BRITISH INTERESTS IN CHINA. (Hansard, 10 December 1900)

§ SIR E. ASHMEAD - BARTLETT (Sheffield, Ecclesall)

said he did not think any apology was required for referring to questions relating to China. Indeed, the gratitude of the House was due to the hon. Member who introduced the question in a speech of so much moderation and knowledge on Friday night, and he ventured to repeat what he then said, that the very treatment of this question afforded the most agreeable contrast to the personalities in which so much of the time of the House was wasted on Thursday and during a portion of Friday. It was perfectly true that the South African question had been one of great gravity, but it might now be considered as practically settled, as South Africa would no doubt be British. But the Chinese question still remained with us, and it was of even greater importance than ever the South African question had been, as our trade with China amounted to between fifty and sixty millions a year—more than double our trade with South Africa, and there was no reason why that trade should not enormously increase if only a wise and statesmanlike policy were pursued in regard to that country. It was not too much to say that the future of China, and perhaps of Asia, was now hanging in the balance. If once Russia was allowed to get military and political control of Manchuria and the North of China, she would obtain a lever to enable her to overrun the whole of China. There were in Manchuria twelve millions of people, hardy and naturally warlike, and in Pe-chi-li there were thirty millions, and what Power was there in Europe which could resist 500,000 Northern Chinese, armed, disciplined, and led by Russian officers? That was whit we must keep in view. It was a real danger which the House was too liable to over- 362 look, but he ventured to say that any statesmen who were proved to have overlooked it would, when the fact was realised by the country, earn the execration of the English people. In some two years the Trans-Siberian Railway would be finished, and then it would be too late to save Manchuria from the grip of the Muscovite. At present England and Germany, backed up by the United States and Japan, were quite able to prevent the annexation of Manchuria by Russia. But the condition necessary for success was that the policy pursued, must be clear and resolute. The noble Lord the Member for Rochester, who spoke on Friday night, rather challenged the hon. Member for Barnsley to give instances of our weakness in the past. He did not wish to take up that challenge too sharply, but he would assert that if our policy was to succeed in the future, there must be no more such incidents as the ignominious withdrawal of our men-of-war from Port Arthur, no more wholly needless invitations to occupy ports in the Yellow Sea; no more such arrangements as were made for giving Russia a monopoly of all the railways north of the Great Wall, and no more tame acceptance of the constant insults offered by the Russian officers in China to our troops and flag. There could now be no doubt as to the nature of the policy of our great rival in Northeast Asia, for it had been fully developed within the last two or three months. It might be described as three-fold. The first aim was to weaken and discredit British prestige by various small affronts, which though not serious individually, were very grave collectively, seeing how prestige was looked upon in the East, and especially in China. The second object was to impress the Chinese with the overwhelming might of Russia and with a sense of her relentless cruelty by the terrible massacres along the Amur river, and the third was to pose as the friend of the corrupt Palace coterie, so that when the old gang resumed control she might claim her reward. Was not the last point proved by the sudden order, two months ago, for the evacuation of Peking by the Russian troops? That was simply done-to please the Palace coterie and to obtain the support of the United States, which, at the time, was somewhat embarrassed by the General Election which was then proceeding. It was a distinct breach of 363 the alleged Concert of Europe lay the Russian Government. He was not a believer in that Concert; he did not believe it did or could exist; it was only effective to inform our enemies of our plans and to give them opportunities of frustrating our objects. It was doubly dangerous—it was dangerous both at home and abroad. It deceived the people at home, and it placed in the hands of right hon. and hon. Members opposite a weapon which would be used should any failure follow upon our policy. Abroad it was even more effectual, because it placed our whole policy and conduct entirely under the control of those who were our natural rivals. If hon. Members had knowledge of the secret history of the last few months they would laugh at the Concert. It had been an unmitigated failure from beginning to end; it even delayed the relief of the Peking Legations until it became almost a miracle, and it absolutely thwarted Admiral Seymour's gallant effort. It had given Russia the lead in everything, it had allowed her to seize the railways, and terrorise the Chinese people. The noble Lord the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs told them the other night that while the difficulties of diplomatic Concert were terrific, those of military Concert were far greater. That was perfectly true, and it was therefore folly on the part of the Government to have embarked on such an expedition as they did, when the work could have been done months earlier, far better, and at less expense, by a force of 10,000 Japanese or of 7,000 British troops. He felt bound to support the protest which the hon. Member for Barnsley had made with great force against the cruelty with which the campaign had been conducted by some of those who had taken part in it. The wholesale massacres of peaceful and industrious populations, including women and children, which had taken place were absolutely indefensible barbarity, for which, owing to our unfortunate diplomatic association with the Powers whoso troops had been guilty of such atrocious conduct, we should in future generations be held in detestation by the people of China. He believed that the public execution of Prince Tuan and other well-known leaders would be far better for China and her future than the massacre of thousands of villagers. It was the greatest hypocrisy for Christian 364 Powers to claim the punishment of the Chinese responsible for the death of some 300 Europeans, and yet to say nothing against the Russian officers responsible for the massacre of 50,000 innocent Chinese. Yet he had looked in vain for any condemnation of such conduct both in our leading journals and by Members of Parliament who were only too ready to denounce the Turk. He agreed entirely with the Amendment of the hon. Member for Barnsley. He agreed that greater efforts were necessary to increase our prestige and strengthen our power in China. He also thought the proposal to substitute increased trade privileges in China for a large part of the money indemnity was excellent. It would benefit both the Chinese and the nations of Europe, and he hoped, therefore, that the Government would direct their efforts in that direction. They might also make efforts to secure an improved and more honest administration in China. That was a necessity if any beneficent result was to follow from the bloodshed and cost of the present expeditions. There were plenty of honest men in China who would come forward if only they were sure of the moral support of European nations. Russia was pursuing the same policy as she had pursued in Turkey—namely, to keep the administration in a rotten condition, and pose as the friend of the Palace coteries, in order that some day the country would fall a helpless prey to her ambition. The most remarkable condemnation of the Conceit was afforded by the action of Her Majesty's Ministers who had themselves inflicted the coup de grâce by substituting for it an Anglo-German Agreement, the main object of which was the maintenance of the territorial independence of China. But the only thing which counted in European politics was force majeure, and the whole value of that agreement depended upon whether by it Manchuria was to be freed from the military and political control of Russia. If the agreement meant winking at the Russian annexation of Manchuria and freely throwing open the Yang-tsze-Kiang valley to German competition it would be worse than useless. It was customary in some quarters to describe his remarks as un-conciliatory, but he was only now doing in regard to China what he ventured to do in 1894 and 1896 with regard to South Africa, when he said that 365 unless the nettle was grasped war would come. If we now allowed Russian control to be established in Manchuria, Russia would become the force majeure in China, and we should be unable to cope with her. The policy he advocated was really the policy of peace, because it would put this country in such a position of strength that its opponents would not dare to attack it. If, on the other hand, the Government followed a policy of vacillation upon this occasion they would find themselves confronted with a condition of things with which they would be unable to contend.

