THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONSir, I said on Thursday last that I would endeavour to-day to make a statement to the House, such as has been on several occasions asked for, with regard to the decisions which have been arrived at by Her Majesty's Government, and the orders which have been given to our officers in the Soudan, in consequence of statements recently made in this House. I will endeavour to do so as shortly as I can. I need scarcely say, Sir, before any decision was arrived at by Her Majesty's Government, or before any announcement was made to the House, confidential communications passed between us and Lord Wolseley as to the possibility in any circumstances, having regard to the safety of our troops, of withdrawing the Nile Force, or any portion of that Force, from the positions which they at present occupy. We satisfied ourselves before any statement was made to the House that such an operation would be possible with due consideration for the health and safety of our troops. On April 20, the day previous to the announcement made in the House, the substance of that announcement was communicated to Lord Wolseley, with instructions that he should prepare at once to act in conformity with that announcement. The House will recollect the nature of the statement made by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, and it is unnecessary on this occasion for me to 153 repeat it. I may, however, say what, in our opinion, the instructions then given involved. They did not, in my opinion, at that time involve the absolute abandonment of the intention to advance on Khartoum. What they did involve was a cessation of active preparations for such an advance, the cessation of offensive operations upon any considerable scale, and the adoption of measures which would enable us, on as short notice as possible, to concentrate the troops now in the Soudan for service in any part of the world where they might be required. Since that time a good deal of communication has taken place between the Government and Lord Wolseley. Several courses appeared to be open to us, which I will shortly state. The troops might either remain in their present positions, which extend from Merawi, the most advanced position up the Nile, including Korti and other places, whose names I need not mention, to Dongola, where the head-quarters of the Army are now established. This disposition of the troops would also have required the maintenance of a considerable number of posts between Assouan and Dongola for keeping up communication and supplying the troops. There are at present along that line, extending from Merawi to Dongola, about 9,000 British troops, and the result of our communications is that, if we decided to continue the occupation of those positions, the number of troops could not be materially reduced. Another alternative would have been to withdraw the troops from the most advanced positions up the Nile and to concentrate them at other positions, such as Dongola and places below Dongola, there to wait for the course of events in the Soudan, and in Asia and Europe. The third alternative was to revert to the line of Wady Halfa or Assouan as the actual frontier of Egypt, and to withdraw the troops as soon as possible from the positions which they now occupy, holding those positions which I have named as the most advanced permanent positions for the defence of Egypt. The last is the course which the Government has in substance decided to adopt. I say in substance, because there are at present reasons, both of a military and political character, which, while it would be pos- 154 sible, make it undesirable that such a course should be very rapidly adopted. At the present time the River Nile is at its very lowest, and there are a considerable number of stores which have been accumulated at the various positions now occupied by our troops which ought to be removed; and arrangements will also have to be made for bringing down the Native officials and troops, and possibly a certain number of Natives who might not wish to remain after the positions have been evacuated. There are strong objections of a military and sanitary character against any attempt at concentration at Dongola and Abu Fatmeh, or other similar positions. The troops are now, in the position which they now occupy, for the most part under some temporary protection or cover, such as huts, and I am happy to take this opportunity of stating that although the heat is very great, and the inconvenience and even suffering which in some cases they have to undergo are very considerable, yet neither the official nor the private reports which I have received tend to show that the condition of the troops is nearly so bad, or their sufferings so great, as might be inferred from some of the statements which have appeared in the newspapers. But what I have to point out is that in the stations which they now occupy some accommodation, perhaps not of the very best description, but some shelter from the heat, has been provided; and any temporary concentration, such as has been suggested, at Dongola or other places, would involve the encampment of a considerable part of the Force, there being no means of providing shelter at these places, and it is considered that the health of the troops would materially suffer. It is, therefore, considered best for the troops that they should remain where they are at present until the river rises, which it will begin to do at the end of this month, and then withdraw from their most advanced positions, with their stores and with such Natives as it may be necessary to bring away. They will be withdrawn first from the most advanced positions, with their stores, straight down the Nile by successive