HC Deb 04 August 1879 vol 249 cc68-102
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

Sir, I rise to move that the Thanks of the House be given to those distinguished persons and those gallant Forces who have been employed in the recent operations in Afghanistan. I must, at the outset, request permission to supply an accidental omission in the first Resolution as it stands on the Paper—an omission which would suggest itself to every person as an accidental one. I mean that the name of the gallant and distinguished Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Frederick Haines, has been omitted. I intend to move—

  1. 1. "That the Thanks of this House be given to the Eight Honourable Lord Lytton, Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and to General Sir Frederick Paul Haines, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., C.I.E., Commander-in-Chief in India, for the ability and judgment with which the resources of the British Empire in India have been applied to the support of the Military operations in Afghanistan.
  2. 2. "That the Thanks of this House be given to—
    • Lieutenant-General Sir Donald Martin Stewart, K.C.B.;
    • Lieutenant-General Sir Samuel James Browne, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., V.C.;
    • Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Francis Maude, K.C.B., V.C.;
    • Major-General Sir Michael Anthony Shrapnell Biddulph, R.A., K.C.B.;
    • Major-General Sir Frederick Sleigh Roberts, R.A., K.C.B., V.C.;
    and the other Officers of the Army, both European and Native, for the intrepidity, skill, and perseverance displayed by them in the Military operations in Afghanistan, and for their indefatigable zeal and exertions throughout the late Campaign:
  3. 3. "That this House doth highly approve and acknowledge the valour and perseverance displayed by the Non-Commissioned Officers and Private Soldiers, both European and Native, employed in Afghanistan, and that the same be signified to them by the Commanders of the several Corps, who are desired to thank them for their gallant behaviour:
  4. 4. "That the said Resolutions be transmitted by Mr. Speaker to the Viceroy and Governor General of India; and that his Lordship be requested to communicate the same to the several Officers referred to therein."

MAJOR O'GORMAN

Mr. Speaker, I rise to Order. I wish to know whether the words inserted now by the Chancellor of the Exchequer are to be considered as an Amendment, or whether it is part of the original Motion?

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

I apprehend, Sir, I am in Order in making my proposition to the House. If not, you can put me in Order by correcting me. Now, Sir, I am sure I need say very few words to recommend this Motion to the House. Parliament has never been slow to acknowledge the services of those who have been employed in the field, and who have been employed in sustaining the honour of the British arms. And I may say, also, that the soldiers of England have never been slow on their side to show themselves worthy of the acknowledgment which Parliament has always been ready to make to them. I believe that there is but one spirit which animates all, whether they be Europeans or soldiers of the Native Princes, who follow the standard of Her Majesty, and that is the spirit which arises from the conviction that the honour of the Empire is in a special sense committed to their hands, and that the eyes of this great country are upon them in the discharge of their duties and in the perils they have to encounter. And I venture to say there has never been any occasion in the military history of this country in which that spirit has been better or more truly shown than in the short campaign in Afghanistan. It has been short; but it has been a highly creditable campaign to all who have been concerned—from those who have organized the preparations which led to this complete and rapid success to those who have been ready to undergo all the hardships which were imposed upon them and to face any dangers which they might be called upon to encounter. I need not, I am sure, detain the House by giving any lengthened account of the operations of that campaign. They were followed by us all with an interest which never flagged from the beginning to the end. We all remember the first operations. We know that there were many who felt, or appeared to feel, that we were undertaking a work of great risk, and one which it would tax all the energies of this country to accomplish. I do not know that the risks which were then spoken of were at all exaggerated. The difficulties of the country, the difficulties of the season, the valour of the enemy; all these matters were put before us in a manner which, undoubtedly, was not exaggerated. The only thing which, perhaps, was not overrated, was the skill and the resolution and the perseverance which were shown by those to whom was committed the task of overcoming and subduing these difficulties. Perhaps it is the case that in enterprizes of this kind the task appears larger to those who are at a distance than to those who have to encounter it, and whose spirit rises to the task before them. Afterwards, perhaps, a contrary feeling comes on, and some of those at a distance begin to underrate the services which have been rendered, and which appear to be less because they have been rendered with such complete success, which is not altogether just to those who have been employed in the undertaking. I remember well, before we undertook this campaign, there were some competent critics, not only in this country, but in other countries also, who thought it quite impossible for us, at so short a notice, and at such a season of the year, to accomplish the objects we had in view in a single campaign. It was thought we might make preparations, but that an actual advance must be delayed till the spring. But the Indian authorities felt, and felt rightly, that promptitude in the attack, and a complete and an immediate advance, was at least as important, perhaps, and even more important, than the ultimate success itself, and so perfect were the preparations made, and so complete were the plans, that on the very day when the time allowed to the Ameer for an answer to our demands expired, orders were sent to the three great divisions which were to attack the country from the three points converging on the capital; and at daybreak on the morning following those orders the three divisions of the Army entered the enemy's country. There was the division of Sir Samuel Browne, which advanced at once on the morning of the 21st November—advanced at once into the dreaded Khyber Pass and attacked the fortress of Ali Musjid. On the morning of the 22nd that fortress had been evacuated by its defenders and put in possession of Her Majesty's troops, and within three days more, on the morning of the 24th, Sir Samuel Browne and his troops were in possession of the Pass from end to end, and in occupation of the fortress of Dakka. The whole of that important work was done in three days, and the position carried, which placed the Khyber Pass, for once and for all, at the command of the British. On the same day another Force, under the command of that gallant officer, General Roberts, advanced and drove the enemy through the Kurrum Valley, and they retreated on the strong and well-defended position of the Peiwar Khotal. I think it was about the end of November when General Roberts prepared to attack the position of the Peiwar Khotal. We all remember the brilliant accounts we received of that action—the night marches of the gallant Highlanders, the Goorkhas emulating one another who should be first on the steep; how they gallantly scaled the stockades, and carried them at the point of the bayonet, after a gallant resistance; how the mountain guns were served under Captain Kelso, who fell on that occasion; and how, under the command of General Roberts himself, at last the position was carried, and the British troops were in possession of that difficult and well-defended fortress. Within a few days afterwards—I think it was the 8th December—the Force advanced further, and General Roberts, with his Force, found himself on the top of the Shutargardan Pass, 11,000 feet above the level of the sea, and in complete command of the roads to the capital of Cabul. It is natural that our minds should be more excited by exploits of this kind than by the less exciting, but at the same time equally creditable, advance that was made by the third column, under General Biddulph and General Stewart. The advance by that Force, which had marched 500 miles encumbered with a large quantity of stores, which had to advance at an inclement period of the year and in a country very imperfectly known, and prepared at every moment to receive an attack of foes on front, flank, or rear, no matter from what quarter it might come—the advance of that Force so encumbered and so threatened, at such a time of the year, without any serious casualty, without any serious loss, is, I think, one of the most creditable of military acts, and it is to the completeness of the services rendered by this part of the Force, as by other parts, that the success of the campaign is owing. I ought also to mention those who took part subsequently in support of the advance. General Maude's was another portion of the Force who had to support the advance through the Shutargardan Pass, and rendered the greatest possible service in maintaining the communications in the Pass and in keeping quiet the Tribes in the disturbed district; and the effect of those operations have been that they have impressed on the people of the country in which the operations were carried on a sense of the power, of the firmness, of the readiness, and, at the same time, of the justice and good behaviour of the British troops who had been employed there. I ought not to pass from this subject without referring to one more class of men to whom the Thanks of the House must be given. I refer to all those Native officers and soldiers who took so distinguished a part in the whole of the campaign, including not only those who are in the service of Her Majesty, but of others who had tendered their services to the Empire—namely, the independent Princes of India. One feeling animated them all. I believe that the fact of men like the Sikhs, the Goorkhas, and British troops serving together, will have a good effect for many years to come. I have already expressed my regret that the name of Sir Frederick Haines was omitted in the first draught of the Resolutions, and, undoubtedly, the Commander-in-Chief in India ought to have a full share of the acknowledgments to those who organized the campaign. I ought also to mention the Adjutant General and the Quartermaster General as those who have taken a great part in the preparations. I have very rapidly, very briefly, and, I know, very imperfectly, attempted to sketch to the House what appear to be the leading features in these operations. I feel it is impossible for anyone—certainly, it is impossible for me—to do justice to such a subject as the gallantry of our troops and the success of our expedition; but I feel sure that, simple as the account is which I have been able to give, it is one which will sufficiently justify the Vote which I am about to ask the House to pass. The very speediness, the very rapidity of the movements, have to some extent, perhaps, obscured and diminished the interest in the campaign; but, at the same time, we cannot, I think, too highly appreciate the value of that rapidity and of that speediness. It has had more than one advantage. Not only has it shown what the strength of the British Empire is in India, but the readiness with which we can put forth our strength. It has also had the effect of diminishing greatly the suffering and privation of our own troops; it has had the effect of diminishing the drain on our resources and the loss of life; and it has had an effect also, which I think we can hardly overrate, of diminishing also the sufferings of those against whom we were conducting our operations. This, at least, we shall be able to say—that we have carried through this campaign against those who were lately our enemies, but who are, we trust, now and henceforth our friends, in a manner which ought to leave the least possible sting behind it. We have done nothing to humiliate the brave people against whom we fought. They have been overcome by a display of overwhelming power, and they have been overcome without any faltering on their part, and without any derogation of the high character for valour they have undoubtedly earned. They have been overcome by superior power, to which they can feel it no disgrace to have to submit; and I trust and believe that the feelings which will remain among the people of Afghanistan will be feelings such as will in no way interfere with their proper relations with the Government of India, and that neither we nor they shall have cause to regret the campaign. I beg, Sir, to move the first of the Resolutions which I have placed in your hands.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That the thanks of this House be given to the Eight Honourable Lord Lytton, Viceroy and Governor General of India, and to General Sir Frederick Paul Haines, G.G.B., G.C.S.I., C.I.E., Commander in Chief in India, for the ability and judgment with which the resources of the British Empire in India have been applied to the support of the Military operations in Afghanistan."—(Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer.)

