HC Deb 14 July 1859 vol 154 cc1253-75

(7.) £410,000, Embodied Militia.

MR. SIDNEY HERBERT

At this late hour of the night I think that the Committee will be of opinion that the more I condense my statement in moving the Army Estimates the better it will be. There is the less necessity for my going into much detail because the greater part of the effective Votes for the army were taken in the last Session of Parliament. Only one Vote was taken on account, and only the non-effective ones remained to be voted. After the very frequent discussions which we have had during the last two or three days upon the subject of the force now in England I need not enter into particulars upon that question. My gallant Friend who preceded me in office (General Peel) has already in the course of the evening explained the exact amount of the military force in Great Britain, and my right hon. Friend has accurately stated that we have now in England, if we include the Indian depots, 110,000 men of all ranks. Of that number 23,000 men belong to the embodied militia. The hon. Member for Invernessshire (Mr. Baillie) objects that the militia ought not to form part of the permanent and first force of England; it was properly a reserve force; and that if it were necessary to make use of that reserve in time of peace we should have nothing to fall back upon in time of war. I entirely concur in that opinion; but then it must be remembered that my gallant Friend had to administer the army in times of singular difficulty. He had suddenly to raise our forces by several battalions, and to send to India, to meet an unprecedented emergency, all the troops upon whom he could lay his hands. Under these circumstances I think he acted wisely in calling upon the militia to afford by embodiment a substitute for the battalions of which England was necessarily denuded, and also in maintaining these regiments embodied until the return of a portion at least of these troops from India would enable him to dispense with their services. I am sorry to say that since the late Government determined to take a Supplemental Estimate for this purpose we have been prospectively deprived of the return of two or three of these battalions by the mutiny which has broken out in the local European army. In spite of that, however, there are coming from India six battalions of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and a large portion of the military train which has been used as a cavalry force in that country. We have also a battalion coming home from Canada. It would not, however, I think, be advisable to disembody a corresponding force of militia upon the arrival of these troops. Next year, if we get a large force from India and can count a large army—a fair army—of regular troops in this country, it may be wise to disembody the regiments of militia, and to trust to that force as a reserve, and as a reserve alone; but before that is done it will be necessary for the Government to look most carefully and anxiously into the state of the disembodied militia. I do not wish to enter into that question now, because it must necessarily come under our consideration upon the Vote for the disembodied militia; but there is no doubt that at present that force to a great extent exists only upon paper, and that the training now coming on will show a lamentable deficiency in its ranks. I will not, therefore, at present allude to the measures which the Government may, with the sanction of the House, take to mitigate this evil, but I think it fair that the country should know what are its real resources, and should not rely upon that which upon paper may appear extremely formidable, but in reality is very weak. Our Ordnance force, small as it is, has of late years been admirably administered. We have now got what we never had be- fore, 180 guns completely horsed and equipped and ready for service, and, I think, 100 in reserve. This is a great improvement, for which we are, I believe, greatly indebted to the zeal and excellent administration of the gallant Officer who preceded me at the War Office. A few years ago there was a great deal of dissatisfaction in this House at the formation of the camp at Aldershot, and the Gentlemen who moved the Army Estimates had frequently great difficulty in obtaining the Votes which were required for carrying out that scheme. There were great complaints that it did not answer the purpose of a camp; and there is no doubt that the English army, admirable as it is as a combatant army, has for years been extremely deficient in those auxiliary services upon which the efficiency of an army depends. Until late in the Crimean war our commissariat, military train, and medical staff were exceedingly deficient. I believe that of late years great pains have been taken with these services, and a great improvement achieved, and that nothing has more contributed to this result than the establishment of the camp at Aldershot. Within the last few days I have read a report from the General commanding at that camp as to how the troops have been engaged during a certain period. He says that the drill is good, that the second battalions, consisting of course of young recruits, have made remarkable progress, and that the embodied militia is in a state of efficiency which has astonished military men. It used to be said that at this camp nothing was done which would enable the soldier really and practically to learn camp life. I believe that much has been done to answer that objection. Earthworks are now thrown up by unpaid military labour—a very wise arrangement—and the engineers are making fascines, and instructing others in their manufacture. The General says that brigades of infantry and artillery have been sent out to encamp at a distance of fifteen miles off, and that under the hot sun which we have experienced during the last month these marches have been effected without a single man falling out of the ranks; that the men show the greatest aptitude in encamping, erecting temporary ovens and so on; and that there is a marked improvement in the facility with which these operations are conducted. The commissariat corps has been practised in the field. It accompanies the troops and purchases animals, slaughter-houses are esta- blished under the management of the troops, and all the operations for victualling the force are conducted as they would be in war. I frankly admit that there are in this country facilities