HC Deb 23 March 1868 vol 191 cc40-98

SUPPLY—considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

"That the number of Land Forces, not exceeding 138,691 Men (including 9,880, all Ranks, to be employed with the Depôts in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland of Regiments Serving in Her Majesty's Indian Possessions), be maintained for the Service of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, from the 1st day of April 1868 to the 31st day of March 1869, inclusive."

SIR JOHN PAKINGTON

said, he was sure he should not ask in vain for the kind consideration and forbearance of the Committee whilst he proceeded to fulfil the somewhat complicated duty of offering some explanation to the Committee on the subject of the Army Estimates. In the first place he wished to remove an impression, which he believed was very general both in the House and out of doors, that the cost of the army of England for the ensuing year would amount to £15,455,450. There was not a newspaper in London that had not, in the last three weeks, contained remarks upon the Army Estimates for the ensuing year, in which remarks it was assumed that the cost would amount to the sum which he had mentioned. Only a few nights ago the hon. Member for Truro (Captain Vivian) asked him a question as to bringing forward these Estimates, and said that the army expenditure would involve a sum of £15,500,000. He (Sir John Pakington) could not wonder at the extent to which this belief had been prevalent; and he attached no blame to the public Tress of London, or to any hon. Member who had been led into that belief. The amount put in the first column, showing the aggregate amount of the year's Vote, was £15,500,000; and this was quite enough to have led to the general impression. He thought that members of the Press and Members of the House could not be blamed for having abstained from plunging into somewhat complicated accounts to see whether there was any set-off to the amount so charged. Further search into the Papers before the House would, however, show that there was a deduction to be made to the extent of £1,568,000. As an illustration of the nature of these details he might mention the fact that the Capitation Grant for the forces which were supplied to India alone accounted for upwards of £850,000 of that sum. He would venture to suggest that it was hardly fair that the public should be led to suppose that the finances of this country were burdened to such a large extent, when in fact the sum should be reduced by a very large amount. The repayments into the Exchequer would reduce the charge of the army to considerably below £14,000,000. Without complaining at all of the general way in which these Estimates were prepared, he must say that he thought it a subject of regret that, in summing up the total of the first column, the £1,568,000 should not have been deducted from it. But this was not all. For many years it had been the practice, of the advisability of which he had much doubt, to include in the Army Estimates the cost of certain stores for the use of the navy, while the cost of certain transports for the army was charged in the Navy Estimates. This practice, which had been much discussed during the greater part of the present century, deprived the Admiralty of any control over the charge for the naval stores, and the Minister for War of any control over the cost of transport. His right hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (General Peel) in his Statement last year said, if he recollected right, that the balance between the cost of these transports and stores amounted to £270,000. This year the difference was less. The cost of naval stores provided for in the Army Estimates was £494,138, the cost of army transport included in the Navy Estimates £424,791, so that the difference was this year only £69,347. Still, the difference was very nearly £70,000, and that, he was bound to say, was a very large amount, and the system of which it was the result was certainly open to very serious objection. He had been struck with the anomaly, while preparing the Navy Estimates of last year, and also while preparing the Army Estimates this year. He had received a certain account of the transport of the army; but had no means of checking it and no means of controlling it. The matter had been long discussed; but it appeared to him that the better course would be to include the stores for the navy in the Navy Estimates, and the transport charges in the Army Estimates. But the Army Estimates had also to bear nearly £120,000 for the cost of the Ordnance Survey by four companies of Royal Engineers; and when; all items not properly chargeable against the army were deducted from the gross total, the result was a net demand on the country of £13,699,455, an enormous figure, but still greatly below the supposed expenditure of £15,500,000; it might be regarded as £1,750,000 less than the sum which the House and the country had supposed to be the real cost of the army. Still, the expenditure was certainly enormous, and imposed upon those who were responsible for the administration of the army a necessity of conducting it with the utmost possible economy, consistent with an efficient service. He hoped, before concluding, to convince the House that it had been his sincere desire to reduce the expenditure of the army within the narrowest limits. Whether the re-payments to which he had alluded were deducted or not, the Estimates for the current year were not very much larger than those of last year. They exceeded the Estimates of last year in gross by £203,200. That he accounted for by the increase of the Capitation Grant to the Volunteer force, the increase in the number of the Militia, and the increase in the Survey Department. The cost of Survey for the current year would be £30,000 over the expenditure of the last year. The number of men had very slightly increased. The number of men voted last year for the army was 137,245, which included a certain force for the Straits Settlements. The intention to raise that regiment had been abandoned, and instead of it they proposed this year to borrow from the Indian government 800 men, a portion of whom would go in aid of our forces at Hong Kong. The number of men he would ask the Committee to vote this year was 137,530, being only 285 more than last year. In Vole 3 the Committee would notice a decrease of £73,100, mainly in consequence of the large amount of goods in store; but he would mention incidentally that the expenses of the clothing establishments were being curtailed. The amount of the Vote last year was £496,900, and this year £570,000. In Vote 4, relating to Barrack establishments, the Committee would notice an increase of £60,300, caused by the Fenian alarm of last year. Vote 7, the Vote for Hospital establishments, amounted to £380,771—an increase on last year of £105,200. This, however, was merely an apparent increase caused by the transfer of certain charges from Vote 1 to Vote 7. These seven Votes immediately arose out of the number of men in the army, and having disposed of them, he would proceed to a subject of very great interest to all branches of the service—the subject of retirement. The Committee, which was ably presided over by an hon. Member opposite (Mr. Childers), and which had dealt with this question as it affected the Artillery and Engineers, had made certain recommendations in their Report which he did not feel justified in endorsing. He objected to them for three reasons. If they were carried out the expense would be very great; the result would be to withdraw from the service of the Artillery and Engineers a great number of the best officers just in their prime, and when most likely to be of service to the country; and a feeling of dissatisfaction would be engendered among the officers of the Line. In fact, officers in the Artillery and Engineers would be offered a pecuniary inducement to retire; and officers in other departments of the service would feel aggrieved that they were not similarly situated. It was evident that the recommendations of the Committee could not be carried out unless they were accompanied by very extensive changes in the whole system of remunerating the army, and he, therefore, did not see his way clear to approve them. On the other hand, it was most desirable that we should, as soon as possible arrange some system of retirement for the scientific corps, by which they would be spared that stagnation in promotion which from time to time was inevitable, from which they had suffered before, and to which, as matters stood at present, they were liable again. More it was at present impossible for him to say, until he had received the opinion of the actuary to whom he had submitted the whole of this matter. He hoped to receive his calculations at an early period, and should then be ready to bring the matter before the House, and to ask them to come to a decision. Another point involved in the Report of this Committee was the mode of recruiting for the army. And here he must offer congratulations to his right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Huntingdon (General Peel) on the success which had attended the changes that he introduced last year. Out of the thirty-nine recommendations made in the valuable Report of the Recruiting Commission, he was in a position to state that no less than twenty-four had been carried into effect. Of those recommendations, one of the most important was that the recruiting should be carried on under the superintendence of an Inspector General, specially charged with the control of that Department. The effect of the changes which had been introduced would be apparent from a comparison between the establishment voted and the actual number of men recruited in different years. In the year 1861 we were only 129 below the establishment; in 1861–2 we were 929 below the proper number; in 1862–3, 3,724; in 1863–4, 5,606; in 1864–5, 5,946; in 1865–6, 6,884; and in 1866–7, 1,358. In the present year, on the 1st of March, we were only 911 men below the establishment, and such had been the progress of recruiting during the present month that not only was there reason to believe that this deficit of 900 might be very considerably reduced; but he felt considerable doubt whether the number would not be above rather than below the Estimate. Another still more striking proof of the effect of the changes introduced by his right hon. and gallant Friend was afforded by the number of men re-engaged. In the year 1860–1 the re-engagements were 2,189 in number; in 1861–2,2,285; in 1862–3, 2,750; in 1863–4, 2,866; in 1864–5, 3,970; in 1865–6,6,120; in 1866–7, 3,462; and for the year 1867–8, up to the 31st of December, 1867, the re-engagements had swollen to the unprecedented number of 26,590. In a national point of view, it might, perhaps, be a question, whether it was desirable to have a great number of reengagements; whether young men might not be better for the State than men who had already served some years. But that had not been the policy of this country. Beyond all doubt, the policy of this country and the desire of commanding officers of regiments had been to obtain re-engagements; and that being so, from the extraordinary figures which he had quoted, there could be no doubt of the signal success of the plan which his right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Huntingdon proposed. Again, the recruits enlisted in the last quarter of 1866 were 3,951, while the recruits enlisted in the last quarter of 1867 were 5,179, showing an amount of increased activity and success in recruiting which was not to be measured merely by the number of men, as the Estimates showed that the amount expended by way of bounty was £22,000 less in the present than in the former year. A Report upon the subject of Recruiting had just been presented to His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, and forwarded to him as Secretary of State for War, which was in all respects a most satisfactory document. One of the recommendations contained in that Report, which he trusted would soon be carried out, had reference to the somewhat discreditable circumstances under which of late years many of our recruits had been engaged, especially to those scenes at public-houses, which were far from creditable to the service, and which every friend of the army must desire to put an end to. General Edwards, of the Recruiting Department, entered warmly into this subject, and recommended the establishment of recruiting officers or depôts in most of the large towns in England. Two were already established—one in London and one in Bristol; and he was happy to be able to add that, as far as experience hitherto had extended, the recruits now being engaged were not only more abundant in number, but belonged to a class of society greatly in advance of the recruits obtained in former times. His hon. Friend the Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread) had very much at heart the carrying out of one of the recommendations of the Royal Commission upon Recruiting—that schools should be established in which young men might be trained and reared for the service of the army. The Commissioners dwelt in their Report upon the very great success which had attended the establishment of schools with a kindred object for the navy. But his own opinion had always been that a comparison could not well be drawn in this respect between the two services. It was part of the system of the navy that the crew of every man-of-war should consist partly of boys; and consequently boys at a very early age were admitted on board training-ships, passed from thence to men-of-war, and, after a short period of service as boys, entered upon the books as regular sailors. In the army, however, the number of boys who could enter was exceedingly limited, being confined to drummer-boys, or to those otherwise engaged as members of the baud; and if a school for training boys in any numbers were founded, the difficulty would be to know what to do with them until they were of an age to be admitted into the ranks. The Report to which he had referred mentioned two well-known establishments—the Royal Military School at Chelsea and the Royal Hibernian School at Dublin—and expressed regret that from their constitution these schools could not be made instrumental in training boys for the army. He ventured so far to differ from the Royal Commissioners as to think that it well deserved consideration, whether it was not possible to render these establishments available in training a class of young men for the army, who would make most valuable non-commissioned officers, adding very much to the character, strength, and efficiency of the service. JN'O doubt, the Commissioners were quite right in stating, that in these two establishments, as now constituted, it would not be feasible to train such a class of young men; and that the boys, moreover, who were trained there frequently branched off into various pursuits in civil life. But he should certainly take into serious consideration, whether, by changing the character of these schools, it might not be possible to meet the recommendations of the Royal Commissioners, by rendering these useful auxiliaries in the supply of trained young men for the army? He now came to touch upon another portion of the subject—that which had reference to the auxiliary and reserved forces, which consisted of the old Militia, the Yeomanry Cavalry, the Volunteers, and the Enrolled Pensioners — the Army of Reserve. The whole strength of the Militia, assuming it to be up to its full quota, was 128,921; that of the Yeomanry Cavalry 15,823. The number of Volunteers now enrolled—he did not speak of the whole establishment—was 187,864; and the Enrolled Pensioners, including what was called the Army of Reserve, established by Lord Herbert's Act, numbered 18,658, which would make the number 220,000. The aggregate of all these forces was 350,658. In the Vote for the Militia there was an increase of £81,931 on the sum taken last year. This increase arose from two causes—first of all, following out the suggestion made by his right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Huntingdon (General Peel) last year, the Government had decided that the Militia should be raised to its full quota. They had deemed it expedient to spread the addition over two years. They had found the same facilities in recruiting for the Militia as they have experienced in the case of the army, and nearly the required number of men had come forward to