HC Deb 26 June 1900 vol 84 cc1187-203

Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Amendment [21st June] proposed to Question [21st Juno], "That the Bill be now read a second time."

And which Amendment was— To leave out the word 'now,' and at the end of the Question to add the words 'upon this day three months.'"—(Mr. Birrell.)

Question again proposed.

Debate resumed.

*MR. MARKS (Tower Hamlets, St. George's)

said there seemed to be a general consensus of opinion that the evils which had been disclosed by the practice of a certain class of moneylenders required to be dealt with by the legislature, and there could be no doubt that the recent exposures of money-lending vampires should be dealt with without delay. But, at the same time, the House did not desire that the treatment of the evils should be characterised by any injustice to any class, and it was a matter for careful consideration as to what extent they would be justified in making the Bill then before the House retroactive. Under the Bill, if it became law, it would not be only a matter of pro-venting evil in the future but of undoing contracts already effected. The Bill proposed to prevent the extortions and in many cases the swindles which had been perpetrated by men of the Isaac Gordon stamp under a variety of aliases, by requiring all money-lenders to register themselves as such in their own names. But for all practical purposes such an enactment, without further safeguards than the Bill provided, would not be worth the paper it was written upon. It was nothing more than playing to the gallery. Any money-lender who desired to carry on business had only to go to a highly respectable solicitor and incorporate himself into a company and the solicitor would be quite prepared to lend seven clerks as signatories to the articles of association, and these money-lenders under some alias or other in the form of a company could carry on business as before. It might be said that we could get behind the company, but that could not be done, because the shares could be issued to bearer, and Isaac Gordon, Limited, could carry on exactly the same as before the com- pany was formed. A money-lender could form as many companies as he pleased, and the business could still be conducted under the alias of one or a dozen companies. Men of the Isaac Gordon type would be able to conceal themselves behind the Companies Act, and they would go a step further as a company than they did as private individuals. They would explain to their clients that under this Bill they could only lend at fifteen per cent., but they would further explain that they were only in a position to lend money to their own shareholders, and if the client was not a shareholder he would be told he would have to take forty-five £1 shares for every £100 advanced before any business could be entered into. The price of those shares added to the fifteen per cent. would bring it up to the traditional 60 percent. What was a money-lender? Who was the-money-lender who was to register himself? The definition given in the Bill was, "Every person whose business was to lend money or who advertised, or otherwise held himself out as carrying on that business." Solicitors held themselves out as carrying on that business. Were they to be included in the operation of the Bill They were not exempted in definite terms; and if it was intended that they should be exempted, what became of the other classes—the capitalist who lent money on the Stock Exchange, who did not limit his interest to 15 per cent. or 30 per cent? If 15 per cent. was the limit imposed by the State great difficulty would be experienced in carrying over some mining accounts. These were points which ought to be considered, because, although the Bill was aimed at the 60 per cent. sharpers of the West End, it was not aimed at the highly respectable 30 per cent. capitalist in the City. It appeared to him that the only way in which a man could discover, if this Bill came into operation, whether he was a money-lender or not would be to get himself prosecuted, and then if he were convicted he would know he was a money-lender, but if he were discharged he would know he was not. He could not regard the Bill as a serious, remedy for the great evil which undoubtedly did exist.


