COLONEL DICKSONsaid, he rose, according to notice, to call the attention of the Secretary of State for War to the present state of the Army in the United Kingdom, and he thought he might do so very appropriately after the conversation that had just occurred, and especially so as they would very shortly be engaged in a discussion upon the question of fortifications. He did not intend to impute blame to any department of the State; but he thought it was right that the House and the country should be informed as to the exact number of troops at present quartered in the United Kingdom. In the course of the Session an erroneous statement, which he had taken upon himself to contradict at the time, had been made to the effect that we had only an army of 30,000 men, for which we paid£15,000,000 yearly, or at the rate of £500 for every soldier. According to a Return which had been furnished to the House during the last week, the numbers were as follows:—The regular army, including all arms, 102,080 men; embodied Militia, 15,911; disembodied Militia, 52,899; Yeomanry Cavalry, 15,002; enrolled Pensioners, 15,000; Volunteer Rifle and Artillery Corps, approximate number, 122,367; making a grand total of 323,259 men. We ought, however, only to consider as the army of the United Kingdom the 102,080 regular troops. The embodied Militia he looked upon as doomed to dispersion within a month or two, and they, the disembodied Militia, the Yeomanry Cavalry, the enrolled Pensioners, and the Volunteer Artillery and Rifle Corps could only be looked upon as a reserve whose assistance could be counted on in case of emergency. No man was more willing than he was to give credit to the Volunteers, of whom, indeed, the country ought to be proud; but he did not think that in calculating the strength of our military defences we ought to reckon 122,367 men as the available addition to the army in the shape of the Volunteer Corps. They had taken great pains and had advanced very rapidly in their training, but it was impossible that they should always drill so constantly as they had done during the last few months, without producing great inconvenience and causing a serious disturbance of business. Already he had heard complaints from tradesmen who were willing to pay any necessary amount for defence; but 871 who were anxious that their business should not be interfered with by their being required to close their establishments, as they were now, in order that the young men in their employment might attend to their drill. Of course if war broke out every man would stand to his regiment, and in time the Volunteers would become as efficient as any other force, but at the present moment we ought not to consider them as part and parcel of the army of the country. That left us with 102,080 men who formed the standing army at present quartered in the United Kingdom. Of these 4,080 were officers, leaving of the really working rank and file only 98,000. From that number was to be deducted 6 per cent, or 6,000 men, who were sick, leaving 92,000. The depot battalions and depots of regiments at home, in the Colonies, and in India included 33,302 men. Considering that they had to supply recruits for 35,000 men in the Colonies and 66,000 men in India, it was but fair to assume that one-third of their number, or 11,000 men, might be looked upon as untrained and unfit for any purpose of war. That reduced the number to 81,000. The absentees from the army on account of desertion, on leave, or from other causes generally equalled in number the sick. Assuming that they amounted to only 5,000, that would leave a really effective force of 76,000 men. An army of 76,000 men might appear a very respectable force if we were actually in a time of peace, but would it be sufficient to meet the emergency for which, from the Estimates and the talk of fortifications, there seemed to be a lingering idea that we ought to be prepared? It became, therefore, necessary to inquire how these 76,000 were disposed of, and it should be recollected they included every branch of the service. He found that there were in garrisoned towns 7,574 Artillerymen, 1,000 Engineers (there being in all 2,089 Engineers), and 1,000 Cavalry. He did not consider the depôt battalions useless; deducting their sick they would number 32,500, and they might be made to do garrison duty. It would be necessary to have 15,000 at least in Scotland and Ireland; there were at present in Ireland 20,000. Then there was the army hospital corps, 6,000 men; these could not be called fighting men. Deducting, therefore, all these latter numbers, amounting in the gross to 57,760 men, from the 76,000, left a manœuvring army of 18,240 only. Now, the Commission upon fortifications had re- 872 ported that if the fortifications of which they recommended the erection were constructed 70,000 men would be required to man them. Of course, if those fortifications were not agreed to, we should require a still larger number for the defence of the country. These 70,000 men might, no doubt, include Volunteers, enrolled Pensioners, and Militia, but among these irregular troops they ought, in order to make them efficient, to have a certain number of regulars. 