§ SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTEThen, Sir, not wishing to interfere with the Business of the House more than I 236 can help, but feeling the great importance of this question, I have to request leave to move the Adjournment of the House for the purpose of discussing a definite question of urgent public importance — namely, the arrangements proposed for the discussion of the Draft Convention relating to Egyptian Affairs.
§ MR. SPEAKERasked, if it was the pleasure of the House that the right hon. Gentleman be heard?
§ SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTESir, if it were only a question of the convenience of private Members, I should certainly not bring the matter before the House; but I feel that this is really a matter of very great public importance, and unless time is given before the discussion to which we are all looking forward neither the House nor the country will be able properly to become acquainted with the issues that are at stake, and the House will not be in a proper position to deal with the subject. This is not really a question of the interests of the bondholders. If it were a question of a few persons, and we were well acquainted with the circumstances of the case, it might be possible, in the course of a few days, easily to master the subject; but we have to look to matters far beyond the mere arrangement with the bondholders. We have to consider what the effect of such an arrangement before us may be on the future relations of this country with Egypt, and the position of this country with regard to the Suez Canal. We are at present kept to a very great extent in ignorance of what has taken place on this matter; for although the right hon. Gentleman says the bulk of the Papers have been accessible to the House since Friday evening last, there must be a very important section of the Papers with which we have not yet been made acquainted, such as those which refer to the proceedings since the 9th of February until the time of the conclusion of the Convention, on the 17th of March. If we are to depend upon the information we can get by Questions addressed to Ministers, we find very great difficulty indeed in getting that information which really opens the case to us. In this case it is peculiarly important, when we are dealing with that which must affect us in future years, that we should look 237 carefully into the meaning and probable operation of clauses which have been agreed to after long discussion—a discussion of more than two years, in fact— and of which the motives are not fully explained to us. The right hon. Gentleman, whenever any question is raised with regard to Egypt, is in the habit of referring us back to the fact that all the Egyptian policy took its rise in the policy which established the Dual Control in Egypt. If out of that have grown all our present difficulties, it ought to make us all the more careful how we sanction other arrangements which may prove similarly, or even more disastrous. With regard to the question of the finances of Egypt, we want to know and to judge for ourselves by observation what the arguments of the Foreign Powers were, what the arguments of the British authorities were which brought about the Settlement it took so long to bring about. We are anxious that nothing should be done in this Settlement which will lay us open to the dangers that must attend a Multiple Control or intervention. Are we secure from that, or are we not? When we listened to the statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer last Wednesday we imagined that we should find when the Papers were laid before us that the interference or interposition of other Powers was entirely barred; but when we look at the Papers which are presented we have difficulty in finding any reference to the point; and when we ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether there is any definite provision on the subject, he says—"No; it is not necessary." Why, Sir, it is necessary, or it may very easily become necessary, from the circumstances of the case. It is very easy to form some anticipation of what might happen within the next two years which would not only justify but require the Egyptian Government to call for a new Commission, to which all the Powers would be invited, and that Commission would go into the whole of the financial arrangements of Egypt, and, therefore, into the administration of the country. It does seem to me that, as regards the dangerous possibility of any such interposition, it is most necessary that we should have a full opportunity of carefully discussing the subject, and thrashing it out in this House, in order that we may see, and the people of this 238 country may see, what engagements the Government are entering into, and what are the provisions made for guarding against those dangers to which I have referred. I would call the attention of the House to the remarkable fact that not only is there a Convention with regard to the financial arrangements, but that our attention is particularly challenged to the fact that we are about to enter into a new arrangement for establishing regulations with regard to the Suez Canal. That is a matter which is vital to the interests of this country. It is a matter in regard to which we should have something further to guide us than what is contained in Earl Granville's Circular of 1883. That document itself, however, shows the necessity for further information. Its points are full of difficult questions and pitfalls, with respect to which we must be on our guard. If the House will look at the eight parts it contains, they will find that there are questions there which might give trouble every day, every month, every year. I do not know how we are to deal with this matter. The Government are, I admit, within their right; they are acting perfectly in accordance with the usage of Parliament in entering into an Agreement with other Powers without coming, as a preliminary measure, to this House; but when we have notice given that such a thing is going to be done, we are most anxious that we should have full information, and should obtain it while we have, to a certain extent, the power still in our hands; because, although we cannot deal with the Treaty that may be made with respect to the Suez Canal, we can deal with the Convention now before us with respect to financial matters, and are perfectly within our right in asking, before being called upon to discuss this question, to be allowed to discuss the question of the Treaty with regard to the navigation of the Suez Canal. We have a right to ask that before pledging ourselves to the financial question. It is necessary, the Prime Minister says, that the first step should be taken without delay towards sanctioning this financial arrangement. But why should we be in a hurry? He says there will still be time for us to consider the other stages of the Bill. But what is so curious is that the reason he gives for its being important that we 239 should take the first step now is a reason which almost excludes the possibility, or, at least, renders it extremely difficult, to reopen the question. He says the other Powers are waiting to see what we do. He practically says Parliament must give the first indication of its willingness to accept this Convention, and until it has done that the other Powers will not move. But, if this be so, have we not a right to say, give us time before we commit ourselves? If the right hon. Gentleman is correct in saying that it is necessary we should move early in order to dispose the other Powers to move at all, does it not show how important our first move is? If we are forced to discuss this matter on Thursday or Monday next, without the amount of consideration which the Easter Recess will afford, we shall find that we have committed ourselves in such a manner that, though we may not technically be bound, Her Majesty's Government will have a strong argument to show that we are. I do entreat the right hon. Gentleman to do justice to that which I am sure is the feeling of the great mass of the people of this country, as it is of hon. Gentlemen on this side of the House, and give us an opportunity of considering the important documents bearing on the question. We have had a part of the Papers laid on the Table on Friday. This is not a time when we have much leisure, and we have as yet scarcely had an opportunity of looking at these Papers, and there are still others to come. These are not Papers that can be merely read—they must be read and re-read, and compared backwards and forwards with the negotiations that took place and that proved fruitless some months ago, and with other matters. It is, therefore, extremely important that we should have an opportunity of examining the whole subject and coming to a definite conclusion with regard to it. I beg to move the adjournment of the House.
§ Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."— (Sir Stafford Northcote.)