detachments. That decision, I need hardly say, involves the practical abandonment of any intention to advance on Khartoum; but by the process which I am describing a considerable time will elapse before the 155 troops can be withdrawn from such positions as Dongola and the stations which are lower down the Nile than Dongola. In the meantime, Sir Evelyn Baring has been instructed to consult the Egyptian Government as to the possibility or the desirability of establishing any administration at Dongola, or in the Province of Dongola, or a portion of that Province, and whether any assistance can be given to the establishment of such administration. He has also been instructed to consult the Egyptian Government as to whether it would be desirable to endeavour to complete the whole or any portion of the prolongation of the Nile Railway, which has been commenced, and whether it may be possible to find any means by which that railway may be completed and worked, as has often been suggested, as a commercial undertaking. Lord Wolseley has given it as his opinion that if Her Majesty's Government decide that Assouan is to be practically the frontier of Upper Egypt which is to be defended, it will be necessary to maintain there for some considerable time a strong brigade of all arms, with small bodies of troops holding Wady Haifa and Korosko as outposts. He also attaches considerable importance to the sending out of some armed boats, which have been prepared in view of an Expedition up the Nile, so that the river above and below the Second Cataract should be patrolled by some of these boats. That is, briefly, the decision which has been arrived at as regards the Force now upon the Nile. As to Suakin, I am afraid I am at present unable to give the House positive and definite information. Lord Wolseley has only been there a little more than a week. Of course, it is possible to communicate with him only by means of the telegraph. Much communication of that character has taken place between us, but there has scarcely yet been sufficient time for an exhaustive exchange of views between him and Her Majesty's Government. I may say that a long and important telegram from him has been received only this morning. As to the position at Suakin I can, however, say this much. General Graham's Forces were sent to Suakin to co-operate with Lord Wolseley in an advance upon Khartoum, and the railway to Berber was undertaken as a military work in support of that operation, and, indeed, 156 at the time it was considered a necessary part of it. With the relinquishment of the intention to advance upon Khartoum neither of these objects will be prosecuted. There is, however, no intention of evacuating Suakin until an arrangement can be made for holding it by some other civilized Power.[ A laugh.] I do not know whether the hon. Member wishes us to hold it permanently. At present Suakin cannot be held without fighting. The position of Osman Digna is not, and has not been for a long time past, that of a Chief fighting for his independence of or against aggression upon his own country. He has for many months past been besieging Suakin. He has openly announced his intention of driving the garrison of Suakin, whether Egyptians or English, into the sea. So long, therefore, as we continue to hold Suakin, the questions of the Forces by which it is to be held and of the positions in the neighbourhood which are to be held are rather military than political questions. It is a military rather than a political question whether the posts already occupied by our troops should be retained or whether there are other positions in the neighbourhood which it is desirable to occupy for the protection of Suakin and to prevent its being besieged in the manner it has been during the last few months. On this subject, therefore, we require some further experience, and, at all events, we require a further expression of the views of the General on the spot than we have yet been able to receive. Such further operations, however, as may be taking place, or as may be hereafter undertaken, will be undertaken with no other view than the defence and protection of Suakin itself. There remains, then, the question of the railway. Under the decision I have announced the railway is not required, and there is no intention of pushing it on as a military work. But a very large expenditure has been already incurred. A very general opinion among many of the best authorities on the Soudan Question is that, both as a civilizing influence and as a means of checking the Slave Trade, and further for the defence of Egypt itself, the construction of a line of railway would be a substantial benefit to the country. We have, therefore, been unwilling to abandon the hope that this railway, which has been com- 157 menced as a military work, may ultimately be prosecuted as a pacific and civilizing work. We are unable to say at present whether it will or will not be possible that this hope may be realized. Although the railway has been attacked by certain portions of the tribes inhabiting that part of the country, there are others which have shown more confidence in what we are doing, and, in fact, they have shown perfect readiness to work upon the railway and to assist in its protection. We do not think that it is possible or that it is desirable to come to a hasty decision upon this subject, but it is probable that within a short time we shall be able to state more definitely to the House what our intentions with regard to this railway are. I am bound, how-over, to say that Lord Wolseley's opinion, so far as we have yet received it, does not give at all a hopeful prospect of a possibility of either holding the portion of the railway which has been already