for purchasing food and conducting every operation which would not exist in the case of actual warfare; but you cannot create difficulties for the purpose of overcoming them, and, as far as possible, the commissariat corps is exercised in the duties which it is intended to perform. Lastly, I may mention that crime has greatly diminished at Aldershot. During the last few months there has been a marked diminution in the number of deserters from the army. It is also stated that the health of the troops at Aldershot is something unequalled in the annals of the British or any other army. I do not think that so much importance ought to be attached to this as we may at first sight be disposed to attribute to it, because it must be borne in mind that while the ages of many of the battalions at Aldershot range only from 18 to 25, those of the men in an army on actual service generally vary from 18 to 40. I have no doubt, however, that a great improvement has taken place in the sanitary arrangements of the camp. Having said thus much with regard to general questions, I will now proceed to explain the Votes to which it is my duty to ask the Committee to assent. For the purpose of keeping up the Embodied Militia we ask for a sum of £410,000. Vote 8, for Wages, amounts to £108,000. A great portion of this expenditure, it must be remembered, is not for purely military purposes. For example, there is taken for the Royal Laboratory a sum of £49,000 for a sup ply of shot and shell to put the garrisons in the Mediterranean in complete order for three years. There has been a revision of the armaments at Gibraltar and Malta, and it is also necessary to keep up a large stock at these places for the use of the fleet. This sum is to be partially employed in making a provision of shot and shell at those places for no less than 15 line-of-battle ships, 30 frigates, 30 sloops, and about 60 gun vessels and gunboats. The Vote for the Royal Gun Factories is £4,842, which is taken merely for the purpose of hastening work already ordered, and completing work required for putting our garrisons in a proper state of defence in as many weeks as it would otherwise occupy months. The Vote for the Royal Carriage Department includes ten new batteries of 18-pounders, to be employed as a moveable force along the coast. This was recommended by the secret Committee which sat to inquire into the national defences. Perhaps the House would like to know what are the probabilities with regard to the delivery of the guns in course of manufacture by Sir William Armstrong. If the new buildings and machinery should be completed by the 1st of October, then I believe we may expect to have the delivery of 100 guns by the end of the year, and I hope we shall have something like 200 more in the course of the present financial year. After that the delivery will continue at a rate which will I hope soon enable us to have, both on board ship and for our land defences, a very great number of these formidable instruments of war. The next Vote, No 9, is merely for the clothing of the embodied militia, which of course would not have been necessary had this force been disembodied. The items for provisions, forage, fuel, &c, are necessarily proportionate to the number of men you intend to maintain. Vote 11 is for warlike stores for land and sea ser vice. Under this head there are several large items. First there is a sum of £60,000 for the purchase and repair of small arms; then comes £61,000 for iron ordnance and for the shells and fuses requisite for the service of Sir William Armstrong's guns. I need hardly mention the other items, but there is one of £225,000 for miscellaneous stores, of which I was not aware till a gallant Officer told me that complaint had been made of so large an amount being asked with so little specification of details in the Estimate. Some of the particulars, however, I can state. Among the articles hero included are various kind of metals, comprising copper, iron, and other materials necessary for store. But I will endeavour, before the Vote is again passed, to have all the particulars printed on a separate sheet, In this way a large sum has accumulated, and before the Vote is again taken I shall ascertain whether more information cannot be afforded in reference to it. I next come to a Vote of a very important character, namely, £123,500 for fortifications. It is most essential that some of these works, which have been sanctioned after long deliberation and much criticism, should be pushed on as rapidly as possible, and on that account we ask for some additional sums with which to expedite them. I need not now explain the general plan of the fortifications at Devonport, because it is not new, and has often been discussed in this House. We only propose to expend a larger amount this year to hasten on those works of defence. It is clear that if they are to be executed at all, they should be executed as speedily as possible. I take it that if England were attacked an unfinished fortification would be a much worse thing for us than none at all, because it would not only be incapable of defence in itself, but if taken by an enemy it might, perhaps, be easily turned against us. Then there is the case of Alderney. The item for that is very small, great progress having already been made with the work, and all that has now to be done being to complete the payments on Fort Touraille, and also for scarping some part of the island, which is now accessible, and can be made inaccessible by a simple process. Again, we have Portsmouth, where there are very extensive defences which have been for some time in course of construction, and large sums for which have already been voted by Parliament. Under this head items are included for the citadel, the South sea line of defence, the Stokes Bay line between Fort Monkton and Fort Gomer, and also some additions on the eastern side of Portsmouth. By these works, and the additions to be made to them, which will be as much as the engineers are likely to get through during the year, we shall have at a future and I trust not distant period formidable means of defence. At Portland there is a necessity for carrying out works which have not yet stood upon the Estimates at all. Portland is one of the finest harbours in the world, and is at present utterly defenceless, and if an enemy were to take possession of the island of Portland, he would have facilities for establishing himself