raise the force to the number at which the Government had fixed it for the present year; the second cause of the addition to the Vote was that he had determined that lodging money should be given to every officer in the Militia. There had been a well-founded complaint that some of those officers received lodging money while others did not; and that the apartments in which officers were billeted were not fit places to send them to. He was sorry that this old force was not so strongly officered as he should wish, especially as regarded the lower ranks; but he hoped that granting lodging money to all the officers would have a good effect in the way of filling up vacancies. The case of the Quarter-master had been much pressed upon him from various directions, and in a manner which made him feel that the matter was one deserving of his attention. He had arrived at the conclusion that those officers were not in the position which, considering their military rank, they ought to be, and accordingly he had increased their lodging money allowance from 10s., the sum which they now received, to 14s. That being extended to them throughout the year would put them on a footing with the subaltern officers of the Line. The additional expense incurred by these changes raises the amount of the Vote by the sum of £81,931. There was another subject with reference to which he had received deputations. Representations had been made from the counties of York and Lancaster as to a state of things in those counties, but which he believed were equally true in respect of the rest of England. He referred to representations as to the unsatisfactory, injurious, and demoralizing results which followed from the present unsatisfactory manner in which the Militia were billeted in country towns. He could not imagine that there could be any serious difficulty in the way of arranging that one regiment should succeed another in such a way that accommodation could be secured for the men without recourse to that very objectionable system. On this subject it only remained for him to notice the proposals made by his right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Huntingdon last year, that 30,000 men of the Militia should stand apart and in a different organization from the rest, with the view of their joining the Line whenever it might be necessary for them to do so. He begged to assure his right hon. and gallant Friend that he had not lost sight of the proposal. It was his full intention to carry it out, and the regulations on the matter had been drawn out Under the Act of last year it was necessary that those regulations should be laid upon the table. He was not able to produce them yet, and for this reason—the whole of the auxiliary forces were about to be placed under the command of one officer—his hon. and gallant Friend Colonel Lindsay; and he thought it desirable that before those regulations were laid upon the table, and before his hon. and gallant Friend commenced his new duties next month, he should have an opportunity of seeing and reading them. The regulations would be laid upon the table as soon as possible. As to the Yeomanry force, he need not detain the Committee by any reference to that branch of the service. The next subject to which he had to advert was the condition of the Volunteer force. The Vote for this force was £385,150, which was an increase of £24,150 on the Vote of last year, The Capitation Grants for the Volunteers amounted in 1867.8 to £205,500; in the current year 1868.9 they had risen to £228,050. The efficients in 1867–8 were 115,427; in the current, year they were 124,605. The extra efficients last year were 78,285; this year they were 90,587. Last year there had been relocated applications for an increase in the amount of the Capitation Grant received by each Volunteer entitled to it; and this year again he had been pressed to make a proposition on the subject. No man felt more highly than he did the great value of the force, or estimated at a higher value the patriotic spirit which had called the Volunteers into existence, and had since maintained them at so high a standard. A number of Volunteer officers had drawn up a Paper last year, in which they expressed their opinion that if the Capitation Grant were not increased it would be impossible for the force to be maintained, so heavy were the expenses thrown on the officers. He had promised a consideration of these representations; but a few days ago he had been obliged to express to a large deputation his deep regret, after a full consideration of the question, the Government felt that, consistently with their duty, they could not concede the request that had been made to them. There were circumstances which made it impossible for him to come down to the House and apply, on the ground of Imperial necessity, for an increase of the Capitation Grant. In 1863 the number of the Volunteers was 113,520, in 1864 it had increased to 123,707, in 1867, 133,848, in 1866 to 142,849, and in 1865 to 155,216. Again, he found that 1863 there were 17 new corps formed and 28 dissolved; in 1864, 6 formed and 29 dissolved; in 1865, 14 formed and 18 dissolved; in 1866, there were 12 new corps formed and 9 corps dissolved; and in 1867, there were 27 new corps formed and only 9 corps dissolved. The only inference he could draw from these figures was that the spirit which laid the foundation of the Volunteer force was still as strong as ever. Within the last fortnight he had been applied to for his sanction to the formation of several new corps. Therefore, while the amount received by the Volunteer force was sufficient to enable them to maintain their efficiency and carry on their noble work with vigour, and while the members of the force were also increased, he felt that he should be hardly justified in coming down to the House and asking it to increase a Vote which at present appeared to be sufficient for the purpose intended. Under these circumstances he had been unable to increase the Capitation allowance to the Volunteer force. With regard to the administration of the Reserve force he made an alteration, which he trusted would receive the approbation of the House. When he came to consider the position of that force he found that it consisted of four different bodies, and was divided under three distinct commands. The Volunteer force was under the Secretary of State for the War Department, and subject to the superintendence of one officer holding the rank of colonel or lieutenant colonel. The Militia was under the superintendence and command of another officer of the same position and rank, and the Enrolled Pensioners and Army of Reserve were under the command of another officer of the army. Thus there were three distinct commands for the Reserve force. It appeared to him to be impossible for this force to carry out properly and legitimately the duties entrusted to them in this divided and unsatisfactory state of control. It seemed that undivided action was desirable, and that some greater and better facilities for organization were indispensable; and that it would very much tend to increase the real value and efficiency of these local forces if they were placed under the command of some one officer of high rank and known military station, able to regulate and control the whole. He received quite lately, after having determined on the change he had mentioned, a letter forwarded from the Horse Guards strongly confirming the views he had adopted. This letter came from a distinguished officer, in command of the forces in the northern districts of England—Sir John Garvock—and was dated at Manchester, the 22nd of February— Since I assumed command of the northern district, and have become aware of the large number of irregular troops, Yeomanry, Militia, and Volunteers, which it contains, it has seemed to me very desirable that some plan should be devised for making them more readily available than they now are in case of emergency. … The numbers approximately of the troops in question in the northern district are as follows:—Yeomanry, 8,000; Militia, 25,000; Volunteers, 53,000; total 86,000. … Over these forces, however, I exercise no control, and it is not necessary, and probably not desirable, that in ordinary times I should do so. Assuming, however, that when called on to act with the regular army they would be placed under my command, or that of some other selected officer, I should be glad to feel myself in a position, if suddenly directed to avail myself of the general resources of the district, to do so with rapidity and effect. As matters stand at present I cannot say that I do feel myself in that position; I do not think that these scattered troops could be brought together in a manageable form without very considerable delay. The circumstance of a general officer having the control of all those local forces, and being fully able to organize and place them, when necessary, in districts where they might be made most available for the public service, would very much tend to increase the value of the forces on which the people of this country depended for home protection. The next Vote was one of the most important in the Army Estimates. It was the Vote for the Manufacturing Departments and the supply of Military and Warlike Stores. The amount proposed to be voted under this head was £1,491,370. The Vote had not, in fact, changed in amount—there was an apparent decrease of £64,000; but it was only apparent, for it arose from the transfer of certain charges for building to another Vote in the Estimates. The question respecting the supply of small arms was one which the right hon. and gallant Member for Huntingdon explained last year, and in which he took a very vigorous and decided part, expending a large sum of money in converting the Enfield rifle into a breechloader on the Snider principle. Last year the sum taken for conversion at Enfield was £90,000, and the sum expended for the same object on the trade was £120,638. This year there would be asked for, £99,604 for conversion at Enfield, and £60,000 for conversion by the trade. The general result was that last year his right hon. and gallant Friend proposed the conversion of 221,500 rifles at a cost of £210,638, and this year it was proposed that 160,000 rifles should be converted at a cost of £159,604; that would exhaust the whole number of small arms that we had capable of conversion. This led him to mention that an important sub-Committee sat last year, under the presidency of Colonel Fletcher, assisted by Earl Spencer. The business of the Committee was to decide to what maker should be awarded the prize for the best arm. Their Report would be laid on the table of the House in a few days, when it would appear that a large number of the arms sent in did not comply with the conditions, and consequently the prize had not been awarded, and the question, which was of the greatest importance to the country, the best rifle, had not been decided. The Committee had, however, consented to renew its labours, which would not be confined to the original conditions of selection; but they would be free to consider and select a more valuable rifle, if possible, than the Snider, which, however, he believed to be at present the best arm possessed by any country in Europe, and which he hoped in a short time to be able to supply to all the forces. From small arms he now came to artillery. The Vote for next year in these Estimates was £271,144, including guns, projectiles, and targets. For the navy the Vote was £494,138. He would now ask the attention of the Committee to a question of which they had heard very little for some years—the wonderful advance which science had been able to make in the construction of heavy guns. Until last year no attempt had been made to provide a new armament for those forts and defences in different parts of the world which it had been the policy of the House to adopt. The Committee would recollect that when the Government of Lord Palmerston in 1860 determined to adopt the system of fortifications which was now so frequently under discussion, it was resolved that the home forts and fortifications should be erected by funds raised by loan, but that the armament of those forts should be defrayed from the Revenue of the year. The result was that the Revenue of the year was never asked for those armaments; and he believed that the Estimate of his right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Huntingdon (General Peel) last year was the first in which an attempt was made to provide an armament for the fortifications in Bermuda, Halifax, and elsewhere, which had been so many years in construction. This did not apply only to fortifications in this country. Simultaneously we had been erecting large works in various parts of the world; and both Malta and Gibraltar stood in need of very considerable strength in their armaments. Last year the Estimate proposed by his right hon. Friend provided ninety-six guns for armament purposes, and in the Estimates he had now the honour to submit to the House about the same provision was made. The number provided this year was ninety-seven guns of different calibre. But it was his duty to state to the House that if we were to provide adequate armaments for the fortifications we had created in this country, and in various parts of the world, we must incur a very heavy expenditure—an expenditure not yet provided for, an expenditure not yet contemplated. It would be idle to pretend that the Vote he had to submit to the House to-night to provide artillery for the defence of this country was even intended to provide for the requirements before them. He must frankly state that he believed it would be absolutely necessary at no distant day that the armaments for the fortifications should be made the subject of a distinct Estimate to the House of Commons. He would only now advert for a few moments to a subject on which his hon. and gallant Friend opposite (Major Anson) intended to found a distinct Motion. He was so confident of the good object his hon. and gallant Friend wished to accomplish by that Motion that he would be ready to meet him in the fairest spirit he could; but he did think that those immense manufacturing establishments at Woolwich ought to be a subject of considerable anxiety with the House. They were enormous establishments, and involved an annual expenditure one year with another of very little less than £1,000,000. These establishments were divided into four parts—the Gun Factory, the Laboratory, the Carriage Department, and the Store Department. The Laboratory alone involved an annual expenditure of very little less than £500,000. At the head of these four establishments were four men of high scientific acquirements and very high character. He did not speak of any one of them except in terms of the highest respect, both for scientific acquirements and personal character; but from the time when he undertook his present office, he must confess he had not felt satisfied that those four establishments were subject to a sufficient cheek and control—looking to the immense expenditure with which they were intrusted—a check such as the interests of the country appeared to require. He believed the public interest would be very much promoted if one officer of knowledge, ability, and high character were placed as the commandant over the whole four establishments. He did not say they were now altogether without check; but they were not subject to such an amount of effectual check as in the interest of the country or even the interest of the officers themselves they ought to be subject to. He should, therefore, very seriously consider whether the interests of the country would not be promoted by appointing a commandant to exercise control and authority over the whole of the immense establishments at Woolwich. With respect to the cadastral Survey, which really had nothing to do with the Army Estimates, and concerned rather the general interests of the country, a considerable increase was made in this year's Estimates. It was the intention of the Government to make that survey proceed a little more rapidly than it had done during the last few years, and with that view they had decided to add £30,000 to the former Estimate, making it in all £118,000. He begged now to reply to a question put by an hon. Member some time since, relative to the extension of the provision of the Contagious Diseases Act. The Act had been found to work beneficially, and the Government intended to take a Vote in these Estimates for £20,650 for the erection of a hospital.