§ * MR. WYLIE (Dumbartonshire)

said that as one who had practical connection with China he might be allowed to offer a few remarks upon this subject. He first, however, desired to congratulate the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs upon his safe return to this country and the position to which he had been appointed. He believed the noble Lord to be possessed of the hereditary capacity for statesmanship which distinguished his family, and that in fulfilling the duties of his office he would be of great advantage to the country and gain honour for himself. So much had been said during the elections against the policy of the Government with regard to China that it was somewhat surprising that when the points of the policy came before the House the criticisms of hon. Gentlemen should be reduced to such small dimensions, and their suggestions should be so erroneous. The second proposal of the Amendment, besides being unsound in principle, would, he believed, have a most injurious effect by encouraging the Chinese officials to repeat those horrible atrocities and cruelties which they had perpetrated upon the Christian population in China. Many business men and missionaries had been sacrificed in those atrocious massacres which were now known to have been instigated and abetted by the Chinese officials, and he felt certain that if the perpetrators of those cruelties were allowed to escape with impunity, at no distant date there would be a recurrence of those atrocities. Among the friends and relatives of those who had perished there was no thought of revenge, but for the safety of life and property in China to-day it was absolutely necessary that such condign punishment should be inflicted upon 366 those wretched and treacherous miscreants, as would burn into the Chinese official mind, as nothing else could, a wholesome dread of European power, and respect for Christian life and property, which would last for all time. In his opinion the Government had already taken ample means for the safeguarding of the vast commercial and political interests of the British in China by the formation of a successful Concert of the European Powers. Notwithstanding the remarks, of the hon. Member for the Ecclesall Division of Sheffield, he thought the action of the Powers had so far been vigorous and harmonious, and that the pacification of China would soon be an accomplished fact. The Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs had intimated that the Government regarded the pacification of China as the most pressing matter in connection with our interests there. The Government was also strenuously supporting the opening up of the whole of China to the trade of all nations. To that end the agreement with Germany had been of great use; it gave a splendid lead to other nations, and it secured the predominance of the British policy of the open door. In working out this policy he thought that all duties levied by the Chinese Government upon imports should be rigorously confined to the port of entry. Sufficient duties should be levied there, under the superintendence and control of European officials, to pay the Chinese officials properly and for the conduct of administrative matters in the Chinese Empire, and that likin should be absolutely abolished. Likin consisted of extortionate extortions levied on all goods at various stages of their transit inland only; they had been measured in the past only by the greed and rapacity of the extortionate officials who levied them, and they had been one of the greatest curses to-British commerce in China. If they were abolished he believed it would be greatly to the advantage not only of Europe, but China herself. Some hon. Gentlemen were of opinion that British interference in the affairs of China would, be of little benefit and much expense to us. He would remind them that our interference in the affairs of India and our direct administration of that great empire had resulted in a trade to this country of £140,000,000 per annum, which every five years nearly doubled itself, and had been of very great benefit to India. Our 367 indirect administration of a small part of China had resulted in a trade which had doubled during ten years, and last year amounted to £70,000,000, three-fifths of which was British, and five-sixths carried in British bottoms, and he believed that the pacification and the opening up of that country would create for British commerce one of the greatest markets in the world. He thought it was the duty of the House to vigorously support the policy of the Government in China, by granting ample supplies.