§ House in Committee.
§ Mr. MASSEY in the Chair.
§ (In the Committee.)
§ (1.) £368,311, Reserved Half-pay, and Retirement to Officers of the Navy and Marines,
MR. LINDSAYpointed out the enormous number of officers on the active retired list. Out of 100 Admirals on that list there were 39 between 70 and 87 years of age. Why, he asked, should they continue to be rated as active? In like manner there were 315 Captains on the active list, of whom 41 were above 60, whilst only 90 were in active service. A similar proportion held good of the Commanders' list. So that we were retaining upon the active list a number of gentlemen who were not active or fit for service, and who themselves felt that they were not fit for service. Again, out of 2000 officers on the active list 214 were between the ages of 60 and 85, although, curious to say, upon the retired list there were not less than 290 below the age of 60. Now, the retired and reserved list was in a most unsatisfactory state. It cost the country upwards of £700,000 a year; and if it were unsatisfactory to the country it was not less so to the officers themselves—for they could not obtain active employment in consequence of their number being so great, and not obtaining active employment of course they could not get promotion. He knew that it was utterly impossible to employ them all in time of peace, and that it was necessary 1224 to retain a very large number to meet the exigencies of war; yet it happened that if we were now to engage in war we should be very far short of the number of officers requisite to man our ships. What he wished to impress upon the country was that there must be a complete change in the whole system; but to maintain sufficient officers for the emergency of war would increase the half-pay list to a still greater amount than its present cost; consequently we ought to look to some other source. Now, in the merchant service, and especially on board those magnificent steam-ships which belonged to the great navigation companies, there were a large number of active and intelligent officers. Since the passing of the Mercantile Marine Act those officers had been obliged to undergo an examination before public Boards with regard to their acquirements in seamanship and navigation quite as strict as that to which officers in the navy were subjected. And he thought that, by adding to that course of examination a further examination in gunnery, officers in the merchant service might make a very efficient body of men, who would be ready, willing, and able to serve the country in the hour of need. If ultimately it should be determined to form a reserve of merchant seamen these officers might be called out with them, and having undergone a month's drill annually with the men he had no doubt they would be found as valuable in fighting our ships as the permanent officers of the navy. The effect of such a measure would be that we should encounter no difficulty in finding reserves; we might reduce the number of naval officers, give them more employment, and at the same time diminish that heavy amount of taxation which we were annually called upon to vote for the half-pay list.
§ MR. W. WILLIAMSsaid, that some of the lower grades of officers in the navy were in a very unsatisfactory state, the late First Lord having stated that mates and midshipmen were 400 short of the required number. On the other hand, there was quite a redundancy of Admirals. We had not less than 341 Admirals, of whom only eleven were employed in the fleet and three in the dockyards, making together fourteen. In his opinion the system of increasing the number of Admirals, which had been going on so long, ought to receive a check. It did not look well, to say the least of it, to have thirty times as many Admirals as were wanted, whilst they were short of the 1225 younger officers, whose services were so essential to the manning of the fleet.
§ SIR CHARLES NAPIERsaid, it could not be wondered at if, after a war of nearly forty years, the list of Admirals was very large. In fact, it could not be helped, though he admitted that the promotions had been too extensive. The reason of the list being in its present state was that successive Lords of the Admiralty had failed to carry out the intentions of Lord Melville. From 1815 to 1830 Lord Melville allowed the promotion to go on just in the same way as in time of war. It was evident, therefore, that there could have been no reduction in the list, and men did not die off so fast during peace as during war. But in 1830 Lord Melville, seeing the error he bad committed in making promotions on that scale, issued a Minute of the Admiralty restricting promotions to one in three. From 1830 to 1846, a period of sixteen years, there were various First Lords of the Admiralty, and one succeeded another with tolerable rapidity. The consequence was that the Minute of Lord Melville was ignored. From February, 1830 to September, 1846, 245 flag officers and 316 captains died; and there were altogether 909 removals from the list by death and promotion; but whilst, according to Lord Melville's Minute, the promotions ought to have been only one in three; instead of one promotion in three, almost as many were promoted as were removed. The case was just the same with the commanders and lieutenants. But the lists of admirals, captains, commanders, and lieutenants were now fixed, and that not too high, and he believed that in a short time they would be all reduced to a proper level. The evils of the system of promotion, from the age of the officers, became very great, and he suggested to the late Sir Robert Peel, who was then in office, a plan for removing a certain number of officers from the top of the list with their own consent. Some years afterwards Sir Robert Peel consented to give a retirement to a certain number of captains, who were allowed to take the rank of admirals at 60 years of age, and if that arrangement had not been interfered with the list would not have been in its present state. But succeeding Lords of the Admiralty had allowed junior officers to retire, and so the alteration had failed of its intention. They could not prevent officers from getting old and he was not prepared to deal with them in such a way as that they should feel hurt 1226 and degraded. If the list were only allowed to remain undisturbed it would be easily ascertained from an actuary within what period that list would be exhausted. With regard to the recommendation of the hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Lindsay) as to employing officers from the merchant service, that would never do. Their education, their manners, and the way in which they had been brought up quite unfitted them for the navy. He admitted that in the event of war, if we had not a sufficient number of officers, it would be absolutely necessary to draw upon the merchant service for a supply, with the understanding, however, that they were only taken up temporarily, though in cases where they distinguished themselves it should be open to them to remain in the navy.