said the hon. Gentleman who had just addressed the House had shown, the ingenious de- vices by which money-lenders would be able to keep outside the limits of this measure when it became law. He admired the ingenuity of the hon. Member, but he doubted the efficacy of his methods. Even if the hon. Gentleman were right there was no reason why the House should not pass a measure dealing with a great many of the evils complained of. He desired to remove one or two misconceptions with regard to the Bill. One misconception was that the Bill implied that all moneylenders were scoundrels and swindlers. Nothing in the Bill justified any such suggestion. Many money-lending transactions were most advantageous to the borrowers themselves. Many persons require a loan for a short time, and it was extremely advantageous for them to be able to get it even at a high rate of interest. There were many money-lenders in the country who carried on their business in a legitimate manner, as advantageous to the borrower as to themselves. At the same time considerable abuses had grown up which would have to be done away with. Another misconception was that this Bill aimed at the revival of the usury laws. If that were so he should oppose it. He believed any attempt to revive the usury laws would be both useless and wrong. A high rate of interest was by no means an indication of fraud. It often happened that a man could advantageously borrow for a short time at a rate of interest which would amount to a very high rate per annum. As to two-thirds of the Bill, there was practical agreement. The chief controversy had arisen as to Clause I. Clause I. of the Bill was a clause whichought to be supported, because it embodied the principle that where a money-lender was proved to have made a harsh and unconscionable bargain with a borrower the transaction might be reopened by the Court and adjusted. This was a principle which had for generations been acted upon in our Courts of Equity. The objection that this was an interference with freedom of contract was unsound, because there could be no freedom of contract where there was weakness on the one side, and advantage taken of that weakness on the other. Such a condition of things made it impossible that there could be any freedom of contract in the transaction. But if the clause was to be passed into law it would require amending in certain particulars. First it provided that where the Court "had reason to believe" that a certain state of things had arisen it might interfere. That must be altered so as to read "where the Court is satisfied on the evidence." A second point was this. The Bill provided that the Court had to be satisfied that the rate of interest charged by the money-lender exceeded the sum mentioned in the schedule. The amount of interest charged was not a criterion of the bona fides or the mala fides of the transaction, and he suggested that all mention of the rate of interest should be left out, and that it should be left to the Court to decide, upon all the circumstances of the case, whether or not a bargain was a harsh and unconscionable one. There was a third point. The great majority of these cases would come before the County Court. As the law stood, there was no appeal from the County Court on questions of fact; and, therefore, when the County Court had decided that a bargain was harsh and unconscionable, which was a question of fact, and had reopened the transaction, there could be no appeal. He thought it was important when giving County Courts this extended jurisdiction that we should subject them to a right of appeal. Such an amendment would have a double effect. It would make the County Court more careful, and probably would not greatly increase the cost, because the unconscionable money-lender would be very loth to advertise himself in a second Court. He supported the Bill because it would remedy admitted abuses, while it would not inflict any injustice upon a class in which there were many deserving and honourable members.