MR. GLADSTONEAs the right hon. Gentleman, I hope, understands, I make no objection to his having moved the adjournment on this occasion. I think, if I may say so, that comparing it with other occasions when Motions for 240 Adjournment have been made, it stands in a very favourable position, because it exactly exemplifies the sort of case which the Rule was made to meet. The right hon. Gentleman is quite within his right in raising the question of time, if he thinks it proper that the House should be asked to take into its serious consideration the Convention which has been framed by Her Majesty's Government, and has been signed by the Powers of Europe. What is the point at issue between us? It is not the question whether we should proceed on Thursday or on Monday. We should certainly extremely regret to postpone the preliminary Resolution from Thursday; but I do not say we would not have consented to postponing it to Monday by way of accommodation. But it is of very great importance that we should go on with the preliminary Resolution on Thursday, and I am afraid the stumbling block between us is that, whereas the right hon. Gentleman declines to give any judgment on this question before the Easter Recess, and has signified that Monday, the 13th of April, was the day on which he would be prepared to give a decision, we, speaking on the 23rd of March, three weeks earlier, feel it to be our absolute and bounden duty, as the persons responsible for the conduct of public affairs, to ask the House to consider this question, and to give a definite vote upon it before they separate for the Easter Recess. Sir, I would urge, for the sake of clearness, that we should put out of the way what the right hon. Gentleman has said with regard to the Suez Canal Convention. There is no great haste with regard to the Suez Canal Convention, such as we plead with regard to the main portions of this Agreement. The case of the Suez Canal Convention I will put aside in a few words. In the first place, the House is not called upon to give any vote whatever with respect to our proceedings in relation to the Suez Canal. We proceed in relation to the Suez Canal upon our general responsibility. That is my first point—that the House will neither gain nor lose anything in regard to the Suez Canal by the vote which we ask it to give before the Easter Recess upon the pecuniary operations of the Convention now concluded. Then, of course, arises this suggestion in the minds of hon. Members. They might 241 say—"You intend to deal with this great commercial subject in the dark, and to give us no opportunity of learning what are your views in respect to it before we find ourselves finally committed." To that question we give the most explicit answer. Upon almost every point of that subject, ever since January 5, 1883, the views of the Government have been definitely before the House in the despatch of Earl Granville, dated on that day. There is, I believe, hardly anything in point of particularity that we could add to that despatch, with the exception of one point, I think, which it would be quite easy to explain to the House at any time, and with regard to which, in my opinion, it is most just and fair that the House should be aware of our views before we proceed to any definite arrangement. Of our views in general it is aware; and I have not learned that there is any disposition to question them, or to enter into any conflict with them. But if there is, the House will have an opportunity, as it has had for two years, and that opportunity has not yet passed away. So much with regard to the Suez Canal part of the arrangement. It has really nothing whatever to do with the point now at issue between the right hon. Gentleman and the Government. The right hon. Gentleman says that it is not an affair of the bondholders only. That is most entirely and absolutely true. The bondholders have a material interest in this Convention; and it is desirable in their interests, no doubt, that the judgments of the different Legislatures should not be delayed. But, as far as they are concerned, their interest in the Convention would certainly not have led the Government to the very positive conclusions at which they had arrived with respect to the necessity of proceeding forthwith in this matter. I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman meant to make a complaint of the answers given by Ministers to Questions when put as insufficient, or whether he only meant that from their nature they do not admit of giving a full explanation of this subject. I agree that the nature of Question and Answer does not admit of giving a full exposition of the views of the Government in reply; but I must say with some regret that the manner in which the answers of the Government 242 on points of delicacy and importance are now almost habitually received with jeers and shouts—certainly in a portion of the House, but not in the portion in which the right hon. Gentleman sits; and it has not received any countenance whatever from him—but this manner certainly does constitute a serious difficulty and addition to the answering of Questions, and may compel the Government to adopt more restricted rules than they have hitherto, in their desire to accommodate the House, been willing to act upon. The right hon. Gentleman says that now is not the proper time for the people of this country to consider the important matters at issue in this Convention; and I, who am always contending that this House is overdone, and that this country is overdone, and has more work on its hands than it can satisfactorily get through, I am not the man to contend with the right hon. Gentleman that we are not always in a hurry with important questions. There are very few subjects indeed with respect to which that is not true. But these things are relative. What we ask is, that the House should, not less than a week after being in possession of the Papers submitted by the Government, proceed to give a vote upon them. That is the request of the Government. I would not urge that request against the right hon. Gentleman, excepting under the pressure of the most commanding considerations; but I am obliged to urge it, and I am obliged to adhere to it. I contend that, viewing the way in which the House of Commons has to transact its Business, and according to our ordinary rules and usages, those Papers, which are not of very great bulk, and the principal part of which, with the exception of 23 pages, has been in the hands of Members since Saturday—I cannot say that according to Parliamentary usage it can be considered as an insufficient time. We are absolutely bound as far as we are concerned, and it is my declaration to ask the House not to require more than sufficient time. The right hon. Gentleman says we must take care—and he is quite justified in saying it—that some past transactions go back to roots of long standing, and that we must take care that we do not have new roots planted. That is perfectly just and sound; and it expresses the desire we entertain that the most vigilant 243 care of this House should be applied in every matter relating to this tangled and difficult Egyptian business. But do not let us exaggerate the effect of this Convention. What is it that the House is about to commit itself to? It is about to commit itself to an International Guarantee. The amount to which we are to be committed is not a very large one; I believe the ultimate amount to which we are committed will be only £1,500,000; whereas the Guarantee, being a joint and several one, so far as we are concerned, there is, of course, a liability for the whole sum; and, further, on my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer no doubt will fall the burden of making a working arrangement, just as in 1855 the working arrangement of the Anglo-Turkish Loan devolved on the Chancellor of the Exchequer of that day. So far as I know, the points—the very material points—that the House has to consider, for its own sake, with the despatch which we ask it to observe are, first of all, the Guarantee; and, secondly, that in connection with that Guarantee there is an arrangement that during the period of two years we are to endeavour both to ascertain, and so far as possible to promote, the improvement of the real condition of Egyptian finance, so that there shall be no longer the question of the capacity of Egypt to bear or not to bear this or that charge. That, Sir, I believe, is the arrangement to which we ask the House to commit itself. The right hon. Gentleman says that he expected that the interference of the other Powers would be barred by some condition in the Agreement. I do not follow the right hon. Gentleman into that matter, because I think it is not quite ad rem. We are now considering the time at which we should take this question, and not the arrangement itself; otherwise I should be prepared to give a very conclusive answer.
§ SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTEI only used it as an illustration of the difficulty of understanding the point.
MR. GLADSTONESo I understood it; but the whole argument would likewise be an illustration of the time required for the consideration of the Agreement. Therefore I take the liberty of passing that question by; but I make no reproach. Then we come back to the question—What is it that prevents 244 the Government from acceding to the request of the right hon. Gentleman? I do not wish to argue this in a grudging spirit; but, in the first place, I admit he has every title to urge on his own account, and as the Representative of a large Party in this House, and every title to urge on account of the forbearance which he has shown in waiting patiently for the conclusion of the arrangements, which were not in our hands, but in those of other Powers, and with respect to which Parliament has been subjected to a delay which might have provoked some impatience. The reason why we take our position is this: we do not think that it is fair to expect Foreign Powers to act in this matter until the House of Commons leads the way. We have the principal responsibility. Sir, we have had more than the principal responsibility. For us this has been a matter of anxiety and solicitude all along, reaching to the very highest point; but as to the Foreign Powers it is quite different. Their position has been the position of the man in Lucretius—
Suave, mari magno, turbantibus æquora ventis, E terrâ magnum alterius spectare laborem.To them it was a small matter whether this question went forward at a snail's pace or at a full canter. [Mr. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT: Hear, hear!] The hon. Member for Eye cheers. He has at last got an inkling of what the matter really is. But for us it was very different indeed; because we were those who were tumbled about upon the sea in the storms and tempests, while the Foreign Powers, if they had chosen, were at liberty to stand on the shore and look on as calm spectators. Why are we in this great anxiety? Because the time has come when every expedient has been exhausted which could honourably be adopted for the purpose of staving off to a future day the financial difficulties of Egypt, and of avoiding Egyptian bankruptcy—Egyptian bankruptcy in a country where financial confusion might come also to mean confusion not financial, and other than financial—and where, whatever consequences ensued, be they financial or be they other than financial, it is upon us—not upon this Government alone, but on the Government of this country, whatever it might be, or the Parliament of this country, whatever it might be—that the whole difficulty really will fall. It comes to 245 that plain statement of the case. I am concerned to meet the wishes of the right Gentleman; but I cannot undertake to risk Egyptian bankruptcy in order to meet him. It is not at a future and a distant date that these difficulties may occur. Last year we stated, and with perfect truth, that the condition of Egyptian finance was very urgent, and so it was. Still, there were expedients —that of withholding the payments due to the Exchequer of this country, and that of withholding the Sinking Fund, which was undoubtedly a measure of the Egyptian Government which we could not refuse to approve, but which undoubtedly was a very strong measure, and which excited strong adverse feeling in the minds of the Powers of Europe. Whatever were the merits of these measures, they have gone by. We are at the end of our tether; there are no more expedients than can be used; and in the month of April, unless this House gives us the means by its Resolution—and that, we are convinced, will be sufficient—Egypt will be called upon as a matter of public faith to meet demands which she will have no means of meeting unless we are able to make such proper arrangements as are contemplated by this Convention. The other day the hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire (Mr. Chaplin) observed to me, in the form of a Question, that I appeared to have forgotten that the House of Commons was not bound to approve the arrangement made by the Government, and that it might refuse its assent to the Convention. But I do not think, with all respect, that the hon. Member quite saw the true bearing of his own Question. Sir, if we are responsible for the affairs of this country, we cannot undertake, and we will not undertake, to face Egyptian bankruptcy through a failure to recognize the engagement into which we have conditionally entered. We cannot do it. Perhaps it will be said that others may be ready for that; and I suppose that is the case with an hon. Gentleman of great consideration on the other side of the House—I do not see him in his place—the hon. Member for Portsmouth (Mr. Bruce), who had given Notice before I entered the House to-night of a Motion condemning this Agreement. [Opposition cheers.] Very well; take care of your cheers, I advise you. ["Oh, oh!"] I do not 246 think that is an uncommon method of advice in this House; and I do not see why I should not give it to the hon. and gallant Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) without being offensive. That hon. and gallant Member will understand my meaning directly. I will tell the hon. and gallant Member for West Sussex that if he is to succeed in his object, and if he induces the House to put a negative on this Agreement, which it is perfectly and absolutely entitled to do—we have done nothing which in the least degree impairs the Constitutional right of the House—it has full power to refuse its sanction to the engagement into which we have conditionally entered. But if it does so, and if in consequence the management of Egyptian finance so pass into hands other than ours, then I tell the hon. and gallant Member for West Sussex, and I tell the right hon. Gentleman opposite, that time is more valuable even to them than it is to us. And when they assume the responsibility which the hon. Member for Portsmouth is so anxious to bring upon them, and undertake to make some better Convention and devise some better arrangement than ours—I tell them they will have neither a week, nor a day, nor an hour to spare. Now, it will be understood why I say that if the House agrees to the Convention and expects us to proceed with Egyptian affairs, hon. Members will not be surprised at our laying before them very explicitly what we believe to be the absolute necessities of the case. But if the House desires that not we but hon. Gentlemen opposite should proceed with the management of those affairs, and that they should take our places for that purpose, it is still more necessary that the vote of the House under which they would receive their title should not be delayed. And I venture to say that if that contingency should come about, not one of the Gentlemen sitting on the opposite Bench, who may doubt now the soundness of the declaration that I am making, will doubt any longer after he has been for 48 hours in contact with the actual necessities of the case. I do not say a word at this moment about the Convention. Let it be the best or the worst that could possibly have been made in the circumstances, I have argued strictly on the question of time. I have said 247 that nothing but necessity would have led me to decline the request of the right hon. Gentleman. That necessity is absolute and inexorable; and I trust that the House, whatever course it may take on the merits of the Instrument, will recognize that the responsible Ministers of the Crown are not only entitled, but bound, to give their judgment in a case of such gravity and such emergency as to the time and moment at which it is their duty to ask the sanction of the House to the arrangement into which we have conditionally entered.