§ SIR JOHN PAKINGTONsaid, he thought it would be admitted by every one that the Question which had been touched upon by the Members who had spoken since this Vote was put into the hands of the Chairman was one of the most important and difficult connected with the whole question of the efficiency of the naval service: and he could not allow the Vote to pass without expressing his anxious hope that the new Board of Admiralty would take into their consideration the present stagnation of promotion in the naval service, and that they will deal boldly and courageously with the subject. He thought he might venture to say that his eighteen months' experience in office had shown him that it was absolutely essential to the maintenance of efficiency in the Royal Navy that some measure comprising a comprehensive plan of retirement should be carried; but he had also seen enough to be satisfied that nothing could be done unless the Minister who attempted, to deal with the subject was prepared to approach it in a bold and determined spirit, not to be deterred by slight difficulties from effecting his purpose. The hon. and gallant Admiral the Member for Southwark (Sir Charles Napier) on a previous occasion had adverted in unfavourable terms to a plan he (Sir John Pakington) had conceived, while he was at the head of the Admiralty, for correcting the existing state of things. He thought he had good reason to complain that the gallant Admiral had chosen to make a paper, which in no sense had ever been made a public document, the subject of public comment. Those who heard that comment had never seen the paper, and were therefore quite unable to form any 1227 opinion as to the fairness or propriety of the hon. and gallant Admiral's remarks. Late in the evening the hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Lindsay) expressed a hope that I would take an opportunity of explaining what my plan of retirement was. Now, while he thought it would be very inconvenient that he should enter into details connected with a paper which had not been made public, and which therefore he could scarcely hope to make intelligible to hon. Members, he had nevertheless no objection to state that the principle of the plan he had prepared was this—that retirement should take place at a given age (not necessarily always at the same age), applicable to all ranks in the naval service, and at which officers would be compelled to retire, receiving as compensation for that compulsory retirement a step in rank and an amount of half-pay commensurate with the length of actual service they had given to the country. Then that there should be another age (of course some years younger than that fixed for the compulsory retirement) at which officers should be permitted to retire voluntarily with the same advantages. He would not further enter into the details of his plan. It was perfectly true that although he had never made this plan in any sense public, he had shown it to a very considerable number of officers with the view of ascertaining their opinions upon the matter. Among others he had shown it to the hon. and gallant Admiral himself. The hon. and gallant Admiral seemed to entertain a notion that the plan would bear hardly upon officers of his own rank. He would however say, that either in public or in private he (Sir John Pakington) was prepared to contend that there was nothing in his plan of retirement of which officers of the high and distinguished rank of Sir Charles Napier would have the least reason to complain. It was a difficult task to devise a new plan of retirement for the purpose of remedying the great evils that now pressed so heavily upon the navy; and he admitted that any one undertaking that task would fail in his duty if he did not show the utmost respect and the utmost possible regard to the high claims of such men as the gallant Admiral and others who had risen to their high position by their great services, by their gallantry, and a long and successful career in a noble profession. But, on the other hand, he felt with equal force, and he was glad to have that opportunity of stating it, that any man who volunteered to undertake that 1228 difficult task would fail in his duty equally if he limited his regard to those officers who had risen to high stations in the navy. The poor lieutenant was as much entitled to consideration as the Admiral; and he begged to state to the House that while he was at the Admiralty nothing was more painful to him than the cases that had come crowding before him of men who had served their country well, but who had failed in the difficult race for promotion merely from want of "interest." It was too true, and he must repeat it, that they failed only from want of interest—from want of that mode of getting advancement which everybody knew was necessary. In saying this, however, he did not impute blame to any one. Everybody knew the difficulties with which a Government was surrounded; they were compelled to make selections from largo bodies of men, and let them make those selections ever so honestly there must remain a large residuum unemployed and unpromoted. At this moment there were cases of men who had been lieutenants for years and years, until they had become old men, and who were now struggling to maintain themselves as officers and gentlemen upon pittances wholly inadequate. No man could hold the position he had held, as First Lord of the Admiralty, without having his feelings continually wounded by the sight of numberless such cases—they came crowding upon him. And he did think—and he said it with no disrespect—that it behoved men like the gallant Admiral, who had been more fortunate, who had risen to great distinction and obtained high positions, not to stand out with too much of punctilio about their own position, but to show some consideration towards their less fortunate brother officers, and be willing to make some sacrifices in order to relieve such men from the great difficulties and privations they had been for so long a time suffering. The plan of retirement he proposed had been so far developed that he had consulted his colleagues in the Cabinet concerning it; and it was most cordially and thoroughly adopted by them; and if he had remained at the Admiralty he would have exerted himself to the utmost to carry it into operation—of course with such modifications as fairness might suggest. Its details throughout were prepared with the most anxious desire on his part to avoid its bearing hardly upon any class of officers. But the gallant Admiral had said on a previous occasion that it was strongly 1229 opposed by many distinguished officers in the service, and further that the naval officers of his (Sir John Pakington's) own Board were also opposed to it. [Sir CHARLES NAPIER: Hear, hear!] He thought this was a very strong statement, and one that could not be passed without notice. But he would tell the hon. and gallant Admiral that so far as he knew, disapprobation of that plan was confined mainly—he would not say exclusively—to a very small number of officers at the head of the list—of the gallant Admiral's own rank—who took a view of the plan which he thought was a very mistaken one, and one that he deeply regretted to find was entertained. True it was that the professional members of the Board of Admiralty were divided upon the subject; but it was equally true that he did not limit his inquiries for opinions respecting it, either to the members of his own Board or to the distinguished men who stood at the head of the navy. He had consulted officers of all ranks, without knowing their previous bias, and solely regarding their competency to give a disinterested and a fair opinion upon the subject; and an overwhelming majority were most cordial and decided in their approbation, and he had received most urgent communications from naval officers of all ranks and in all directions, expressing their approval of the scheme, and their hopes that he would carry out the plan to a successful issue. As a proof that it was necessary to agree upon some alteration of the existing system he would mention that during the first twelve months, from April, 1858, to April, 1859, that he had held office, he was able to promote only five lieutenants to be commanders, and two commanders to be post captains. He excepted extraordinary cases of promotion in consequence of transactions in China, because they had nothing to do with the general accuracy of the statement he had made as to the very limited amount of ordinary promotion which occurred between April 1858, and April 1859. Was it to be supposed that in a great profession like the navy satisfaction or contentment could exist under such a system of stagnation? Was it likely that officers could be obtained of the right age, active and willing to perform their duties, if such stagnation in the system of promotion were allowed to continue? The gallant Admiral had alluded to the army, and had said that no evils of the kind existed there—that the general officers were not asked to re- 1230 tire at a certain age for the purpose of providing room for promotion for their younger brethren. But in using that argument the hon. and gallant Member clearly lost sight of the fact that the two professions were governed upon totally different principles. The General remaining in the army did not stop promotion; but the Admiral remaining in the navy did stop promotion. Every year there were numbers—he might without exaggeration say hundreds—of officers who left the army by sale of their commissions. Who left the navy? Nobody. Year after year young gentlemen were constantly pouring in; hitherto perhaps not to a sufficient extent, for he believed it was true, as had been stated, that the number of entries was so restricted that Her Majesty's ships in commission were short some 300 or 400 of the junior rank of officers. But while pouring in these young men at the bottom who was going out at the top? Nobody. The gallant Admiral (Sir Charles Napier) had talked about those of his own rank growing old. It really seemed as if our Admirals were immortal; they seemed to be always growing old, and never to get so, for such was their tenacity of life it really would appear that unless they happened to get knocked off by a cannon hall, they were exempted from the payment of that debt of nature to which it was the general belief that we were all liable. He hoped that the worthy Admiral would long enjoy his apparent exemption; but in any profession, if new members were constantly pouring in at the bottom, and none going out at the top, it could not be matter of surprise if stagnation were to result. That stagnation existed in the navy; and it certainly embarrassed, and he might almost say endangered, the naval service. Successive Boards of Admiralty, attempting to reduce the evil, had adopted new retiring lists until the alphabet itself was exhausted in supplying distinguishing initials. But those lists only relieved the system temporarily; in a few years it was again choked up; and it was impossible to devise any remedy that would prove effectual and lasting, unless it were made self-acting, clearing the way at the top as fresh blood was poured in at the bottom. By this means we should always have a due succession of officers who would not be discouraged by want of promotion, and who would reach the different branches of the navy at that time of life when they could do good service to their country. It was 1231 his anxious wish, by the adoption of a simple mode of retirement, with a fair compensation for the disadvantages it created, to afford a permanent remedy for the existing state of things. He hoped he should have been able to carry out his plan of retirement before he left office, because he believed the leading principles of that plan to be perfectly fair and sound, and that it would have effected the desired object. He had, however, left it to his successor. It was now in the hands of the Duke of Somerset, and he had implored the noble Duke to consider it impartially—not to view it as a question between one Admiralty Board and another, but as one deeply affecting the welfare of the British Navy. He should be glad to hear from his noble Friend opposite, the Secretary of the Admiralty (Lord Clarence Paget) that it would be taken into consideration, and that the new Board of Admiralty would devise some plan by which that great and growing evil—the existing stagnation of promotion—might be effectually remedied.