constructed, or of completing it without the retention of a very considerable portion of the Force which is now there under his command. He also states that he anticipates that if that Force is retained there for a considerable time during the hot weather it may materially suffer in health. In these circumstances, we still desire to take some short time to consider what shall be done as to the railway which has been partly constructed and the materials that have been sent there. We do not pledge ourselves to the opinion that there are at present any means by which the railway can be prosecuted except as a military work, which it is not our intention to do. It is not our desire or intention to continue a railway which can only be continued at the cost of severe fighting, and which we could defend only by a large Military Force. We, however, desire to suspend our judgment whether the expenditure which has already been incurred upon it is to be entirely abandoned, or whether some other course is to be taken with the material which has been accumulated, and which there is some reason to hope may ultimately, if not immediately, be made use of in the continuance of a work which has been long contemplated, and which, in the opinion of many authorities, will still be of great value to the country. I do not think there is any- 158 thing I need add to the statement I have made. I have endeavoured to confine myself to a bare statement of fact, and I have not attempted to enter into a defence of the course taken by Her Majesty's Government. I do not consider this to be the proper time for such a defence; but, having on several occasions been asked what were the instructions that have been issued to our officers, we have taken the earliest opportunity in our power to give a bare recital of them and to place the House as fully as possible in possession of the views of the Government.
§ SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACHThere is one question which will occur to every Member of the House, although I am not quite sure that I am in Order in putting it to the noble Marquess—it might, perhaps, arise more appropriately in debate—and that is, why in the world they have incurred all this vast expenditure in the Soudan?
§ MR. SPEAKERIt is my duty to remind the House that there is no Question before it, and that any argument or debate should be deferred until we have reached the Orders of the Day.
§ SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACHThen I will merely ask the noble Marquess a question on the statement he has made. It is, whether he is able to give the House any information as to the views which may have been expressed by Lord Wolseley on the policy Her Majesty's Government have adopted with respect to the Nile Valley, and whether the Egyptian Government have been informed that in the event of their recommending the continuation of the railway in the Nile Valley south of Wady Haifa Her Majesty's Government intend still to recommend that the taxpayers of this country shall pay for the material of that railway, which is, I understand, to be abandoned to those who may live in the country after we have withdrawn from it?
§ MR. O'KELLYinquired at what period of the year the Nile would commence to rise so as to enable the troops to withdraw, and whether the suffering of the troops would not be greater if they remained until the Nile rose than if they came away now?
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONI believe the period at which the Nile rises varies, but it is expected it will begin to rise at Merawi and Khorti, 159 where are the advanced positions of the troops, about the end of this month. The military opinion distinctly is that for the health of the troops it is best that they should remain in their present position until the river begins to rise. They are not suffering materially in their present position, and to withdraw them now, in the present low state of the Nile, would entail a great amount of hard work and probable suffering among the troops. The withdrawal of the troops from these positions will be conducted slowly, and will be regulated solely with reference to the considerations to which I have referred. The right hon. Gentleman asks me whether there is any information to give as to Lord Wolseley's opinion on the political effects of the withdrawal from Dongola. I think it is possible that very shortly I will be able to lay Papers on the Table, and amongst them will be found some despatches from Lord Wolseley bearing on the question. However, I need hardly remind the right hon. Gentleman that it is the duty of Her Majesty's Government to make themselves responsible for political considerations, and that whilst Lord Wolseley's opinion naturally carries weight on all questions of military consideration, it is not supposed to dictate the political decisions of the Government. With reference to the Nile Railway, we do not yet know what is the result of the negotiations which have passed between Sir Evelyn Baring and the Egyptian Government on the subject of that railway. Until we hear what, or any, proposals may be made, I do not know that I can give any further information.
§ MR. A. J. BALFOURWill the noble Marquess be able to lay before the House the evidence upon which the Government have come to the conclusion that there is no more danger to be apprehended from the progress of the Mahdi's Army?
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONAs I have said, if the House desires it, the Papers can very speedily be laid on the Table, and those Papers may, to a certain extent, touch on the question raised by the hon. Member; but the point as to the conclusion we have arrived at will, I submit, be best discussed in the debate.