20,000 regular troops, backed by 100,000 Militia, would do much more than 200,000 Militia without regular troops to support them. Therefore, he thought that the House would agree with him that although we had an army which was superior to what was usually supposed, and which, in time of peace, would be sufficient for any purpose, yet, looking to the vast works which we were about to under-take, the state of affairs throughout the world, and the possibility of an outbreak upon the Continent, a large number of men was required to support the dignity and maintain the safety of the country. He thought that if they were to raise 20,000 additional men, which would give them a manœuvring army of 40,000 or 50,000 men, they would be in a condition to meet any sudden emergency that might arise, and that number of men could be raised without any very great increase of expenditure. Without adding to the number of regiments, but rather increasing the number of men in the regiments that now existed, 20,000 men might be raised at a cost of about £600,000 a year. They were about to spend a large sum of money on fortifications, but what would be the use of those fortifications if they had not men to defend them? If he had to choose between laying out money on improved arms and fortifications, or on men, he would say, "Give me the men without the arms and fortifications, rather than the arms and fortifications without the men." He would therefore urge the augmentation of the regular army by a force of 20,000 men. He saw by a return he held in his hand that the quota of the disembodied Militia was put down at 113,801, and that the whole number of effectives was 52,899. That corroborated a statement he had formerly made, that we could not depend on more than one-half of the disembodied Militia if they were suddenly required for active service. He also thought the Militia should be put on a different footing. They should be able to depend on 50,000 Militia, 873 whom one-third should be embodied for three or six months at a time, each regiment in its turn. In this way every regiment would be embodied and thoroughly trained in due course, and they would be saved the expense of the useless training now given for a short time every year to a large body of men who never would be found when wanted. A retaining fee should be given to the men in their disembodied state, and they should be obliged periodically to present themselves at head-quarters. With 15,000 embodied and 37,000 disembodied Militia, which could always be found, they would on any sudden emergency start with a certain force of at least 50,000 or 60,000 Militia, which could be increased, within a month or six weeks, to any extent that might be required, since that time was known to be long enough to drill the working man into a soldier sufficiently for manning fortifications. He made these suggestions for the consideration of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War. Everybody must be impressed with the necessity of making our army system more efficient, when all that was taking place around them proved that there was a lurking suspicion in men's minds that the state of peace could not last, and that this country might be suddenly called on to interfere in contests abroad, or to defend our own shores. On this subject he could not do better than quote the language of Lord Overstone, in his reply to the inquiries put to him by the Royal Commission on National Defences. He said—
We have every inducement to make our system of national defence complete and effectual, because the calamities and misery which a successful invasion of England must produce would be far more serious than any of which the world has yet had experience. We have ample means for self-defence, in accumulated wealth and productive energies, sufficient to support all necessary expenditure, in mechanical skill and appliances, and in abundance of mineral products, which properly applied, must render us predominant in all the scientific machinery of modern warfare; in a people proud at heart of their country, attached to its free institutions, and whose courage and self-devotion have never been found to fail in the hour of trial. Negligence alone can bring about the calamity under discussion. Unless we suffer ourselves to be surprised, we cannot be invaded with success. It is useless to discuss what will occur, or what can be done, after London has fallen into the hands of an invading foe. The apathy, be it of the Government or of the people, which renders the occurrence of such a catastrophe possible, will not afterwards enable the country, enfeebled, dispirited, and disorganized by the loss of its capital, to redeem the fatal error. In short, we have a 874 stake at issue in the property, the happiness, and the free institutions to be protected, in the plunder, the misery, and the degradation to be averted, which may well call forth all our energies. We have means of defence of every kind; national wealth, engineering skill, personal courage, amply sufficient to secure our safety. We have warning more than enough to awake our vigilance. If we prove too apathetic to take the necessary precautions, to make the requisite efforts, or too shortsighted and selfish to submit to the necessary sacrifice, we must bow to the fate which the whole world will declare that we have deserved.In calling the attention of the Secretary for War to this subject, he wished to point out the condition of the Militia Artillery in our garrison towns. They were so many nights on guard that they had little time to attend to their drill, and did not therefore attain that efficiency which it was desirable they should have. Besides, the duty in which they were engaged had a deteriorating effect upon the constitutions of the men. There were more men in hospital in garrison towns than in other towns, chiefly in consequence of the night duties they had to perform, and, therefore, even as a matter of economy, this was a matter that called for the consideration of the Secretary for War. There was a feeling in some minds that a large standing army was inimical to our liberties. The time might have been when, with monarchs fond of despotic sway, a large standing army might be made to control the liberties of the people; but, as matters were now constituted—with a Sovereign who reigned not by her power only, but through the love and affection of her people—who so truly knew and understood her position—considering the constitution under which we lived, and the constitution of the army itself, he asked if it was possible that danger could accrue to the liberties of this country from increasing the number of the standing army? His sole object in directing their attention to this subject was that the House might be induced to make our army sufficiently strong to enable us to maintain our honour and influence abroad, and to preserve at home the inviolability of our shores.