§ SIR CHARLES NAPIERsaid, he had hoped that after his explanation the right hon. Baronet would not again have found fault with him for having mentioned his plan of retirement. That plan was not furnished to him confidentially, and he appealed to the House to say whether a document which was handed round to almost every old Admiral resident in London, and which formed the subject of a petition to Her Majesty, could properly be called confidential. It was true that the petition to which he referred was not presented to the Queen, but the reason of that was that the right hon. Baronet left office before the requisite arrangements could be completed. The petition, however, was signed by himself and several other admirals, and one of those who attached their names to it took the liberty of tolling the right hon. Baronet that an experience of fifteen months at the head of the Admiralty did not seem to have taught him to respect the feelings of naval officers. It would be perfectly fair to offer compensation to the lower ranks of officers for voluntary retirement; but to force old officers to retire from the service was degrading; and he could never forget that the death of his own father, a captain in the navy, who had not had an opportunity of serving, was caused by his being passed over in promotion. He never held up his head after it. The truth was that the right hon. Baronet did not know, and never would know, what the feelings of 1232 naval officers were, and fortunate it was that he was driven from office before he could bring forward his nefarious system of retirement. It was, no doubt, true that the right hon. Baronet obtained the assent of a number of officers to his plan, but the probability was that those officers were young men who would profit by the change; at all events he could state with certainty that the plan was disapproved by the senior officers. His own first naval Lord disapproved of it. The first civil Lord might have approved of it, but he knew nothing about it. But the right hon. Baronet had not told the House all. In addition to the other objectionable features of his scheme, the right hon. Baronet actually wanted to take into his own hands, with the view of increasing the patronage at his disposal, the haul-down vacancies belonging to flag officers, as well as those special vacancies which were given to the Board of Admiralty for the purpose of rewarding officers for distinguished services. It was quite true that various Boards had made retirements. That was quite right; for it brought forward a sufficient number of young officers, and at the present moment there were more young Admirals in the service than there were during the war. But the proposal of the right hon. Baronet went much further, and he could only say that he hoped the present First Lord would find something better to do than going out of his way to hurt the feelings of old officers, and that the House of Commons would not vote a single shilling except for the purpose of assisting old commanders and lieutenants who had not sufficient interest to make their way in the service.
§ SIR JOHN PAKINGTONsaid, that the observations of the hon. and gallant Admiral afforded an additional exemplification of the inconvenience of discussing a plan the details of which were not before the House. Not one of these observations applied to the plan as it at present stood. The hon. and gallant Admiral complained of the cruelty of compelling old and distinguished officers to retire. Perhaps the House would be surprised to hear that his (Sir John Pakington's) plan did not compel any flag-officer to retire. It applied to officers in junior ranks, but it did not deprive any flag-officer of any privilege that he now possessed.
§ SIR CHARLES NAPIERsaid, he did not know how the plan stood now: his observations applied to the plan as it stood when he had cognizance of it.
§ SIR CHARLES WOODagreed in thinking it very inconvenient that a plan which was not before the House should form the subject of discussion. He thought, however, the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir John Pakington) had very considerably understated the effect of the plan of retirement proposed in the "confidential" document. He should certainly disapprove of any plan by which compulsory retirement at the age of sixty years would be enforced. If such a regulation had been in force, the country would have been deprived of the eminent services of the late Lord Lyons. There had certainly been a difficulty with regard to the tardy promotion of post captains to the higher rank; Lord Lyons himself had continued for thirty-six years in the rank of post captain, and he doubted not that there were other distinguished officers who had the same story to tell. But regulations had been adopted to meet this admitted evil shortly before he himself had quitted the Admiralty, and the beneficial effects of these, by which captains would become admirals, generally speaking, in less than twenty years, were only now beginning to be felt. He could not therefore agree with the right hon. Gentleman when he spoke of the utter stagnation of the service as regarded promotion; and he believed that since Lord Howe's time there had never been, comparatively speaking, so many young admirals in the service as at present. At the period when he succeeded to the office of First Lord of the Admiralty there were only nine admirals under sixty years of age, and from a Return which he held in his hand there were now upwards of thirty under that age upon the active list. This was certainly effected by the system of retirement to which he had alluded. He certainly did not believe that retirement by age would be an improvement of the present system. He thought every one would admit that Lord Lyons was one of the most efficient officers we had had for many years, and yet Lord Lyons would have been disqualified years ago if retirement at the age of sixty had been compulsory, for Lord Lyons, he believed, was seventy when he died. [Admiral Walcott: Sixty-eight.] He did not say that every man above or below sixty would be able to command a fleet, but he thought it would be a great mistake to debar themselves of the services of such a man as Lord Lyons because he was above sixty years of age. He said this without 1234 any reference to the plan of the right hon. Gentleman. The number of superior officers being much less than those of the inferior officers, it was impossible to hope that by any plan of retirement promotion could be given to all the inferior officers. Suppose that 1,200 lieutenants to be the number on the list, and that there were 350 captains and 450 commanders, it was obviously impossible that the whole number of lieutenants could be promoted to commanders. He was not in possession of the exact proportion of the commanders, but he was aware that the actual number exceeded the authorized limit; thereby showing that promotion to that rank had gone on more rapidly than in any other, and consequently the delay was not, as was supposed, in the grade of lieutenant. By increasing the retired list they removed officers who had attained an age which rendered it almost impossible for them to serve, and it was to the interest of the county that the list of officers in the lower rank should be relieved of such as are incapable of serving in that rank. He thought that the present rules of retirement had answered, to a great extent, the purpose for which they were instituted. No scheme that could be invented would be agreeable to all classes of persons.
