HC Deb 21 July 1881 vol 263 cc1470-2
SIR WILFRID LAWSON

asked the First Lord of the Treasury, Whether the information which the Government had received, and which he communicated to the House on the 2nd of May, to the effect that— The capitulation of Potchesfroom was obtained by an act of treachery on the part of the commandant of the besieging force, has been confirmed, or otherwise, by more recent accounts from the Transvaal?

MR. GLADSTONE

Sir, the Question of my hon. Friend arises out of the circumstance that I said on a former day that the capitulation of Potchefstroom was obtained by an act of treachery on the part of the commandant of the besieging force. Since that time we have had an opportunity of receiving full details of the nature of that act. I do not know that it would be convenient, or attended with advantage, for me to enter upon those details. The real question is whether I adhere to that phrase. I admit that its accuracy is a matter of argument. We do not precisely know every particular of what occurred in such a way as to know exactly the consequences that were produced by certain acts; but undoubtedly this is true, that there was bad faith. It was stipulated in the arrangements that the conclusion of the armistice was to be made known to the English Commander by the Commander of the Dutch Force. He had that communicated to him, and yet, though this was a stipulation of the armistice, he did not communicate it to the English Commander. To what extent that acted on the mind of the Commander at Potchefstroom I cannot say; but, without expressingany opinion at present on the question of treachery, I may say that there was certainly very gross misconduct on his part. I have only to say, in addition, that the complete record of the facts, which is very minute and complicated, is quite at the service of the hon. Baronet who put the Question, or of any other hon. Member who wishes to inquire into the circumstances.

SIR WILFRID LAWSON

Is it not known that the English Commander had a copy of the terms of the armistice the day before the capitulation?

MR. GLADSTONE

I do not think I can answer the Question precisely. He may have had a copy of the terms, but I do not think it likely.

SIR JOHN HAY

Will the Papers with reference to the siege of Potchefstroom be laid on the Table of the House?

MR. GLADSTONE

I will inquire whether the Papers are in such a form that they can be produced. But I would rather recommend the right hon. and gallant Gentleman to avail himself of the hint which I gave a little time ago, and inspect the Papers for himself. I may say that they have no bearing on the subject of the discussion of Monday next as to the Transvaal—I mean as regards the conduct of the Government or as regards the conduct of the Boer Leaders, because the conduct of the latter in respect of the matter is perfectly unimpeachable. The whole question is as to the conduct of the local Commandant.

SIR JOHN HAY

The reason why I ask for the Papers is because I have received letters from officers who were imprisoned at Potchefstroom; and I found myself upon those letters when I say that the conduct of the Dutch Commandant, who was a Boer Leader, was contrary to the laws of civilized warfare.

MR. GLADSTONE

So much I have already said, and desire to be responsible for. "Treachery" is, no doubt, a very hard word, and I do not call the individual referred to a Boer Leader. He was the local Commandant. By Boer Leaders we mean those with whom we communicated respecting all the new arrangements, and their conduct has been perfectly honourable and unimpeachable.

SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE

May we expect that any further communications will be laid on the Table before the debate fixed for Monday—a debate which has been put off for a considerable time on the ground of the proceedings at Potchefstroom?

MR. GLADSTONE

I do not think there are any communications more than what may be found in the Papers already produced. I can explain in a moment the change which took place in our attitude with respect to the discussion referred to. It is this—that when a case occurred in which a British garrison had been compelled to surrender, owing to the non-fulfilment of a condition of the armistice by the local Commandant, we at once raised the whole question whether we could or could not rely upon a continuance of a specific state of things, or whether it might not be the losing of the whole of the ground we had made. Under that state of things, although no actual hostilities were going on, we could not feel secure until our arrangements were made and carried into effect. We did not know what might happen until we had re-occupied Potchefstroom. Our object was to place ourselves in the same position as when the armistice was concluded. We considered, of course, subject to the judgment of the House, that when that miscarriage—to use a very weak word, indeed—occurred in the fulfilment of the condition of the arrangement, there was so much uncertainly cast on the whole of the arrangement that the state of things was not such as to encourage the House to enter upon a discussion of political matters while military affairs were in that condition.