PAPERS MOVED FOR.

HC Deb 06 April 1865 vol 178 cc793-848

MR. HALIBURTON

said, he rose to appeal to the noble Lord the Member for Haddingtonshire (Lord Elcho) to postpone the Motion upon this subject of which he had given notice. A deputation from Canada was at present on its way to this country, and probably one of the objects of its visit was to make some arrangements with reference to this very question.

LORD ELCHO,

in rising to move an Address for Copy of Papers and Extracts of Correspondence relative to the proposed Canadian Defences and the share of the total cost which is to be respectively borne by Canada and the United Kingdom, said, that the very reasons which had been assigned by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Launceston (Mr. Haliburton) for asking him to postpone the Motion were those which had induced him to bring it forward. In doing so, he felt that some apology was necessary for again bringing the subject of the defence of Canada before the House. In what he was about to say he should be careful not to infringe those rules which had been wisely drawn up for the guidance of Members in debate, and would not quote from, or refer to, the speeches which were made in a previous discussion upon this subject, nor should be question the policy of the Vote to which the House came upon that occasion. He then voted in the majority, and he only regretted that the amount granted was not larger; but he then voted, as he believed most of the majority did, under a false impression. His only reason for renewing the debate upon this subject was that since the last discussion circumstances had been made public which indicated the existence on the other side of the Atlantic of a state of things which not only justified but rendered absolutely necessary their reconsideration of this very grave question. From the first he had entertained a very strong opinion with reference to the policy which the Government were pursuing towards Canada; and he could not but think that of the two courses which had been presented to the House the true policy of this country was to be found rather in the path which had been marked out by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Calne (Mr. Lowe)—although he was not disposed to go so far as that right hon. Gentleman—than in what he might call the trail of Colonel Jervois which was being followed by Her Majesty's Government. The opinion of the majority of that House had been clearly indicated by its vote, and he should not have again raised the question had it not been for the news which had recently been received from Canada. Without infringing the Rules of the House, he might Ray that the impression under which they voted the money for the fortification of Quebec was that the share which England was to pay and the part which Canada was expected to take in the defence of her own frontier had been definitively settled between the Governments of the two countries. He was, however, now in a position to show that those who voted under that impression voted under a very wrong impression—that so far from anything having been settled, everything was unsettled, that the whole question was the subject of negotiations between the two Governments, and that the deputation alluded to by the hon. Member for Launceston was now on its way to this country in order to endeavour to bring about some arrangement. The first hint of the existence of this difference of opinion between the Imperial Government and that of Canada he obtained immediately after the last division upon this subject. He repeated that it was the general impression of the House when it was asked to vote this money that everything had been settled, and that there was no difference of opinion. Immediately after the division, on his way home, he went into the reading room and happened to take up The Sun, and the first paragraph that caught his eye was a telegram to this effect— Quebec, March 10. The news that £50,000 has been recommended to be voted by the Imperial Parliament for the defences of Quebec has been very ill received here. Mr. J. A. Macdonald stated in the House that there must he a mistake in the figures, and that £500,000 doubtless is intended. Upon the hon. Mr. Moore inquiring of the Government if the fortifications recommended by Colonel Jervois to be built at a cost of £1,343,000 were to be erected, and what proportion of the cost would fall on Canada, Sir E. T. Tache replied that he hoped all necessary fortifications would be built; but as the matter was now the subject of negotiation between the Imperial Government and that of Canada, he could not say how much Canada would be expected to pay. That clearly pointed out that everything had not been so satisfactorily settled between the two Governments as the House had been led to believe. That telegram had been confirmed by detailed reports which had been received from Canada of what had taken place in the House of Assembly. He found that Mr. Macdonald, referring to what had been reported by telegram as having been said in the House of Lords by Earl De Grey, stated that the figures must have been intended to mean £300,000or£500,000,instead of £30,000 or £50,000, and that negotiations were going on between the Provincial and the Imperial Governments. Now, as he had before observed, it appeared that there was no understanding between the two Governments, and he hoped the House would bear patiently with him while he read a few extracts from the Canadian papers which had an immediate bearing on the question at issue. The extracts which he was about to quote he had taken from the summary of the proceedings of the House of Assembly in the Toronto Weekly Globe, and from that journal he learnt that Mr. Gait, the Finance Minister, in moving a Vote of 1,000,000 dollars for defences, used the following words:— I may state that in the communications which have passed between the Government of Canada and the Imperial Government on the question of defence, the subject of what the colonies and the mother country should each do in this respect has been postponed..… Those points in reference to the general relations which the colonies should bear towards the mother country in the matter of defence have, owing to the anticipated delay (the Confederation) which may arise, assumed an appearance that requires the Government of this province to approach the Imperial Government in order to obtain a decision on this very important subject. Then came a passage to the announcement made in which the attention of the House of Commons had not been invited during the discussions on the subject—for it appeared that after all this 1,000,000 dollars was to be raised on English credit. Mr. Gait added— Any expenditure which Canada may feel called upon to assume must be on the understanding that this will be sustained by the Imperial credit.… We have a right to ask that the credit of the country should be sustained by the Empire. The House would now, perhaps, like to have some information on the same authority as to the opinion which prevailed in Canada in reference to the extent to which she ought to be defended, and the part the mother country was to take in that defence. Mr. Gait said— The Government feel that their responsibility extends much further than this Report of Colonel Jervois comprises. The responsibility rests on the Government of giving protection not to one part of the province or the other, but to every man in this country. It has been asked why no answer has been made to the Report. Answers have been made, and negotiations are going on, and it is because they are still going on that the Government are desirous of proceeding to Eng land to press them to an issue..… The Government take this ground—that the expense should be assumed in part by the Imperial Government, and under an Imperial guarantee. I have no hesitation in saying that difficulties have arisen in obtaining that guarantee, and unless these difficulties are removed the Government are not prepared to say that this million of dollars will be expended on these works. An hon. Member (Mr. Dorion) on hearing that statement made seemed to have been as much astonished as he was himself when he had read it and asked— Am I to understand that no part of this money will be expended until the Government meets again? Mr. Gait.—Certainly not. But let the House mark what it was that they were called upon to do— The question of defence (said Mr. Gait) is not merely confined to the erection of certain works. That is only one means of defence…The great lakes will have to be defended. The defence of that portion of the country requires that gunboats should be placed on the lakes. Well, the province of Canada is not able, and cannot be expected, to place gunboats on those lakes. But the Empire is. All these points have to be met and considered with the Imperial Government. If for defence this country is to depend upon a petty Vote of £50,000 a year, then it may be better to adopt the words of one who is no longer among us, but who occupies a seat on the Bench, and say that the best armament for this country is no armament at all. Now, he confessed that he, for one, was very much disposed to concur in that opinion. The extracts he might add, which he had just read, were taken from the papers of the 17th of March; but another mail had arrived last night, in which the subject was continued, and the authority which he was next about to quote was one he felt sure to which his right hon. Friend the Secretary for the Colonies would not object, for he quoted the same gentleman himself. He found that Mr. Rose—not the gallant Alderman opposite—in speaking of the Vote of 1,000,000 dollars, said— I do not understand this Vote as meaning that we are to expend one million dollars merely as a contribution towards any particular defen- sive works, but this—that the Government on going home can say the people of Canada are serious in this matter, and as an earnest of what they are prepared to do for defence they have armed us with authority at once to spend money for this object on condition that a correct understanding be come to with reference to the future entire system of defence, and that all those anterior misunderstandings which have existed between the two countries should be brought to an end. … They (the Imperial Government) should be told even more strongly than Colonel Jervois has told them, that danger is imminent, that the country is utterly defenceless, and that Canadians could not hold it twenty-four hours. They should, above all, be told that in case of war we shall need the whole strength and all the resources, not of Canada only, but of the whole Empire; and that these must be given ungrudgingly, as before; they should be asked at once to take care of the lakes, and to send a flotilla of the small class of gunboats that are now laid up useless at Portsmouth. Now, these extracts afforded, he thought, a sufficient justification for his having brought the subject before the House. He was of opinion that every step we took upon so grave a question—the gravest by far which had been brought under the consideration of Parliament in his time—should be taken only with the fullest information which we could procure, and that we should take care by no rash course of proceeding to enter into engagements with Canada which we might find it impossible to fulfil. And it would, perhaps, be well, seeing what was the state of feeling in Canada on the subject, to take into account what it was she had already done and was capable of doing. In a letter which had appeared the day before in The Times newspaper from "A Member of the Canadian Parliament," the writer, in drawing a comparison between the relative resources of Canada and this country for the purposes of military defence, said— Within the last three years the Canadian Parliament has voted nearly 2,000,000 dollars for our defence, and some 20,000 volunteers have enrolled and organized themselves more or less effectively; that is to say, we have done as much relatively to our population and financial resources as you would in England if you had organized 240,000 volunteers and voted £20,000,000 sterling for military purposes. He went on to say— The extreme limit to which any one has ventured to go on this side of the Atlantic has been to propose an expenditure of 10,000,000 dollars on the organization of the militia, and even that only on the supposition that the Imperial Government would lend us the money at the lowest rate of interest at which they could obtain it themselves. And this is precisely equivalent on our part to your undertaking to organize 1,200,000 men, and to expend £100,000,000 sterling of money. It is by no means improbable that some such proposition may be made before this communication reaches you. Will the people of England permit their Government to lend us the requisite funds?—will they undertake to provide a flotilla, and to build the fortifications deemed necessary, whether they cost £1,000,000 or £2,000,000 sterling? It was, in his opinion, most desirable that we should come to a distinct understanding with Canada as to what England could and could not do in reference to the present question. The course which he thought we should take was to say that so long as Canada stood by England, England would stand by her, but that we were not prepared to attempt to do that which was not possible. We should deal with the question, bearing in mind what could be done, taking into account the resources at our command and also what was politic in regard to Canada herself. Now, the question of what was possible turned so completely on military considerations that he, as a civilian, was not presumptuous or foolish enough to pronounce any opinion of his own on that point. He, therefore, looked to the opinions of military men, and he should, he confessed, be prepared to rest the point on the views to which an hon. and gallant relative of his (Major Anson) had a few evenings before given expression; for, though the hon. and gallant Gentleman did not belong to the scientific branch of the army, he would not, he felt sure, be deemed to be exceeding the bounds of what was right when he said that no man for his age had seen so much service, or had served with greater distinction in all parts of the world. The career of his hon. and gallant Friend begun in the Crimea; he then went to India, and from the first shot fired at Delhi to the last on the frontiers of Nepaul he had been in all the military operations in that country. Again in China he was one of the first to enter the Taku forts; and after his return from the East, he was for a time present with M'Clellan's army (so that he well knew what an American army was), and afterwards visited Canada, with the position of whose frontier he was well acquainted, so that he could speak of its capability for defence from personal knowledge. There were good grounds, then, for placing reliance on his opinion on such a subject as that before the House; but his hon. and gallant Friend, as well as himself, had since he made the speech to which he referred deemed it to be their duty, to collect upon the question the opinions of practical military men, and he would state without fear of contradiction that, going beyond the narrow circle of official military authority, for every one such man who would say that it was possible to defend Canada there were ten who maintained that she could not be defended. His hon. and gallant Friend had written for the best practical military opinion in the country, and the substance of the reply he received was that Canada in a military point of view and in the sense pointed out by Colonel Jervois, and adopted by the Government, was utterly and entirely indefensible. But this question of the defence of Canada was not so much a military question as one of common sense. There was an instinct which told every one that such a country as Canada, with a population of 2,500,000 persons and an extended frontier could not be defended by England, which was 4,000 miles distant, against America, furnished with all the munitions and requisites for war, and also with railways capable of transporting at any moment those munitions to the Canadian frontier. Not even with the assistance of England was it possible for Canada to defend herself against America. That appeared to him to be a self-evident proposition and one more of common sense than of military science. What was the opinion of persons on the Continent looking dispassionately at this question? A letter from the Paris correspondent of The Morning Post—a journal said to be in the especial confidence of the noble Lord at the head of the Government—appeared in that newspaper on the 27th of March, and the following was an extract from it:— The discussion which is taking place in the British House of Commons concerning the defence of Canada attracts much interest and suggests a considerable amount of speculation on this side of the water. The conviction here is that Great Britain cannot hold Canada; and to throw up defences is an invitation, some urge, to war. Are these observations worth the consideration of Her Majesty's Government. He did not know whether they were worth the consideration of the Government, but he thought that the House of Commons, instead of indulging in buncombe and "tall talk," which deceived nobody—not even themselves—and least of all those whom it was intended to deceive, the Americans, who were masters of that sort of language. Instead of indulging in bombast they should look the question in the face and say what they meant and would do in this matter. After conversing with military men on the subject he found their opinion to be that the utmost it was wise or politic for England to do was to defend Quebec and Halifax, especially the latter. In their opinion Halifax ought to be made inpregnable—our Gibraltar in that part. This it was possible for England to do; and it was very evident what England could not do. He did not think England could or should enter into any engagement to furnish by her credit or give herself to an unlimited extent her money for the erection of defences at Montreal, Kingston, and along that line, which he believed would be perfectly useless. He believed that England would not send an army of 30,000 soldiers to man those defences; and England would not and could not compete with America in the construction of gunboats on the Lakes. He had spoken of what he believed to be possible, and he would now say what he thought politic. He thought that in the interests of Canada it was not wise for that country to burden herself with debt to erect fortifications which it would be difficult, if not impossible to defend, and to make that country a hopeless battlefield in the event of a war with America. They had always been taught to consider that the greatest misfortune which could befall a country was to be made the seat of war, and he believed that all that these defences would do would be to bring down in an aggravated form on Canada, in the event of a contest with America, all the horrors which accompanied war. In the interests of Canada, therefore, he asked the Government to re-consider the policy they were disposed to pursue with respect to Canada. His impression was that the wise policy for Canada to pursue would be, instead of building these useless forts and encumbering herself with debt, to endeavour by freedom from debt, and by every attraction which could be held out to settlers, to increase her population, so that the rich wastes in her territory might be occupied. That was a policy which England ought to encourage. Having stated what he believed to be possible and politic with respect to Canada, he would now say a word on the question which had often been raised in the course of these discussions, and that was the point of honour. He denied the right of those who took a different view from himself on this question to assume that they had a monopoly of proper national feeling and pride in respect to it. He believed that the course he suggested was strictly consistent with national honour; and far from deserting Canada, he accepted the dictum of the right hon. Secretary for the Colonies that war with Canada was war with England. He did not suggest that England should desert Canada, but this country should pursue the policy which she adopted with respect to Turkey and the Danubian Provinces. What was that policy? The Danubian Provinces lay between a great military Empire and a river, the possession of which that Empire was anxious to obtain for the purpose of its commerce. The provinces were defenceless, and on more than one occasion Russian armies had crossed the Pruth and occupied them. The Russian hordes were swept back again; but was that result produced by war carried on in the Provinces? No, but by a totally different means; by war made upon Russia in a different quarter. It might be said that England had the advantage of attacking a vital point to Russia at Sebastopol, and that a similar vital point was not to be found in America. The basis of all reasoning on this subject rested on our having the supremacy of the sea—for if we had not that supremacy of what use were our fortifications? But if we had the supremacy at Bea we could inflict immense damage on America. That was the only way in which England could deal an effective blow at America. It appeared to him that to make Canada the battlefield in a war with America would be similar to a man engaged in a duel taking up a position so that his eyes faced the sun. He only hoped that in bringing that subject before the House he had not exceeded the legitimate bounds of debate. He believed the facts he had adduced would show that there were some grounds for asking the House to re-consider that question, for it stood, he maintained, in a totally different position from that which they had been led to suppose it occupied. He knew not what the result of these discussions or of the negotiations pending between the Canadian and the Imperial Governments might be, but for his own part he never should regret having raised his voice against a policy, which, if not tested by war, might doubtless prove successful, but which if tested by war would, he firmly believed, prove fatal to this country. He should ever rejoice that, however feebly, he had raised his voice against a policy which might be preparing in Canada the grave either of the honour or the power of England.

