HC Deb 04 August 1879 vol 249 cc102-22
MR. RYLANDS

, in moving— That, in view of the large and increasing expenditure for military purposes in South Africa, this House is of opinion that the Colonies of the Cape of Good Hope and Natal ought to be required to contribute a due proportion of the military expenditure incurred in the interests of those Colonies, and which cannot, in justice, be made a Charge upon the British Exchequer, said: If hon. Gentlemen were to take the trouble to refer to the proceedings in Parliament 28 years ago, they will find that the House of Commons were engaged in very much the same sort of discussions as those which are occupying our attention at the present moment. In 1851, the country was engaged in a protracted war at the Cape of Good Hope. It was the last of several wars in which we had been engaged, and in consequence of the great amount of expenditure, and also in consequence of the great uneasiness produced in the country by the succession of wars, the House of Commons seriously considered a Motion brought before it having reference to the circumstances which then existed. I think I may truly say that at that time the opinion of the highest authorities in this House was entirely to the effect that the wars in South Africa had been, for the most part, of a very unjust character; that they had been fomented by the Colonists, and had arisen, to a very great extent, from aggressions made by the Colonists upon the adjoining Tribes; and, at the same time, there was a feeling very strongly expressed in this House that the expenditure which was incurred in the interests of the South African Colony ought not to be borne by the taxpayers of this country, but that the South African Colonists themselves should provide the means for the protection of their own Frontier and for the support of their own interests. That which happened 28 years ago has again happened within our own recent experience. We have again wars in South Africa, wars which I hope, for the time, may be considered as happily concluded; but there is a very strong opinion on the part of many Members of this House, and I think it is an opinion which is also entertained in the country, that the origin of these wars—I am speaking-not merely of the Zulu War, but of the Transkei War as well—can hardly be justified, but that the wars might have been avoided, and that all the expenditure and all the anxiety which had arisen in consequence of these wars might have been saved to the country. I observe from the Report of the debates in the House of Commons in 1851 that Sir William Molesworth, in a speech which he made on the subject, stated the opinion, which our subsequent experience has proved to be correct, that so long as this country continued to pay for the maintenance of British Forces in the Colonies at the Cape of Good Hope, and so long as we led the Colonists to look to this country to furnish the military Forces to carry out the objects which the Colonists had in view, we should continue to have wars, and each war would prove greater than its predecessor. That has been so, for every Kaffir war has been more formidable than its predecessor, requiring more troops and costing more money. That we found in the experience which we have gained in the war we have just had in South Africa. The Transkei War, according to the Estimate of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, has cost the country near £1,000,000—I think the exact figure is between £800,000 and £900,000—and we are now about to consider an additional Vote of Credit for the Zulu War amounting to £3,000,000. In the last year we passed a Vote of Credit for £1,500,000 on account of the same campaign. From the Statements, in fact, which have been laid on the Table of the House of Commons, we find that, in respect of the Zulu and Transkei Wars, we had already voted for extraordinary expenditure nearly £5,500,000. But I wish to point out that this sum by no means represents the whole expenditure which has been incurred for military purposes in South Africa. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in a speech he made a short time ago, in laying on the Table an Estimate for the Vote of Credit, spoke of the entire expenditure, which he estimated as the net cost of the war, beyond the sums already provided in the Army Estimates as being the amount which he proposed to raise by the Vote of Credit. Now, that sum already provided in the Army Estimates is a very large sum indeed. The amount which we pay under the ordinary Votes of this House on account of the Force which is now in South Africa is very large indeed, and the ordinary Estimates must be added to the total amount of extraordinary expenditure which we are incurring in South Africa. I am not quite sure whether I notice some dissent on the part of the Secretary of State for War; but I should be very glad to be corrected. I am quite satisfied, however, that at the present moment the amount of the Estimate which we have on the Table of the House for the Vote of Credit is simply a further expenditure which does not include the ordinary charges of the troops which are placed in the ordinary Estimates of the year. [Colonel STANLEY assented.] Now, the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War agrees with me. If I am right, it means that, in addition to this large sum of £5,500,000, which is the amount of the extraordinary expenditure which has had to be met by this country during the last three or four years, for the purposes of the Transkei and Zulu Wars, we must place at least £1,000,000 more on account of the expenditure which appears in the Army