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON

Sir, there has been great difference amongst us in this House as to the policy which led to this war. It is probable there may yet be differences amongst us as to the results which have been obtained by the war, and even as to the manner in which, in some respects, the war has been conducted; but I am sure there will be no difference in any part of this House on at least one point—there will be no desire to grudge the officers and soldiers who have been engaged in the war the thanks which are due for the manner in which it has been conducted so far as they are concerned. The events of the war have been admirably and briefly described by the Chancellor of the Exchequer; and I may say we must all feel, if this has not been a war in which it has been possible for the Army to earn so much military honour as in some wars we can recall, yet, nevertheless, it has been one which has called forth some of the highest qualities which are required in the soldier—patience, perseverance, and endurance, even if it should have been the case that the enemy we have had to encounter has been less formidable than was originally anticipated. But it appears to me there are two things which are essentially desirable on occasions of this kind. It is extremely desirable, in the first place, that there should be absolute unanimity on the part of the House; and it is desirable, in the next place, that there should be a substantial expression of the opinion of the House, and that it should not be reduced, or be liable to be reduced, in any way to a mere matter of form. I cannot but think that the mode in which this Vote is now proposed is not the best calculated to attain either of those ends. I am not going to blame the Government for the course they have taken on this subject; but I do think it would have been a proper subject of consideration whether the Indian precedents ought to be so strictly followed, and whether it was desirable, on a Motion of this kind, to mix up the Vote of Thanks to the officers and soldiers, which nobody can grudge, with a Vote of Thanks to the Governor General of India, which, to say the least of it, introduces more debatable and disputable matter. As far as I have been able to examine the precedents, none of the most recent are entirely satisfactory. In 1840, a Vote of Thanks was moved to the Army engaged in the first Afghan War, and the proposal was in precisely the same form as has been adopted on the present occasion. But, upon that occasion, Sir Robert Peel, who was then the Leader of the Opposition, said that— No difference of political opinion could for a moment induce any political party to withhold the expression of their satisfaction at the success of the British Army and their admiration of the valour and perseverance by which that success had been achieved. Sir Robert Peel added that he reserved his opinion on the policy, on the conduct of the war, and on its results; he said he should like to see the Bill before he pronounced an opinion upon the advantages to be derived from it. But Sir Robert Peel had not expected that the Vote was to include Thanks to the Governor General, for he had grave doubts as to the policy of including civil officers, whatever their merits, in the expression of a gratitude which had reference to military operations alone. On the occasion of Thanks being voted to the Army at the close of the Indian Mutiny, in 1858, the risk of a difference of opinion, in a case where there ought to have been, if possible, absolute unanimity, was still greater. Lord Palmerston proposed a Vote of Thanks in the same form in which it had been proposed in 1840; and, upon that occasion, Mr. Disraeli, the then Leader of the Opposition, having asked Lord Palmerston to postpone the first Resolution, which Lord Palmerston refused to do, actually moved the Previous Question upon the whole of the Resolutions. The Motion was not, it is true, pressed to a Division; but it led to a considerable debate, in the course of which a very severe—I may almost say a bitter—attack was made by Mr. Disraeli and other speakers upon Lord Canning, the then Governor General, and upon the policy of his Government. I am not going, on this occasion, to follow the example of Lord Beaconsfield, although he has been on so many occasions held up to our admiration as the very model of a patriotic Leader of Opposition. I do not intend to move the Previous Question on this Resolution, and I certainly do not intend to take this opportunity of making an attack on the policy of Lord Lytton; but I think that one or two observations of the Leader of the then Opposition may be appropriately quoted on the present occasion. Mr. Disraeli said— When I am told, if I make any observation on the manner in which these Votes have been brought forward, that it is the usual form and the usual precedent to name in the same Votes persons whose actions are of far different degrees of excellence, I will say that we should beware that we do not make our votes mere votes of form, because, without honouring those who receive them undeserved, we shall destroy the distinction to those who have been prepared to give their lives in order to obtain it."—[3 Hansard, cxlviii. 883–4.] Further on, Mr. Disraeli said— There are passages in the conduct of Lord Canning which require great explanation and a vindication which I have not yet heard. I am not prepared to say that a satisfactory explanation cannot he given, or that a triumphant defence may not be made; but I am prepared to say that we ought not to vote those thanks, and Lord Canning ought not to deign to accept them, until we have arrived at the clear conviction that his services are entitled to our approbation."—[Ibid. 884.] And, again, Mr. Disraeli said— Do not let the mail go out and tell him—' Well, we have smuggled a Vote of Thanks to you through Parliament.' Will that reward him, and will that sustain him in his labours? Will that add to his moral influence in Calcutta? No I There is not an hon. Gentleman in this House but must feel that a Vote of Thanks under these circumstances is worse than nothing. It excites the passions of party, and, instead of Lord Canning being held forth as a statesman who has deserved well of his country, an impression will go about that he is used as a stalking-horse, and that for factious purposes the Vote has been bestowed."—[Ibid. 888.] It may be said that this Vote of Thanks to Lord Lytton and the Government of India does not deal in any way with the question of the policy of the war. That is perfectly true. If it were otherwise, I should not feel justified in confining myself to these observations; but I should think it necessary to challenge the Vote. But I may say it is extremely desirable on this occasion that these Votes should be passed, not as a mere matter of form. I must call the attention of the House to the fact that we have not before us any information which would enable us to pass this Vote of Thanks to the Government of India otherwise than as a matter of form. Indeed, I think, as a matter of justice towards all those who have been in command of the troops, it would have been desirable that this Vote should have been postponed until the House was in possession of some fuller information than any before it respecting the actual character of the services rendered by the Governor General. The accounts we have had in the newspapers and the despatches published in The Gazette, coupled with the statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, justify us in giving any thanks in our power to the Military Forces that have taken part in the campaign; but, from the same sources of information, we cannot help being aware that, as to the conduct of the campaign by the Indian Government, there has not been the same unanimity of opinion. I do not say whether things that have been said can be proved or not; probably, there may be a good defence; but it certainly was currently rumoured at the commencement of the war that Lord Lytton had been restrained by the strongest remonstrances on the part of the military authorities from precipitating military operations before adequate preparations had been made. We have been told, further, that the commissariat and transport arrangements have left a great deal to be desired, that the defects in transport have involved enormous loss, and that the cost of transport was so enormous at one time as to all but render it necessary to suspend military operations. There may be an answer to all this; but, certainly, we have not in the official Papers any information which would justify us in agreeing to the Vote of Thanks. If we are asked to pass a Vote of Thanks to Lord Lytton and the Government of India for the way in which the resources of India have been applied to the furtherance of this war, we can only do it as a mere matter of form, and it will not be a Vote of Thanks which can convey any very substantial gratification to Lord Lytton. It is but a short time ago since we have heard of the arrangements made for the return of the troops, and those arrangements seem to have been far from perfect, and very unsatisfactory—some of them, it appears, had suffered very severely in their march across the plains in hot weather. Now, I cannot help thinking that some explanations ought to have been given to us upon this point, before we are called upon to assent to a Vote of Thanks to the Government of India. As regards the military authorities and the troops, I can subscribe heartily to any Vote of Thanks which may be proposed; but I must express my regret that matter of so debatable a character as the conduct of Lord Lytton should have been mixed up with it. I must, therefore, record my protest that, in passing a Vote in this shape, it is merely as a matter of form, and that we are not to be precluded in the slightest degree from calling attention, if. We should see fit, to the policy of the war itself, and to the manner in which it has been conducted. I trust, notwithstanding the unfortunate precedent, as I consider, that has been followed on the present occasion, this Vote may be carried unanimously. I am sure that, as far as the military authorities and the troops are concerned, it will be passed, not only unanimously, but very heartily, by every Member in this House.

