§ SIR CHARLES NAPIERsaid, that before the right hon. Gentleman left the Chair he wished to make some remarks upon the Navy, which was not in such a healthy state as he should wish to see. It would be remembered that, in a previous Session, the noble Lord now Secretary to the Admiralty called attention to the great discrepancies in the accounts of the dockyard expenditure for some years past, under the management of several successive Boards of Admiralty. The noble Lord then stated that these discrepancies amounted to a deficit of no less than five millions; and that much of the public money had been thrown away in the constant alterations and extensions made in the form and length of ships. The right hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich (Sir J. Pakington) had since called on the Surveyor General of the Navy to account for these unnecessary and expensive changes. But it appeared on reference to the facts, with regard to the Lyra, the Racer, and the Immortalité, the vessels which had been specified, that the Surveyor General was 1810 not to blame. Still the complaint was in many respects too well founded, for the Orlando and the Mersey were the only ships laid down in 1856 that were completed in strict conformity with the original drawings without any alteration. He confessed he was astounded when he saw the sweeping accusations that were made against the Surveyor of the Navy, for if that officer had been guilty of the enormous extravagance which the charges against him alleged, the matter ought not to be slightly passed over by that House, while if the Secretary to the Admiralty had been mistaken in his calculations, he (Sir Charles Napier) was sure the noble Lord would be the first to make the amende honorable to the Surveyor General, for otherwise an accusation of this sort made against an officer, if not answered or withdrawn, would be handed down in Hansard for ever afterwards. The fact was, that between 1830 and 1845, as appeared from some Returns for which he (Sir Charles Napier) had moved, about £50,000 had been expended in altering ships' sterns, and during the eleven years that Sir Baldwin Walker had been Surveyor General, there had only been £550 spent on such alterations. The expenditure for altering sailing ships to screw ships was quite a different matter from that of laying a ship down on the stocks, and then capriciously pulling her to pieces. The progress of science had such an effect upon the whole system of the navy as to render sailing ships almost useless; and both the late and the present Lords of the Admiralty were right in turning all the sailing vessels into screw ships fit for service. They had at last a steam navy of 23 screw ships of the line, 19 frigates, 9 block-ships, 4 mortar ships, 15 corvettes and sloops, 26 gun-vessels, 161 gunboats, 4 troop-ships, and some other classes, making a total of 319 screw ships, besides 112 paddle ships, and 32 building; altogether, 463. By the alteration which had been lately made, and which the House, no doubt, approved, the country had at last got a very large and powerful steam fleet, though the getting it had cost a great deal of money. Successive Governments of late had allowed the French to go ahead, and therefore it became necessary to expend enormous sums of money to enable the navy of this country to recover its proper position. The whole of the alterations had been effected with green timber; nd this did not agree with the old 1811 timber, which the ships were originally made of, so that by the time when the whole of the navy should be converted into screw vessels it would be requisite to begin to repair the ships over again. Consequently the country need not expect a diminution in the Navy Estimates next year. The country had likewise got, after a long struggle, a Channel Fleet, consisting of ten sail of the line, but the difficulty which still existed was how to man that fleet. So far as he had been able to understand, the Channel Fleet was but indifferently manned, and it was not yet complete. There was a great want of petty officers; they were chiefly pensioners, and this ought not to be, for as everybody who had ever been to sea must know, the petty officers were the backbone of a fleet. This was owing to the Channel Fleet being paid off in 1857, when the petty officers were turned adrift to get other employment how they could. Many of them went to America, and it would take years to bring back the fleet to the condition in which it was in 1857. Another defect was the want of midshipmen, though some years ago the Government put in such a number of young cadets that they did not know what to do with them, and Lieutenants were promoted to make room above. Just let the House consider the position we should be in supposing a war were to break out, because of the want of these officers. There was hardly a ship with more than two midshipmen, and there was a great deficiency of mates. He would advise, therefore, that mates should be borrowed from the merchant service till the youngsters now under training should be fitted for the vacant posts. He had often complained, and felt bound to do so again, that no encouragement was given to the lower classes to rise in the navy. The importance of this as an aid to effective discipline had been recognized by the Admiralty in