§ LORD JOHN MANNERSThe House, I think, will perceive that the real argument of the right hon. Gentleman for opposing the postponement of the discussion on the Convention till after Easter is simply this—We have brought the financial affairs of Egypt into such a state of hopeless confusion that if the House of Commons does not shut its eyes and close its ears and at once accept this Convention Egyptian bankruptcy must necessarily ensue. It is with this pistol held at our heads that the right hon. Gentleman turns round on the House and says—"I cannot give you time to consider this important proposal. You must accept it without further delay." That was really the right hon. Gentleman's principal argument, though no doubt there were minor arguments woven into his most skilful speech. Among them was this—that all the Foreign Powers are now agreed on this proposal; that it is essential that we should take the lead, and that the Powers of Europe are waiting on our deliberations and decisions. I would put this question to the right hon. Gentleman—Is it intended that this Convention, and all the financial arrangements depending on it, shall come into operation as soon as the British House of Commons has given its first vote; or is it intended that the sanction of all the Great Powers of Europe which have Parliaments shall remain subject to a similar Parliamentary vote? If he tells us that the Convention will not come into practical operation until the assent of the Parliaments of Prance and Italy, for example, has been obtained, then I put this question to the right hon. Gentleman—if we deliberate on this Convention now and give our sanction to it, when will the sanction of the Italian Parliament be obtained? I find from the papers that 248 the Italian Parliament is on the eve of adjourning till a distant date in April. What, then, is to happen to the Convention? The right hon. Gentleman tells us that Egypt will be in a state of bankruptcy in the month of April. But the Italian Parliament will not have an opportunity of considering the Convention until nearly the end of April. And that may also be the case, for aught I know, with respect to the Parliament of France. As to Germany and Austria, I do not feel so confident. But what, then, becomes of this plea of urgency, that England must take the first step and sanction the Convention, and then that all the other Powers will follow? I say that the statement of the right hon. Gentleman cannot be taken without further proof; and that this plea as respects foreign countries requires far greater confirmation than the right hon. Gentleman has given us. But with regard to the condition of the finances of Egypt, can anything be conceived more damaging than the confession which the right hon. Gentleman has made? The finances of Egypt, under his fostering care, are in such a state that not a week or a fortnight's delay can be permitted; and there lies, according to his reasoning, on all who presume even to discuss the question in a serious and practical manner the responsibility of Egyptian bankruptcy. I say, on the contrary, that it is not the House of Commons that will be responsible for the bankruptcy of Egypt, but the responsibility will lie at the doors of that Government which, for the last three years, has so mismanaged Egyptian finance and Egyptian affairs generally that they now come to this House, and, holding a loaded pistol at its head, seek to deprive us of all legitimate opportunity of discussing this great question. But is it correct, as the right hon. Gentleman has represented to us to-night, that this is a mere financial transaction, by which, at the outside, England will only become responsible for something like £1,250,000 sterling? Why, if this were only a financial arrangement, and one involving a responsibility on our part, even for £5,000,000, I have no doubt that the British House of Commons would rise to the emergency and meet the difficulty. But that is not the difficulty or the danger that we apprehend; nor is it the condition of affairs against which we feel bound to 249 guard. Sir, the danger is—and the right hon. Gentleman said nothing about it in the whole of his speech—the danger is that by this Convention, in order to secure this apparent limitation of the responsibility of England to £1,250,000, engagements shall have been contracted with the Great Powers of Europe, by which the whole of the vast sacrifices which this country has been making, is now making, and will have to make in treasure, and in what is still more important—blood may be thrown away; and that for the sake of that financial easement to the Treasury of Egypt, and for the sake of being able to say to the people of England that, after all, it is only a matter of £1,250,000, future complications with the Powers of Europe may have been entered into. That is the real difficulty that we feel in discussing off-hand the question of this Convention; and that is the real reason why we think it is essential in the interests not only of this Party or of the House of Commons, but in the interests of the country and of the Empire, that further time should be given for the consideration of a question of such great importance.
§ THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. CHILDERS)Sir, I will pass by—as I think I now ought to do—the political matters that have been introduced by the noble Lord. But I will reply to so much of his speech as referred to the question of the time at which the debate, and what we hope will be the confirmation of the Convention, ought to take place. The noble Lord has spoken of the affairs of Egypt during the last three years as having been the subject of mismanagement on our part. To that he shall have a full answer when the debate comes on. But I wish to remind the House that two years and a-half ago, before the details of the financial administration of Egypt were a matter of care to us, the estimate of the Controllers General, Sir Auckland Colvin and M. Brédif, was that £8,000,000 would have to be raised to put Egyptian affairs straight; and, therefore, the difference in that respect now is a question between £8,000,000 and £9,000,000—a difference which it will very easy to explain when we come to the subject. The noble Lord made an ingenious argument with respect to the necessity of 250 obtaining Parliamentary sanction to the Arrangement. The noble Lord admits the gravity of the occasion, and the urgency of the case. At any rate, he said nothing to dispute it. But he said it would be impossible that any relief to Egyptian finance could take place and come into practical operation until the Parliaments of the Great Powers assenting to that Arrangement had expressed approval of that assent. Now, I wish to say a few words as to what the present state of the matter is. In the early part of next month, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has said, Egypt will be called upon for certain payments, which it is impossible for her to make under the existing circumstances. Now, the noble Lord would say—"Oh, but the Parliament of Italy, possibly the Parliament of Germany, and possibly the Parliament of France, will not meet until May next; or even later." I understood him to say that the Parliament of Italy is about to adjourn, or has adjourned, for a great length of time. But the answer to that is perfectly plain. If this House approves of the Convention, it will be in the power of the Egyptian Government to borrow a sufficient amount of money to carry them through the next three weeks—to carry them for more than three weeks, probably into the month of April or May. But without that sanction on the part of this Parliament the Egyptian Government will not have the security which will enable them to borrow the money. The question, therefore, is a simple and practical one. Will you deny to the Egyptian Government the approval of the proposals of Her Majesty's Government, under which Egypt will be able to borrow a sufficient sum to meet this expenditure, or will you adopt the Arrangement arrived at by Her Majesty's Government, and enable Egypt to tide over the difficulty? It is simply a practical question of bankruptcy or not on the part of Egypt. If Parliament, within the next few days, adopts the Convention it will not be bankruptcy. If, on the other side, it declines to adopt, or postpones the adoption of the Convention, Egypt will be bankrupt, and others will have to deal with the question. On the showing of the noble Lord himself the case is most urgent, and I hope the House will not refuse an early discussion and decision.