He now came to the last head to which he intended to call the attention of the Committee, which was Vote 18, for the Administration of the Army. The remaining Votes related only to the Non-effective Service, which did not call for any observation. The Vote for the Administration of the Army was £224,000, being an increase of £6,000. A portion of that increase arose from the salaries of Sir Henry Storks, £2,000, and General Balfour, £1,000, the officers lately added to the War Office, with a view to carry out the Report of Lord Strathnairn. He thought he might say that Reform in administering the Departments of the army had been more or less a subject of public attention and anxiety ever since the Crimean War. It was during that war that the defects in our transport service and the supply Department of the War Office became manifest, and they must all remember the anxiety caused in consequence of those defects. The first occasion on which a desire was shown to alter the arrangements of the War Department was when Lord Herbert, then Mr. Sidney Herbert, laid before the Organization Commission of 1860 a scheme for the appointment of an officer to be called the Director of Supply. It was clearly the intention of Lord Herbert, in proposing the appointment of such an officer, that the supply Department of the Army should be placed under the control of one responsible officer. In 1864 a Committee was appointed to consider the system of supply in the army, and before the close of 1866 Lord De Grey addressed a very able letter to the Treasury, recommending a considerable change being effected in this portion of the administration of the army. In that letter Lord De Grey said— The theory of the present arrangement is that each local head of a Department is in direct communication with the general officer commanding; but it would obviously work far better, and produce fir more unity of action, both in peace and in war, if the general officer commanding communicated with one head only, who was acquainted with the organization of the several Departments, and accustomed to control them. For these reasons, both on account of economy in peace and efficiency in war, it appears to Lord De Grey to be necessary that the several administrative Departments should be brought to a focus, both locally and in this office. Before Lord De Grey could take any action for the purpose of carrying out these views he was succeeded in his office by the noble Lord opposite (the Marquess of Hartington), who in proposing the Army Estimates in 1866 made the following remarks:— I am anxious to state to the Committee that we have been for some time convinced that the charges of some of those establishments are no doubt greater than they ought to be; but the only way by which a more economical system can be introduced is to bring them more directly under the control of one head. The Committee will understand that the head of a Department, such as the commissariat, or the purveyor's Department, at any particular station, although he is subordinate to the General Officer, corresponds upon matters connected with the Department with the head of his Department at home. The General Officer at the station has many other important and arduous duties to perform, and consequently is not able to exercise any very minute supervision. This is not all; under the present circumstances it is necessary that each station should have an officer, or several officers, of considerable rank. We have, therefore, made a proposal that a superior class of officers should be appointed at each station, to be called comptrollers, or by some similar name, who shall be placed at the head of the administrative Departments. Each comptroller will be subordinate to the General Officer, and responsible to him for the proper and efficient administration of the Departments; and it will be his duty to advise the Secretary of State upon the organization of each Department, and to point out where economy can be exercised."—[3 Hansard, clxxxi, 1541–2.] From this extract it was clear that the noble Lord opposite concurred generally in the views which had been indicated by Lord De Grey. No direct steps, however, were taken in order to carry those views into effect; but in June, 1866, the noble Lord opposite appointed a Committee, which had since been known by the name of "Lord Strathnairn's Committee," to inquire into the subject of army transport. That Committee soon found that it would be impossible for them to discharge their duties properly if their inquiries were limited to the question of army transport, and they therefore asked and obtained permission to extend their inquiries into the whole subject of army supply. He would read extracts from the Report of that Committee, which was laid upon the table of the House in the course of last summer. The Committee recommended as the leading measures required— That a Department should be organized to be responsible for, and to control, the working of all Departments of supply—namely, 1st, commissariat, including store accountants for provisions, forage, fuel, and light, military accountants and treasurers; 2nd, purveyors; 3rd, military store, as regards clothing and stores generally, but not arms, ammunition, or warlike stores, herein subsequently defined: 4th, barrack, as regards fuel and light and straw, at home as well as abroad, and in camp; and also as regards cash and barrack and miscellaneous stores, now administered by barrack-masters; 5th, army transport. The Committee then proceeded— Setting aside considerations of economy to be effected by the abolition of the superior officers of the different branches, it is difficult to over-rate the advantages which it may be calculated will arise from the united action and harmony which will be produced by making the several supply Departments of the army ace under one impulse, and subordinate to one chief. The Committee further said— The practical result of these and other recommendations in the same sense will be that the Secretary of State for War at home, and general officers commanding abroad, will have to deal, in all matters relative to the administration of the army, with one responsible department—that of control—instead of, as at present, with five separate departments. General officers commanding will be relieved of the details, duty, and correspondence connected with the supply Departments of the army, as they at present exist; affording them more time for consideration of purely military and strategical duties of command; and both Minister for War and general officers will be able to intrust greater powers, and give move confidence, to an officer in the position of controller than they can under the present system to the several heads of Departments, each naturally anxious to secure the utmost advantage and influence for his own Department. It was apparent that the intention of the Committee was to get rid of the present system of divided responsibility in this branch of the army administration, and to place that Department under the control of a single officer. In accordance with the statements he had made in answer to the numerous questions which had been put to him in the course of last Session upon the subject, he had devoted a large portion of the time at his disposal during the Recess to the consideration of the recommendations of the Committee, and he had arrived at the conclusion that it was his duty to carry those recommendations into effect. As it would have been scarcely just to the gentlemen engaged in the War Office, who were already fully employed and whose position might possibly be affected by the proposed changes, to request them to assist him in drawing out a scheme in accordance with the recommendations of the Committee, he had had recourse to the assistance of those who had been engaged in similar work in connection with the Indian Army. He applied also to Sir Bartle Frere with a view to obtaining the advice of an officer of such high character and recognized ability, one who, moreover, had given so much attention to the economical reforms which had taken place in the Indian Army, and it was to a great extent, through the assistance of Sir Bartle Frere and Sir Henry Storks, whose experience in connection with the War Office at home had been very large, and to whom he had preferred a similar request, that he was enabled to carry out some of the recommendations of Lord Strathnairn's Committee. Those two distinguished officers recommended, with a view to carrying out the suggestions of Lord Strathnairn's Committee — suggestions in which they cordially concurred—that an officer of known ability should be appointed to the post of Controller-in-Chief, and be entrusted with the organization of a Department. He had then to consider who should be appointed to this new office, and, bearing in mind the recommendation of the Committee that the Controller-in-Chief ought, at all events at first, to be an officer of high rank in the army and of known administrative ability, he arrived, after careful consideration, at the conclusion that he could not in the interests of the public make a better suggestion than Sir Henry Storks himself. At his earnest request Sir Henry Storks acquiesced in the appointment, and, with the consent and approval of that officer, he appointed General Balfour, whose experience in India would, he thought, enable him greatly to assist Sir Henry Storks in effecting changes which concerned, not only the administrative Department of the army, but which would prospectively affect the constitution of the War Office itself. The next question which arose was, in what manner they should proceed to carry out their scheme. Was Sir Henry Storks to be placed at the head of a Department? He (Sir John Pakington) decided that this would be a most undesirable mode of proceeding; and that the best course which he could adopt was to place Sir Henry Storks on the Board entirely free from all entanglements. He requested him thoroughly to investigate the state of the War Office itself, and see what changes were necessary in connection with the supply Departments, and make his report from time to time as to what changes he might deem to be necessary. He (Sir John Pakington) had reason, day by day, to rejoice at this appointment. The task had no doubt been very laborious, and one attended with much anxiety; but every day had given him fresh cause to congratulate himself, not only upon the appointment of Sir Henry Storks and General Balfour, but upon the fact that the former officer was not embarrassed by the consideration of departmental details. Although the appointment was but a recent one, these officers had addressed their attention to the system of audit now in operation, to the question of stores, to the changes which might be necessary with respect to transport, and to the mode of arranging the Department of control. The consideration of the question of barracks, though one that was the subject of recommendations by Lord Strathnairn's Committee, was for the present postponed. An able and elaborate Report on the subject of audit had already been drawn up and presented, and the tendency of that Report was, not only to promote economy, but to make the system more complete and efficient than it was at present. It suggested many practical improvements—improvements in which he fully concurred; indeed, he had already made arrangements for the duty of auditing being turned over to the particular Secretary of State, instead of continuing the present, somewhat anomalous system of placing the accounts and the audit under the same Department. He had also received an able Report from the auditor. It would, he thought, be advisable to lay the Reports, which would be successively received, on the table of the House, although, in his opinion, it would be better not to do so immediately on their reception, but to wait until the intended changes had been considered as a whole. The suggestions with regard to the Department of control were now under the consideration of the Treasury, and upon the assent of that Department being received he should at once proceed to act upon them. Those suggestions would not result in any very great saving of expenditure, but the House would, he trusted, rather regard them as indicating the general tendency of the changes proposed—a lessened expenditure combined with increased efficiency. If the plan now suggested were adopted a saving of £25,000 would, he believed, be ultimately effected upon an annual expenditure of £175,000, while the decrease would be attended with the best possible results as far as the efficiency of the work was concerned. The next point to which he would allude was the Department of Transport. A plan had been drawn up for some time. That plan he was not able to carry out; but he confidently hoped and believed that, when a plan was decided on, a transport system would be established which might be beneficially employed in times of peace, and be capable of extension in time of war. They all remembered the complaints that were made of the transport service at the time of the Crimean War; and what was it they heard now from Abyssinia? Everything there, they were told, went on well but the transport. But it was obvious that if the transport were inefficient the army could not advance, and it was therefore most essential that they should endeavour, if possible, to organize a transport system on a satisfactory footing. He was truly thankful to say that when the transport plans that were under consideration should have been fully matured they would have a system of transport that would be really worthy of the name—a system that would be not more than adequate to the requirements of peace, but that would be capable of indefinite expansion in time of war. Another important duty of the Controller-in-Chief related to stores, a Department which was considerably larger than hon. Gentlemen were aware. He had received no report as yet on the subject of any new arrangement regarding the store Department, but he was prepared to say that, after mature consideration, the Government did not intend to carry out the recommendations of Lord Strathnairn's Committee. The Government, however, hoped greatly to improve the transport service, and at the same time to reduce the expenditure of that Department. The Committee would be struck with the increase in the stock of military stores. On the 31st of March, 1858, the value of our military stores was £9,420,000; on the 31st of March, 1867, the stores at home and abroad were valued at £14,601,000. This increase arose from a great variety of causes, which at present engaged the serious attention of the Government; and, although he was not able to state the decision at which the War Office would arrive, he could assure the Committee that it would not only endeavour to insure economy but also improved arrangements. He believed that the stores had very unwisely been distributed in a great variety of places; that the great object which ought to be kept in view was their concentration, and to avoid that great deterioration in value which arises from their frequent removal from place to place. In concluding his statement he thanked the Committee for the attention with which his remarks had been listened to; he had been obliged to deal with a great variety of subjects, and had endeavoured to do so as clearly and as frankly as possible. He trusted the Committee would remember that, although great changes had been initiated, a sufficient time had not yet elapsed to mature them, and that it was impossible yet to estimate how far they would tend to a reduction of expenditure. He said this in order that the efforts of those distinguished men who had given him their cordial and constant assistance might not be hastily judged. For himself, he assured the Committee the whole subject had received his anxious attention, and he firmly believed that when the plans to which he had alluded were fully carried out they would result in solid improvement, both as regards efficiency of the army and a decided reduction in the expenditure.