MAJOR O'GORMAN

Sir, I feel quite convinced that this Vote of Thanks would have been carried unanimously in this House if the name of Lord Lytton had been omitted. I am of opinion that Lord Lytton's conduct has been far from praiseworthy. Like Sir Bartle Frere, he has entered upon a most unnecessary, most sanguinary, and most pitiless war. He has mismanaged the resources of India, and plunged that country and this country also into debt. I beg, therefore, to move, as an Amendment, that the words conveying the Thanks of this House to Lord Lytton, Governor General of India, be omitted from the Resolution.

MR. O'DONNELL

Sir, I beg leave to second the Motion of the hon. and gallant Member for Waterford. It is quite true that much of what was contained in the speech of the noble Lord was of a nature to inspire some doubts as to the propriety of dividing against a Vote of this kind, and if I did not see that some further steps must be taken in order to prevent bad precedents being made I should have taken the advice of the noble Lord, and not have proceeded further against the Vote before the House; but I find that repeated protests, which in former years have been raised in the House to Votes of Thanks of this indiscriminate description, have been of no avail, and I see on these occasions that the protest has not been followed by a Division. Therefore, I think it will be necessary to take steps to mark the opinion of at least a section of the House, and show that the introduction of such a very debatable matter as the conduct of Lord Lytton in a Resolution of Thanks to our Military Forces in India is not unanimously viewed with favour. I believe that Lord Lytton did not act with judgment, and not with much ability, in respect to the war in Afghanistan. I believe he hurried on the war unnecessarily, and I believe he has concluded that war without honour or credit to this country, and without additional security to India. I will not say more on the point with regard to Lord Lytton than to express my conviction that the war has alienated from us the Border population, which ordinary calmness and honesty would have conciliated. I believe the policy of Lord Lytton has immensely increased the danger of our Indian Empire. I believe Lord Lytton is not the originator—it may be doubted whether he originated anything of importance during his administration of India—but he supported a policy of directly provoking and challenging the Russian Empire. I am convinced at this moment that the war in Afghanistan has caused Russia to take steps in the neighbourhood of our Indian Frontier, for which the House of Commons, at no distant day, will have to note a heavy increase in the taxation of the country. I am satisfied you have made no friends in Afghanistan by your movement, and I doubt very much whether the war has been conducted according to the strict usages of civilized warfare. I believe, for every clansman we have gained over by a miserable system of subsidy and bribe, we have alienated tens of thousands. There is a piece of good advice, "Don't prophesy unless you know;" but the manner in which the Vote has been brought on and hastened forward prevents us from voting upon facts, except such as we can gather from the reliable but still unofficial accounts of the newspapers. If Her Majesty's Government had chosen to have the conduct of the authorities and troops decided by this House in full possession of the facts, they would not have brought on their Vote just previous to another important discussion upon another department of Government blundering and maladministration—the war in South Africa. I cannot speak with certainty of the motives of Her Majesty's Government; but I think the position the Ministry have taken up is highly calculated to provoke the suspicion that the Government wish to have the public attention occupied with the thought of the glory of the Afghan campaign, and the Vote of Thanks to our heroic soldiers will serve as a foil to cover the undisguisable blunders of the Government in South Africa. In conclusion, I have great pleasure in seconding the Amendment of the hon. and gallant Member for Waterford, which, as far as I am concerned, I will press to a Division.

Amendment proposed, To leave out the words "to the Right Honourable Lord Lytton, Viceroy and Governor General of India, and."—(Major O'Gorman.)

