MOTION FOR PAPERS. (Hansard, 8 June 1866)

§ MR. DARBY GRIFFITH

asked the 76 Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, What course the Conference on the Danubian Provinces were taking in reference to the expressed wishes of the Moldo-Wallachian population? and added that he was quite aware of the difficulties of dealing with the matter. The elements of the subject were so various that no Government appeared to be able to look at them in such a light as would afford fair hope of a settlement. In ancient times the provinces were a mere appanage of the Porte, but by the intervention of the European Powers that state of things had been altered, and they had become more or less European in their character. The maxims, however, which were applied to them in the present day seemed to suit neither their old character nor their new one. They were not considered as actually subject to the Porte nor as actually independent. The Treaty of 1856 assumed to settle the position of the provinces, but soon afterwards it was found that its provisions would not be tolerated in the country; and therefore the provision that required the separation of the provinces was abrogated, and the union of the two countries was allowed. If this part of the treaty was so easily abrogated by the consent of the Powers, in what particular was the other part of the treaty as to their not being governed by a foreign prince, entitled to a greater amount of respect? No doubt the inhabitants had excellent reasons for selecting a foreign Prince, and especially that one which was founded upon the existence of internal jealousies. The state of feeling there was accurately described by the present leader of the House (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) eight years ago, when he said that— If the rule of a foreign Prince is thought to be desirable, depend upon it such a choice is made as a means of avoiding internal jealousies. No people in their senses ever preferred the rule of a foreign Prince, except as a means of preventing internal dissensions. If the people of Wallachia and Moldavia were now acting on that principle, why should we interfere to prevent them from doing so? This was not a mere caprice on their part, for the very same jealousy existed in this country, as appeared by the Royal Marriage Act, the object of which was to avoid the possibility of internal dissensions, by preventing members of the Royal family from contracting marriages with English subjects. The first attempt had been made in Belgium to obtain a prince, and that having failed, the 77 people had looked elsewhere. But it had been said that the interests of the Porte were affected and perhaps injured by this election. He altogether denied it. The only object these provinces had in view was to obtain their reasonable independence. It was the true interest of the Porte to consult all the reasonable wishes of the people in the Danubian Principalities, just as it was the interest of England to do the same with respect to her colonies. The Principalities were quite aware of the value of their nominal suzerainty to the Porte, just as the colonists of England were conscious of the benefits they derived from their nominal dependence upon us; but in the one case as in the other, it was felt to be desirable that the dependence should be nominal, and that it should not be made the excuse for an injudicious and unnecessary interference with the privileges and desires of the people. The reason why the provinces were valuable to the Porte was because they were a bulwark against any other Power. There could be no doubt that the real policy to be recommended to the Porte was to acquiesce in the wish of the people. In Belgium, under circumstances substantially similar, no objection was made to the election of Prince Leopold, nor were the consequences of that exercise of the popular will such as to inspire them with any feeling of regret that it had taken place. The relations between Holland and Belgium had grown more intimate in consequence, and the result was that those two countries would cordially assist each other, if any common enemy should menace them. He believed it was wrong to prefer any policy of any other Continental Power in the East to that pursued by France. That policy was the best for the preservation of the peace of the world, though he did not deny that there might be a certain amount of ambition in it, and an occasional hankering after an extension of territory. At all events, the policy of France was based upon some kind of principle, and showed consideration for the rights and the habits of other people; and it was a great mistake to depart from the policy of France without having a paramount reason for doing so. Now, the Emperor of the French either avowedly or tacitly had given his countenance to the election of the Hospodar, and England could not do better than follow the example thus set. He was afraid that unless some steps were speedily taken in the matter, a serious col- 78 lision would occur between Turkey and Russia. He did not wish to make Her Majesty's Government responsible for what might happen, but it was not sufficient that the intentions of a Government should be good, their conduct should be wise, and of this wisdom success might be taken as a test. He wished to ask, what was the present state of the negotiations, and especially whether the Turkish troops had entered these provinces? And he also begged to move for any papers that there might be relating to the subject.