congratulated the hon. Gentleman upon the access of an enthusiastic supporter of this somewhat extraordinary measure. The only other cordial speech in its favour was that delivered by the hon. the Secretary to the Local Government Board, and his parental relation to the Bill somewhat biassed his opinion in regard to the matter. The hon. and learned Member for York had no doubt enthusiastically defended the one clause of this measure which he should have thought would have elicited the condemnation of every legal Member of the House. His hon. friend was in favour of conferring upon a judicial tribunal the right of setting aside a bargain, not in accordance with the application of any defined legal principles, but in accordance with the view the members of that tribunal might take of certain abstract principles of humanity and philanthropy. They were to unmake a bargain, not because it was opposed to statute; they were not to determine that it involved a restraint of trade, or was against any defined principles; they were to have the assistance of no principle either from the common law or from statute, but they were to appeal to the realm of ethics or moral philosophy, and from the inner consciousness they were supposed, somewhat rashly, to possess, they were to come to the conclusion that the bargain was what the Bill described as "harsh and unconscionable." And if they arrived at that conclusion, without any control or appeal, the assent of the parties was to be set aside, and an entirely new contract was to be made by the Court. With all respect to his hon. friend, such a principle was absolutely foreign, he had almost said, to the jurisprudence of any civilised country; at any rate it was utterly unknown to our own. What reason had we to imagine that our judges were educated in any system which would entitle them to exercise this new jurisprudence with advantage to the community? Judges were sometimes lawyers; but what right had we to suppose that they were philanthropists? What reason had we to imagine that they had been educated in any system of humanity or ethics? How were we to infer that the average county court judge might take an enlightened view of what was harsh in the commercial relations between a lender and a borrower of money? And what assistance did we give him in arriving at the conclusion that the relation he was asked to adjudicate upon was unconscionable in its character? His hon. and learned friend the Attorney General had said that the opposition to this measure was founded upon a most complete misconception as to its real meaning. He would like the Attorney General to tell the House what meaning he attached to the word "harsh," and what was his abstract definition of the word "unconscionable"? Suppose that two men of adult age and average familiarity with affairs enter, on equal terms, and without any intention of fraud, into a contract, it might be to pay 60 per cent. for a loan of money for a short period, how were we to decide that it was "harsh"? Were we to appeal to the inner consciousness of the County Court Judge? If that Judge thought that 50 per cent. would have been enough, was he to set aside the transaction? What did the word "unconscionable" mean? Did it mean fraudulent? If so, the existing law-was sufficient, because if a bargain were fraudulent it might be set aside as well as if the word "unconscionable" had been used. Did it mean harsh? If so, the word "harsh" was enough. So that we get a piece of rhetorical legislation by which a County Court Judge, on no defined principle or regulation to guide him, and subject to no review, was to sot aside a bargain because in his opinion the borrower might have secured more favourable terms. In the very able and ingenious speech made by the hon. and learned Member for York, we were told that the application of principles of this kind was not unknown in the existing law, and that a Judge set aside a contract if it was in restraint of trade. But in such a case there were well-defined principles of law given to the Judge for application to the case. What was the real blemish in this measure, assuming that there was some case for a change in the law? The measure dealt solely with the harshness attending the initial transaction. It left out of sight altogether the harshness attending the enforcement of the bargain. The cases which appealed to the signatories of the Report of the Select Committee were nearly all cases in which the lender ruthlessly sought to impose his bargain at a time when the borrower was entirely at his mercy. The lender who has lent his money on terms might be guilty of great barbarity. The bargain of Antonio and Shylock was a bargain which Antonio applauded. The infamy was the enforcement of the contract. And so we might get a transaction on terms which were not unfair; but if the lender sought to enforce it at a time when the borrower was unable to pay, that difficulty could be dealt with by the existing law. This measure would introduce untold confusion into the administration of the law in this country. It was said that we would drive money-lending beyond the four seas, that we would force it underground and into subterfuges, and compel the moneylender to take refuge in subterranean channels. He was told that an entirely new department had been created in the jewellery trade—a man bought diamonds at 150 per cent. more than they were worth, and then borrowed money upon them, and left the diamonds in the hands of the lender as security for a loan. Another illustration was the incorporation of a company with the provision that the borrower should become a shareholder of the company. It was impossible, while there were men who wished to borrow money and had no credit, and men who wished to lend money, and were prepared to take the risk of its never being repaid, to prevent transactions of that kind. Then they would have in every County Court district a different standard as to what was harsh and unconscionable. One County Court Judge had announced that he would never enforce a bargain for a loan of money in which more than 5 per cent. was charged, no matter what the security might be. Another County Court Judge had decided that the borrower should have a fortnight's grace before being called upon to pay the money. Thus there would be districts in which the money-lender would flourish, and others in which he would be strangled out of existence. All this confusion would take place because there was not in the Bill any defined legal principle which could be applied to all these transactions. There was no specific test which could either be proved or disproved, but only the inner consciousness of a class of men who had no special experience in appeals to the principles of economics and humanity, to which the law did not apply. Having regard to that view, he appealed to the House not to give way to the sentiment which had produced this Bill. It had been produced with good intentions, but it would not yield the wished for results. An hon. Member had pointed out that there was an enormous discrepancy in the opinion of Judges as to the punishment of crime. Did we wish to extend that element of uncertainty into other branches of the law? If there was anything more deplorable than another in the administration of the law, it was the inequality of the sentences for offences against the person and larceny. The Home Office and the Judges themselves had very considerable perplexity in connection with the infliction of punishment attending the commission of crime, although there was a great body of tradition and a large body of opinion among the members of the judicial staff to assist them. But what would be the uncertainty if fifty-six tribunals in the country had cast upon them the duty, without any guide, to determine what they considered harsh and unconscionable He quite agreed that the law required altering, and he would gladly have supported a moderate measure upon the lines the Attorney General seemed to have in his mind when he rose to support the Second Reading of the Bill. He said a good deal about the first clause; that we should register the money-lender, should regulate the carrying on of his trade, and prohibit issue of circulars to young men under age and improvident. All that was admirable, and if the Government had been content to introduce a measure of that class, and content with re-defining the common law of fraud, he would have supported it. Let them re-define the common law in all classes of fraud, and enact that, unless a money-lender could satisfy the Court that the borrower was a person of average intelligence with a fair knowledge of business, and thoroughly understood the interest he was to pay, and the conditions of his bargain, then the Court could set aside the bargain. He would go further and say, let the Government enlarge the common law of duress or provide a redefinition of duress, so that if it appeared that the moneylender was taking advantage of an apprehension of exposure and scandal on the borrower -in making the bargain, then the bargain should be set aside. He would support such a measure, because there we should have a legal principle which would allow the Judge to determine its application to a particular case. But if we were to call upon the judicial body in the administration of jurisprudence to be guided by no principle except their own humanity and sympathies, then we would introduce into purely commercial transactions an element which would lead to confusion and be of no advantage to the community.