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

SIR WILFRID LAWSON

said, he was very much impressed with the speech of the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition. The noble Lord had made out a most convincing case against the desirability of passing this Resolution. He was still more impressed by the quotations the noble Lord had made, which were most apposite and telling, especially the one showing that the present Prime Minister, on a similar occasion, moved the Previous Question rather than allow a similar Vote to be passed. The noble Lord was perfectly right when he said that, without unanimity, such a Vote would lose all its charms. On one point they were unanimous—namely, in thankfulness that this war was over; but, to say the least of it, the present Vote of Thanks was, in his opinion, premature. It had been brought forward so hastily that the Government had omitted from the Resolution the name of one of the most important actors in this war; and it was only on second thoughts that the Chancellor of the Exchequer put in the name of Sir Frederick Haines, the Commander-in-Chief in India. Then, as the noble Lord said, we had not yet received the most important despatch about the close of the war, telling how the thing was wound up; therefore, these were sufficient reasons for postponing the Vote. But he went further. This war was not like other wars in which Votes of Thanks had been passed by Parliament to those who carried them out. In the case of great wars, the nation was virtually unanimous in favour of them. It was so in the Crimean War, although a very small minority in the country was opposed to it, who were right, as minorities generally were. Since then we had had the Abyssinian War and the War on the Gold Coast. Though the policy of those wars was objected to by some, there was no organized opposition, and the wars might be said to have been carried on by the will of the nation. But that was not the case with respect to the Afghan War. Some months ago a great Division in the House of Commons was taken on that question; and though the Government were supported by a majority of 328, there was a large and influential minority, numbering 227, opposed to the policy of the war. It was not, therefore, a national war. What were the causes of the war? None of the reasons assigned in justification of the war had been satisfactory to him. The Prime Minister said it was undertaken to get a scientific Frontier. That was robbery of our neighbour. The reason given by the Chancellor of the Exchequer was because the Afghans refused to receive a Mission of friendship sent by England. That meant a war of revenge. A third reason was given by his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Sunderland (Sir Henry Havelock), who, in a speech at Leeds, said that the war would be very useful in promoting Baptist Missions. His (Sir Wilfrid Lawson's) version was that the Government wanted to fight the Russians, but were afraid, so they went to fight the Afghans. If the question of policy had been distinctly raised by the Motion, he should have voted against it; but this might be considered invidious to the soldiers engaged, whose only duty was to obey— Not theirs to reason why, Theirs but to do or die. They had done their duty gallantly, and I were in no way responsible for the injustice of the war itself. If the war were a crime against morality and justice, as he believed it to be, it was the House of Commons and not the soldiers who were to blame for it. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said they had all followed the Afghan campaign with the deepest interest. He was sure they did; and he himself had followed it with horror, week after week, reading of the burning of the villages of innocent people, and of the slaughter of men, who, as compared with English troops, were almost defenceless. He wanted to know why these special Votes of Thanks were given only to one class of the community—namely, the soldiers. He admitted that the soldiers did their duty; but did not other people do their duty who were not rewarded by the Thanks of Parliament? It was said that war, in which great armies were engaged, was intended to promote peace; but did not other people promote peace in a more humane and rational way? A year ago there was a Conference in Berlin which was attended by Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury. They exerted themselves greatly—it was said that they made superhuman efforts to bring about peace. Well, they came home to Charing Cross, which was well filled with people, as was also the square adjoining, and they brought home—"Peace with Honour." They were much praised by hon. Gentlemen opposite, and he was pleased that the country had not to fight. But why were not the Thanks of both Houses of Parliament proposed to Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury? Take another case. The Chancellor of the Exchequer took one of the most honourable steps that he ever took during his laudable and distinguished career when he went to America to settle a quarrel, not by fighting, but by the Christian and rational method of arbitration. Had anyone moved a Vote of Thanks to the right hon. Gentleman? No one would have seconded it with greater pleasure than he would; but no such Vote was moved. For his part, he believed that no Vote of Thanks ought to be given except for distinguished services in the field; but he was informed by military men that no great skill had been displayed in those operations, and no great opportunity offered for the display of distinguished valour. That, he admitted, was not the fault of the soldiers, but rather of the circumstances; the soldiers would have shown their accustomed gallantry if the occasion offered. With regard to distinguished services in the field, he found that in what was described by an officer as "one of the most gallant episodes in cavalry warfare ever seen," in the fight at Mhoutan 20 bodies of the enemy were found dead, while our loss out of 2,000 men was two! When that was claimed as a glorious victory he could not help thinking that they were playing a little with the credulity of the public. The fights which took place were not great and glorious battles. They were nothing more nor less than massacres. Overwhelming numbers of trained soldiers were brought against Natives who might, in comparison with the equipment of our Forces, be said to be unarmed. That was not his idea of glory, if any fighting could be said to be glorious. It was, in fact, a second-class war, and it was not worthy of the House to pass a Vote of Thanks for such proceedings. He agreed with the noble Lord that it was a formal Vote; but it was dangerous to pass such formal Votes. If they passed Votes of Thanks in respect of those miserable wars, what were they to do in the case of really great wars? And if the present Government remained long enough in power they would, no doubt, fight Russia, and Prussia, and Austria, and all Europe, probably. Such Votes tended to lower the tone of public life, and he objected to them entirely. He would not, however, vote a negative, because that would seem to be invidious to the soldiers to whom he wished to do, and had done justice; but when the Amendment now before the House was disposed of, he would, in order to show his opinion of these formal Votes for services too insignificant to justify the Thanks of Parliament, take the liberty of following the example of the Prime Minister on a former occasion by moving the Previous Question.

MR. ONSLOW

was sure that every hon. Member who heard the speech of the hon. Baronet would agree with him that full justice ought to be done to the gallant soldiers who had fought the battles of their country. He could not but regret, however, that that speech had been made; because it would, he feared, create an impression in India which would not be conducive to the interests of that great Empire. He had hoped, notwithstanding the words which fell from the noble Lord opposite, that this Vote would not have been a merely formal Vote, but would have come from the bottom of their hearts to express their gratitude to the Viceroy, to the General Commanding-in-Chief, and to every officer and soldier who took part in the campaign. The noble Lord told the House that he did not wish to divide on the question, but that he would agree to the Vote as a matter of form. He thought that was a very poor reason indeed to give the House for such a step; and he believed that if the noble Lord had moved a direct negative to the question he would have met with a more crushing defeat than any he had yet sustained. That, he could not help thinking, was the reason the noble Lord had not moved a negative to the Motion. The conduct of Lord Lytton had been reviewed. Well, that was not the time to discuss the policy of the war, nor was that question involved in the Vote. They were only asked to thank Lord Lytton for the ability and judgment with which the resources of the British Empire in India had been applied for the military operations in Afghanistan. He regretted very much that the question of policy should have been introduced into the discussion. He held that the war was, in every respect, just and necessary; and, had it not been for that war, the belief that we were in fear of Russia would have grown to an enormous extent. The people of India now knew that, should the occasion arise, they need not fear Russia or any other country, and that we were determined to defend her against all comers. Allusion had been made to the conduct of the men and officers of Her Majesty's Army, and he thought that they ought to congratulate the Native Army in India for the noble and admirable way in which they had acted with the English troops. He could not help admiring the noble way in which the Guide Corps had behaved, and the manner in which the Goorkhas and the Rifle Brigade had acted in concert. He believed that enormous good had been done fox India, by showing that when once the strength of this country came forward they had nothing to fear. He trusted that no Division would be taken upon the question before the House, as it would be a bad thing if it were to go forth to the people of India that any doubt was entertained of the use of a campaign which had been such a great and glorious success.