§ MR. LAYARD

said, he would not detain the House at greater length than he could help; but, at the same time, he wished to say a few words in order that the whole matter might be correctly understood. His hon. Friend said the subject to which his question related had been very much misunderstood in this country and still more so abroad, and he was not sorry to have an opportunity of placing the matter before the House in a proper light. The hon. Gentleman, however, had altogether misstated the history of the Danubian provinces. He had spoken of them as though they had long been conquered and governed by the Turks; whereas, in truth, those provinces at a distant period of time, for reasons of their own, voluntarily placed themselves under the suzerainty of the Porte. Turkey was then a strong Power, and they considered that she was then enabled to protect them. At first the Turkish Sultan was in the habit of sending as Hospodars or Governors of the provinces Turkish subjects; but, after a time, the provinces became dissatisfied with that arrangement, and claimed the right of electing their own Princes. That right was conceded to them by the Porte, and the two provinces had for a long course of years themselves through their Assemblies selected their Hospodars. The Russian Government who always felt or professed to feel a great interest in those Princi- 79 palities interfered on various occasions in consequence of what they considered to be the improper conduct of the Turks towards the Principalities. It was, however, but fair and just to the Turks to say that during the whole of their long connection with Moldavia and Wallachia, on no occasion had they interfered with the internal self-government of those provinces. No Turks ever lived there, nor, except in case of war, were ever seen there, and he believed that no two provinces were ever more independent and self-administered than Moldavia and Wallachia. There existed in Moldavia and Wallachia a Christian aristocracy, which was not the case in the other Christian provinces belonging to the Turks, where the land was almost entirely in the hands of Mahommedans. While in nearly all the other provinces of Turkey the landholders and chief persons were Mussulmans, in the Principalities they were all Christians, and the population was purely Christian. In no other provinces of the Turkish Empire was there a Christian aristocracy, which stood between the power of the Hospodar and the people at large. It was the want of such an aristocracy that he believed had been the cause of the great misfortunes that had befallen Greece since its severance from Turkey. In consequence of the presence of that Christian landed aristocracy, the provinces were far advanced in civilization, and were the richest and most prosperous of any of the Sultan's dominions. By the treaties of Adrianople and Bucharest, the Russian Government had obtained from the Porte a right of protectorate over the provinces, and a right to interfere in their internal affairs. The Crimean War arose in consequence of the Russian troops crossing the frontier of the province. At the termination of that war by the Treaty of Paris the suzerainty of the Sultan over the provinces was solemnly recorded, although it was especially stipulated that the Hospodars should be elected from among the natives of the provinces, and that treaty further declared that the exclusive right of protectorate over the provinces claimed by Russia should be transferred to the great Powers jointly who were parties to that treaty. As the interests of Moldavia and Wallachia were not well understood in Western Europe, a sort of joint Diplomatic Commission, of which Sir Henry Bulwer was a member, was sent by the 80 great Powers who were parties to the treaty to inquire into the affairs of those provinces. Eventually, in consequence of the Report of that Commission, an additional convention was entered into between the great Powers, whereby it was stipulated that while the suzerainty of Turkey over the provinces was fully recognized, the inhabitants should have power to elect as Hospodar of each province a native not less than thirty-five years of age, whose father was also a native of the province. No doubt there had existed a party in Moldavia and Wallachia who were anxious for the separation of the provinces from Turkey. The first object of the party in endeavouring to carry out that design, was to induce Turkey to allow them to elect a foreign Prince as Hospodar. That design did not succeed, and then they sought for a union of the provinces, and to have one prince, and Moldavia having elected Prince Couza, the object was that the Wallachians should also become subjects of the same prince. By taking this step they had not violated the Paris Convention, although it was certainly an infringement of the spirit of the treaty, and the parties to that arrangement represented to the Turkish Government that it would not be worth while to insist upon the provinces electing separate Hospodars. The Porte voluntarily accepted the recommendations of the Great Powers, but made this reservation, that in case of Prince Couza's death or deposition, the two Assemblies should be convened, and the people should have the opportunity of deciding freely whether union or separation was most conducive to their interests. The Porte made this stipulation from no interested motive, but because it entertained a firm opinion that the supporters of the union and of a foreign Prince formed a small minority, and that the greater portion of the population were in favour of separation of the Principalities. Whether