)

I wish to recall the House from things spiritual to things temporal. We have been listening for a considerable time to a discussion on the question of religious education; I want to raise a point which has nothing to do with education. The authorities at the War Office, for all I know to the contrary, are grown-up people, but one thing I respectfully submit to the House is, that they have yet to learn the very first principles of the Christian religion, to do unto others as they would that others should do unto them. My opinions about this war are perfectly well known, and I am not going to repeat them. What I am going to do is to endeavour to bring before the House of Commons—not before the War Office, but through the House of Commons to the country—the terrible grievance under which the officers and men of the Royal Irish Fusilier Regiments have suffered at the hands of the Government in reference to promotion. The Irish regiments have been practically annihilated; vacancies have been created by deaths, wounds, or disease, and, would it be believed, those vacancies have been filled not by the gentlemen who fought and bled in the war, but by English importations, gentlemen brought in who were never on the field, but who were War Office favourites. That is a very strong and serious observation to make. If I prove it it will come home to the meanest intelligence that the War Office is simply a hot-bed of favouritism. I will bring before the House the case of one regiment of which I have the honour to know something, namely, the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. That regiment when it embarked for the war on 5th November was no fewer than 1,135 strong. They wont to the Natal Campaign, and they were placed by Sir Redvers Buller in the forefront, but never mentioned in the dispatches. On the 24th February, after the final crossing of the Tugela, only twenty-five men and one officer answered to their names. The regiment lost no fewer than twelve officers on 10th December at the battle of Colenso, and fourteen out of fifteen at the battle of the Tugela on the 24th February, and the only unwounded officer died of enteric fever at Ladysmith. This very day I casually caught sight of an illustration in one of the illustrated weeklies representing the remnant of the officers of this Irish regiment, and it gives the portraits of a captain, two subalterns, and a quartermaster, the only ones to escape actually unscathed. How have they been rewarded? These vacancies, which ought to have; been filled up by the gentlemen who survived, have been filled up, not by them at all, but from other sources by Lord Wolseley and his Board of Officers, the Board of Officers being creatures of Lord Wolseley's nomination. Colonel Thackeray, the splendid commander of this regiment, fell at Colon so, but the second in command was not given his place. A gentleman from another regiment in India was brought in, and by the course which has been taken two steps have been lost in the promotion of the officers who fought and bled in the campaign. It is quite possible that by these gentlemen being brought in from other regiments without military experience some of these gallant fellows will have to leave the Army because they will not have received the necessary promotion by the time their retirement become necessary under the age limit. These are not isolated instances. I have received letters from military men, but for obvious reasons I cannot mention names. One says— You have done a very great kindness to the officer by questioning Mr. Wyndham with reference to the promotion of officers in the regiment, but I am sorry to see how evasively he replied to your questions. As a matter of fact, one, if not two, of the majors of other regiments have been gazetted to this regiment lieutenant-colonels over the heads of those who fought and bled in the South African war, and neither of them have ever seen a shot fired… I think you will agree with me that this son of back-door influence is most unjust to the officers of the Royal Irish Fusiliers. I have also received a letter from the mother of one of the officers who fell. She tells me about her son, and then she speaks about the officers brought in from other regiments, and she says she is speaking for the officers who remain, but she can understand their feelings by thinking how hard it would have been for her own boy to have missed his captaincy by this treatment. Then my informant goes on to say— I would not mind my name being published, but for the fact that I have a nephew in the service, and if they knew? had been in communication with you, they would wreak their vengeance on him. [Ministerial laughter.] I notice that hon. Gentlemen opposite laugh, but I do not think that they actually realise the gravity of the matter. Now I come to the Highland Brigade. In reply to questions which I put to him the Under Secretary of State for War told mo that he would deal with the subject on the discussion of the War Office Vote. I will now leave the subject of that shameful act on the Tugela, and I wish to allude to the 78th Highlanders, now known as the Sea forths, who were practically decimated at Magersfontoin. There they lost eight officers killed and twelve wounded, while 385 men were disabled, of whom 112 wore killed. Again I ask the Under Secretary of State for War, as I have asked him before by questions in the House, to state who gave the order to the three Highland regiments — of which the Seaforths wore one—to march in quarter-column in the dark without scouts? On a previous occasion when I mentioned this question I could not give the name of my informant, but since then I have received from him a most assuring letter, in which he says he will gladly give me any information he has. Sir G. Lockhart was the man who gave me that information. These men at Magersfontein lost their lives through the disastrous incompetence of the War Office, who are now shielding those who were responsible for the disaster. The War Office is simply a hot-bed of favourites. We know the cruel way in which the name of Colonel Long, who was supposed to have lost the guns at the Tugola, was paraded before the public in this country. We also know how other disastrous transactions in other parts of South Africa have been shielded. We do not know a word about the officer who is responsible for the loss of the convoy at Koorn Spruit. That convoy must have been lost through the negligence of the officer who was second in command, and the name of that officer has not yet been given. Evidently he is not a mere man of the ordinary Inniskilling regiment, or a mere hard - working soldier, and perhaps he is one of the Guards. Why is this officer not punished? I am not asking for this from any personal motive, for I do not care whose name it happens to be. I am not asking it simply out of curiosity. will now give the House a few extracts from the columns of The Times which have appeared in no fewer than three loading articles asking for the name of the culprit. On the 12th of April last a leading article appeared in The Times, from which the following is a quotation— What is the explanation of the Boer success at Koorn Spruit? Why did nobody fire a rifle to alarm that portion of the convoy with their guns behind even at the sacrifice of his life? Why did those who were first captured think they had nothing to do but to obey the Boer orders, and so facilitate the defeat of their comrades? There are other particulars about this officer which need elucidation. We have yet to hear the name of the escort officer who, personally, is the man wholly responsible for the surprise. Why has it been held back, and why have we not been furnished with his explanation? On the 30th of April, The Times again referred to this question, and stated— Olivier's plan was clever and it was well executed, but it succeeded only because somebody, whose name has not yet been given to the public—though it must be known to thousands at Bloemfontem—was guilty of gross and culpable carelessness. Explanations of this officer's conduct may be forthcoming, but on the facts as at present known, they are very sorely needed. On the 2nd of May last, the writer in The Times says— When Mr. Balfour was asked whether he proposed to discuss the Koorn Spruit incident on Friday, his reply was that there is no published despatch upon it. This despatch will have to he published and adequate reasons will have to be given for any delay in its publication that may have occurred. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, with a true front bench mind, would be satisfied apparently by a further discussion towards the end of the session. The public will not be satisfied with this. I have received a letter from a gentleman who is one of the most distinguished men in the Army. I will read one extract, and one only, from his letter. With reference to the Koorn Spruit incident he says— Did you see that the Duke of Teck lost all his outfit in the capture of the convoy? Would it be legitimate for you to inquire whether this is the case, and if he has received compensation; whether the officer responsible would be required to reimburse his Serene Highness for the loss of his outfit? These are questions which I want to put to the First Lord of the Treasury in reference to this war, but I am afraid it would not be legitimate of me to put such questions of the Paper, for they would hardly pass the Chief Clerk. There is one thing which has not been discussed, and upon which the hon. Gentleman has not given me any information. I allude to the relations which existed between Mr. Cecil Rhodes and the officers and men who wore defending Kimberley. I think my contention is a fair one. I should like to know whether it is true that Lord Methuen was ordered to take Kimberley at all costs simply because Mr. Cecil Rhodes was there.