Estimates. Well, if that be so, it comes to this—that on account of the Transkei and Zulu Wars we have up to the present time expended the sum of £6,000,000 or£7,000,000 for our Military and Naval Forces. That is the amount, if I take the Estimate as it has been laid on the Table by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. But I am bound to say that I believe that the Government themselves are in some doubt as to whether these Estimates may not be exceeded, judging from previous experience, and from the experience of the Abyssinian War, whore Estimates were laid on the Table of the House, carefully prepared by the Government, something like, in the first instance, the amount which the Government are asking on account of the South African War. They asked, first of all, £3,000,000, and then £4,500,000, and gradually it amounted to £9,000,000. But if we take the experience of former African Wars, I think we shall have very good reason to believe that the expenditure will mount up to very much more than the Government are at the present moment expecting. I know that the Government intend to check this expenditure as far as they can; but in the former wars, which were under discussion 28 years ago, I find that the War of 1846–7 cost £685,000 extraordinary expenditure, and that of 1853 cost £2,000,000 in extraordinary expenditure; and it was stated in the House by the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies of that day that no one in this country had a definite idea how the money was spent; and it was also stated, in one of the speeches which was made in the debate, that Sir Henry Pottinger told Lord Grey— That it was impossible to convey an adequate idea of the confusion in consequence of the unauthorized expenditure and the attendant peculations which prevailed during the war. Commissions of Audit were utterly incapable of auditing or checking the accounts. He further stated that— Though he had offered the burghers liberal terms for serving in a force to protect their own property, they had deserted their duty and returned homo within a month.…Rations were served out to them after their desertion; and at one time it appeared that the whole population was receiving rations, and that, by some mistake, women received four ounces more meat than men."—[3 Hansard, cxvi. 250.] I dare say the Chancellor of the Exchequer hopes that no abuses to that extent will prove to have existed in the Commissariat Department in the present war; but we must bear in mind that in South Africa we are placed in the midst of a population, every one of whom must have a direct interest in getting as much money out of us as he possibly can. There are the merchants at the Cape, who are importing—the merchants who are dealing in various commodities, a demand for which arises in connection with the war. There are traders in every district, and burghers, who have something to sell; and these tradesmen all derive such a great advantage from the war, and have such an opportunity to charge an enormous sum, that I must say I am not very sanguine in supposing that the Government will find that their labours are very successful efficiently to check these accounts. We hoard, the other day, from my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham (Mr. Chamberlain), a quotation from The Times newspaper, where it was said that some Colonists in Natal said that war paid better than sugar. And that is only repeating what occurred 28 years ago; for I find that in the debate on Sir Charles Adderley's Motion for a Committee of Inquiry into South African affairs Mr. Vernon Smith said— It was a notorious saying in the Colony that the war would last as long as the expenditure went on, and would begin to end when the expenditure declined, or, as the phrase was, 'when the price for the hire of waggons fell.'" [Ibid, 250.] Well, Sir, we have that repeated in reference to the late war. I observe, in The Daily News correspondent's letter of 18th May, that the Transport and Commissariat difficulties— At that time were causing increased anxiety, and the movement of the troops was delayed in consequence. It is said that many are holding back waggons and oxen, with the view of forcing the Government to give them higher prices. The Committee are considering what would be fair to both parties; this is at present unknown. Two to three pounds a-day is being given for the hire of a waggon and a span of oxen. When it is known that 1,600 waggons are employed, and that this is quite inadequate, the cost and the difficulties will be realized. Well, Sir, the fact is that during the continuance of the war there was plundering in every direction. Those burghers, those traders, whose battle we were fighting, so far from showing any great disposition to aid us, determined to take every advantage to obtain out of the British Exchequer as much money as they possibly could; and the consequence has been that the war has been extremely popular at the Cape of Good Hope and throughout South Africa. I hold in my hand several extracts from the Cape newspapers, which will show how this spending of money actually made the war popular at the Cape. I observe in The Cape Argus, regarding the remarks at the meetings at the Cape expressing confidence in Sir Bartle Frere, and endorsing his policy, the writer says— None of the enthusiasts thought it expedient to inquire into the policy of Sir Bartle Frere, probably because the cost of the Zulu War will be paid for in English blood, and out of the taxes raised in the United Kingdom. Then, another paper, The Standard and Mail, said— We are glad that England has resolved on putting things