I think it convenient to intervene at this stage, because I rather hope that after the time which has been devoted to the Bill the House may now come to a decision. I shall be very brief; and the first question I should like to ask the House is, what we are, on both sides of the House, agreed upon. I believe we are all agreed that the mere magnitude of interest charged on a sum of money is no reason for interfering with a bargain come to between lender and borrower. We are all agreed that an interest which, on the face of it, may seem extravagant, excessive, and, in the words of the Bill, almost harsh and unconscionable, may, if you look into the facts, prove an interest which does no more than secure the lender against the very probable failure of the borrower to repay the money. In other words, we are all agreed that we ought not, under a disguise, to attempt to revive the old and discredited usury laws. The second point on which we are all agreed is that there are some harsh, unconscionable, and tyrannical bargains to which it is absurd to apply the term freedom of contract at all—bargains which no moralist would support, which everyone would like to see broken, if they could be broken without the destruction of some very important principles. Where we differ is as to whether the particular machinery which the Bill provides for dealing with harsh and unconscionable bargains is of a kind which interferes illegitimately with freedom of contract between adult human beings, and whether the task we impose upon County Court Judges and other judicial authorities is a task which ought to be imposed on them and which they are competent to perform. On that point authorities differ in opinion. But let it not be supposed that there is agreement between the opponents of the Bill. The Bill has been opposed by hon. and learned Gentlemen on the other side of the House in very important speeches, not only for different reasons, but for reasons absolutely inconsistent with each other. There was the hon. and learned Member for West Fife, who interested and amused the House the other night for a considerable period, and was the first to lead the opposition to this Bill; and there was the hon. and learned Member for South Leeds. Well, these two learned Gentlemen are agreed upon nothing except in their opposition to the Bill. They absolutely and fundamentally differ otherwise. The hon. and learned Member for West Fife says that this equitable power to deal with harsh and unconscionable bargains is a power which from time immemorial has been inherent in our courts of law; that the principle of law which Clause 1 em- bodies is a principle of English law, and is not the creation of the revolutionary mind of my hon. friend the Under Secretary of the Local Government Board; on the contrary, it is a principle which all the greatest authorities on English law have for many generations extolled as one of the glories of our equity system. But the hon. and learned Gentleman who has just sat down brushes aside with one wave of his hand the whole equity system of the country. He says: Are you going to ask Judges untrained in moral philosophy and in the humanities to seek in their inner consciousness for principles to apply to questions of fact, to questions of law, between man and man? The hon. and learned Member for West Fife declares that Her Majesty's Judges are sufficiently trained in the humanities and in moral philosophy to be able to extract from their inner consciousness the very principles by which problems of this kind are to be decided. The hon. Member for South Leeds is not content with demolishing courts of equity and abolishing courts of criminal jurisprudence, but he tells us that we are already under the tyranny of moral philosophy and the humanities. He has explained to the House that you cannot avoid dealing with these problems; that every Judge who tries a criminal has to draw from his inner consciousness some moral estimate of the guilt of that criminal, and to apportion the sentence according to the estimate. Surely that is not a more difficult problem than is cast upon the Judges of the land by this Bill.


