RESOLUTION. (Hansard, 25 February 1870)

§ MR. FAWCETT

, in rising to move a Resolution in favour of applying the principle of open competition to the Civil and Diplomatic Services, said, that the success of the principle which had been adopted of open competition in the East India Civil Service was a conclusive argument in favour of his Motion. If it were necessary a host of quotations might be adduced to prove, beyond doubt or cavil, that since the system of open competition had been established for India the general average efficiency of the Indian Civil Service had been raised. It might be said that if this system were adopted for the Diplomatic and Civil Service at home too great a number of young men would be attracted to it; but why in such a matter could not men be trusted to look after their own interests? The experience of the system in connection with the Indian Civil Service was against any such view. At the Universities it was not men who took the highest degrees who competed for these appointments, but the best men of the second class. Men of the highest class looked for Fellowships. It was also said that the Indian Civil Service was different from the Civil Service at home, where a part of the work was merely mechanical and might be equally well done by copying clerks. This argument, however, merely pointed to a glaring defect in the organization of the Government offices, which was admitted last Session from the Treasury Benches. It was then said that the work should be so arranged that 808 what was merely mechanical should be separated from that which required ability and intellect of a higher order. It might also be objected that his Motion only asserted a principle, and did not enter into details. Short as had been his experience in that House, however, it had shown him that it would be extremely unwise for a private Member to sketch out a scheme of administrative reform. All he had to do was to lay down the principle and let the House affirm it, and then leave it for the Government to carry it out. The work that required intellect and mental culture ought to be well remunerated, and then the best men would be attracted to it. The humbler situations might then serve as rewards and prizes for boys of the class who succeeded in the University local examinations, or even for boys who had used to the utmost the advantages offered to them in the national schools. One of the evils of the present system was that it got rid of the personal responsibility of the Minister. If under the old system a Minister made a flagrantly bad appointment, hon. Members could come down to that House and blame the Minister. Now, however, when a bad appointment was made, the Minister could turn round and say—"See what the system of competition has brought us to!" He knew it was said that a test examination was a sufficient security against an incompetent person being admitted to compete, but they had the authority of the Chancellor of the Exchequer for saying that a test examination had a constant tendency to degrade itself, whereas the examination in a system of open competition had a tendency to maintain itself by a purely natural process. The present system was based on political patronage, and it was peculiarly the duty of those who wished to maintain the independence of the House to restrict and narrow political patronage within the smallest possible limits. How did the present system work? A Member received a letter from an influential constituent asking him to apply to the Patronage Secretary for an appointment for a son, or a nephew, or a cousin. In such a case he had two alternatives. On the one hand, he might ask for the appointment for a person of whose qualifications he knew absolutely nothing, or, on the other hand, he might offend a constituent whose support was essential to him at the next election. 809 Perhaps the Member had devoted a great amount of time and money to obtain that which was the great object of his life, and it was not wonderful if the first of these alternatives was that which he adopted. The appointment is obtained, and the Member who obtains it knows little of the qualifications of the person to whom it is given, and of course the Patronage Secretary or the Minister who gives it knows still less respecting them. But the mischief did not stop there. What was its effect upon the constituencies? The intelligence was carried down to a certain country borough that a well known electioneering politician had obtained a good appointment for his son, brother, or cousin, and what was more natural than that an artizan or small tradesman struggling with poverty should think that if Mr. A., who was very influential and very respectable, regarded it as being only fair that he should obtain an equivalent for his electioneering influence, at the next election he, who required assistance in a far greater degree, should obtain same pecuniary recognition of his vote. Thus it was that a feeling gradually spread over the constituency that an election was an occasion of which a person ought to avail himself for his own pecuniary advantage. Yet Mr. A. is a very respectable person, who moves in high society, and moralizes over the bribery that prevails in the borough; and the hon. Member who has obtained the appointment for him declares in that House, with indignant enthusiasm, that it is necessary to pass laws to repress electoral corruption. As long as this system of patronage for services rendered at elections was continued it was useless to pass laws against bribery and corruption, which, moreover, could scarcely be expected to bear the marks of earnestness and sincerity. Another objection to the system was the inequality with which it operated. During the last twenty-five years the Conservative party had only been in Office for three years, and the result was that the Government patronage had been most unequally distributed between the adherents of the two parties. Again, in some constituencies there were men who, prompted by a laudable spirit of independence, declined to ask for appointments, and therefore had no chance of participating in the Government patronage; while, in other cases, constituencies 810 were represented in that House by men who objected to pledge themselves to any party, and who, therefore, would