SIR JOHN HAY,

in seconding the Motion, said, that he had been unable to give his vote on the late occasion when the fortifications for Canada were discussed in that House. He had felt that to oppose the Vote then proposed by the Government might have seemed indicative of that which he would be the last to entertain—namely, a wish to desert Canada should she unfortunately be engaged in hostilities with the United States. On the other hand, he had felt that if he had supported the Motion he should have given his vote in favour of a system of defence which he believed to be indefensible and not calculated to afford that support to those Provinces which it was, he was sure, the desire of all classes in this country to afford them. Having had the advantage of travelling in Canada and serving in those seas, his attention had been in some degree turned to these matters; and having formed some plan in his own mind as to how Canada should be defended in the event of hostilities, he had thought it would not have been dealing fairly with the House to have given a vote in favour of a policy which in his conscience he disapproved. He must bear testimony to his entire concurrence in the views so ably stated by the gallant Member for Lichfield on the previous discussion. Canada had for the greater part of its frontier a series of lakes, two-thirds the size of the Mediterranean. The upper lakes above Niagara were cut off entirely from Lake Ontario and the River St. Lawrence, and Lakes Huron, Michigan, Erie, and Superior, were entirely commanded by the American navy or the mercantile marine which had Chicago for its headquarters. The Western Provinces of Canada were, at present, utterly indefensible, because it would be impossible, even if England were inclined to do so, to place a naval force on these Upper Lakes in good time, by reason of the physical obstructions which would prevent her sending vessels to occupy them. The forces of America, assembling at Chicago, could advance upon Western Canada and landing at Collingwood, in Georgian Bay, could turn all our defences; and it would be impossible either in a naval or military point of view to defend those Western Provinces against any forces which might attack them either from Detroit or from the shore of Lake Erie. The only portion of the frontier which it might be possible to defend was the eastern portion—namely, Mon- treal, Quebec, Lake Ontario, and the St. Lawrence; and unless we decided to keep a naval force there—which we could do only by the termination of the treaty limiting the forces on the Lakes—it would be impossible to defend those Lakes or the St. Lawrence by any naval force which we could improvise on the occasion. The Americans could place any force they pleased at Rouse's Point on Lake Champ-lain, which would be impregnable against anything but regular military operations, and they might have an army of 60,000 men encamped and supplied within thirty-five miles of Montreal, and on our only line of communication which existed in winter. That single line of communication was by the railway from Richmond to Montreal, on the south side of the St. Lawrence, and unless it was defended by an enormous military force it would be cut in two by the force which the Americans might have assembled at Rouse's Point. The fortifications of Quebec and of Montreal would be entirely separated from each other, and Quebec again would be isolated from England during five months in the year by the freezing of the St. Lawrence. The true defence for our North Armerican colonies was the fortification of Halifax and the holding of the province of Nova Scotia. There they had a harbour accessible at all times of the year; for during the twenty-six years that the Cunard line had kept up the communication between Halifax and England, there had been only one occasion on which it was necessary to cut the steamer out of the ice, and even then she was not delayed in making her passage. Therefore, for all practical purposes, Halifax was always within ten days communication of England; and no place could be made more impregnable as long as we had the command of the sea. Having Halifax they might throw in forces for the defence of the other provinces. All they required was a communication between Halifax and Quebec. The true defence for Canada, therefore, was to expedite the arrangements for completing what was called the Intercolonial Railway between Halifax and Quebec. Nearly 200 miles of that railway had been made, leaving about 420 to complete, and when it was finished, avoiding as far as possible the American frontier, they would have a line of communication which would be open at all times of the year, and which would enable this country, even should it be the misfortune of Canada to be overrun by American armies, to throw upon the flank of the invading force whatever force we might chose to devote to that purpose. That railway would also be supplemented during the open season of the year by water communication with Quebec. But our great line of defence should be by the railway between Halifax and Quebec. They ought not to attempt to fortify Montreal, or seek to make of that mercantile capital a military base of operations. The Intercolonial Railway would also be advantageous for mercantile purposes; for there was no supply of coal in Canada, and the whole of its supplies could be brought with great rapidity and abundance by such a railway from Picton and Cape Breton, during the five months of the year when the St. Lawrence was frozen. He agreed, therefore, with the noble Lord (Lord Elcho) that it was very desirable that the Government should re-consider the mode in which they were about to afford assistance to Canada, should expedite the completion of those communications on which her defence would so greatly depend, and should hesitate to encourage the Canadians to vote large sums of money for the fortification of a great mercantile city, which could not for a moment be held in the face of the forces which might be sent against it. He should, therefore, support the noble Lord in his Motion for these papers.

Amendment proposed, To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that She will be graciously pleased to give directions that there be laid before this House, Copy of Papers and Extracts of Correspondence relative to the proposed Canadian De fences and the share of the total cost which is to be respectively borne by Canada and the United Kingdom,"—(Lord Elcho,) —instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the words, proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