1. Motion made, and Question proposed, That the number of Land Forces, not exceeding 138,691 Men (including 9,880, all Ranks, to be employed with the Depôts in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland of Regiments Serving in Her Majesty's Indian Possessions), be maintained for the Service of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, from the 1st day of April 1868 to the 31st day of March 1869, inclusive.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON

said, it was not his intention to follow the right hon. Baronet (Sir John Pakington) through his long and very able statement; but he wished to make an observation or two on some points that provoked criticism and required explanation. The right hon. Baronet had informed the Committee that the sum asked for was to all practicable purposes the same as that asked for last year; but the Committee would remember with regret that, although the Estimate for the current year was only slightly in excess of the year 1867–8, that year's Estimate largely exceeded the Estimate which it was his (the Marquess of Hartington's) duty to submit of the year before. The right hon. Baronet wished the Committee to pass an Estimate which exceeded by £1,500,000 the last Estimate of Lord Russell's Government. Of course, it was easy, as he had said last year, to find very excellent reasons for an increase of expenditure, and he was not prepared to place his finger on any item where a proposed increase should be refused, or where a Vote might be diminished; but although a good case might, in many instances, be made out for a proposed increase of expenditure, it was very certain that nothing but the most constant supervision by the Secretary of State, coupled with a strong determination on his part that the Estimate should not be increased, could insure economy and produce reduction in the annual charge. The Committee should not forget that during the last three or four years of the Administration which preceded the present one the Estimates for the Army showed a decrease year by year, while the Estimates of the present Government showed year by year an increasing sum. However, he joined with the right hon. Baronet in congratulating the right hon. and gallant Member for Huntingdon on the success of his measures for recruiting and re-enlistment. It might not be an unmixed benefit that that should re-enlist a large number of men; but it was an unmixed benefit that they should have the offer of them. He was sorry he could not extend his congratulations to the Government on the result of their plan for creating a Reserve force. Apparently the Government did not expect any very great result from those measures, which had been introduced to the House with some little appearance of importance. This was at least the case as regards the current year. As far as he could make out, the only money asked for on account of the Reserve forces created last year was £20,000 in the Militia fund, and £7,000 in the Enrolled Pensioners' fund, making £27,000, the extent of the sum to be taken on account of the Reserve forces. It therefore appeared to him that the proposed plan was not producing any very great effect. Perhaps, the right hon. Baronet would state, in his reply, what numbers he anticipated would join the Militia and Army Reserves during the year. The Committee would cordially agree in approving the appointment of General Lindsay to be Inspector General of the Reserve force, announced by the right hon. Baronet. It had, he knew, been the intention of successive Secretaries of State for a considerable period that the offices of Inspector General of Militia and Inspector General of Volunteers should, when opportunity offered, be merged into one. At the same time he considered it very doubtful whether any great progress could be made in the way of amalgamating the Reserve forces, the Volunteers, and the Militia. They were bodies raised and organized on entirely different principles, and a certain amount of feeling—he would not say jealousy — had always existed between them. Even since the appointment of General Lindsay he had heard apprehensions expressed by Militia officers of designs supposed to be entertained for altering the constitution of that force, or for assimilating them in any way to the Volunteers. He therefore wished to warn the right hon. Baronet that it would be necessary to proceed with very great caution in any scheme which he might have before him for assimilating or amalgamating the Militia or Volunteer forces. It was quite true, as stated by the right hon. Baronet, that the Vote for Army Stores and Manufacturing Department showed a slight decrease, but the Committee, he thought, would feel disappointed that the decrease was not more considerable. Very large additions were made to the Estimates last year and the year before for the conversion of army rifles; but his impression had been that the process of conversion was to have been completed during the present financial year, and it would cause some disappointment to the Committee to find that the conversion was to be continued during a large part of next year. The right hon. Baronet had stated that last year was the first in which any provision had been made for supplying the armament of rifled guns suitable for the fortifications in process of erection. He would find, however, upon inquiry at the War Office, that attention had been steadily pointed in that direction for many years past. Changes were being made so rapidly in the patterns of heavy guns that it would have been most imprudent to provide these until the works were ready to receive them. Up to the time that he left the War Office, the patterns of heavy guns were being continually altered, and the largest patterns, in fact, had hardly been decided on. Rapid provision of the armament, however, was not nearly as pressing as the completion of the fortifications; and, as far as he knew, the armament had been provided in every case as soon as the works were in a state sufficiently forward for the purpose. The right hon. Baronet would find that for years past a large sum had been annually taken for heavy guns for land service; and all those made in the Arsenal which were not for the purposes of the navy must, of course, have been for the purposes of fortifications. A point, which he was not prepared to discuss at present, but which would demand careful consideration by the Committee, was the statement of the right hon. Baronet that he intended to act upon the recommendation he had received, and to appoint a head of the Arsenal at Woolwich. That point had been considered over and over again, and was warmly debated before a Committee of that House, presided over by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Limerick (Mr. Monsell), and the subject was one on which eminent authorities held very different opinions. He admitted that there might be many advantages in the plan contemplated by the right hon. Baronet. At the same time he felt strongly that the appointment of a head of the establishment at Woolwich must weaken the feeling of responsibility on the part of the heads of the different manufacturing Departments, thereby tending to lessen their efficiency. There was one Vote showing a very considerable increase—Vote 14, for Works—upon which the right hon. Baronet had not entered into any explanation, probably by accident — [Sir JOHN PAKINGTON: Hear!]—and he would doubtless take an opportunity in reply of supplying the omission. It was hardly possible to discuss satisfactorily, and without some special opportunity, the views which had been put before them with respect to army and War Office reorganization; and he accordingly suggested that the discussion upon the point should be taken either upon a separate Notice on going into Supply, or else should be postponed till they came to Vote 18, the Vote for Administration of the Army. The right hon. Baronet, he must admit, had made a very full and frank statement of his intentions; but some little time was necessary for considering the plan which he had submitted, before its discussion could be usefully approached. Without pledging himself to adopt the principles recommended by Lord Strathnairn's Committee, he (the Marquess of Harrington) admitted that the intentions both of Lord de Grey and himself had pointed in the same direction. And he wished to explain that the reason why nothing had been done in the matter, before he himself left office was that the Treasury recommended that the scheme should not be actually set to work till the details had been thoroughly examined, and, among other matters, till the financial bearings of the scheme had been carefully investigated. He was not surprised that the Committee, presided over by Lord Strathnairn, should have found it necessary, at the very threshold of their labours, to come to a decision upon the larger question of amalgamation. He was of opinion that although the Committee was one admirably adapted for considering the question of transport, he did not think its constitution was that which would have been adopted if it had been intended to refer to the Committee the subject of army organization generally, or even that of the organization of the Civil Department. The composition of the Committee was too purely military to render its conclusions such as the House would be willing to accept without hesitation. The only civilian upon it was Sir William Power, the Commissary General. He is a man of very large experience; but he (the Marquess of Hartington) thought the House, while agreeing that there should be a considerable military element in the Committee, would be of opinion that in a matter of finance and public credit there should have been much more of the civilian element than was possessed by this Committee. The right hon. Gentleman had told them that the new Department would load to economy. He hoped it would, and possibly it might; but he was not without some apprehensions that ultimately it might be the cause of increased expenditure. On this point, however, he had a strong opinion—that in any scheme of army organization the House ought not to lose any portion of the control which, through the Secretary of State, it at present possessed. For that reason, he should prefer to have had the civilian element more largely represented in the Commission. He knew that on the Army Estimates it was competent to hon. Members to discuss any of those subjects at length; but, as a matter of convenience, he thought it would be better not to go into details on the organization of the army till this question came before the House in a more direct form.

GENERAL PEEL

said, that the noble Marquess had commenced by drawing a comparison between the present Estimates and those for the last year during which he (the Marquess of Hartington) had been in office as Minister for War. The noble Marquess was perfectly correct in saying that the estimated military expenditure for the current year was greater than the actual expenditure of 1865–6 by £1,340,667; but the practical question for the House was what had been the cause of that increase. With the expenditure of 1865–6, the War Department of that day was not able to fill up the ordinary casualties in the army; they had not a breech-loading rifle in the service. There is a great increase in the Estimates on Votes 12 and 13; but during the time the noble Marquess was at the head of the Department it had not fixed upon a pattern. In fact, it was at a stand-still. Had the increase in the Estimates produced the desired effects? The increased pay of the army raised the Votes by the amount of between £300,000 and £400,000, but that increase had put an end to what he confessed to have felt to be a source of great anxiety during two years. Last year was an exceptional year. No fewer than 32,000 men were entitled to their discharge, and their places must be filled up. But there was no longer any anxiety about that, though it had been said that the 2d. and 3d. additional pay which he proposed last year would not prove a sufficient inducement to men to continue in the service. He hoped that the readiness with which the ten years' men had re-entered the service would be regarded as an answer to much that was said about the treatment of men in the army. They found that the persons now offering themselves were not men taken into a public-house and there made to enlist, but men who had already served their ten years in the army. Within two years 350,000 breech-loaders had been got ready. He believed that the 100,000 provided at Enfield had been turned out by the very day named, and 50,000 had been provided at Birmingham. He should like his right hon. Friend (Sir John Pakington) to explain where the remaining breechloaders had come from, because there had been only 300,000 new rifles in store. With reference to what the noble Marquess had said on the subject of the great guns, he thought it fortunate that he (the Marquess of Hartington) had made no considerable provision for them, because the pattern had since been altered, and because the expense would not now be so great. The original arrangement was that the money for the building of the fortifications should be raised by loan, and that the armaments were to be provided out of the annual Estimates. The approximate Estimate of the total cost for guns, projectiles, gun carriages and waggons for works under Defence Act of 1860 was £1,885,000, of which sum, the amount provided during the first seven years was only £85,000. If they went on at that rate they would not have the necessary armaments provided before seventeen years. It struck him that if they could afford to do without them for seventeen years they might as well do without them altogether. On the point of the increased expenditure he must remind the noble Marquess that the Royal Commission had been appointed by the Government of which he was a Member, and in their Report the Commissioners stated that a natural consequence of carrying out what they recommended would be to increase the cost of the army. There were several points in the speech of his right hon. Friend to which he did not think it necessary to advert; but he wished to observe that he did not exactly understand how or to what extent the recommendations which he himself had made on the subject of the Army of Reserve were to be carried out by his right hon. Friend. He thought it would be advisable to allow men who had served two-thirds of their existing engagements in the army to commute for the rest of their military service by joining the Army of Reserve; and that, on similar conditions, men purchasing their discharge might be allowed to commute for a portion of what they had to pay. With respect to the manufacturing establishments he did not see how it was possible to improve them. He should attach more importance to the individual selection that might be made of a Controller than he should do to the scheme itself. He had every confidence in the Controller and other officers of the new Departments.

LORD ELCHO

said, he desired to express the pleasure he felt at the statement of his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War—that his object was to introduce unity of action into the administrative Departments of the army. He concurred, too, in what had been said in favour of Sir Henry Storks and General Balfour; but, whatever the satisfaction at what his right hon. Friend had been doing to improve the administration of the army, he confessed that with reference to the other part of his statement—that bearing on the amount of our force—he did not think that our present position or the proposed changes could be looked on with any great satisfaction. His right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War proposed a change with reference to the Reserves; but even his right hon. and gallant Friend (General Feel) who proposed the change last year did not seem to understand in what manner the change was to be carried out. The House had, however, to deal with this broad fact—that the Army Estimates were increasing, steadily increasing. His right hon. and gallant Friend had just accounted for some part of the increase; but we had this increase in the Votes without any great available increase in the number of men. The Estimates amount to £13,500,000, and after this enormous expenditure the utmost force we could put in line for the defence of the country—he spoke, of course, of regular troops—was 40,000. He ventured to say that this was a result wholly disproportionate to that enormous expenditure; and he believed that the country would not go on paying such sums without a more satisfactory result. He had placed on the paper a Motion for to-morrow evening, with the object of obtaining a Commission on an Army of Reserve. The Recruiting Commission did not go into that question. That had been distinctly stated in "another place" by a noble Lord who was a Member of the Commission, and who stated that the Commissioners had not touched on that branch of the subject, because it was too vast a one. He should postpone his Motion till after Easter, when he proposed to bring under the notice of the Mouse the question of military organization, and the means we possessed, under the present system, of providing, by an economical arrangement, an efficient Army of Reserve. He believed that the more these matters were discussed the stronger would become the opinion of the country that things were not in a satisfactory condition, and that we had not that strength at home which ought to be maintained here for the purposes of defence.

MR. WYLD

said, he would wish to call the right hon. Gentleman's attention to the conduct of the Ordnance Survey, which was very unsatisfactory. There was great difficulty in obtaining copies of the surveys, and the object of the heads of the Department appeared to be chiefly to amuse themselves with photographic pursuits. He thought the people of Scotland had the greatest possible reason to complain of the manner in which their interests had been neglected, and the backward state of the survey as regarded that country.

COLONEL GILPIN

said, he was glad that his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War had adopted the suggestion of his right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Huntingdon (General Peel), which would prevent the War Department from calling on the Militia to furnish recruits to the army during a time of peace. He did not, however, understand, what advantage would be derived from placing under one command the forces which the right hon. Baronet proposed to place under that, able and courteous officer, General Lindsay. Was the hon. and gallant General's command to be an actual one? The Militia were, under the Mutiny Act, to be in time of war taken up for home service; but during the last war they did more—they not only filled up gaps in the ranks of the regular army on foreign service, but sent out a larger force than had been in the first instance embarked for the Crimea. The Yeomanry were under the Mutiny Act; but he did not suppose his right hon. Friend proposed to put the Volunteers under it, because they appeared to dislike very much the control of the Horse Guards. He thought the proposed amalgamation of reserved forces required some further information.

MAJOR WALKER

, in allusion to the deficiency of officers in the Militia force, quoted from a Return stating the deficiency in this respect in various ranks. It appeared that the deficiencies in the rank of lieutenant were 756, and in the rank of ensign and second lieutenant 1,219. With regard to the last figures, he felt bound to explain that the deficiency was caused by an Order issued some years ago for the cessation of the rank of ensign and second lieutenant; but it was notorious that that Order was issued solely on the ground that it was utterly impossible to fill up vacancies in that rank. This did not represent the full amount of the deficiency; for it was well known that the first result of the permanent embodiment of the Militia would be that a very large number of gentlemen would find it impossible for them to serve, and probably from 300 to 400 would at once retire. Those gentlemen held their commissions when the duties were confined to a short annual training, but the other calls upon their time were incompatible with permanent embodiment. The subject was no doubt a difficult one, and he agreed that they could offer no pecuniary reward that would attract young men of good families into the Militia as officers. They might, however, find other ways to attract them. At present a Militia officer's duty was one course of drudgery, and if the country took no interest in the service they could not expect that young men of family should do so. He believed that if they associated the Militia regiments with each other—had regiments of the Line brigaded with them—adopted a system of inspection—and treated the Militia as an honourable branch of Her Majesty's service, instead of, as a necessary evil, they would be able to obtain a better class of young men for officers. He was glad to hear that the billeting system was to be changed, for it was almost impossible to preserve discipline under the billeting system. Until the scheme for the amalgamation of the Reserves was produced, he thought that it would be premature to discuss it at any length; but holding the Militia to be the younger brother of the Line, he must say that if, by drawing the Militia closer to the Volunteers, the relations between the Militia and the Line should be rendered less close he should regard it us a great evil. He should have liked to hear that the Government proposed to place breech-loading rifles in the hands of the Militia; especially as the number of converted rifles now in store must be so considerable that there could be no difficulty at least in sending a sufficient number of the new arm to each Militia regiment to enable instruction in the new drill to be given this year, so that another year's training might not be wasted on a useless arm. He felt bound to express his gratitude for what the Government had already done for the service. They had increased the numbers and efficiency of the Militia, and he trusted that they would now address themselves to the task of increasing the popularity of the service among the class which commanded the force.