their circular with regard to the promotion of shipwrights in the dockyards. The distinction in the navy between common seamen and petty officers was not sufficient to give the petty officers due command over the men. The pay of the first class petty officer was £41 1s. 3d.; the second class, £36 10s.; and below that, £33 9s. 2d.; whilst the seaman's pay was £26 or £27. It depended chiefly on the petty officers to keep up discipline among the men. Since the present Board of Admiralty had been formed they had 1812 heard a good deal about mutinies, as for instance on board the Princess Royal and the Edgar. He thought the Admiralty was much to blame, for if they had taken rigid and proper steps he did not think these mutinies would have taken place. Mutiny used to be considered a serious offence, but now it seemed to be treated very lightly, but unless decisive steps were taken it could not be known where these mutinies would stop. The warrant officers indeed were placed on a better footing. Their pay was £122 8s. for the first class, £103, and then £86 13s., so that there was an immense difference between warrant officers and petty officers; and the Government allowed a warrant officer to become a commissioned officer, and gave him £100 for outfit; and he understood that if a petty officer became a warrant officer he would be allowed something for outfit also. But it should be remembered that the position of warrant officer was now almost the highest one that was open to the ordinary seaman to obtain, though formerly the seaman could sometimes rise to be a mate or lieutenant. The neglect of the warrant officers' widows had been a most objectionable feature of our system. The widows of captains or lieutenants had been allowed pensions, though they would probably be in less need of them than those of warrant officers. The Government, however, had at length, and very properly, allowed the warrant officers' widows to claim a pension; but they had done so in a very shabby way. If a man was made a warrant officer in December, and died in January, his widow received a pension; but, if having been a petty officer ten or fifteen years, and having gone through ever so much hard service, he died in 1859, his widow was left to starve. On this account much discontent was felt. He trusted the Government would correct themselves and reward the warrant officers as they deserved. He had said they had a Channel fleet, but they did not make the use of it they ought to do. The Channel fleet was now ten sail of the line; but in the position the country was in at the present moment, they ought to have the means of increasing it; and he thought they might increase it without putting the country to great expense. The Commission had recommended that there ought to be more Marines in the garrison towns. They ought to have them, and if fewer Marines and more seamen were on board ship, they might, on an emergency, 1813 by shifting the seamen too ther vessels, and supplying their place with Marines, soon double the fleet. This had been impressed on the Government over and over again, but without effect. It was said, "Oh, we can't get seamen." Why, then, had the Admiralty cut down the bounty from £10 to £2 or £3? The fleet was not yet complete, and from what he had heard, it was not manned as a British fleet ought to be. He was not one of those who thought that corporal punishment could at once be remitted, as he was of opinion that it would be impossible to maintain discipline if that system were at once abolished. As he was upon that subject, he would read from a return of the punishments that had been ordered and inflicted during a period of five years. He found that in 1854 there were throughout the whole fleet 1,214 men punished, and that the number of lashes inflicted was 35,479; but only 196 were inflicted by order of a court-martial. In 1855 the number of men punished was 1333, and the lashes inflicted 14,226; in 1856 the number of men punished was 8,397, and the number of lashes inflicted 44,492; but only 476 were inflicted by a court-martial; and in 1857 the number of men punished was 1,087, and the lashes inflicted were 35,000. He was much surprised that the Commission for Manning the Navy had not taken into consideration whether there were not some means of diminishing corporal punishment. There was a plan, and a simple one, by which that might be effected. Petty officers should be placed on a more respectable footing, and their pay should be increased. If that course were taken, they would obtain a better class of men for the service, whom there would be no necessity for visiting with corporal punishment. He did not approve of the manner in which the men were punished. The captain had the power of disrating petty officers, and then of punishing them through another tribunal. That was too great a power to place in the hands of the captain. He, for one, would not allow such a power to be conferred upon him, but would have the men tried solemnly by court-martial, which tribunal should have the power of dismissing them—a sentence by which they would lose their pay and the value of their past services. That would be considered a very severe punishment by the men; but, if that punishment were not severe enough, they could add imprisonment. Then with regard to the sailors. They must