on that island, from which it would be extremely difficult to dislodge him. It so happens that the work there can now be executed very economically, and at a great advantage, because it is proposed to form a citadel on the island by scarping the rock, and the materials obtained in forming it will go at once into the sea, and will thus create part of the great breakwater. It is also proposed to guard the principal entrance into the harbour by a large tower at the end of the mole carrying eighty or ninety guns, with another similar battery on the south of Weymouth Point. Smaller batteries will also be constructed for the lesser entrances. These defences will be so strong as, I hope, to make it quite impossible that Portland should ever fall into the hands of an enemy. At Milford Haven it is only proposed to continue the works now in progress. Large guns are to be put on the principal islands within the haven, so as to guard the approach to the dockyard. At a future time it will be necessary there to build some works inland to the south of the harbour, in order to repel any attack that might be made on the land side at Tenby, or some other part of the coast; but that does not yet appear in the Estimates. There is one thing which I have omitted to state with regard to Portsmouth. It is, that the defences there are at the entrance of the Solent, while there are none at the entrance at Spithead, and there is a difficulty in making them. I wished to take a large sum to commence the works with at the Horse-shoal, as it is called, at Spithead, opposite St. Helen's; but it is impossible that any outlay can under present circumstances be made on this work. We have got a very accurate survey of the whole of this position, and experiments are now about to be made with regard to the nature of the soil. I believe Sir Charles Pox is to give his assistance, in order to ascertain where the best foundations are on which to place the batteries, or whether it will be more advisable to have recourse to floating defences. I attach the greatest importance to these works; but it is impossible to proceed with them until the ground has been most carefully and accurately examined. The next Vote is for civil buildings. This includes, first, the school of gunnery at Shoeburyness. The House will not, I am sure, grudge anything which improves the skill of the army, and renders that great arm, the artillery, more efficient; and this school is absolutely necessary to afford that branch of the service the means of practice. Then comes the Storekeeper's department at Woolwich; and here there is a new magazine to be built, which will be attended with great economy to the country. The powder is now kept in old men-of-war, which like all floating wooden structures are very expensive. The annual cost of the floating magazines at Woolwich is £3,092; but for a total outlay of £12,000 you will have a solid, substantial building, saving the charge for watchmen, &c, and obviating the inconvenience of conveying the powder backwards and forwards from the vessels. There are also some alterations to be made at Chatham, several rooms to be added to Fort Pitt, and the medical school at Chatham to be reconstituted. There is also a Vote for the salaries of the teachers of the last-named institution. The present practice in the Medical Department of the army is, when candidates are wanted for that service, to advertise for them, and those candidates are examined by three officers selected for the purpose, or as more frequently happens to be the case, by three officers who can most conveniently be obtained. Before the Royal Sanitary Commission, of which I had the honour to be chairman, we had the most clear evidence from Sir Benjamin Brodie and other men of the highest eminence that the existing system is entirely nugatory and theoretical; and so little confidence has the Medical Department reposed in its own examinations that it sends the successful candidates to Chatham to receive fresh instruction in the very branches of science in which they are supposed to have already proved their proficiency. We wish to improve the system, first of all by adopting the plan pursued with great success by the East India Company, of having practised examiners, and afterwards, when the candidates who have passed go to Chatham, by teaching them not those general branches of medical knowledge which they can acquire at the civil schools much better than in the army schools, but only the specialties of army medical practice. Thus you will get the best young general practitioners from the civil schools, and will convert them at Chatham into excellent army medical officers. There they will learn the habits of troops and the diseases to which they are more particularly liable; they will learn how to treat gun shot wounds and study all the precautions required by different climates, especially by that of India, against ill-health, besides many other things which I am sorry to say army practitioners have hitherto never been instructed in previously to having to deal with military patients. I have to thank my hon. and gallant Friend opposite (General Peel) for the manner in which he adopted the suggestions of the Royal Commission, and it only remains for me now to carry out the scheme, as the Committee see the Vote for this purpose is by no means extravagant. In Vote 14 a small sum is taken for contributions to a railway station, for the convenience of embarking and disembarking troops at Aldershot. There is also £1,500 for a rifle range at Hythe, and £17,000 for a rifle range at Chatham. The only other item is for the erection of huts in the Ionian Islands, which is rendered necessary by the inability of the barracks there to accommodate the increased garrison. Vote 15 relates to the subject which I have already explained—the Medical School. I have now gone through the whole of these Votes, and I trust have made them as clear to the House as I can. At the same time I must frankly confess that, most of the great manufacturing establishments to which I have had occasion to refer have come under the War Department since I was connected with it; the press of business has prevented me seeing them with my own eyes, and I am not so well acquainted with the details as I ought to be, and I have therefore to crave the indulgence of the House in this respect. I beg to conclude by moving the first Vote, £410,000 for the expenses of the embodied militia.

