§ SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE,in moving for leave to introduce a Bill "to amend in certain respects the Act for the better Government of India," and another Bill "to define the powers of the Governor General of India in Council at meetings for making Laws and Regulations, and to make better provision for making Laws and Regulations for certain parts of India, and for certain other purposes," said: I might have put these two subjects into a single amending Bill, but they were separated for this reason—the first of the two Bills is one of a limited character, but one which, if the House want to alter the position of the Council in India, it is important they should pass this Session; the second Bill contains provisions of a miscellaneous character, which possibly the House might desire to take more time in considering. It is necessary, with regard to the first Bill, that anything which this House may do should be done at once; because, it is certain that, in the course of 1202 this year, several Members of the present Council of India will resign their appointments, and, according to the present state of the law, their vacancies must be filled up by other gentlemen who will hold their offices, under the present Act, for life. If, therefore, as seems to be generally agreed, the tenure of the office of Councillor is to be limited, this opportunity of altering the constitution of the body ought not to be lost. The object of these Bills is to amend in several minute particulars the system under which we now administer the Government of India. It is not necessary on this occasion to enter into any elaborate discussion of the principles upon which our administration of India is founded. Still less shall I enter into any general question of the particular relation between this country and India. It is, indeed, a wonderful feat for a country constituted as England is to administer the affairs of so vast a territory as India, situated at such an enormous distance, and comprising so many populations so diverse from one another and from our own. It reflects honour upon this country that it should be able to conduct such an administration with the success which has, at all events, in recent times, upon the whole, attended our administration of India; and, if we look back upon the last ten years, during which we have been trying the experiment of the direct government of India through a Secretary of State in Council, responsible to Parliament, we may fairly say that experiment has been a very successful one, and that India has been fully as well Governed since 1858 as before, if not better. Certainly, in rising to propose some amendment in the present system, it is far from my intention to pass any reflection upon the working of the existing system of Government. The main principle that has guided Parliament in administering Indian affairs may be said to be this: that we have endeavoured to govern India by means of an Executive machinery in India, subject to a controlling machinery in England. And, although the distinction between the Executive machinery and the controlling machinery has not been always very strictly observed; still, upon the whole, that is the character of our administration. The Executive Government in India rests with the Governor General and the subordinate administrations. The control which was formerly divided between the East India Company and Parliament has, since 1858, been vested 1203 in Parliament itself; so that Parliament has become directly responsible for the administration of the affairs of India. The machinery by which Parliament has exercised this control is that of the Secretary of State in Council. The Council, as hon. Members are aware, consists of fifteen; gentlemen, of whom the greater part have served for a certain length of time in India. Half of them are elected members and half nominated by the Crown, and they have certain powers conferred upon them. They hold their offices for life, and act as the advisers, and, to a certain extent, the controllers, of the Secretary of State, in whom is vested the control of the Executive Government of India. The experience of the working of this system is very favourable to the general principles upon which it is founded. I am now speaking more especially of the Council, and it is right to bear my testimony—and I am sure my predecessors would also bear theirs—to the very efficient and invaluable assistance which they have derived from the gentlemen who have acted as their Council. I believe that, in some quarters, among persons not very cognizant of the nature of the business of the Council, or of the mode in which they discharge their functions, an impression prevails that the Council are more or less of a useless, and even of an obstructive, character. One frequently sees taunts thrown out against them as being old and superannuated members of Indian services, who have no acquaintance with the wants of the present day, and stand in the way of all improvement and reform; but any one who has had practical experience of the mode in which the Council has worked would feel that this was not only ungenerous, but a very untrue account of the matter. The greater number of the members of Council devote a large part of their time to the discharge of the duties of their office; many of them work as hard as any clerks or secretaries I have ever known in any public office; and, combined with the amount of work they do as departmental officers, they afford most valuable assistance as advisers to the Secretary of State. In estimating the value of the Council hon. Gentlemen ought to bear in mind the peculiar position in which the Secretary of State, as a general rule, is placed in administering the affairs of India. One who has had no personal experience of India is placed in an anomalous and difficult position, at least if he have not the assistance 1204 of a Council, because removed almost entirely from the control of public opinion in this country, deprived of the advantage