EGYPT—MR. CAVE'S MISSION—EGYPTIAN FINANCE.—RESOLUTION.

HC Deb 05 August 1876 vol 231 cc615-53

SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL

rose to call attention to Mr. Cave's Mission to Egypt, and to move, That it is inexpedient that the British Government should take any part to facilitate loan transactions to the Khedive of Egypt. He said that the Motion was now somewhat out of date, because the evils which it was intended to guard against had not come off in a direct form. He had kept the Motion on the Paper to bring it forward that day, rather with the view of giving the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Shoreham an opportunity of giving some information to the House on his important Mission, than with any other object. The Session bade fair to end as it began, with discussions regarding the Suez Canal and the affairs of Egypt. He would not refer to the Suez Canal, except to say it was evident that the great and glorious results which the Press and the public seemed to anticipate from that purchase had not been realized. He was bound to say also that the evils, the risk of which had been incurred had not so far developed themselves, but that, as often happened in such cases, neither the good nor the evil was so great as had been anticipated. He would confine his observations to the Mission of the right hon. Gentleman and the state of Egyptian finances, of which his Report was the subject. At one time there was very great reason to fear that Her Majesty's Government might meddle with the finances of Egypt, and he, for one, thought it undesirable and inexpedient to do so; but he was very glad to find that the intention of Her Majesty's Government to appoint a Commission to deal with the Egyptian Debt had not been carried out. The general feeling of the country, if he (Sir George Campbell) apprehended it rightly, was that too large a political character had been given to the right hon. Gentleman's Mission, and that too large a staff accompanied him to do what might very well have been done by a clever and experienced financial clerk. He went to ascertain the exact state of the finances of Egypt, and not to produce any great political or financial effect upon that country. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would take the opportunity of giving the House some information with regard to the Report which had been presented to Parliament, and especially in regard to the sources of the information contained in the Report, and to the state of the Egyptian Revenue, especially the effect of the imposition of the Moukabala and the probable effect of the cessation of the Moukabala. He should be glad to hear the right hon. Gentleman justify his sanguine view of Egyptian finances, and to know that the reports of these finances were founded on clear and undoubted evidence. Until he (Sir George Campbell) heard full explanations on those points he must continue to regard the right hon. Gentleman's Report as too sanguine. If it should prove that the right hon. Gentleman had been too sanguine, that would be, he apprehended, a great evil, because the result had been to bolster up unduly the credit of Egypt—a result which the Khedive, a shrewd and sagacious man, no doubt desired. At first the Khedive did not like the Mission, but finding it was inevitable, he determined to utilize it to the utmost for the benefit of Egyptian credit, to supply it with facts of a sanguine and roseate hue, and thus to favour a financial scheme, which, if it had succeeded, would have induced the people of these countries to lend their moneys. He (Sir George Campbell) was glad that scheme for the conversion of the Egyptian Debt had not succeeded; for he was very apprehensive that if it had succeeded, all the people who lent their money would have said, and said with some justice, that they were induced to do so by the Report of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Shoreham. He had expressed in the Resolution on the Paper, that it was better they should not interfere to try and patch, up Egyptian finance, for he did not believe in patching up the finances of foreign countries for the benefit of the widow, and the orphan, and the poor clergyman, and the half-pay officer. He was aware that it was argued that for the benefit of the poor people who held these old Egyptian loans, these foreign loans should be patched up. He pitied those poor people very much; but if we were to adopt this mode of assisting them, a great many other people might similarly get into difficulties. He believed the first loss was the best, and that it was not wise to prop up the credit of any foreign State that might be in a rotten or tottering condition. He thought, too, that the very sanguine reports of the Revenues of Egypt would lead to great harm; and it might lead the Khedive to think it necessary to justify the estimate by screwing more money out of those under his control. He found that the land revenue of Egypt was already ten times the highest revenue which we obtained from the people of India. It was above the average rent per acre of the land of England, and, if additional taxation was imposed upon the down-trodden cultivators of Egypt, the result would be one we should not be justified in aiding and abetting. He found from the figures that the land revenue of Egypt was £4,300,000, and that on account of the operation of what was called the Moukabala that revenue had been reduced by about £1,600,000. He also found that about £1,500,000 of the Moukabala had been treated as an asset, whereas it was in reality only a capitalization of the Revenue. There would be, according to his figures, a loss of £3,200,000 of the revenue on account of the cessation of the Moukabala. He wanted to know where these figures came from, and on what it was that the right hon. Gentleman based his sanguine estimate of the finances of Egypt on the cessation of the Moukabala payments? If a new land tax was, as he gathered, to be imposed in substitution for the Moukabala, great injustice was likely to be done. He would be glad if the right hon. Member for Shoreham removed that impression. There were other items of revenue of which he should like explanations. In other parts of Europe an octroi was supposed to be a local tax which could not legitimately be taken as a source of general revenue, and if the estimate of the net profit of the Egyptian railways was correct, they must be the most profitable railways in the world. He had the greatest doubts of the possibility of, and therefore of the expediency of attempting to, veneer these old Oriental Governments with the gloss of modern civilization. They had a strength and vigour of their own; but his experience was that the result of any attempt to civilize and modernize them was to destroy their old vitality without imparting a new one. This was more specially the case when you put them into the hands of City financiers and tried to vitalize them with money from the City; there could not be a more speedy, more effectual road to ruin for these States than their putting themselves into the hands of persons in the City. Whereas the Predecessors of the Khedive had executed considerable works of public importance, and yet had incurred only a small Debt, the impression derived from the Papers was that the Khedive had incurred large debts and done little work with the money. We had not only aided him in great financial schemes and industrial enterprizes, but our money had also aided and abetted him in great political projects. He was an exceedingly ambitious man, and he had conceived the project of establishing a great Empire in Africa, which he thought would be better in the hands of still more civilized Powers. As the result of the loan from this country, he had established a large Army, which had not only been employed for great conquest or attempted conquest in Abyssinia, but 15,000 or 20,000 black troops in Egypt had been sent to assist in crushing the Christians of Turkey, a course of proceeding which to him (Sir George Campbell) seemed to be a serious thing to be done with the money of this country. Further, a Mahomedan Power must be a very great difficulty in the way of our efforts to put down the Slave Trade, and the evidence was strong that in the Red Sea, under the Turkish and Egyptian flags, a very large slave trade was carried on. Considering the doubtful character of the enterprizes which the Ruler of Egypt undertook, at all events, there was every reason why at present the Rulers of this country should not bolster up the credit of the Potentate of Egypt; that he should settle as best he could with the financiers with whom he might deal, without being patted on the back in official Reports to our own Government, or having his credit bolstered up by any other indirect means. Having made these observations, perhaps he would best consult the opinion of the House by not moving his Resolution, and by simply calling his attention to the subject, in the hope that he would elicit some statement from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Shoreham.