that opinion was right or wrong he would not discuss, but many persons acquainted with the Principalities still believed that separation would be more conducive to their prosperity, and there was undoubtedly a very large party in Moldavia who objected to that principality being merged into Wallachia, which was what the union really amounted to. The reservation of the Porte was accepted by all the Great Powers. He would not go into the events of Prince Couza's, reign, but one of his first 81 acts was to destroy the landed aristocracy, by taking away their lands and dividing them among the people. After a few years, as they all knew, he raised loans and did other things which excited a popular rising; and he was forced to leave the country. Upon this the Porte desired that the reservation which it had insisted on should be carried out, and that the Assembly should be called together to declare whether the provinces should be separated or remain intact. The great Powers assembled in Conference at Paris resolved to wait until the Porte had, with the advice of the Great Powers, declared what steps should be taken for the future government of the provinces. But at this juncture the extreme democratic party that had deposed Prince Couza called upon the people to declare by plébiscite who should reign over them, without any reference to treaty engagements with the Porte and the Great Powers. He had heard with astonishment his hon. Friend's remark against what he called a priggish adherence to treaties, which he seemed to think was characteristic of some Members of the Government. This was a very dangerous doctrine, and one, he was afraid, that had too much prevailed of late years in Europe. If ever a time came when nations were to have no respect for treaties there would be the utmost danger to civilization and liberty. The present dreadful state of Europe, the muster of 2,500,000 of armed men ready to go to war, and the horrible slaughter which, before many days, might take place, were entirely owing to the disregard of what his hon. Friend termed a priggish adherence to treaties. His hon. Friend seemed to think that every Power had a right to deal with a treaty as it chose, except the Power specially affected, for he left altogether out of consideration the position of the Sultan, and seemed to forget that the Treaty of Paris and the Convention of 1858 solemnly ratified the suzerainty of the Sultan, and prescribed the manner in which the Hospodar should be elected. Whether, however, we might think it advisable for the Principalities to be separate or united was not the question, for we were bound by this treaty, and if it was to be set aside only ten years after being solemnly entered into, what treaty, he would ask, could be regarded as binding? What, then, had the Powers done? On the supposed election of Prince Charles of Hohenzollern by the Moldavians and Wallachians their representatives assem- 82 bled in Conference at Paris, and conjointly—for France, contrary to what his hon. Friend supposed, acted with us—issued directions to their Consuls in the Principalities not to take any step which might commit them to the recognition of Prince Charles. The Powers were bound by treaty to take this step, and they could not honestly have acted otherwise. Now, his hon. Friend seemed to think that the Porte had no right to interfere without the consent of the other Powers; but in that he was quite mistaken. It was true that an article in the treaty stipulated that, in case of the disturbance of internal order in the Principalities, the Turkish Government should not interfere except with the consent of the other Powers. This, however, was not a question of internal order, but was an infringement of the sovereign rights of the Sultan. Suppose, for instance, Austria or Russia should send troops into either of the provinces, did his hon. Friend think that the Porte could not defend its rights without the sanction of all the parties to the treaty? [Mr. DARBY GRIFFITH: It cannot interfere alone.] His hon. Friend was entirely mistaken with regard to the interpretation of that article, for what it laid down was that the Porte should not interfere in case of any internal revolution, whereas in the present case the inhabitants had acted in defiance of the treaty and had violated the sovereign rights of the Porte. Undoubtedly, therefore, the Porte had a right to interfere; but then came the question whether it was advisable or prudent to exercise its right, and the British Government, so far from having advised the Turkish Government to insist upon their right, had advised them to act with the utmost moderation, and not to endanger the peace of the Principalities by a military intervention. His hon. Friend asked whether the Government had received any information with reference to the entry of Turkish troops into the Principalities. His reply was that, though he saw rumours in the public press that Turkish troops were about to cross the Danube, they had received no official information to that effect, and he earnestly hoped that the Porte would not at the present time take a step which might have the effect at that moment of exposing them to serious inconvenience, and of lighting up the flames of war in the Eastern parts of Europe. The British Government did not deny the undoubted right of the Porte to interfere, but while 83 recognizing the provisions of the treaty, they espoused the side of prudence and conciliation by advising the Turkish Government not to take any measure which might add an additional complication to the present lamentable state of Europe.