§ COLONEL SYKESstated, that with a view to afford explanations of his motives for putting the questions, he had intended they should appear upon the paper on the motion for going into Committee of Supply; but, inadvertently, they were printed amongst the ordinary questions of the day, and he was disabled by the forms of the House from giving explanations. He now, therefore, begged to repeat his questions, Whether Her Majesty's subjects in India, and coloured British subjects in Canada and the Colonies, would be allowed to compete; why 1,824 recruits, for the Bengal Presidency alone, were sent out at the end of last year, the fixed establishment of European troops of all arms for India—namely, 71,000 men—being at the time exceeded by 9,770 men; and why the Queen's Bays, ordered home from India, were stopped at Cawnpore on their march to embark for England? The reason alleged last Session, as stated by the Secretary for War, for refusing to allow natives of India to compete for medical commissions in the Royal army was, that their constitutions would not bear exposure in northern climates. But admitting this to be the fact, which it was not, there was always an army of 200,000 men in India, Europeans and Natives; and if it had been desired to give natives of India the full rights of British subjects, provision could always have been made for any number of coloured medical men in India. But the argument of birth failed entirely with respect to coloured British subjects in Canada. There were at least 10,000 coloured persons, either born in Africa or descended from fugitive slaves, who had formed communities in Upper Canada, and passed unscathed many Canadian winters: many of them had gone through the curriculum of the Toronto University and become members of the liberal professions, and in London the year before last, at the meeting of the International Statistical Association, a Dr. Delany, a pure negro, took a distinguished part. The inference, therefore, was that a lamentable prejudice against colour deprived one class of British subjects of their rights. But if the colour of the skin were to exclude, what shade was to be the standard—black, yellow, brown, or whitey-brown? With respect to sending to India 300 European recruits unnecessarily, as the European force in India already exceeded the fixed establishment, he must remind the House that it was stated in the Calcutta papers that the European force cost £110 per head per annum, while a veteran sepoy cost only £10. Since 1857 the native army of 232,224 has been reduced by 121,824, saving therefore, at £10 per head, £1,218,240; but the European troops are now in excess of the strength of 1857 by 27,778, and the increased charge therefore is £3,055,580; and Mr. Laing had stated to the Chamber of Commerce, at Calcutta, that he could not diminish taxation while the military charges continued at their present amount. With respect to the Queen's Bays he would simply ask why they were not permitted to return to England?
§ SIR CHARLES WOODI am very glad that my hon. and gallant friend has put these questions to me. He implies rather than makes a charge against the Home Government, which has been made directly against us elsewhere, and it gives me an opportunity of stating what has been the conduct of the Home Government and of removing a fallacious impression which I know prevails with regard to it. I will not enter into a discussion as to what should be the European force in India, further than to remark that an overgrown Native army has cost the finances of India much more than the sum of £10 per man, which my hon. and gallant Friend calculates as the cost of a Native soldier. I think, therefore, that the Indian Government, with the entire concurrence of the Government at home, and of every man of sense, both here and on the spot, wisely determined upon reducing, very largely, the Native army and maintaining such a force of European troops in India as will insure us, as far as human precautions can insure us, against a recurrence of such a calamity as, unhappily, we have had to deplore. The charge is that we have forced upon India a larger number of European troops than the authorities of India thought necessary, and thereby thrown upon the finances of India a burden which ought not to have been imposed. I might content myself by simply stating that the charge is totally incorrect, and that it is not true that the fixed establishment of troops in India is exceeded by 9,000 men. But I do not think I should do justice if I did not state rather more fully what the conduct of the Government in India and of the Go- 301 vernment at home has been, and how far the charge made is foreign to the truth. I quite admit that the amount of European force in India must entirely depend upon Indian considerations, and that there is no justification for saddling upon India a larger force than is necessary for the safety and protection of the country. The immediate charge against the Home Government is that we sent out last summer a larger number of recruits than was necessary, and thereby imposed an unnecessary burden upon the Indian finances. In the summer of 1860 the Government of India sent home an estimate that the force required would be 92,000 men. The Home Government thought it excessive, and I took upon myself materially to reduce it. The Military Committee of the Indian Council had reported that in their opinion the force ought to be 80,000 men. I could not pretend to give orders on my own authority in opposition to the opinion of the Government in India, and of persons who were far better acquainted with the position of India than myself; but I did suggest privately to Lord Canning that he might reduce the number to a little above 70,000 men, and the number which I recommended to him as quite sufficient was 73,000. The whole question was brought under the consideration of the Home Government in the summer and autumn of 1860, when, in consequence of the conversion of the local forces into regiments of the line, we had to determine how many regiments should be formed in the Queen's army out of the local troops. In the spring of 1861 we had to determine what number of recruits should be sent to India. The House is aware that recruits are only sent out once a year—in June or July—in order that they may arrive at the commencement of the cold season. In 1861 the Home Government took upon themselves to reduce the establishment of Queen's regiments in India from 1,000 to 850 men, and the depots in this country nearly one-half. A calculation was made in the India Office as to the number of recruits which ought to be sent out. We took the number of men in India according to the last return, and such a number of recruits was to be sent out as with a fair allowance for casualties would keep up the regiments to the reduced strength. The calculation was made in the spring of 1861, and the second arrival of recruits would be twenty months afterwards. The rate of casualties 302 in Indian regiments, including men who have served their time, is 10 per cent; and as twenty mouths would elapse without any fresh supply, recruits were to be sent to make up the number of the regiments to 15 per cent above the reduced strength; but where the regiments were more than 15 per cent above the reduced