SIR HARRY VERNEY

expressed the pleasure with which he had heard the announcement that 30,000 of the Militia force were to be brigaded with the Regular army, the result of which would, he hoped, be advantageous to both branches of the service. It was a serious consideration that there were only 40,000 men of the Regular army disposable in these islands, for the defence of the country in case of invasion, while the enormous sum of £13,000,000 or £14,000,000 was expended on the Army Estimates. There was one thing which he should like to see decided upon in the army—namely, a shorter time of service. He thought that four or five years was a sufficiently long time in which to make a good infantry soldier; and he should like to see some such length of time fixed upon for the duration of military service. By this means a more intelligent class of men would be obtained as recruits. He believed that if men could become soldiers for four or five years only, there would be hardly a family in the country who would not like to have one of its members in the army. He wanted to see more military training for the whole population introduced into our schools. He would suggest that in each of the schools which were under the Privy Council there should be some sort of military training afforded, by the engagement of a sergeant from the army to drill the boys. With regard to the Reserved force, it was not a satisfactory state of things that the Staff should be drawn from the Line, and he should like to see the Volunteer force and the Militia supplied with a Staff of their own.

MR. ALDERMAN LUSK

said, he considered that civilians had a right to indulge in military criticism on the ground that they paid the Estimates, which were in creasing year by year, so much so that one branch of the defensive service cost as much now as both did in the time of the Duke of Wellington, and, in fact, our army was the most expensive in the world. He would not begrudge the expense if we had a satisfactory army; but it appeared there were only 40,000 men we could depend upon in case of need. Little and dear as the army was, there was much internal dissatisfaction; for scarcely a night passed but a military grievance was ventilated in the House, and there were many blunders of administration, such as those which had been recently exposed in connection with the removal of troops—mistakes of a character that could not, as a rule, be committed by business men, whose success depended upon their own efforts. There was a want of a responsible head. The fact appeared to be that there were several heads, and it was most difficult to fix responsibility when anything wrong occurred. The best places in the army, instead of being bought and sold, ought to be thrown open to the best men, who should rise by their merits, as the leaders of parties in the House of Commons did. With an open army and an open navy we should give a chance of advancement to men who might become future Wellingtons and Nelsons. He was sorry the right hon. Baronet did not look with a little more complacency on the Volunteers. It was very hard that they should give their time and energies and still have to pay in money for the liberty of serving their country. They ought to receive a little more from the State to save them from being out of pocket. It was most unhandsome of the country to allow that, especially as we trusted so much to the Volunteer force, and its requirements could be amply met by a tenth of the money which was now as good as thrown into the sea.

GENERAL DUNNE

said, the hon. Member, who had just addressed the House, had brought forward a number of grievances upon which hon. Members were accustomed to descant, but they might be easily disposed of. The expense of the army was to be in a great measure accounted for by the high price of wages in England; the comparatively small number of men retained in this country was owing to the large numbers drafted for service abroad; the disasters, which had happened in reference to the supply of the army when on active service, were chiefly owing to the failure of contractors to fulfil their contracts; while the reason why the purchase system had been retained was that the country would not sufficiently pay those officers who retired, worn out. Taking the statement of the right hon. Baronet as a whole, he thought it impossible not to be gratified with it. The right hon. Baronet had stated the whole case with a candour seldom displayed by Secretaries of State for War, and had clearly set forth the numerous defects in our system and the modes by which he was about to redress them. This would be most satisfactory to the country. The subject had been treated so ably by those who had preceded him that it was not necessary for him to go at all into detail. He only wished to say that the right hon. Baronet had shown them how necessary it was to retrace the steps taken by former Secretaries of War, for his opinion was that from 1848 down to the time when the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Huntingdon (General Peel) took office we had not had a Minister in this Department of the public service worthy to be called a Secretary at War. The right hon. Baronet who was now in office was going back to the old system, and much good would be the result. The right hon. Baronet now proposed to appoint an officer over all the manufacturing Departments of the army, and this would in his (General Dunne's) opinion be found most advantageous; but it was only going back to the system of the Duke of Wellington. He must, however, object to the amalgamation of the Militia and the Volunteers; it would be impossible to weld two forces that were entirely different in construction, training, and discipline. The Militia were under martial law; while the Volunteers were only under the discipline of their own will. He could not speak too highly of the patriotism of the Volunteers; but he could not call them soldiers or a Reserve army. Volunteers might be very well called an auxiliary force; but, technically and truly, they were not a Reserve, and he hoped, before it was too late, the Government would see the error they were about to commit in the amalgamation. It would not be good for the Volunteers—they did not wish it; it would certainly be injurious to the Militia, and it could never be carried out.

MR. PUGH

said, he hoped a fair trial would be given to the experiment of amalgamating the Militia with the Volunteers. He thought that many of the grievances of the two forces would be done away by that judicious step. There should be no jealousy whatever between them. The Militia were drawn from the same classes as the army, which had done so much for the glory of the country. The Volunteers were drawn from the middle classes, who by no fault of their own had had no opportunity of distinguishing themselves; but he hoped if ever they were called upon they would do their duty. It was said they were not under the Mutiny Act, but if ever their services were required for the defence of the country they would be placed under the Mutiny Act; and he should like to see them assimilated to the Militia, not by making the Militia more civilian, but by making the Volunteers more military. This question of a Reserve was a great question; it was that of the defence of the country; it engaged the attention of the Continental Powers, of France and Prussia especially. In favour of the Volunteers it might be said that the triumphant army of the latter Power was composed, in a great measure, of those classes from which the Volunteers derived their strength, from men engaged in trade, in professions, and in the arts and sciences. He remembered hearing that a distinguished statuary at Berlin had left his studio and shouldered his rifle to engage the Austrians. He hoped the Volunteers would not be disheartened because the Government was not able to comply with their request at present. They would remember they had a costly affair on hand at present—the Abyssinian war, which he hoped would soon terminate to the satisfaction of the country, and then the claims of the Volunteers might be considered. At present he thought a step had been taken in the right direction to unite them more closely with the Militia, and he hoped the only rivalry that would ever exist between them would be which of them should best serve their country.

MR. O'REILLY

said, there was one subject to which he had called attention for several years, when the fact was indeed denied—namely, how very inefficient the recruiting system was, and how far we were below the establishment at the end of each year. It was satisfactory, however, to find that the recommendations of the Royal Commission on this subject had been well and efficiently carried out by the Department. They had been successful in a double degree, providing a large increase and a superior supply of first recruits—an increase of from 5,000 to 7,000. They had given not only a large supply of re-enlisted men, but enabled them to take or reject whom they pleased. The reengagements last year were 26,000; the number we might have re-engaged had not been mentioned, but it must have been nearly equal to the whole number of men whose terms of service had expired. The hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Huntingdon (General Peel) had stated the number wanted to be 32,000; but it was satisfactory to know that the average number required to keep up the army would not be much more than 18,000—certainly not more than 20,000—so that they had now a source of supply that would enable them effectually to keep up the army. He hoped that every means would be adopted to maintain and increase the standard of good conduct among the men; and he would venture to express a hope that, now the pay of the soldier had been increased, it would no longer be given to him in driblets—as if the only way to keep a man sober was to give him his pay in such small sums that he could not get drunk upon it. When they were getting a better class of men they should treat them with more confidence. He had heard with great satisfaction that the Report of the Inspector General of Recruiting would be produced so as to enable them to form a judgment on the whole matter. There were several matters deserving serious consideration which were to be reserved. One was the subject of the retirement from the non-purchase corps of the army. That subject was to be brought before them for separate consideration. When it was brought forward he should be prepared to support the recommendation of the Committee of which he had been a member. There was another point that had been reserved—namely, the combination of the different manufacturing Departments of the army under one head. He expressed no opinion on that subject. It was also unnecessary for him to refer at present to the recommendations of Lord Strathnairn's Committeee, since they would be brought forward on a future occasion in greater detail. He, however thought that the change proposed by the right hon. Gentleman in the administration of the army supply would lead to greater economy. He did not feel called upon to express any opinion with respect to the question of the Army Reserve which had been brought forward by the right hon. Member for Huntingdon last year, as that subject would also come under discussion on a future occasion. With reference to the question that had been raised by the hon. Member for Queen's County (General Dunne), he saw no reason why the Militia and the Volunteers should not be under the inspection of the same general officer. There were five different species of military forces in this country—the Regular army, Militia, the Yeomanry, the Embodied Pensioners, and the Volunteers, which were at present entirely separate, and in some instances antagonistic, in their organization, and, in his opinion, it would be far better if all the different elements of the Army of Reserve were brought under the control of one head. He wished to direct the attention of the right hon. Baronet (Sir John Pakington) to two minor points connected with the subject. In the first place, it would be advisable to place the members of the survey Department upon a permanent, instead of leaving them upon their present temporary, footing. It would also be well if some arrangement were come to by which the sums to which those cavalry officers, who had purchased their commissions before the change in the regulations, were entitled on leaving the service were paid them at once, or were rendered available towards purchasing their future steps.

MR. AYRTON

said, he understood the Secretary of State for War to say that it was contemplated to put both the Militia and the Volunteers under generals of districts. [Sir JOHN PAKINGTON made a gesture of dissent.] He was anxious that the right hon. Baronet should explain whether he proposed to retain the great principle of the civil administration of the army—the principle that everything connected with the expenditure of public money—everything, in short, unconnected with the discipline of the troops and the use of arms, should remain in the hands of civil administrators. He could well understand how a contrary principle might find favour in the eyes of military men; but he trusted that, before introducing any change in this respect, the right hon. Baronet would submit his proposal in a distinct form, so that the House might express an opinion upon what, in his opinion, would tend to withdraw the expenditure of public money from the control of the representatives of the British taxpayers.

COLONEL NORTH

said, he should be glad to receive from his right hon. Friend some explanation with respect to the boys whom he proposed to introduce into the army. His right hon. Friend said he thought the boys educated at Chelsea might be advantageously employed in the army as non-commissioned officers. But did his right hon. Friend mean to say that they should at once be invested with the rank, and placed over the heads of all the other members of the force? If that were his intention, he (Colonel North) could assure him that the measure would create great dissatisfaction throughout the service. The hon. Alderman (Mr. Alderman Lusk) who had addressed some remarks to the Committee upon the subject of the army, and had immediately afterwards left the House, gave the Committee to understand that this country was paying a great number of millions for the support of 40,000 men; but the fact was, that although we had only about 40,000 at home, about £13,000,000 covered the expenses of something like 136,000 men. It was true, as the hon. Alderman complained, that the troops were scattered all over the world; but our soldiers were stationed in the West Indies and other unhealthy and pestilential places, not in consequence of their own inclination, for they would much rather remain in this country, but for objects of which the hon. Alderman himself would probably strongly approve. The hon. Member for Carmarthenshire (Mr. Pugh), in talking of the advantages which had accrued from volunteering in the Prussian service, should have remembered that volunteering was unknown in that country, and that every one was bound to serve for a certain length of time. He did not believe that such a system would be tolerated for a moment by the people of this country. The Volunteers ought and wished to be regarded as auxiliary to the military and the Militia, with whom they did not desire in any way to interfere.

MR. AYTOUN

wished to know, whether all the troops at home had been supplied with Snider rifles; whether they had been furnished to our troops in India and the colonies; and, whether it was intended to place them in the hands of our native troops in India and of our Volunteers? He understood that already about 300,000 weapons had been converted—enough, it might be thought, to arm the whole of our regular force. With respect to the Volunteers, the right hon. Baronet appeared to argue that, because the number of efficient riflemen was increasing, the Capitation Grant ought to receive no addition. He denied the justness of the inference. It was a fact that, owing to the smallness of the Grant, the selection of officers was confined to within very narrow limits, only rich men being able to accept the higher appointments.

