HC Deb 16 April 1860 vol 157 cc1820-51
SIR JAMES ELPHINSTONE

said, he rose, pursuant to notice, to call attention to the case of Post-Captains on the reserved list. He regretted that the advocacy of the claims of these gentlemen had not been undertaken by some officer belonging to the Royal Navy; but at least it could not have fallen into the hands of any one who was more thoroughly convinced of the hardship and injustice of their treatment, and he trusted that the short statement he was about to make would induce the Admiralty to reconsider the decision to which they had come with regard to them; to grant the prayer of those veterans; and to relieve them from the reproach of being refused, for the few remaining years they had to live, that small increase of pay which they believed to be their due. On the 25th of March, 1851, in consequence of the overcharged state of the Navy List, an Order in Council was issued, beginning a system of retirement; and, as an experiment, 50 commanders were selected for their eminent services as being proper to be placed on the reserved list, for the purpose of being promoted to the rank of post-captain, and to rise (as he should show) by seniority to the rank of admiral. The Order in Council stated that the number of commanders on the active list would be reduced to 450—firstly, by promoting 50 commanders to the rank of captain; secondly, by increasing to 100 the list of commanders promoted to the rank of retired captain under the Order in Council of 1840; and thirdly, By placing on reserved half-pay all commanders who have not served afloat, or in the packet or revenue service, within 20 years, or who are physically incapable of service, and by continuing from time to time to remove such officers from the active list to reserved half-pay. Officers who may be thus placed on reserved half-pay will be allowed to retain all the advantages they now enjoy of rising in pay or rank, or of receiving the Greenwich out-pension. [Lord C. PAGET.—"Read the next paragraph."] The next paragraph was as follows:— The system of promoting by brevet will be abandoned. Fifty lieutenants, however, will be promoted by selection to the rank of commander, to be placed on reserved half-pay, in the same manner as specified in the case of commanders promoted to be captains. The letter to the 50 commanders thus promoted to be captains, from the First Lord of the Admiralty, stated that in consideration of their services he offered them this promotion, and that if they accepted the offer it would not prevent them from being eligible for a commander's out-pension for Greenwich. In 1854 Captain Allen was appointed to a Greenwich out-pension, and subsequently two other captains on the reserved list received similar appointments. But another captain who applied in February, 1856, was refused the out-pension, on the pretext that by a recent regulation he was not eligible to be put upon the Greenwich out-pension. He held in his hand the commission issued to these officers, which in all respects resembled that issued to post-captains in active service, except that the words, "for rank only," were inserted in the corner of the docu- ment. An hon. and gallant Gentleman now no more (Captain L. Vernon)—to whom he could not allude without expressing the great loss which the House had suffered from his untimely fate—had recently read a letter from an officer high in the Admiralty, calling upon a gentleman (Mr. Churchward) to continue a series of graphic sketches of the services of these very officers, in order to satisfy the country that they were entitled to be placed on the reserved list. One of these officers, Captain Gordon, applied to be admitted to an out-pension at Greenwich, and he received an answer, signed by Mr. Phinn, stating that his name had been placed in the list of candidates, and that at the proper time his claims would be taken into consideration. At the same time he was informed that the object in granting these pensions was the relief of officers who might be old, wounded, or disabled, and that if the pension were granted he would be ineligible for further employment. It appeared, therefore, that his application had been entertained by the Admiralty, and that he had received intimation that it had been duly noted. When Captain Gordon rose to the grade of captain, which entitled him to have his pay increased to 12s. 6d. a day, he wrote to the Admiralty on the subject, and was informed by Mr. Romaine that being on the reserved list he was not entitled to any increase of half-pay. He renewed his application, but the Admiralty refused to enter further into the question. This, then, was the case as it stood. As all of their commissions were dated in 1851 none of those gentlemen could have risen to the grade which entitled them to an increase of pay till the past year; but the views of former Admiralties on this point might be gathered from the fact that three of these very officers, as he had stated, had obtained the captain's out-pension for Greenwich since their retirement; and he believed that if the views of the Admiralty which first granted the retirement had been still adhered to they would now have received their increase of pay without any difficulty. The whole case rested on the construction of the Order in Council, and he must leave that to be dealt with by lion. Gentlemen who were more accustomed to argue legal questions than he was. When he first took up the case of these officers, he hoard from several quarters that their services did not entitle them to this consideration. He, therefore, applied to O'Byrne's "Naval Biography," with a view to extract the services of those gentlemen, going through their names alphabetically. But he confessed that by the time he came to the letter C he found such an amount of service as to convince him that it was quite unnecessary to go farther. There was only one name under the letter A. There were eight under the letter B, all men of high service, and amongst them was Captain Bevis, who, he did not hesitate to say—though he knew it was a bold word—was the worst-used man in the British navy. He was at Copenhagen; and first lieutenant of the Galatea, in the action off Madagascar, where three frigates and a brig, under Captain Schomberg, engaged three French frigates and took two of them. The action was fought in a calm, or nearly so, and the Galatea was most severely handled; notwithstanding this, Captain Bevis was allowed to remain a lieutenant for eighteen years after the date of that action. And now they refused to allow him more than 6d. a day higher than the pay he would have received had he continued a commander. These were the services of the men whose case he brought forward. He hoped, therefore, the Admiralty would reconsider their decision, and not allow these veterans—for most of them were above 70 years of years—to be deprived of their just rights by what he could not help designating as a quibble, and would save them from the reproach of feeling that their claims to the gratitude of the country were no longer acknowledged.