GENERAL PEEL

So far from having anything to complain of in the manner in which my right hon. Friend has introduced these Estimates, I have only to thank him for the very complimentary manner in which he spoke of my services in the War Department; and I should not have had a word to say, but that these Supplementary Estimates are almost precisely those which it would have been my duty to propose to the House had I remained in office. These Supplementary Estimates do not arise from any increase in the original Estimates which I had the honour of submitting at the early part of the year, but they are rendered necessary by the circumstances which have arisen since the original estimates were framed, and it is now in the power of the Committee, if they do not approve of the items, to disallow them. If, for instance, they do not think it necessary that the embodied militia should be retained, they have only to strike out that item, and the proposal will fall to the ground. I thought it was absolutely necessary to retain them, and I am glad to see the present Government are of the same opinion. I perfectly agree with my right hon. Friend that the embodied militia, as a general principle, ought to be counted only as part of our reserve; but, of course, they will be perfectly useless even' in that capacity, unless they are well drilled, and I think it would be of great advantage if arrangements were made by which a large portion should be embodied by turns, so that every regiment may get a year's training in every five years. In that way you would render them much more efficient than by calling them out for twenty-one days every year. It is impossible that regiments so trained should be so efficient as those which have been embodied, and it is now acknowledged by the general commanding at Aldershot that most of our embodied militia regiments who have gone through this training are equal in efficiency to any regiment of the line. I also agree with the right hon. Gentleman that the state of the disembodied militia is not satisfactory. I expressed that opinion when I came into office, and one of the first things I did was to appoint a Commission to inquire into the reasons. I have not seen the Report of that Commission, but I believe it will be found that most of the regiments of disembodied militia are deficient in strength by at least one-third. I concur altogether in the testimony which the right hon. Gentleman has borne to the advantages of Aldershot Camp, and, so far from complaining of the expense, I think the country has cause to look upon the money expended there as very well spent. For defensive purposes it is the most beneficial outlay that has yet been made. The greatest advantage has been conferred by it on our Commissariat, Military Train and Medical Staff, and the system which has been adopted there of making the soldiers do everything for themselves has had the most beneficial effect upon their health. With respect to the Vote for fortifications, I observe that my right hon. Friend has adopted the same course that I myself proposed; and I wish the hon. Member for Lambeth to understand that the Vote is not an increase, but simply an advance for this year of Votes already sanctioned by Parliament. The Inspector General of Fortifications informed the Government that it would be a great advantage if a certain sum of money could be spent this year, and I thought it my duty to ask Parliament for it. Most of these items of expenditure have been occasioned by circumstances which have occurred since the original Estimates were framed. The additional number of line-of-battle ships built, and increase of the armaments of our great garrisons have made it necessary to increase the manufacture of stores at Woolwich; and, as it was discovered that the ammunition served out to the troops in India had been injured, the heat and damp having so affected the lubricating matter in the cartridges that the ball would no longer fit the rifles, all that ammunition has had to be withdrawn and fresh manufactured and sent out. We have also had to manufacture ammunition for the new Armstrong gun, for without ammunition of course the guns, would be useless. There is also a sum for the gunnery school at Shoeburyness, which is rendered necessary by our new ordnance, for, of course, without trained men our new guns would be of comparatively little service to us. That school will, I believe, be found of the utmost benefit to the country.