MR. BUXTON

said, he found that as a matter of form he could not move the Amendment of which he had given notice. He could entirely confirm what had fallen from the noble Lord as to the opinions of military men out of doors on this matter. Only the other day a military engineer of considerable authority told him that it would be impossible for us to resist an invasion of Canada by the proposed fortifications, la giving notice of his Amendment he did not at all mean to imply that in the interval before the whole question could be decided upon by the Canadian people the fortification of Quebec should be suspended—for, if these fortifications were to be made at all, not an hour ought to be lost in beginning them; and if it should afterwards turn out that the Canadians wished the whole scheme to be dropped, why the loss of £50,000 would not matter. Nor yet did he intend to suggest that the tie between Canada and England should be broken. He only wished that Canada, being so vitally interested in this matter, should be taken into council with us, and allowed the opportunity of deliberating on the question, whether it really was for her interest that we should take part in her land defences. Now, of course, it was very possible that Canada might not take that view; but if she should—and he thought he could show good reason for anticipating it—then we should find ourselves set free, without loss of honour, from what everybody felt to be a most unpleasant, if not perilous, predicament. He had not met with any sensible man who did not see that in commencing this great fortification scheme we were plunging into a sea of difficulty and expense to which no limit was visible; and, although the people of this country were perfectly willing to accept what was inevitable, it would be a great relief if a way of escape could be found without any stain being cast upon our honour. Now, two things were clear—first, that if British troops were to be retained in Canada then fortifications must be built for their protection. The fortification scheme was the inevitable corollary of the maintenance in Canada of a British force. The second point was, that it was clear that England could not at the present time renounce her connection with Canada, and that if she did so she would incur the scorn of the whole civilized world. A third alternative had been presented to the House by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Calne (Mr. Lowe)—namely, that without cutting the tie that bound us to Canada we should inform her that for strategic reasons we must withdraw our army from her shores. That suggestion had been supported by arguments of great force but there was one strong objection. The world had become extremely suspicious of strategic movements. It had been observed that somehow they were always movements towards the rear; and this strategic movement, however wise in itself, would probably also be misunderstood as being, in fact, the result of fear. But there remained the question, whether the same end might not be attained in a way to which this objection could not apply. If the Canadians for their own advantage and for the purpose of diminishing the danger of their becoming involved in a war with the United States, requested the mother country to withdraw her troops, and therefore let the fortification scheme fall to the ground, this would not cast the slightest taint upon the honour of the mother country, while at the same time we should be saved from the enormous outlay and the enormous risks which our attempt to defend Canada by land must involve. But two questions would naturally suggest themselves. It might be said that the Canadian Government had already given their assent to the proposals of Her Majesty's Government. But this was not even true with regard to the fortification, scheme. The news had lately arrived that Mr. Gait, the Finance Minister of Canada, in asking for a quarter of a million sterling towards the permanent defences of the country, at the same time intimated that Canada would look to being sustained by the Imperial credit in raising funds for her protection, but said that— Difficulties had arisen on that point, and unless those difficulties should be removed he was not prepared to say that this million of dollars would be expended on the proposed works. Mr. Gait said— These and other points must be discussed with the Imperial Government, so that Canada may not be thrust into a position which it would only be an idle sacrifice for her to try to endure. And, in fact, the broad question had never been submitted to the Canadian Government, whether they would not prefer that we should withdraw our troops and drop the fortification scheme altogether, which was a very different question from the one whether or not, on the assumption that the troops were to remain there, they should be protected. But then came the main question whether it was worth while to submit the whole matter to the decision of the Canadian people; whether there was a sufficient probability that they would decline our aid on land to make it worth while for us to take such a step. Now, at first sight undoubtedly it might seem absurd to suppose that any colony would deprecate the maintenance of a strong body of troops within their borders by the mother country. There, were, however, strong reasons for anticipating that if the question were formally submitted to the people of Canada—if it were fully discussed and deliberated upon by them—they might come to the conclusion that the most prudent course would be to decline the plausible, but dangerous aid offered them by the mother country. It was possible, in the first place, that they would not believe in the likelihood of any war with their American neighbours. They had shown what to us seemed a surprising apathy on this point. Our Government and press during the last three years had been doing their utmost to awaken them to a sense of their danger; but it was only after bullying them and pushing them that they could be induced to arouse themselves to even a moment's alarm. A slight and short panic had no doubt seized them last January; but the circumstances had already passed away which led to that transient feeling of alarm, and symptoms were already visible of their relapsing into their former state of confident repose. Now, should that be their feeling—be it or be it not a well-grounded one—in that case it would naturally strike them that if there really were no great risk of war, then it would be folly for them to lavish, in warding off an imaginary danger, that capital which was so urgently needed for the development of their great natural resources—for railways, for canals, for roads, for bridges, for harbours, and a thousand other enterprizes for which a country like Canada would be ripe could the means only be forthcoming. They would feel—they would justly feel—that for a young and growing country to have its savings buried in dykes and melted in guns, when every farthing was so pressingly needed, would be nothing less than a calamity. The increase of taxation would not only weigh down the springs of their commercial energy, but it would discourage immigration, it would tend to keep away from their shores that population who otherwise might seek a home in their boundless, fertile plains. But it might be said, what would be an outlay of a million and a half of money to a country with such prospects? Now, could any rational being suppose that if Canada were really to be put into a thorough state of self-defence against, perhaps, the greatest military and naval Power in the world, this could be done by an outlay of a million and a half? In fact, that was the bare estimate of the first outlay on the fortifications alone. Then they would have to arm them with costly ordnance, to maintain a large army to man them, there must be barracks and bomb-proofs, besides va9t preparations for warfare on the lakes as well, including especially an enlargement of the Rideaux Canal. It was impossible not to perceive that the outlay of this sum upon fortifications involved the expenditure of at least another million and a half in general military appliances. The Canadians would surely shrink exceedingly from their share of this outlay, unless they were under strong and serious apprehension of the approach of war. But let them take the other supposition—let it be granted that they would regard it as probable that war might arise between England and the United States. Perhaps they would take this view; in fact, though he himself was persuaded that there was no valid ground for panic, it would be reasonable to regard it, not, indeed, as probable, but yet as more than possible, that such a war might arise; for, whatever theoretical arguments might seem to prove that the Americans would never fly to arms if they could possibly avoid it, actual experience had shown, and that not once, but on three mighty occasions, with what fiery impetuosity that proud and gallant people would fly to arms, with a reckless disregard of the calamities that might befall them. Ninety years ago they plunged into the War of Independence. Fifty years ago they plunged into a second war with this country when she was in the pride of her power, and they actually had only four frigates and six sloops of war. Again, within the last five years we had seen how eagerly they rushed into a tremendous civil contest, from which, in the opinion of most bystanders, it would have been honourable as well as prudent to abstain. Remembering all this, the Canadians might, perhaps, contemplate the contingency of a war between England and the Federal States. But even in that case it would not follow that they should think it desirable that a detachment of the British army should be quartered within their borders. On the contrary, the Canadians might reasonably conceive that the presence of some 10,000, or even 20,000 British troops in Canada, so far from securing her from attack, would inevitably act as the most powerful inducement that could possibly be held out to the enemy to pour his armies into that province, in hopes of inflicting disaster and disgrace upon England at the one vulner- able point so luckily presented to them. They all knew well what a vain, proud, self-confident people our American brethren are. In all likelihood the result of the dreadful war in which they were now engaged would be such as to leave them in a state of the highest elation, fully believing, and not without some reason, that their country had become the mightiest military and naval Power in the world. The Canadians would surely feel that to the Americans thus inflamed and exultant not a shadow of doubt would suggest itself that if they poured into Canada with, perhaps, 200,000 or 300,000 men and an unparalleled artillery they would sweep all before them, and that the little British army would fall into their hands as a glorious prize. The Americans would assuredly be fired by what would seem to them the sure and certain prospect of such a triumph. Surely it stood to common sense that a little British army stationed there, 3,000 miles away from its base, would seem a glittering bait to American ambition. So far from terrifying their powerful neighbours, this mere handful of men would rouse all their energies, would kindle their courage, would fill them— With that stern joy that warriors feel In foemen worthy of their steel. In fact, as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for North Staffordshire (Mr. Adderley) said the other day, our keeping these troops in Canada was like waving a red flag in the face of an enraged bull. The right hon. Gentleman concluded thence that we ought to protect them by fortificacations; and he (Mr. Buxton) cordially agreed that if the troops were to be retained there, then the fortification scheme was inevitable; but could the Canadians or any one else suppose that the Americans would be restrained by a few forts on Point Levi or elsewhere from making an ugly rush at the red flag thus waved before them? On the contrary, they would probably consider that the fortifications would also fall into their hands, and thus only add to the splendour of their success. They had shown again and again in the course of the present civil war how little they would shrink from the most lavish expenditure of life in assailing fortifications, and how little fortifications would withstand them. The Canadians, then, might very likely come to the conclusion that the presence of our troops would inevitably cause their provinces to become the theatre of war, should hostilities break out—and this, too, a war which might last for years and years, and fill their now happy country with ravage and ruin. He believed the Canadians would feel all this very strongly. But then the question naturally suggested itself whether, even if we had no troops or forts to tempt attack, still the Americans would not invade Canada in order to annex that country to their own. Now, he felt sure that those who were most intimate with the feelings of the Americans would tell them that it was no longer any part of their policy to annex Canada by violence. Some years ago they were eager to induce those Provinces to join them; but he did not believe that they had any ambition to subjugate the Canadians and to compel them into union by force of arms. The war they were now waging was no precedent that way. It was not waged for the conquest of a foreign land, but for the maintenance of the unity of their own country. Surely, too, the work they would have for many and many years in keeping on the shoulders of the South a yoke forced upon them at the point of the sword would render it absolutely impossible for them to attempt at the same time to seize and hold a vast country containing 3,000,000 or 4,000,000 inhabitants, who would regard their dominion with ineffable hatred. But suppose for a moment that they should resolve on such an outrageous and preposterous enterprize as that of the conquest of Canada—in such a case would this fortification scheme be of the least shadow of avail to stop them? Why, of course, as the hon. Member for Launceston (Mr. Haliburton) said the other day, their main object would not be to seize the rugged and comparatively valueless province of Lower Canada; their aim would be to seize the fertile and prosperous plains of Upper Canada, to annex the territory adjoining their own along the line of the Lakes. Our defences of Quebec and of Montreal, therefore, would have no effect in resisting such an enterprize as that. No one proposed that Kingston and Toronto should be defended by our troops, but only by the Canadian militia. Would any one venture in that House to say that if the Americans concentrated an army of, perhaps, 200,000 or 300,000 men at the western corner of Lake Ontario and invested Toronto by land, while innumerable gunboats, brought in pieces by the railways, assailed it from the water, that town could possibly hold out against them? Would not the same fate inevitably befall Kingston? Would not our having induced or rather compelled the Canadians to fortify those towns simply be an attraction to the Americans to attack them, and be a help to the Americans in afterwards holding them, should we endeavour afterwards to drive them out? This supposed attempt at annexation would not be delayed even for a week by our having persuaded the Canadians to fortify their principal towns. Considering all these points, his conviction was that if the question were deliberately submitted to the Canadians, whether they wished to retain our troops among them with the inevitable corollary of the fortification scheme, they would probably come to the conclusion that it would only aggravate their danger and tend to involve their country in all the horrors of war. He thought they would probably hold that we could far more effectually aid them by a direct assault upon the enemy, and especially by aiding an uprising of the South. At any rate, it seemed to him that the Canadians had a right to be consulted, and to let their voice be decisive on this question. They were not children to be dandled and done for by the mother country; they ought to be allowed to deliberate and decide for themselves; and if their conclusion should be the one which he anticipated, he was sure that in that case every sensible man would think that we might heartily congratulate ourselves on having got, with perfect honour, out of a very embarrassing position.

COLONEL SYKES

said, that half a century's military experience had given him Borne ideas on military matters, though they might not be worth much. He had asked himself three questions on this subject of the defences of Canada. The first question was whether it was possible to defend a country like Canada, which was larger than Europe, and possessed a frontier of 1,500 miles, had an overwhelmingly powerful neighbour, and was far distant from this country. The second question was, whether it was politic to defend Canada. And the third, whether we should be justified, so far as the interests of the great mass of the people of this country were concerned, in involving them and their children in prospective responsibilities, which must greatly enhance the burdens this country has to bear. With regard to the first question, there was no doubt in his mind that the country which had not within itself a sufficient military force to meet an enemy who would enter it at any point along a line of 1,500 miles, could not be successfully defended. Was it possible that Canada, with every assistance we could render her, could raise a force to withstand 100,000 men, which would be the smallest number that America would send over the frontier? Could the Canadians keep the field against such a force? Certainly not. Then they would have to fall back upon those fortifications named in the Report from Colonel Jervois. All experience and military history taught us that if a country could not keep the open field against an enemy it could not hold its own in a fortress. Engineers informed us that a fortress could be reduced, with a garrison inferior to the besiegers, within a certain number, not of months, but of weeks even. Was it rational, therefore, with the prospects which we had before us of the military aid which Canada could give, to attempt to defend that country? Was it politic to pretend to defend it by laying out £50,000, for fortifications? That sum would do very little for providing adequate fortresses, even were £150,000 added to it next year. Was it creditable that we should expose our troops in such a position as they would be placed in should a war break out? They would inevitably be shut up in a fortress and be obliged finally to retire down the St. Lawrence and return to England. Then, in respect to the second question, admitting that we could not defend Canada, was it politic to show the Americans that we distrusted them by offering menaces such as had been used in the debate? He believed there could be no wisdom in such a course of proceeding. As to the third question, what would the consequences, in a financial point of view, be of a war with America in the defence of Canada? Colonel Jervois, in his Report, stated— That efficient communication should be established with the western districts; that the country between Lake St. Louis and Lake Ontario should he protected by naval in combination with military means that a naval depot should be provided at Kingston, which place should be fortified so as to form a secure harbour for gunboats on Lake Ontario. With the naval command of that lake troops acting for the defence of the western peninsular of Canada might, if overpowered, fall back upon its shore at Toronto, where, if proper works were constructed, they might act in conjunction with the naval force for the defence of that position, either until reinforcements arrived from other parts of the country, or until the winter season obliged the enemy to retire. The whole programme resolved itself into a succession of "ifs,"—a mere myth. As to the question of costs, Colonel Jervois said— I regard the works for the defence of Montreal and Quebec as being of the most pressing importance. I estimate the cost of those for Quebec at £200,000; those for Montreal at £443,000; and that the armaments for the works at those places will cost about £100,000. The works of fortification recommended at Kingston, Toronto, and Hamilton will cost about £500,000, and the armaments for those places about £100,000. But this outlay would only initiate the great scheme, and it must be admitted that there would not be afforded by the plan proposed anything like a sufficient defence of the country. Why, then, spend the money and run the risk of being beaten and degraded in the eyes of the world? Why not retire from Canada while we could do so with honour? As long as we had fortifications in Canada and kept adding to them and maintained troops there, the Canadians as well as ourselves would be constantly apprehending imminent war with America. If we withdrew our troops and reposed confidence in the American people and in the Government of the United States, there was not much probability in the present and prospective condition of the Federals that they would desire to acquire Canada. We can now retire with honour, and leave the Canadian people to make their own arrangements. Supposing we undertook the defence of Canada, which it has been said we were bound to do, the financial condition of that country was such that she could give us very little assistance. Those gentlemen who read The Times newspaper would learn that Canada had no less than five loans open in England, three at 6 per cent, and two at 5 per cent, the stock of every one of which was at a discount, the 5 per cents as low as 82 to 84. Canada was obliged to levy a heavy tariff against England on account of the depression in her finances, not in a hostile spirit, but really from want of money. What, then, was the likelihood of Canada being able to raise and pay a force commensurate with the necessities of a war with America, and what would be our responsibilities if we undertook her defence? England had prospective responsibilities enough for her public works, which must necessarily operate against the Chancellor of the Exchequer's freedom of action for many years to come in the arrangement of his Budgets. No fewer than seventy-two fortifications and batteries were now in progress in various parts of this country, and there was a large prospective liability in respect of them. According to the hon. Member for Finsbury (Sir Morton Peto)the armaments of these forts alone would cost something like £14,000,000. Then, on looking into the Army Estimates of this year he found large prospective demands, which would stand over after these Estimates were voted, in respect of works at Dover, Alderney, Chatham, Aldershot and Colchester, defences of Bermuda and Nova Scotia, commercial harbour defences, and other similar purposes. Taking the cost of these works and making a moderate estimate for the outlay upon the proposed defences in Canada and at home, he believed that the total amount of these prospective demands, which hung like a millstone round the neck of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, was about £29,812,201. He asked the House whether they would deliberately continue to involve the taxpayers of this country by augmenting these heavy responsibilities? His advice would be to withdraw our troops from Canada, to keep on good terms with her, and, if possible, with the United States and if America resolved to attack Canada and we resolved to defend her, he agreed with those who thought that we could only do so effectually by operating with our navy on the American coast.