which his Colleagues who are administering other Departments of the State have of free discussion in Parliament upon every question that arises, he is called upon to superintend and control the proceedings of the Governors of an enormous Empire at the other side of the world, upon thousands of details, embracing every class of business. He is at once charged with military duties, with financial duties, with the duties of home administration, with foreign affairs, with judicial affairs, with the management of great railway and other public works; and the enormous mass of business which comes upon him is perfectly overwhelming. How is he to deal with all these questions, unless he has the advantage of taking counsel with persons possessing such a considerable amount of practical knowledge and holding such an independent position as to be competent to enter into discussion with him? I do not know whether those who speak of the great advantages of personal government mean the term to be applied to the controlling authority in this country; I am quite certain, if they do, they are using a term of the significance and effect of which they are hardly conscious. Anything like an attempt to regulate and control the affairs of India through the personal authority of the Secretary of State alone would be a most disastrous failure and would lead to serious consequences. It may be said, no doubt, that the Secretary of State, if he were not assisted by a Council, would, of course, have the advantage of having heads of Departments who would be possessed of a large amount of experience and would be compelled to give advice; but that would not be equivalent to the advice, assistance, and control of a body of Councillors properly selected and holding a proper position. One of the objections urged against the present system is that these Councillors are able to overrule the Secretary of State upon various points of importance—that, in fact, his responsibility is frittered away by the circumstance that he has not the power to act as he himself pleases, and that, therefore, when he is taken to task in this House for anything done or omitted, he may shelter himself by pleading that it is not he but the Council that is responsible. In the first place, that is not strictly true; at least, to a very great extent it is not 1205 true. Except in questions immediately connected with the expenditure of money, and except in questions relating to certain appointments—of which I shall speak presently—the Secretary of State has always the power of over-ruling his Council if he pleases, although no Secretary of State would unnecessarily exercise it. Still, he has the power, and whenever he thinks a sufficient case has arisen, he is bound to exercise it. Therefore, he certainly ought not as a rule to shelter himself under the plea that it is the Council and not he that is responsible. No doubt he has the power, which has been from time to time exercised, of overruling his Council, and as he has the power he must be responsible when he does not choose to do so. With regard to questions of expenditure, I was some time before I was able to make up my mind as to the right proposal to submit to the House, or, indeed, whether I should make any at all. It is undoubtedly the case that the Secretary of State has not the same power of over-ruling his Council with regard to the expenditure of money that he has in other matters, and that is a very important limitation upon his powers. It might happen, for instance, that the Governor General might send home a despatch to this country calling attention to the sanitary condition of some of the great towns in India; and he might point out that it was necessary, in his opinion, that certain measures should be undertaken to improve the condition of those towns. The Secretary of State might be perfectly convinced that the Governor General was right; he might propose the necessary expenditure to his Council; they might by a majority, perhaps a small one, refuse to sanction it; and in that case the Secretary of State would be powerless. Suppose after a time a great calamity happened, an epidemic broke out in consequence of the neglect of sanitary precautions, a number of lives were lost, and the Secretary of State were called upon in Parliament to answer for that neglect, all he would be able to say would be that he was over-ruled by his Council. That is an illustration of what might happen under the present system. Undoubtedly, the controlling power is vested in Parliament, and if Parliament chose to hold the Secretary of State responsible it would seem reasonable that he should have ample power to exercise his authority. After full consideration, I am satisfied we may still leave things as they stand at present. I own 1206 that my first impression was that it would be desirable to give the Secretary of State power, when any expenditure was recommended by the Governor General, to overrule his Council if he thought proper, and bring the matter before Parliament for approval; but, upon further consideration, I believe it is better and safer to leave the matter as it now stands. I do not know that the imaginary case I have put has ever happened, and, looking to the spirit which animates the Council in India—and which I believe always will animate any Council in India, if you have a Secretary of State who is really competent for his office—I think it will scarcely ever happen that the Council will refuse expenditure which he takes the responsibility of urging upon them, telling them that he must hold them responsible for refusing it. If they do so, he has it in his power to bring the matter before Parliament in such a way as to raise a full and fair discussion, and if the Council were objecting to that which was absolutely necessary, I believe he would be able to overcome them. Therefore, I do not think it is necessary to introduce any change in the present system, which has in it very great advantages, including this, that it furnishes a check to any rash or ignorant