§ MR. O'DONNELLsaid, he was inclined to wonder at the anxiety displayed on the Conservative Benches for delay in the final signing, sealing, and delivering of the British surrender to International control. Whether that surrender took place on Thursday next, or on Thursday fortnight, he really could not see that it mattered very much to any British Party. Under the able auspices of the Premier, for whom he had the greatest respect, and who was the uncontrolled master of the liberties of the Members of the House of Commons, although his concentrated influence was not worth a feather's weight in the Councils of Europe—under the able auspices of the Premier, they were placed in that position, that they must surrender all their so-called sacrifices in Egypt to the Powers of Europe. This country lost its position in Europe when its Navy bombarded Alexandria, and it was now losing its Indian Empire in the blood-pools of the Soudan. It appeared that the Conservative Members wanted discussion. He thought that they were a patriotic Party, who wished for action. Was it more talk on the Egyptian Question that was necessary? The real fact of the matter was, as he had said, whether this question was settled before the Easter Recess or after it, they must surrender to the Powers. They might talk of opposing the Powers; but they had not sufficient men to garrison even their Indian Empire. This sham was going on from day to day, and it was a fact which made them the laughing-stock of their enemies, and a source of grief and shame to every Englishman who had a shadow of patriotism with whom he had the honour to be acquainted.
§ SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFFsaid, that the Prime Minister took upon himself to rebuke hon. Members sitting on the Opposition side of the House with regard to their treatment of answers given by the Government. He (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) thought a little better example might be set by the Treasury Bench, where he observed that laughing and talking took place while the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War was reading out a list of killed and wounded. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer was, he understood, to be charged with the conduct of the arrangement of this Con- 252 vention. He (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) did not feel his confidence very much increased in the transaction by that announcement, because anyone more unsuccessful than the right hon. Gentleman in dealing with these Egyptian questions he could not conceive. The right hon. Gentleman was charged with the arrangement of the Suez Canal in the first instance, and there he signally failed; he was not successful in the Conference on Egyptian matters; and he (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) could not see why the right hon. Gentleman should now be Chosen as the principal factor in the new arrangement. The right hon. Gentleman had shown complete ignorance of the subject which he was discussing, inasmuch as he had stated that this Guarantee, which they were about to give, was on the same footing as the Anglo-French Guarantee of 1855, with regard to the Turkish Loan. He (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) happened to know a good deal about that arrangement, and he should like to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer and other Ministers to tell the House in what respect the two arrangements were similar? In 1855 there was a clear transaction between England and France to guarantee a loan, the Sultan having assigned certain revenues as security for that loan. In the present case, the Convention referred to the Edict of the Sultan which sanctioned the loan, and the document stated that it was necessary to introduce certain modifications into the Law of Liquidation. It then went on to create new taxes to be raised in Egypt for the purpose of meeting the exigencies of the loan. In addition to that, the Commission of the Caisse, to which had been added Representatives of Russia and Germany, were to furnish accounts and reports of the sums gathered from this new taxation.
§ THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. CHILDERS)I may as well remind the hon. Gentleman that the new loan is the first charge on the assigned, and virtually on all the Revenues of Egypt.
§ SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFFsaid, he did not say it was not the first charge. That had nothing to do with the question. What he did say was that there were new taxes to be raised for the purpose of meeting the loan. In two years there was to be a final Report 253 to the Powers; and, meanwhile, it was laid down that the Commissioners of the Treasury of the Debt should, 15 days before each payment was due—
§ MR. SPEAKERI must remind the hon. Gentleman that the subject before the House is not the Convention itself, but simply the arrangement for the discussion of the Draft Convention. I hope the hon. Gentleman will see the propriety of confining himself to the Question of the Arrangement as proposed by the Government.
§ SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFFsaid, he was trying to show that it was necessary that the House should have a clear elucidation of the point before they discussed the Arrangement; and his contention was that they had no Papers for elucidating the particular difficulty before them. There was another point upon which he wished to speak. The Prime Minister had stated that the portion of the Arrangement with regard to the Suez Canal need not come under purview of the House; and that, as hon. Members were in possession of the views of the Government, owing to Lord Granville's Circular of 1883, there was no occasion to furnish them with any other information before the Government went into the discussion of the matter. He (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) maintained, however, that the arrangement with regard to the Suez Canal did not come under the same category as ordinary Treaty undertakings. The Crown, he admitted, had a perfect right to enter into such International engagements, provided they did not come under the financial cognizance of that House; but he submitted that everything connected with the Suez Canal must come under the financial cognizance of the House. The English Government being, by the purchase of half the shares in 1876, the proprietors of half the Canal, half the revenues would before long become a portion of the ordinary Revenue of this country. Therefore, any arrangement which they might enter into with regard to the Canal might greatly affect the Canal itself, and as such might affect the pecuniary arrangements of this country. He maintained that the Government could not enter into a political arrangement in which the Suez Canal was concerned without the consent of the House, inasmuch as it might affect the pecuniary value of the shares. He 254 did not know whether that question had been discussed by the Government; but hon. Members could not discuss the arrangement now before them unless they had ample information on the point.