MR. LINDSAY

said, he agreed with the hon. Member for Portsmouth to a certain extent. He had no doubt that the gallant captains referred to deserved well of their country, and that the half-pay awarded to them fell far short of those deserts, but, on the other hand, he would ask the House to consider the enormous cost to the nation which the system of half-pay entailed. From the Estimates before the House for the current year he found that £690,000 was the amount voted for half-pay to officers of the Navy and Royal Marines, and that £488,000 additional was voted for pensions and allowances. This was really an enormous expenditure. The present system of retiring allowances could not but he unsatisfactory to the men who received these sums; it could not be otherwise than unsatisfactory to the Government who made the Estimates; and, most of all, was it unsatisfactory to the House, whose duty it was to provide the amount. He thought it was high time that the whole question of reserve and retired lists should be carefully looked into, because in consequence of it there was a large amount of dissatisfaction among the officers themselves, as there were a very large number of officers—more especially above the rank of lieutenant —who were knocking in vain at the door of the Admiralty for employment. They felt that there was no possibility of obtaining employment, and that if every ship in the British navy were commissioned to-morrow, there were still great numbers of officers who would not and could not be employed. The gallant Admiral (Sir Charles Napier) had complained that there was now only an average of two midshipmen to each ship of war, but would the gallant Admiral wish to go back to the times when the average was about eight— a state of things which eventually saddled the House with an enormous amount of half-pay. Instead of bringing more midshipmen into the service, his plan would be rather to bring the petty officers forward, to give them a higher grade, to make a greater distinction between them and the able-bodied seamen, and so giving the petty officers much of the duty to do that was done by midshipmen. In this way two good effects would follow. They would be spared the necessity of rearing up officers whom they could not afterwards employ, and they would encourage the able-bodied seamen in the merchant service to enter the Royal Navy, in the hope that they would reach the superior grade of petty officers. Without following the gallant Admiral through the whole of his speech, he might yet say a word respecting the Royal Commission, of which he had the honour to be a member, but from whose Report he had the misfortune to dissent. With all due respect to the gallant Admiral, he thought it would not be so very easy to follow out the recommendations of the Commission; but even if that were done, the object which the Commission had in view would, he believed, be still unattained. If they wanted to draw men from the merchant service, they must appeal to the officers of that service by giving them some honorary rank, some distinguishing badge which, without raising them to the same rank as naval officers, would raise their social position in this country, and more especially abroad, and constitute them officers of the reserve which had been recommended. But to do the Admiralty justice, he must say they had used every possible exertion to carry out the recommendations of the Commission. The hon. and gallant Admiral thought it might be ultimately found necessary to resort to impressment. He did not think so. If our shores were in danger of invasion, men would not be wanting to resist and overcome it. But if we were to fight other battles than our own, then we might find difficulty indeed in obtaining men from the merchant service. His main object, however, was to call attention to the enormous and constantly increasing expenditure on the navy. In 1852 it amounted to £5,800,000; in 1853 to £6,300,000; in 1858 to £8,800,000; in 1859 to £11,770,000; and this year the amount of the Vote was £12,800,000. And there was no expectation that the expenditure would stop at this point. He asked the House what was the meaning of it? What was this enormous outlay for? Against whom were they arming? Against the United States? Against Russia? Against Prussia? Every one had a feeling as to the Power against whom we were arming, but none cared to express it. It was best, however, to be honest, and to speak it out at once. We were arming against France, and France was increasing her expenditure as much as we were. Her annual expenditure was as great as ours—about £72,000,000. Why were these enormous charges kept up? It was because we were afraid of France, and France was afraid of us. It was monstrous that the two most intelligent and most highly civilized nations upon the earth should go on in this way; and he asked, whether something could not be done to prevent it. We had entered into a treaty of commerce with France, and great friendship was professed between the two countries; but what a mockery were such professions when, at the very time they were being made, both countries were heavily taxing their people to keep up these enormous armaments! He strongly recommended that some understanding be arrived at in order to prevent so much waste going on from year to year. Something might certainly be done if the right mode were adopted. France had no reason to be afraid of attack from England, and he felt that France had no intention of attacking England. The Emperor of the French was much too enlightened a man not to know that it was his interest, as well as the interest of Europe, to keep at peace with England. Many hon. Members might differ from him (Mr. Lindsay) upon that point, but that was his honest belief, and he felt convinced that those Members who might happen to entertain opinions from which a majority of the House dissented ought to express them frankly. But if they were to maintain those armaments, the question next arose whether they might not attain that object for a less sum than they were at present expending. That was a subject to which he was anxious to call the attention of the House. The late Government, feeling, as he took it for granted, that out naval expenditure, and more especially the expenditure in our dockyards, had risen to an enormous amount, had appointed a Commission to inquire into the outlay in the dockyards, especially with regard to the building and repairing of ships. Some of the charges contained in the Report of that Commission were exceedingly graver It was alleged, for example, that 20 per cent could be saved in the cost of new works alone; that great changes were required in the mode of superintendence e that additional machinery was required to save manual labour; that alterations were necessary in the mode of receiving timber and stores. Then, going into particulars, the Commissioners asserted that while at least 20 per cent could be saved in the construction of new vessels, the cost of building vessels was much higher in some yards than others. They mentioned, for example, that while a corvette of 1,400 tons, built at Devonport, cost for shipwrights' labour £6,450, or £4 8s. 3d. per ton; another, built at Woolwich, cost £10,065, or £6 17s. 8d. per ton; and another £10,119, or £6 18s. 5d. per ton. So that the cost of labour for the last was one-third more than that of the first. Then, a frigate, of 2,651 tons, built at Portsmouth, cost £14,033 in shipwrights' labour, or £5 5s. 10d. per ton; another, of 2,355 tons, built at Chatham, cost £9,357, or £3 19s. 7d. per ton. As to another class of ships, the Mersey, of 3,727 tons, cost for shipwrights' labour £3 19s. 7½d. per ton, while the Orlando, of the same burden, cost £5 4s. 8d. per ton. These were serious charges, and no satisfactory answer had been given to them either by Sir Baldwin Walker, Mr. Chat-field, or any other person. It was said that the cost of labour was higher in some dockyards than others; but this could not account for the difference, nor would it account for the different cost of material. In both there must be greater waste in one dockyard than in another. His noble Friend the Secretary to the Admiralty had told them, upon a former occasion, that he found it impossible to ascertain from the accounts how a certain sum of £5,000,000 had been expended, and that subject seemed to be still involved in mystery, although his noble Friend certainly appeared to have done his best to throw some light upon it, for he had recently laid on the table of the House an analysis showing the respective cost of different ships, and enabling them to trace more readily than they could formerly have done where the money went. A Royal Commission of Inquiry had been proposed. But his opinion was that, in the first instance, the allegations of the Report of the former Commission should be referred to a Committee of that House who should examine the Commissioners and also the officers who had sent in answers to the Report. If that Committee should be unable to arrive at a conclusion, then let a Royal Commission be appointed to inquire whether it was possible to reduce the expenditure upon the construction of new ships. This would be a definite object, and it would satisfy the just expectations of the country. There was another point to which he had called their attention in the course of the last Session, and upon which he had as yet been unable to obtain any satisfactory information. By a paper which he held in his hand he found that the average price actually paid by the Admiralty for anchors, according to the Estimates, was £3,434, while the market price was only £1,428, thus showing the Government was paying nearly three times as much as the same number could have been provided by the most eminent firms. He had moved for a copy of the contract and the price paid from 1841 to the present date, by which it appeared that the price paid was materially reduced in 1842, and again, and still more, in 1850. The prices for anchors in the table from 1842 to 1849 were £1 16s. per cwt. from 20 cwt. and under 30 cwt.; £2 8s. above 30 cwt. and under 50 cwt.; and £3 5s. above 70 cwt. and under 95 cwt. Now, it so happened that he held documents also from the Storekeeper of the Navy addressed to a City firm, which showed that the price paid by Government in 1845 was precisely the same as in 1841, and that no reduction had been made at all. He left it to the noble Lord to reconcile the discrepancy. One or the other must be wrong. There was no secret about the writer; it was Mr. Dundas, and there was no mistaking his signature; for no one who did not know what was meant would be able to understand it. Assuming its correctness, what was the country now paying for anchors? He had made a calculation of the cost of four anchors to the Admiralty at the present time, and found that the average cost to the country of the four anchors was 180s. per cwt., whereas the current price was much lower. The most eminent manufacturers of the country were willing to supply for 94s. 6d. the same class of anchors for which the Admiralty were paying 180s. to their contractor. However grave this charge, he was not surprised at it. He believed the dockyards were costing the country a great deal more than they ought. He believed that £9,000,000, or at most £10,000,000, would, under proper management, go as far as the £13,000,000 they were about to vote would go. Therefore, if they were to continue this heavy expenditure, which he did not believe to be at all necessary, they must have a further and a more searching inquiry into the management of Her Majesty's dockyards.