I say, do not extend it.


The hon. and learned Gentleman says the principle exists, but do not extend it; surely that implies that he dislikes the principle. I can say that by the confession of the lawyers in the House this kind of responsibility is, by the nature of the case, a responsibility which is forced on all the Judges, and has been deliberately undertaken by all our great Judges in equity. That being so, it seems to me that the argument of the hon. and learned Gentleman falls self-destroyed to the ground. Is it not as well to make the question clear on the face of our Statute-book that this kind of equitable jurisdiction which has been exercised by practical judges is really part of our law? I have been told, I and I have no doubt the story is true, that there have been County Court Judges so impressed by the iniquity of bargains otherwise strictly accurate and correct brought before them that they have given some such decision as this—that the debtor is indeed liable for the full amount claimed by the creditor, but that he need not pay that full amount except at a rate of a penny a week, or some trifling sum which will finally extinguish the debt at the Day of Judgment. That is the argument which was so powerfully put before the House by my hon. and learned friend the Member for Leamington. Is it a good thing that that kind of technicality should be forced on a Judge who feels that he is bound by his office to do equity? There is a famous instance of the way in which usurers may be used by technical courts, which the dramatic genius of Shakespeare has rendered immortal. For my own part, I have always thought that the expedient by which Portia demolished Shy lock was one of the most abominable pieces of technical special pleading that ever was contrived. Yes; but it was forced upon the Court because they had not got this Bill. If the principle of my hon. friend's Bill had then been in existence we should, no doubt, have been deprived of a dramatic masterpiece; but, on the other hand, Shylock would, I think, have been treated in a manner far more consistent with the dignity of a court of law than he appears to have been on the occasion to which I have referred. [Laughter.] The House laughs, but really these considerations are worthy of being held in mind. My hon. friend's Bill has been admitted by its opponents not to be revolutionary in its dealings with the law of this country. I have stated that in the view of the Government we have no desire to revive the usury laws in any disguise whatever. What we do desire is to prevent gross acts of tyranny against a small and very helpless class. We do not think we are injuring the legitimate money-lender, who performs a most useful and important function in the general social organism. The only thing we interfere with is the extravagant exercise of his power, which, in every age and in every country, has brought his profession into disrepute, and which, in some countries, has even threatened the public and social order of the community in which he lived. In these circumstances, I have no hesitation in recommending the House to give the Bill a Second Reading. Any Amendments which do not touch the principle of the Bill may easily and with advantage be introduced in the Bill in Committee.

MR. BECKETT (Yorkshire, N.R., Whitby)

I am sorry not to find in the speeches of the Leader of the House and a number of other members of the Government any consciousness of the fact that they are dealing with interests of vast magnitude to the small traders of the country. If the Government inform the House before the Second Reading is taken that they intend in Committee to withdraw the schedule, it will greatly facilitate the passing of the Bill.


was understood to say that it was the intention of the Government to withdraw the schedule in. Committee.