MR. CHILDERS

said, he had to congratulate the right hon. Baronet on the very lucid statement in which he had brought these Estimates under the consideration of the House. The explanations which the right hon. Baronet had made had been none the more easy from the fact that the right hon. Baronet had to show that an apparent expenditure of about £15,500,000 represented a real outlay of less than £14,000,000. But there were some points involved in that statement on which he (Mr. Childers) was anxious to take that opportunity of making a few observations. He, like his right hon. Friend, noticed in the form of the Estimates some changes which, although about to be considered by them, had not been approved by the Committee on Public Accounts, and which, undoubtedly, tended to swell the Estimates. He would not, however, discuss this question of extra receipts, as it would come before the Committee to which he belonged. But the Secretary of State had suggested more questionable changes. His right hon. Friend had referred to the fact that all the transport expenditure was borne on the Navy Votes, and all the cost of the guns for the navy on the Army Votes; and had told them that he should like to see the cost of the army transports inserted in the Army Estimates, and the cost of guns for the navy in the Navy Estimates. Now, it seemed to him (Mr. Childers) that it would be very difficult to carry out that arrangement. The rule should be that the Department which had the spending of the money ought to be accountable for it on the lace of the Estimates. If the military Departments had the manufacturing establishments under their charge, then, however much of the out-turn of those establishments went to the navy, it was impossible that the navy could be properly made accountable for them. If again the transport department were under the control of the military authorities, then it ought to come under the military Votes; but as long as the charge of the transport service rested on the Admiralty, its cost should not be placed in the Army Estimates. The cost of the transport service was not all comprised in Vote 17 of the Navy Estimates; but included the charge for men, provisions, and items in several other Votes, and, therefore, if the army took those charges upon its Votes, it would take upon them, provision for a certain number of sailors, the cost of victualling the vessels, &c., and the only result will be confusion worse confounded. With the exception of cases of that kind, however, he entirely agreed in the general tone of his right hon. Friend's remarks, and admitted the desirableness of the Army Estimates showing army expenditure and the Navy Estimates showing navy expenditure. He thought it ought to go out to the country that they were not spending £15,500,000, but really less than £14,000,000, on the army. This, indeed, was a far too great expense for this country. But he could not but admit that the last Estimates of an expiring Parliament ought not to deal largely in important changes, which, whatever might be their direction or their extent, would have to come before the next Parliament, chosen by the new constituencies. The next House of Commons would most probably seek to render the army more national than it had hitherto been with respect both to officers and men; and those questions would have to be handled in a careful manner, lest they should destroy the existing machinery without constructing a better machinery in its place. But meanwhile one of the preparatory steps should be to get the control of the civil Departments of the army into a thoroughly efficient condition before they attempted to make more extensive changes. He was glad, therefore that his right hon. Friend had, during the Recess, taken up as his own peculiar question the subject treated by Lord Strathnairn's Committee, and although his right hon. Friend had not yet gone far in the matter, they had every reason to hope that, in the course of the present Session, an efficient control over those Departments would be brought about prior to the consideration of the further changes to which he had alluded. But coming to the recommendations of Lord Strathnairn's Committee, he wished to say at once that he thought it would not be expedient for Parliament to deal with them, as far as sanctioning or disapproving them went, until the whole scheme was fully before it. The matter was too large and too important to be treated piecemeal. We had a very peculiar system of army management. Without, then, discussing whether the relations between the War Office and the Horse Guards were the best that could exist, it must be admitted that those relations were of a peculiar and delicate character, and a danger he foresaw in dealing with the recommendations of Lord Strathnairn's Committee was that, unless the greatest care was taken, they might intensify the existing duality of the army administration, the result of which would be the most complete financial confusion and the utter destruction of anything like uniform action. The right hon. Baronet was of opinion that it would be desirable to place the Controller's Department under the management of an officer of high rank, who would bring to the War Office the experience which he had acquired in the service.

SIR JOHN PAKINGTON

explained, that what he had said was, that the recommendations of Lord Strathnairn's Committee was that the system of control should be commenced under an officer of high rank.

MR. CHILDERS

was not at all disputing the fitness of the two gallant officers selected, but desirous of pointing out to his right hon. Friend that unless the greatest caution was observed the effect produced might be to minimize that civil control to which the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Ayrton) had referred; and one of two things would probably happen—either the entire management of the army would be thrown into military hands, the Secretary of State being practically powerless, or they would have two military Departments acting as rivals to each other, and creating an infinitely worse dualism and anarchy than was produced by the antagonism between a civil and a military administration. He would next take the question of audit. For an efficient check on expenditure three things were necessary. First, they ought to have the means of knowing what expenditure was really going on; next, they wanted a proper controlling authority; and, thirdly, they required to have a Department engaged in auditing the expenditure which had been incurred, to ensure that the accounts were correct, both as to authority and as to voucher. It was important that there should be no confusion between these several distinct branches of financial administration. The right hon. Baronet had spoken of a prompt audit; but the whole theory of audit rested on the hypothesis that the auditor should not be hurried, and should not feel that he was obliged to exercise his functions with rapidity in order to keep up with the requirements of the service. For this reason he had heard with regret, rumours that the auditors of army accounts were to be subordinate to some high War Office official. He especially insisted that the auditing Department should be more directly under the control of Parliament, as is the Auditor-General. It should not be under departmental control. [Sir JOHN PAKINGTON said it was not.] He admitted that the right hon. Baronet had not yet committed himself to the error he wished to guard against; but he feared that the tendency of his arrangements was in that direction. The Audit Office, properly so called, or the War Office, should be more under the control of the Auditor General than under that either of the Controller or of the Under Secretary of State. With regard again to transport, so far as conveyance of troops by water was concerned, he thought the right hon. Baronet would act somewhat rashly if he attempted to run counter to the recommendations of the Committee which considered the subject, and to bring back that service under the control of the War Office. Allusion had been made to the scheme of retirement from the non-purchase corps which had emanated from the Committee which sat last year, and of which he was Chairman. Three objections had been urged against it, according to his right hon. Friend; first, the expense; secondly, that it would have a tendency to withdraw efficient officers from the army; and, thirdly, the dissatisfaction among the other branches of the service that would arise in the event of its being applied to the officers of the Artillery and Engineers. The Report had received, however, the unanimous sanction of a Committee composed of civilians and military men. But the real fault found with the plan had not been mentioned. The objectors to the scheme really felt that the system proposed was too economical for them. It had been urged by the senior officers of Artillery that under it they would lose prospects which, by the unequal character of the present system, had fortunately and accidentally been held out to them. Most probably the discovery of the three other objections alluded to by the right hon. Baronet was due to this cause. [Sir JOHN PAKINGTON: I never heard of that.] If the right hon. Baronet had not heard of what had been in every newspaper during the last six months, it showed how industrious those had been whose interest it was to keep him in ignorance. He (Mr. Childers) honestly believed the objections came from a very few persons, and that the facts were as he had stated them. He concluded by thanking the right hon. Baronet for his clear statement.

MR. WHITBREAD

said he would beg to recall the attention of the Committee to the question of the supply of men for the army. The right hon. and gallant Member for Huntingdon (General Peel) was to be congratulated on the success of his measures for supplying recruits and securing the services of the time-expired men. Not to detract from the measure; but in order to dispel any idea that they had already done sufficient, he must remind the Committee that the scheme came into operation at a favourable time. The years 1866–7 and 1867–8, in which the greatest number of men might have claimed discharge, were also years in which employment out of the army had been extremely scarce; and, consequently, there had been more men willing to enter the army and fewer desirous of leaving it. This was an clement that must not be omitted from the calculation. It was a moot point whether it was right or wrong to continue the services of the time-expired men; and the right hon. Baronet had hit the nail upon the head when he said that the Government should be in a position to accept or not, as they chose, the services of such men. The right hon. Baronet said he thought the number of men reengaging was a sufficient answer to the attacks made on the way in which the soldiers were treated. All he (Mr. Whitbread) had ever said, on this point, was that the measures formerly adopted had the effect of checking the disposition of men to re-enlist; and no man felt greater satisfaction than himself at the successful results of the improvements which had been made in the condition of our soldiers. With regard to the proposed system of training recruits for the army, he admitted that a fatal mistake had been made by the Committee, of which he had the honour to be a Member, in using the phrase "training boys." Those whom the Committee wished to train would be like the boys who enter the naval service. The boys of the navy were young men of nearly seventeen years of age when they entered the service. The Committee contemplated taking these young men a year older than the boys in the navy, and keeping them a year longer in training as soldiers. To make an effective soldier a man had a great deal to learn, and all he (Mr. Whitbread) asked was that he should be taught before and not after he was eighteen years of age. Let the boys be taught during the most teachable time of life, as boys intended for trades were taught. Were the training schools open to young men at the age of sixteen, they would not enter the army from sheer want of employment, or be driven to it because of their worthlessness; but would assuredly seek it with a determination to rise in the profession. Much fault had been found with the statement of the Government that these youths should go in as non-commissioned officers. [Sir JOHN PAKINGTON said, he had never intended it.] He was glad to hear it; for nothing could be more fatal to the plan he had at heart than that these boys should enter in any other capacity than ordinary privates. If the right hon. Baronet would give those boys a certain amount of general education and as much professional instruction as possible, and then take them straight from the school to the army, commanding officers would be only too glad to avail themselves of their services. Finding the value of these boys, they would not leave it to civilians to press this matter upon the War Office; but would themselves ask the right hon. Baronet to increase the number of these training schools for the army.

