SUPPLEMENTAL WAR LOAN BILL. (Hansard, 6 August 1900)

§ *Sir E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT (Sheffield, Ecclesall)

This Bill contains a large loan for our military operations in China, and this perhaps is the only occasion upon which we have an opportunity of calling attention to the deplorable delay which has taken place in those military operations. The accounts-coming to us both from Peking, where the Legations are still in the direst straits, and from Tientsin, where the relief force is assembled, are of the most alarming character. The latest accounts from Peking say that the Legations on the 21st or 22nd of July had only a fortnight's provisions and very little ammunition. The fortnight has expired; whilst the reports from Tientsin show a deplorable want of harmony amongst the commanders of the allied forces. I do not propose on this Bill to go into the policy of the Government, but I think we have a right to complain of the long; delay which has taken place in starting; the relief expedition, and also of the fact, 797 that, so far as we know, no commander-in-chief has been appointed for that expedition. The appointment of a commander-in-chief is a most serious military necessity—far more serious nowadays than it would have been twenty or even ten years ago, because the operations of modern warfare are on so large a scale, and turning movements are so great, that there never was a time when a directing chief was so important as the present. Yet we cannot find, although Her Majesty's Government have had two months in which to make arrangements for this expedition, that any commander-in-chief has been appointed. The result of that may be very serious upon the Legations when the force approaches Peking. It may be very serious indeed also, on the grounds of humanity, when the population of Peking, amounting to 1,000,000, are exposed to the attacks of five or six different armies without any direct heading. We already know what serious events have occurred at Tientsin, where apparently there was a deplorable massacre of the civilian Chinese population by the Russian troops, and we also know the delays which have taken place for want of a commander-in-chief. I read in a telegram from Tientsin that the greatest indignation is felt there at the delay. The president of the Tientsin University made a speech ten days ago, in which he said— This way of proceeding is not in accordance with Anglo-Saxon traditions; 21,000 soldiers are staying here, while women and children of their own race are starving and awaiting massacre eighty miles away. The officers are wasting their time in bickering over party politics. That is borne out by information which comes to nearly every English paper. It is possible, of course, that all the correspondents may be mistaken, and that the utmost is being done for the relief of Peking, but it does not appear to be so. Unfortunately we have ground in the past for distrusting the energy of Her Majesty's Government on this point. My right hon. friend the Under Secretary of State the other day attempted to justify the delay which took place before the despatch of 6th July to the Japanese Government. That despatch of 6th July was, in my opinion, the first sign that Her Majesty's Government really grasped the necessities of the position. On 6th July 798 they did give a direct guarantee to the Japanese Government that, if Japan would send an adequate force, Japan would be supported by Great Britain. I hold if that statement had been made on 8th June, when the gravity of the crisis became known, the Japanese would have sent a sufficient force, which would have saved us a great part of this large vote of credit for the relief of the Legations. There is a remarkable and interesting letter in The Times to-day from Tokio, dated 6th July, the very (late of that despatch. That letter says— Japan could have dispatched an army of 50,000 men within ten days of the receipt of the news that Tientsin had been invested.… With such a programme (the balance of power and the open door) Japan entirely sympathises. But she declines to rely on conjecture only. She wants an explicit, understanding, and it is in Downing Street that the outlines of an understanding must be traced. If the British Government consents to be explicit, the difficulties will disappear at once. By this time a strong Japanese force might have been marching to the relief of Peking. That entirely bears out what I have stated in this House before, that Her Majesty's Government have not bean sufficiently decided and explicit in regard to employment of a large Japanese force. I am very much afraid that precisely the same course of want of decision, which led to the delay in the guarantee to Japan and the risking of the Legations, has been pursued in regard to the appointment of the commander-in-chief. It is obvious that a commander-in-chief should be appointed, and it is obvious also that he should be an English general officer. Our interests in China are far the largest, our historical connection with China is the greatest, our trade is far the most valuable, and our force at Tientsin are, I believe, the most numerous of any European force there—of course not so numerous as the Japanese. To allow this question of the commander-in-chief to drift, to allow the forces of Europe to be arrested in their progress at Tientsin, owing to the bickerings which prevail amongst their leaders, while the Legations are in a state of the utmost need, and while their food is running short, if it has not entirely disappeared, creates a very serious responsibility for Her Majesty's Government. I am afraid it is due to their pursuit of that will-o'-the-wisp the Concert of Europe, which they will never find in 799 any part of the world, and least of all in European policy towards China. Their only hope is the adoption of a clear British policy, both political and military, and the support of that policy by all the friendly aid that Her Majesty's Government can obtain. They can get the support of the Japanese if they will only be explicit. They can get the support of the United States. They probably can get the support of Germany as well. But to wait for that chimera the Concert of Europe, when they know that several European Powers are deliberately counterworking their efforts, will only too likely end in the loss of those lives which everyone in this country is so anxious to see saved.