That will remove many objections to the Bill. I feel sure if the Bill had been drawn up on the reasonable lines laid down by the hon. Member for York it would have been generally accepted; and I think if it is remodelled in Committee in that spirit it may prove a very useful measure. I do not propose to interfere with the discussion between the lawyers as to the extent of the moral consciousness to be exercised by the Judge. All I can say is that it ought to be the business of the Judge to administer the law as he finds it, and not as he thinks it should be. There is no doubt that this Bill deals harshly and unconscionably with the money-lending fraternity, as if they were thieves and liars. I venture to say that the borrowers are not always immaculate. According to Charles Lamb, the world is divided into borrowers and lenders, and the borrowers are "free, pleasant, jolly fellows," whereas the lenders are "harsh, disreputable gentlemen, who ought never to be seen except on business." If the world is divided between borrowers and lenders, it is inevitable that money will be lent, and the needs of the one and the other will determine the contract in either case. The question has been frequently asked, "What is a money-lender?" and the answer seems to me as difficult to ascertain as that other question, "What is truth?" My answer is that a moneylender is a dealer in money, just as a banker or a pawnbroker; but he has this disadvantage, that in 90 per cent. of cases the money-lender lends money without any security. That being so, he is entitled to fair protection, and certainly ought not to be singled out for condemnation in this way. My great objection to the Bill is the schedule, which fixes the rate of interest at 15 per cent., and I am very glad to hear from the Government that they are prepared to withdraw it, and to make concessions on the first clause. If they do that, they can make this a very useful measure to the community at large.

MR. BIRRELL (Fifeshire, W.)

I am not at all dissatisfied with the course of this debate, and I feel fully justified in the motion I made on a previous occasion, when the Bill was under discussion, for its rejection. But having regard to the concessions made by the hon. Gentleman in charge of the Bill, and to what the First Lord of the Treasury said in his speech in reply to the speech of the hon. Gentleman opposite, I may by permission of the House ask leave to withdraw my Amendment. I understand that there is an actual promise to strike out any reference to 15 per cent. in the schedule, and that Clause 1 is to be amended to the effect that if a Judge has evidence before him in coming to a conclusion that the bargain was harsh and unconscionable it may be set aside, and that there is to be an appeal on that question from the County Court Judge. I cannot bind forty legions; if I could I would, but I do not want to put the House to the trouble of a division on a question of this sort. I only trust that the benevolent dispositions of the Government shown to-night will be carried out in Committee. I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Main Question put, and agreed to.

Bill read a second time.


I beg leave to move that the Bill be committed to the Standing Committee on Law.


The Standing Committee on Law has more-work before it already than it can do.


I will move that it be committed to the Standing Committee on Trade instead of the Standing Committee on Law.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be committed to the Standing Committee on Trade, etc." (Mr. T. W. Russell.)


In reference to that, we have just sent a very important measure to the Committee on Trade, namely, the Companies Bill, which everyone will agree is of much greater importance to the community at large than this Bill. I do not see why the Committee of the whole House should abdicate its functions. The discussion will almost entirely turn on Clause 1, and there is no reason why, for once, we should not have that discussion in Committee of the whole House. I hope the House will not send the Bill to the over-burdened Standing Committee on Trade.


also thought that the Bill should be remitted to Committee of the whole House.


joined in the appeal for Committee of the whole House.

MR. PAEKEE SMITH (Lanarkshire, Partick)

said that all the Bills before the Committee on Law were short Bills, and could be got through very quickly. It seemed to him that that Committee would be more suitable.


I do not gather that there is likely to be much difference of opinion regarding the principle of the Bill, and, as regards the drafting, I think that could be better done with a Grand Committee than with a Committee of the whole House. As regards the principle, that is a question which undoubtedly the House ought at some stage to pronounce upon, but I think the Report stage would be a very convenient time for that. The reason why the Government have selected the Grand Committee on Trade is because there is only one Bill before it, whereas there are four Bills before the Grand Committee! on Law. Under the circumstances I am disposed to think that the motion of my hon. friend really represents the most expedient course to take.