SIR E. ASHMEAI) - BARTLETT (Sheffield, Ecclesall)

There were 45,000 people at Kimberley.

MR. SWIFT MACNEILL

I asked the hon. Gentleman whether the military commander, Colonel Kekewich, had not on the 10th of February given the Diamond Fields Advertiser a warning in reference to Mr. Rhodes' conduct, and he told mo that he had no published information about it. I have now got the incriminating paper itself which, is Mr. Rhodes' journal. Nothing is mentioned in the despatches about these matters, and nothing but praise of Mr. Rhodes appears in them. Mr. Rhodes went up to Kimberley in order that he might control the campaign, and he did control it through the help of his creatures in the War Office. Is it true that during the siege Mr. Rhodes ordered Colonel Keke- wich, the commander, out of his room, and treated other English officers with the same disrespect? Not one word of these transactions has been told to the British public. Every drop of blood which was shed in this northern campaign was shed, not in the interest of the country but in the interest of Mr. Rhodes. I wish to say that nothing I have said in the course of this discussion has been dictated by any personal feeling towards the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for War. I draw the greatest possible distinction between the hon. Gentleman and some of the clerks at the War Office, who have dictated the answers to be given in this House. A minister has, no doubt, a perfect right to refuse to answer a question; but that minister has no right to allow himself to be made the conduit pipe for false information supplied by the War office clerks. If the hon. Gentleman will say that the information was false, and that he has been guilty, quite unintentionally, of conveying a false impression, I shall be the first to withdraw my accusation. I asked the Under Secretary for War twice a question in regard to Lord Methuen's despatch in reference to the battle of Magersfontein, and he replied that it was the form, and not the substance, of Lord Methuen's despatch which was taken exception to.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE NOR WAR (Mr. WYNDHAM, Dover)