§ ADMIRAL WALCOTTsaid, if the country and the House would only exercise a little patience these grey-headed officers would soon disappear from the reach of their bounty, or the hearing of their regrets; the broken spirit and the wounded heart will be beyond recall. The House had not, however, been made acquainted with the circumstance under which the large list had been produced. It owed its origin to the war, which lasted from 1792 to 1815, during which we had at one time nigh 1,000 pendants flying. There were at the same time no less than 147,000 seamen and marines in the service—we were at war with almost the whole world. Russia, Denmark, Holland, France, Spain, Turkey and lastly the United States of America; and it was absolutely necessary to have fleets blockading the ports of the enemy, and protecting the commerce of the country. The number of officers was consequently very large, and that was the cause, as he had always said, of the number of officers on those lists. If an actuary were applied to, he would tell them that officers of the navy did not live longer than other men; but the more favourable state of the public health of late years accounted for 1235 the average of life being greater. All the lists, whether of admirals, captains, commanders, or lieutenants, were crowded with old men, and they had only to exercise the little patience he had entreated of the House and they would see them thinned by the natural effect of time. In regard to the sum required it was a debt of honour, the fulfilment of an ancient and just engagement, upon the part of the country; these officers demanded only this moderate requital in their age and compulsory retirement for activity, energy, and fidelity, the aggregate of which ennobles the national history. Since 1815, appointments, promotions, and recommendations for marks of honour at the hand of the Sovereign had gone, in very many instances, by favour. Every First Lord had his own friends to provide for, and then he probably took the advice of the First Naval Lord, who knew certain officers with whom he had served, and naturally recommended them. It was impossible there could be any confidence in the service until the colleagues of the First Lord were made responsible with him for appointments, promotions and rewards. During forty years of peace the proportion of captains employed was 80 out of 600, and few therefore could rise to the rank of admiral on the active list without friends at the Admiralty. In peace a captain must have been six years, and in war four years, in command of a post ship, before he was entitled to rise to the rank of admiral on the active list—consequently, if he were not employed this list was barred to him; if he had no interest he could not get employed. There were ninety-nine admirals on the active list. They had more young admirals than they could employ or did employ. If an officer could not reach the ear of the First Lord he remained without employment, and was put upon the reserved list. He was one of those who was displaced when he had a fair right and title to be employed. he never could obtain employment sedulously as he had applied for it. Captains who had been six, nine, and ten years afloat were able to get ships, while other captains could not serve the time necessary to keep on the active list. When the experienced captains died the country lost their services, and in addition the advantage of the survivors having shared the experience. Until some great consideration was shown for merit the evil must continue. If it were known that the only road to employment, promotion, and recommendation 1236 for marks of honour at the hands of the Sovereign was by zeal, energy, and gallant good conduct, there would be a very different feeling in the service—officers who had no influence saw First Lord after First Lord succeed to office, and just when they expected that the First Lord had provided for his friends and could give encouragement to merit, a change, came, and with the change disappointment. They had rolled the stone up hill with the greatest difficulty when it fell and crushed them, and they had to begin over and over again. That was his case for thirty years, and hundreds of others who had spared no effort to get employment never could get a command. His heart had been almost broken, and he had been thrust upon the reserved list when he had energy and ability to have done his country some service. Officers who had not used every effort to get employment were unworthy of the profession, and should be thrust aside; but those who offered for any command and any station were entitled to some consideration. He was glad that the Admiralty had given some advantages to chaplains and surgeons, but the same was equally duo to masters and lieutenants. He suggested that to those lieutenants no longer available for active employment, the rank of commander and some small pecuniary consideration, probably an increase of a shilling a day, would remove discontent and afford encouragement to young officers who were just entering the navy.
§ SIR FRANCIS BARINGsaid, that he quite agreed with the hon. and gallant Member in the propriety of encouraging good and efficient men. In the year 1848 the average age of those officers whose names stood upon the admirals' list was seventy, and that there were only six of them whose age was under sixty, while there were at the present moment thirty- one admirals who were below that age. The complaint now was that we had too many young admirals rather than too many old ones on the list. The consequence of the state of things which formerly prevailed was that when he, being then at the head of the Admiralty, communicated with two gallant admirals, with the view of sending them out to take command of the East Indies, the answer he received was that they were too old to perform the service which was required at their hands, and he was eventually obliged to appoint an officer to the command whose age was seventy-two years. There were 1237 at the period to which he referred, about 100 officers in the captains' list who were incapable of service, and on that of the lieutenants', which embraced 2,300 names, about 1,000 in a similar position. Under these circumstances he found it impossible to leave matters as they were, and he therefore introduced a measure which, in conjunction with other measures in the same direction by which it was followed, brought about the present efficient state of the Navy list. There were on the list many gallant officers who were able and would be delighted to serve, and who would feel their removal from the active list as one of the greatest calamities that could befall them. The question of the ago of naval officers was one which had been over and over again taken into consideration at the Admiralty; but, however well any scheme for dealing with it might look upon paper, to strike distinguished and historic names, such, for instance, as that of the hon. and gallant Member for Southwark, off the list was by no means a pleasant task for a first Lord of the Admiralty to discharge. With regard to the complaints which were made by those officers who occupied the lower ranks in the service, he could only say that it was impossible to make every lieutenant an admiral—there must always be more subordinates than chiefs—and, in his opinion, the best mode of dealing with them would he to open a dour which would admit of their retirement from the service with honour and satisfaction to themselves. To deal with the lower grades in a liberal spirit would, be believed, be the truest economy. So far as the question of promotion was concerned he thought that, instead of promotion having been slow, there had been a considerable flow of it for the last few years.
§ SIR JAMES ELPHINSTONEsaid, it would be found on looking at the matter from a practical point of view that the number of junior officers was too small for the service, How was that difficulty best to be got over? The hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Lindsay) had recommended that the officers of the superior class of merchants' ships should be made available for the navy; but he should remind the Committee that it would not be easy to secure the services of such men. For his own part, he should not, when he was in the East India Company's service, have thought of entering the navy, in as much as the former service was much preferable on the score of pay, and in con- 1238 sequence of the rapidity with which promotion might he obtained. Those who served in the superior classes of merchant vessels were generally the sons of mercantile men who had the prospect before them of becoming partners in some mercantile house, or of settling down comfortably in some other capacity, and it was not therefore probable that many would be lured into the navy from that service. As to the manner in which the officers in the lower ranks of the navy might be provided for, he could only say that in his opinion the best mode of dealing with them would be cither to raise them to the rank of commanders or buy them out, as had been done in the East India Company's service, in which a man on leaving the service received a certain sum of money according to the rank which he filled, and a small premium. If a similar practice were to be adopted in the navy the lieutenant's list would soon be cleared. He might add that when a man had served as a midshipman for eight or nine years, and afterwards a lieutenant for thirteen or fourteen years, making in all a period of from twenty-one to twenty-three years' service, he generally became, owing to the wear and tear of constitution to which he was subjected, practically unfitted for duty as a quarter deck officer. What, then, under these circumstances, was to be done with him? He could not be made an admiral; but then he might have conferred upon him the privilege of writing Captain So-and-So on his door, together with a small addition to his pay if he remained in the service, and by that means the list might be cleared. There was at the present moment in the navy a largo number of officers who were discontented, because they saw, as it were, no daylight before them, and because their youth had passed away, leaving them to spend the rest of their days in the endeavour to live on a pittance which was a disgrace to the country, He might also observe that the navy, instead of being a cheap was in fact an expensive profession, and consequently it was only right that an officer in his old age should be entitled to receive something from his country for his past service. As to the admiral's list, he did not think it much mattered how many names stood upon it, as long as there was a power of selection.