right, whatever it may cost her in men and money.' The London Daily News made some very pertinent remarks. It published several special articles on the injustice that would arise if the English were called upon to pay for the cost of this war, which was being carried on for the benefit of the Colonies. Upon which, the Cape Times replied to the London Daily News in these words— The London Daily News says in truth that we are waging a war of policy, but that the policy is that of Sir Bartle Frere and the Cape Colonists; and it not unreasonably complains at our having all the advantages and they all the cost. John Bull has to pay for the mistakes of the past; and though he will growl at having to pay he has never yet shirked his duty. If everything were admitted that The Daily News asserts, then all the more grateful should we be to that statesman who, being sent here in England's name to govern this land, has come forward nobly in defence of the Colony. Then there was an account in the same paper, as follows:— From the Boers' camp his Excellency's progress has been marked by the warmest outpourings of a people's gratitude, and Capetown, as it is her privilege and her place, will put the final seal on all that has been done; and at the meeting in the Commercial Exchange to-day it was decided that the demonstration should be worthy of the metropolis of this country. Now, I wish to point out to the House that all this rejoicing at the Cape took place at the time when the war itself was languishing, and when we in this country were in a state of anxiety and alarm. At that period it seemed as though the whole military operations were paralyzed, mainly because of this want of Commissariat arrangements, and, to some extent, on account of the greed of the Colonists. At the very period when we were in this country feeling great interest and some despondency in relation to this war; at that time, when we were suffering from commercial depression, when the demand for our industries was declining, and when the revenue returns were also declining, and we had expectations of Budget deficits—at that very time, everything at the Cape was flourishing. We find that the Colonists were absolutely bathing in the stream of gold that was sent from this country. They were all in a state of the greatest satisfaction and perfect enjoyment. Now, the people of this country, when they saw this contrast of opinion between the Colonies and the Mother Country, were, no doubt, very much dissatisfied. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Colonies must have seen in the papers recently abundant evidence to assure him that the people of this country were thus dissatisfied; and I can only say that I think it would be the greatest injustice if, in the face of what I have just referred to, their labour were to be taxed in order to gratify what I would call Colonial rapacity. The Government, I know, have already taken steps with a view to obtain from the Cape Governments repayment of what they have to determine as a fair proportion of this expenditure. I quite recognize the course which the Government have taken in this matter. I am glad to bear testimony that for the last two or three years the Secretary of State for the Colonies has not lost sight of this; and in one despatch, dated June last, the right hon. Gentleman has brought under the notice of Sir Bartle Frere, in very strong terms, what he believes to be the only just arrangement for the people of this country. But I am bound to say that while I acknowledge the course the Government has taken, we ought, as a House of Commons, to strengthen the hands of the Government by expressing very strongly, as it is our duty to our constituents to do, our opinion that we have a claim upon the Colonists in this connection. And we have great reason for our doing so, because of the difficulty in which the Government will be placed by the supineness of former Governments. The Cape Colonists have been told again and again that they would be required to pay for the outlay on their account. I have referred to several Blue Books in the Library on that subject, and I find that so early as 1848, in the despatches of the 21st of March and 21st of June, Lord Grey declared to the Colonists that it was not to be expected that this country should in future bear the expenses incurred by maintaining a Force to defend the Colony, and that it was incumbent on the Colonists to make a suitable provision for that purpose; and, subsequently, Lord John Russell, relying upon these despatches, said that the Colony was mainly responsible for meeting that expenditure. That was in 1848. In 1867, Lord Carnarvon sent a despatch to Sir Philip Wodehouse, giving notice— That payment must be made for British troops at the same rate as paid by the Australian Colonies—namely, £40 a-head for every Infantry soldier, and £70 for every Artilleryman. In default of these payments, Her Majesty's Government will be at liberty to withdraw the troops from the Colony either wholly or to such extent as they may deem expedient. That, of course, was only part of the expense which would, no doubt, have amounted to £80 a-head for every Infantry soldier. I think I am within the mark in saying that. In replying to that despatch of Lord Carnarvon, the House of Assembly passed Resolutions which were communicated to the Home Government, and those Resolutions set forth a number of reasons—not of any strength, but still they were reasons—which the Colonial Government thought fit to put forward. The Duke of Buckingham, who had succeeded Lord Carnarvon in 1867, wrote to Sir Philip "Wodehouse— You request me to observe that