MR. STEPHEN CAVE,

who was received with cheers, said: I rise in accordance with the hon. Member's invitation, and because I imagine the House will expect me to say a few words before the Session closes; otherwise I should much prefer remaining silent. I agree with him that his Motion is now somewhat out of date. I feel that the interest which formerly attached to my Mission has well nigh died away, and that the affairs of Egypt have naturally been thrown into the shade by more urgent and important events in the East. I should not, therefore, be justified in repeating what is said in my Report, or detaining the House over the varying fortunes of the Egyptian Mission. My Report has long been before the country. All that we said and did in Egypt, and a good deal more, has been duly chronicled and commented upon. Still less is it my business to defend the policy of sending the Mission to Cairo. That will be done by others. But whatever differences of opinion there may have been in England on that point, I believe there was little doubt in other countries. I believe, moreover, that without it—without the exposure of the perilous state of the finances of Egypt which resulted from our inquiries—her Ruler would, like so many others in similar difficulties, have gone on shutting his eyes to the danger of the course he was pursuing, and the end would have been more hopelessly disastrous than the present crisis. The hon. Member charges me with unduly bolstering up the credit of Egypt. That may be his opinion, but that was not the opinion of the Khedive. He complained that the Mission, far from assisting him to borrow, closed the Money Market against him; and, if that were so, it may turn out that this was the best thing that could have happened, though his difficulties may have been aggravated at the time. No doubt, such a Mission to an independent Power was perhaps unprecedented, and it was a very delicate and difficult duty to carry out our instructions so as to avoid giving offence on the one hand and to attain our object of obtaining accurate information on the other. I hope we have performed that duty with tolerable success. I am sure the Khedive will admit that we were not wanting in the respect due to his high position; and I must say that His Highness treated us with every consideration, and seemed most desirous of giving us all the information we could desire. Whether this information would have been so readily afforded to the "clever clerk" whom the hon. Member would have substituted for my Mission may be doubted. It has been suggested by the hon. Member that all our information was merely second-hand, and that we were obliged to take what was set before us without asking any questions. That, of course, is in the main true, though not entirely so. We did test what we had opportunities of testing; but, of course, we could hardly be expected in two months to unravel the intricacies and audit the accounts—kept in Arabic—of the Finance Minister. We might have been deceived, no doubt. Still, we had this to rely upon, that though we might easily have been deceived, yet that a person who wished to deceive us would hardly have asked for an experienced English financier to remain in his employment for five or ten years, to whom all the accounts of the Government were to be submitted, and by whom the statement furnished to us would, of course, be examined. The result, however, has exceeded my expectations. I fully expected that many errors would be detected and exposed, and was prepared to be satisfied if the truth at length came out amid the conflict of statements. But what has happened? The Report has been before the public for four months. It has been translated into every civilized language, and as far as I know, beyond some very minor details chiefly arising from accidental errors of transcription—the detection of which shows the care with which the Report has been scrutinized—it has been accepted as accurate, and has formed the basis of every negotiation which has up to this time been carried on. The dif- ference between the French computation and the figures in my Report, I have already explained, in answer to a Question in the House, to be due to circumstances which have taken place since my Report was written. I at one time hoped that the plan indicated in that Report—not of assisting the Khedive to borrow, as the hon. Member for the Kirkcaldy Boroughs (Sir George Campbell) imagines, but of preventing his borrowing more—would have been carried into effect by capitalists in this country. We had good reason for expecting this; but unfortunately our expectations were not realized, and the matter was afterwards complicated by the extreme pretensions of the French holders of Treasury Bonds, to whom the necessities of the Khedive, driven as it were into a corner, obliged him to yield. For this I am in no way responsible. Indeed, I told the Khedive plainly, and placed it on record, that the acceptance of any plan which did not provide for the full payment of his creditors was really an act of bankruptcy, and was incompatible with the expenditure which he was still carrying on. I believed that his liabilities might have been met then. I believe they may be met even now, though of course it is much more difficult. The total indebtedness is far larger than when my Report was written, and the Khedive is most unfortunately again involved, this time probably against his will, and in consequence of the obligations he is under to the Porte, in the waste of war. I am naturally sorry that my own labours did not bear fruit more speedily and more conspicuously, but I hope that they may yet be carried to a successful issue by more fortunate and abler hands. This one merit I may, without presumption, claim for my scheme—namely, that it kept steadily in view the equitable demands of creditors on the one hand, and on the other the relief of the taxpayer—for whom the hon. Member expresses very natural sympathy—from burdens too heavy for him to bear. It was in order to further both these objects that I laid much stress upon a complete control over both the collection and the appropriation of the revenue, to be vested in the Control Department presided over by the financial agent whom the Khedive was anxious to obtain from this country. This is the key of the whole position. Whatever ar- rangements may be made in future, I am convinced that such a control must form part of them; and one of the worst features in the Decrees which have been issued in favour of the French scheme is the absence of any security for the independence and permanence of the Control Department. I think I am bound to say a few words, and they shall be very few, on the character of the Khedive, who has sometimes been spoken of in very hard, and in some instances, I think, very unjustifiable terms by a portion of the public Press. The Khedive has been even compared to the late Sultan, but no two characters could be more unlike. The Sultan's fall was preceded by his abdication of the functions and duties of a Sovereign. His vast expenditure was mainly upon unworthy favourites, upon luxury, and debauchery. The Khedive, on the contrary, is the most intelligent and laborious man in his dominions. In his Cabinet early and late, there is hardly any public business with which he is not familiar. He allows himself scarcely any rest or relaxation. His Highness told me once that nothing was so delightful to him as a few weeks' repose at Minieh amid his private estates, but that he had not been able to go there for three years. Profuse in hospitality, proud of entertaining the princely visitors now not unfrequent in Egypt in a princely way, he is frugal and simple in his personal habits. He is, however, obliged to work with the instruments which custom and tradition have handed down to him, to employ officials whom he cannot trust, and whose object is to enrich themselves as rapidly as possible, and to insure against their uncertain tenure of office by plundering the Exchequer. Consequently he endeavours, as many others have done, to manage everything himself, which Rulers of far greater bodily activity would entirely fail to do; and though his knowledge of detail is extraordinary, it is difficult for him to see what it is everybody's interest to conceal. I was once told in Egypt by an eminent official, that the difficulty of educating Arab children lay in the fact that they had no conscience, their only motives being fear and the hope of gain. Probably in consequence of being aware of something of the same kind in others than children, His Highness is too prone to throw him- self into the arms of hardly more disinterested foreign advisers who press upon him schemes of various kinds, some good, some crude and ill-considered, but mostly involving heavy expenditure, an undue proportion of which goes into the pockets of these advisers, who are often identical with or closely allied to the contractors who carry out the works, and the financiers who find the means. Loans at ruinous rates, bonds renewed on terms still more ruinous, supplementary contracts in which, for obvious reasons, the Khedive is as much at the mercy of the contractor as the English Post Office used to be in respect of the great steamship companies when contracts were to be renewed. All these have eaten out the resources of the country. The Khedive is of a sanguine disposition, easily impressed with new ideas, which uncontrolled power and impatience of restraint lead him to realize without proper deliberation. Those around him are afraid to tell him the truth. It is most rare for him to find his ideas combated or corrected. The answer of his highest Ministers is usually, "Arda"—"As you please." The customs of the country, polygamy, the system of adoption, the palaces and great establishments considered necessary for the various branches of the ruling family, the practice, as old as ancient Egypt, of never repairing or finishing the work of another, all contribute to the ruinous expenditure. Even Nature appears to encourage this kind of extravagance. The slowness of the growth of trees in the North seems to attach people to one locality. There is no chance of making more than one place in a lifetime. In Egypt, not only is the growth of trees extraordinarily rapid, but the acacia and sycamore can be transplanted at almost full size. The avenue to the Gezeerah Palace, which was not in existence a few years ago, looks as if it had been planted 50 years. It is only fair, however, to mention that the Khedive is the first of his race who has shown an appreciation of the antiquities of his country. In Mohamed Ali's time, the priceless monuments of the past were used as quarries for his bridges and factories. His Highness has collected these objects in a most valuable museum, freely open to the inspection of travellers. The hon. Member talks of the Khedive having done very little. In reply to this, I need only allude to the Bahr Ibrahim, a navigable irrigation canal 160 miles long, fertilizing vast tracts of land. He speaks also of the Khedive originating sugar cultivation, which, he says, is only successful on virgin soil. But I may remind him that Mohamed Ali originated this cultivation, and that the place where sugar pays perhaps best, is the colony of which we have heard so much lately, the island of Barbadoes, where the soil is almost as artificial as in Malta. Still, I agree that the cost of these enterprizes has been enormous; sugar factories unfinished, with expensive machinery lying about; irrigation works, with recent inventions, never completed; experiments half tried—these represent a waste of capital never to be restored. The great body of Europeans resident in the country think only of getting as much as possible out of the general plunder, and of exempting themselves from the taxation to which they ought to contribute. A curious specimen of their character and ideas might be seen in a complaint from Alexandria, in The Times of Wednesday last, that high rates of interest could no longer be obtained; that a contract for a thousand quarters of wheat, which used to change hands 30 times, paying 30 brokerages and employing the staffs of 30 merchants, was now made direct by the Government with one exporter, who paid one brokerage, and then sent it out of the country. This was regarded as a sign of degenerate times. The great want, and one we have endeavoured to impress upon the Khedive and to some extent to supply, is that of an official body of high-class Europeans, such, for instance, as our public servants in India—a class which the hon. Member who has just spoken knows well—men accustomed to deal with Native races in outlying Provinces, and to conduct affairs in which tact, integrity, and decision are required. Under such men the railways and Customs duties would produce far more than at present. I have alluded to the uncertain tenure of office. There seems, moreover, to be no system of appointment. We do not expect a complicated system of Civil Service Examinations like our own; but we might suppose that when a man was found fit for his post, he would retain it. Far from it: Ali Pacha, when at the head of the railway department, proved himself to possess the rare qualities requisite for such a post; but he was suddenly made Governor of Alexandria, and then Master of the Ceremonies at Cairo, where I left him. His successor, Zecchi Pacha, after being several months in office, did not, as we were informed, know whether the French mails went by railway from Cairo to Suez or not. Such men as those I have indicated would also protect the Fellaheen, for whom the hon. Member expresses natural sympathy, from irregular collection of land tax, from corvées, and from the many forms of oppression and extortion which cripple their energy, and make them reluctant to apply money to the land, inducing them rather to conceal it and deny the possession of it. The state of the peasantry is highly unsatisfactory, though I doubt their being as wretched as many writers imagine, simply because it is their habit, after the manner of the Jews of the Middle Ages, to make themselves look as poor as possible. But this alone, it must be admitted, implies a great deal. Those, however, among us who have studied the Reports of the various Commissions on the state of women and children employed in mines, factories, and agricultural labour in this country, will acknowledge that we are not justified in being too severe upon a nation only just emerging from barbarism. The hon. Member has asked about the Moukabala. I will not go into figures, for which I refer him to my Report. But, shortly, the Moukabala is the redemption of land tax. I have shown in my Report that it has proved very unfavourable to the Revenue. The Khedive has discovered this, and wishes to put an end to it, which he cannot do without paying the sums advanced by the proprietors. He also inquired about the octroi. In Europe, no doubt, the octroi is received and expended by municipalities; but in Egypt, where everything is done by the central Government, these imposts are paid into the Exchequer, and form part of the general revenue. I feel I have detained the House too long. I could say much more about Egypt and her Ruler—subjects in which I naturally take deep interest. I am bound, however, before sitting down, to direct attention to one or two points: First, to my remarks on the Moukabala in the covering despatch of my Report. This paragraph was published by an accident, for which I alone am responsible; but I promised to explain that the Khedive states that I misunderstood him, that he did not say that he had only recently discovered the error in the calculations of the land tax, but that he thought it had escaped our notice. Secondly, it was alleged in one of the papers that I had submitted my Report to the Khedive in the first instance, and at his request made it more favourable. It is hardly necessary to say that there is not a word of truth in this. The Report was written on my way home and after my return, and was seen by no one outside the Mission, before it was delivered to the Government. I have only one other point upon which I feel bound to touch, and I do so with great pleasure. I feel bound to acknowledge the obligations under which I personally am, and the country in general, in my opinion, is to my colleague, Colonel Stokes, not only for his labours in regard to the Suez Canal arrangement, but for the tact, the intelligence, and the industry he brought to bear upon the work of the Mission, and the valuable assistance he rendered in our interviews with the Khedive and in the preparation of the Report. I am sure no better man could have been chosen to represent British interests on the Suez Canal direction, and I am glad to bear this testimony to one who cannot make his voice heard in this House. Sir, there is still corn in Egypt, and there are not wanting those who are ready to reap where they have not sown; but I trust that they may fail in their machinations, and that better days, and a more lasting, because a more securely founded, prosperity may yet be in store for that interesting and hospitable country, and for its amiable, peaceful, and industrious inhabitants—a country in which there is the greatest security for life and property and the most entire freedom of religious worship, a country in which European ladies, unattended except by Natives, may and do travel in perfect safety from Alexandria to the Second Cataract,—and of how many Christian lands can this be said?—a country in which every Englishman must take especial interest, as the gate of our mighty Empire in India.