action on the part of the Secretary of State. There are certain disadvantages; but, considering all things, I do not propose any alteration. With regard to the other point on which the Council have supreme authority—namely, the appointment of certain officers in India, the members of the Governor General's Council, and of the Councils of the Governors of the Presidencies, I feel differently. I think we ought to lay down as the first principle of our proceeding that the Executive in India should be as strong as possible, and that the control should be exercised, not in India, not by any vexatious hampering of the Governor General or the Governors, as the case may be, but by the deliberate action of the Secretary of State in this country. In former times, when India was at a great distance in point of time from this country, when it was impossible to send home for instructions, and when the Governors and the Governor General had enormous power, it was undoubtedly right to put some check upon them, and Council in India were, no doubt, invented for that purpose. In the days of Warren Hastings such control was effectually exercised. The state of things now is so changed that the occasion 1207 for this sort of control seems to have ceased. On the other hand, the character of the business done in India has materially changed as India has become more civilized. It becomes more and more necessary that the Executive should be able to distribute its business among Departments, as is done in this country, ceasing to be a controlling power over the Governor General, and becoming more ministerial to discharge particular functions with authority. It is becoming important that the Governor General should have the support in his Council of men upon whom he can rely, and who will be of use to himself, he retaining his responsibility, he being the person responsible to the Secretary of State, and not they; and if that is so, it would seem natural that the Governor General should have the power of selecting his Councillors. Speaking from my own point of view, I should have been very glad to give the Governor General directly the power of nominating his own Councillors. It has, however, been pressed upon me by men whose opinions I am bound to respect that there may be cases in which this would lead to inconvenience. I therefore propose, instead of giving the power directly to the Governor General, to give it to the Secretary of State—that is to say, to provide that Her Majesty shall by Royal Warrant nominate these Councillors, and that power Her Majesty will, of course, exercise, under the advice of the Secretary of State, who, it is to be supposed, will be guided by the advice of the Governor General in regard to the selection of those gentlemen. I cannot but think that there may be a tendency, on the part of the Council of India, composed of men such as Indian Councillors always must be, to look upon such appointments in a different light from that in which as I conceive they ought to be regarded. That is to say, that, being for the most part old civil servants, they are tempted to look on the position of Councillor as one which the members of that service, if they are persons of average competence, and of a certain standing, ought in due course to attain, and that it is a case of injustice or unfairness to pass over a man standing high in the Civil Service and put one who is his junior into the Indian Council. It is, in fact, thought that after a certain period of service a man earns his appointment to the Council. That is a state of 1208 things which I do not deem satisfactory, and I wish to get rid of any danger of that kind, because nothing could be more injurious to the Government of India than to turn it into anything that could be called a "bureaucracy." But if you pursue a system under which the majority of the Councillors are appointed by rising to a certain position in the Civil Service, you do, in fact, create a "bureaucracy." I therefore propose that the power of nominating the members of the Governor General's Council, and those of the Councils of the Presidencies should be transferred virtually to the Secretary of State. The only other point in this Bill that I need mention relates to the control over the expenditure. It is this—There is in the present Act for the Government of India a section which provides for the appointment of an officer called the Auditor General, who has great power vested in him by that Act. He has to examine all the accounts, and see that nothing is done, and no expenditure ordered without proper sanction; and, to secure his independence, direction is given in the Act that he shall be appointed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who is also to fix his salary, which he is to receive for life, or as long as he conducts himself properly. All that sounds very well, but in actual practice, whether intentionally or through inadvertence, I do not know, that clause has been made a mere farce. Because, although a very distinguished gentleman has been appointed as Auditor General, and a salary which cannot be taken from him, has been assigned to him by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, yet that salary is only £300 a year; and, inasmuch as he is a very valuable officer, and performs some important departmental duties, an addition of £700 a year has been made to his income by the Secretary of State in Council, which is quite independent of what he enjoys by Royal Warrant, and might be taken from him to-morrow by a stroke of the pen of the Secretary of State in Council. To say that a gentleman with a fixed salary of £300, and a variable one of £700, depending on the pleasure of those whom he is appointed to control, is an independent officer, is what I call a mere farce; and I therefore; propose that the Auditor General shall continue to receive the same salary as now—namely, £1,000 a year, but that it shall be given him by the Act, and at the same words will be inserted, providing that he shall not receive any