remember 1814 that a sailor worked very hard to get a pension of sixpence a day for ten years, and that he worked still harder and longer to get a shilling a day. If he conducted himself improperly therefore he should be tried by court-martial; and the knowledge that he was liable to be dismissed from the service, would have a considerable effect in deterring him from the commission of offences. Looking at the few instances in which, according to Parliamentary returns, corporal punishment had been inflicted by sentence of court-martial, as compared with the number of cases in which it had been inflicted by order of the captains, he thought that this power should be taken away from the latter. If that man was tried by court-martial, and was liable to lose his pension, he held that the knowledge of that fact would have a great tendency to diminish offences. He thought it would have a great effect if the power of inflicting corporal punishment were taken away from the captain. Seeing that societies were being formed all over the country to abolish corporal punishment, he belived it would be impossible to maintain it long, and they ought to consider what would be the best substitute. The Government had better immediately stare the matter in the face, and endeavour to reform the bloodthirsty code which at present existed. Almost every one of the Articles of War prescribed death, or some other severe punishment, and how could they expect men to enter the service, when they knew they were subject to death? Death was awarded for the offence of sleeping in the watch; yet it was notorious that the law was a perfect farce, for a man was often ordered down to sleep by his superior officer. He trusted the Government would be prepared to take some step in reference to this matter, in the course of the present Session. If not, he should feel it his duty to bring forward a Motion on the subject himself. There was one other matter of complaint, and that was with regard to the discomfort of the hulks. He knew them to be most uncomfortable, and it was impossible to maintain discipline on board them. He thought he should be able to show that there was no necessity for hulks. Ships were now ready at the different ports to receive the men, except as regarded perishable stores. A ship should be ready to receive her crew on the first day of being put into commission. With reference to paying off, he had observed with regret that the Admiralty had reiterated the order which had 1815 been so much complained of. He perfectly agreed with Admiral Bowles that it was not necessary, and was not wise, after men had been abroad two or three years, to keep them on board without seeing their wives and families. It was most unreasonable and unwise to do so. If a ship came home, and was to be paid off, the whole of the crew, officers and all, ought to be turned over into one of those ships which he had shown were ready to receive them, and the men would then have an opportunity of taking off all their clothes, and all the other little things that they had accumulated. It was bad economy too. They all knew that when ships were going to be paid off, the captain was impatient and the men were impatient, and the remaining stores were turned over in a slovenly manner. He was sorry to say he had done it himself. It was only the other day that he saw at Portsmouth bran-new cables, which had never been used, and which were cut. If the ships which were to be paid off were carefully unrigged, under the supervision of the superintendent of the dockyard, a great saving would be effected. The Admiralty had made a great blunder in the matter of the Princess Royal, and the mutiny which arose on board that ship was entirely their own fault. Their mode of proceeding was extraordinary and unjustifiable, for they had 180 men tried in block by court martial, under circumstances which rendered it impossible to ascertain who were innocent and who were guilty. He hoped they would hear no more of cases of that kind. He had shown that, instead of ten sail of the line for their Channel fleet, they might easily have twenty. He would now show how without a single halfpenny additional expense they might have eight more. They had in their different ports eight block-ships, but he would have a line-of-battle ship at each of the different large ports. The Admiralty had at last managed to place a real ship at Liverpool, and to withdraw the block-ship, which was an object of derision to all the sailors visiting that port. At present there were eight block-ships, which, if an emergency arose, would be compelled to remain in port and run great risk of capture by the enemy. Yet those block-ships were considered as our reserve in case of war, to be manned by the Coastguard, assisted by the Coast Volunteers. Now the House had been very much misled with regard to the Coastguard, and he was sorry to say that he had uninten- 1816 tionally assisted to mislead it. He stated last year that the Coastguard consisted of 8,200 men. The Manning Commission recommended that they should be increased to 12,000. Now Admiral Martin, who had been in the Admiralty himself, had published a clear and sensible pamphlet, in which he showed that the only reliable number of the Coastguard was 3,200. That was the amount of their reserve, if the statement of