Mr. DODSON

said, he had listened with great interest to the statement of the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Cave). The remarks he (Mr. Dodson) had to make would have reference to the policy of the Mission itself, which appeared to have been attended with a fatality of cross purposes amongst those who initiated and conducted it, and the last thing he intended would be to convey the slightest reflection on the right hon. Gentleman, who had been placed in a most difficult position. In October, the Khedive had requested the English Government to send out two gentlemen intimately acquainted with the English system of accounts, to act under the superintendence of his own Chancellor of the Exchequer; but the Government, instead of sending two officers to give him the assistance required to investigate the condition of his finance, had sent out one of their own Colleagues. It did not appear to have been known whether the information obtained was to be regarded as confidential or not. At first, it appeared to have been presumed that it was, and a telegraphic inquiry brought the answer from the Khedive that it was intended solely for the information of our Government. Then, on its being intimated that it was intended to lay the Report before Parliament, publication was objected to by the Khedive pending a certain negotiation, but the Prime Minister described this objection as a general one in the then condition of the Khedive's finances. Next, Lord Derby telegraphed that refusal to consent to publication was injurious; and the Khedive replied that he never refused, but asked only for temporary postponement. The declaration, however, made by the Prime Minister was so prejudicial to the Khedive that he telegraphed requesting immediate and unreserved publication. The Khedive was placed in this dilemma—that whereas immediate publication was injurious to him, such a situation was created for him that non-publication was worse. At least four different versions of the confidential nature of the Report were given; but after all that had been said, and after all the withholding of information on the part of the Government, there was the despatch of the Khedive showing that he wished the Report only withheld for a short time pending the appointment of a Com- missioner. In fact, the Khedive had shown that he only wished for a momentary delay in the publication of the Papers. There was one other point to which he wished to call attention, and that was, that there had been a very narrow escape of this country being to some extent involved in the responsibilities of Egyptian finance. Lord Derby telegraphed to the Khedive at a most critical moment in the condition of his affairs, to await the arrival of Mr. Rivers Wilson, and to abstain from hasty action because proposals were under the consideration of English financiers, but those proposals came to nothing, and it was then necessary for Lord Derby to telegraph that the Government had no proposal before them, and could not originate any, so that we raised false hopes and expectations. Lord Derby, in his last despatch, declared the Mission had been of undoubted benefit to the Khedive, but it was difficult to see how this could be when his bonds had since fallen in value from between 50 and 60 to 40; and, indeed, the Khedive himself was reported to have said of the English Government—Ils ont creusé ma fosse. The Khedive was willing to abide by the plan sketched in Mr. Cave's Report, but the voluntary conversion of a debt of £75,000,000 required the assistance of bankers and capitalists, and, as they did not come forward, the plan could not be carried out. The only chance for the right hon. Gentleman's scheme was the assistance of great capitalists. How otherwise could the Khedive be expected to carry it into effect, as Lord Derby told him he might, unless compulsorily. According to the Correspondence, Her Majesty's Government were asked to appoint a Commissioner as one of the International Commission to carry out the plan recommended by Mr. Cave. On the 21st of April, Lord Derby telegraphed to inform the Khedive that he had heard with satisfaction that he proposed to adopt the plan proposed in Mr. Cave's Report, and told His Highness that the Government would have much pleasure in suggesting or recommending a Commissioner. Now, the plan recommended in what was known as Mr. Cave's Report, involved the appointment of a Commission which was to receive a certain part of the Revenue, which was to be handed over to them, and by them applied to the payment of Debt, and it further involved that His Highness was not to interfere with the Committee of Control, nor to raise any fresh loans without the consent of the Committee of Control. But the defect of that scheme was that either the Commission would have no powers to carry out this proposal, or the Khedive would be deprived of his Sovereign rights. The Government, however, had gone very far in coquetting with the appointment of some Commissioner. After the Khedive had agreed to the French scheme, Lord Derby declined to recommend a Commissioner to form one of the International Commission. He (Mr. Dodson) did not mean to say that the refusal to recommend a Commissioner was not valid and good; but he regretted that the Government had committed themselves so far, that Lord Derby should have found it necessary to explain himself out of the recommendation. The scheme of Mr. Cave was a voluntary scheme, but the scheme adopted by the Khedive was a compulsory one. Lord Derby, however, was too far committed to be able to get off on that ground, and therefore he said he would not recommend a Commissioner, because the amount of Debt was larger than was stated in Mr. Cave's Report; that the charge would be £1,000,000 more, and so on. All those things, which might be traced through the Correspondence, showed that Her Majesty's Government went rashly into the business, and that they had been at cross purposes with the Egyptian Government all through. If he were called upon to sum up the result of this Mission, which was described by Lord Derby as having been such an undoubted benefit to the Khedive, he should say, shortly that the Mission was a fiasco, the Report was waste paper, that we had done no good to the Khedive, no credit to ourselves, and certainly had not improved our relations with the Government of Egypt.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