in the Resolution of the House of Assembly no attempt is made to dispute the right of the Mother Country to make the stipulations insisted on; that the House simply pleads its regret that such a demand should be put forward, its sense that the peculiar position of the country gives it some claim to consideration, and its conclusion that the Colony is unable to pay the sum demanded for its military defence. I have to inform you, in reply, that Her Majesty's Government adhere to the general principles indicated in Lord Carnarvon's despatch, and to the propriety of requiring from the Colony of the Capo of Good Hope a substantial contribution towards the expenses of Her Majesty's troops. On December 9, 1869, there had been a change of the Home Government. Lord Granville was then Secretary of State for the Colonies, and Lord Granville wrote a despatch to Sir Philip Wodehouse, in which he said— Her Majesty's Government have come to the conclusion that British troops cannot be retained in the Colony for Colonial purposes, and should be gradually withdrawn. Upon that, there was a Memorial from the Cape Colonists, numerously signed, addressed to the noble Lord, praying Her Majesty that military protection might be continued to the Cape Colonists at the expense of Great Britain. Lord Granville, in replying in acknowledgment of that Memorial, said— I do not doubt that the effectual protection of life and property is essential to the protection of the Colony. I observe, however, that the memorialists estimate the White population at 200,000, and the cost of defence at £100,000, which, if the whole were paid by persons of European origin, would only amount to 10s. per head, and declares this sum to be a strain on the finances of the Colony greater than it can bear. But this is scarcely a good reason for the shifting all further expense upon the inhabitants of Great Britain, who already pay 15s. per head for their own defence independently of police. I think that was a very sound position for Lord Granville to take up, and upon that despatch there was another Address to the Queen from the House of Assembly, praying that the withdrawal of troops might be postponed. Then Lord Granville, on May 23, 1870, wrote— It is impossible to hold out any hopes that Her Majesty's Government will sanction any further delay in the removal of the troops beyond that which has been already determined upon, and I, therefore, earnestly hope that the Cape Parliament will address themselves seriously to the task of placing the finances on a proper footing, and making further provision for the defence of the Colony. Now, Sir, I think it is a matter of grave regret that, notwithstanding the position which Her Majesty's Government took on that occasion, there should not have been stops taken in accordance with these despatches. There was a diminution of troops; but there was no such step taken as was contemplated in the despatches, and we still retained something like 3,000 men in the Colony—3,000 men costing us at the rate of £100 per man, per year, all the charges taken into account, and we were paying all that large expenditure for the protection of the Colonies, while the Colonial Government were satisfied to pay to us the magnificent sum of £10,000 a-year. That, no doubt, is a difficulty which the Government will meet with arising from what I must call the laches of former Governments. I think it is most unfortunate that former Governments did not follow up the decisions which were communicated to the Cape Colony, and I believe that if they had been determined to carry out the policy which they had announced, and if they had insisted upon payment by the Colonists of the sum which they intimated that they should require them to pay; or if they had acted upon the alternative of withdrawing the troops, I have a very firm opinion indeed that the Colonists would have made ample arrangements for their own protection; and I have a very strong impression that the war which we are now unfortunately experiencing would never have happened. Well, I want to ask the Government what they intend to do in order to compel the Colonists to pay what is due from them? Of course, they will be met as former Governments have been met—by all sorts of flimsy excuses. I am perfectly aware that they will be met by the statement of the Colonists that they cannot pay. They will appeal to the Colonial Secretary that they cannot afford to pay. But I say they can afford a great deal better than we can afford it. It so happens that the very last mail, or one of the last, brought us a Budget speech which was made by the Finance Minister in the Cape of Good Hope Assembly. Now, that is a very important speech, and I have no doubt the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Colonies has noticed it in connection with this question. I quote the speech from The Times of one day last week— The Budget speech which was delivered yesterday by the Treasurer General (Mr. Stiller) was a very satisfactory one. It shows an increasing revenue and a prosperous condition of the country. For the financial year 1878–70, just expired, the Estimate, including the addition of amounts expected from the taxing measures passed last year, was £1,838,000, while the actual income will probably he about £2,067,888, giving an excess of £229,889. Duty from customs alone realized £909,387, being an excess of £152,387. The excise on brandy returned £50,000, and the house duty £80,000. The Government, after defraying all the ordinary expenditure, will, with their surplus, be able to meet all the war expenses without any increase of taxation, or of the public debt. If