Admiral Martin was correct, and he was just hot from the Admiralty, and the Admiralty must have known it, although they put down the number of 8,200 in the Estimate. As to the Coast Volunteers, the Commission themselves described them not exactly as sailors, but still as men upon whom they could depend. What ought they to do with the Coast Volunteers? He would tell them. He dared to say that the noble Lord at the head of the Admiralty had looked back to the sea fencibles of former days. He (Sir C. Napier) thought that they ought to return to the sea fencibles; but if not let them take the Coast Volunteers for what they were worth. Only a few of them could go aloft as they were trained mostly to work the guns. He would place those men on board the block-ships, for no other purpose than to remain in their ports. Those vessels had had their steam power reduced to 200 horse, and their masts and yards had been also reduced; so that they could not sail or steam. They were only fit to remain in port; and he should propose that the Coast Volunteers should be placed in them; and he would get rid of all the men in the Coastguard who were not seamen. If that were done they would be able to send eight additional sail of the line to sea at a moment's warning. There were six vessels ready to replace the block-ships, namely, the Mars, the Cressy, the Colossus, the Marie, the Lion, and the Goliath; and the sooner the exchange was made the better. Now he came to the question of the reserve. The last time he made inquiry about it, he found that the number of men on the reserve list was only between 600 and 700; so that, adding those to the Coastguard force, estimated at 3,200, we could not count on more than 4,000 men, if so many, coming within the description of a reserve. They had been told, both by the Secretary to the Admiralty and the Member for Halifax (Sir C. Wood) that Prance could man the whole of her fleet whenever she pleased. The men destined to serve in the French navy were 1817 all regularly organized and could be promptly drafted on board ship. On the other hand, the men we had enlisted on the reserve were far from being efficient. They were not even so good as those who served in the Baltic. He was not blaming the Admiralty for that, they were doing their best; but he blamed the Government for reducing the bounty from £6 to £2 or £3. The Commissioners of last year recommended an increase of Seamen Gunners, and for that purpose suggested that their pay should be augmented, and that five years' service should count as six in reckoning for pensions. He was not aware whether the Government was resolved on carrying out that proposal. The Commissioners also recommended an increase in the allowance of provisions, and that suggestion had been adopted; but what the Government gave with one hand they took away with the other. They had decreased the savings, and he (Sir C. Napier) believed that nine-tenths of the seamen in Her Majesty's service would have preferred the old arrangement. The recommendation of the Commission with regard to clothing, bedding, and mess traps had been agreed to, and a very great boon it had proved to the navy. The allotment system had likewise been established; but it took nearly six weeks before an allotment could be paid. Now, he would ask the House, how in God's name was a seaman's wife to subsist in the meantime? He considered that the arrangements ought to be such that the wages might be paid over the day after the allotment was made. In 1852 a Commission, composed of excellent officers, recommended that besides the Channel fleet, there should be a reserve of 10,000 men always in the home ports; but what was the good of going to the expense of a Commission if its suggestions were not attended to? Seeing the way in which the Report of 1852 had been neglected, he (Sir C. Napier) moved for another Commission to go over the ground again; and that Commission had reduced the number of the reserve to 4,000, in addition to the Channel fleet and the guard-ships. He (Sir C. Napier) did not complain of that reduction; but had the other suggestions of the Commissioners been carried out? They recommended, for instance, that a large ship like the Britannia should be stationed at Plymouth, and that there should be four additional training vessels. Had either of these things been done? They also recommended the establishment of school 1818 ships. Had school ships been established? [Lord CLARENCE PAGET: There is one preparing.] One preparing! The Commissioners recommended that the Merchant Seamen's Fund should be re-established. Had that been done? The noble Lord (Lord C. Paget) held his tongue, and he (Sir Charles Napier) took it for granted that it had not. They were told that the Coastguard would be entitled to admission into Greenwich Hospital; but did any one think that that offered any temptation to seamen to join the force? When the Report of the Commission which was now sitting on the hospital was published, the House would be thunderstruck to find how shamefully and disgracefully the institution had been managed for many years past; in fact, an admission into the hospital was hardly worth a man's acceptance. Another recommendation of the Commission was in favour of a better regulation for the payment of wages when a ship was fitting out. He believed