MR. JOSEPH COWENsaid, that when the Prime Minister came to the House and stated that the circumstances of the case were so urgent and commanding that they required the House to give its assent to a Convention such as that provisionally effected with the Powers, within a certain time, a private Member was virtually put to silence, and it was scarcely within the right or obligation of such a one to contest the position. For his own part, he did not wish to argue the question of urgency on this occasion. There might be circumstances unknown to the House that compelled the Government to take this peremptory course, and persons like himself were not in a position to pronounce an opinion upon them. But he must say that the force of the Prime Minister's contention was somewhat weakened by the fact that he had made other declarations to a like effect on former occasions. They were told, not once, but several times last year, that the finances of Egypt were in so critical a state that an immediate decision respecting them was absolutely necessary, and that if the House did not consent to certain arrangements her position would be very precarious. But the necessity for that decision had been got over; and, reasoning from what had been done, the present crisis might probably be got over also by an effort, if the Government felt disposed to make it. The demand made upon them was a very small one, and certainly it was a reasonable one. The Government had taken 12 months or more to settle the terms of the Convention; and surely it was not a great deal to ask that the Representatives of the people should have 12 days to deliberate upon it before they gave to it an assent which would be irrevocable. He thought that that was a most modest request, and regretted that the Government did not see their way to accede to it. The Prime Minister's statement came to this —that they were to legislate in this matter under foreign pressure. The position taken up was somewhat disparaged by the Prime Minister himself, 255 for he had endeavoured to minimize the responsibilities that the Government were about to undertake; but that was not the tone that had been taken on previous occasions when speaking of the Convention, and certainly was not the idea that their Continental critics formed of the Arrangement. They regarded it as a triumph for their diplomacy, and as a defeat for ours. But, however that might be, it was an undoubted fact that the Government were about to create an International Guarantee, and it would not be unreasonable for anyone to suppose that when they consented to this International Guarantee that International Guarantee would carry with it International control. And International control meant International confusion and mischief, discontent, and possibly war. Surely, then, there was nothing exorbitant in the request to allow Parliament time to consider the details of a bargain which covered such momentous consequences to this country, to Egypt, and to Europe. His object, however, was not to discuss the question on its merits, but merely to lodge a protest against the hurry the Government were in in asking for a decision, and to make an inquiry about the Suez Canal. The House knew that the Convention carried with it the right to hold a Conference to re-adjust the position of the Canal—in a word, to internationalize it. They were told, also, that the basis on which the Government would ask for this Internationalization had been set out in the Circular Despatch of Lord Granville. This was all well enough as far as England was concerned, and there might not be much objection to most of the points that had been laid down by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; but he would like some Minister to inform the House whether the other Powers had agreed that Lord Granville's Despatch should be taken by them as the basis of negotiations in the same way as it was taken by England? If this was not the case, the country would go into a Conference about the Suez Canal, without any guarantee as to the arrangements that might be effected. These arrangements might very seriously concern, not only special interests, but the nation at large.
MR. GORSTsaid, that the question before the House was a question of 256 time, and upon that question the Government had completely driven the House into a corner. This was not the first time that had been done. The Government were extremely fond of driving them into a corner; and, in doing so, they showed most distinctly the contempt in which they held the House of Commons. He (Mr. Gorst) did not know that the House of Commons deserved much better treatment at the hands of the Government; because when time was given it for the discussion of the Egyptian Question, though many criticisms were delivered, yet, as a whole, it tamely endorsed any course which the Government had hitherto thought fit to pursue. But he would ask the House to contrast the time accorded to it with the time the Government had themselves taken to consider the matter. When Lord North brook came back from Egypt, the Government had not only before them the Report given to the House of Commons, but they had full Reports besides. Did they make up their minds in a week, for that was the time they gave the House of Commons to consider the question? The Government, with full and complete information before them, took considerably more than a week before making their propositions to the Powers of Europe. It was more than five months since Lord Northbrook returned, and more than four months since his full Reports were placed in writing before the Government, and the Government had taken all that time to formulate their plans. It seemed to show but little respect for the House of Commons to ask them to form their judgment within a week. He would like that the House should contrast the time given to the House of Commons with the time given to the Government of France. The Government of France had a whole month given them to consider the propositions of the Government before the Government even pressed them for any reply. When they pressed them they took another fortnight. Why did not the Government then explain to the Government of France the extreme urgency of time? [Sir WILLIAM HARCOURT: They did.] Why should they allow the Government of France to have an entire six weeks before giving a reply? When the Government of France did give their reply, it certainly did not take a long time for the Govern- 257 ment to make up their minds; for on February 4 they issued their last despatch, which was a complete surrender to France. From that time down to the present had been taken up by some sort of negotiations with the Government of France, which they could not at present understand—though perhaps it might be explained in the Papers to be circulated to morrow—before coming to an agreement. When so much time had been given to the Government of France, it was rather hard to ask the House of Commons, under pain of causing bankruptcy to Egypt, to give their consent in one week. If that was the first time in which the Government had acted in that way there might be some excuse for it; but when they were coming perpetually to the House of Commons, asking them to give an important decision at once, that was a very different matter.
§ SIR WILLIAM HARCOURTThe hon. and learned Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst) said that Her Majesty's Government had driven the House of Commons into a corner. That may be so; and my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has expressed his great regret that it should be so. But the real truth is, the Government have themselves been driven into a corner. The hon. and learned Member said that one of the great faults of the Government was that they allowed the Government of France to delay their answer. I want to know what is the view of the hon. Member as to the relation of the Government of this country to that of France?
MR. GORSTsaid, he did not say "allow." What he said was that the Government had given France more time.
§ SIR WILLIAM HARCOURTYes, you did; I took the word down at the time. I refer to it, because it is an admirable example of the way in which the hon. and learned Gentleman would have us speak to Foreign Governments— of the way in which he expects the Government of England to treat Foreign Powers, and deal with foreign affairs. The reason of the delay, as everyone knows, is our desire to arrange financial matters with the Governments of Europe, and because they have a right to a voice in the matter. But when the hon. and learned Member and the Conserva- 258 tive Opposition jeer the Government, and ask, What do you mean by allowing the Government of France so many weeks for their answer? I wonder what sort of tone it is intended and expected the Government of England is to take upon this question. The hon. and learned Member asks how long Her Majesty's Government have taken to make up their minds? Why, it is months ago since we made up our minds as to the proposals we should offer to Europe; and if we had been in the position which, no doubt, the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Gorst) will be able to take when he comes to conduct the affairs of this country—to go to France, Germany, Russia, and Italy, and say—"Here are our proposals, and mind you answer them to-morrow. We will not give you another day," then there would have been some ground for the sort of speech which the hon. and learned Gentleman has made on this occasion. Her Majesty's Government, unfortunately, are not in that position. They cannot say to France or Germany," You must answer to-morrow, or we shall have nothing to say to you. "We placed before them the proposals we thought it right to offer, and that was done weeks and months ago. There were differences of opinion which had to be considered and reconciled, and that was all the cause of the delay which has occurred; but it is a delay which has reduced Egypt to the brink of financial ruin. The hon. and learned Gentleman argues as if it were for us to say how many weeks one Power and another should take, and how many weeks the House of Commons should take to consider the matter. But the Government has no power of controlling any of these Governments. Did it never occur to the hon. and learned Member that if the Government had not had the consent of the Foreign Powers, this Loan could never have been made a first charge on the Sinking Fund; and that there was only the option of coming to an agreement with them, in order that the Loan might be a first charge upon the Fund, or a charge at all? It is obvious that the Foreign Powers had to be consulted; but it is also obvious that they should be the masters, in saying what time they should have before they gave their answers. So much for this charge against the Government, that they al- 259 lowed the Government of France to take so much time. Well, this delay having taken place in receiving the answers of the Powers, we had no option in the matter except to accept and present the Arrangement as soon as it was concluded with the Powers of Europe, and to tell the House of Commons that the matter did not admit of a lengthened delay. And now a word upon the remarks of the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. Joseph Cowen). The hon. Member says he must have time to consider the matter. There may be people in this House who want time to consider it; but the hon. Member is not one of these. He does not generally want time to form his opinion. That opinion, made up, as it is, at the first moment, I am sorry to say, is generally not very favourable to Her Majesty's Government. What does the hon. Member want time for? The hon. Member says that an International Guarantee means an. International Control, which will be the cause of confusion and every kind of evil. Well, the hon. Member has made up his mind as to that, and therefore there can be no reason for delay in his case. He has condemned the Convention to-night; why, then, does he put in a plea for delay? He does not want Papers. The position in which we are placed is not one of our own making. We have been obliged, against our will, having to deal with a great many European Powers, to delay until a period which brings Egyptian finance to the verge of a very dangerous state of things. We have now, under the circumstances, only to ask the House on their responsibility to come to an early decision upon the subject, because it is absolutely necessary that the affairs of Egypt should not be thrown into inextricable confusion.