SIR PATRICK O'BRIEN

, in supporting the Amendment of the hon. and gallant Member for Waterford (Major O'Gorman), said, he had, on former occasions, supported the Government, because he believed they were determined to oppose Russian aggression in Europe. The Government, however, instead of doing that, had created this Afghan cloud, under which they might retreat from the tall language used to Russia in reference to the action of Russia in Europe. He was quite ready to acknowledge that the troops sent to Afghanistan had done their duty, and had behaved as every British soldier would have behaved under similar circumstances. The soldier had done his duty; but it was quite another thing to know how the Vote of Thanks would be received by the people of Afghanistan, No doubt, General Roberts had acted gallantly; but was there really anything for which a Vote of Thanks should be passed? If they gave thanks to those to whom thanks were due, they ought to have given them to Major Cavagnari for buying the Afridis in the Khyber Pass. Looking to our achievements in the past, he did not, while admiring the gallantry of our troops, think this war was of such a nature as to justify a step which ought only to be taken in great emergencies. However, as he did not desire for a moment to cast a reflection upon the British soldier, he would not oppose the Vote of Thanks if the Government thought it right. At the same time, he thought it would be a sorry compliment to pass such a Vote under circumstances which did not indisputably warrant it.

MR. JACOB BRIGHT

pointed out that, altogether independent of the question of policy, the soldier must be regarded as a man who was not absolutely a free man. He was obliged to obey orders, and it might occur that those orders were of a character which compelled him to go to war in a cause which he could not conscientiously support. But when they came to the Governor General of India (Lord Lytton), a totally different condition of affairs was presented. The Viceroy was a voluntary agent, and he was not obliged to enter into this Afghan War. He could have taken any course he pleased to prevent it, and, believing that the war was indefensible, he could not join in a Vote of Thanks to Lord Lytton. He failed utterly to see why the campaign was started, and on what ground it could be supported. It was begun in the dark, and he did not think that any act of any Governor General in his recollection was ever more criminal than the act which commenced this war without the knowledge of Parliament and the country. They had no Papers; they were kept for months without information, and yet information was constantly demanded, and he suspected that Lord Lytton was in the conspiracy which led to the war. That had always been his feeling. Lord Lytton was a party to these dark transactions, and it was, therefore, impossible for him to join in this Vote. He should certainly vote for the Amendment of the hon. and gallant Member for Waterford (Major O'Gorman); and after that, if the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) moved the Previous Question, he should go into the Lobby with him.

MR. NEWDEGATE

said, he did not see that any question of policy was involved in the Resolution, which was simply a Vote of Thanks for military services performed. When hon. Members spoke so lightly of a campaign in Afghanistan he must remind them that on one occasion, within the memory of many living men, a British Force was totally annihilated in the fields of these recent operations, and that this had been, in a great measure, the result of the Governor General, and his Council in India, of that day having undervalued the enmity and power of the Afghans. Their expeditionary Force was, in conse- quence, utterly annihilated. He had no wish, however, to exaggerate the importance of the recent war, or enter upon a discussion of its policy; but this he would say—that if the House was to notice these minor wars in the manner now proposed, it was well to acknowledge the good service done and the success achieved in a field which had once witnessed the destruction of a British Army. With regard to Lord Lytton, the Resolution praised him for the preparations he had made, and for the arrangements he had carried out to support the Military Force which was to give effect to the verdict of this House. Although many hon. Members might have differed with regard to the policy of this war, they should bear in mind that it had been sanctioned by the House. Knowing, then, that our troops had done all that was required of them, that they had been adequately supported by the Civil Government, and that there had been no repetition of a disaster, which filled one of the darkest pages in Anglo-Indian history, he, for one, was prepared to support a Vote of Thanks to those who had carried out the decision of that House.

MR. ANDERSON

said, the Motion, as presented by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, fell flat upon the House. It had received but meagre signs of support from the Conservative side, and these were indications quite as much as the speech of the noble Lord the Member for the Radnor Boroughs (the Marquess of Hartington) that the Motion was most inappropriate. He quite agreed with the noble Lord, and he only regretted that the noble Lord, after such a speech, did not follow it up by the conclusion to which it naturally led. He ought to have followed the example of the Prime Minister on a previous occasion, and to have moved the Previous Question, and in that case the House would have had a decision upon what was the best line to take on the Motion. Now, what were the facts? The House were asked to vote the Thanks of Parliament for the wretched, miserable raid that was called a great war. If they did so, they would simply degrade the Thanks of Parliament, and take away the good of it for future great events. If they gave the Thanks of Parliament formally for every twopenny-halfpenny engagement, they would not only do a thing which was wrong in itself, but also which would entail evil consequences hereafter. Our Armies would not care a farthing for the Thanks of Parliament if they were given under such circumstances as these. We gathered an enormous Force on the Frontier of Afghanistan with which we were at peace. We marched into that country, and we engaged in a greedy and aggressive war for no earthly reason except that we wanted to get a scientific Frontier by robbing that State. We found the Ruler of Afghanistan unprepared. He had no Armies and armaments to meet us. The consequence was that he fled and died in exile. Then his son became Ameer, and as he had no Army he was obliged to give in. There was the whole affair. We marched through the Khyber Pass; but how did we do it? We sent Major Cavagnari on beforehand to subsidize the Natives in order to prevent their fighting us; and so we got through the wretched business. Because we were angry with Russia and did not dare to fight her, we made a scapegoat of poor Afghanistan and demolished the wretched Ameer. He was told the war was not particularly well carried on either, and there were many mistakes made. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had given the House a sketch of what he called the leading features; but the right hon. Gentleman took care not to tell them of some other deeds of Major General Roberts. The right hon. Gentleman was most cautiously silent on that subject; and yet the House had in a Paper before them Major General Robert's admissions of having done actions which were altogether unworthy of a British soldier. He carried on his operations in the Khost Valley with the barbarism of an uncivilized people, and not according to the usages of modern warfare at all. He (Mr. Anderson) would pay General Roberts one compliment, fie had been straightforward and truthful in acknowledging all his misdeeds. He was charged by the correspondent of The Standard with having carried fire and sword into peaceful villages, and he admitted the truthfulness of the statement, and then attempted to justify his proceedings. He (Mr. Anderson) had read both the charge and the justification, and he must say that it did not impress him as being a justification at all. General Roberts said the charge against him was the giving up of unarmed villages to be looted and burnt, and that was correct. He said the exact number of villages was 11, and that severe punishment was both deserved and necessary. His reason was as follows:—There were a large number of Mangals assembled. They did not belong to the Khost Valley at all, and they were harbouring in these villages. The fact was that the Mangals were armed, and the villagers could not help harbouring them; and yet General Roberts sent word that if his camp were attacked summary and severe retribution would be exacted from all who had given admittance to the Mangals or other persons. Then he received information that a considerable number of Mangals had gone into these villages, and then he considered it necessary to put into execution "my throat of summary and severe retribution." To use his own words— The warning given on the previous evening had been completely disregarded. Camp followers had been murdered and camels carried off, and I therefore gave orders that certain villages, which had harboured Mangals, and from which hostile shots had been fired, should be plundered and burnt. He (Mr. Anderson) would not ask the House to go through the Papers, but just to consider those simple admissions. Suppose the German Army, when it was marching through France, had sent round to all the peaceable villages to say that any one of them where a French soldier was seen would be given up to fire and sword, what would have been said about it in this country? It would have aroused the execrations of all England, and Members of this House would not have been able to find words strong enough to denounce such conduct; and yet that was precisely the conduct of Major General Roberts towards the peaceful villages of Afghanistan, and which he adopted, too, after the Proclamation in which the Governor General announced to the people of Afghanistan that he had no quarrel whatever with them, and that his quarrel was solely with the Ruler of the country. The Ruler having been driven into exile, General Roberts set out to murder and slaughter the innocent people. Looking at these and other circumstances he could not even agree that the war had been carried on in a mode which deserved the Thanks of the country. Nor did he think the war was in itself of a character sufficiently great or important to warrant these Thanks; and if the Thanks went in a divided way they lost all their grace, and the blame of that rested upon those who had introduced this Vote in so inappropriate a manner.