COMMANDER BETHELL (Yorkshire, E. R., Holderness)

I would like to remind my right hon. friend and the House of the effect of sending too many Hills to the Standing Committees. The Grand Committees are often very badly attended,

and the House would lie astonished if it could see the attendance on some of the Bills sent up to them. I think it is open to doubt whether we ought to send so many Bills of such importance as we do to the Standing Committees. I do not oppose the motion, but I respectfully submit to the House a word of caution on this practice.

Question put.

The House divided:—Ayes, 150; Noes, 47. (Division List No. 164.)

Anson, Sir William Reynell Fisher, William Hayes Nicholson. William Graham
Atkinson, Rt. Hon. John Fitz Wygram General Sir F. Nicol, Donald Ninian
Balcarres, Lord Fletcher, Sir Henry Parkes, Ebenezer
Balfour, Rt. Hon. A. J. (Manch'r) Flower, Ernest Pease, Herbert P. (Darlington)
Balfour, Rt. Hon. G. W.(Leeds) Galloway, William Johnson Peel, Hon. Wm. Robert W.
Banbury, Frederick George Gedge, Sydney Penn, John
Barry, Rt. Hn A H Smith-(Hunts) Gibbons, J. Lloyd Phillotts, Captain Arthur
Bayley, Thomas (Derbyshire) Giles, Charles Tyrrell Platt-Higgins, Frederick
Beach, Rt. Hn. Sir M. H. (Bristol) Goldsworthy, Major-General Plunkett, Rt. Hon. H. C.
Bemrose, Sir Henry Howe Gordon, Hon. John Edward Powell, Sir Francis Sharp
Bethell, Commander Gorst, Rt. Hn. Sir John Eldon Pryce-Jones, Lt.-Col. Edw.
Bill, Charles Goschen, Rt. Hn G J (St George's) Purvis, Robert
Blundell, Colonel Henry Greville, Hon. Ronald
Boscawen, Arthur Griffith- Hamilton, Rt. Hon. Lord G. Renshaw Charles Bine
Brassey, Albert Hamond, Sir C. (Newcastle) Rentoul, James Alexander
Broadhurst, Henry Hanbury, Rt. Hn. Robert W. Richardson, Sir T. (Hartlepool)
Brodrick, Rt. Hon. St. John Healy, Maurice (Cork) Ritchie, Rt. Hon. Chas. T.
Bullard Sir Harry Healy, Timothy M. (N. Louth) Robinson, Brooke
Burns, John Holland, William Hentry Royds, Clement Molyneux
Butcher, John George Houldsworth, Sir William H. Russell, T. W.(Tyrone)
Carson, Rt. Hon. Sir Edw. H. Hozier, Hon James Henry Cecil Sandon, Viscount
Cavendish, R. F. (N. Lancs.) Jeffreys, Arthur Frederick Seely, Charles Hilton
Cavendish, V. C. W. (Derbyshire) Johnson-Ferguson, Jabez Edw Shaw-Stewart, M. H. (Renfrew)
Cecil, Evelyn (Hertford, East) Johnston, Wm. (Belfast) Sidebotham, J. W. (Cheshire)
Cecil, Lord Hugh (Greenwich) Johnston, Heywood (Sussex) Simeon, Sir Barrington
Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. J. (Birm.) Jones, William (Carnarvonsh) Sinclair, Louis (Romford)
Chamberlain, J Austen (Worc'r) Kenyon, James Smith, James Parker (Lanarks.)
Channing, Francis Allston Kenyon-Slaney, Col. William Stanley, Edw. Jas. (Somerset)
Charrington, Spencer Langley-Batty Steadman, William Charles