SIR MICHAEL SEYMOUR

said, that the gallant officers whose case had been brought before the House by the hon. Member for Portsmouth (Sir J. Elphinstone), had been induced to remove from the active list, in the hope that as time passed their position would not materially differ from that of the officers remaining on the active list, and they felt themselves aggrieved because they had not shared in the awards which the other classes had received. The subject had been frequently brought under the notice of the Admiralty, and he trusted the noble Lord would be able to deal satisfactorily with their claim. A subject equally deserving attention was the case of the widows of warrant officers, which had been touched on by the gallant officer the Member for Southwark. A certain degree of consideration had been extended by the Admiralty and the Chancellor of the Exchequer to this class, an arrangement having been made by which from January, 1860, these widows were to receive their pensions. But it was in evidence that from the year 1830 till now a number of these widows with their children had been compelled to seek relief from the different unions, and he hoped some measure of relief would also be extended to them. The Navy Estimates were rightly held to be enormously large, but he did not believe the country would refuse the amount requisite to do justice to the widows of deserving officers. Several instances had come under his own observation, when serving in a distant part of the world, in which warrant officers had lost their lives by climate and exertion. The carpenter of his flagship, after performing his duties with great ability and assiduity, and with much care and economy in superintending repairs and the handling of stores, died on his passage home a few months prior to the period from which this order would take effect, and had left a widow and several children in great distress. Such cases ought to meet with the consideration of the Government. He agreed up to a certain point with what the gallant Member for Southwark had said in reference to the Channel fleet; he believed their rules were not as good as they might be, and that in certain ships the conduct of the men had not been so steady and satisfactory as all well-wishers of the Navy must desire. But it must be borne in mind that both officers and men on board those ships had been placed in a position of great temptation. In any previous period of our naval history ships with their full war complement had never been kept in the home ports during the entire winter season. In future a different arrangement would probably be made, and by an altered distribution of vessels in different quarters of the globe, a recurrence of such irregularities would be avoided, and a greater efficiency to the service would be secured. There was also a great deficiency in petty officers, which was a very important consideration, because the discipline of a ship to a great extent depended upon them. He thought hardly sufficient encouragement was given to petty officers in the shape of increased pay, and otherwise to create the necessary spirit of emulation among the men to attain the position of a petty officer. He quite agreed with the hon. Member that it was very unwise to have too great a number of midshipmen and cadets in the navy, which tended to clog the service and interfere with the course of promotion. He thought with the hon. Member for Sunderland that the national dockyards were not managed with all the economy possible; but many of the differences between the cost of the same class of ships which the hon. Member had been unable to reconcile were entirely owing to the various modes of keeping the accounts in different yards. He admitted that the expenditure of the naval dockyards was exceedingly heavy; but the work done in them was of the very best kind, and it was unfair to look at the cost alone without taking into consideration the quality of the work. If, however, an inquiry was to take place, it should be full, fair, and impartial. As to the important question of manning the navy, he was glad to hear that the Government intended to carry into effect the recommendations of the Manning Commission. He fully approved the proposal to keep 1,000 seamen gunners in the home ports as a reserve force, and the plan of a standing reserve of seamen. The Marines, too—a body of whom it was impossible to speak too highly—might well be increased by 5,000 or 6,000 men. The difficulty of manning the navy had always been great; the Admiralty had never been able to get a fleet together without considerable difficulty in manning it. A system of general impressment could never be resorted to again; it would not be desirable or justifiable, except, perhaps, to the extent of an impressment afloat. With an enemy at sea, and a sudden necessity for men, he did not suppose an admiral lying with an unmanned fleet at St. Helen's could allow a merchant ship to come up Channel without taking some of her sailors for the public service. The number of seamen in the mercantile marine had greatly increased; but their money value to the naval service had not yet been quite ascertained. The commercial marine of the United States was very large; but there was this curious fact connected with it. A Report to Congress a few years ago showed that of 150,000 men sailing from American ports only 9,000, or about 1 in 12, were Americans born. Of the crew of the Ohio, a ship of the line, consisting of 1,000 men, only 182 were native Americans. The rate of pay was a most important question, which the Admiralty would be compelled to take into serious consideration. Representing as he did a seaport, he had frequent opportunities of hearing various complaints. No one class were satisfied; all seemed to think their services of greater money value; and the moment certainly had arrived when a question of this sort should, in a comprehensive spirit, be investigated. The fact was, the cost of seamen had increased, and he believed the Secretary of the Admiralty would be compelled to take into consideration the pay of the men as well as that of the other classes who composed the naval service. The system of manning had been often spoken of as a money question, and it was so certainly; for there was a great difficulty in obtaining men to man the navy, and how that difficulty was to be got over had yet to be considered. We were in alliance with a great and powerful and friendly nation, but our position in relation to that country was most unsatisfactory, when the position of our relative navies was considered. He remembered that after the close of the long war in 1815 there was great difficulty in manning the fleet. At that period 140,000 men were paid off, and when the expedition to Algiers was undertaken nothing but the gratuity of two months' pay could get them together again. In the Russian war the House voted 30,000 seamen, but there never were in reality above 22,000 in the service. He regretted to say that, as regarded the mercantile seamen who had been referred to by the hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Lindsay), the Government had been unable during that war to obtain more than 1,000. With regard to the defences of the country, it struck him that there ought to be a force reserved for the manning of the navy, and he looked upon it as highly important that this country should have something like a volunteer force to fall back upon. He was of opinion that the disembodiment of the Militia was not a wise course, and that resort ought to be had to the ballot. In 1803 the total military force of the country—when neither her population nor her wealth reached half its present amount— was, including the Volunteers., 615,000 men. It was, quite evident, however, that the patriotism of the English people had since that period undergone no diminution, and it only rested with the Government to give the national feeling due effect.

SIR JOHN PAKINGTON

said, he wished before the Speaker left the Chair to allude to the position of the officers on the captains' reserved list, and to express his belief that the claims which they put forward, and to which reference had been made by the hon. Member for Portsmouth, were not without foundation. Had he been aware that the subject would have been entered into that evening, he should have had the Order in Council which bore upon it at hand, in order to substantiate the view which he entertained; for, although that document Was somewhat loosely worded, he could not help thinking the con- struction which was put upon it by the officers to whom he referred in their memorial was more reasonable than the interpretation of the Board of Admiralty. He under those circumstances, trusted that the Board would be able to take a generous view of the matter, and he might add that they would be enabled to do so with the less difficulty because of the fact that the list of officers in question must be regarded as an expiring list, and that the number of names on it was very limited—only about 100. This was one of those numerous lists which were the result of a succession of contrivances which had been resorted to for a long period as a substitute—and a miserably bad substitute they were—for a good system of retirement and promotion. He did hope that before this Session closed the noble Lord opposite would be enabled to announce that the Admiralty had adopted a system of retirement that would be satisfactory to the profession. Whenever that desirable end was attained there would be no more necessity for creating from time to time those little lists, which as he had said were mere substitutes, and very miserable substitutes, for what was due to the navy, and what the Admiralty were bound to provide—namely, a well regulated system of promotion and retirement. When his noble Friend (Lord C. Paget) brought forward the Navy Estimates he did intimate that the Admiralty were meditating a system of retirement which they intended to announce; such was the general understanding; he hoped his noble Friend would not now object to state that the Admiralty still entertained that intention, and that before the Estimates were concluded he would be able to inform Parliament what was the nature of the scheme they proposed to adopt. He had no desire to detain the House longer on this question, but he sincerely hoped the Admiralty would take a liberal and generous view of the claim which these gallant officers had made.