GENERAL SHUTE

denied the statement of the hon. Member for Glasgow that there was no enthusiasm on that side of the House in reference to this Motion, and added that he was surprised to hear the bloodthirsty speeches which had been made by hon. Members opposite, many of whom were generally credited with a desire to promote peace at any price. Those hon. Members seemed to think the Army ought not to be thanked because there had not been a tremendous scene of butchery. He, on the other hand, thought they were pre-eminently worthy of praise, because, by their well-conceived strategy and brilliant tactics, they had brought about splendid military results with comparatively little loss of life on our side. His own opinion was that they would have been even more deserving of a Vote of Thanks if they had not lost a single man. The campaign had been carried on and completed without one misfortune, though war was a game that could rarely be played by even the best of players without occasional errors; and although no great action had been fought they had achieved great results with very little sacrifice of life, which well deserved the thanks of every Member of the House.

MR. E. JENKINS

observed, that the hon. and gallant Member for Brighton (General Shute) had represented the complaint of the Opposition to be that there was no butcher's bill. What they complained of was that there was no butcher's bill on our side, whilst the butcher's bill on the other side was very considerable. He believed that whenever Englishmen found foemen worthy of their steel there was a butcher's bill on both sides. But our troops had swept through the Passes of Afghanistan without any considerable loss, except in fording rivers and from other avoidable causes which were owing to the incapacity of the Military Staff, and the whole of the proceedings were not worth the Thanks proposed to be given. Hon. Members were placed in a difficult position on the Vote, which had been proposed with no enthusiasm by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and was greeted with very few cheers by the House, whilst the speech of the noble Lord was a most extraordinary mode of seconding a proposition of the Government. [An hon. MEMBER: He did not second it.] He was told the noble Lord did not second the Motion. Then, he would say that the noble Lord would have acted a more candid and more manly part, if he had proposed a direct Vote against it. What was the position in which the House was placed? What was the object of the Government? He ventured to say the object of the Government would not be attained by these proceedings. They were trying their old advertising dodge. Ever since an opportunity offered for histrionic purposes in Europe and Asia the Government had carefully gone in for an advertising business. It was a Governmental "Willing & Co." In every part of the world England was advertised as willing to fight anyone who liked to come on. But when it came to the push it was found that we dared to fight only the little ones. The hon. Baronet (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) was perfectly right, and there was not a shadow of doubt that the war was originated in India by Lord Lytton, who was the representative of a small Imperial clique, and who was sent there for the purpose of ending the mistake they had made in Europe, and the defeat they had suffered at the hands of Russian diplomacy; and now, after the war had been carried on, the House of Commons was asked to vote Thanks to those who had been the tools of the policy of the Government in this matter. He wanted to know what capacity had Lord Lytton shown? His Lordship had a brilliant imagination, and was ready to be the tool of this Imperial clique; but, even as far as the conduct of this war was concerned, he deserved no Thanks. At any rate, he did not deserve them from those who felt that the war was an infamous thing, and was simply undertaken by the Government for the purpose of hiding the confusion into which they were thrown by their European policy. He could not support the Government in proposing a Vote of Thanks to Lord Lytton, and he should certainly follow both hon. Members (Sir Wilfrid Lawson and Major O'Gorman) into the Lobby in support of their Amendments.

MR. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN

supported the Motion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He should not have done so if his taking that course could be regarded as implying approval on his part of the policy of the war; but he did not see how it could be viewed in that light. And when hon. Gentlemen said they were going to vote against that Motion on account of the policy of the war, the effect could only be to give rise to a belief that the immense majority by which the Motion would be carried expressed approval of the policy against which they protested. For his own part, he separated entirely the policy of the war from the Vote of Thanks proposed by Her Majesty's Government. The House had not before it sufficient information, or Papers enough, to enable it to form a judgment on the conduct of Lord Lytton with respect to the Afghan War; but they must take it upon the authority of the Government that a certain policy having been determined upon, with regard to which they were not now called upon to pronounce an opinion, he had employed the resources of India vigorously to carry out that policy, and for this he was to be included in the Vote of Thanks. If, on the other hand, they refused so to include him, the position in which the House would be placed by a Division on that point would be that it would send out a qualified Vote of Thanks to those who had been engaged in the war. The hon. Member for Dundee (Mr. E. Jenkins) had said that it would have been more candid and manly for the noble Lord to have opposed the Motion. He (Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen) was not there to defend his noble Friend; but it appeared to him that anyone who could accuse his noble Friend of acting otherwise than in a candid and manly way damaged his own reputation more than that of his noble Friend. His noble Friend had spoken as an English statesman and an English gentleman. His noble Friend made it plain, as he should have thought, even to the most limited capacity, that, as far as he and his Friends were concerned, the Vote to Lord Lytton must be regarded as a matter of form. But as to the soldier, he was a creature who had to obey; he was no judge of the policy of the war—he was not in arms for any particular policy—and the House was about to thank the soldiers, because they had done what British soldiers always had done and always would do—namely, gone straight forward and done their duty. It was easy for them to sit there and talk about butcher's bills; but he, for one, should blush to charge our soldiers with inhu- manity. Wherever the British soldier went he acted with courage, and did not disgrace himself with acts of wanton and unnecessary cruelty. It did not follow, because there was no great bloodshed in this war, that the honour of British gallantry had not been maintained. He thought the great merit of this campaign was that it had been a comparatively bloodless campaign. He entirely disapproved of the policy of the Government by which this war was commenced. He had grave doubts as to whether the objects they believed to have been attained would really be found to have been so; but he hoped he was patriot enough to desire that this might be the case, and that those objects might be fully realized in the acquisition of a safer Frontier and a permanent peace. He most cordially supported the Vote of Thanks to the Army.

SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL

said, that the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition had expressed so completely the views he himself entertained that, after the speech, he had not intended to address the House; but since then some expressions had been made use of, in consequence of which he was obliged to add testimony and belief to this extent—that he believed the campaign was really a hard and arduous and a dangerous campaign, and that it had been gone through with great skill and with great merit. He should be very sorry if the House grudged Thanks simply because it had not been a very sanguinary campaign. With the reservations which had been expressed by his noble Friend the Member for the Radnor Boroughs he should support the Vote heartily.