said, the last words of the right hon. Gentleman rather reminded him of an expression in Shakespeare, "I knew I should have your good word." Indeed, the Government had never expected anything else when the subject came to be discussed, than that the right hon. Gentleman would not spare them any comments which he thought would be disagreeable. But when the right hon. Gentleman described the Mission of his (the Chancellor of the Exchequer's) right hon. Friend the Member for Shoreham as a total fiasco, and the Report as being so much waste paper, it was to be regretted that his Colleague the right hon. Member for the City (Mr. Goschen) was not sitting beside him, because he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) would have liked to have asked that right hon. Gentleman whether he considered the Mission such an entire fiasco as the right hon. Member for Chester would have them believe, or the Report to be simply waste paper as he gave them to understand? Whatever else might be said with respect to the Mission, he was inclined to think that the Report which his right hon. Friend had laid before the country and the world, and which had been subjected to such severe and minute criticism by, it might be, interested persons, and persons who had all kinds of information, had stood a very severe test, and one point was clear—which was that his right hon. Friend had obtained a large amount of valuable information, and had put it together in a form which rendered it a valuable authority, and in all the schemes which were afloat it had been taken as the basis of information on which great reliance might be placed. He really felt that it was necessary to make these observations in answer to the remarks of the right hon. Gentleman; but, of course, the criticisms which he had made were perfectly legitimate criticisms, and the questions were questions which it was fair that they should be called upon to answer. He was afraid that it would be inconvenient at that time, when it was to a certain extent after the interest in the matter had subsided, and that it also would be unfair of him to detain the House by going at very great length into the minute particulars which he might enter into, and he would therefore endeavour in what he had to say to confine his observations to following as far as he could the line which had been taken up by the right hon. Gentleman, and explain the points which he had thought it necessary to call the attention of the House to. The right hon. Gentleman said that that business had been marked by a series of blunders, and that they had on many points been at cross purposes with the Government of the Khedive. Now, in the first place, with re- gard to the origin of the Mission, the right hon. Gentleman said that the origin of the Mission was, that the Khedive had applied to them for a gentleman or gentlemen, possibly to assist in the management of his finances, and that what he required was one or two clerks of business-like habits and experience in business matters; and that instead of that, they sent him a Gentleman of high rank, one of their own Colleagues, with instructions that he was to assist the Khedive in various ways, which, after all, he never did assist him in. But let them bear in mind the history of that Mission. It was perfectly true that the application was made by the Khedive in the first instance for two gentlemen who were to go out and assist him in his financial department. But when the application came the course taken was this—the Foreign Office receiving it communicated with the Treasury, and the Treasury took time to consider the matter, for they felt some little hesitation and some difficulty as to the class of persons to be sent, as to the precise amount of responsibility the Government would assume in recommending one person more than another; and they also felt there might be some difficulty as to the instructions and stipulations which they might have to give to those persons when they were to enter the service of the Khedive. The Government were considering those points when an interlude occurred which very much altered the position and increased the importance of what they were about to do. That interlude was the purchase of the Suez Canal shares. The Mission of his right hon. Friend was in many respects distinct from the question of the purchase of the Suez Canal shares, and the right hon. Gentleman had treated it apart from that question. He would try to follow the right hon. Gentleman's example as much as possible, but he was not able entirely to separate the two matters, because they were in their origin closely connected, and, in point of fact, the reasons which led the Government to take the one step had considerable relations to the reasons which induced them to take the other. It was said by some that in the purchase of those shares Her Majesty's Government intended to make a great commercial speculation, by others that they aimed at great political objects, by others that they were coming forward to assist the Khedive, and various other explanations had been given as to the grounds of the purchase which had been made. But the action taken by the Government was not upon any of those grounds. Of course, in taking a step of that sort many considerations entered into the mind of the Government, and into some of those considerations it was not necessary that he should then enter. But this was one very leading consideration. The Suez Canal was important to us, and not to us only, but to Europe at large, especially as the highway to the East. It was also valuable property, capable of being converted into money in the hands of the Khedive, and Her Majesty's Government were aware that the Khedive was in a position in which it was necessary for him to raise money. Her Majesty's Government, therefore, were anxious lest he should make use of the valuable property which he held in the Canal in order to get money in some way that might be prejudicial to the interests of this country. They felt that it would be of great importance to this country and to European interests that by one and the same action a considerable command of the Canal should be obtained by England, so that there might be no fear of its falling into the hands of others who might make use of it inconveniently to England, and to Europe generally, and by the same transaction they would improve the position of the Khedive, and enable him to meet pressing difficulties, by advancing money on those shares. Well, upon these considerations the Canal shares were purchased, and then they had again to take up the question which was still before them as to what they were going to do with respect to giving the Khedive assistance in the way of officers to advise him in the financial question. That was not originated by the Canal shares, but had assumed a greater importance in consequence of that transaction; and various considerations necessarily imported themselves into the question. They had to consider what was likely to be the effect of that purchase, and what use the Khedive would make of the £4,000,000. One of their objects in giving the money was to get him out of his financial difficulties; therefore, they were anxious that he should be well advised as to the mode in which he should apply that money, so that it might not be thrown into the sea or spent in useless works. They were anxious again to ascertain for themselves whether there were any reasons why they should take further securities than they had done with regard to their position in connection with the Suez Canal—what would be the measures most desirable to be taken—whether it was desirable to have separate arrangements as to the constitution of the Company, which to a certain extent was under the Khedive's patronage. On these grounds they thought the best course would be to send out a Gentleman of such position, experience, and weight, that he would be able both to give advice to His Highness and obtain for them valuable and useful information. They thought that by associating Mr. Cave and Colonel Stokes they should best obtain the ends they had in view. They believed they were thus doing a good service to Egypt and likely to put matters on a proper footing between Egypt and themselves. But they did not lose sight of the original ground on which they were proceeding. The original ground was the request of the Khedive that they should send out a gentleman or gentlemen who might assist him in his financial department. [Mr. Lowe: Might assist his Ministers.] That was a very refined distinction, he thought; but, at all events, they were asked, as, he had said, to send out a gentleman or gentlemen to assist—he would not say whom—but in the financial administration of Egypt. They bore in mind that the Mission of Mr. Cave had for its preliminary object, as regarded the relations between England and the Khedive, to ascertain what sort of person should be sent, what position he would occupy; and the result was that Mr. Cave did give them such information that they selected Mr. Rivers Wilson to go, as the gentleman the Khedive had asked for. He, therefore, said there was no cross purpose in the matter; the gentleman sent did fulfil the Mission the Khedive had requested them to undertake—to send out a gentleman competent to render him the assistance required. He might appeal to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of London (Mr. Lowe) himself whether in making that selection they had not made a good one, or whether they could have made a better? But, said the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Chester, while all this was going on, Mr. Cave was preparing his Report. He sent it home, and a question then arose whether that Report was to be published, or whether it should be considered confidential? He gave that as an instance of cross purposes on the part of the Government. Well, he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) was not at the moment prepared to go through every one of the Questions put in the House—every one of the communications made at one or another time on that subject, but he would wish to point out to the House that when they were continually being asked a Question here and a Question there, and when they were expected to give an answer at the moment, it was very difficult not to give an answer which might seem in a certain way contradictory or inconsistent with another answer given at another time, because the circumstances of the case might vary from time to time, and they could not be fully aware how much of the information at the time was subsequent to the Report. He certainly was not aware, at first, how far it might be fit to publish the Report, for it was not even written in February when he gave the first reply to a Question on thesubject—at all events, it was not communicated to the Government, although he was privately made aware of what its general character would be, yet he was unaware how far it would have to be considered confidential. When it was sent to them they were aware that the information was obtained from the Khedive, but not under the seal of confidence, and the question was, whether they could publish it without his permission. At the same time, they considered, as the information was not of a character that could