SIR FRANCIS BARING

said, he was sorry he had not been present when the case of these officers were brought forward by his gallant Colleague. Indeed he only rose in consequence of some expressions which had dropt from the right hon. Baronet who had just sat down. It had been his fate to draw up the order on which this claim was founded, and he could therefore give evidence as to what the intention was. He should have no objection, on the contrary he should be glad to hear that the Admiralty took a favourable view of these claims; but, on the other hand, he was bound to say, what he had stated to the claimants themselves, that the order never was intended to bear the construction they put upon it. In neither the letter, which stated the intention of the Admiralty, nor in the Order in Council which carried that intention into effect, was there anything to sustain that construction. The letter was not loose, but perfectly clear, and drew a plain distinction between the two classes. What it did was this:—It placed on the redundant permanent half-pay list, officers who had not served for twenty-years or who were incapable, promising them they should rise and enjoy all the advantages they had on the active list; but to those who were promoted under the arrangement it made no such promise. It gave them promotion and not prospective advantages. It never was the intention to give them more. It did not even in words do so. He quite admitted the gallant services of these officers, many of whom he had himself placed on the list, and he should be very glad if the Admiralty, on a fair consideration of the case, could take any view that might be favourable to them; but he must say, as a witness, having himself drawn up the order and the letter of the Admiralty on which the vote in Parliament was given, that it was not the intention of that order to give these officers what they now asked.