MR. OTWAY

in rising to move that the Vote be reduced by the number of 2,758 men said, the speech of the right hon. Baronet the Secretary of State for War was rather inconsistent. The right hon. Baronet had indicated a desire for economy; but, at the same time, the only economy which he seemed to have any hope of effecting was insignificant and hardly worth mentioning in an expenditure so vast. It was strange to hear the Secretary for War admit that these military accounts were no accounts at all—that they contained inaccuracies of such a character that it was impossible to determine from them what our military expenditure was. The expense occasioned in transport by the invaliding of soldiers was, for instance, charged to the navy, although it properly arose in the army. But it was evident that, in such a case, all that was necessary to prevent confusion was that a debtor and creditor account should be kept between the army and navy with regard to the transport of troops and every expense occasioned to the navy by transporting troops should be charged on account to the army. One important point in connection with the accounts before them was the question of audit. The hon. Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) said it was the theory that it should not be hurried. To that might be added another theory, that it should be independent. It was hardly credible that these accounts amounting to £15,500,000 was submitted to no independent audit whatever. What protection was there for the public? The system adopted was one of the worst that could be conceived; for the gentleman who audited the accounts had at the same time the payment of the money, and he would be a most disinterested gentleman if he were in a hurry to expose any error which he might discover he had made. There was one thing very noticeable, too, in reference to the audit, and that was, that whatever errors might be discovered, it very rarely happened that the money which had been improperly expended was recovered. In a year of profound peace Parliament was called upon to vote £15,500,000 for military purposes, and in return for that sum we had the smallest army maintained by any country in the world which professed to exercise any power. If the House would accept the proposition he was about to submit—namely, that the troops in the colonies should be withdrawn, we might very hugely reduce our military expenditure. The right hon. and gallant Member for Huntingdon (General Peel) had said that no comparison could be instituted between the cost of maintaining our army and that of maintaining foreign armies, especially those of France and Prussia, because we maintained troops in the colonies. But as to France that was incorrect. France maintained in Algeria as large an army as we had in India. He admitted that the soldier was better paid here than in any other country in the world, and he believed that he was as well clothed and as well fed. He did not think that any economy could be introduced into our army with regard to the pay, clothing, or food of a soldier. As to the officers, considering the outlay they had to make, through the pernicious system of purchase, they were the worst-paid officers in the world. In 1835, a year of profound peace, our military expenditure was £5,626,713, including the Effective and Non-effective services. In 1855, when we were engaged in a war with one of the great powers of Europe, and maintained a large body of contingent troops, our military expenditure was £13,721,158. Of course, the accounts then did not include certain things which were included now. [Colonel HERBERT: Did they include the Ordnance charges?] They did not. Again, in 1815, at the close of the great war, when we had 246,000 men under arms, the military expenditure of the country was £19,869,000. These figures showed how the Army Estimates grew. This year—a year of peace—the military expenditure was put down at £15,500,000. As the Estimates increased, however, the number of men employed grew smaller. That had been the case since the present Government came into office. In 1866, the Army Estimates were £14,340,000, and the number of men was 138,117. In 1867, the Estimates were £15,252,200, and the number of men 139,163. This year the Estimates were £15,455,400, and the number of men 138,691. The amount for the general staff of officers was also increasing. The sum voted for the general staff last year was £98,291; this year, with fewer men, it was £101,815. But these were only small matters. That which lay at the bottom of our military expenditure, was what might be culled the double government of the army. He did not think that that was a subject to be discussed on a question of military Estimates. He had given notice that he should take an occasion of submitting that subject to the House; because it involved, not merely matters of great constitutional importance, but questions of essential importance as regarded economy in the army. There was a double staff of officials to do work which could be well done by one Department. When we compared the expense of these two Departments with that of the one Department in France or Prussia, we saw the cost which the double government of our army entailed. The charge for the War Department was £224,578. There were 621 employés in the War Department, and 156 in the Commander-in-Chief's Department, making a total of 777 persons employed in the administration of the army. France, which had an army three times as numerous as ours, had only 480 clerks to administer her army, and the total cost of administration was 1,920,528f., or £76,838. The French standing army amounted generally to between 500,000 and 600,000 men, while ours was only 138,000. He had recently had an opportunity of inspecting the War Department at Berlin. Anyone who was acquainted with the arrangements in Pall Mall would be astonished on seeing the contrast exhibited by the Berlin Department. During the late war the Prussian army consisted of between 400,000 and 500,000 men, and it was administered in a way which commanded the admiration of all who watched its proceedings. The whole cost of the Prussian War Department was 326,000 thalers, or £48,900 a year. With these facts before them, he thought it was clearly time to make some reforms in our War Department. The right hon. Baronet was, like most Ministers of State, very hopeful, and if his hope was to be realized it would be by the employment of Sir Henry Storks and General Balfour, than whom two more competent gentlemen could with difficulty be found. He (Mr. Otway) was strongly of opinion that no real economy would be obtained in this direction until the Horse Guards were brought under the same roof with the War Department, and an end was put to the ridiculous and overdone system of correspondence between the two offices. He remembered a recent instance. As hon. Member put a question to the Secretary of State for War as to the landing of the 86th Regiment upon an island in which an epidemic was raging. He was asked to postpone his question until communication could be made with the Horse Guards. He would give an instance of the circumlocution which existed. A communication was sent the other day to the office by an Adjutant General of Artillery. It was the custom for every letter to pass through the hands of several clerks, each of whom made his sentiments known by a memorandum on the back of the letter. On the occasion in question the letter was returned to the writer with fifteen endorsements by clerks, the last of which was—"This letter should be referred to the Adjutant General of Artillery"—the very person by whom the letter had been written. This was a specimen of the "confusion worse confounded" which now prevailed. He knew a gentleman, too, who had assured him that his employment in the War Department consisted entirely in stamping and copying letters—work which could be done equally well by a non-commissioned officer at 1s. or 2s. a day in addition to his pension. He hoped Sir Henry Storks would soon see his way to a sensible reduction in the number of clerks. One of the items on which he desired to comment was that of £48,000 for agency. This sum the public were called upon to pay to certain gentlemen who acted as bankers for the army; but whose most important occupation was the conducting of illicit arrangements between officers for the sale and purchase of commissions. It was one of the most pernicious military systems that had ever existed, and the sooner this item disappeared from the Estimates the better it would be for the credit of everybody concerned. He hoped, indeed, his hon. Friend (Mr. Trevelyan) would succeed in carrying a Motion of which he had given notice, and with it the disappearance of this charge. With regard to recruiting, a considerable saving might be accomplished; for only those who had investigated the matter could have any idea of the unnecessary trouble which a recruit had to undergo, or of the expense which attended his being bandied backwards and forwards, and subjected to different examinations. When a recruit was brought up by the Marines, he was examined by a medical man, and if he was rejected there was no expense to the country; and this plan, if generally adopted, would be serviceable to the country with regard to general recruiting. He now approached the most important point in which a substantial saving might be effected. It had been asked, seeing that we had only 45,000 troops for the defence of the country in case of attack, where were the remainder of the 136,000 men the Committee were asked to vote, and the answer had been that 48,000 were distributed over our colonies. One would think that if soldiers were enlisted and sent to the colonies, the colonies would pay for their own defence. The people of Australia, man for man, were richer than the people of this country. But the colonics did not contribute their share. There was only one exception, and that was the unfortunate island of Ceylon, which was called upon to pay for more men than were in fact sent there. At least, so it was stated. The cost was £146,000 a year; the contribution, £160,000. The whole cost of our troops stationed in the colonies was £3,388,023, of which they returned to us £365,700, leaving a balance against us upon this head of £3,022,323. Expense, however, was not the only drawback attendant upon the present disposition of our troops; there was also danger. Would any man in possession of his senses contend that by any possible amount of valour or arrangement 12,000 British troops could successfully defend Canada from invasion? With such an immense frontier, America, at any moment she chose to march into Canada, could swallow the British force at a mouthful, and the very presence there of a small British force was provocative of such an expedition. Malta cost us a large sum yearly. Besides being a great military station, Malta was a great naval entrepôt; and there were naval and military hospitals, naval and military prisons, a naval and military baking establishment—in fact, all the establishments were in double. The place was not large enough to admit of the manœuvring of troops, and, as a consequence, the soldiers were suffering from lassitude and sickness in the warm seasons. It should be made essentially a naval station, and the military expense would at once be got rid of. The island should be garrisoned by marines, who could be changed about with the marines of the Mediterranean fleet. Great good would accrue and much less expense would be incurred than at present; 6,500 men would be set free for duty elsewhere. As for the guns at Malta, the Marine Artillery, the finest force in existence, could take care of them. He commended this idea to the Secretary of State; but he supposed it would not have much effect upon him. With regard to the particular Vote upon which he intended to test the opinion of the House by a Motion, the hon. Member proceeded to quote the opinions of officers, civilians, and military men, who were either heard orally or to whom interrogations had been addressed by the Committee moved for by the hon. and gallant Member for Lichfield (Major Anson), as to the possibility of superseding, or supplementing, British troops in the colonics by the employment of native troops. They sent British regiments to the West Indies, at a very considerable expense, to be decimated, when their places might be filled by troops belonging to a different race—for instance, Malays or Indian troops—having no affinity with the natives, and therefore not dangerous in case of disaffection amongst them. With regard to the Mauritius, it was questionable whether it was necessary to maintain a garrison there, but according to the statement of the right hon. Baronet himself, one-half of the force there might be dispensed with. Matters had changed very much since the days of Paul and Virginia, and sometimes the climate was little short of pestilential. He protested against our sending several thousands of European troops every year to climates of the most unhealthy character, and believed that to be one of the greatest impediments to recruiting. If it were necessary to send European troops there at all, such troops should be specially raised for the service. Never were soldiers more satisfied than the European troops that had served under the East India Company. The defence of all the West India islands must be a maritime defence, and garrisons as a means of defence were but of little use. What happened with regard to Hong Kong? Dr. Dick, the principal medical officer there, made a Report of the sanitary state of the island, and recommended the withdrawal of an European regiment, with a view to the preservation, as far as possible, of the health and efficiency of the British soldiers, and to a diminution of the great expenditure arising from casualties in a European regiment stationed in such a climate, and his recommendation was supported by the General in command. That Report was never acted upon, and six months after it was followed by another, in which Dr. Dick said that it was now his duty to show to what an extent the fears he then ventured to express had been realized. He then proceeded to state that within little more than three months deaths and invaliding among the men to the amount of 66 per cent per annum had taken place; that 81 out of 101 women and 71 out of 171 children had died, and that 11 officers had died or were invalided within the quainter. The West India command furnished an illustration of the way military affairs were managed by the War Department. The West India command consisted of 4,919 men, the cost of which was £282,172, and he now asked the Committee to listen to what followed. The staff employed in commanding those 4,919 men—about as large as a brigade or a major-general's command—consisted, among others, of two general officers, two deputy-assistant-adjutants-general, two assistant-quarter-masters-general, two military secretaries, two aides-de-camp, four fort-adjutants, four commandants, and nineteen clerks, and their pay amounted to £10,750. At the Mauritius 2,000 men were stationed, and the cost was £132,700, and the staff consisted of one major-general, one deputy-quarter-master-general, one military secretary, one aide-de-camp, one fort-major, and eight clerks. Their pay amounted to £8,880. Such a state of things was enough to excite the attention of the country; and people would say that there was an absurd, lavish, and improper expenditure, two or three general officers being employed to do what would be the work of one colonel in the French or Prussian armies. The authorities at the Horse Guards would say that they must find employment for our general officers, and the general officers when abroad must have European troops, the consequence of which was that the country was saddled with a vast expenditure for purposes so small and useless. He did not venture to ask that in this year's Estimates any large reduction should be made; but he would ask the Committee to do that which could be done without in any way affecting the public service. He proposed to withdraw half the garrison in the Mauritius, amounting to 958 men, and half the garrison in the West India, Windward, and Leeward Islands, amounting to three battalions, or 1,800 men. He would move that the number of men be diminished by 2,758.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That the number of Land Forces, not exceeding 135,933 Men (including 9,880, all Ranks, to be employed with the Depôts in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland of Regiments Serving in Her Majesty's Indian Possessions), be maintained for the Service of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, from the 1st day of April 1868 to the 31st day of March 1869, inclusive."—(Mr. Otway.)

SIR CHARLES RUSSELL

said, he would not at that hour attempt to follow in detail the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down (Mr. Otway) through his various statements; but would merely remark that every friend and foe of the army were agreed that the expenditure was too much, and would be exceedingly glad to see it reduced. The hon. Member said we had the smallest standing army of any nation that professed to keep one, and the hon. Gentleman now proposed to increase its efficiency by reducing it by 2,758 men. The hon. Gentleman had enlarged upon the intricacies of the double command, and, in fact, had entered into the question of the re-organization of the War Department — a matter which was now actually taken in hand, and which they expected to see dealt with in a manner which would lead to very beneficial results. The hon. Gentleman had alluded to 700 employés in that Department who, he said, had to do with only 136,000 men. But he omitted to mention the Militia and Volunteers, with which the Department had also to deal, making in all a force of 500,000 men. The hon. Gentleman had referred to the agency system, which he had discovered was maintained at great expense for the purchase and sale of commissions. He was surprised the hon. Gentleman had forgotten that the sum paid to Messrs. Cox nd Co. and other army agents was paid for their services in distributing pay, and acting as very useful and efficient bankers to the army in general. Though under the admirable arrangements of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Huntingdon (General Peel) the standard of the army had been raised an inch, which meant reducing the available sources of the supply of recruits by a very large number, the fact was that the strength of the army had been greatly increased. An advantage of the present system was that now, for the first time, commanding officers had the power of rejecting men that offered themselves for re-engagement. The hon. Member for Chatham (Mr. Otway) had complained that our troops were so scattered in the colonics that we could only put 40,000 men in line. He supposed the hon. Member must include Ireland among the colonies, for he had made no allusion to the 20,000 troops stationed there. He agreed with the hon. Gentleman that the defence of the long line of Canadian frontier was difficult; but how could we with any dignity withdraw our troops from Canada? As to the extraordinary arrangement suggested by the hon. Member at Malta, he was at a loss to know why marines should not suffer as much from lassitude there as Line soldiers. The hon. Member seemed to think there was no drill ground in Malta; but he could assure him that there was an excellent drill ground there, and that he had often been drilled on it till he was very tired indeed. With regard to the mortality at the Mauritius, he had passed fourteen months there, and a more beautiful and, at ordinary times, a healthier island he had never seen. The fever there was, of course, much to be deplored; but the island could not be defended by naval means, for it was surrounded by coral reefs, and ships of war could not lie off the island. Moreover, the Isle of Bourbon, close at hand, was garrisoned by a French force, which might at any moment make a descent upon the Mauritius. The substitution of black troops there and elsewhere would be no economy; for the cost of a regiment was within a few pounds that of an English regiment, and the black troops died off as rapidly as white troops. The proposal of the hon. Gentleman would effect an inconsiderable saving, and, as it would reduce the strength of the army by 2,700 men, he hoped the hon. Member would not put the Committee to the trouble of dividing.