MR. ADDERLEY

said, that when he listened to the speech of the noble Lord who made this Motion (Lord Elcho) he had been under the impression that the noble Lord was asking the House to re-consider its Vote on this subject the other day upon the ground that the Canadians were not so ready as we had supposed them to be to take part in defending their own country. He understood, however, that this was a wrong impression and that the noble Lord did not wish the House to re-consider this Vote, and desired we should proceed at once with the fortifications at Quebec, but was of opinion that we should not encourage the Canadians to take the further steps we were then anticipating they would take for their own defence. Now, if this were the noble Lord's view, it was surely an inconsistent and an indefensible one; because if we were not to encourage the Canadians to contribute to their own defence, cui bono the fortifying of Quebec? The only reason why we should undertake to fortify this city was to enable the Canadians to elaborate their own defences. The noble Lord said that this defence would be impossible, and that, if possible, it would be impolitic. But a contrary opinion had been mantained by eminent military authorities, and he believed that no country in the world was indefensible if the people were free and were determined to preserve their independence. He saw nothing in the position of Canada to distinguish it from other countries, and there was nothing absurd in the proposition of Colonel Jervois that the Canadians should be encouraged to make strongholds along their frontier which they might themselves garrison. Neither was it absurd to suppose that such strongholds might be garrisoned by Volunteers. We expected that in case of invasion the fortifications lately made around Portsmouth and Plymouth would be held by Volunteer forces; and it was not unreasonable to expect, in the same way, that the Canadian Volunteers would, if attacked, be able similarly to hold the fortifications now proposed. But the noble Lord thought it would be better if they allowed Canada to be overrun, citing, as an analogous case, the Danubian Provinces, the safety of which was maintained not by fortifications but by dependence on the intervention, on occasion arising, of an exterior force. But who was to supply the exterior force in case Canada were attacked? [Lord ELCHO: England.] England? But he thought that part of the argument of the noble Lord was that it was not the interest of England to defend Canada. The two opinions seemed to be inconsistent. If it were the interest of England to defend Canada, then one part of the argument failed; and if it were not the interest of England, then the other part of the argument fell to the ground. He thought himself that it was the interest of England to maintain the North American Provinces as an independent Power. England was a great maritime nation, and in that quarter of the world would gain a great accession of strength by an alliance with the maritime Provinces of North America, which we ought not to allow to accrue to the United States. The reason why the North American Provinces were at present a weakness to England was that they had been prevented from properly developing their own resources. But if the whole strength of Canada was drawn out and organized, instead of being an embarrassment and a source of weakness and anxiety at such a moment as this, she would add tenfold to the strength of this country. If the noble Lord had not made out that it was either impossible or impolitic that Canada should develop her own means of self-defence, then the sooner she was both encouraged and enabled to do so the better. But how was that to be done? No one had made any other proposition—even the noble Lord himself had not done so—than that England should assist her. If Canada was to raise militia and Volunteers, how was she to do it? Simply by the aid of the veteran troops of England. [Lord ELCHO: Hear, hear!] So far the noble Lord went with him, English troops must be kept at present in Canada to teach the Canadians; and if that were so, they must have fortifications for them, in case of need, to fall back upon;—and what fortifications should they be? [Lord ELCHO: Quebec.] Well, then, they were both agreed that Quebec must be fortified. But the noble Lord had said that from what he had read in the papers there appeared to be some doubt whether the Canadians were really in earnest in taking steps to defend their frontier. But if the noble Lord drew one inference from that circumstance he (Mr. Adderley) drew another. He allowed there was some uncertainty about the matter, and he was sorry for it, as delay at that time might be very disastrous. But what was the reason for that uncertainty? It was simply this, that the great question of Federation was still undecided. The two Canadas were perfectly prepared for Confederation, but the maritime provinces were not, and until they were, the question of Confederation and of united measures for defence could not be fully determined. In New Brunswick the general election had resulted in the defeat of several of the most prominent advocates of union, but not by large majorities. In Nova Scotia the supporters of union seemed to be paralyzed by the effects of the election in New Brunswick. In Prince Edward's Island the local influence had been always opposed to the union; but it was to be hoped that the opposition might be overcome. In Newfoundland the proposal had been postponed. In New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, however, which were the most important, and which guided the rest, there was a strong and active party in favour of Confedera- tion. It might be hoped, therefore, that all opposition to the scheme would soon be removed. He had not the slightest doubt that what made New Brunswick and Nova Scotia hang back was partly because they thought, that by Confederation, they would be swamped by the greater Provinces of Canada, but still more because they could not make up their minds to give up the good things which they were accustomed to get from England, and they feared that they would be thrown more upon their own resources. But he begged to tell them—and in doing so he knew he expressed the fellings of the House—that these Provinces were very much mistaken if they thought that by holding back from Confederation they would continue to receive from England the same support in men and supplies as before. He would tell them plainly that there never would be a Minister in this country strong enough to induce the House of Commons, after an opportunity of independence had been offered, to vote supplies for their special purposes, and the sooner they gave up any such idea the better. He was convinced that the time was at hand when the proposed federation would be accomplished, and that then the defence of Canada, by the Confederated Provinces, would soon be undertaken. He could not at all agree with his noble Friend that the House of Commons should attempt to check the Canadians in their present efforts at defence. On the contrary, they should be encouraged and aided. If the delegates now on their way to England should ask for an Imperial guarantee to raise the sum of money that would be required for their fortifications, he for one would be ready to vote for it. The Government might not be prepared at present to express an opinion upon that point; but so strongly was he convinced that it was the duty of this country to encourage and assist the Canadians in self-reliant efforts that he had no hesitation in saying even beforehand that he should be ready, if the Government were to make such a proposal, to support them in giving the guarantee requisite to enable the Canadians to raise a loan on easier terms for the cost of their own defences, and which he did not believe would involve this country in any serious risk. In conclusion, he deprecated any debates in that House which should lead to remarks in France or other countries that England considered Canada indefensible. He believed it was the opinion of that House that Canada was perfectly capable of defence, and therefore, so far from reconsidering their previous decision upon the subject, he held that the Canadians should be encouraged without hesitation or delay, and assisted by Her Majesty's Government to do everything in their power to defend themselves.

MR. CARDWELL

Sir, I am going to offer only a very few observations, as I am under the impression that it is not the wish of the House that the debate should be much longer continued—indeed, after the able speech just addressed to us by my right hon. Friend (Mr. Adderley) there is not much to be said upon the question raised by the noble Lord. My noble Friend (Lord Elcho) has entirely disclaimed the wish that we should recede from the decision to which we came in the former debate upon this subject, and I think that the gallant Gentleman opposite (Sir John Hay) also told us that in his opinion Quebec ought to be fortified. But my noble Friend says that on the former occasion he voted under a different impression from that which recent intelligence is calculated to make. But if my noble Friend is satisfied that Quebec should be defended, and does not wish that we should reverse our former decision, what does it signify under what impression he gave his vote on the occasion referred to? It is a settled point, then, that Quebec should be fortified—that, at all events, is undisputed; and when my noble Friend says that he gave his vote the other night under the impression that arrangements had been made with the Canadian Government for the defence of the frontier, I must be permitted to say that neither my noble Friend who moved the Vote (the Marquess of Hartington) nor myself said anything to create that misapprehension, and the hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Bentinck) who moved the rejection of the Vote commented upon the fact that no such statement had been made on the part of Her Majesty's Government. My noble Friend, however, brings forward this Motion on account of intelligence which has reached us since the last discussion. But I should have thought if there was anything which made it demonstrably unfit to bring forward this Motion, it was that intelligence. Why, what is the intelligence? Is it that the Canadian Government have prorogued their Parliament, and have deputed four Members to come over here in order to confer with Her Majesty's Government on this matter. But does my noble Friend suppose that we are going to produce papers in an imperfect state—that we are going to anticipate what these gentlemen may say, or by a statement rashly made to prejudge the question at issue? Manifestly not. These gentlemen have already left their own shores and are now on their way to hold discussion with the Government of this country; and when that is the case it would be a great mistake for us to anticipate the proposals which they may have to make. My noble Friend has read extracts from the debates which have taken place in the Canadian Chambers of Legislation. I believe it would be possible to extract passages which might create an impression which would not be altogether satisfactory; but, then, it would be most unjust to these gentlemen to say that the general spirit in which this subject has been discussed in the Canadian Chambers has not been eminently creditable both to them and us. [Lord ELCHO: Hear, hear!] I am glad my noble Friend cheers that remark. Well, if such be their spirit—if there be but one feeling among them of loyalty to the British Crown, of attachment to British connection, and but one earnest and evident desire to secure the defence of their country, why should those doubts be now thrown upon their disposition at this moment? I shall not quote extracts from the Canadian debates, but I think it only just to Mr. Gait that I should read to the House the concluding passage of his speech. After having alluded to the feeling of the people of this country, to what we should require from the Canadians, and to the spirit which we should expect to be shown, he goes on to say— I trust the taking of this Vote—I speak of the million of dollars on account for defence—will show to the people of England that now, when the danger is before us, we are ready to bear our share of it; that we clothe our Government with power to ask then to unite their resources with our resources, and with these means, united in the defence of this country, I am perfectly certain that we can resist any attack that can be made upon us, from whatever quarter it may come. Weir, Sir, that is the spirit in which the Canadian Minister addresses the Assembly. I sincerely trust that when he lands upon these shores that spirit shall not be damped by finding that this House has concluded the question in another sense, that we have determined that it is no use for them to have exerted themselves, to have drawn upon their resources, to have exhibited a loyal spirit to the Crown, or devoted attachment to British connection—no use to hare increased their taxation, to have called out their Volunteers, to have exercised their militia, because we, in our superior wisdom, have determined that it would be impossible to defend Canada, and impolitic to do so if it were possible. I trust that the spirit to be found here will correspond with that which they have exhibited, and that, after we have been engaged for years in calling out the energies of the Canadian people, we shall not turn round on them at last and desire to recall the proposals which we have made. I trust we shall take no such retrograde step as that. The right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Adderley) said that Canada could be defended, but that the defence could be undertaken by its own people. As I stated the other evening, there is no doubt that the primary defence of Canada consists in the knowledge on the part of every foreign country that war with Canada implies also war with England; but the second defence of Canada is to be found in the spirit and energy of its own people. To evoke that spirit and energy has been the aim of Her Majesty's Government, and that it has been evoked in a manner heretofore seldom witnessed I certainly believe. I perceive in their discussions a desire not merely of defending themselves, but of increasing their power to a point which will render them a valuable adjunct to the whole Empire if any danger threaten it; and I trust that the day is not far distant when, in spite of momentary discouragements, the great scheme of federation shall be carried into effect, and when a country, greater than many of the countries of Europe, shall be established in British North America—a country not destined to be great and powerful for its own defence and security alone, but for the support of Great Britain in those times of adversity when the alliance of so great a State will be of infinite advantage to her. Believing, then, that this is the spirit in which these gentlemen are coming to this country, I submit to this House that it is undesirable to continue a discussion which must have the effect of casting doubt upon the intentions of the Canadian people. I think we ought rather to adhere to the policy determined upon by a large majority of this House, and welcome those gentlemen on their arrival in the spirit in which they left their own country.