MR. HENLEY

said, he thought the great amount of the Navy Estimates this year warranted every hon. Member in making almost any observations on them which came strongly before his mind. The hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Lindsay) had alluded to the Report on dockyard expenditure, its voluminous nature, and the various subjects with which it dealt. The gallant Admiral the Member for South-wark (Sir C. Napier) also alluded to the deficiency in the supply of timber in the dockyards. That deficiency was commented on by the Commissioners in very strong language. It was almost impossible to speak more decidedly than they did on this subject. The Report of that Commission, as had been stated, was, naturally enough, referred to the various officers of the dockyards and of the Admiralty. It was sustained by no less than twenty-two witnesses; eighteen of whom spoke in the most positive and general terms, four qualifying their statements by reference to the kind of timber. The Report was very strong— The store of timber, thick staff plank, and deals is not sufficient to meet the ordinary demands of the service and ensure their being pro-pertly seasoned before being converted, They go on to say— In all the yards the Commissioners have found a uniform want of large timber and deck deals. To six superintendents and many of the officers under them this grave matter was referred. All the disputes which had taken place between the various parties who made this Report and counter Report—this blast and counter-blast, had been as to labour. They all agreed that the labour was costly and that it was well done. There was a difference as to whether it cost more than it ought to do. No one could for a moment doubt that just in proportion as the labour was costly they ought to be careful that the material on which it was expended was good and properly seasoned. A great deal was said by Government of work that was done cheaply being "scamped." They all knew that cheap work was apt to be scamped; but scamping in material was much worse than in labour. Scamping in labour was much more easily seen and more easily remedied if discovered; but scamping in the timber used in shipbuilding was most destructive. That made the ship rotten; it must then be opened, and it was very difficult to say what the cost of that might be. The Minute of the First Lord of the Admiralty on this subject was so full of sound sense that he could not forbear quoting it. They (the Committee) observe the shipwright officers devote their attention too much to the quality and rapidity of the work, and too little to the cost."—(Par. 935.) "In this remark the Committee seem to have overlooked the essential difference between ships of war and merchant ships. Wherever the services of a ship of war are required it is indispensable that the ship should be in all respects efficient. The question of cost, however important, is insignificant compared with the efficiency, because the value of the ship's services cannot be estimated by a price in money. The detention of the ship for some necessary repairs may be a national calamity; its inferiority as a ship of war may be attended with national dishonour. This was a great truth, and they did not often meet with one expressed in better language. But did not this apply equally to the timber of which a ship was made as to the labour expended on her? What was the use of applying such good labour to improper materials? One of the five gentlemen who had to make this Report dissented from his colleagues. What did he say as to timber? Mr. Chatfield, master shipwright, says, at page 118:— It is a fact not generally known, perhaps, but which ought not to be overlooked, that the value of timber alone in building a ship is equal to the value of all the other stores and the labour added together. In this grave matter of the deficiency of timber, on which the evidence was uncontradicted, not one of the six superintendents took any notice whether the Report was true or false. Was it wrong to call that a grave charge? The First Lord of the Admiralty himself, alluding to the allegation of the Committee, that the store of timber was insufficient to meet the ordinary demands of the service, said, and said very naturally, that, if that statement were correct, it conveyed "a grave censure upon the Board of Admiralty." Curiously enough, the Controller of the Navy did not condescend to notice that charge at all, although he made comments on the finding of the Committee on two other points. Mr. Chatfield also wholly passed it by. When therefore, men holding high official positions, while treating the Report as highly condemnatory of the system, remained silent upon a charge which they admitted to be grave, one was almost compelled to assume that they assented to its truth. What was the evidence on which the charge rested? The matter was not only serious in itself, but doubly serious because the Board of Admiralty had come to a decision upon it that was not founded on any evidence before the House. They might have good grounds for their conclusion, but they had not set them forth. The three master-shipwrights at Portsmouth, Devonport, and Chatham—gentlemen who must be supposed competent to give an opinion on this subject—had borne testimony to the same effect. Mr. Lang, master-shipwright, stated that the large English timber had always been deficient, and that there ought to be three years' stock. At Portsmouth, Mr. Abethell said, there ought to be a larger store than at present; it should be equal to four years' consumption. Mr. Eadie, another master-shipwright, said the stock ought to be doubled. Mr. Moore, foreman at Devon-port, said that, as a rule, the large timber was not seasoned. Mr. Peake stated that they were very short of large timber at Devonport; that they were using this year's supply. The timber-inspector at Sheerness said they were so short that they were actually using "green timber." Mr. Rice, master-shipwright at Woolwich, said they had not sufficient store; that "some pieces were used as they came in." It was unnecessary to trouble the House with the opinions of the other gentlemen, but there was the concurring testimony of eighteen witnesses, all in Government employ, to the purport already described. It was, however, only fair to notice the evidence of the four gentlemen, also in the service of the Government, who made qualified statements on the same point. Mr. Brown, who had acted as foreman at Portsmouth, stated that he did not know how the store stood at present, but his impression was that the timber lately converted was dry and seasoned, except the sternposts of the large ships. That was not a very unimportant exception. Next, Mr. Laslett, timber-inspector, said, in his judgment, the timber ought to be two years in store, except "the large and compass timber." The storekeeper at Woolwich said they were pretty well off except in "sternposts and under-pieces." Mr. Watts, first assistant to the Surveyor-General, gave rather odd evidence. He thought they had between two and three years' average consumption in stock. The master-shipwright said it ought to be four years'; so that Mr. Watts's testimony was not very strong. But Mr. Watts went further, and added, "We want 60,000 loads this year;" and he expected to get only 30,000. That evidence was given in 1859. Now, the Storekeeper-General said that in 1859 the consumption would be 55,000 loads. The witnesses who made the qualified statements to which he had just referred did not therefore in any degree shake the immense mass of testimony on the other side. He now came to the mode in which the Admiralty had met this question. The First Lord had drawn up a memorandum on the subject, which was afterwards confirmed by the Board. The Board took no notice of the matter, except by passing—as was probably the ordinary-course—a short Minute agreeing to what the First Lord said. The First Lord, in his memorandum, observed that the finding of the Committee as to the insufficiency of the stores, if correct, implied a grave censure on the Board of Admiralty; but he added that the Committee did not explain "what they considered to be the ordinary demands of the service." The First Lord continued—and this was a passage deserving the special attention of the House—"The Storekeeper-General has given a satisfactory answer to the statement." That was the only thing on which the First Lord founded himself. The Storekeeper-General showed that although the expenditure of timber during the last two years had been unprecedented, yet the stores had been in excess of the establishment; and he went on to say it was to be hoped that such a high rate of timber expenditure would not be necessary in future years, and therefore it was not expedient to increase the permanent establishment of ship-building timber. Strangely enough, the First Lord of the Admiralty, following, it was to be supposed, in the wake of the Storekeeper-General, made no allusion whatever to the question of the timber being seasoned; and, from the way in which the Storekeeper-General treated the matter, he did not seem to regard it at all the business of his department to express any opinion as to the seasoning or not seasoning of the timber. He merely answered all the claims made upon him, and if a man asked him for a stick of timber he gave him one, whether it was fit to use or not. That was a proceeding about as sensible as to give a pair of shoes to a man who wanted a pair without any regard to the size of his foot. It was to be doubted whether anybody, looking curiously at the Report of the Storekeeper-General, would agree with his Grace the First Lord, that it was satisfactory because in his (Mr. Henley's) opinion, that Report appeared entirely to confirm the statement of the Committee. The Storekeeper-General commenced his paragraph in answer to the Committee by setting out a long array of figures showing what had been the supply of timber in various years, and giving the actual consumption from 1830 down to 1858 inclusive. He then went on to say, I need scarcely observe that the expenditure of shipbuilding timber since the year 1853, and Still less within the last twelve months, cannot reasonably be regarded as meeting only the ordinary demands of the public service. He did not notice that part of the Report which referred to the timber being seasoned and fit for consumption, but went on to say that the present consumption of shipbuilding timber, of large scantling, was unprecedented, that the consumption of timber during the years 1857 and 1858 was double that of the years 1837 and 1838, while the receipt of shipbuilding timber in those years was more than five times what it was in 1837 and 1838, and that the stock of timber on the 30th June last was in excess of the esta- blishment by 6,500 loads. What did all this come to? Up to the beginning of the year 1858 what was called the establishment of timber was 53,000 loads; in that year it was raised to 60,000 loads. Had not the Storekeeper-General afterwards given the figures he should have thought that the reference to the years 1837 and 1838 was intended to mystify, and throw dust in the eyes of the House, because of all the evils which followed the Reform Bill, there was none which was greater, and none which more conduced to the removal of the Reformers from office, than their shameful neglect of the navy. He believed it was now admitted on all hands that these two years, 1837 and 1838, formed the crowning period of the deficiency of timber, and that during those years the store was so fabulously low that it was hardly possible to conceive how any one could have had—he was going to say—the impudence, but, at all events the face, so to have diminished the stock of materials for the Queen's navy. The Surveyor however had given the actual figures. He did not know whether the Returns which had been supplied to the House were worth the paper upon which they were printed, because in the answers as well as in the evidence, things peeped out which raised a doubt whether these accounts were very correct. For his own purpose, however, he was entitled to use them as figures supplied by the Government, and to treat them as correct. As he understood the Minute of the First Lord, the Admiralty had come to the conclusion that a store of 60,000 loads of timber was sufficient for the future. He bad already shown by the evidence taken before the Committee, and he would endeavour to show by other figures, which would not easily be disputed, that whether they looked to the number of men in the navy, to the number of vessels, to their quality, or to the greater wear-and-tear in screw vessels, as compared with sailing ships, such a store was totally insufficient to meet the ordinary demands of the service, to say nothing of those extraordinary demands which might arise from losses by sea, or in time of war from damage if not loss by the enemy, and which did arise from the more rapid decay of the timbers of steam-vessels occasioned by the heat which was within them, and by the vibration occasioned by their machinery. The Storekeeper-General had furnished them with a return of the supply and consumption of timber in the navy from the year 1830 to the present time; and they also possessed information from other papers as to the number of ships and men in the navy during the same period. From these facts, which furnished the only elements for coming to a sound conclusion upon this subject, it was demonstrable that a store of only 60,000 loads was not sufficient to keep up a supply of timber properly seasoned and fit for conversion. In the period from 1830 to 1844—which included three of the periods of five years into which the Storekeeper-General had chosen to divide the consumption—the greatest number of ships in the navy, at any one time, was 620, the average number 589, the grestest number of steam-vessels 112, the average number of men 33,000 (omitting the odd figures). The permanent establishment of timber at the same period was 53,000 loads, and the average yearly consumption 16,200; so that the establishment contained rather more than a supply for three years; and he would presently show that the stock kept was always more than the establishment. Between 1845 and 1854 the greatest number of vessels in the navy at any one time was 690; the greatest number of steamers 205; the average number of vessels of all kinds 655. The number of seamen had increased to 43,000. The permanent establishment of timber remained the same as during the previous fifteen years, but the average annual consumption had risen to 25,000 loads. He was not seeking to cast blame upon any particular Board of Admiralty, but only endeavouring to show that, since the necessity for creating a steam navy had arisen, the stock of timber had not been kept up in proportion to its consumption. In 1845, the consumption of timber being 25,000 loads per annum and the establishment only 53,000 loads, it was clear that the timber, instead of being in store between three and four years, could only be there, upon the average, for a little more than two years. During the fourteen years from 1845 to 1858, both inclusive, the greatest number of ships in the navy at any one time was 927, the average number 720, the number of steam-ships 478—a vast increase in the number of that class of vessels which caused the greatest consumption of timber—and the number of seamen 48,000. The establishment of timber up to the beginning of 1858 was, as he had said, 53,000 loads; it was now 60,000. But what was the annual consumption? 28,000 loads. Therefore, the stock was still only equal to a little more than two years' consumption. Nor did that represent the whole of the case—not by a good deal. The late First Lord of the Admiralty, when explaining the Navy Estimates last year, stated that in the last ten years, though three line-of-battle ships and a fraction had been ordered by successive Boards, two and a fraction only had been produced. But it had been always held, even up to the time of the Reform Bill, that to keep up the navy three line-of-battle ships should be built every year. That had become almost a household word, A proportionate number of frigates should also he built. That had not been done, and the deficiency which had been caused was the reason why we were now paying £13,000,000 for the navy this year, which sum would probably be increased next year. But that was not half the evil, be-because they had been told by one shipwright that they were putting green timber into ships, and by another that they were using timber direct from the forest. But if ships were built of green timber they could not be expected to last very long. He might mention another fact. The whole quantity of timber received from 1830 to 1858 was 631,000 loads; the quantity used in the same period was 636,000 loads; and in 1859 the storekeeper had 65,000 loads in hand. It was clear, therefore, that in 1830 there must have been a stock of timber larger than the establishment. But the case did not end here. Among the papers recently presented there was an account by the present Surveyor of the Navy of the amount of timber required to build three line-of-battle ships, one frigate, and two corvettes, sailing and steam-vessels respectively of the same rates. The sailing vessels required 15,700 loads, and the steam-vessels 22,000 loads, being a difference of 6,300 loads. Seeing, therefore, how our steam navy had increased, and what would be the probable expenditure for the next few years, there could be no doubt that if the supply of timber had been short hitherto, it would be still shorter in future. No amount of money, said the Storekeeper-General, could procure large supplies, consisting exclusively of timber of the largest dimensions, and undoubtedly the present wants of the service were not easily met. England, he added, could not supply them, and cargoes of shipbuilding timber imported from foreign countries could not consist only of the largest sizes, even if such timber of hard and durable quality and unobjectionable weight was forthcoming in abundance at the ports of shipment. That was a most important and suggestive statement. They might get metal to any amount, shipwrights to any number, but seasoned timber could not be got at all, and the supply of raw timber was not over-abundant. A gallant Admiral (Sir Charles Napier) had said that England might not always have the command of the Channel. Suppose their supply of timber from abroad was interrupted even for a few months. That was a contingency which ought to be guarded against, and they could guard against it only by having in stock a supply of timber sufficient to meet, not only the ordinary demands of the service, but any extraordinary demand which might suddenly come upon us, exposed as our ships were to tempests, decay, and an enemy. Those were the extraordinary risks that they had to guard against; and he could not think that 60,000 loads, which appeared to be the establishment fixed by the Admiralty, would be enough. He did not wish to cast blame upon any one, but he thought it desirable to call attention to the most important part of this Report. It must be remembered that this supply of timber was of far more importance than workmanship. It should be remembered also that the timber was distributed amongst six yards. He had shown that the supply in the aggregate was not sufficent, but when they came to divide that into six parts the deficiency became more apparent. The two great arsenals of Portsmouth and Plymouth ought to have an abundant supply, because they could not tell what demands might be made suddenly upon them. Everybody who knew anything of timber knew that that which might be sufficient in the aggregate was not sufficient when divided; there might not be sufficient for naval officers to pick out the proper pieces for particular work without going to timber that was unseasoned, and, consequently, unfit to be used. It must be remembered that the ships must be kept up, whether they were in commission or in ordinary. If we had 900 vessels now, it would not do to let them rot and perish, because they were not manned by seamen and sent to sea. He found that 203 steam-vessels in commission had been dealt with in the way of repairs, and that the average expense of materials on each of those vessels—not labour, but materials—was £325 each. There were 211 vessels in ordinary dealt with, and the expense of materials for the hulls was £449 each. It would, therefore, be seen that the expense of the vessels in ordinary was greater than the expense for those in commission. [Lord CLARENCE PAGET: What Return is that?] It was headed "fitting and refitting," and was numbered 174. This Return showed that even if they were so fortunate as to have fewer vessels in commission they would not on that account save the expense of materials for the hulls. He had the figures with respect to sailing ships, but as they were not accurately given he was unable to draw any conclusion from them; but the figures in respect to the steam-vessels were quite enough to show what the fact was, and that even if the number of men were reduced to the average of the last few years, it must not be supposed that the expense of maintaining the vessels would be got rid of. The whole expense of putting the establishment of timber in a proper state would be simply an expense, once for all, of about £300,000 or £400,000. But, whatever might be the cost, the country would be secure, with a proper store of timber, of having well-seasoned materials for the work to be well done.