the Admiralty were considering this point, but they always considered things so long that probably a year would elapse before the recommendation of the Committee could be carried out. The Commission on Manning the Navy further contemplated a reserve force consisting of 4,000 Marines in the home ports; 12,000 Coastguards, 6,000 Marines, 5,000 short-pension Marines, 3,000 short-pension Seamen, 20,000 Royal Naval Volunteers, and 10,000 Naval Coastguards and other forces, making a total of 70,000 men; but how many had the country really got? They had not got the 4,000 Marines in the home ports; the Coastguards numbered 3,200 men instead of 12,000; the Marines were of the full force of 6,000, but they had no short-service Marines; of short-service Seamen they had 190 instead of 3,000; of the Volunteers there were, 700 instead of 20,000; and how many Naval Coastguards there might now be he was unable to say. Surely this was a matter that required to be looked into. If the Admiralty were to give the short-service pension men to understand that if they joined the reserve allowance would be made for past services, they might be induced to come forward; but at present they would not do so, especially as they were liable to be sent off immediately to distant parts of the world. The Commission wound up by expressing their opinion that the reliefs at the home ports should be speedily raised, but they all knew that they were not being speedily raised, and that a period of seven 1819 years might elapse before the reserve could be established under the present system. The Commissioners on National Defences recommended an expenditure of no less than £10,000,000 in fortifications, but he doubted the wisdom of such a course. There was, for instance, Alderney, on which £300,000 had been spent, and on which it was proposed to lay out another £100,000 this year. But what was the use of Alderney? It was not even a harbour of refuge. It was a mistake to say that it looked into Cherbourg. They could only keep four or five ships of the line in the harbour, and that part of the Channel was too dangerous to have a fleet cruising about in it. Again, they had just been building forts at Portsmouth and Cosham, and they had recently discovered that a few guns planted on Portsdown Hill would blow them and the harbour and dockyard at Portsmouth to pieces. It would be far better to spend the money on Armstrong's guns, by means of which they could attack any place. Yet he heard that there was not a single Armstrong gun on board a man-of-war. The other day he asked for a return of the number of Armstrong's guns, when the noble Lord at the head of the Government said the Secretary to the Admiralty was not in his place. The Secretary was now present, and, perhaps, he would answer the question. Having spoken of all these numerous defects with regard to the navy, he might be expected to state his own opinion of what was the proper course to be taken; and he would do so, although he knew he should not be popular. The only certain way of manning the navy in case of war breaking out was by calling the seamen out by a proclamation, imposing a penalty on all captains of merchant ships for detaining a man falling under the terms of the proclamation, and paying the men the high bounty. Calling them out by proclamation was a system of impressment; but if the Government expected men to come forward voluntarily at the present moment they would be deceived. If they wanted men in the navy they must resort to the same means as a mercantile man or a millowner—namely, offer a good market price for labour. If they wanted sailors they must offer pay sufficiently high to induce them to come forward and enter the service. To expect men to enter follow wages would only lead to disappointment; it would be found to be impossible to get them without high wages. That 1820 was the only fair and just way of obtaining them, but hitherto the House of Commons had refused to adopt it. They contented themselves with giving them a penny or twopence a day for good service, but that was not the way in which they would ever get the men to come forward. He had stated to the House the only way which, as he believed, they would ever get the navy thoroughly, efficiently, and immediately manned; and if the House refused to adopt it the responsibility would rest with themselves. At the present moment he did not believe there was an officer that would say our British fleet at the present moment was in a position to meet any well disciplined adversary. They ought to be morally certain that British sailors and British officers—such men as they had on board their ships—would be able to vanquish any enemy at sea in any part of the world. There ought not to be a chance of failure; there should hardly be a single doubt as to the power of a British fleet to drive a hostile fleet back into its ports, as used to be done forty years ago. This could only be secured by carrying out the recommendations of the Royal Commission. He hoped to see those recommendations more fully carried out by the Government; but if the Admiralty should refuse to do their duty in this matter, he (Sir Charles Napier) should think it his duty to bring forward a substantive Motion on the subject, in order to put the country into a proper state of defence.
§ Subject dropped.