other salary from the 1209 Secretary of State. Beyond this, we do not propose that there should be any material alteration in the principles on which the control over the expenditure is exercised; but I do think it would be desirable that this House should take somewhat more interest in observing what the expenditure is. I have introduced some changes in the form of the accounts which will render them rather more intelligible to the House. I have called on the Auditor General to make his Report in such a manner as will show whether there are any points which he thinks ought to be challenged, so that attention may be directed to them; and I hope the House will consent to refer the accounts with the Auditor General's Report upon them to the standing Committee of Public Accounts, which examines the audited accounts of Imperial expenditure. And if that Committee will undertake this duty, I should propose that when the Secretary of State brings forward what is called his Indian Budget, instead of asking the House to pass a Resolution affirming simply that certain facts have been laid before it, he should propose a Resolution to the effect that the House has seen the Report of the Committee of Public Accounts upon the Auditor General's statement, and approves the same. That would be a kind of voucher which would not impose any great responsibility on the House, but which would afford it more opportunity, if so disposed, of challenging any particular portion of the expenditure, may mention a matter which has been, I admit very properly, the subject of some criticism in this House. I refer to the expenditure incurred last year for the ball to the Sultan. Under the old form of the accounts that expenditure would never have appeared in any account presented to this House; but I have ordered the accounts to be prepared in such a shape as that any item of that kind would be easily seen, and that the House might have an opportunity of expressing an opinion upon it. I do not, however, think it would be desirable so to alter these things as to call upon the House in any way to vote the expenditure for India, because that would change in an inconvenient manner the relations between the Imperial Parliament and India in financial matters. I have described to the House the whole of the first Bill which I wish to bring in for the amendment of the Govern merit of India Act. There is another Bill I propose to introduce, which is intended to de- 1210 fine the powers of the Governor General of India in Council at meetings for making Laws and Regulations, and to make better provision for making Laws and Regulations for certain parts of India, and for certain other purposes. That is a measure of a somewhat miscellaneous character. There are three or four provisions in it which I will very briefly mention. The first of them does not make any change in the law, but affords greater facilities to the Governor General for over-ruling his Council. At present the Governor General has by law the power, by a very cumbrous process, of over-ruling his Council in matters in which he thinks the safety or the good government of India is concerned. That is to say, it is understood that if there is a difference of opinion between the Governor General and the members of his Council, they may exchange Minutes the one with the other, and after that exchange of Minutes has gone on for a certain time, and they have failed to convince one another, then the Governor General may over-rule his Council. Now I propose a simpler method of doing the same thing—namely, that on the first occasion their difference of opinion has become decided, and they know that they do disagree, the Governor General shall at once be able to over-rule his Council, giving, of course, to his Councillors the power of recording Minutes, with their reasons for dissenting from him, and providing for those Minutes being sent to the Secretary of State. Another point of a rather technical nature, and which it will, perhaps, be best to leave till the Bill is in print, relates to the definition of the power which the Governor General in his Legislative Council has to make laws for British subjects in other parts of India. Then comes another point of considerable importance. The House is aware generally of the distinction drawn between the Regulation and the non Regulation provinces of India, and probably also that under the Indian Councils Act of 1861, the power which was formerly supposed to be vested in the Governor General of making laws or regulations with the force of law for the non-Regulation provinces, has now ceased to exist, and that, in fact, there is no means by which he can legislate for the Punjab, the Central Provinces, or any of the outlying parts of India which has not a Legislative Council of its own, except through the Legislative Council of India. Well, the Legislative Council of 1211 India is a body extremely well qualified, no doubt, to legislate for the settled parts of India; but it does not appear to be very well qualified to legislate for the wilder, ruder, and more distant portions of that country. In the first place, its composition is not such as would enable it very easily to legislate for certain remote parts of India; and, in the next place, the very fact, that anything which is proposed for the regulation of those provinces must form matter of debate in the Legislative Council is a serious evil; because in those wilder districts what is wanted is something more in the nature of despotic ordinances to meet promptly and at once some difficulty that has arisen; and if those ordinances are made the subject of discussion in such a fairly advanced Council as now usually sits at Calcutta, there is every probability that misunderstanding and misrepresentation may arise, and those very discussions may produce much mischief in the provinces in question. What I propose in this Bill is to give powers to the Lieutenant Governors of the Punjab and the other provinces where there are no Legislatures, and also to the authorities