COLONEL P. HERBERT

was of opinion that the only mode by which the occasional panic with which England was afflicted was to put the defences of the country into such a state as would inspire everybody with confidence. A little irritability with France now and then would be a small penalty to pay for putting our armaments into a perfect state of efficiency. It was no doubt very agreeable to find business was being transacted between the Secretary for War and the gallant General (General Peel) on such amicable terms. But he thought there could be no harm in questioning some of the very favourable statements that had been so pleasantly agreed on between them. One of these statements was that the number of men available for home service was 110,000. Now he had already shown that this force included recruits and many other men unavailable for the public service. On turning to the Votes already passed he found our infantry was put down at 62,200 rank and file, besides 5,600 Foot Guards, making a total of about 68,000 men. That 62,200 rank and file were, however, not in the country. They had to furnish all the garrisons from Hong Kong to Quebec, and from New Zealand to the Mediterranean. He believed he was within the mark in taking 30,000 men for these garrisons; which would leave only 38,000 for the defence of this country. The recruits at the Indian depôts might be added to that number, but they could not be relied upon to meet the disciplined troops of France; while it should be recollected that only a limited portion of the militia had been embodied for any considerable length of time. We had not the power, in fact, to bring a respectable force into the field, and he maintained that until we could do so, taking care always that at least one-half were troops of the line, justice would not be done either to the officers who commanded, to the troops themselves, or to the interests of a great country like this. He did not advocate extravagant Estimates, but he thought there was an increase wanted in the bone and sinew of the English army—the rank and file was the cheapest addition that could be made to the army. Again, as to the strength of individual regiments, he thought that the number of 950 men was sufficient neither for peace nor for war. It was expensive in peace, because the establishment of officers was out of proportion to the number of men; while in time of war each regiment could furnish only 800 men fit for duty. Even that number was exclusive of men employed on recruiting service. But, leaving it at 800 men, they could not be relied on to be sent abroad, as some portion of the men should be left at home to form a depot. It was often urged as a good thing to have "skeleton" regiments. Skeleton regiments might do very well on the Continent, where no difficulty was found in filling them up when an emergency occurred; but the case was different in this country. On this subject he would mention an anecdote he had heard in Italy a few days before. Shortly before the war an Austrian regiment stood at 3,000 men. That regiment got orders for service, and it became necessary to increase the men. Well, what was done? Within eight days the rank and file of that regiment was increased to 6,000 men, and it came down to the gates of Vienna, waiting in arms to know what part of the empire it was to go to. Those new men were not mere recruits, such as we were forced to pick up in our fairs and market towns; they were all of them men who had served their two or three years in the service, and who had been sent home until called on to finish their full time of service. That was the system which was adopted, and could only be adopted in despotic countries. But he was not aware of any means by which in this country men could be so sent to their homes, and obliged to wait until again called on for active service. Therefore, in his opinion, the skeleton system was not adapted to this country. He hoped also that recourse would not again be had to the stop-gap system which was adopted during the Russian war; he meant the system of volunteering from one regiment to another. The consequence of that system was that one regiment was gutted of its men in order to bring another up to a war establishment and that the recruits who were sent out to join their regiments in the Crimea did not in many cases know how to load their muskets. The objections to the present mode of reinforcing the infantry were equally applicable to the cavalry. The yearly expense of the regiments as they now stood, including all ranks, was £26 per head, but by adopting the system that he recommended they could add men to the rank and file at rather less than £20 per head. In the one case they could get for a given sum of money 14,000 men added to the army, but in the other case about 20,000. The system of expansion might be perfectly well provided for by dividing the regiments into two wings and throwing the recruits upon them. They could add to their army much more rapidly by dividing one regiment of 1,200 men into two wings and adding recruits to it, than by raising a 2nd battalion upon a weak depôt. The regiments should have twelve companies of never less than 100 men each. The expense of adding to all the regiments in the manner he suggested would be about £400,000. The hon. and gallant General (General Peel) had alluded to some remarks made by an hon. Member (Mr. Baillie) early in the evening with respect to the embodied militia. His hon. Friend however did not object to an embodied militia, but to that militia being allowed longer than absolute necessity required to be a substitute for regular soldiers. An embodied militia cost as much as new regiments of the line.

SIR HARRY VERNEY

thought it was to be regretted that we lost many of our soldiers just at the time that they had become efficient, and suggested that with the view of inducing the ten years' service men to remain in the army a small addition should be made to their pay. Those soldiers were the most healthy who were the most employed in garrison, and less crime was committed in those garrisons in which the men were well employed than in those in which they were idle. In the barracks in France the men themselves made almost every article of clothing that they required. Why could not the men in our own barracks be similarly employed? In every French company so many men were employed to cook, others to purchase food or other duties. The French soldier was taught to do everything for himself. Why should not our men be taught to do the same as far as practicable?