MR. LYGONwished to remove a misconception which appeared in the speeches of the hon. and gallant Member for Christchurch (Admiral Walcott), and the right 1239 hon. Baronet the Member for Portsmouth (Sir F. Baring), in regard to the scheme that had been incidentally alluded to in the present discussion. There was no attempt made under that scheme to crush the feelings and break the hearts of any of the gallant men of the profession. The hon. and gallant Gentleman was quite under a misconception on that point. The intention of the scheme was to secure to every officer his fair chance of promotion without hurting the feelings of any one.
ADMIRAL DUNCOMBEsaid, it had been currently stated that the officers who were consulted by the late First Lord in this matter, one and all disapproved of the scheme. Surely, if such men as Lord Dundonald, Sir George Seymour, and others disapproved of the scheme, it could not be said to bear the construction just put upon it by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Tewkesbury (Mr. Lygon).
§ ADMIRAL WALCOTTdeclared, that to neglect old officers was not calculated to encourage the present or provide for the future, and that the scheme of the late First Lord of the Admiralty had given infinite pain to many old and gallant officers who were the pride and ornament of the navy, and whom every young officer might look up to as an example. The hon. Member for Tewkesbury, and the late First Lord of the Admiralty, had no fair knowledge of the profession, or they would not in intention have adopted any such system. True it was they had denied by their speeches any such infliction, but, nevertheless, by some unfortunate misunderstanding, it had been created, and the late First Lord must have been sensible this had been produced, because he admitted he had modified his first proposition. Naval officers should be encouraged to improve themselves in the various branches of their profession, and they should be made to feel that this was the only road to employment, to promotion, and honours. In the case of the gunnery officers, however, no such encouragement was held out, and he thought their case was really deserving of consideration.
§ SIR JOHN PAKINGTONsaid, the observations of the hon. and gallant Admiral (Admiral Duncombe), showed the extreme inconvenience of discussing a matter that was not actually before the House. From what had fallen from the hon. and gallant Of beer, it was evident that he did not hear the fieginning of the discussion. [Admiral DUN 1240 COMBE said, he was present all through the discussion.] The gallant Admiral has stated that which he (Sir J. Pakington) could understand if he were not in the House at the beginning of the discussion; but he certainly could not understand his observations when he said that he had been listening to the debate throughout. The hon. and gallant Admiral said, that all the officers in his (Sir J. Pakington's) confidence disapproved of the plan. Now, his gallant Friend, if he were present, must have heard him state that he thought it his duty to consult a great number of officers in the navy as to his scheme without any knowledge of their previous bias, and that an overwhelming majority had given a cordial assent to his proposition.
§ LORD CLARENCE PAGETsaid, he had understood the right hon. Gentleman (Sir J. Pakington) to say, on the subject of the present rate of promotion, that he had only during one year the opportunity of promoting two commanders to be captains, and five lieutenants to be commanders. It was therefore, but fair, that he (Lord C. Paget) should state what the promotions in the year were during the year 1858; when the right hon. Gentleman was in office, there were nine admirals made from captains, twenty-two captains made from commanders, sixty-two commanders made from lieutenants, and fifty-one lieutenants made from mates. He (Lord C. Paget) did not say that even that was sufficient promotion, but it made up a very different figure from that which the right hon. Gentleman put before the Committee.
§ SIR JOHN PAKINGTONhad, in his previous observations referred to Board promotions only, and not to promotions from the retired list; and he repeated that in the first twelve months that he was at the Amiralty, he had only made two commanders and five lieutenants.
§ Vote agreed to, as were also—
§ (2.) £243,957, Military Pensions and Allowances.
§ (3.) £83,416, Civil Pensions and Allowances.
§ (4.) £175,000, Freight of Ships.
§ (5.) £704,008, Packet Service.
MR. LINDSAYsaid, he wished to direct the attention of the Committee to the scale of payment of seamen in the navy. He would be the last to oppose unnecessarily any increase of that pay, for he had been 1241 a sailor himself; but he asked if that increased pay—and a bounty was only increased pay in another form—was necessary, and, if so, would it effect the object in view? The right hon. Gentleman the late First Lord, in a time of peace, but taking alarm at rumours which had not the slightest foundation, thought it necessary to hurry on the work of manning the navy. It was extraordinary that, while the pay of the seaman and his position in the navy wore better than in the merchant service, while his work was less severe, and that he was not only provided for in sickness, but in old age—when we wanted men to enter the navy they could not be got. There must be something wrong to account for such a state of things. Excessive drill was alleged to be one reason, and flogging another. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Lambeth had told them that no less than 2,100 lashes had been inflicted in one Queen's ship in a single year. What a degrading position it was to strip a man and flog him before his shipmates, and that not after any trial, but from the mere impulse of the moment! It was so degrading that it was enough to deter men from entering the service. He (Mr. Lindsay) did not advocate the doing away with corporal punishment; it might be necessary; but let a man, before being punished, be tried by a court-martial composed of his officers, under the presidency of the Captain, and then if he was held to have deserved punishment let it be inflicted under the authority of that tribunal. He had heard also of excessive drill. A removal of these causes of complaint might induce seamen to enter the navy; but the bounty of £10, while it increased the pay of the Royal Navy, ended with increasing the pay of the merchant service from £2 10s. to £3 10s. per month; and yet, after saddling an important and depressed interest with a heavy additional burden, the bounty did not effect the object that the Government had in view. The shipping interest of this country were running a great ocean race with all the countries in the world, and anything that raised the rate of wages paid in British ships made the ship owner less able to run the race prescribed for him by the law. The £10 bounty created dissatisfaction among the old hands serving in the navy. The seamen asked why they should not get £10, as well as the men of the merchant service. Well, the Government now proposed to vote £5 to able seamen. Would that 1242 satisfy them? They would say that if it were just to give them £5 it was equally just to give them £10. He had no doubt it would be necessary to vote another £100,000, and still the Government would not be able to gain their object. He certainly thought the offer of a £10 bounty a mistake on the part of the late Government.