in Such parts of India as may be specified by the Secretary of State, to propose regulations to the Governors in Council to which they may give the force of law. That suggestion emanates from Mr. Maine, and is entirely approved by Sir John Lawrence. There is another point which relates to the very important question of the Government of Bengal. The House will bear in mind much that happened last year in consequence of the melancholy and disastrous famine in Orissa, and the inquiries that were made into the steps that were taken to avert and relieve that distress. The House will not have forgotten the result of those inquiries was far from satisfactory as to the picture of our administration of Orissa. It was a difficult matter to say upon whom the responsibility of that failure directly fell—whether on the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, on the the officers under him, or on the Government of India. The peculiar relations that exist between the Governor General and the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal were undoubtedly seen to be very inconvenient and embarrassing. These circumstances have naturally caused a great deal of attention to be bestowed upon the question of the administration of Bengal. Early in the autumn, I drew the attention of my Council to the subject; and the most 1212 convenient mode of proceeding, I thought, was to appoint, a Special Committee of the Council of India, and submit to them certain questions as to the administration of India generally, and especially as to the future organization of the administration of Bengal. That Committee devoted considerable time to the examination of the subject, and ultimately presented a Report, which was signed by four out of six members of Committee; the other two put in a dissent. The view the majority took was this — that Calcutta ought to be the capital of India, that it was essential that the Governor General and the Government of India should be permanently resident in Calcutta, and that if the Government resided in Calcutta it would be inexpedient and embarrassing to have a separate Government of Bengal in the same city with the Government of India. They held, therefore, that the Government of Bengal should continue, as at present, under a Lieutenant Governor, but strengthened by the addition of secretaries and other officers, and they proposed to take the city of Calcutta out of the administration of the Lieutenant Governor and place it under the direct administration of the Governor General of India. They also proposed that the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal should be a member of the Governor General's Council. Two Members of the Committee dissented from those recommendations, however, and advocated the erection of Bengal into a full Government, like Madras and Bombay. It happened that Mr. Maine was in this country, and he put in a very interesting memorandum on the subject. After these Papers were presented and I had considered them, I adopted the view of the minority — that it was more desirable that the Government of Bengal should be erected into a Presidency on the footing of Madras and Bombay. I also came to the conclusion that the majority of the Committee were wrong in thinking that it was necessary to confine the Governor General of India and his Council to Calcutta, and that it was rather desirable that they should be as far as possible detached from any local or special administration. It seemed to me unnecessary to lay down the principle that there should be but one capital of India, and that capital Calcutta. I thought that by detaching the Government of India from local administration, and setting it free to place itself wherever its presence was required, 1213 the question of the capital would soon settle itself. I caused a despatch to be prepared for the purpose of being sent to India, and submitted it to my Council; they came to a division on the subject, seven in favour and eight against my despatch; I had power by giving a double vote to have turned the scale, but I was under this difficulty—I had been in private communication with Sir John Lawrence, and I knew his own opinion was adverse to the change I wished to propose. He thought it would weaken the authority of the Governor General that a Governor of Bengal should be silting by his side; and, knowing that to be the opinion of the Governor General, and that my Council were equally divided, I thought it was not a case in which it would be right for me to exercise my casting vote to direct that these steps should be taken. I thought it rather desirable that I should direct a letter to be written to the Government of India, stating the case, and asking them officially to state their views. Accordingly, I had such a despatch prepared and sent out to India. I did so with the intention of bringing the matter before Parliament, and giving this House full knowledge of what had taken place, and all the arguments used on both sides of the question. I am sorry that I have not yet got the official answers from India; but I have received privately Papers from Sir John Lawrence, and from the present Lieutenant Governor of Bengal; and what I propose to do is to lay before the House the various memoranda which have been put in, and the despatch and Papers I have sent out to India; so that the House may have before it all I have as the means for forming their opinion. But in the Bill all I propose to do is to insert a clause giving power to the Secretary of State, if he please, to erect Bengal into a Presidency, on the footing of Madras and Bombay, either with or without a Council. I do not think I need enter further into that part of the subject. There is only one other point included in the Bill which I must mention, and it is one of considerable importance and interest. I am sorry I do not see the hon. Member for Brighton (Mr. White) in his place, who has given a Notice with reference to the subject—it relates to the admission of the Natives into the Civil Service of