our Chancellor of the Exchequer could produce such a Budget, he would be a very fortunate man—a much more fortunate man than he is at the present moment. I believe, however, there is an omission here, because the Cape Colony had borrowed £750,000 in the course of the year 1878–9. The authorised Debt now stands at £10,500,000, including an annual charge of £472,491 for interest, and £88,884 for Sinking Fund towards its gradual extinction, making, together, £581,375—an amount exceeding what was the total public income of the Colony 10 years ago. Well, if this Debt was a debt which had been incurred in some most wasteful way, if it had been thrown away by some extravagant body, it would, no doubt, be a very serious charge upon them; but, in point of fact, this Debt is all for works of a character which are returning very good interest indeed. They are public works which produce a very large income. The Treasurer General further stated that— Of the whole amount charged as public Debt, £9,816,858 has been raised for reproductive works, chiefly extended and nearly completed lines of railways. Although only portions of these lines have yet been opened up for traffic, the estimates of railway receipts for next year is about £600,000, and there is no doubt of its being realized. The telegraph system of the Colony was also extended last year by the erection of 263 miles of new lines bearing 421 miles of new wire. The war expenditure borne by the Colony has been about £1,250,000, including cost of the disturbances on the Northern Border of Basutoland. Up to the 30th of April, 1879, the actual payments reached a total of £1,087,361, and for May and June about £134,843, making a total on the 30th of Juno last of £1,222,704; including all advances and expenditure on account of these services, and, deducting the amount of the war loan, £750,000, leaves a balance of £472,704, which has been met from general revenue. So that, in point of fact, they assume that their war expenditure for the 12 months of 1878–9, amounted to £1,200,000, which, I believe, is a very excessive Estimate; and yet they say that the balance of expenditure over the loan—the balance amounting to £472,704—has been met out of the general Revenue without increased taxation. Then he goes to the Budget for the coming year; and this Budget, with regard to taxation, is altogether most satisfactory. The Finance Minister says he believes the income for 1879–80 will be £2,309,000, while the expenditure he estimates at £2,226,164; and this, he goes on to say, includes what he calls the large sum of £217,151 for military expenses. This is the total sum the Cape Government has put down in its Budget for purposes of defence. That does not look as if the Colony contemplated meeting the demands of the British Government to any large extent; but I wish to point out to the Government that, in this statement, which shows how flourishing is the Revenue of the Colony—which shows no Debt as a burden, because it has been incurred for productive works which produce a large income—which shows a light taxation, an increasing trade, and extension of resources at the Cape—with all this before us, any pretence that the Colony is not in a position to meet the just demands of our Government ought to be put aside as unworthy of consideration. No such excuse ought to be entertained for a moment; because, knowing what we do of the Cape of Good Hope, knowing how its Revenues have been increased by the extension of territory, as shown by the extent of good land advertised for sale after annexation of the Transkei—with all those resources, which have been so much increased by the expenditure we have incurred, they should be required to pay their due proportion of that expenditure. I have no doubt there will be an attempt made in another way to evade the demands of Her Majesty's Government. It will be said by the Colony—"The responsibility of these operations are not ours, they were forced upon us by the action of the High Commissioner, and the expenditure was incurred in carrying out the policy of Her Majesty's Government. It was the view which the High Commissioner came to carry out that landed us in the expenditure and this war, and, therefore, we are not responsible." Now, I am bound to say, in the first instance, they have grounds in Capo Colony to make the assertion that Her Majesty's Government did send a Chief Commissioner to carry out a policy which, directly and indirectly, tended to foment these disturbances, which extended the area of the war and of the expenditure; but my position is this—whatever was the original responsibility of the Government, warned by the policy of their High Commissioner, the Colonists have since, by their own policy, by every Constitutional method, supported the Commissioner. Now, when the High Commissioner arrived at the Cape there was a Government in power, presided over by Mr. Molteno, a man of great Cape experience, and who, for years, had taken a leading-part in Cape politics. Mr. Molteno did not like the policy of the Government. I will not occupy the attention of the House on the point; but I will rather content myself with indicating what, if it were necessary and time allowed, I could show, by abundant reference to the Blue Book, that there was a decided divergence of opinion between the Chief Commissioner and Mr. Molteno. Mr. Molteno believed that he and his Government knew best how to manage Cape affairs, and that the trouble on their Frontier could be better managed than by the measures which the High Commissioner proposed. I am justified in maintaining that Mr. Molteno, who was Prime Minister, wished to carry