§ LORD CLARENCE PAGETsaid, he had always understood that it was the custom of the House to allow the mover of a Vote an opportunity of explaining it; but the hon. Gentleman was so anxious to speak that he had debarred him from that chance. He was now enabled to give an explanation of this Vote, which he was unable to do on Friday. At that time the Order in Council was not issued, and he preferred to wait until he was in a position to propose this Estimate. He wished to repeat the opinion he had before expressed, that nothing but the most urgent necessity could justify a recourse to bounties, especially to bounties of so large an amount as that lately offered. A system of bounties might be compared to those opium draughts which were common in Eastern countries: each dose must be stronger than the former. In like manner, if our seamen were taught to expect that at the least cloud in the west, or approach to a political difficulty, a bounty would be offered, the Admiralty would never be able to get a seaman without a bounty. The wisdom of giving a bounty ought therefore to be very carefully considered by any Government before they proposed it, and the bounty ought never, in his opinion, to be adopted without the sanction of the House of Commons. The bounty offered by the late Government had certainly rapidly increased our force of seamen. But another question then arose. The Government had to consider the position of those seamen who had been serving their country faithfully, who had learnt in the Royal Navy the whole of the duties of a seaman, and who had come to be efficient men-of-war's-men. Now extending a portion of this gratuity to men who had five years to serve or who were willing to continue in the service five years longer was a step he was perfectly prepared to defend. The gratuity proposed to be given to each such man was £5, or one half the bounty offered by the late Board to new entries. He did not mean to say that those men had any claim to any gratuity whatever; but he wished to bring this matter home to his right hon. 1243 Friend (Sir John Pakington) as a personal question. He would suppose that his right hon. Friend and himself were captains of line-of-battle ships, and that instead of a scarcity of seamen there was a scarcity of captains of line-of-battle ships. That had happened before, not in the English, but in the French service, for in France during the Revolution the captains of merchantmen were taken out of their ships and put in command of men-of-war. They wore the uniform and enjoyed all the privileges of captains of men-of-war. Now, suppose that some respectable merchant captain, who was a very good seaman, but utterly unacquainted with the duties of captain of a man-of-war, were put upon an equality with his right hon. Friend and himself. That would be unsatisfactory; but what would his right hon. Friend and himself say if this captain of a merchantman had given to him a large sum of money in hand beyond what they had received? If he obtained his epaulettes, sword, cocked hat, and all the paraphernalia of rank, and all the furniture of his cabin? Would his right hon. Friend and himself be satisfied that men, uneducated in the service, should thus come among them, with vast advantages over them in the shape of the rewards given to the new-comers for becoming captains in the navy? He thought they would not like it at all. But that was precisely the case of the seamen of the Royal Navy at the present moment. The bounty of £10 was nearly half a year's pay. Though the seamen in the Royal Navy had no legal claim to any participation in the bounty, their position was such that the Government had to consider how they ought to be treated. He must say for these men that, so far as he was aware, they had never uttered a word of complaint. But was that a reason for not considering their claims? If the Government thought they had a just demand for some consideration justice ought to be done at once and spontaneously, and without waiting for complaints. He thought it was best that the seamen already in the service should have no cause of complaint. Although one-half of the bounty was to be given to men already in the fleet, it was upon certain conditions that a man who had less than five years to serve should enter for an extension of that period to five years, and one month after the receipt of the Order in Council on board each ship should be allowed to the seamen to elect whether they would accept the gratuity or 1244 not upon those terms. Supposing that those conditions were accepted by a majority of the men, we should, as it were, have our fleet manned for five years to come. Under these circumstances he submitted that the Government was justified, upon grounds of public policy and fair consideration towards the men, in asking the Committee to vote this sum of money.
§ SIR JOHN PAKINGTONsaid, he was sorry to have to state that what had fallen from the noble Lord had not affected in the least degree the opinion he had expressed upon a former evening. He had heard nothing which he could call a reason for the extraordinary course proposed, which was a deviation from all precedent in the past, and establishing an embarrassing and inconvenient example for the future. He could only hope that by the immediate adoption of a better system of reserves we might escape being placed in the critical position in which the late Government were placed when they were compelled to resort to the system of a bounty. The hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Lindsay) and the noble Lord had both touched upon the general policy of a bounty; but that question was not now before the Committee, and, indeed, it was settled last week, when the House voted the sum necessary for that bounty. All he would say as to the general policy of the bounty was, that a great national object was at stake, and that object had been accomplished by it. The question before the Committee was a different one—whether, because Parliament had voted £31,000 to get seamen, it was right to spend £100,000 more in malting a voluntary gift to men who were already in the navy. He thought nothing could justify such wanton expenditure but the most urgent necessity. If any complaints had been made, if there had been any great exhibition of dissatisfaction in the fleet, that might have been an excuse for such a proposal, but nothing of the kind existed upon the noble Lord's own admission. The whole case of the Government turned on the possibility that there might be dissatisfaction amongst those men. He had said the other evening that if there were discontent upon that ground, it was a case in which the Government were bound for high reasons of high policy to take a bold attitude and declare the demand unreasonable. But, to the honour of the sailors it must be said, they manifestly saw the unreasonableness of the demand. The Committee must remember 1245 what had been done for those men recently. In the Supplementary Estimates they were now considering, in the first Vote, were three items to which he begged to call their attention. The first was to meet the increase of extra pay allowed to seamen gunners, £13,000; the next was to provide for good-conduct pay to petty officers for badges awarded to them after promotion to that rank, £7,657; and the third was for gratuitous issues of bedding and clothing to seamen and boys, £38,000. Those were boons just granted for the first time, and it was unreasonable that a bounty which was only granted upon an emergency to induce sailors to enter the Royal Navy, who would otherwise have remained in the merchant service, should be extended to all the men who were already in the service. Considering the increased pay and advantages enjoyed by men engaged for continuous service, there never was a moment when there was less excuse for dissatisfaction. Nothing had fallen from the noble Lord which would not have been applicable to the three former occasions upon which bounties had been granted, and which were not paid to men already serving. At some future time, not with standing all improvements, a day might come when the Government of this country would be embarrassed by this unreasonable proposal to throw away £100,000 just now, when, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer would probably soon tell the House, our national finances were in a condition in which it was peculiarly desirable that no unnecessary public expenditure should be incurred. He (Sir John Pakington) believed that there was no amount of money which the House would not vote and their constituents sanction if that money was to be judiciously and properly expended to secure our national defences. But, on the other hand, he was equally persuaded that public opinion ought to condemn and would condemn any gratuitous, unnecessary expenditure of the kind now proposed, which was not justified by past precedent nor existing facts, and which must prove most embarrassing and inconvenient for future Administrations. However, approval of the proposal was one thing, and opposing it when proposed was another, and while he disapproved of the proposition of the Government, he believed it would not now be possible for the House to refuse its sanction to the arrangement into which they had entered. Such a refusal would indeed be productive of discontent in the Royal Navy 1246 where two months ago there was none. The late Government attained their object, got the men they wanted, and there was not a whisper of discontent heard. The noble Lord had talked about the policy of treating the British sailor with generosity; and so he should be: but the fact was that never was the sailor treated with so much generosity and consideration as at the present time. Now, for some motive which he could not understand, and which the noble Lord had certainly not explained, he found the Government at a moment of financial difficulty embarking in this most unnecessary expenditure. Having protested against it on these grounds of public policy, he must leave the Government the responsibility of the course they had adopted, for they had embarrassed the question and placed it on a totally different footing from that on which it stood before.