be considered confidential, the Khedive should have no objection to its being printed. They communicated with him on the subject, Mr. Cave having authorized them to say that nothing in the Report had been communicated to him under the seal of confidence. Then came the question whether they should publish it or not. At that moment the position of Egyptian finance was somewhat critical. There were hopes that an arrangement would be made which might be deranged by the publication of his right hon. Friend's Report, unless, indeed, they were prepared to come forward and assist the Khedive. Therefore, it was said there was inconsistency again between what his right hon. Friend at the head of the Government had said as to the unsettled state of Egyptian finance being the reason for not publishing the Report, and the explanation which the Khedive himself afterwards gave. But the Khedive was naturally anxious to get assistance from Her Majesty's Government of a practical kind—he was anxious for a Commissioner, who might carry with him authority, to be nominated by the British Government. He might not have rightly understood the difficulties, but he believed that by urging upon them the nomination of a Commissioner, and by objecting to the publication of the Report, he might put a pressure upon them to induce them to comply with his wishes. They were not able to comply, and the result was that the Report had to be withheld, simply because the Khedive objected. They were obliged to tell the truth. They withheld it not from any feeling of their own, but because the Khedive objected to its publication. If there was any confusion occasioned by the short answer his right hon. Friend the Prime Minister was obliged to give, it was, to a great extent, due to the unfortunate position in which he was placed on the occasion of being obliged to give an answer which might be abrupt and could not enter into the full circumstances of the case. He (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) explained the matter immediately afterwards—the next day he thought—and he pointed out that his right hon. Friend, in his reply, had no intention of bringing discredit upon Egyptian finance, or of implying that there was anything in the Report damaging to Egyptian credit. It was simply to the effect that arrangements were in progress; and in that sense, it was perfectly correct to speak of those arrangements as being in an unsettled state. Not being settled, they were rightly described as being in an unsettled state. There was another point which the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Dodson) touched. He took notice of an expression which occurred in a telegram from Lord Derby to Egypt. The expression used was this— Government have reason to know that proposals are under the consideration of certain English financiers, which may lead to a satisfactory settlement of the Khedive's affairs. You should urge His Highness to abstain from any hasty action, and at least to await the arrival in Egypt of Mr. Rivers Wilson. The right hon. Gentleman commented on some expressions of the Khedive, and threw on the Government the responsibility of the position. The circumstances were these—The net result of his right hon. Friend's Mission to Egypt—its primary purpose was the selection of Mr. Rivers Wilson, according to the request of the Khedive. They communicated this while his right hon. Friend was still in Egypt. The Khedive expressed satisfaction with the selection of that gentleman, and requested that Mr. Rivers Wilson might be sent out quickly; at the same time, he expected that there would no longer be any occasion for Mr. Cave to remain in Egypt—he hoped Mr. Rivers Wilson would be sent out and that Mr. Cave would return. His right hon. Friend accordingly proceeded to leave Egypt and come home; but Mr. Rivers Wilson, who was preparing to go out to Egypt, naturally put himself into communication with the Khedive's representatives here, and with Egypt by telegraph, and he was instructed by the Khedive to endeavour, before he left England, at all events before he left Europe, to make some arrangement for giving effect to what might be agreed upon as desirable. The Government, having once nominated Mr. Rivers Wilson, and being informed that the Khedive was pleased with the selection, considered themselves entirely released—dissociated from any further proceeding which Mr. Wilson might take as the Khedive's servant. That gentleman was in Paris making arrangements in the service of the Khedive. Of what those arrangements consisted the Government were not cognizant, although they had reason to believe that Mr. Wilson had hopes that they would end in a successful result. All of a sudden the Khedive thought it desirable to send to the French Government to ask for a gentleman to be sent to him for financial advice. The Government were surprised at this information, which came upon them suddenly, and they thought it possible that the Khedive might not be aware of what was going on, and might think that Mr. Wilson was not coming, and they thought it well to let him know that Mr. Wilson was on his way. Mr. Wilson had, in fact, left Paris, and was somewhere upon his journey, and they requested the Khedive not to take any steps until he saw Mr. Wilson. Having sent his right hon. Friend on a Mission to Egypt, and he having proposed a scheme, and having selected a gentleman fully competent to carry out financial arrangements, they did feel it unfortunate to hear that the Khedive had applied to France for assistance, and they feared that it was owing to some misapprehension. They, as Her Majesty's Government, had no communication with capitalists, and nothing to propose. They only wanted to know what the Khedive had to propose. That was the explanation of that point. Then the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Chester commented upon some expression used by Lord Derby in which the noble Lord spoke of the undoubted benefit which had resulted to His Highness and to Egyptian finance, and further remarked that the Egyptian Funds had fallen, and that the Khedive was reported to have said we had dug his grave. Of course, he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) could not say what expression His Highness might have used on this or that occasion. It was not unnatural that as the Khedive was pressing them to appoint a Commissioner to assist him in a scheme for the consolidation and reduction of his Debt, he should use every kind of argument to show that the position was due to them, and they should assist him out of it. Every sort of argument was natural, and for his purpose legitimate to use. As to the Egyptian Funds falling, was it an advantage to keep them up? They fell because of the light which was let in upon matters, and discovering what was not before known. What was the process going on in Egypt before the Mission of his right hon. Friend the Member for Shoreham? Egypt was subject to a large fixed Debt—a considerable Debt—not a Debt which was crushing to the resources of the country, but still a considerable Debt, and in addition Egypt was burdened with the weight of floating debt, with obligations which would shortly have to be met. It was a necessity that the Khedive should meet his obligations, and the consequence was that money had to be raised at sacrifices ruinous for the future, and a house of cards was built up in the form of a floating debt. And the state of things must have got worse; the time must have come when the floating debt must be paid, and then Egypt would be brought to a state of bankruptcy. "What was the benefit?" asked the right hon. Gentleman. Did he not think there was a benefit when the Khedive was involving himself in loans at 20, 30, and 40 per cent? Was it not desirable to bring such a state of things to a conclusion? Was it not, he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) would ask, a benefit to Egypt to stop such a state things? He would ask the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of London whether there would be any advantage in going on with a fool's paradise, supposing all things pleasant, till the crash came—all the heavier for being thus deferred? It was, he thought, the truest friendship and the wisest policy to bring the light to bear upon the course being pursued, and, as far as possible, to mark the path of safety. Egypt, he further thought, had claims upon them. They had instructed her in that pleasant vice of borrowing. Western Europe had done a great deal to encourage that which had undoubtedly been to Egypt the source of considerable confusion. Was it not their duty to take steps to point out to those going a pleasant, though dangerous, road where that danger was? What was the benefit to the Khedive? Why, was it not a benefit to put a stop to a system of so much danger—a danger which would lead, perhaps, to foreign intervention or Heaven knows what, if the evil were not stopped? The right hon. Gentleman had questioned whether the scheme propounded in the Report was workable or not. Well, although capitalists were not at once found to take up the proposal, it was one, at all events, which was not manifestly unworkable, and it did not require the raising of a large loan of £70,000,000 or £75,000,000. The scheme had many advantages, and might have been adopted had the Khedive issued a decree such as he had since had recourse to. But upon that point he did not think it necessary to enter. The scheme had been presented to the world, and it was one on which the Khedive was able to form his own judgment. The right hon. Gentleman had also spoken of a narrow escape from serious responsibilities. He (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) could not help thinking a great deal too much was made of that. The Government had agreed to nominate a gentleman as Commissioner for certain purposes, and what, after all, were the purposes the Khedive had in view? Not only did his right hon. Friend the Member for Shoreham obtain a large amount of information, but he pointed out the way in which it was desirable to administer the finances. And what were the responsibilities? If a gentleman was required to receive the revenues on one hand, and apply them to the relief of the Debt on the other hand, they would have been exempt from all responsibility. The gentleman would be in the service of the Khedive, and their responsibility would only go so far as they recommended him as a capable and honest man, and that responsibility, he thought, it was not worth while to discuss. It was not the first time that gentlemen had been requested from this country for matters of the kind. There was, for instance, the case of Tunis. Well, he did not know that that was a case in point, but such cases had occurred, and there was nothing in the nature of the thing unreasonable or compromising to this country. Having given that brief outline of the history of his right hon. Friend's Mission, and having, he thought, touched upon those points the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Chester referred to, he felt it would at that time be unreasonable to trespass further upon the House, and should any further questions arise in regard to the subject, he should have an opportunity of meeting them in Committee.