MR. W. WILLIAMS

said, it was very important the House should be distinctly informed what course the Admiralty intended to pursue on the Report of the Commissioners appointed to inquire into the state of the dockyards. That Report was one of immense value and of great public interest. It had been prepared by men of large experience, official standing, and who were quite capable of understanding what they inquired into, and they stated that 20 per cent might be saved to the country in the building of new ships. There were, it was true, two Gentlemen, Government officials, who pursued the red-tape system, and they defended that system in the best way they could. He would tell the House that nobody was more anxious to maintain the efficient state of the navy than himself, but when the House was asked to vote such large Estimates, it was quite time they were inquired into. If they took the years from 1832, the commencement of the Reformed Parliament to 1838, it would be found that the average expenditure on the navy in those seven years was £4,770,000 while the expenditure in 1858 was no less than £8,800,000, and now it was proposed to ask for £12,800,000 for the year 1860–1861, being about £8,000,000 more than the average of the seven years from 1832 to 1838, and £4,000,000 more than the Estimates of two years ago. Now what, he would ask, was all that for? It was most extraordinary and unaccountable to him. Were they preparing for war with some nation? But there was no other nation than that of France which could compete with them. Now, what had been the course adopted for the last seven years? The expenditure upon the British Navy from 1851 to 1858–1859 had been about £86,000,000, but the expenditure upon the French Navy during the same period had been £46,309,000. The two countries appeared to be going into a sort of contest as to which of their navies should be the most efficient and the largest in the number of screw ships, yet France had placed this country in a condition of fear and apprehension by the creation of a navy which cost little more than half the expenditure upon the English Navy. What was still more extraordinary was, that the whole expenditure upon the French Navy two years ago was £4,600,000, while the Estimates of this year for the wages and victuals of seamen in the English Navy amounted alone to£4,900,000 or£300,000 more; and he believed that the French Navy was not now more extensive. The gallant Admiral (Sir M. Seymour) had spoken in high terms of the character of the shipbuilding carried on in our yards; but he (Mr. Williams) wished the noble Secretary to the Admiralty to explain how it happened that in the principal dockyards in the kingdom there was so great a difference in the wages of shipwrights engaged upon vessels of precisely the same tonnage and character? At Chatham, the cost of wages was £4 8s. 2d. per ton; at Devonport, £4 10s.; at Sheerness, £6 2s. 7d.; and at Woolwich, £6 18s. This was most monstrous, and he wished to know why the cost at Woolwich was 50 per cent more than at Chatham. He was also perfectly astonished at the vast quantity of timber which had been paid for. At the termination of the French war we had 240 sail of the line, now we had only 59 afloat and on the stocks, and yet during that interval we had expended upon timber and wages, in the construction of ships, no less a sum than £88,000,000. There must have been some gross mismanage- ment somewhere. No attempts, however, was made to check the system until the late Commission; and he thought, after the disclosures which they had made, it was high time that this House should interpose to prevent the mismanagement which prevailed in our dockyards. A Commission of efficient men, who thoroughly understood every branch of the subject, would probably do more effectual service with this view than even a Committee of the House.