out the policy supported by the leading statesmen of this country, of the Colonists managing their affairs upon their own responsibility, for, towards the end of the difference between the High Commismissioner and Mr. Molteno, we come to the main points upon which Sir Bartle Frere disagreed with the Ministers. Sir Bartle Frere, when he found that he could not induce Mr. Molteno to yield to his strong will—because it is quite evident that Sir Bartle Frere went to the Cape and was influenced throughout by a strong will, to which he was determined to make everybody yield in one way or another—when he found there was the difference of opinion between himself and Mr. Molteno—and they had had a conversation on the grounds of this difference—Sir Bartle Frere wrote a Memorandum, in which he jotted down the conversation which had just oc- curred, and he left it with Mr. Molteno to say if it was correct. Mr. Molteno disliked this. It was an unusual proceeding, and he refused to accept the exact accuracy of the Memorandum in which Sir Bartle Frere stated Mr. Molteno's views; but, no doubt, they were his views, for Mr. Molteno stated them afterwards. The Memorandum gives the substance of Mr. Molteno's statement as follows:— There is a strong impression in the Colony that the conduct of military operations has been entrusted too exclusively to military men, and that the management of affairs has passed too much from the hands of the Colonial Ministry into those of officers of Her Majesty's Service, in whose ability to manage them economically and efficiently the Colony has far less confidence than it has in its Ministers. MR. Molteno further said— That Ministers are quite competent themselves to do, with Colonial Forces, all that is now required to restore peace and order to the Colony," and that "the reinforcements of Her Majesty's troops, asked for by the Government, are not needed for any Colonial purpose in this Colony. This was a very strong statement for Mr. Molteno to make in the conversation with the Commissioner; and he repeats it, I find, in a Memorandum of January 31st, 1878, in which he says the Government are prepared to undertake the responsibility of putting down the rebellion speedily and in the most effectual manner by Colonial Forces led by Colonists, and not encumbered by military impediments; and he urged that these measures ought to be under the control of the Colonial Government, who were prepared to accept the responsibility of preserving peace and maintaining the defence of the Colony. Now, what happened? I declare, when I read what occurred, it makes me indignant, when I read of the dictatorial manner in which Sir Bartle Frere dismissed the Prime Minister from Office simply because he would maintain what we believe is the right principle of Colonial government—that they should have the management who were asked to pay for it, and take the responsibility of defending their Frontier and maintaining peace within their own borders. But, no. Sir Bartle Frere, in that dictatorial spirit which he has assumed, so much to the disadvantage of the country, called into power a Government presided over by Mr. Sprigg; and here we come to the responsibility of the Colonial Govern- ment. If the Colonists had supported the Molteno Government, they might have said this is an Imperial policy forced upon us and for which we should not pay; but when Mr. Sprigg came into power, anyone who reads his manifesto will see that he came into power with the determination of taking advantage of the British policy to get a large amount of plundering for South Africa. I have not formed a high opinion of Mr. Sprigg's capacity as a Prime Minister; but he knows what he is about. In Mr. Trollope's work on South Africa, written at the time of the Transkei War, he mentions having gone into the House of Assembly, and describes Mr. Molteno as Prime Minister, and Mr. Sprigg as leading the Opposition. He says of Mr. Molteno, he— Has been in Parliamentary life for many years, having held a seat since the creation of the first House of Assembly in 1854—has been a very useful public servant, and thoroughly understands the nature of the work required of him. MR. Trollope continues— I attended one hot debate, and heard the Leaders of the Opposition attack the Prime Minister and his Colleagues in the proper Parliamentary manner. The question was one of defence against the Kaffirs, and it was made by the Opposition to appear that the object of the Premier was to rob the Colony of its money. It is a curious thing' that a year before he came into Office Mr. Sprigg was opposing Mr. Molteno, because the latter wished to have the defence conducted out of Colonial funds. Well, this policy of Sir Bartle Frere was adopted by Mr. Sprigg's Government, and Mr. Sprigg's Government received the support of the Parliament then in existence. That Parliament was dissolved, and, so far as I have heard, the return to the new Parliament proved that Mr. Sprigg's Government was extremely popular. In Cape Town there were six candidates for four seats. Five of these candidates approved of the policy of the High Commissioner in the Zulu War, one attacked that policy and opposed Confederation. The one who opposed the policy of the Commissioner was a remarkable man—a gentleman of the name of Saul Solomon—a man who for some years occupied an independent but leading position in the Cape Legislature—a man on whose opinion all parties placed great reliance. Well, he opposed the policy, and he who had been a Member for a number of years was turned out.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE

No; he came in on the Minority Vote.