Mr. LOWE

Sir, we have commenced the Session with discussions on this subject, and it seems that we are about to end it with them. I hope, therefore, I may be excused if I take a leaf out of the book of successful dramatists, and, as I think not inaptly, term the drama which the right hon. Gentleman has gone over "the decline and fall of Egyptian credit," and I should be inclined to divide its parts into four acts, or tableaux. The first of those acts may, I think, be named "intrusion;" the second, "inquisition;" the third, "suppression;" and the fourth and last, "repudiation;" and though I cannot expect the right hon. Gentleman opposite to see at once the force of that nomenclature, I hope it will be made apparent in the course of my remarks. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer has just told us that the Khedive applied for a person or persons—he did not seem to know which—to assist him in the re-organization of his finances. Now, a great deal depends on what the Khedive really did apply for, and we find from the Papers that Nubar Pasha, addressing General Stanton, asked for two persons who might be placed in the Finance Department of Egypt, under the orders of the Minister of Finance, in the two divisions of that Department, one of which has the direction of the receipts and the other the direction of expenditure. It is as plain as words can make it that what the Khedive asked for was not anybody to advise or anybody to re-organize his finances. He did not ask for anybody of high trust or confidence, but simply for two persons, one of whom, as he says with some simplicity, should know something of political economy, to work under the Finance Minister, and they were to be persons who had a good financial education in England. That was the whole demand out of which these transactions have sprung, and nothing is more remarkable than the way in which this has all arisen through a small and insignificant request for two skilful clerks. The Chancellor of the Exchequer says—"We could not tell at all how to deal with such a question. It puzzled the whole wisdom of the Treasury. What sort of clerks did they want? What were the duties they were to perform? What would have been their status under the Khedive? All these things were so difficult that we could not undertake to deal with them." The consequence was, that the request has never been complied with to this day, and the two clerks asked for have never been sent; but the Treasury and Foreign Secretary laid down this extraordinary doctrine—that in order to find out what sort of men these two clerks were to be, and what were to be their salaries and their position with the Khedive, it was necessary to send out an envoy, as they call him, to make inquiries into the subject, so that when he had thoroughly ransacked the finances of Egypt from one end to the other he might come home and report to the Government exactly what sort of clerks should be sent out. An envoy was ac- cordingly sent out in the person of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Shoreham, and no doubt a better person could not have been selected for the job if we only knew what the job was. He was provided with every possible adjunct to swell his natural dignity to the proper proportions in the eyes of the Khedive. All this I do not deny, but what I say is that this thing was done without its ever being asked for by the Khedive, and without his ever expressing the slightest wish that anything of the sort should be done. It was the misfortune of the Khedive to ask for these two poor clerks, and upon that we forced upon him this envoy without his having an opportunity of saying whether he would like to see the envoy or not. This forms the first act of the drama, which I venture to call by the name of "intrusion." There is not the least ground for saying that the Khedive asked for such a thing at all, or that he wished to have an envoy in the land of Egypt to take stock of his affairs. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, feeling that that part of the case is rather weak, went into a digression, into which I do not mean to follow him, in regard to what happened in the purchase of the Suez Canal shares; and what he seemed to say—though I doubt whether he will admit my construction of his words—is that we bought these shares for £4,000,000, on the personal security of the Khedive, to pay a certain amount of interest, and having entered upon the transaction and thus bound ourselves we thought it was right to send out some one to see what was our chance of being paid. The Chancellor of the Exchequer seems to see no other reason for the Mission except that we had spent a very large sum of money on which we got a very doubtful security indeed, and when we found ourselves bound we thought it necessary to send out to see whether we should ever get our money back again. I believe, with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that the purchase of these Suez Canal shares had a great deal to do with the sending out of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Shoreham, but in a different way. Unfortunately, as I think, for the Khedive, these affairs happened to come at a peculiar moment. The letters dealing with this subject are dated the 26th November last, and on the 27th November the world was delighted and electrified by the information of the splendid property we had acquired in these canal shares. All right-minded people were in raptures at the prospect before them. It was believed that we were about to take possession of Egypt. Everybody was enchanted with the whole thing, and the Prime Minister and everybody else were in the height of human glory. It is not the time now to inquire whether that position has been maintained, but every pretext, and no pretext at all, was greedily laid hold of to increase the belief of the public that we had at last got a high-minded policy in connection with affairs in the East, and that we were going to take a more prominent part than we had done for years in the affairs of Europe. I trace much more to that feeling, than to any desire to find out how much salary two clerks were to have, the fact that this splendid Mission was sent out. This concludes the first tableaux of "intrusion." The next is "inquisition." The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Shoreham was sent out to inquire, without leave asked or given, into the Khedive's finances, and he did his duty, as he would be sure to do it, most fairly, assiduously, and honourably. He has collected together a great mass of information; but it appears to me to be one of the most remarkable things in this history that such a Mission for such a purpose should have been forced and foisted upon an independent country that never asked for it, and that it should have been maintained at the Khedive's expense, and at a very large expense indeed. I cannot help thinking that it would have been more proper, and more worthy of this country, if the Mission had not been maintained at the Khedive's expense, and I should like to hear something more upon this subject. It was bad enough to go without leave to examine into the state of Egyptian finances and to publish them to the whole world, without quartering ourselves on the Khedive; but, of course, all this rests upon the assumption that we did send out the right hon. Gentleman and his suite to be supported by the Khedive, and not at the expense of the British Government. Information was collected, and this forms my second tableaux of "inquisition." We sent out persons with no right whatever to inquire, but the Khedive being in difficulties and almost at his wit's end, he was glad no doubt to do almost anything in the hope of getting some assistance of some kind or another. The House will observe that the words used in sending out the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Shoreham on his Mission was that he was to inquire what assistance we were to give the Khedive, though the words are somewhat ambiguous. The two clerks grew somehow or other till they seemed to involve the question—at least in the minds of the people of England, though I do not know how far they involved it in the minds of the Government—whether we were not to give some very great pecuniary assistance of some kind beyond the £4,000,000 which we were to pay for the Canal Shares. That was the question which had to be solved by the inquisition. I now close the second tableaux—that of the "inquisition"—and come to the third, which I venture to call "suppression." The Report was finished, and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Shoreham returned to England. Then the Prime Minister was asked whether he would produce the right hon. Gentleman's Report, and he said in substance, though I cannot give his exact words, that the Khedive was unwilling that it should be published, and therefore he could not allow it. When we look into the Papers we find that that, of course unintentionally, is not a fair representation of the views of the Khedive. The day before he made that statement he received a telegram stating that His Highness strongly objected to the publication of the Report at present, and information which had been given to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Shoreham was confidential, and intended solely for the information of Her Majesty's Government, and the Khedive went on to say in that telegram that, if the publication was not preceded by an arrangement with English financiers or by the nomination of an English Commissioner, any discussion of Egyptian finance must be prejudicial to his interests, and would prevent a solution of his difficulties; but he added that he would not object to the publication of the Report at the conclusion of such an arrangement as he had mentioned or after the nomination of a Commissioner. He trusted, finally, that Her Majesty's Government would not place him in the false position which would ensue from the premature publication of the right hon. Gentleman's Report. The fact was, that the Khedive objected to the publication of the Report till he knew the mind of Her Majesty's Government with regard to Egypt and what they were prepared to do for him. It was most unfortunate that the Prime Minister in making his statement should have told us in substance that the Khedive objected to the publication of the Report—

MR. DISRAELI

In the unsatisfactory state of affairs I read the telegram to the House, and it was in the language of the Khedive himself.