MR. KINGLAKE

said, that he should follow the suggestion thrown out by his right hon. Friend the Secretary for the Colonies, and carefully abstain from cast- ing any doubt upon the possibility of defending Canada. He was one of those who voted the other evening with the majority in favour of the Vote for the defence of Canada, and the intelligence afforded to the House that evening by his right hon. Friend was not such as to cause him to desire to retract the Vote he had given; for when the question was one affecting the solemn duty of defending a part of the Queen's dominions there ought to be no faltering, or semblance of faltering, on the part of either the Parliament or the country. He could not, however, agree with the arguments employed by the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Adderley) when he endeavoured to deal with the propositions of his noble Friend (Lord Elcho). The right hon. Gentleman asked which would be the country that would come forward to defend Canada in time of need? And his noble Friend answered "England." The whole spirit and meaning of his noble Friend's remarks were, not that he more than any other Member of the House would acquiesce in the invasion of Canada, but that this country should in such an emergency make choice of her own theatre of war, whether in Canada or another part of the globe. He believed that they would all agree that in case of our troops being exposed to a conflict with a vast superiority of forces there was no necessity for any wild sacrifice, and that our troops should therefore if necessary be withdrawn. But at this point he differed from his noble Friend, and also from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Calne (Mr. Lowe), because his opinion was that if we were driven to that painful necessity, the duty of withdrawing our troops was a military duty, and not one to be undertaken beforehand by the State—it was not a duty to be undertaken prematurely upon the suggestion of an imaginary war with another country—a war which had not yet commenced, and with a country which as yet had not even quarrelled with us. But as one who voted with the majority on a previous evening, he must say that, rightly or wrongly, he and others around him had recorded their votes under the impression that Her Majesty's Government had already arrived at an understanding: with the Canadian Government. He did not now, as it were, ask to retract that Vote, because they found only too clearly that that impression was unfounded. He only stated it as a fact. They knew that negotiations had been going on for years, that negotiations were still going on, and that these negotiations were of such a character as absolutely to force upon us the considerations of what were to be our relations with Canada, in case of the lamentable contingency of a war with the United States. When a State had determined the limits of the duties it was to perform, he imagined that there was no better test for measuring the extent of those duties than the endeavour to ascertain the correlative power possessed by that State—because, in such a case as this, duty and power were inseparable. Now, it appeared to him the negotiations which had been going on between Canada and the parent State would show that we had not the power—not the unlimited power—of dealing with the resources of Canada which was implied in the argument that it was the obvious and unquestionable duty of every State to defend itself. If the Isle of Wight were invaded it would be competent upon the State and Legislature to deal as it might think fit with every man on that island, to employ its resources as might be deemed proper, and to make use of every acre of its land that might be thought necessary for its defence. But could we deal with Canada in that manner? If he understood the question aright, since the concession to that country of a responsible Government of its own, we were with regard to Canada exactly in the same position as we should be with regard to any foreign and minor Power which we were desirous of protecting. The negotiations which had been carried on appeared to partake exactly of that character. It was very true that these negotiations were conducted by his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies instead of by the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office, but in the end it amounted to the same thing, and the question ought, therefore, to be treated upon the same footing. Now, if we were dealing with a foreign and minor State apprehensive of invasion from a great Power, one of the things we should most carefully abstain from would be advising the lesser State with regard to undertaking hostilities, which we might not be certain of conducting to a triumphant issue:—because no lesson of modern times had been more strongly impressed upon us than that responsibility, and that, too, of the most tremendous kind, must result from our giving advice to a minor Power. When a nation had done that she always felt herself hound in honour to make good the promises which, at all events, were implied in the advice which she had given. It appeared to him that for the purposes of this war, if such were to arise, it was of all things necessary that the understanding between the Imperial Government and the Government of Canada should be perfect. He could not but think, therefore, that the suggestions of his hon. Friend the Member for Maidstone (Mr. Buxton) were of great value. His hon. Friend would endeavour to elicit from the Canadian people some explicit declaration of their desire to have Canada defended in Canada, without regard to the consequences which they knew must result from such a war. He did not think, however, that a mere declaration on the part of the Canadian people would suffice for such a purpose, and the necessary test for proving that the Canadians were in earnest in this matter would be their willingness to resign—of course, for a time only, and for the purpose of providing against an apprehended war—the power which we on our part had willingly conceded to them. He did not suppose that there was any Member in the House, or any man in the country, who desired to revoke the concessions which we had made to the colonies; but it was of the utmost importance that two countries acting together for the purposes of war should act together as one and the same country; and unless such a state of things existed between this country and Canada he should despair of our conducting a war to anything like a successful issue. In the suggestions of his right hon. Friend the Member for Calne there were but two things objectionable. He did not at all believe that the policy shadowed forth by his right hon. Friend was at all less resolute than that suggested by any other Member of the House—indeed, he should be disposed to regard the policy advocated by his right hon. Friend and by the noble Lord the Member for Haddingtonshire (Lord Elcho) as more formidable in the eyes of an enemy than the plan of defending Canada by a war upon the spot. He believed it would be a mistake unnecessarily to limit the theatre of war in the way suggested by his right hon. Friend the Member for Calne. If his view were acceded to, they would without any necessity be giving to the supposed enemy the advantage of knowing in what part of the world no resistance would be made. At the same time, he argued that the sug- gestions of the noble Lord and of the right hon. Gentleman had been of the greatest value, as they very much tended to guard against the very error which was most likely to be committed. There could be no greater error at the beginning of a war than unnecessary seeking a theatre of war in the ground upon which the quarrel had arisen. It was one of the common mistakes of belligerents to confound the cause of quarrel with the business of the war, while, in point of fact, they were quite distinct things. The moment that a cause of quarrel had ripened into actual war, which it would do if Canada were invaded, then the one thing a belligerent had to think of was how best to conduct the war. He thought that some injustice had been done to Colonel Jervois, not by laying his Report before the House, but by using it as an argument for the defence of Canada in Canada. The question put to Colonel Jervois had been how best to defend Canada. If that gallant officer had been asked what, in the event of war between England and the United States, would be the best policy for England, his Report would perhaps have contained different matter, and would have led to a very different conclusion. His (Mr. Kinglake's) opinion was that we should do all we could to raise such fortifications as would secure the British troops in Canada, but that we should disentangle ourselves as much as possible from any arrangement with Canada until we knew that Canada would, in the event of war, place the parent State in full control over her resources. Without such arrangement the position of Canada towards England would be rather that of an independent State than that of an independent colony.

MR. J. B. SMITH

said: I believe every Gentleman who has yet spoken this evening voted for the fortifications; I voted against them, and am desirous of shortly stating my reasons for so doing. The right hon. the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Cardwell) deprecates further discussion on this question, but I think the noble Lord (Lord Elcho) has rendered a public service by bringing the subject again under the notice of the House. We have committed so many blunders in our policy towards Canada that we ought to be particularly cautious to escape errors for the future. Some thirty years ago the people of Canada were dissatisfied with being governed by a colonial Minister sitting in London, and prayed for the right to govern themselves. This prayer was denied, and a rebellion broke out in that country, which was only put down at the cost of several millions of money. No sooner, however, was the rebellion quelled, than we granted all that Canada asked for. Now if it were just to grant the Canadians self-government at all, was it not a gross blunder not to have granted it before they were driven into rebellion, and thus have saved the expenditure of millions of treasure and the loss of precious lives? But our blunders did not end here. When we granted to the people of Canada the right of self-government we also gave them all the public lands and all the public revenues, but we neglected to provide that Canada should do what is done by every free country in the world—namely, make the national defence the first charge on the national revenues. Notwithstanding, however, that we gave up to Canada the legitimate sources from which such expenditures should be derived, we have continued, to the present time, to provide her with military and naval armaments without any charge to her; and, moreover, we took upon ourselves to pay the charges of her ecclesiastical establishments and the expenses of the Indian Department. Hon. Members will see among the Estimates delivered yesterday a Vote to be proposed for the ecclesiastical establishments and the expenses of the Indian Departments in Canada. The course we have pursued in not requiring Canada to bear the expenses of her own military establishments is a gross injustice committed on the people of England, because it has forced us not only to pay our own taxes but also the taxes of Canada. Now the working classes of Canada are as well, if not better able than the same classes here to pay taxes, and it is on their labour that the chief taxation falls. But have we benefited the people of Canada by this course? No; on the contrary we have inflicted a serious injury upon them by destroying their self-reliance, which is the distinguishing characteristic of the English race; we have demoralized them, and created among them a pauper spirit, just as a parish is demoralized by giving parish relief to able-bodied labourers. Only the other day we called upon Canada to provide militia to guard their frontiers against American raiders; but it was not until they were dragooned into the duty by the threat of the United States to enter their territory, and by the withdrawal of our troops from the frontier and the threat of withdrawing them from the country altogether, that they raised the necessary force to prevent confederate raids upon our allies—the United States. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for North Staffordshire (Mr. Adderley) has this evening given us another evidence of the demoralization of our North American Provinces. A plan has been proposed for forming the whole of these provinces into one Confederate Government. Some of the provinces, however, object to this union; and what does the right hon. Gentleman assign as the reason? He says— He has not the slightest doubt that what made New Brunswick and Nova Scotia hang back from the union was partly because they would be swamped by the greater provinces of Canada, but still more because they could not make up their minds to give up the good things which they were accustomed to get from England, and they feared they would be thrown on their own resources. Why should they not be thrown on their own resources? They are able-bodied labourers, and would be all the better by the withdrawal of parish relief. Why do we make all these sacrifices to Canada, seeing that they are equally injurious to us and to them? It is surprising to find the amount of ignorance which exists in this country on the subject. Some think we should make sacrifices in consideration of the value of our trade with Canada; but the fact is, we derive no benefit whatever from our trade with her more than we should if she ceased to be a colony. In the first place Canada, in return for our liberality to her, imposes higher rates of duties on our manufactures than France does. Second, as she is permitted to buy what she wants wherever she pleases, she only buys of us because ours is the cheapest market. Third, our trade with Canada, instead of being important, is insignificant. The return of our total exports of manufactures to all countries for the year 1863 shows the amount to have been £146,487,368, of which our exports to Canada amounted to only £2,938,201, or just 2 per cent of our whole exports—an amount which, if it were to cease altogether, would scarcely be felt. Our military and naval expenditure on account of Canada during the last four years cannot have been much less than £2,000,000 per annum. Surely it must be admitted that the fewer we have of such customers the better. Having committed such mistakes in past times it behoves us to exercise more than usual caution in our future Canadian policy. What are we going to do now? To build forts to provide against an enemy. What enemy, the enemy of Canada? Then Canada is best able to judge and decide what defences are necessary, and she it is who ought to defend herself against her own enemies. But is it the enemy of England that you are going to provide against? Some enemy that will attack England through Canada? There can be no enemy that will attack England through Canada but the United States. I am not one of those who think we are likely to go to war with that country; at the same time we ought not to disregard such a contingency. Now, if, unhappily, we should quarrel with the United States, is Canada, I ask, the battleground that any sane man would choose? It is necessary for England, as well as every other country, to change its policy from time to time with the altered state of things. Let us not shut our eyes to the great fact which has just dawned upon the world. Four years ago the army of the United States was less than 20,000 men, and her navy was composed of a few frigates. Now she is become one of the greatest military and naval powers in the world. Some gentlemen talked of our ability to defend Canada, and as a proof of it have referred to the gallant defence of that country made with 2,000 or 3,000 men some fifty years ago; but do not let us disguise from ourselves that old things have passed away—everything is become new. Have those who talk of fifty years ago been asleep during the past four years? The noble Lord the Member for Stamford (Lord Robert Cecil), however, appears awake to the new state of things. He observed in this House that no one could doubt the fact that America could send 300,000 men to the frontiers of Canada; he might have added that she can bring a force of ironclad steam-rams and gunboats, such as no other country can furnish, to bear upon the coasts and rivers of Canada. Besides, America would have this advantage over us—her base of operations would be the frontiers of Canada, while ours would be 3,000 to 4,000 miles distant. Look at the Crimean war. What an effort was made to send 30,000 men there. How many should we want for Canada? Does any thoughtful man believe we can cope with the greatest military power in the world on its own ground, with men of our own race, too, from abase of operations 3,000 miles off? I do not believe that if we were to double our national debt in such an attempt we could prevent America from taking possession of Canada in case of war. Why, then, court humiliation and defeat by erecting fortifications which we should have to defend with such enormous odds against us? One hon. Member wished Quebec to be fortified in order, if necessary, we might withdraw our army. But it would be impossible for it to run away, in case of war, without great national humiliation. I do not wish to live to see such a day. What, then, is the plain and just course to pursue? Let us not commit the folly of placing ourselves, by these fortifications, in the position of an enemy forcing us into a disadvantageous battle-ground. If Canada require fortifications she must provide them for herself, and I would not object that the sum proposed to be voted should be given to her for this object. At the same time, she should be called upon henceforth to do that which she ought to have done from the time the public revenues were granted to her—namely, to pay us all the military and naval expenses we may incur on her account. It is not improbable on these just terms Canada might no longer desire the nominal government of the mother country, but she might wish to manage her own military as she now manages her own civil affairs. The time is arrived when such a change would be beneficial to both countries; for while it would relieve us from burdens we ought never to have been called upon to bear, it will be the means of restoring Canada to a healthy state of self-reliance.