not go to the Patronage Secretary, because they were aware that if they accepted a favour from him they should have to make an equivalent return on some subsequent occasion; and the result was that the constituencies represented by them obtained no share of the Government patronage. It was an admitted fact that the amount of Government patronage obtained by a constituency was in an inverse ratio to its consequence, its purity, and its independence. It was upon small constituencies that the Government patronage was showered with the greatest abundance, because the Patronage Secretary knew that in such places a Government appointment acted with greater effect than in large places like Liverpool or Manchester. Looking at the subject from every point of view, and remembering the events that had recently occurred, he thought that it could hardly be disputed that political patronage tended to foster political corruption and to destroy the independence of that House, and for these reasons they should endeavour, as far as possible, to put a stop to and restrict it. Hon. Members had told him that he would have been wiser had he omitted the Diplomatic Service from his Motion. He was aware that there were arguments in favour of that view; but, on the other hand, there were also reasons wiry the system of open competition should be applied to that service as well as to the Civil Service. In the Indian Civil Service it had been found that the persons selected by open competition were equally skilled to deal with matters requiring delicate handling with those who were selected by nomination. If any special qualification were required in the person of a diplomatist, such as the speaking of foreign languages, it was only fair that those who were candidates for the position should be tested as rigidly as possible, in order to ascertain whether they possessed that accomplishment. It was particularly notorious that under the present system young diplomatists, located in foreign capitals, did not speak the language of the country in which they were employed with either fluency or accuracy. There were those who thought that diplomatic ability was confined within a certain charmed family circle, and that 811 a man was born a diplomatist. But when he heard an argument of that kind the fact always forcibly recurred to his recollection that these aristocratic families, supposed to have a peculiar aptitude for diplomacy, were not always aristocratic—that they were once plebeian, that the founder of their line was himself a plebeian, and that it not unfrequently happened that the most distinguished man in such a family was one who had begun life as a plebeian, and had forced himself up into the ranks of the aristocracy. It, therefore, appeared to him that the qualities that made a diplomatist were not exclusively possessed by any one family in the country. The qualifications required for a diplomatist were intelligence and acuteness, combined with caution and that perception which enabled him to understand the feelings and opinions of others; and the best security that we could have for the possession of those qualities by those engaged in the Diplomatic Service was by giving them intellectual culture and a good mental training. When he raised this question last year he was told that his Motion was too sweeping, but he had now taken the exact words accepted by the Government last year, when they were asked to recognize the importance of dealing with the subject of national education. Of course he did not wish to force the Government to pledge themselves to deal with the question this Session; but if they gave him such a promise as they did last year with respect to education, he should be perfectly satisfied, and from that moment his connection with the question would cease. They might then hope to see the system which was based upon political patronage swept away, and one substituted for it which would be based upon the old maxim of a fair field and no favour. He begged to conclude by moving his Resolution.

MR. GLADSTONE

Sir, it is not necessary for me, for the best possible reason, to criticize minutely the terms of the Motion of my hon. Friend; but I will point out to him—and he will probably hear the announcement with satisfaction—that it will not be necessary to introduce any measure into the House for the purpose of giving effect to the principle of open competition. So far as I am aware, there is nothing in the system of open competition which will require the application of legislative authority. The subject, as the hon. Member himself very clearly perceives, does involve a great deal of important administrative detail; and I should have been very glad if it had been of such a nature that we could have had that assistance from the House which we have upon ordinary Bills introduced to become Acts of Parliament—the assistance of criticism and observation—in order to help us on in the task we have undertaken. But, in point of fact, this is entirely a question of arrangements internal to the offices, and not one which touches upon legislative duties. The administrative changes, as my hon. Friend defines them, are very considerable, although the principle upon which he proposes we should act in making them at first sight looks simple enough. The general idea which Members conceive is, that first appointments in the Civil Service are to be regulated by open competition—the correlative principle having been long ago established—namely, that promotions in the Civil Service are regulated by the Chiefs of Departments, and are understood and believed to be given—and, I am bound to say, are given—under the influence of merit and service alone. But when we pass beyond these general statements there are very important matters of detail to consider. There is that which of itself amounts to a complete reorganization of the Civil Service—the division proposed to be introduced, and which I hope will be carried out as far as possible, and made as clear as possible, between duties which are mechanical and formal, and those duties which require high mental training. That is a question which cannot be decided by rule of thumb; it cannot be disposed of by laying down a strict and absolute principle for all the Departments, but it requires of necessity a careful