SIR HENRY LEEKE

said, he was one of those who would have the most efficient ships that could be obtained for the purpose. He would even go beyond the gallant Admiral, and have every guard-ship in port and ordinary fully efficient. At every port there should be two, and they would thus form a fleet the ships of which would be of the largest size and of the most efficient character. That was what he would do if he were a First Lord. The gallant Admiral had alluded to the subject of corporal punishment. He (Sir H. Leeke) was acquainted with many seamen in the fleet, and they were anxious that he should express a few words regarding their views on the subject. He was deeply interested in their welfare, having commanded many of them and having lived with them. A short time ago he was in conversation with them on the subject of corporal punishment, and they said, "Parliament men don't know much about it. You had better send the case down to us, and what would take them two or three nights to settle we would settle in an hour." He (Sir H. Leeke) said, "But you would not have corporal punishment, would you?" "Oh! wouldn't we," said they. "I thought you would like to have it done away with," he rejoined; "I am not, although I detest flogging, for doing away with corporal punishment. I think its abolition would be fraught with great danger to our fleet." Their answer was, "No, Sir." He was quite sure that the men themselves would not like to have it done away with. An instance occurred the other day, in which, on hoard one of the ships, some of the men conducted themselves in such a disgusting way that the seamen of the ship called on the captain of the ship to punish the men, but it was not done, and the case was reported to the admiral, who said that he would avoid punishment if possible, but that if it occurred so frequently he would enforce it, and that to withhold it would be productive of mischief. It was intimated, after remonstrance, that if the thing occurred again the man would be severely punished; and so he was, to the great delight of the rest, if he might use such an expression with reference to having a fellow-creature flogged. For his own part he detested flogging, and never slept for two or three days before or after it. Two men were afterwards flogged, and it was now one of the best of the ordinary ships in the service. This was a proof, he thought, that the men preferred the cat, or corporal punishment, to be continued, for their own protection, to its being done away with. He had commanded a large ship under Admirals Parker and Napier, in a fleet consisting of ten sail of the line, and a great number of steamers. During the twelve months he commanded in that fleet only twelve men were punished. His own ship was the Queen, with 1,050, and he only punished two men in three years; going far to prove that the necessity of corporal punishment in that and other ships was as good as done away with altogether. As a general principle he would not punish the men, except under the most outrageous circumstances. With reference to the reserve captains in the Royal Navy, he thought they were very hardly treated, and whatever construction the right hon. Member for Portsmouth (Sir F. Baring) might put on the Order in Council, he thought the terms of it were perfectly clear, and that these officers were entitled to progress in their rank, and have an increase in their pay. There was not an officer in the service who was not grateful to the hon. Member for the way in which he bad taken the matter up. He did not rail at the measures adopted by the Board of Admiralty, for he believed it was composed of gentlemen who were most anxious about the service, and desirous of keeping up its prestige, and no one more so than the noble Lord the Secretary of the Board, who had often to append his name to letters, however unpleasing to his feelings, that emanated not from himself but from the Board. These officers wished to progress in their rank, and have their pay increased; but, according to the letter signed by the noble Lord it would appear they were to remain as they were, somewhat, if he might so say, in the position of an old hulk, until broken up. Some of them had seen great service, and had passed the greater part of their years in it; and there were two or three of their number who, if he were called upon to hoist his flag to-morrow, he should really like to have as his flag captains. He should like to have a captain who was a seaman. He did not ask for an officer who was a steam officer. In action he wanted a seaman by his side, and not one conversant with the engine-room. It was not his business to rail at the Board of Admiralty and the measures adopted by them. If he received an order from them he obeyed it, with all under him, with the utmost cheerfulness; but in that House he was in a different position, as a Member of Parliament and a citizen, and it was his duty to assist these officers provided he thought their claim to be a just one, and he called on the House, the Admiralty, and the country, to say whether these officers had been properly treated. He would instance the case of one gallant officer, who was a midshipman in the Gibraltar in Lord Hotham's action, who was at the evacuation of Corsica, at St. Vincent, attack on Teneriffe, bombardment of Cadiz, who was at Copenhagen, and who served on the coasts of France and Holland, and who was made commander for his long and gallant and meritorious services. That was an officer who had only 6d. a day increase after being made post captain. If any man in the service were deserving of reward, it was assuredly men of that description. They had passed the best of their clays in the service of their country, and had taught the young men in the service to uphold the honour of England's flag, and the Admiralty would not be doing too much by putting them on the same footing with their more fortunate brethren, for were a war to break out many of these men were as well fitted to command a line-of-battle ship as any commander of the present day. They did not, to use the words of the Report in the blue-book, expect to be employed, but they did ask for additional pay. A sum of some £2,000 a year would suffice to meet it, and 2s. a day, or £30 a year, would be a great addition to the pay of those worthy officers, who only received an income of some £180 or £185 per annum, and that would enable them to get an extra servant, or provide themselves with additional conveniences and comforts.