MR. ALDERMAN ROSE

said, he very much feared that the effect of the debate would be very mischievous. Upon a recent occasion the House came to the resolution that Canada should be fortified; and the country was thus pledged to the policy that she would exert all her power to defend Canada in the event of its being invaded; and he thought that the Canadians had shown an earnest desire upon their part to prepare the necessary means for their own defence. This debate, however, would have a mischievous and depressing effect, because it would create in Canada the feeling that there was a great uncertainty as to what our future policy would be. We had ourselves made a great demand on the patriotism of the country to supplement our regular army in the case of emergency, and having raised a large Volunteer force, he thought that we had a right to call upon Canada to do her part towards her own defence; and he fully believed that the Canadians were prepared to do all in their power to perform their obligations. It was not a fair argument to say that because the project of federation had not been unanimously adopted that therefore it was not to be carried out. He believed it would be carried out, and that we should have the benefit of it in the defence of Canada. He could not accept the noble Lord as an authority on the defensibility of Canada, and he entirely disagreed with the conclusions to which the noble Lord had come. They had heard from the best authorities that Canada was defensible, and that for six months in the year all military operations must be suspended by the excessive cold of the country. If the same doctrine which was enunciated by some hon. Members that evening had been propounded during the Indian mutiny and the other great struggles in which this country was involved, where, he asked, would they have been? He believed that England had attained its present prosperous condition by combating manfully with every difficulty which it encountered. If it were found that this country was pledged to the defence of Canada, and that Canada, relying with confidence upon that pledge, was determined to do her utmost, he was of opinion that the very knowledge of those facts would be sufficient to dispel the emergency which seemed impending over us. He considered that such discussions as the present bad a most mischievous tendency.

SIR FREDERIC SMITH

said, he could not understand what object the noble Lord the Member for Haddingtonshire had in bringing forward this Motion, as the question appeared to him to have been thoroughly settled on a former occasion. He at first supposed that the noble Lord desired to reverse the Vote for the fortifications of Canada which had been agreed to a few evenings ago; but that impression was removed when he heard the noble Lord urge upon the Government the importance of defending Quebec. But if the noble Lord were really of opinion that Quebec should be defended, what was the object of his Motion? The defensibility of Canada had been discussed by the highest military authorities in their official capacity, and it has been stated that they had given their opinion in favour of the general scheme of defence and of the particular works which had been brought under the consideration of the House. When a man, too, of such great experience as the chief of our Engineers had given his opinion in favour of it, it was rash for any military man of less experience to give a contrary opinion. They knew that the Government intended to send out to Canada, as commander of the troops there, an officer of great experience and talent. He should like to know from the Secretary for the Colonies whether that gallant officer had not stated as his opinion that the defence of Canada was feasible in the manner proposed? The Quartermaster General, too, had had this matter under his consideration, and had expressed his opinion that Canada was defensible. All these things ought to give confidence. He would pin his faith implicitly on the hon. and gallant Member for Wakefield (Sir John Hay) in any naval matter, but he maintained that Quebec and Montreal under the circumstances were perfectly defensible unless we lost the superiority at sea. The hon. Member for Stockport (Mr. J. B. Smith) had stated that America was now stronger than us upon the sea. He (Sir Frederic Smith) must respectfully decline to accept the hon. Member as an authority for such a statement. But if it be true that we are inferior to the Americans on the sea he hoped that the Admiralty would take immediate steps to amend that state of things. He agreed with the hon. Member for Bridgwater (Mr. Kinglake) that those who recommended war incurred a grave responsibility; but it was altogether another thing to advise an effectual system of defence against threatened hostilities. Was it to be supposed that it should be a question in the British House of Commons of turning our backs on the Canadians, who were willing to come forward to defend themselves? If a war took place between England and America, we must not select Canada as the battlefield. It was the last place we should choose for our fighting ground. But it would not be for us to make the choice. We must do our worst elsewhere, but, at the same time, we must do our best in Canada. If we showed a gallant spirit in the matter we should rouse the Canadians to do great things for their independence. But we were told that we were 4,000 miles from our base of operations. He had never heard an old term so much abused as was "the base of operations." Where was General Sherman's base of operations when he marched through Georgia and Carolina? Our base of operations in respect of the defence of Canada must, of course, be on the other side the Atlantic. Our base of operations would be at Halifax, where our stores would be collected. Some hon. Members had told the House that war could be made in Canada during winter. But when one of our regiments had been obliged to march there in winter, the men were obliged to have their muskets enveloped in straw and flannel. They could not have carried them otherwise. We were told that Colonel Jervois ought not to have reported on the defences of Canada, or that the Government ought not to have produced his Report. But what had Colonel Jervois been sent to Canada for but to make a Report on the best means of defending that colony? He was to report, not on the question of our making war there, but on the best means of defending Canada. The most eminent officers in the army and the navy would have to give advice to the Government as to the way in which we should conduct a war; but Colonel Jervois had been sent out for a specific object, and he had accomplished that object in a manner that did honour to himselt, and reflected credit on the corps to which he belonged. The argument that had been used as to the base of operations for the defence of Canada did not apply at all—it was a mistaken phrase. Our base of operations, in the case of hostilities in the summer, must necessarily be at Halifax and Bermuda. In case of a war with America we should have a fleet in the St. Lawrence; and if, as the hon. Member for Stockport said, our navy was inferior in numbers to that which the Americans could bring there, the sooner that state of things was altered the better. He was glad to see the noble Lord the Secretary of the Admiralty in his place, because he would be able to tell the House whether our navy was or was not inferior to that of the Americans. The Government should be urged to proceed with the defences of Canada quickly, for delay was dangerous upon two grounds. In the first place, an enemy might be "tempted to take advantage of the weakness of Canada; and in the next place, if we delayed with our works of defence, Canada might think us lukewarm in these matters, and neglect those precautionary measures which, on her part, were so necessary. We should do our part; and we should give any assistance that we could give to the colony from Imperial funds if there was a certainty of our advances being repaid by Canada.

MAJOR ANSON

said, that he would undertake for every one officer which the hon. and gallant Member opposite could produce in proof of Canada being defensible to bring forward ten who would state that Canada was indefensible. In the remarks he was about to address to the House he should express this opinion. He had taken great pains to ascertain the views of experienced officers who had been out in Canada since the affair of the Trent; and he thought the House would be astonished at the concurrence of opinion against the notion that Canada could be defended. He did not think he had met with one officer who did not answer the question he had put to him to the effect that Canada was utterly and hopelessly indefensible. And the officers who expressed this opinion were soldiers in every sense of the term—men distinguished by their efficient and active services in the field, and not mere theorists who could make anything appear defensible upon paper. Why had Colonel Jervois been sent to report on the defences of Canada? Colonel Gordon had been previously sent out to examine into the condition of Canada. Now, no man stood higher than Colonel Gordon in his profession—he was one of the best Engineer officers in the army. And what was the nature of his Report? Colonel Wetherall and Colonel Mackenzie, whose equals in the service could scarely be found, bad also investigated this subject. They formed the best staff of officers that were ever sent out on any expedition. Well, did not all these able and experienced men report upon the defences of Canada? He believed that they did, and that they rather astonished the War Office by the Report which they gave. Why was not their Report produced to Parliament? Why was Colonel Jervois sent out to Canada after they had come home? Now, the whole of this question turned upon the point whether Canada was or was not defensible. By the answer to that question the House ought to be guided in coming to a decision on the course to be taken. If Canada were not defensible, we ought to withdraw our troops to-morrow. The Government had not brought forward a single military authority to show that Canada was defensible. It was true that Colonel Jervois was sent out to Canada to report upon the best mode of defending Canada. Colonel Jervois had sent in an able Report, in which he (Major Anson) had no doubt he recommended the very best means of defending Canada so far as engineering operations went. The only two authorities quoted by the Government in favour of Canada being defensible were Mr. Rose and Mr. Galt—no doubt two excellent gentlemen, but certainly no great military authorities. It was said that it was easy to defend Montreal by keeping up our communication with that place and Quebec if we retained our supremacy on the St. Lawrence. But he should just like to ask hon. Members what chance had we of doing that? Just let them look into the question. He believed that there was no portion of the American system of attack so highly organized as the numerous gunboats which swarmed on the American coasts and rivers. We had not got at the present moment, he believed, one single iron-clad gunboat which could navigate the St. Lawrence. Did we know whether we could build iron-clad gunboats capable of crossing the Atlantic, and of then entering the St. Lawrence and standing the fire of the heavy guns planted on the south side of that river—for he supposed we were not going to hold the south side of the St Lawrence. Could we build such boats here and send them out ready for service? Could we build them in pieces here and send them out to be put together at the other side of the Atlantic in sufficient strength to stand against the American batteries? The hon. and gallant Gentleman (Sir Frederic Smith) objected to the phrase "base of operations." Well, we had no dockyards or arsenals in Canada, and therefore when they talked of the base of operations, that must of necessity be in this country and not in Canada, from the want there of any resources of that kind. England, he contended, was, and must be, the base of operations. The chances were, so far as he could judge, that instead of our having the preponderance on the St. Lawrence the Americans would have it. With regard to the fortifications of Canada, he had received a letter from one of the best officers in the British service upon the subject. That gallant officer said, that— If the proposal is carried out of fortifying Montreal and other places no advantage will be gained; as, though such fortifications may afford shelter, an invading army could have its own way in Canada, particularly in the west, by simply avoiding the few strongholds. I do think that the British soldiers, who in all parts of the world lace cheerfully danger and disease, would be placed in a false position, far apart, with no sup- port but a militia force, which as yet we know very little about; while the Americans can at any time, and without difficulty, convey any amount of men and warlike stores by the railways, which lead to so many vulnerable points along the frontier. This question about the defences of Canada is a common-sense one, which in my humble opinion can best be decided by officers of experience, who know not only what an army can do, but also what it cannot do. He thought the latter question was lost sight of when we talked about the easy way in which Canada could be defended; and those who argued that Canada could be defended as well as any other country could have read but little of military history, or studied the question at all. Now, with regard to the winter, there was little doubt but that the severity of the weather would stop active military operations in that country. But so far from the winter assisting in the defence of Canada, it would be much more fatal to our garrisons imprisoned in fortifications and cut off from communication with the world than to the enemy, who, by means of their railways running into their camps, would be able to carry off their wounded to a more genial climate, and be able also to get any amount of stores and supplies forwarded to them. So far as the military question was concerned, he regretted to state that he had not heard on the part of Her Majesty's Government any attempt to meet it in argument. All they said was that Canada could be defended, and there wa9 an end of it. But they gave no proof that she was practically defensible.