§ MR. BOURKEsaid, he hoped the House would not be led away by threats of consequences, which he did not believe would follow. The right hon. Gentleman who had just sat down (Sir William Harcourt) had striven to show that the Government had been driven into a corner. But all the consequences of delay, which they were now told would be so terrible, were before Earl Granville in November last, who seemed then to be perfectly calm upon the subject. When asked by the French Government to come to a decision upon the subject 260 of Egyptian finance, he did not seem to be at all in a hurry, or to seem to think that there was the least cause for haste. At that time, when the French Ambassador pressed Earl Granville to state what the English Government intended to do, the noble Earl said that they had been so unsuccessful in their attempts to come to an agreement with France, that there did not seem any use in making propositions. All the confusion which the House was now told was inevitable must have been in the mind of Earl Granville, and must have been seen by him as the existing condition of things, so that if anybody was responsible for the present state of affairs it was the Foreign Office itself, and if blame was to be attached to anybody, it must attach to them for not expediting the negotiations. The right hon. Gentleman also said that months since Her Majesty's Government made up their minds as to the proposals they would submit to Europe. They did make proposals to Europe, it was true, but Europe treated them with perfect contempt; and the extraordinary nature of those proposals, and the manner in which they were received by the Powers, was one of the strongest reasons why the House should ask for full time for consideration. If Her Majesty's Government would but place themselves in the position of the House of Commons, they would, he believed, be amongst the most determined advocates of delay. But it must be remembered that the Government had ample means of obtaining information upon the matter. They had had 14 or 15 months to consider the matter, and they had had experts and other gentlemen at their command, who could set them right upon questions which, like this, involved enormous gravity and difficulty. But even experts themselves differed now upon the most vital points, and the very Agreement the House was called upon to ratify was actually impaired by the admissions of Her Majesty's Government. It was substantially a French Agreement, and Sir Evelyn Baring had said, over and over again, that the estimates of the French experts were altogether untrustworthy. These calculations were so complicated, that it was impossible for the House of Commons to give them their true value without ample time for consideration. They were told that the Agreement was 261 only a financial one; but he did not think anybody could be taken in by that statement. If it were so, the Powers of Europe would not be so anxious to share in it; and it would be the most unjust thing which could be done, because we were face to face with that difficulty which the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. Joseph Cowen) seemed to deplore?—namely, International Agreement and International Control. With regard to the question of the Suez Canal, that might possibly be, as the right hon. Gentleman had said, beyond the financial question. He doubted however, whether the French Government would not consider that to be part and parcel of the entire question, and that they would not agree with us on one of these questions apart from the other. He thought, therefore, the House should not be hurried into a decision upon a subject involving such grave issues. He believed that, under the circumstances, any decision which the House might come to at the present time would be of no value, and would only lead to further complications, and land this country in a serious difficulty.
§ MR. MITCHELL HENRYsaid, that, in his opinion, it was not so much time for consideration of the Agreement that right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite required, as a policy. They wanted an opportunity of going to the country to ascertain whether they could find support for views opposed to the Convention which had been proposed by the Government. The Papers which had been presented to Parliament were by no means voluminous, and could be mastered by anyone of average intelligence in a few hours. The right hon. Gentleman who had just sat down (Mr. Bourke) had evidently mastered them; but, in the course of his speech, had carefully kept out of sight the points which told in favour of the Government. Her Majesty's Government had repeatedly been accused of vacillation; but the Papers showed clearly that they had, in this instance, been exceptionally firm, and very unwillingly granted part of what Prance demanded. They had, it was true, admitted that if, in two years' time, the finances of Egypt should not have improved by the paltry amount of £200,000, an inquiry might be held; but who could doubt that, under the fostering care of England, 262 such an improvement as that would be effected? Another thing evident by the Papers was the extraordinary activity of the Foreign Office; and he thought Lord Lyons must have been hard put to it to find words in which to clothe the hints and instructions given to him to hurry on the French Government to a decision. He believed that this Convention would be happy in its results both for England and Egypt.
§ MR. SPEAKERcalled the hon. Member to Order, saying that he was not entitled to pursue that course on a Motion for the adjournment of the House.
§ MR. MITCHELL HENRY,in conclusion, said, if it were merely a question of time to enable hon. Gentlemen to make up their minds, he should be happy to assent it; but, feeling that delay was not necessary for that purpose, he should oppose the Motion for the adjournment of the House.