MR. RYLANDS

At all events, he lost a large amount of support. What I wish to urge on the Government is this—that inasmuch as the Cape Legislature has adopted the policy of the Commissioner, and which has become immensely popular in the Cape, simply because a large expenditure upon the war arises out of it, I think that if Sir Bartle Frere is unable to obtain a satisfactory pecuniary arrangement with the Colony they ought to withdraw Sir Bartle Frere and send some Representative who would be determined to put more pressure on the Sprigg Government. It may possibly arise that when we know more about the secret transactions going on we shall find that some encouragement was given by Sir Bartle Frere to Mr. Sprigg to believe there would be large pecuniary assistance in carrying out their plans which induced Mr. Sprigg's Government to entirely endorse the policy which had been recommended to them. But it is quite clear that, so far as the Home Government is concerned, those on the Front Bench have never gone from their position of requiring the Colonies to pay their proper share; therefore, if there have been any transactions at the Cape which may have led to the supposition that Great Britain would not insist upon a share of the expenditure being borne by the Colony Her Majesty's Government are not at all compromised by that. The other day we were talking about the policy of the future, and, perhaps, I may say a few words upon that. It is clear that in the future, when all this war is over, we must decide on a policy with regard to the government of the Cape. We are quite aware that Lord Grey is a distinguished advocate of paternal government. He would withdraw responsible government from the Cape, and treat it like a Crown Colony, dealing with all Cape matters from Downing Street. He argues that it would be much better that all proposals in reference to national troubles, commercial interests, &c, should be decided by ourselves. But no one can seriously imagine that any such system would work; we should soon find that we could not control the Cape, or, from this country, manage Cape affairs with anything like efficiency. But there is another plan which, apparently, is almost as bad; that is a plan which does not assume to be paternal government, but would continue a responsible government at the Cape, and still insist upon an interference to a certain extent, claiming for this country a controlling voice in the management of Cape affairs. A most absurd, untenable policy. We have followed it to some extent for 30 years; and I observe it is a policy which has high support in the person of my right hon. Friend the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster). He referred to the idea, when he said on Friday— They had now a responsible self-governing community to deal with at the Cape. Whether it was a mistake to give self-government to the Cape was a grave question. For his own part, he did not think it was a mistake; at all events, they could not now take that self-government away. The problem of the Government was a fresh departure. They must ask themselves—'What terms shall we make with the Governments of the South African communities generally for the future?' That was to say—on what terms should they consent, in any case in the future, to assist the South African Colonists with our own troops? He thought the time had come when the Government ought to say, with the greatest possible determination, that the terms must be different from what they had been. They must say—' They shall he definite terms. You shall not find the policy, and we find the money and men to carry it out.' "—[3 Hansard, ccxlviii. 1891.] Well, it seems to me, this is a kind of bargain you cannot make with the Cape. How can you say to them—"You shall not dictate the policy, and we find the men." Of course, if they have a House of Assembly, they naturally will dictate a policy; we cannot stop them. The right hon. Gentleman continues— However, he believed there was really one feeling in the House of Commons and the country on the question, which, was, that our relations with the Cape Colony must be put on a different footing—that we would not join in unjust wars."—[Ibid. 1893.] But we know well enough that, where you have a responsible Government, a Colonial Power, it is not possible to say—I am assuming that you have a mutual agreement—"This is an unjust war you are engaging in, and we will have nothing to do with it." Why, if we could take that course, we should not have been drawn into the Zulu War, which we believed unjust; and the Transkei War, I believe, ought to have been avoided. Why, nearly every war we have had in the Colony has been an unjust war. It is quite clear, supposing we enter into such a bargain as that suggested by the right hon. Member for Bradford, the only effect would be, we should still hold ourselves in readiness with our resources, and we should find it utterly impossible to raise the question whether a war was just or unjust; we should be entrapped into the unfortunate position in which we now find ourselves. It is no use trying to adopt this middle course; you have but a choice of two courses, unless you choose to go on as before; one, to go back upon what I look upon as impossible—of governing the Colony from Downing Street—and the other a policy of non-intervention. I believe the only safe plan is absolutely to withdraw from any part or parcel in their military arrangements. This is a policy for which I have high authority. Distinguished statesmen, Colonial Secretaries, have recognized the doctrine—Lord Cardwell, Lord Carnarvon, the Duke of Buckingham, Lord Granville—that it is the interest and duty of the Imperial Government to withdraw as much as possible from interference in the internal affairs of the Colonies, for their sakes as well as for our own; that the Colonies should support their own charges, both civil and military, for government and defence. That was an opinion expressed by high authorities in the debate of 1851, when, on April 10th, Sir William Molesworth moved his first Resolution— That it is the opinion of this 'House, that steps should be taken to relieve the country as speedily as possible from its present civil and military expenditure on account of the Colonies, with the exception of its expenditure on account of military stations or convict establishments. I will not trouble the House with quotations from the speeches; but from several Members, distinguished on both sides of the House, who spoke in that debate of 1851, all declared that the only safe course was to withdraw from intermeddling with the Colonial Forces, trusting the control and their own defence to themselves. I will only give a short extract from the speech of a right hon. Gentleman—who will command respect at least on this side—the right hon. Member for Greenwich. On April 15th, 1851, he spoke of the Most mischievous and unsound system of managing the local affairs of the Colonies from home. He contended that these -wars on the Cape Frontier were altogether local affairs."—[3 Hansard, cxvi. 264.] Then we have the Report of the Select Committee on Colonial Military Expenditure, presided over by the hon. Member for Exeter, in 1861. That Committee reported— That with respect to the South African Colonies, and all those similarly circumstanced Dependencies which contain large European populations, their security against warlike tribes or domestic disturbances should be provided for, as far as possible, by means of local efforts and local organization; and that the main object of any system adopted by this country should be to encourage such efforts, not merely with a view to diminish Imperial expenditure, but for the still more important purpose of stimulating the spirit of self-reliance in Colonial communities. I think I am justified, on these authorities, in asking the House to pass my Resolution; and I hope the expression of opinion may lead to a determination, on the part of the Government, to take steps to secure what I think would be a fair measure of justice to the taxpayers of this country.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE

seconded the Motion.