§ MR. WHITBREADasked the House to consider, as the right hon. Baronet said the present Government had adopted an inconvenient precedent, whether it was not the late Government who had set the example of inconvenient precedents by giving a bounty to seamen on enlisting? Could any one hope that henceforward men would readily engage in the service without a similar inducement? The right hon. Baronet referred to the success of the bounty in obtaining a certain number of men, and said that a great national object was to be gained by it. So likewise it might be said of the recent act of the present Government, that a great national object was to be gained by it; and he thought that object would be accomplished by the prevention of any discontent arising among the seamen, as well as in securing the services of the flower of the fleet for many years to come. He believed, notwithstanding what had fallen from an hon. Member, that this gratuity would satisfy the seamen, for they knew that they had no legal claim to it, and they would be pleased and gratified by having it offered to them on a principle of justice. It was maintained by the right hon. Baronet that, as no discontent had been heard of hitherto, none was ever likely to arise, even if this gratuity had not been offered; but discontent did not arise in a moment. The men whom this question affected lived not like other people in the midst of society composed of all sorts of professions, but entirely in the company of persons like themselves. All their interests and feelings ran in one way; and was it not certain, when the propriety 1247 of the late Government's act was questioned in such an assembly as that House that it would be questioned by them? It was impossible to conceive, unless the present proposition were acceded to, that the seamen would not think that, having made a bargain with the country, the country had got the beat of it, and was determined to keep to it. He thought it might safely be maintained that by the step now taken the Government had not only secured to this country the services of the most efficient body of men for the fleet for five years to come, but had also impressed on the minds of those men—and this was a result of far more value than the money at present asked for—the conviction that they were dealing with a just and generous country.
§ SIR CHARLES NAPIERapproved of the bounty which had been given, inasmuch as it had obtained for the fleet a considerable number of men; and what could the country have done without them? He would remind the hon. Gentleman the Member for Sunderland, who so much disapproved of the bounty, that some years ago, when our fleet was in danger from the superiority of the French fleet in the Mediterranean, we had a fleet lying at Spithead for which the Admiralty could not procure seamen. Now by means of the bounty, we had got 6,000 out of 8,000 men voted. Was that nothing? The noble Lord said that ameliorations had taken place in the service. He knew that that was the case, but he did not thank the Admiralty for it, because, had it not been for the Motions brought forward by himself and others none of these ameliorations would have taken place. Corporal punishment had been alluded to; but he did not think that the men generally were averse to it, as they knew that the discipline of the navy could not be carried on without it. He should like, however, to see the men brought to a court-martial before punishment was inflicted. Such a course would give great satisfaction to the seamen, and would not destroy the discipline of the navy one iota. He gave the late First Lord of the Admiralty the greatest credit for offering the bounty, and he did not see that the present Government had a right to find fault with that measure, since it had proved successful. He believed the men would feel grateful for the gratuity granted to them. They knew that they were not legally entitled to it, and they would receive it all the more gratefully on that account. 1248 The late First Lord of the Admiralty said he had heard of no discontent among the men; but he (Sir Charles Napier) was often at Portsmouth, and heard loud expressions of discontent. If an experienced sailor got no gratuity and a man who had not experience equal to him got the bounty of £10, was there not likely to be discontent? Would the House like to see the fleet lying at Spithead in the present state of Europe without hands to man it? The war was said to be finished; but was it really finished? In the present position of affairs no effort should be spared to place the country in a state of safety. There was not a man in that House or a Peer in another place who did not read or hear with pleasure the speech of Lord Lyndhurst the other evening; he should like to see the same spirit that he displayed exhibited in that House. Let Gentlemen forget for a time that they had constituents, and let them boldly approve all that could be done for the defence of the country, so that they might be able to point to the British fleet and say. "There is our fleet, ready to do all that it ever did in former days."
§ SIR JAMES GRAHAMSir, I am very unwilling to prolong this discussion, and it is desirable that we should get through the Navy Estimates as soon as possible; but like the hon. and gallant Admiral who has just sat down, I have for a long period taken a deep interest in the question of the manning of the navy, and am therefore desirous of saying a very few words. I will not discuss questions that are not before the Committee—questions of peace or war, and of the state of Europe, the subject of corporal punishment, and other topics that have been introduced. The question of a gratuity consequent on the bounty that has been granted is the matter now in hand, and to that I shall address a few observations. On a former occasion I expressed at some length my decided opinion against a bounty in time of peace. I then stated my objection to it in detail, and to those objections I still adhere. I think they are conclusive against the precedent set for the first time by the late Board of Admiralty of offering a bounty in time of peace. I think that bounty ought to be the last resource of a Government in the last extremity of war, or when war is imminently pending, and I fear that to have had resort to this last resource now will be found to have established a precedent that will add to our diffi- 1249 culties in manning the navy in future in time of peace. But it is needless to argue that question at any length on this occasion, because the bounty has received the sanction of Parliament, and I must assume, therefore, that such a bounty was necessary. But if that be the case, I can have no doubt whatever with respect to the Vote now before the House. I think this gratuity is the inevitable consequence of the bounty which we have granted. The late First Lord of the Admiralty says, there has been no discontent on the part of the men now serving in the Royal Navy. There are two important occasions on which a bounty has been offered in this country. One of these was in 1793, at the commencement of the revolutionary war. We had then only about 14,000 seamen, and just one-half of the amount now offered in time of peace was offered as bounty by the Government. The effect was, that in six months the number of men rose from 14,000 to 60,000. The other occasion was in 1803, at the commencement of the second French war. A bounty was then offered of £5 for able seamen, and £2 10s. for ordinary seamen—or exactly half the amount of that now offered in time of peace. At that time there were about 20,000 men serving in the navy, and the effect of the bounty in six months was to raise the number again to 60,000. Now, what is the case on this occasion? If I mistake not, there are more than 30,000 men now serving. But, besides that, a new system has been adopted—namely, that of continuous service. I believe that is a system which ought to be cherished as the foundation of an effective navy, and as one likely at all times to ensure the service of disciplined men. It is a system which, either in peace or war, promises to be of the greatest benefit to the nation. The right hon. Gentleman says there is no discontent; but let the House reflect on what is the inevitable effect of this bounty. Supposing a ship arrives in port from a foreign station to be paid off. There are five continuous-service men on board and five non-continuous-service men. The five continuous-service men are obliged to go to the flagship, in order to be employed in some other ship. The non-continuous-service men can the next day take the bounty of £10 and enter into service in another ship; but the continuous-service men, though of equal merit in every respect, are bound to serve five years longer without any bounty whatever. But the 1250 advantage to the non-continuous-service man does not end there—he gets a suit of clothes, bidding, and kit, complete, worth £6, while the continuous-service man gets nothing.