CAPTAIN VIVIAN

said, the right hon. Gentleman had referred to him in the course of his speech as if he had stated that the British army cost £1;5,000,000. He was aware, however, that there was a sum of £2,000,000 under the head of repayments, which the Government would be recouped, and which reduced the army expenditure to £13,000,000. He believed that the public were led into error by these figures, and that they thought our army cost the extravagant sum of £130 per man. Many items were not fairly chargeable upon the army. For instance, as had been pointed out, there was the item of warlike Stores for the navy, though this was, perhaps, balanced by the transport furnished for the army by the sister service. On this point he suggested whether it would not be a good plan to set up a system of army transport for the army alone, quite independent of the navy. Deducting all the items which were not fairly chargeable against the regular forces, there only remained £11,750,000, or £86 per man; and this comprised food, clothing, arms, equipment, horses, and the pay of every single person connected with the army, from the right hon. Baronet downwards. He was glad to hear the improvements proposed in the Militia, which was the real constitutional force of Reserve to which we must look. It would be well that this force should be brought into closer relations with the regular army; and if it were placed in barracks when called out, that would be a great advantage, for discipline and morality could never be maintained under the system of billeting. Militia officers ought to receive greater encouragement, and he was much gratified at hearing that something was about to be done for that ill-used class of Militia officers, the Quartermasters. He congratulated the right hon. and gallant Member (General Peel) on the great success of the extra 2d. per day in procuring men for the army. It appeared from the statement of the right hon. Baronet that more men had re-engaged last year than in the preceding five years. It had been stated, with truth, that not more than 40,000 men could be set in line in this country; and his hon. Friend (Mr. Otway), looking at the number of troops employed in the colonies, wished to reduce the Vote for that service. Such a proposal opened up a grave question, which was probably of too much importance to be dealt with incidentally in Committee. If we were to increase our effective force it must be done by making the colonies pay for their own troops. It was an extraordinary thing that some colonies paid so largely for the number they had in comparison with the payments made by other colonies. He did not see how our interests could be served by our maintaining 12,000 men in Canada. The military courage of the Canadians would be more readily developed if we did not allow it to remain dormant by quartering our troops in the colony.

COLONEL PERCY HERBERT

said, that from his own knowledge and experience he should strongly deprecate the transfer from the navy to a military department of the transport of troops. In time of war it would be impossible to secure troops a proper safeguard during passage unless the arrangements were in the hands of the officer in charge of the naval force on the station. He was glad that notice had been taken of the remarks made about military agents; for it would be unjust to let it go forth that the very respectable firms and gentlemen who acted as agents for the different regiments did nothing for the £48,000 except carry on a traffic in commissions. They had responsible duties, and discharged them efficiently, and, although that might be done by a public Department, as it had been proposed they should, it had generally been considered that it was more economical to leave them to the agents. With regard to the force in the Mauritius, it was one thing to have it reduced by sickness in time of peace, and another to reduce it permanently by one half. The French had much the same garrison at Bourbon that we had at the Mauritius, which island was assailable at two points, where it could be defended by 2,000 men. There were only two harbours in the island; the smaller could be defended by 300 or 400 men, and the main harbour could be equally well defended by 1,500 men, with suitable fortifications. Therefore, granted that it was expedient to defend the Mauritius, the garrison was not altogether useless nor insufficient. It might require to be increased in time of war, but it was strong enough in time of peace. If it were not held by such a garrison, and were consequently lost, it would require a considerable number of troops and ships to re-take it. He had heard it stated that during the old wars with France £15,000,000 worth of property was captured by cruizers and privateers issuing from the Mauritius. Our commerce had enormously increased since then; and where would be the economy of saving £200,000 a year, and then re-taking the island, with a diversion of force which might be inconvenient, and at a very considerable expense, in order to prevent far greater loss being inflicted on our commerce?

MR. BARCLAY

said, that having resided two years in the Mauritius, he was able to affirm that the reduction of the garrison to 1,000 men would be most pleasing to the colonists, and would be a most acceptable relief to them. Personally, he thought the reduction might be made with safety, if the health of the remaining regiment were promoted by removing it from the town of Port Louis to a site already selected in a district of the island that was more salubrious. When privateers issued from the Mauritius, the island was self-supporting; but now, owing to the great cultivation of sugar, and increased population, the inhabitants depended for their subsistence upon the importation of rice from India; and, therefore the possession of the island depended entirely on maritime supremacy. The insalubrity of the island had been greatly exaggerated. A British regiment might be kept there with safety, and alone, or with a Sikh regiment, it would be sufficient for defence.

MR. CARDWELL

said, that an important question had been raised—the employment of British troops in our distant colonial possessions, which absorbed 50,000 men. It was satisfactory that, since the Report of the Committee of 1862, continuous and considerable progress had been made in giving effect to the policy which the House meant to pursue on this subject. He had heard with pleasure the other evening the statement of his right hon. Friend the Under Secretary for the Colonies, that the last remaining regiment was to be withdrawn from New Zealand. It happened to be his duty to propose to the House the arrangements which led to this; and he was glad the Ministers and Assembly of New Zealand had not elected the alternative offered to them of paying for the troops, but had decided upon their withdrawal. He was glad that the present Government were following the policy of their predecessors in this respect. In the course of last Session they were told the same view was being carried into effect by the present Government in regard to the Cape of Good Hope, and he cheerfully supported the policy, although no doubt at the Cape it must be pursued with caution and prudence. At the same time he hoped that the policy which had been firmly commenced, would be steadily and continuously adhered to. The question had been raised, whether we could not dispense with white troops in some colonies by substituting troops of a different race, not, he hoped, as a charge upon the Estimates of this country. He agreed with the hon. and gallant Officer opposite that if you wanted a service to be performed you would get it in the main performed more efficiently and cheaply by the employment of British troops; but the principle for which he wished to contend was that we should steadily go forward, declaring to the colonies that it is beyond our intention, as it is beyond our power, to furnish the men by whom they are to be defended. He said this on other than merely pecuniary grounds. Much was said about sanitary reforms and moral reforms that were to accompany our new system of recruiting, and to attract a higher class of men to the service; but if these things were to be done we must put an end to the plan of maintaining at one time 50,000 men in our colonial dependencies. For these reasons we must pursue, steadily and without check, the policy upon which we had entered. He felt convinced that the object of his hon. Friend the Member for Chatham (Mr. Otway) was not to diminish the British Army, but to bring it up to a higher point of efficiency, and he hoped that the reply of the right hon. Baronet the Secretary of State for War would render it unnecessary for his hon. Friend to go to a division.

MAJOR ANSON

cordially concurred in what had fallen from the hon. Member for Chatham with regard to the military expenditure for the colonies, and thought that the House should insist upon having a clear statement of the money which the colonists cost the mother country. The accounts were at present not worth the paper they were written on. There was also an absence of information as to the money value of our stores both at home and in the colonies.

SIR JOHN PAKINGTON

, in reply, said, he must express his thanks and his satisfaction at the general tone of the remarks with which his Statement had been received. In reference to some observations made by the noble Marquess the Member for North Lancashire (the Marquess of Hartington), he begged to assure the noble Marquess that when he stated that no guns were provided for the fortifications earlier than last year he had no intention to impute blame to the late Government. Indeed, he agreed with the right hon. and gallant Member for Huntingdon (General Peel) that, considering the progress which had been made in the manufacture of artillery, it was fortunate that a large expenditure had not been previously incurred in furnishing guns for the fortifications. In reply to the question which had been asked as to the intentions of the Government with regard to the two branches of the new Army of Reserve, as proposed by the right hon. and gallant Member for Huntingdon last year, he observed that he thought he had made it clear that he fully intended to adopt the plan proposed by that right hon. Gentleman of forming an Army of Reserve out of the Line by giving an increased amount of bounty to the Militia, and raising the Militia to a full quota. He had also intended to say that the scheme contemplated leaving it open to soldiers to commute the latter part of their service in the Line for a certain amount of service in the Army of Reserve. He did not anticipate that any large number of men would be derived in that way; but in order to carry out the plan it was necessary that regulations should be drawn up, which, after General Lindsay was consulted with respect to them, would be laid on the table of the House. Surprise had been expressed that so few small arms had been converted. He had to state that it was intended to convert 160,000 in the course of the year. The conversion would cost 3s. each, and when these had been converted their whole stock would be exhausted and they would have to rely on new manufactures. With regard to the armament of the Militia, he had to observe that there were not sufficient breech-loading arms in store to provide the Militia with weapons of that description. A certain number of Militia regiments would be sent this year, as during last year, to Aldershot, and all those would be provided with breech-loading arms, but a greater number could not be furnished this year with breech-loaders. In fact, all the regiments of the Line were not at present armed with them. The regiments sent of late to India were provided with the new arms, but the regiments previously quartered in India were not yet furnished with them. In reference to what had fallen from the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Ayrton), he repeated that the four branches of the reserved force, instead of being as now under the superintendence of three officers of inferior rank, would be placed under one officer of much higher rank. His hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Oxfordshire (Colonel North) had fallen into a serious mistake as to what he had said on the subject of training boys or young men for the army in any schools which might be established. It seemed to be the impression of the hon. and gallant Member that these boys would be at once turned out as non-commissioned officers. He had no intention of conveying such an idea, although he had alluded to a recommendation on that subject contained in the Report of the Commissioners. He entertained a sanguine hope, however, that by altering the constitution of Chelsea School and of the Hibernian School in Ireland, those two great establishments would be enabled to contribute well-educated and well-trained boys and young men to the army. All he had intended to say was that if a number of these well-trained young men joined the army every year, they would form a valuable class from whom non-commissioned officers might be selected. The hon. Member for Chatham had made some remarks respecting the unnecessary extent of the War Office establishment. That was one of the points which were now being investigated, and he was ready to confess that in his opinion the establishment might be beneficially reduced, both in regard to numbers and expense. He therefore did not feel disposed to express dissent from the remarks of the hon. Gentleman. Great complaints had also been made respecting the extent of the Staff in some of our colonial establishments, and here again he was not disposed to defend the existing state of things; for he believed that, in some cases, the Staff was larger than was necessary. He would now turn for a moment to the Motion of the hon. Gentleman, which he trusted would not be pressed to a division. The number of men in the West Indies and the Mauritius was smaller than it had been for several years, and the Government would not feel themselves justified in proposing any reduction. The hon. Member had represented him as saying that the establishment in the Mauritius had undergone a considerable reduction, but this was not the correct way of stating the case. What he said was that last year, owing to the pressure of a great calamity and to a dreadful amount of sickness prevailing in the island, discretionary powers to remove a portion of the troops were given to the commanding officer there. He did not think, however, that as a matter of public policy it was desirable to reduce the number of battalions in that island. The policy of the presen—as of the last — Government is to endeavour to make the colonies bear a fair share of the expenses of the military establishments kept up in them. In conclusion, he appealed to the hon. Gentleman not to press his Motion to a division.

COLONEL STUART KNOX

said, he wished to ask the right hon. Baronet, Whether he had taken into consideration the subject of granting pensions to the Quartermasters in the Militia in Ireland? There were, he believed, two quartermasters in Ireland who had been between fifty and sixty years in the service, and who could not retire because they would not be entitled to pensions. Thus the service was burdened with men who could not efficiently discharge their duty. In justice to them something ought to be done. He might add that their actual income was only £115 a year, including lodging money.

LORD ELCHO

said, he would beg to ask the right hon. Baronet, Whether he could state to the Committee the exact number of arms which had been converted up to the present date; and, also, what the cost of each of the boys to whom the right hon. Baronet alluded was to be?

MR. H. E. SURTEES

said, he was not sure whether the hon. Member for Chatham (Mr. Otway) wished that the troops should be removed from the West Indies, or merely that the cost of maintaining them should devolve on the local authorities. In the latter event a fresh burden would be imposed on those islands, which had suffered so immensely for years past; and to show the inexpediency of withdrawing the troops it was only necessary to refer to what occurred in Jamaica two years and a half ago.

SIR JOHN PAKINGTON

said, that with reference to the Question of the hon. and gallant Member for Dungannon (Colonel Stuart Knox), at present he had no intention of proposing any change with regard to quartermasters' pensions in Ireland. He was not able at that moment to reply to the Question of the noble Lord the Member for Haddingtonshire (Lord Elcho) as to the number of arms that had been converted. With inference to the supply of trained boys, he was sanguine enough to believe that he should be able to procure them without great expense.

MR. OTWAY

concurred in the desirableness of withdrawing the Amendment; but nothing that he had heard had at all altered his opinion as to the propriety of withdrawing our troops from the colonial out-stations, which now absorbed so great a number of them. It seemed to be a singularly difficult thing to make any reduction in the Estimates. At first he attempted to reduce the amount of expenditure, and to-night he attempted to reduce the number of men. But he could see the force of his right hon. Friend the Member for Oxfordshire's objection to a reduction of the number of men, and under these circumstances he did not think it would be right to put the Committee to the trouble of dividing.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

Original Question put, and agreed to.

2. 880 Native Indian Troops.

3. £4,249,200, Pay and Allowances, Land Forces, at Home and Abroad.

4. £892,500, Commissariat Establishment, &c.

MR. OTWAY

hoped the right hon. Baronet would now report Progress, as he believed the hon. and gallant Member for Lichfield (Major Anson) had something to say on this Vote.

MR. ALDERMAN LUSK

moved, that the Chairman report Progress.

House resumed.

Resolutions to be reported To-morrow;

Committee to sit again upon Wednesday.