Amendment proposed, To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "in view of the large and increasing expenditure for military purposes in South Africa, this House is of opinion that the Colonies of the Cape of Good Hope and Natal ought to be required to contribute a due proportion of the military expenditure incurred in the interests of those Colonies, and which cannot with justice be made a charge upon the British Exchequer,"—(Mr. Rylands,) —instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH

said, he was not about to enter into the topics which formed the latter part of the speech of the hon. Gentleman. Those questions were of very great importance, and were discussed at considerable length last week. He would not renew the discussion of last Friday; but there was one essential preliminary to throwing the Colonies on their own resources, and that was, that we should both induce and enable them to take such measures as would provide for their own defence when the occasion arose. As for what had been done by the Cape Colony in the emergency just passing away, he considered that the present Ministry, headed by Mr. Sprigg, had done far more than its predecessors to effect the object the hon. Member for Burnley had in view, and the result of its action, promised well for the future. During the last Session measures had been passed for the raising of mounted police, militia, and other local forces; and these measures had been carried out to a large extent. There were two criticisms he might make on the speech of the hon. Member for Burnley. The one was, that in reference to the Zulu War he had rather mixed up the position of the Cape Colony and Natal. He did not think it was fair to charge the Cape Colony with having profited by the Transkei War; for, as the Papers showed, the Capo Colony incurred very heavy expenses in that war. The Forces engaged were to a great extent Volunteers and Colonial troops, and the hardships and the loss fell more largely upon them than upon Her Majesty's Forces. The Zulu War was, of course, a different affair. The cost in men and money had mainly fallen upon us, and the money expended by us had been laid out in the districts adjoining Zululand rather than in the Cape Colony. As to the remarks made by the hon. Gentleman on the course pursued by Sir Bartle Frere, he did not believe that if Mr. Molteno had remained in Office the Transkei War would have been brought to as satisfactory a termination as the hon. Member thought. When Mr. Molteno left Office the Transkei War seemed likely to spread, not only over a large part of the Cape Colony, but to Her Majesty's Dominions in other parts of South Africa. That was the reason which induced Sir Bartle Frere to take the Constitutional course of dismissing Ministers, and calling to the service of the Colony those who would carry on the war with vigour and bring it to a satisfactory end. With the exceptions he had taken, he did not wish to criticize the hon. Gentleman's remarks, for he could re-echo every word of the hon. Gentleman's Motion, and he begged to tender the hon. Gentleman his thanks and those of the Government for the manner in which he had brought the question before the House. In that way, the hon. Member had done not a little to strengthen the hands of the Government in the course they had adopted. He did not gather that the hon. Member had the least fault to find with any expres- sions in his despatches. The course which the Government had pursued hitherto they would continue to pursue to the utmost of their power, and that not with regard to the Cape Colony alone. He had not been able to lay on the Table the despatches with respect to Natal, because the Correspondence was not in a state to be produced at present. But the same principles had guided the Government as they had followed in the case of the Cape Colony. They had done their best to insist that some of the expenditure should be fairly charged on the Colonial Treasury, and that there should be a clear understanding on all sides that a division of expenditure, when the amount of the expenditure was ascertained, should be made between the Mother Country and the Colony interested—of course, claiming from the Colony the utmost that it could reasonably be expected to bear, looking to the condition of its finances and population. He would only say, in conclusion, that what had fallen from the hon. Gentleman with regard to the ability of the Cape Colony to bear the charges he wished to see imposed on it was no slight testimony, so far as the ability of that Colony was concerned, to the justice of the expectations held out the other night by his right hon. Friend—that a considerable portion of the expenditure should be borne by that Colony.

Question put, and agreed to.

Main Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair," put, and agreed to.