Mr. LOWE

I think not. I have read the telegram of the Khedive, and I will read the words of the right hon. Gentleman.

MR. DISRAELI

The right hon. Gentleman is correct.

MR. LOWE

The right hon. Gentleman said in substance that the Khedive objected to the publication, and the effect had been that the finances of Egypt from that moment had never recovered the blow. It gave a mortal wound, from which they have never rallied since. I do not make any charge against the right hon. Gentleman in the matter, except that he only confined himself to the Khedive's refusal to allow the publication, without stating the concomitant part of the subject, which showed that the Khedive considered that Her Majesty's Government were about to give him some assistance in some shape or other. I make no charge against anybody, but the effect of the unfortunate suppression of those words has been absolutely destructive to the finances of Egypt, which never rallied from the blow from that time to this. This concludes the third act of the drama, and then there is a little interlude, which I should like to mention. It has been said that the Khedive asked for Mr. Rivers Wilson or some one else to be sent out, but I cannot find anything in the Papers to show that he made any request of the kind. I remember that the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer told us in this House that the Government had declined to send out Mr. Rivers Wilson to advise the Khedive, or something of that kind; but I never heard a word, and I see nothing in the Papers to show, that the Khedive had ever asked for Mr. Wilson to be sent out. As to supposing for a moment that any person in the position of Mr. Wilson, and going out in the manner in which he was sent, would be sent out to fulfil the wish of the Khedive for two clerks to assist in the Finance Department, that is simply ridiculous. It is not likely that a gentleman holding the office he held would be sent out to act in a small Department under the Egyptian Minister. That also, as I understood it, is another intrusion on the part of the Government, but not equally blameable, because they did not send out Mr. Wilson as an inquisitor to get information, which might be used greatly to the injury of the Government of Egypt, but, as I understand the matter, it was a very considerable liberty to send him out, unless they had made up their minds to some definite policy. What was the result? Mr. Wilson was sent out, and a little while afterwards telegrams were sent to him telling him in the most peremptory manner to return, as he would be doing nothing but mischief by staying longer, and that therefore the best thing he could do was to come back as soon as possible, and that he did. That is the history of the transactions with Egypt, but then comes the tragical part of the drama. Lord Derby, in a very remarkable passage, finds himself under the necessity of disentangling himself and the Government from all these complicated transactions which have been attended by so small a result; and he declares in one of his despatches that at this juncture the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Shoreham arrived at Cairo, and that the information given to him by the Government of Egypt led him to believe that, great as they were, the difficulties in the case were not insurmountable, and that the Khedive would be able to maintain his Government, and to discharge his obligations within a reasonable time and on reasonable terms, without the imposition of fresh burdens upon his subjects. That opinion, coming from the right hon. Gentleman, was entitled to every respect, but I may mark two things. There was some error in the way in which the revenue was estimated on account of the Moukabala diminishing rather faster than he thought it did, and also there will be a considerable difference in the expenditure for which he is not responsible, because he could only act upon the information which was given to him; and though I do not doubt that he took every trouble to get the matter correctly, still his information must partake of the weakness of the source from which he got it. The result of the matter was that whereas he estimated the debt of the Khedive at £77,500,000, the amount is brought out to £91,000,000. Then Lord Derby goes on to say that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Shoreham accordingly prepared a scheme which was so framed as to satisfy these important conditions without interfering with the independent action of the Khedive within his own dominions, and that though no doubt it involved to a certain extent an arrangement with creditors, such as England would always be an unwilling party to, it did provide ultimately for the payment of the Debt, and thus the Mission of the right hon. Member for Shoreham had been an undoubted benefit to His Highness. The House will observe that Lord Derby says the Mission had been of undoubted benefit, not to Egypt, but to the Khedive. Now, this arrangement had one misfortune—it would not work. We remember Moore's imaginary criticism of a friend's novel— Clever work, Sir!—would got up exceedingly well— The only fault is—that it never would sell! And though statesmen may glory in being unbought, In an author, we think, Sir, that's rather a fault. This admirable scheme would not work for good and sufficient reasons. It was a scheme by which a large quantity of stocks were to be made into a single consolidated stock, and that could well be done in one of two ways, either by the consent of every single bondholder, or by purchasing the interest of those who would not agree. Both these courses were, however, impossible, and the scheme accordingly failed. Lord Derby gives us as reason why the Mission has been of great benefit to the Khedive, that the right hon. Gentleman devised a scheme which would not work. But the Chancellor of the Exchequer spoke differently of it. He did not look at it in the same light as Lord Derby. He did not see how a scheme which, however innocent and well meant, turned out to be utterly abortive, could be of great benefit to the Khedive. "In the first place," he says, "we did not send out the right hon. Gentleman to benefit Egypt, but at the request of the Khedive, to assist him with his finances." That is the way in which he puts it, and that is the only way of course to justify it. If it had not been done for that reason it would have been a simple outrage. But he said it would benefit Egypt. Well, how did it benefit Egypt? Why, the Mission and the answer of the Prime Minister together produced such a state of Egyptian finance that the Khedive found himself perfectly unable to get on with the system of financing which he had adopted; and I dare say it is a good thing when people become insolvent that their affairs should be brought to an end. Therefore, it may have been a benefit to Egypt just as it may have been a benefit to England for a man to go through the Bankruptcy Court when he cannot pay any longer. What I say is that the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer has substituted the word "Egypt" for "His Highness," which is the phrase in the despatch; secondly, I say that it was not for this that the right hon. Gentleman was sent out; and, thirdly, I say that in no one way has it benefited Egypt except in this, that it has forced upon the Khedive a declaration of insolvency and repudiation, and enforced suspension of payments, and all those plans for reduction of interest and unification of stock. These are not transactions such as take place between individuals; they are all high-handed acts of power by a debtor who cannot pay, and who chooses to select the terms as to what he will pay, whom he will pay, and how he will pay; not because such a course is right or proper, but because his creditors have no remedy against him. If the right hon. Gentleman will take the credit of this, I should be very sorry that the country should share it with him; for, though it may be the best thing for the Khedive of Egypt, I quite agree with Lord Derby that England does not look with much favour on these enforced settlements, and therefore I call this the closing act of the tragedy "repudiation;" first of all, because Lord Derby repudiates any intention to help the Khedive after all the hopes held out to him by the manner in which the Mission was announced to this House; and, secondly, because the result of the Report of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Shoreham was to hasten the repudiation which has taken place in Egypt. That is the whole nature of this transaction. First, you take the most marvellous pretext in the world, and avail yourselves of it, to force on a friendly nation an inquisition which nobody called for and did not desire; secondly, you held that inquisition; thirdly, you continue to persistently withhold the Report of that inquisition, and then to publish it, first casting a slur upon it by not giving reasons for not publishing it; and, fourthly, by this course you strike a fatal blow at the finances of Egypt, which ends in an act of repudiation on the part of the Government, and then you take credit to yourselves for producing that result. That is a plain statement of the case, and I commend it to the consideration of the right hon. Gentleman and the House.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLEF

said, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Chester (Mr. Dodson) had described the Mission of his right hon. Friend the Member for Shoreham (Mr. Cave) as being a fiasco, but he (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) considered the present debate the most complete fiasco of the Session. The right hon. Gentleman who had just sat down (Mr. Lowe) had endeavoured to treat the subject with dramatic propriety, and had divided it into four acts—intrusion, inquisition, suppression, and repudiation. As connected with the first of those acts, as regarded the appointment of the two clerks, the Khedive had asked for them on October 24, when there was no idea of the purchase of the shares in the Suez Canal. He considered that act as most important in. the interest of Egypt and of England. It was a great political act, and was especially important as ensuring the way to our Indian possessions. The right hon. Gentleman said that the British Government had intruded Mr. Cave upon the Khedive; but the fact was that on November 29, two days after the purchase of the shares, Lord Derby telegraphed to General Stanton that the Government proposed that Mr. Cave should go on a special Mission to Egypt, to advise on financial matters. General Stanton telegraphed back to say that he had given the information to the Khedive, and that His Highness appeared grati- fied and thankful at the announcement. Was that intrusion? Then as to inquisition, His Highness the Viceroy had undertaken to give every information to his right hon. Friend the Member for Shoreham. The object was to obtain such information as might be important both to Egypt and to England. It was not likely that two clerks would be entrusted with such a Mission, but these gentlemen went as subaltern officers. It was true that these shares were bought in a hurry, but the boldness of the act was justified considering the state of Turkey, and it was our duty to seek to prevent Egyptian finance from falling into the state of decay in which finance at Constantinople was involved. As to the charge of suppression, what was the fatal blow to the finance of Egypt of which they had been told? The Report was supposed to contain the truth with reference to Egypt, and because it was not satisfactory, Egyptian finance had not recovered its depression. He believed it had done a great deal of good. It had reduced the finances of that country to its proper level, and investors ought not to be blamed for acts which every honest man should defend. Whatever harm was done by the telegram of the Government which spoke of financial proposals, was undone by subsequent explanations when Mr. Wilson and the French Commissioners were at Cairo. The Mission of Mr. Cave had been of great advantage to the Khedive, because it had, as he said, reduced Egyptian finance to its proper level, and had shown the people of France to whom they could lend and to what extent, and when the Report was published it produced that effect. The right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Lowe) had sought to make a distinction between the Khedive and Egypt, but if the Mission had been beneficial to Egypt it must have been so also to the Khedive. What did the right hon. Gentleman mean by saying that this measure had forced on bankruptcy? How could bankruptcy have been prevented if it was so likely to take place? His right hon. Friend the Member for Shoreham (Mr. Cave) was not going to take out money. Bankruptcy arose from the absence of assets and resources, and on its being found that the assets would not meet the liabilities, and if his right hon. Friend had not gone out the state of things would have been much worse. With respect to Mr. Wilson's recall, the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Lowe) said it was peremptory, but it was not so, for it was entirely at Mr. Wilson's own suggestion. He telegraphed to the Chancellor of the Exchequer to say that he could not approve the scheme in consequence of the heavy burden upon the taxpayers; and after that it was, of course, impossible that he could be allowed to remain to carry on negotiations in a policy which he did not approve. He (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) conceived that the Government had done its duty. They had shown that England was determined to maintain her position in the Mediterranean, to keep open the thoroughfare to India, and that she was desirous to enable the Khedive to administer the affairs of a country in which he held so great an interest. With regard to another matter referred to by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of London, it was a condition made by the Viceroy that Mr. Cave should be entertained by him, for it was at that moment more than ever necessary that he should not depart from those rules of Eastern hospitality which had always been observed by the Rulers of Egypt.

SIR GEORGE ELLIOT

said, that he very seldom trespassed upon the time of the House; and he would not have done so on that occasion if he had not taken such an active part in the subject under discussion. He had had a long acquaintance with Egyptian matters, and had resided in the country for some time; and he therefore thought that he could speak with some authority on the matter. In listening to the debate he could endorse what had been said by the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer that the purchase of the Suez Canal shares was a most proper measure as regarded the interests of this country, and that it had, in a manner, led up to the appointment of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Shoreham (Mr. Cave) to go on the Mission which he had so ably conducted. Previously there had been an inquiry for some clerical assistance; but when the larger business of the Canal shares had been completed, and the interests of England became more identified with Egypt, there was a greater necessity shown for the inquiry which followed. He could speak of his own knowledge that it was not the desire or at all the feeling of the Khedive to have mere clerks sent to him to look into his accounts. His Highness believed that Mr. Cave would report upon the affairs of Egypt, and the Khedive believed that the finances were sound and good at that time. The Khedive was not aware of the defective administration of his affairs, and His Highness had expressed to him (Sir George Elliot) over and over again his willingness to accord to any well-organized system for the administration of the affairs of Egypt his most cordial co-operation. With the permission of the House he would read a note which he himself had addressed to the Khedive. It was as follows:— Two years ago His Excellency the Minister of Finance submitted to me, through Mr. Laing, then of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, a general statement of the Egyptian finance, and asked my opinion as to the best course to be taken for getting rid of the high interest then paid upon temporary loans, and the further accumulation of Debt. Since that time the subject has occupied much of my attention. On my arrival in Egypt in December last a suggestion was made to me by His Excellency the Minister of Finance as to the procuring of a loan of £2,000,000 on the security of the harbour revenues. I presumed on that occasion to express my conviction that any partial and temporary mode of dealing with the financial difficulties of the Government would be only to prolong a system which had already involved the country in general pecuniary embarrassments, and that some more comprehensive and effectual means should be adopted for re-adjusting the finances and restoring the credit of the Government. He might say that the Report which he had published on Egyptian finance was prepared long before any Report was made by Mr. Cave; in fact, it was more than two years since he was invited by His Highness to look carefully into the financial condition of Egypt, and that occupied a considerable time. During his recent visit there he had his official accountants, Deloitte, Dever, Griffiths, and Co., and Ali Hassan, who was educated at King's College 25 years ago, and a most efficient and competent person, to assist in understanding the books and accounts;and after fully going into those matters it was remarkable that, although his inquiry had been commenced more than two years previously and was carried on entirely by independent means—not at the expense of either the English Government or of the Egyptian Government, but at his own cost—the statement of the general Debt of Egypt so nearly agreed with that of the right hon. Member for Shoreham. Indeed, there was not more than £1,000,000 difference between the two estimates. He thought that answered in a great measure the question that had been put—"What was the foundation of the correctness of the statements contained in Mr. Cave's Report?" For himself, he believed they were practically correct, and his opinion was that it would be well if such a change could be made as to the revenues that the Khedive should have his subsidy or civil list. As to the question whether the Mission of Mr. Cave had been of use or not, he believed that although attended with temporary inconvenience and hardship, because it had in a degree as it were precipitated the result, yet it had done good inasmuch as it had revealed plainly and clearly the condition of the finances of Egypt. It had, perhaps, as he said, brought about a crisis earlier than it would have come; but the disaster resulting from it must be proportionately diminished because of the system of raising money to provide for the floating debt, which was constantly becoming due—almost every week, being raised at 20 and 25 per cent—was continued. It was not necessary to point out what must have been the inevitable consequence of such a process. The inquiry had revealed the actual state of Egypt, which was not a forlorn one. It was sound so far as the income was calculated to deal with a fair payment of the Debts which were due from it. What he meant by that was giving fair and proper security, but with a reduced rate of interest, such as he proposed in his own scheme. By following out the scheme which he proposed to the Khedive, he had no doubt whatever that Egypt was equal to discharge all the interest for the sinking fund, which would relieve the Debt in 65 years, and there would be a margin sufficient for all the necessary requirements of the proper administration of the country. Having said so much, he returned to the most important part of the subject, which was this—That, in his opinion, it would be for the interest of Egypt, of the bondholders, and of England also, if the Government would give their moral countenance to Egypt. With an abundance of means, or, at any rate, with sufficient means, to do all that he had said, it would not avail unless there was proper administration; that was to say, due economy in the discharge of the several duties of the State, proper functionaries appointed, and a responsibility attached to the discharge of such duties, that the persons acting in such a position might feel assured that, if they did their duty, they would not undergo any kind of menace or chance of being discharged from their employment. He had a thorough conviction that Egypt was sound in itself. Egypt had ample resources, which had increased and developed in the most extraordinary way, and had every appearance of doing so in future. He believed that before that day twelvemonth the facts which had been stated would be more thoroughly verified, and the country would be in a much better condition, both commercially and in every other respect in higher repute than it was at the present moment.

MR. DODSON

begged to offer an apology to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Shoreham (Mr. Stephen Cave) for having called his Report waste paper. When he said that the Report which had been made was only waste paper he referred to its scheme, which had proved unworkable.

MR. STEPHEN CAVE

said, he had no doubt the right hon. Gentleman used the words only in that sense, and was satisfied that nothing offensive to himself was meant.