Clare, Octavius Leigh Lawrence, Sir E. During-(Corn) Steward, Sir Mark J. M'Taggart
Coghill, Douglas Harry Lawson John Grant (Yorks.) Stirling-Maxwell, Sir John M.
Collings, Rt. Hon. Jesse Leigh-Bannett, Henry Currie Sturt, Hon. Humphry Napier
Corbett, a. Cameron (Glasg'w) Long, Rt. Hon. W. (Liverp'l) Tomlinson, Wm. Edw. M.
Cotton-Jodrell, Col. Edw. T. D. Lopes, Henry Yarde Buller
Cox, Irwin Edw. Bainbridge Lucas-Shedwell, William Warr, Augustus Frederick
Cross, Alexander (Glasgow) Macaleese, Daniel Welby, Sir C. G. E. (Notts.)
Cross, Herb. Shepherd (Bolton) Macdona, John Cumming Wentworth, Bruce C. Vernon-
Dalkeith, Earl of MacIver, David (Liverpool) Willoughby de Eresby Lord
Dairymple, Sir Charles M'Arthur, Charles (Liverpool) Wilson, J. W. (Worerstersh, N.)
Davies, Sir Horatio D (Chatham) K'Killop., James Wodehouse, Rt. Hn. E.R.(Bath)
Denny, Colonel Maple, Sir John Blundell Wrightson, Thomas
Digby, John K. D. Wingfield- Marks, Henry Hananel Wylie, Alexander
Doogan, P. C. Martin, Richard Biddulph Wyndham, George
Doughty, George Melville, Beresford Valentine Yerburgh, Robert Armstrong
Douglas, Rt. Hon. A. Akers- Mendl, Sigismund Ferdinand Young, Commander (Berks, E.)
Duckworth, James Monckton, Edward Philip
Dyke, Rt. Hon. Sir William Hart More, Robt. Jasper (Shrop shire)
Faber, George Denison Morgan, Hon. F. (Monm'thsh. TELLERS FOR THE AYES
Fellowes, Hon. Ailwyn Edward Morrell, George Herbert Sir William Walrond and Mr. Anstruther.
Ffrench, Peter Morton, A. H. A. (Deptford)
Finch, George H. Murnaghan, George
Finlay, Sir Robert Bannatyne Murray, Rt. Hon. A. G. (Bute)
Asher, Alexander Hayne, Rt. Hn. Charles Seale- Robson, William Snowdon
Beckett, Ernest William Hazell, Walter Samuel, J. (Stockton-on-Tees)
Billson, Alfred Hedderwick, Thomas Chas. H. Shaw, Thomas (Hawick, B.)
Bolton, Thomas Dolling Hemphiil, Rt. Hon. Charles H. Sinclair, Capt. J. (Forfarshire)
Brigg, John Horniman, Frederick John Smith, Samuel (Flint)
Caldwell, James Humphreys-Owen, Arthur C. Soames, Arthur Wellesley
Cawley, Frederick Lawson, Sir W. (Cumberland) Sullivan, Donal (Westmeath)
Dewar, Arthur Maclean, James Mackenzie Sullivan, T. D. (Donegal, W.)
Douglas, Charles M. (Lanark) M'Crae, George Thomas, David A. (Mertlryr)
Fitzmaurice, Lord Edmund Moss, Samuel Trevelyan, Charles Philips
Flavin, Michael Joseph Paulton, James Mellor Wilson, Frederick W.(Norfolk)
Foster, Harry S. (Suffolk) Pearson, Sir Weetman D. Wilson, Henry J. (York, W. R.)
Goddard, Daniel Ford Pickersgill, Edward Hare Wilson, John (Govan)
Godson, Sir Augustus F. Price, Robert John
Greene, Henry D.(Shrewsbury) Provand, Andrew Dryburgh TELLERS FOR THE NOES
Griffith, Ellis J. Rickett, J. Compton Mr. Lawson Walton and Mr. Birrell.
Harrington. Timothy Roberts, John Bryn (Eifion)

Bill read a second time, and committed for Thursday next.