MR. CALLAN

said, he thought it was a mistake to place in the Vote for the officers and soldiers engaged in the Afghan War the name of Lord Lytton, and he was afraid that that course had been purposely pursued by Her Majesty's Government. At the outset, he did not intend to take part in the Division; and if he had done so, he should have recorded his vote in favour of the Motion of the hon. and gallant Member for Waterford. He should not have then voted in favour of the Vote of Thanks to Lord Lytton, because the Government had not given them sufficient information as to the war. Now, however, he should not refrain from voting in favour of the Government, because of the language used with regard to Irish, as well as with regard to Scotch and English, soldiers by the hon. Member for Dundee (Mr. E. Jenkins), who had been very impartial in the distribution of his censure. He had spoken of the conduct of Her Majesty's Government in terms which were barely Parliamentary, and he had spoken of the conduct of the noble Lord the Member for the Radnor Boroughs, his Leader—["No, no!"]—in language no less strong. Perhaps, the hon. Member was only acting within his duty in talking of "the butcher's bill of that infamous war." But he was not aware that the hon. Member for Dundee had ever placed any Notice upon the Paper which justified his condemnation of the war in the terms he had used. He found, in the list of persons named in the Vote of Thanks, that of Major General Roberts, who was a Waterford man. ["No."] Well, then, he was sorry he was not an Irishman. ["He is."] Well, he was glad that he was an Irishman. He should vote, as he had stated, as a protest against the reflection which had been cast on our soldiers.

MR. SULLIVAN

said, that he believed that the real question before the House was the omission of Lord Lytton's name. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Sandwich (Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen) appeared to consider his position, as he put it before the House, one of a somewhat painful and embarrassing character, and had stated that he read all the papers, facts, and information necessary to enable him to pass judgment on Lord Lytton; but that, nevertheless, he intended to thank him first, and judge him afterwards. There could not be a question that that was a position which demanded their sympathy. There was no doubt that the spectacle which the House of Commons presented that evening was one that would hardly command the admiration of posterity. The British Parliament presented its Thanks to Lord Wellington when he defeated the Armies of France; the Thanks of Parliament were also presented to Nelson. He had no doubt that Bismarck would laugh to-morrow morning, and so would Moltke and Todleben. These eminent critics would laugh when they found this country engaged in thanking its officers for what had been described as a petty war in Afghanistan. The American Senate thanked General Grant after the suppression of the great Secessional Rebellion; but he had never heard that a Vote of Thanks was proposed to the General who defeated Sitting Bull. It was not clear to him that the American General who defeated those Indians would not henceforth complain grievously if the American Senate did not follow the example set that evening. Hitherto, it had been thought that the Thanks of Parliament were something unusual—something that ought not to be passed, as a matter of course, upon the conclusion of every petty war. If they took from the rarity of the occurrence, they would cheapen it until it would lose all its historical importance and effect. If they were to thank every General and every Corps which did its duty, it would only be the Corps which turned its back upon the enemy—which he hoped no British Army would ever do—which would be deemed unworthy of thanks. They were, then, adopting the principle of thanking the leaders of every petty expedition, instead of reserving so grave a proceeding as the proposal of the Thanks of Parliament for the man who approached something nearer to the achievements of Wellington and Nelson. The men who served in the Army ought to be taught to do their duty without coming to Parliament for thanks for their actions. The reason they were asked to pass the Vote that night was to gratify the military element, and to offer some incense to Lord Lytton. Instead of thanking Lord Lytton, he should be glad to join in a Vote of Censure upon him. There was not a man in the country who did not feel that the country had got, happily, out of the miserable position into which Lord Lytton had led it. he did not desire to criticize the military proceedings, or whether there had been a large or small "butcher's bill;" but it could not be said that the troops over which our soldiers had been victorious were on equal footing with them. Could it be said that an Afghan Chief was worthy to stand against the Imperial power of this country? By giving a Vote of Thanks for such affairs as these, they would cheapen it until it became the laughing stock of Europe. The truth was, this was a mere proceeding at the dictation of the Jingo element out-of-doors. He should vote heartily against the proposal to thank Lord Lytton, who, he thought, if they had an opportunity of gauging, would be found more entitled to their censure of his administration.

MR. E. STANHOPE

said, the words of the Resolution put before the House by the Government implied the approval of the House to the support given by Lord Lytton to the military operations in Afghanistan; but it was not intended by that to give any approval to his civil policy and administration. The terms of the Resolution followed very much the precedent of 1858. His noble Friend the present Prime Minister made a speech upon that occasion, and, in answer to it, after he had moved the Previous Question, various explanations were given. A very excellent speech was made by his right hon. Friend the Member for the University of Cambridge (Mr. Walpole). He pointed out grave reasons for objecting to a Vote of Thanks to Lord Canning, although, in that case, there was a Memorial from a number of inhabitants of India against Lord Canning with respect to specific points, and as it was distinctly understood that the Vote of Thanks was to be given to those who had been engaged in the war, and was not to be taken as implying any approval of Lord Canning's policy, he urged upon the present Prime Minister to withdraw his Amendment. Mr. Disraeli—as he then was—did so, on the understanding that it did not imply such approval. Therefore, it was clear that, according to that precedent, the civil policy of Lord Lytton was not now in question. If it were, he need scarcely say that he was then prepared and ready to defend it—and in no less degree with regard to the policy of the Afghan War than on other occasions—and if occasion arose they would not shrink from the encounter; but that question was not now raised. He regretted very much the language used in some of the speeches which had been made on the Resolution now before the House, as tending to detract from the character of the operations in Afghanistan—operations which, as had been already said, were to be measured not by the amount of slaughter that had taken place, but by the great difficulties that had to be encountered and hardships that had to be endured. We were told very often in the course of the debates in both Houses in December last, as well as in speeches made out-of-doors, that the difficulties which lay in the way of our troops in entering upon this war were very great, and that the task was very onerous. We were told that when our troops entered Afghanistan most dreadful things would happen—that if our posts were too weak they would be overpowered, whilst if they were too strong they would be a menace to the country; that if we put them on the hills they would be without water, and that if we put them in the valleys they would be commanded from the hills. What really did happen? Crossing the Frontier, the troops advanced almost without a hitch; so that, within three months from the time they entered Afghanistan, they had achieved the objects of the war. Could it be said, therefore, that Lord Lytton ought not to be thanked "for the ability and judgment with which the resources of the British Empire in India had been applied to the support of the Military operations in Afghanistan?" In these circumstances, he hoped the House would not hesitate to adopt the Resolution, thanking Lord Lytton, as well as the officers and men, who had brought the campaign to so speedy and successful a conclusion.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, he concurred in everything that the Under Secretary of State for India had said with regard to the Army in India, and cordially gave his voice for the Vote to the Army for the manner in which they had conducted operations; but he did not think the Under Secretary had removed the difficulty in regard to the Thanks to the civil officers. There was no distinction between the Vote of 1858 and the Vote in this case, and no mere declaration or suggestion by anybody could alter the real character of the Vote. The House was asked to thank Lord Lytton for the ability and judgment with which the resources of the British Empire in India had been applied to the support of the military operations in Afghanistan. The Under Secretary had said that was not the passing of any opinion on his civil policy of course; but then it never was a civil policy at all. It never was intended to be a civil policy; it was never supposed to be anything but a military policy from the first. But the question he had to ask was, what was the meaning of a Vote of Parliament which thanked Lord Lytton for having applied the resources of India to military operations in Afghanistan? He had had an opportunity, when that policy was discussed previously, of saying what he thought on the subject; and he could not, without stultifying himself, vote on that Resolution, because he had expressed the opinion that Lord Lytton ought not to have applied the resources of India to the military operations in Afghanistan. He held that opinion still, and thought it was an entire mistake to have applied the resources of India to military operations in Afghanistan; and the greater the ability and judgment which were shown in taking a wrong course the worse it became, in his opinion. For these reasons, while he should concur in thanking all concerned in the military operations, he should abstain from anything which had the appearance of endorsing the policy that had made them necessary.