ADMIRAL WALCOTT

I rise, Sir, to advocate the cause of the Reserved Captains of 1851, cordially agreeing with the sentiments of the hon. Member for Portsmouth (Sir J. Elphinstone); but I have received much discouragement from the statement made by th right hon. Baronet the Member for the same borough (Sir Francis Baring), himself First Lord of the Admiralty formerly, and one Whose public and private character are in this House the credentials of truth and honour. He assures the House that he it was who framed that Minute which constituted a reserved list of captains, and did so with the clear understanding, both in his own mind and in the minds of his colleagues in office, that the advantages which he held out was to be restricted simply to the advancement of such officers to the rank of captain receiving the graduated pay of junior captains. On the other hand, these officers contend that in accepting that advancement, while they surrendered all expectation of a good-service pension and the hope of employment or active service, except in case of emergency, nevertheless they retained a firm belief that they would continue to rise and receive a proportionate increase of pay agreeable to their seniority in the same manner as if they had been placed upon the active list of captains. This is not the impression of the right hon. Baronet (Sir Francis Baring); but may I remind the House that these officers have done their duty whenever called upon, and accepted, in many instances, that advancement for the good of the service, and to enable their younger brethren to obtain promotion. I heard with equal regret and astonishment the statement of the hon. and gallant Admiral the Member for Devonport (Sir Michael Seymour), that the United States employ no less than 150,000 sailors, of whom one-fourth only consisted of American subjects. I entertain no fears; I believe assuredly that, in the unhappy event of a war being forced upon this country, a considerable proportion of our merchant seamen, being unable to serve in their ordinary calling, and numbers of our seafaring population, would crowd into the Royal Navy with the same zeal and alacrity, loyalty, and devotion, which have been evinced in the Volunteer Corps on shore. We have now 180,000 merchant seamen, and with the certain prospect of such an augmentation of brave and devoted men, I can see no ground for ignoble despondency. The nature of a seaman is to love a roving life, and to be averse to the discipline of a man of war; and, therefore, in the despite of pensions and other boons, the time of peace is not that in which we ought to ook for them in any abundance. Of these 180,000 sailors, 23,000 are mates, and 60,000 able seamen, and of the remainder, ordinary seamen constitute a large number. I earnestly desire to see an efficient reserve maintained; and in the year 1853, I, with this purpose, impressed upon the Government the necessity of stationing ships at all mercantile ports for the training of men for the navy, under the command of officers of high character, possessing the happy union of temper and ability for this duty. If that suggestion had been acted upon, we should now have possessed (as I proposed the entry of 4,000 lads, from fourteen to eighteen years of age, annually) a reserve of between 20,000 and 30,000 young able seamen upon whom we could have relied in case of need. Every encouragement should be held out by the Admiralty to officers to induce them to acquaint themselves and become familiar with the new modes and instruments of naval warfare; the same zeal should be urged, indeed, upon the whole service. But, unhappily, numbers of the lieutenants have lost all heart, so few are their chances of promotion. There is a remedy; it is this: let those officers, after a certain number of years' service, be advanced to the rank of commander with an increased pay; but not, as at present, be retained on their present list to discourage others. The hon. Member for Lambeth (Mr. W. Williams) complains that the Navy List is overcrowded. This is quite true, in consequence of the unusual longevity in that department of the service. The protracted period of war from 1794 with scarce intermission to 1815, maintained with many nations, necessitated the employment of a thousand sail of men of war and a corresponding number of officers, of whom three-fourths, on the restoration of Peace in 1815, were placed on half pay. Every year, every month and day, reduces their number, and I believe no money will be, or is more cheerfully voted than that which is devoted to the officers or efficiency of the navy, which in a war would be indispensable, and in peace time is no less serviceable and important in securing the mastery of the seas for the ocean path along which the wealth of England' is brought home, has been kept clear and open for centuries, only by the presence of the ships that carry the British pendant.

MR. BENTINCK

said, that before adverting to the subject under discussion, he was anxious to tender his thanks to his hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth (Sir J. Elphinstone) for the graceful and feeling allusion he had made to a recent melancholy event. He believed there was no hon. Member on either side of the House who would not readily acknowledge that the amiable qualities and the great ability of the late lamented Member for Berkshire (Captain Liecester Vernon) were such as to render his untimely end a source of the deepest regret. [Cries of "Hear, hear," from both sides of the House.] He (Mr. Bentinck) entirely concurred with the hon. and gallant Member for South-wark in the observation that the naval expenditure of this country must be of an increasing character; but he could not forbear reminding the House that the Government had inaugurated a new financial policy, the obvious result, if not the avowed object, of which must be so to cripple our financial resources as to render the maintenance of the national defences next to impossible; and he asked how they could reconcile the conflicting positions of, in all probability, decreasing resources with an increasing expenditure. Reference had been made during the debate, by the gallant Admiral, to recent disturbances on board some of Her Majesty's ships. He (Mr. Bentinck) believed the real cause of those disturbances was referable to the whole tendency of recent legislation and the existing state of public feeling to resist authority. In the navy disgraceful occurrences of that kind were constantly occurring, and he believed there was no Member of that House who would not say that when discipline ceased to exist in the navy the navy itself might as well cease to exist altogether. In the case of the mercantile marine the tendency of their legislation had been such that, in the case of disputes between masters of vessels and the men, the former were sometimes compelled to have recourse to what must be regarded as very unjustifiable acts. The gallant Admiral opposite had referred to the subject of bounties. There might no doubt be cases in which a system of bounties might be beneficially resorted to, but he believed those cases were of an exceptional character. In moat instances where bounties were resorted to the fault lay with the Admiralty in not providing the means of keeping up a regular supply of seamen for the service. But here, again, he believed the origin of the evil was to be found in that House. There was a constant struggle between the Board of Admiralty and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who was always making use of every expedient to make the two ends meet, and driving the Board of Admiralty to practices of which they were ashamed. The system of bounties was one of extravagance in the long run, and he believed that if they were to pay their seamen well, so as to preserve them to the navy, they would not only add to the security of the country, but effect an actual saving of money. The hon. and gallant Admiral (Sir C. Napier) had called attention to the marked difference between our system and that of the French in obtaining levies of seamen, and had shown that the French system was such that they never did really disarm, and it would be well if this truth were impressed upon the country generally. Complaints had been made of the enormous cost of building, and the large outlay of public money at the docks. Every one admitted that the work done in the dockyards was admirable, yet the cost was enormous; but he quite concurred in the observation, that it was utterly impossible in the present state of things that an efficient reduction in our expenditure could be arrived at. He attached no blame to any Board of Admiralty, past or present, and he contended that the proposal for an inquiry into the cause of the extravagant expenditure in the dockyards was waste of time. The cause was evident: it was in the system, in the fact that men were placed in a responsible position who could have no acquaintance with the profession; that men who had this acquaintance were placed in irresponsible positions, and that the Board of Admiralty was made a stalking horse for political jobbery. If they wanted to have efficiency and economy they must have at the Admiralty a continuous system, managed by persons continuously responsible and wholly independent of political movements, and they must place at the head of it a man who, by profession and reputation, was admitted to be thoroughly competent to undertake the whole management. They had heard something about the price of anchors; and he had no doubt the Admiralty paid twice as much as they ought to do for their anchors; but this arose from the same cause. His right hon. Friend the Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Henley) had brought before the House the important question of timber, and he impugned the figures and calculations of the noble Duke at the head of the Admiralty. His right hon. Friend made out his case with that clearness and force which always distinguished him; but he could not agree with him when he impugned the conduct of the noble Duke. He believed that if they were to have a civilian at the head of the Board the noble Duke was as good a man for the position as could be got, and he knew that his noble and gallant Friend (Lord C. Paget) had worked hard to remedy the abuses of the Admiralty. But it was impossible fully to remedy those abuses under the present system which his noble and gallant Friend knew to be perfectly indefensible. They had been told time after time that if any private building yard was carried on upon the system pursued by the Admiralty, the Bank of England would not be able to keep them going six months. He believed that the great body of officials at the Admiralty time after time had been doing their best to remedy abuses, but that they found them beyond their control. The expenses of the navy were likely to increase year by year, and it was of the utmost importance that they should watch with the utmost vigilance the expenditure of every shilling in the dockyards. [Mr. WILLIAMS: Hear, hear!] The hon. Member for Lambeth cheered, but his views and those of that lion. Gentleman were very different upon this subject, for he considered it a penny wise and pound foolish policy to restrict expenditure when it was shown to be necessary. He would not grudge the most liberal outlay for the navy, and all he asked was that the money should be judiciously applied. Till the House was prepared to grapple with the great evil of the system all Committees of Inquiry were useless, and in the discussion of details they were only wasting their time, and wasting millions of the public money.

LORD CLARENCE PAGET

said, he would not then make any remarks, but when the House went into Committee he would take the opportunity of answering the various statements that had been made.

Motion agreed to.