India. It was always felt by the old Court of Directors, by the Indian Council, by all the home authorities, and, 1214 indeed, by the Indian authorities also, that it was most desirable, as far as possible, to make provision for the employment of the Natives of India; but the difficulty has been in what way it could be accomplished. When the hon. Member for Brighton brings forward the Motion for which he has given notice—that competitive examinations should be held in India I shall feel it my duty to state the reasons why I cannot assent to that proposal. I do not think it would be at all suitable to the condition of India that the Civil Service should be thrown open to anybody who can pass the best competitive examination among the Natives of India; for, although I am a strong advocate for competitive examinations in this country, I do not think they apply to such a country as India, where you require, not the cleverest men, but various other qualifications which you are not so well able to test by competitive examinations. It was felt, however, that a great deal more might be done with respect to the admission of Natives. In the Uncovenanted Service there are a great many appointments that are of considerable value, and a Return has been presented to the House showing the number of appointments in the Uncovenanted Service held by Natives and Europeans; and it is not pleasant for me to say that the proportion is, I think, about six Europeans to one Native. The impression of myself and the Council is, that the Uncovenanted Service should be, as far as possible, a Native service, though no doubt certain appointments should be given to Englishmen. In explanation of the large proportion of Europeans in the Uncovenanted Service I may mention that appointments were given to many Europeans who rendered services during the Mutiny, and other appointments were given to the sons and relatives of old officers. Still, I feel that the Uncovenanted Service is a dangerous service for Europeans, as it affords a scope for jobbing, and we ought to confine it more to Natives than to Europeans. In addition to this, I think it desirable that we should provide some mode by which Natives should be admitted into the Covenanted Service; and I therefore propose to introduce into the Bill a clause to open, to a certain extent, a door for that purpose. At present there is an Act by which a certain number of choice appointments are reserved to members of the Covenanted Civil Service which can only 1215 be entered by competitive examination in this country; but there is also, by a section of that Act, power given to the authorities to appoint other persons, provided they have resided in India a certain number of years, and have passed certain language tests. This latter provision, however, not being thoroughly effective, I propose to introduce a clause declaring that nothing in that Act shall prevent the authorities from appointing any Native of India to any post in the Covenanted Service, subject to such regulations as may appear expedient to the Governor General, and as shall be approved by the Secretary for India and the majority of his Council. Such a provision will afford a safeguard against the powers being abused to the detriment of the Covenanted Civil Service. I propose, also, to define a Native of India as being a person born of parents habitually resident in India, and not of persons merely established there for a temporary purpose. I have now gone through all the main provisions of the two Bills, and if the House adopts them I think they may tend to improvements in the Government of India, though I am far from saying that they go to the root of the difficulties we have to deal with. We must consider that India is not one undivided whole; and that we have to deal with an enormous variety of people in every stage of development. It is desirable to provide, as far as possible, the means of fair play among the different parts of India, and to bring about a state of things, in accordance with which there would be more of local administration, subject, however, to the general control of the Government of India. With respect to the financial relations of one part of India to another, those are questions into which it is impossible for me at the present time to enter; but they have been raised in India, and are now undergoing consideration there. Mr. Massey hits proposed a scheme by which local administration and objects may be promoted by the expenditure of local funds, raised on a system of local taxation. This is a matter difficult to manage, and we must be cautious, for it is better to be a year or two too long than to be precipitate in our proceedings. However, in the general principle of Mr. Massey's proposals I cordially concur; and I hope it will not be very long before something of the kind is carried into effect. We must take care that the solidity of Indian finance is not shaken, and we must 1216 provide safeguards against reckless expenditure. We have a system which has raised the credit of India to the highest pitch, and therefore I would be the last to disturb it, and would be slow and cautious in introducing any change. Nevertheless, I repeat that in the principle of Mr. Massey's suggestions I concur. With regard to the two Bills, the objects of which I have now explained, I propose to introduce them to-night, and to name three weeks or a month hence for the second reading, and I will move for the production of those Minutes and Papers to which I have adverted. Some of these Papers are of a character that it is not usual, perhaps, to produce, they being more or less of a confidential character; but there is nothing in them which it will be objectionable to publish, and it will be for the convenience of the House that they should be in the hands of Members.
§ Bill to amend in certain respects the Act for the better Government of India, ordered to be brought in by Sir STAFFORD NORTHCOTE and Sir JAMES FERGUSSON.
§ Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 91.]