I say so now.

MR. SWIFT MACNEILL

I do ask the hon. Gentleman not to be too previous by repeating that, for I wish to protect him against himself. To say that the difference between the original despatch and the one which was substituted was only one of form and not of substance is untrue. The private telegrams which passed between the War Office and Lord Roberts in regard to Spion Kop have been laid before the public. There is one telegram furnished by the Commander-in-Chief on the 10th of February, 1900, in reference to Lord Methuen's despatch. The idea was that the despatches with reference to Spion Kop should be revised or edited after the plan of Lord Methuen's despatch. I say that matters of the utmost importance were kept out of a revised despatch—matters which it is said would have given important informa- tion to the enemy if published. How can the hon. Gentleman state to me in the face of these facts that the difference between these despatches is simply one of form and not of substance? I think there ought to be some standard of truth and accuracy even amongst War Office officials, and the hon. Gentleman should take care not to make himself the conduit pipe of false information. I say that there has been during this war an improper suppression of despatches, and I will give some instances. Sir William Butler, the late Commander-in-Chief in South Africa, made a statement in reference to the fortifications of Natal, and that despatch has never been published, although Sir William Butler has been covered with obloquy, and has been made a target for all sorts of charges. That despatch, which would have cleared Sir William Butler of blame, is still in the archives of the War Office. Even Colonel Long has never had an opportunity of giving his account of the transaction of Colenso, though he has stated that he acted under orders from Sir Redvers Buller himself. Of course, he is only one of the ordinary class, and he must lie under this serious charge while the hero of Koorn Spruit is to be protected. It is a well-known fact that three or four days before the battle of Magersfontoin, Colonel Gough refused to obey orders. He was sent home, but his conduct was never investigated, because such an investigation could not take place without inquiries into Lord Methuen's conduct taking place at the same time. I see that Colonel Gough has just been offered an appointment, and why? Simply to shut his mouth as to what has been going on. I put a question to the hon. Gentleman asking what explanation the War Office had to make in regard to the statement made by Sir George White on the 6th of March that he was on the point of being dismissed by the War Office, but that Sir Eedvers Buller prevented his dismissal. That statement was also made by Mr. Winston Churchill and it appeared in the Morning Post. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will be able to tell us something about that point. The system adopted by the War Office appears to be to expose the poor and needy and to protect the highly paid. At Paardeberg our troops were marched out without proper ambulances or medical staff. A large number of our men were killed and wounded. The wounded men amounted to some 800, and they were put into wagons and Capo carts and were rolled about for hours over the boulders. But because Lord Kitchener was in command no investigation was made, and we have not heard one single word about Lord Kitchener's conduct in this matter. I accuse the War Office of being harsh and heartless in its treatment of the poor, and of running the whole business in the interests of a very few persons who have influence in society and who exercise great influence at the War Office. I have shown that the Government have treated the Irish regiments in a manner which is an insult to the memory of every Irish officer who has lost his life. Men who have earned reward have been passed over. At the time of the Crimean War the then Secretary for War wrote a letter to the commander of the forces, which was read in the House of Commons, asking him to take care of poor Dunne. The Dunnes of the War Office are now being protected also by the "Lansdowneising" of these despatches. I would ask the hon. Gentleman's specific attention to the manner in which the Irish officers have boon passed over, and also to the shameful way in which the Scotch brigade and General Wauchope were sacrificed. The fathers, the mothers, and the sisters of the men who fell require an explanation for the blood of those dear to them, and the explanation that Rhodes had to be protected and that the interests of German Jews had to be safeguarded will not be sufficient.

Attention called to the fact that forty Members were not present (Dr. TANNER, Cork County, Mid). House counted, and forty Members being found present—