MR. PLUNKET

said, that the hon. and learned Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt) knew that the grammatical construction of the proposed Vote, as well as every circumstance connected with it, had nothing whatever to do with the policy of Lord Lytton. It was not a Vote of Thanks to Lord Lytton for the manner in which he had applied the resources of India in the sense of his having commenced the war; but that war having been commenced, and, as everybody knew, sanctioned by Parliament, and he believed by the vast majority of the people of this country, he skilfully applied the resources at his command. That was the true meaning. If it was not an un-Parliamentary expression, he should say that it was mere quibbling to attempt to put Lord Lytton out of the Vote in the way indicated by the hon. and learned Member for Oxford. Nobody could believe that it was a Vote on foreign policy. It was a Vote simply on the manner in which the policy of Parliament had been carried out, and on the way in which Lord Lytton had applied the great resources of India to this purpose. The hon. and learned Member for Oxford had reduced himself to this absurd position—that Parliament having decided to carry on the war, Lord Lytton ought not to have applied the resources of India to the prosecution of it.

SIR JOSEPH M'KENNA

remarked that, although he had steadily voted against the policy of the Government in the Afghan War, he did not think he should run counter to the votes which he had given on previous occasions if he now voted for the Resolution of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. But he admitted that Lord Lytton's policy was a perfectly open question. He would say, however, that the course of the war had tended, to a certain extent, to modify the judgment which he formed against it in its earlier stages. He thought, however, now that the war was over, that they would do very wrong if they were to look at the terms of the Resolution with too microscopic an eye. He looked upon the Vote, and coupling Lord Lytton's name with it, as a Parliamentary amenity. They could not pass a Vote in regard to the Army and, at the same time, pass over the Viceroy. Although he could not vote with his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Waterford (Major O'Gorman), yet he thought he had fairly stated the exception which he took, and that he had given grounds sufficiently strong for the distinction which he had drawn, yet not sufficient to warrant the rejection of this Resolution.

SIR HENRY HAVELOCK

would have been glad to see the Vote divisible into two parts, so that he might have voted in support of the Thanks to the Army without upholding the policy of Lord Lytton. He thought the course of that noble Lord in relation to the war, both as regarded the civil and military policy, was a mistaken one; and, therefore, while he admitted his intention of voting with the Government, he did so wholly and solely on the supposition that in doing so he was according that due and proper and just meed of praise to the troops to which he thought they were entitled. This campaign had been neither small or insignificant; no less than 25,000 men had been engaged in it, very few lives had been lost, and the whole conduct of the operations had been managed in such a manner as to induce him to support the Motion for a Vote of Thanks to the troops.

MR. RAMSAY

would be glad to vote for the Amendment and yet thank the officers and soldiers for their conduct in the war. He contended that the hon. and learned Member for Dublin University (Mr. Plunket) was putting a false issue before the House when he said that Parliament had been consulted on the Afghan War, because no consultation of Parliament ever took place, and that was specially what they complained of.

Question put.

The House divided:—Ayes 148; Noes 33: Majority 115.—(Div. List, No. 205.)

Original Question again proposed.

SIR WILFRID LAWSON

thought he was now justified in moving the Previous Question. He did not want to make a speech; but all he had heard that night had confirmed him as to the wisdom of the course he proposed, but especially the speech of the right hon. Member for Sandwich (Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen). The right hon. Gentleman said he made it as a patriot. As a patriot, he (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) made this Motion.

MR. O'DONNELL

, in seconding the Amendment, said, he was compelled to support the principle that Votes of this kind ought not to be brought on until the House had a full opportunity of learning how the War, for which the Thanks were to be given, had been conducted. At this moment they had read the most fearful news of the manner in which the wounded Zulus had been treated at the battle of Ulundi. ["Question!"] It was strictly the question. For all they knew it was hypothetically possible that some of our more irregular troops in Afghanistan had committed fearful atrocities. They had no time to look into the question, and there were no facts before the House. They might yet be asked to give a Vote of Thanks to the Native Contingent in Zululand. The news from Ulundi was that after that battle the Zulus were refused permission to take their wounded from the field, and every wounded Zulu was murdered by our Native Contingent. That might, or might not, be true. But they knew that the murder of women and children had been admitted and proved in recent Blue Books. The story might, therefore, be true; and it was sent by Dr. Russell, of The Daily Telegraph, of high authority, and one not likely to lead this country willingly wrong. He wished to ask the Government when they intended to publish the Report which they promised three months ago, in reply to a Question by himself, respecting- the reported execution of seven Afghan priests, on the charge of having instigated the resistance of the Afghans? There were other questions requiring to be answered. It was evident that this Vote of Thanks was not so much for the Army as for the public out-of-doors; and, as had been wittily observed, it was not so much a Vote for General Roberts or General Haines as for General Election. It was an evil precedent, fraught with the greatest danger. It was a mere formal Vote; and it could not have real weight and force unless it were postponed, in order that fuller information might be placed before the House.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That that Question be now put."—(Sir Wilfrid Lawson.)

MR. KNIGHT

inquired whether it was regular to move the Previous Question, except as an initial Amendment?

MR. SPEAKER

said, that the hon. Baronet was entitled to move the Previous Question.

MR. PAPNELL

said, he objected to thanking Lord Lytton, because he objected to the policy he had had to carry out. He looked upon that policy as a murderous policy, undertaken on account of the necessities, or supposed necessities, of this country. He could not but look on the act of the Government of this country in going to war against a friendly people in Afghanistan as an act of assassination against the people. He considered that every human being who had been killed in Afghanistan, whether on the side of the British, or on the side of Afghanistan, had been murdered. There was no other way of putting it. It was all very well to call it war; but he called it murder. They feared to go to war with Russia, and they were obliged to enter upon this diversion in Afghanistan in order to satisfy the instincts of a section of the people of this country, whom Lord Beaconsfield looked on as his chief supporters. He knew the power of the Government in bringing up a majority to vote Thanks to Lord Lytton; but he did not intend to be silent, or acquiesce in any of these Resolutions; and he intended, by way of protest, to divide against every one of them.

Question put.

The House divided:—Ayes 140; Noes 28: Majority 112.—(Div. List, No. 206.)

Original Question put, and agreed to.

1.Resolved, That the Thanks of this House be given to the Right Honourable Lord Lytton, Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and to General Sir Frederick Paul Haines, G.C.B., G.C.S.L, C.L.E., Commander-in-Chief in India, for the ability and judgment with which the resources of the British Empire in India have been applied to the support of the Military operations in Afghanistan.

2. Resolved, That the Thanks of this House be given to,—

and the other Officers of the Army, both European and Native, for the intrepidity, skill, and perseverance displayed by them in the Military operations in Afghanistan, and for their indefatigable zeal and exertions throughout the late Campaign:

3. Resolved, That this House doth highly approve and acknowledge the valour and perseverance displayed by the Non-Commissioned Officers and Private Soldiers, both European and Native, employed in Afghanistan, and that the same be signified to them by the Commanders of the several Corps, who are desired to thank them for their gallant behaviour:

4. Ordered, That the said Resolutions be transmitted by Mr. Speaker to the Viceroy and Governor General of India; and that his Lordship be requested to communicate the same to the several Officers referred to therein.