SIR JOHN PAKINGTON

Sir, although the hon. and gallant Gentleman who has just spoken is a young Member of this House and is a young officer—one, however, who has gained reputation in every quarter of the world—it is impossible to deny that whatever falls from his lips on a subject of this nature is entitled to respectful attention. The impression made upon my mind by his statements this evening is to strengthen the feelings I before entertained, that we have great reason to complain of Her Majesty's Government in relation to this delicate and difficult question. In the first place, so far as I am informed, we have reason to complain of the manner in which they have produced the Report of Colonel Jervois. The hon. and gallant Member has adverted to the Report which he supposes—for he goes no further—has been made by Colonel Gordon and Colonel Wetherall. I do not know whether there is such a Report—at all events, I am not aware of its existence; but it is currently reported—it is everywhere believed—that what has been laid upon the table of the House by Her Majesty's Government as the Report of Colonel Jervois is nothing but its covering letter, and that we have, in fact, never seen that Report, I should like to ask the Government whether that is true or false? They have come down to this House and asked for a Vote for the defences of Canada upon the grounds furnished by Colonel Jervois's Report; and my belief is that up to this moment we have never seen that document. I must say we have a right to complain of the course which Her Majesty's Government have thought fit to adopt in reference to this question during the last four years. From the moment of the occurrence of the Trent affair our relations with the United States have been neither comfortable nor satisfactory, and I think it neither delicate nor desirable for Government to have reserved it until this moment to force the subject into a degree of prominence. I think if the Government had taken a wise course they would have seen the possibilities hanging over us, and during the last four years would have, in concert with Canada, gradually prepared us for events, and have placed us in a position in which, if the worst should happen, we should have been better prepared than we are at present to face the exigencies of war. Again, I complain, if Her Majesty's Government meant to do anything, of the paltry course they have taken in proposing a Vote of £50,000 to the House. Now, what has been the result of that proposition? We have heard it stated by the noble Lord the Member for Haddingtonshire (Lord Elcho) that upon the arrival in Canada of the information that a Vote of £50,000 had been proposed in this House for the defence of Canada, the first impression it made on the minds of the people of Canada was an impression of incredulity. They said it could not be that Her Majesty's Government had only proposed a Vote of £50,000; that there must have been some mistake in the figures; and that Her Majesty's Government must have meant £500,000. I stated on a former evening, and I repeat it, though Her Majesty's Government stated that the amount was as large a sum as could be expended within the year, that that is not the only consideration—the question is, what impression you are to produce upon other countries; and I say with regard to the impression to be created in the United States of America, and also in Canada, that Her Majesty's Government could not have adopted a weaker or a more unwise policy on such a subject as this than to come down to the House and ask for a Vote of only £50,000. But the point upon which I most complain of Her Majesty's Government is that they have misled the House with regard to the existing state of affairs between the Canadian and the British Governments. I have no hesitation in stating it, and I believe that there are not two men in this House who went into the lobby in the division that took place the other evening on the proposal of Her Majesty's Government who did not fully and entirely believe that there was a distinct understanding between the Ministers of Canada and the Ministers of the Queen of Great Britain with regard to the policy to be mutually adopted. I have no hesitation in saying that my belief on that point was complete and explicit. I say the conduct of the Government on that occasion was not ingenuous. I myself heard a question upon this subject asked by no less than three Members of the House—by the right hon. Member for Huntingdon, the hon. Member for Horsham, and the hon. Member for Norfolk. Those hon. Members positively and deliberately put the question to the Government, "Are you proposing this Vote on the distinct understanding with Canada what is to be her proportion of the expense." I say it was not candid of the Government, knowing, as they must have done, that no such understanding existed, and that the whole question remained open, not to give an explicit answer to that question. The inevitable result of their silence was that the House was practically misled upon the subject. So far from there being a complete understanding between our Government and that of Canada on this point, we find that the intention of Government as to the fortifications caused the greatest surprise when it became known in that country; and we now find that there is at this very moment on the high seas a deputation sent over by the Canadians to negotiate with us as to the proportion of the expenses each country is to bear. I think it is far from creditable to Government that at this moment, after they have come before the House to ask for a Vote for these fortifications, they know not what the intentions of the Canadians are in respect to these works, neither are the Canadians aware of ours. I can only attribute this feeble and halting policy to the same cause which has produced other bad results—namely, a division of opinion in the Government. I cannot understand what can have been the motives of Her Majesty's Government in coming down to this House, and asking for this Vote, without being prepared to state what were their intentions and what were the intentions of Canada upon this subject. With regard to the future, I must say that I feel impressed with the language I have heard this evening from my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Lichfield (Major Anson). He has spoken upon this subject with authority, and with a freedom from party bias; and it is incumbent upon the Government to explain more fully than they have done upon what grounds they have not produced the bonâ fide Report of Colonel Jervois, upon which, we are told, we are proceeding, and what answer they are prepared to make to the high professional opinion we have heard expressed by my hon. and gallant Friend, and those other officers to whom he has referred. I freely say my impression has hitherto been of an opposite character. I do not regret the Vote I gave the other evening in favour of the Government proposition. My opinion is strong and decided that so long as Canada is loyal she cannot he abandoned. I heard with sorrow and with entire dissent the language made use of on a former occasion by the right hon. Member for Calne (Mr. Lowe). I do not say that his policy is not entitled to credit for its prudence, and that, perhaps, it might be better with nations as with individuals if they were, instead of showing fight, to run away. No doubt, the running away would be cheaper than fighting. ["No, no!"] I am not alluding to my noble Friend, but to the language of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Calne, and I do not think that I greatly exaggerate that language when I say that, in dealing with a question of this kind, it is practically running away, though I entirely dissent from his and other hon. Members' views upon that point. I can imagine no greater misfortune, not only to the two countries but to mankind, than a war between this country and America, and I hope and trust that the Government of this country will not give the United States the slightest excuse for a quarrel between them; but if, unhappily, a quarrel should be forced upon us we have but one course to pursue, which is to meet it with the whole force and power of the Empire. I am sorry hon. Gentlemen have raised the question whether, in the event of that unhappy circumstance arising, we should fight America in Canada or elsewhere; but if that unhappy event should arise, which God forbid! we must fight her wherever she is vulnerable, and, above all, if Canada is loyal we must not desert her. I entirely go with the noble Lord in that policy, and whatever difference of opinion I might have with the noble Lord on other subjects, I believe he is one of the last men in this country to advocate the desertion of a loyal people attached to this country as a portion of the Empire. Then arises the question, is there any force or not in the arguments of my hon. Friend? Is the defence of Canada a practical impossibility or not? England has not been in the habit of regarding anything of this nature as impossible; it has not been by following a prudent policy like that which is now recommended that we have arrived at our present pitch of grandeur. Had we been guided by such a policy, we should not have been what we are in India; we should not have captured Sebastopol or gained | any of the hundred triumphs of which we are so proud. My noble Friend (Lord Elcho) smiles. Is he thinking of the language which he used in the early part of the evening—that we must not push the doctrine of honour too far? That is language which is not acceptable either in this House or elsewhere. Personally, I am sure that my noble Friend is one of I the last men who would think of abandoning the honour of England; but when he and my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Lichfield (Major Anson) raise a question of most grave and serious importance, it behaves the Government to state candidly to the country upon what authority they are acting. However high may be our sense of honour, and however indomitable the courage of our people, it would of course be folly to attempt anything which is really an impossibility; and if the defence of Canada is impossible, if we are to regard the question in this serious light, let us address ourselves to it in time. Do not let us wait till the emergency of war arrives, and then say that the thing cannot be done. Now is the time—when this deputation is on its way—now is the time for the Government to make up their minds deliberately, calmly, and carefully as to the policy which they mean to adopt, and I hope that they will then candidly declare to the House what that policy is to be.

MR. CHICHESTER FORTESCUE

said, that although he entirely agreed with what had fallen from the right hon. Baronet (Sir John Pakington) towards the close of his remarks, he could not concur in his earlier observations. The first charge which the right hon. Baronet made against the Government he should leave to be dealt with by his noble Friend (the Marquess of Hartington); but this he must say, that whatever military advice Her Majesty's Government might have received from Colonel Jervois, Colonel Gordon, or others, which they had not produced, they were in possession of none which was inconsistent with those opinions of Colonel Jervois which they had laid before the House. The right hon. Baronet made a second charge which had been answered over and over again, and accused the Government of proposing to contribute no more than the paltry sum of £50,000 towards the defences of Canada. Only the sum of £50,000 was asked for this year, because, according to the professional advice given to the Government, that was the largest sum which could properly be expended upon Quebec and Point Levi during the next twelve months. The right hon. Baronet did not quite correctly represent the substance of what was said by that eminent person Mr. John A. Macdonald in the debate of the 7th of March. That gentleman supposed that the sum voted was £30,000, and not having heard the explanations of Her Majesty's Government, he expressed surprise at the smallness of the amount, and suggested that it must be a mistake for £300,000. Oddly enough Mr. John A. Macdonald had hit upon the exact amount which the Government were asking the House to vote—namely, £200,000 for works at Quebec, and £100,000 towards their armament. The taking of a small sum this year was merely a question of time and arrangement. But Mr. John A. Macdonald went on to say that— He had every reason to believe that these negotiations would result most happily in defences being provided which would secure the protection of Canada without pressing too heavily on the resources of the country. In the third place, the right hon. Baronet complained that his right hon. Friend the Secretary for the Colonies had misled the House by the statement which he made the other night, and which induced them to vote by an overwhelming majority the first instalment of the grant towards the defences of Canada. He entirely denied that either his right hon. Friend or his noble Friend at the head of the Government said anything which could have had the effect of misleading the House, or inducing them to assent to a Vote which they would otherwise have rejected. His right hon. Friend never for a moment pretended that he was in possession of official documents which would show a detailed arrangement between the Home Government and that of Canada, as to the contribution which each was to make towards the defences of that country. The hon. Member for Norfolk (Mr. Bentinck), indeed, alleged it as a serious charge against him, that he produced no such arrangement. His right hon. Friend merely assured the House of the general confidence which he entertained as to the part which the Canadian Government were prepared to take in this matter. But, more than that, he did not rest the justification of the Vote which was then before the Committee upon anything which was to be done by the Canadian Government, but maintained that even if they did not fortify Montreal, it was right and proper that the Imperial Government should fortify Quebec. Her Majesty's Government were indeed convinced that the Canadians were prepared to take upon themselves a share of the expense of providing their own defences, and that conviction had since been confirmed by the fact that the Canadian Parliament had voted 1,000,000 dollars for that purpose; but what they said was, that independently of the fortifications of Montreal, it was right and expedient that the Imperial Government, thinking it their duty to maintain a considerable force in Canada, should fortify Quebec in connection with that force. He, therefore, denied that the right hon. Baronet had established any of the charges which he had made against the Government. He was, however, happy to agree entirely with everything which the right hon. Baronet had said in the latter part of his speech. He had never listened to any debate in which it was more difficult to make out what was the real meaning of the speakers. He did not at that moment comprehend what was at the bottom of the mind of his noble Friend who introduced the question. Did he mean that Canada was to lay down her arms? because that was the only true and logical conclusion from his arguments. After all these dreary, dispiriting, and, if they had any effect at all, most mischievous proclamations to the people of Canada —after telling them that they were indefensible, how could we have the face to urge them, as we had for years past been doing, to make preparations for their defence? The fact was that our military authorities had concentrated all their attention and interest upon our own gallant troops; but the Canadians had the same interest in their gallant forces, and if we were continually proclaiming that it would be folly and madness to expose our troops to destruction in Canada, the Canadians would draw their own inference from that doctrine; and it would be unpardonable in us to continue to exhort them to organize their militia, to increase the number of their Volunteers, and to engage in war, when at the same time we told them that the task which we sought to impose upon them was a hopeless one. Let us be consistent in this matter, and if we held these views with regard to our troops, let us—though we should be applying to the New World a rule which had never been accepted in the Old one—tell the Canadians at once that their only safety was to be found in laying down their arms and inviting no attack. His belief in regard to these matters was that common sense—he was almost ashamed to use the word, they had heard so much about common sense on both sides—was of more use than military knowledge, and that the rules of common sense on the other side of the Atlantic were much the same as they were on this. When he saw that in Europe a comparatively weak Power believed that its true safety lay in disarming in the presence of a superior Power, he should be ready to recommend the adoption of such a course by Canada. When, for instance, he saw Belgium dismantle the fortifications of Antwerp and disband her army, he should be prepared to concur with his noble Friend (Lord Elcho), who, if he was consistent, ought to recommend Canada to adopt such a measure. Belgium, however, though infinitely inferior to Canada in natural means of resistance, was doing her best to play a gallant part in her own defence—not, of course, expecting that she was to defend her territory unassisted, and for ever, against a superior Power—and who expected Canada to do that?—but knowing that she would make herself, as Canada would, a very tough customer to any assailant, and that she would be assisted, as Canada would be, by powerful allies both within her territory and without it. When he saw Belgium taking that course, he was convinced that that was the one which ought to be followed in the New World. A good deal had been said in the course of the discussion about a supposed dilemma, which in reality was no dilemma at all. It was contended by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Calne that the question at issue involved the alternative of defending Canada either in Canada or elsewhere; but to the Government there was no difficulty on the point, for they were of opinion that Canada should be defended both in Canada and elsewhere. And he thought that the majority of the House had shown plainly enough that they concurred in this view of the matter.