strength, no recruits were to be sent. There were and there are regiments which are above 15 per cent beyond the reduced strength, but any one will see that it could not be desirable to discharge men and send them home, and that it was far better to leave the reduction to be effected gradually by casualties. That was the principle upon which the calculation was made; but we did not send anything like the number of men which we should have been justified in sending upon that basis. It was only in the month of June, 1861, that a general estimate was sent from India, showing that a less number of men would be required. We were not in possession of it when the recruits were sent out, and therefore, when I show, as I shall, that we kept the number below the calculation even for this less number, I shall prove more than is needed to justify the Government in the course which they pursued. The recruiting had been carried on on the basis of the previous establishment; but when we had to send out a body of men proportioned to the reduced establishment there was a considerable number of men who had been recruited for Indian regiments whom we did not send out. These men were thrown upon the home Government, to their great inconvenience. In June, 1861, the Government of India, which may be regarded as the best authority on such a question, sent home a proposal that the strength of the army in India should be 73,577—that is to say, their estimate in that year was within 500 of the suggestion I had made the year before. The casualties in India are 10 per cent per annum. If, therefore, we had sent out such a number as would have maintained to the end of the year the force which the Government of India requires, we should have despatched upon their reduced estimate (which, however, we had not then received) 7,300. The minimum number we were justified in sending out on their estimate was 5 per cent on the strength required, or 3,650, which would have kept up the average strength throughout the year. The number we actually did send was 2,844, or, in 303 other words, 800 less than the minimum necessary to maintain the average strength on the reduced demand. Can it then he said that we have so overdone the sending out recruits that there are a great many more men in India than the Government require? On the 1st of October in Bengal, and the 1st of November in Madras and Bombay, the total number of European troops in India was 73,286. If the recruits had arrived, the number in India was below the requirements of the Government of India. But I will assume that they had not arrived; that is the view most unfavourable to my argument. If we add the 5 per cent (or 3,650 men) for the numbers weought, at the least, to have sent out, that brings the total up to 76,936. The numbers of the actual force on the 1st of December, as near as I can ascertain, were 74,015, or nearly 3,000 below the number required, with the proper allowance to make up casualties, according to the calculation of the Indian Government. 1,000 Artillery recruits were despatched later than the others, and it is possible they may not have arrived; but, after deducting them, there is still a deficiency of 2,000. The House will, therefore, see how groundless is the assertion that the proper strength of the Indian army has been exceeded by 9,000 men. The hon. and gallant Gentleman states, I do not know on what authority, the fixed establishment of European troops in India at 71,000 men. I will assume, for the sake of argument, that his figures are correct. Ten per cent on that number would be 7,100, the addition of which would raise the strength to 78,100. An addition at the rate of 5 per cent, or 3,550, would make the total number 74,550. But we sent out only 2,844, instead of 3,550; and, while the actual strength ought to be 74,550, it is only 74,015. I think I have shown completely that the Indian Government has asked for more men than we have given them; that even on the reduced establishment we have not sent out a sufficient number to keep it up; and that from the first the Home Government has been far below the Indian Government in its estimate of the force required to maintain British power in India. Then, so far from the finances of this country having been relieved at the expense of India, to a small extent the reverse has happened, for we have had to take, on the charge of this country, a number of men whom the Indian Government threw upon our hands.
304 As to the other questions of my hon. and gallant Friend, I would observe that in 1858 the Government of India made a calculation of the force required for the garrisons of that country, and that after two years' consideration they adhered to their former estimate, Lord Canning, however, differing from Lord Clyde, in thinking a large force necessary. The Cavalry force they then requested for Bengal was ten local and three Queen's regiments, with an aggregate strength of 6,600, two regiments for Madras, and two for Bombay. The Home Government, after communicating with the Secretary for War, the Commander-in-Chief, and the military Members of the Indian Council, determined to allow for Bengal only eight instead of thirteen regiments, with a strength of 5,000 men instead of 6,600, to be further reduced on the new establishment to 4,000. There were at the time in Bengal four Queen's regiments and five local regiments, to be made into three; in Madras two, and in Bombay three regiments. In order to provide the required force for Bengal the Home Government proposed to retain the four Queen's regiments which were already stationed there, and the three regiments to be formed out of the locals, and one regiment to transfer from Bombay. The Bengal Government, however, declined to receive the regiment from Bombay. We took one regiment of cavalry on the Home establishment more than we calculated on; and the force in Bengal was thus reduced to seven regiments. Recently they have determined that they only want six regiments, and proposed to send the Queen's Bays home. They intended to keep the new regiments which had been made out of the locals, and to send home one of the old English regiments which was not wanted at home, and would have to be reduced if it came here. It seemed to us hard that an old regiment should thus be sacrificed to a new one which had never seen any service. We wrote out, "We are not prepared to say that a single regiment shall be retained in India which you do not think necessary, but we cannot receive more cavalry regiments at home, because we do not want them. If you have made up your minds that six regiments are all that are required in Bengal, instead of thirteen for which you asked, or eight which we sanctioned, you may reduce the youngest regiment,"—that being the universal practice in the Queen's service. 305 "Therefore," we said, "don't send home the Queen's Bays, but if you think it safe that six regiments only should be retained in Bengal, the last and youngest regiment must be reduced, and you have our authority to reduce it." I hope, therefore, that I have satisfied my hon. and gallant Friend and other hon. Members that the Government are not responsible for imposing any unnecessary military charge upon India; but that, on the contrary, we have done our utmost to keep that charge as low as possible.