examination into the circumstances of each Department; and the precise point at which the line is to be 813 drawn is a matter that cannot be settled except in detail and after minute scrutiny. There are other matters to be considered in establishing the principle of open competition. For example, it will be necessary that the responsible officers of the Government should reserve in a very strict and clear manner, so as to preclude all possibility of mistake, the power of defining and determining, from time to time, what are those superior offices which are to be considered as Staff appointments, and to which persons may be introduced and appointed irrespective of any prior services they may have rendered in the Civil Departments. That is a matter of the utmost consequence, and one on which, when once open competition is established, it is necessary the clearest understanding should prevail; because those who come into the Civil Service upon the basis of open competition, determined only by merit, may be disposed to rate highly, and perhaps justly so, their own claims to the fulfilment of what they may consider a covenant with respect to prospective advancement. We must, therefore, consider carefully the terms of that covenant, so as to reserve in the hands of the Government that discretion, with respect to the higher appointments which it is absolutely necessary for the public service they should retain. Both, therefore, with respect to the limit, upwards, of those offices the first appointments to which need not be, and could not be, the subject of open competition; and, again, with respect to the limit, downwards, of all that class of offices with regard to which a test examination applies, and a rate of pay governed by what the market requires, much has to be considered. I cannot at all complain of my hon. Friend's speech, either as regards the principle he has laid down, or with respect to his remarks on political patronage, or as to the allowance of time he is disposed to give the Government for the consideration of all these matters. For my own part—and I think it is a sentiment that prevails amongst us—I do not desire to retain the present system of limited competition as the ne plus ultra of arrangements. It often occurs to my mind that we inflict possibly very considerable hardship upon many meritorious men by the cast-iron, stereotyped rule we adopt that for every office exposed for competition there shall be three candidates—that is, in order that one may succeed we insist that two 814 shall fail. If the open market and the state of supply and demand should determine with respect to the public service that the proportion of defeated candidates to successful candidates should be as great as that, there is no ground for complaint—they must take their chance; but there is a great deal of hardship in laying down, upon what must be considered to a great extent an arbitrary assumption, the rule that now applies. I cannot dismiss from my mind the idea that it must be a considerable hardship, and that the number of persons defeated is possibly greater than it would be if the market were perfectly open and free. Exactly the same would, happen if we attempted to regulate the quantity of any kind of provisions to be brought into the market. If sonic executive authority were to determine the number of live animals or the quantity of dead meat that should be brought into London, it would be the duty of those who made the regulation to take care there was an ample supply; but then it would entail great hardship on those who would be called upon to bring in more than they might ultimately find necessary. Thus the mischief would be in attempting to interfere with what ought to be left free. I confess I have a great deal of faith in freedom as applied to this matter. Though, probably, when the system of open competition is introduced there will be a rush of candidates, and it will take time before matters find their level, I believe, on the whole, that by the adjustment and adaptation between the number of offices and the persons disposed to compete for them, the system will be more satisfactorily arranged on the basis of freedom than it can be by any regulation, however well intended or judiciously chosen. I do not wish to stand on promises alone in this matter—because we have felt the obligation of the engagement we entered into last year on the Motion of my hon. Friend. I should tell my hon. Friend that we have not waited for the appearance of his Motion on the Paper to spur us on to make progress towards the fulfilment of our engagement with him. I will not say that our plan is quite complete, but communications have been held between the Treasury and the other Departments of the State; and though I cannot at the present moment undertake to state whether it would be in our power within a short time to establish in 815 every public office a system of open competition, I can venture to say, unless our present expectations are very much disappointed, it will be within a limited period in our power to announce the establishment of a system of open competition upon an extended scale, a scale quite sufficient, even if there should be exceptions, to enable the public to test its principle on a perfect scale, and determine upon the propriety of applying it to any cases that may remain with greater advantage than we may be said to possess at this moment. Without longer detaining the House, I hope I have fulfilled the engagement with which I commenced these few remarks and have fully met the terms laid down by my hon. Friend in his speech. I do not undertake to define by the number of days or weeks the completion of a positive measure. It is very probable, although it will not require and would not admit being put in the form of an Act of Parliament to advantage, that it may require when drawn up in detail to become the subject of an Order in Council to be submitted to Parliament. I think no lengthened period will elapse before it will have assumed a practical shape; and my hon. Friend, I trust, will, in the course of the present Session, have an opportunity, not of recommending, as he has done, the adoption of the principle, but of judging of the good faith and prudence and wisdom with which the Government has applied itself to the subject.