§ SIR JOHN PAKINGTONThe continuous-service man has more than an equivalent for the bounty.
§ Sir JAMES GRAHAMHe will, at the end of ten years, have received an equivalent; but it will be doled out to him in small driblets, at each monthly pay; while the non-continuous man gets £10 in his hand and £6 worth in clothes.
§ SIR JOHN PAKINGTONThe non-continuance man will receive £40.
§ SIR JAMES GRAHAMAt the end of ten years he will have received £40 I admit; but still, when one man receives £10 in hand and clothes worth £6, and another gets £40 in small sums at the expiration of ten years, I appeal to the House whether the immediate effect is not likely to be discontent? Then the right hon. Gentleman says, no demand has been made for this gratuity. But can any doctrine be more dangerous than that? Why wait for demands? What was the cause of the mutiny at the Nore? The men made demands, but no attention was paid to them till those demands assumed a most dangerous and formidable shape; and then concessions were made in a manner most degrading to the State, and that produced no salutary effect. It is said this is great generosity on the part of the State. Let there be such generosity. I think the wisest possible course at the present moment is to treat our sailors with kindness, generosity, and due consideration. The hon. and gallant Admiral (Sir Charles Napier) takes to himself exclusively the merit of everything that has been done in favour of the sailor for the last thirty years; but, setting aside that claim, it has been the object of Governments for the last thirty years to improve the condition of our sailors, and the concessions of the late Government, founded as they were upon justice, seem to me to have been based upon sound policy. I think the question is not one of generosity, of discontent, or contentment, but of justice. The hon. and gallant Admiral referred to a measure which I introduced in 1832, when I had the advantage of the advice of the late Sir Thomas Hardy, who was better acquainted with the feelings, the habits, and the prejudices of sailors, and the motives by which they are actuated, than any officer I have 1251 ever known. With the view of averting the necessity of impressment I introduced that measure, giving Her Majesty, at the commencement of a war, or when war was imminent, or when invasion was expected, the power of issuing a Proclamation calling for the service of seafaring men within a short period—six or twelve days—and of offering to all men who volunteered within that limited time double bounty. By the advice of Sir Thomas Hardy I included in that Bill a provision which, after debate, received the sanction of this House, that a bounty being given to new-comers an equal bounty should be given to all men then serving in the fleet. The object of that Act was to abolish the system of impressment. The hon. and gallant Member for Southwark, in a pamphlet published in 1840, referred to circumstances which had occurred in the Mediterranean, and pointed out what appeared to him the disadvantages of the enactment. I thought, upon mature consideration, that the objections were well founded, and in 1853 I introduced a measure materially altering the Act of 1832, and enabling the Queen to issue a Proclamation, not to all seafaring men, but to classes between certain ages, and leaving the question of the gratuity to the advisers of the Crown. So the law now stands; but I am bound to say that upon every principle of equity, and upon every consideration of policy, I am convinced, in the first place, that no Proclamation for compulsory service can be issued without the concomitant offer of a bounty, though I think the offer of a bounty ought to be reserved for that great emergency; and secondly, that whenever a bounty is offered to new recruits a gratuity must be given, not perhaps of an equal amount, but of a considerable amount, to all men already serving in the fleet. I think you cannot avoid the risk of serious discontent without taking that step, and in my opinion it, is demanded by strict equity. I deny that it is impossible to man the fleet quickly without a bounty. On this occasion a bounty has been offered in a time of peace. It was my duty to man a fleet in time of war without a bounty, and I succeeded in doing it; not I, but an officer of the highest merit, who was associated with me—Sir Maurice Berkeley—who was entirely opposed to a bounty, and who, in the extremity of war, and amid all the difficulties of manning the fleet at that time, steadily resisted the offer of a bounty. The gallant Admiral (Sir Charles Napier) says, that the 1252 fleet on that occasion was manned by tinkers, tailors, and Lord Mayor's men. Well, Sir, there may have been tinkers, and there may have been tailors, in every ship on the station; but there were captains in that fleet who, satisfied with their crews, were ready to follow with their men into any action and into any danger in which the gallant Admiral was prepared to lead them. I can appeal to Sir Henry Keppel, who commanded the St. Jean d'Acre—to Admiral Elliot, who commanded a screw line-of-battle ship, and to the present Secretary to the Admiralty (Lord Clarence Paget), who commanded the Princess Royal, and I would ask them whether those "tinkers and tailors" were not men in whom they placed such confidence that they were ready to encounter any fleet that might have dared to engage them. So much, then, for the experience of manning the fleet without a bounty in time of war. I say, again, that in time of peace I consider the bounty to have been a rash and an inexpedient measure. I hold, however, the gratuity to be an inevitable concomitant to the offer of the bounty; and if the result should be to render future Governments more cautious in offering a bounty in time of peace, with reference to the inevitable expenditure occasioned in the shape of a gratuity, without which gratuity they would run the risk of creating discontent in the fleet, I, for one, shall be extremely glad that that salutary effect of greater caution has been produced. The bounty having been given, I cannot object to the necessity and prudence of voting the sum now demanded.
§ SIR CHARLES NAPIERThe right hon. Baronet says I took credit for all that has been done for the sailor during the last thirty years, I did no such thing. I say so distinctly. It is untrue. [Cries of "Order!"] What I took credit for was obtaining the appointment of the Committee which was the means of doing much that has lately been done for the good of the service. The right hon. Baronet says he manned the fleet. He man the fleet! Prettily the fleet was manned. There never was a fleet sent to sea in such a disgraceful state as the Baltic fleet. He refers to Sir Henry Keppel and to Admiral Elliot. Why does he not refer to other officers? He knows how the ships were manned as well as I do, and every officer in that fleet knows that it was shamefully and disgracefully manned. The fleet was a disgrace to the British Navy. And I will tell the right hon. Baronet further that if he will allow 1253 me to produce his own letters, and Sir Maurice Berkeley's private letters to me, referring to the way in which that fleet was manned the House will be astonished. I am not sure that I am doing my duty in not producing those letters; and I ask the right hon. Baronet now to let me come down to the House with them on another day, and they will show how the fleet was manned.
§ SIR JAMES GRAHAMThe gallant Admiral has already taken that liberty by producing my private letters without my consent.
§ SIR CHARLES NAPIERNot all of them. Will the right hon. Baronet allow me to produce the rest of the letters?
§ MR. W. WILLIAMSexplained, that though the noble Lord the Secretary of the Admiralty commanded the Princess Royal in the Baltic, he was not captain of that ship when the abominable flogging of which he had complained took place.
§ Vote agreed to.