§ MR. STUART-WORTLEYI beg to ask the noble Marquess whether the 160 Government have decided to maintain at Assouan or Wady Haifa the whole Force at present about Dongola, or whether they consider themselves free to withdraw any of the soldiers altogether from that part of the Nile for service elsewhere, and, if so, which?
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONThe strength of the Force which is required at Suakin and the frontier posts will be a strongbrigade—probably about 2,500 men. It may be necessary or desirable to retain, for a time at all events, a larger portion of the Force on the Nile or in Egypt itself, in ease of any excitement or disturbance occurring there; but no doubt a very considerable portion of the Force now on the Nile will be available for service elsewhere.
§ SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTWill the noble Marquess at least remove the corps from Korti, which is the most unhealthy station upon the Nile?
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONI think I stated the other day all the information we have received from the Nile, and I do not know that Korti is more unhealthy than other places. There is no intention of making a concentration at Korti or any other point. When we consider the time has arrived when they may be removed, they will be withdrawn down the Nile in detachments; but there is no intention to concentrate the troops at any given point.
§ MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTI wish to ask the noble Marquess a question of some importance. The noble Marquess on a previous occasion described the policy which he has just explained to the House as a new departure, a new step of the most momentous and most disgraceful character. I wish to ask the noble Marquess whether he now wishes to withdraw that statement? ["Oh, oh!" and cries of "Order!"]
§ MR. SPEAKERI must point out to the hon. Member that the question he has put is rather in the nature of argument, and may be used in debate.
§ MR. RITCHIEI should like to ask the Secretary of State for War, whether the Government are in negotiation with any Foreign Power for the purpose of taking over Suakin; and, if so, what Foreign Power?
§ MR. FINCH-HATTONMay I ask the noble Marquess whether it would not be possible, instead of waiting for high 161 Nile, to remove a portion of the troops by land?
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONI have not stated that the troops will remain where they are till high Nile. What I did say was that the withdrawal will be very much facilitated when the Nile begins to rise, which is in about three weeks time. The removal of the most advanced stations will then commence. Questions about negotiations hardly come within the sphere of my Department to answer; these should be addressed to my right hon. Friend, or the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
§ MR. CHAPLINAs both the Nile Expeditions are to be practically abandoned, I wish to ask whether it is the intention of the Government still to propose the Vote of £4,500,000 which only a fortnight ago the right hon. Gentleman asked for, on the ground that it would be necessary to be spent on the Nile?
§ MR. RITCHIEPerhaps the right hon. Gentleman, when he rises, will be good enough to answer the Question I put to the Secretary of State for War a few minutes ago.
MR. GLADSTONEI am not able to state more than this—that the question of the ultimate disposition of Suakin and all the proceedings there is under careful consideration; but there are no negotiations as to which I can at the present moment give any account. With regard to the Question of the hon. Member for Mid Lincoln (Mr. Chaplin), the Bill relating to the Vote of £4,500,000 for the proceedings in the Soudan stands for second reading to-night, and the hon. Member will hardly ask me at this stage whether it is the intention to abandon that Bill. The best reply which I can give to his Question is to say that a very considerable charge has been incurred, and will have to be met in the Soudan; and, consequently, I am not able to assure the House that there can be any relief from that charge. The question whether there can be any relief from that charge can only be decided when we approach the stage of Committee on the Bill. It is highly probable that there will be no necessity for pressing forward the stages of that Bill at the present moment; but when we come to Committee on the Bill we may be in a position to give further infor- 162 mation bearing on the question which may assist the House in discussing the matter.
§ LORD EUSTACE CECILCan the right hon. Gentleman give the House any idea as to how much of that money has been spent?
§ COLONEL KING-HARMANWill the safety of the troops of the Mudir of Dongola, which have been of such loyal assistance to us, be assured before the evacuation of the country by the British troops takes place?
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONArrangements will be made simultaneously with, or previous to, the withdrawal of our own troops for the withdrawal at the same time of any troops who may think they would be in any danger from our evacuation.
§ MR. PULESTONI think it was understood that a statement about Russia would be included in the statement of the noble Lord.