§ LORD GEORGE HAMILTONsaid, he rose for the purpose of making a practical suggestion. The Government were in a corner, and asked the House of Commons to get them out of it. The dilemma in which the Government put the House of Commons was that either they must assent to the proposal contained in the Convention, with all the complications that followed in its train, or, as they were told, precipitate the bankruptcy of Egypt. But there was nothing in the Papers to show that the financial affairs of Egypt could not be carried on for a few days, while the House of Commons was considering the important matter placed before them, neither had the Government proved that the payments the Egyptian Government would be called upon to make in the next fortnight were of a pressing and urgent character. On Friday, the Prime Minister used words which clearly indicated that those payments were not of a pressing character, when he said—
So strongly has the condition of the persons entitled to indemnities been felt that it has been arranged in the Agreement that the payment of them shall rank as a first charge.It was self-evident that the postponement of payment of the indemnities, which had stood over for 18 months, for another 18 days would not make Egypt bankrupt. What, then, were these pressing payments? Having looked through the Papers, he was very sceptical as to the necessity of their assent- 263 ing to the arrangement for the purpose of keeping the country from bankruptcy. He thought they were entitled to ask the Government to telegraph to Sir Evelyn Baring, and ask him what was the excess of payments for the next fortnight over and above the Revenue which the Egyptian Government would have to make. Supposing the Egyptian Government might possibly want an advance of £100,000, would it not be better that some arrangement should be made for advancing such a sum temporarily, for the purpose of carrying on the financial business for the next fortnight, even at the risk of losing it"? But, looking at the matter as a business transaction, -was it not most extraordinary that the Prime Minister should come down and say—"You are to advance £9,000,000 to a Government; and, because that Government is bankrupt, you are not to inquire into the circumstances under which you make the advance." If this transaction stood by itself it would not so much matter; but, unfortunately, it was remarkable that all the financial proposals of Her Majesty's present Advisers were laid before Parliament under such circumstances as to prevent their being discussed. He thought, therefore, the House was entitled to a reply from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, or the Prime Minister, undertaking to obtain from the Egyptian Government a definite statement as to what these pressing payments were, and as to the amount that would be actually required by the Egyptian Government within the next few weeks.
§ MR. LABOUCHEREsaid, he did not think that hon. Gentlemen opposite had made out their case for delay. Surely they did not do themselves justice when they said they would not be able to master the details of the Papers to be distributed to-morrow morning before next Thursday. His own impression was that hon. Gentlemen opposite had already made up their minds upon the question, and all they wanted to know was what the country thought of it, so as to enable them to come back after the Recess with a policy before committing themselves upon the matter. The strongest argument in favour of the contention of the Opposition had been used by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, when he told the House that if they did not agree to this Convention before 264 Easter, Egypt would be bankrupt. Why should not Egypt be bankrupt? He thought it would be a most desirable thing. The errors of the present Government were due to the main fault that they had committed in endeavouring to save the sick man from the consequences of his own acts. There had been a revolution in Egypt; and one advantage of a revolution was that it made a clean sweep of all financial liabilities. Bankruptcy for the Egyptians meant that they would be able to devote their resources to improving their own country, and would not be obliged to pay those large amounts to the bondholders they now had to pay. Sooner or later, he trusted Egypt would be bankrupt, for then she would not come to this country to back her bills.
§ MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTsaid, the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Home Department had affected great regard for the rights of the Powers with respect to Egyptian finance; but the right hon. Gentleman forgot that, by the action of the present Government, a great affront was offered to the Powers by the arbitrary suspension of the Sinking Fund last September. He wished to make a protest against the ignominious language used by the Prime Minister at the close of his speech. The Prime Minister thought the House and the country were under an imperious necessity to ratify the Agreement before Easter. Did he mean that this country was now under the coercion of Foreign Powers in this matter? ["Oh, oh!"] Although the Prime Minister could not undertake that the House of Commons should assent to the Agreement, he (Mr. Ash-mead - Bartlett) understood that some such promise had been made to a Foreign Power, and that it was upon that statement that the Agreement was entered into. He could not avoid smiling when the right hon. Gentleman assured the House that it was impossible to ask the Powers for delay, and then proceeded to answer his own argument by stating, through the medium of a well-worn Latin quotation, that the matter was very trifling to them, but of great interest to England. He protested against Parliament being asked to assent to this arrangement without due consideration, when a satisfactory settlement might have been made at any 265 time during the past two years. The House of Commons was asked to vote with its eyes shut, and to assent to the establishment of an insane Internationalization and a Multiple Control, which would be equally fatal to our interests and the interests of the people of Egypt.
§ MR. LAINGsaid, he wished to say two words in support of a speedy decision of the question. He did not do so from any Party motive, or any general approval of the policy of the Government in Egypt. But he thought the position of Egypt was so critical that it was the duty of everyone to throw aside all other considerations, and to look simply at what might be proper for the country. He was glad the Government, after what he might almost call the hostile attitude of the European Powers, had come back to that which ought to have been the keystone of the policy of this country—a cordial understanding with Germany. That friendship, however, had only been recently renewed, and the position was still too strained and critical to play any tricks with it. There was no doubt the London Conference caused a great deal of irritation amongst the European Powers, as they felt they were invited upon a fool's errand. What would be the feeling of the Powers now, especially if Egypt-were allowed to fall into bankruptcy, simply because hon. Gentlemen opposite wanted an extra fortnight to try to evolve a policy of their own out of the Blue Books? This was not a question which required time. As a matter of fact, there was nothing in the Blue Books which had not been perfectly well known to the country for the last month or six weeks. The question was between adopting this Convention, or else they had got to face the very much larger question by which we would have to guarantee the whole Egyptian Debt. It seemed to him unpatriotic to run any risks, especially of misunderstanding with those Powers with whom it must be recollected we were bound by international obligations, simply because hon. Gentlemen opposite wanted a little more time to study the Blue Books. A decision ought to be come to on this question, even though Members had to sacrifice their Easter Holidays. He hoped the House would do nothing by which it would expose itself to be misunderstood. When the discussion came 266 on, he would see whether a better policy could be devised; but whatever was done, it was essential that it should be done quickly. He should certainly not assent to the Motion, until he heard what was the alternative policy of the Opposition.
MR. MACARTNEYsaid, that the Prime Minister had shown a great deal of irritation at the jeers he had evoked earlier in the discussion, and the Secretary of State for the Home Department had read them a lecture on the mode in which they should conduct their relations with. Foreign Powers. He thought all such manifestations were out of place. They did not want to eat humble pie, and they had no intention of bullying foreign countries. He supported the Motion, on the ground of the enormous magnitude of the issues involved in the question which the House were to be asked to dispose of at short notice.
§ SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTEasked leave to withdraw the Motion for the Adjournment.
MR. GLADSTONEinquired, whether the right hon. Gentleman would prefer the discussion on the Arrangement being taken on Thursday or Monday?
§ SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTEI think either day too early for the proper discussion; but as I understand that Thursday will suit the Government best, I am, therefore, ready to accept Thursday.
§ Motion, by leave, withdrawn.