GENERAL PEEL

I have already given my opinion as to the policy of defending Canada, and I do not intend to trespass upon the time of the House for more than a few minutes on this occasion. I regret that anything should have occurred to render necessary a renewal of the debate on this subject, or which should have the appearance of weakening in any way or producing any misunderstanding with regard to the unanimous decision of the House of Commons that if Canada should be attacked on our account it was our duty to defend her. Even the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Calne, I think, went that length; and although he, as well as my noble Friend the Member for Haddingtonshire, says it is not possible to do so—[Lord ELCHO: Not in Canada]—still they admit that it is our duty, if possible, to defend Canada if the Canadians are prepared to assist in defending themselves. Now, I do not at all wish to speculate as to the power which might be brought to bear either in attacking or defending Canada. The Canadians themselves, I imagine, ought to be the best judges whether they would be able to resist attack or not; and, for my own part, I can only say that if they are prepared to display the same devotion and energy as the Americans of the South have exhibited they may hope, with our assistance, to be able to resist any attack which may be made upon them. I recollect having heard it said within the last twenty-five years that it was impossible to defend this country, and that if England were invaded the best thing the Guards could do would be to march out of London and leave it to take care of itself. But what was the answer of the Minister of that day to those statements—of a Minister who could not be accused of being warlike—the late Sir Robert Peel? He said— In the first place, the Guards would not inarch out of London; and, in the next place, if they did they would be pelted by every old woman whom they met. Such, too, I cannot help thinking would be the fate, and deservedly, of the Members of this House if they came to the conclusion that in the event of Canada being prepared to defend herself we should afford her no assistance. There is not, I believe, a single hon. Gentleman—not even the hon. Member for Birmingham—who goes further than myself in approving the policy of not interfering in the affairs of other nations, or who would more deprecate any measure tending to drag this country into a war with America or any other State, unless our honour was involved. There is, however, a great difference between not fighting another person's battle and not fighting our own. It would be no question of our going to war for Canada; but, that if war should be declared against us, and that Canada was attacked on our account, and was defending herself, and fighting in our battle, that we should assist her to the utmost of our power. This is said to be "fair weather policy" and "tall talk;" but I know of no policy so deserving of being designated "foul weather policy" and "small talk" as that of those who proclaim to the world that we do not intend to defend ourselves. If, indeed, we are in such a state of helplessness as to warrant that conclusion, what has become of the £185,000,000 which, including the Estimates of the present year, have been voted by the present Parliament for the naval and military service of the country? We may well be asked whether we did not divide the money among ourselves. I believe that if any foreign Minister were to take up our Estimates he would imagine us to be a great military nation. We have 220,000 regular troops in a state of great efficiency; we have 120,000 militia, and 150,000 Volunteers, besides the Yeomanry and the Pensioners which form a very formidable array. But, then, there is another force with respect to which, I am sorry to say, I was indiscreet enough to put a question to the Government the other evening; we have got an army of reserve, which is formidable exactly in proportion to the mystery observed with respect to it. No army is so much to be feared as that about whose movements or numbers you know nothing, and which, for all you can tell, may be in your rear, or on your flank. Indeed, my own opinion was that this army of reserve must have been in the backwoods of Canada, for we never see it in this country. I only hope that the gunboats about which we have heard so much are not of quite so mythical a character, But, be that as it may, I may, in confirmation of what has fallen from my right hon. Friend near me (Sir John Pakington), say that I, too, was under the impression that some understanding had been come to between Her Majesty's Government and that of Canada on this question of defences because I inferred from the replies of the right hon. Gentleman opposite, in answer to repeated questions as to whether the defences of Montreal and those of Quebec were to be carried on at the same time, and whether our fortification of the latter depended upon the Canadians taking upon themselves the defence of the former place, that there was between the two Governments some sort of agreement on the subject, and I believe the House concluded that there was a proper understanding between the two Governments, I do not now wish to draw any comparison between the force which might be employed in attacking Canada and that which ought to be engaged in defending the province. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Lichfield (Major Anson), than whose authority as a military man I am willing to admit there is no higher, has given it as his opinion that Canada cannot be defended; but I, for one, am not prepared to relieve the Government from the responsibility which attaches to their carrying out that policy which they deem to be right. I cannot consent to act on the opinions of military men, however distinguished, who are not responsible for those opinions. I prefer leaving the matter in the hands of the Government, whose duty it is to carry into execution those measures which have been sanctioned by the House of Commons. I hold in my hand a letter in which it is stated that it is perfectly possible to defend Canada; but, for the reasons I have just mentioned, I should not lay any stress upon it. The hon. Member for Stockport (Mr. Smith), I may add, in speaking of America, said she was in a very different position from that which she some time ago occupied. In that statement I perfectly concur with him. Four years ago America had no standing army; and what is it that she has since done? Why, she has raised an army second to none, whether you take into account the bravery of the men of whom it is composed or the merits of some of the S officers. Am I alarmed by this fact? Not at all; because I see no reason why we, I with all our resources, with the standing army which we have ready at hand, and the number of experienced officers which we possess, should not in a short time be I enabled to cope with America or any other country. I sincerely trust we may not have occasion to enter into a war, but if such a misfortune should happen, it must be no little war, or must England ever submit to any humiliation that the last man, or last guinea she has got, can save, her from.

MR. CARDWELL

wished to say, in explanation, that he never said anything intended to confirm the impression that any agreement had been made between us and the Canadian Government with respect to these defences. He always understood that we acted on our own responsibility; and when the hon. Member for Norfolk (Mr. Bentinck) put questions on this subject he (Mr. Cardwell) stated twice, in order that there might be no mistake, that no despatch had been received which would justify him in giving a positive assurance on that point.

GENERAL PEEL

said, his complaint against the right hon. Gentleman was rather that he had never answered explicitly the questions which had been put on the subject than that he had made any positive statement.

MR. LAIRD

said, that as the House was of opinion that Canada should be fortified, the sooner the fortifications were commenced the better. The hon. and gallant Major who recently spoke (Major Anson) seemed to doubt the possibility of sending out armour-clad vessels in pieces; but such a proceeding was very practicable. When a difficulty arose some twenty-five years ago in the East Indies with respect to Russia, he was instructed by the Government to send out several armed vessels in pieces, and they arrived at their destination, and were afloat on the Euphrates before people in this country knew that they had been ordered. There was no doubt, then, that it was possible to send out armour-clad vessels in pieces, and put them together in Canada. He had sent out a vessel to Savannah in pieces, and had no doubt that it had since been adopt- ed as a gunboat and used in the present wars. In reply to the question, whether this country had any armour-clad vessels fit to go up to Montreal, he could state that four capable of reaching that point were now ready. They were the Scorpion, Wyvern, Research, and Enterprise. Two other iron-clad vessels were building—the Viper and Vixen, which could get up to Montreal, and from thence, through the locks, to Lake Ontario. They might be ready for sea by the next summer; and there were no other iron clads able to go beyond that point. If it were thought desirable to send out other iron-clads, there would be no difficulty in building them so that they could pass through the locks between Lake Ontario and Lake Erie, or they might be sent out in pieces. With respect to the defences of Canada, the basis of operations was an important consideration. That basis must in winter be Halifax and Bermuda; but both those places were deficient in means for repairing vessels, and until the Government brought forward a scheme for remedying this deficiency, this country would stand at great disadvantage in time of war. In the event of a war with America, he hoped the Government would not only be prepared to hold their own, but to carry on offensive operations by sea if necessary. We ought to be prepared with the means of offence as well as defence, and the Government ought to lose no time in making their preparations.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON,

in reply to some observations which fell from the hon. and gallant Member for Lichfield (Major Anson), said, it was true that Colonel Gordon and other officers had been sent to Canada at the time of the Trent affair, and had made a Report, which was in the possession of the War Office; but he denied that there was anything in that Report implying that, in the opinion of those officers, it was not possible to defend Canada. On the contrary, they drew up a plan of defence resembling in many particulars the scheme of Colonel Jervois. It was true that Colonel Gordon's plan for defending the Western Provinces differed from that of Colonel Jervois; but in Colonel Gordon's Report there was not one word showing that Canada was not defensible. The hon. and gallant Member said that the conclusion of the great majority of military men was adverse to the opinion that Canada was defensible. Now, he thought, with the right hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite, that while according all possible deference to the judgment of the hon. and gallant Member for Lichfield, very much value should not be attached to opinions given by those who were not responsible. It was very strange, if there were such unanimity in the army against attempting to defend Canada, that every one of the officers whom the Government felt it their duty to consult expressed a contrary opinion. Not only Colonel Jervois, but also Colonel Gordon, Sir William Fenwick Williams, and other military officers, held sentiments at variance with those expressed by the hon. and gallant Member for Lich field. But even if military opinions were against the Government he should deny that this was a question on which military men alone were able to give an opinion. He had always admitted that it would be impossible to preserve intact the whole frontier of Canada, as it was impossible to preserve intact the frontier of any continental country having on its border a great military Power; but a point on which civilians were competent to give an opinion was, that by the expenditure of a certain sum, and by raising a certain number of men, it was possible to defend certain points; and if those points could be held, it would not, the Government thought, be worth while for an enemy to attack that country at all. The Government anticipated that they would be able to hold Quebec, if Canada, as they had every reason to believe she would do, performed what she had promised. If the Canadians would defend Montreal, it would be possible to defend the line from Quebec to Montreal; and if Canada were willing to expend a larger sum, and raise more men, it would be possible to defend the line of the Upper Province, and maintain an intrenched camp in Western Canada. There was one other observation he wished to make. The right hon. Member for Droitwich (Sir John Pakington) remarked on the smallness of the proposed Vote. Now, it had been repeated over and over again that in fixing the sum for the present year the Government acted on professional advice, and they were told that the sum proposed to be voted was all that could be usefully expended during the year. The right hon. Gentleman said that the Government ought to have asked for a larger sum; but no useful end could be answered by attempting to delude the House or the world into the notion that Government were going to spend a larger sum within the year than they really intended to do. The right hon. Baronet opposite, had he been in office himself, would not have asked for a larger amount. In the first year of commencing a work it was not easy to spend profitably a large sum of money, although much had to be done in preliminary matters. He considered that the Under Secretary for the Colonies had completely answered all the other questions; and there was no ground for saying that there was such a diversity of opinion among military men as had been stated.

LORD ELCHO,

in withdrawing his Amendment, said, he desired to offer an explanation with respect to two points on which he had been misunderstood by some hon. Gentlemen. What he had said with regard to Quebec was that he thought this country ought to fortify it; and with regard to the honour of England, while admitting that England could not be too jealous of her honour, he nevertheless was of opinion that in fighting Canada's battle it was not necessary for the honour of England to fight it on Canadian soil.

Amendment withdrawn.

Question, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question," put, and agreed to.

SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE

asked whether the Government would postpone the War Office Vote till after Easter. If money were required in the meantime, he supposed there would be no difficulty in obtaining a small Vote on account.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON

said the Vote had already been postponed as late as possible, and every exertion had been made to place the Reports relating to the War Office in the hands of Members in time for that discussion. It was very desirable that the discussion on the subject should be taken that night, as it had occasioned considerable amount of excitement in the War Office.

GENERAL PEEL

thought that was a reason why the matter should not be hurried over that night.

COLONEL GILPIN

said, there could be no reason for hurrying on the Vote, as it could not come into operation before the 30th June.

Main Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair," put, and agreed to.