SIR FREDERICK SMITH

said, the clothing and accoutrements in the French service were not made by each man for himself, but a company in each Regiment was employed for that purpose. In his opinion, with reference to our coast defences, he thought we did not act in a business-like manner with respect to them. The Estimates for the defences at Devonport were £320,000, but only £10,000 had been asked for this year. That appeared to be trifling with a very great subject. If these works of defence were needed at all why were they not undertaken boldly and at once? It was more injurious than beneficial to deal in a paltry way with great works. Then when all these defensive works now in contemplation were completed he wanted to know where the garrisons were to come from? He thought that there ought to be a Commisson to settle what our defences ought to be, and to settle the matter once for all. There were two or three other items which he wished to notice. "For examination of sites of works of defence of St. Helen's passage." Now, he knew that five years ago Sir Charles Fox gave in a special plan for the foundation of the works, but what had been the cause of the delay he did not know. Then, as to Portland, the right hon. Gentleman had justly said that it was one of the finest harbours in the world, but it was a harbour without defence. Though he was not one of those who thought this country would be invaded by the French, he considered that they ought to put it in a state of defence. If they were to defend the country at all they ought not to leave a harbour like that without as much as a battery to protect it. No time was to be lost. It was the advanced post. It was opposite to Cherbourg, and it was the right wing of the navy as Dovor was the left. Large works were proposed at Dovor, and small sums were taken. No military man believed that if we were invaded it would be at Dovor. There were abundance of places which would be preferred by an enemy, and yet they were laying out hundreds of thousands of pounds upon Dovor, which would never be a point of attack. Having made these few observations, he should leave the Motion in the hands of the Committee.

GENERAL UPTON

said, he understood the late Secretary for War to recommend that the regiments of militia should be embodied for one year, and that the training for twenty-one days should be dispensed with. His opinion was that no regiment of militia should be embodied for a less period than two years, and that the period of training of the disembodied mili- tia should be increased to at least one month. His reason for considering the period of one year too short was, that no regiment could so learn its duties in that time as not to forget them. In a military point of view two years was the least period which he should recommend. He also thought that with respect to the officers, who had given up other occupations, they should be kept together for at least two years.

COLONEL DUNNE

said, there was a chorus of compliments to one another from Under Secretaries on the perfect state of defence and the perfect army which they asserted we possessed; but if they mixed, as he did, with military men, they would have a very different opinion. Every man would allow, at least in theory, that if we were to have an army we ought to have it at the least possible expense. But we paid more for our 110,000 men than any nation in the world for its whole military force, and far more than was necessary. The system of administration was faulty. Generally men were appointed to preside over the war departments who were not military men and who knew nothing about the army. They had lately had a general officer as Secretary for War, and praise was justly due to that gallant Gentleman; but if he possessed twice the powers of mind and twice the physical powers which he did he would defy him to perform all the duties which devolved upon him. He could not be responsible for half that was to be done. The Ordnance and half-a-dozen offices had been abolished, an admirable system had been broken up; it had not been replaced by any system whatever; a civilian, ignorant of military matters, was placed at the head of this confused and over-loaded Department, and the persons who assisted the Secretary knew nothing of soldiers' wants and requirements. There was a statement of the force on paper which every military man knew was not available. There was a great difference between the number of men on the muster roll and the number of men who could take the field. He believed that with all our expenditure of £10,000,000 or £11,000,000, it would be impossible to concentrate on any part of the island more than 30,000 men in case of emergency. He also thought it wrong that the military departments, beyond a limited extent, should become manufacturers. The system of small manufactories might be justified, but large es- tablishments were a great error in a country where the work could be equally well done by private enterprize. They had 28,000 militiamen effective, and they were a better class of men physically than even the men at present enlisted in the line. But they were obtained at the expense of the line, and the Secretary of State for War must know that there was a large number, from 4 to 6,000 wanting to complete the regiments of that service. They might vote as much money as they chose, but they did not get the men. Thus they were much under the nominal strength. And what were the line regiments recruited with, if not with boys not half formed? The system of recruiting was also, he thought, defective, because they had several different establishments for recruiting, which, by competition, defeated the object. They had the ordinary recruiting establishment, then the militia staff, and finally the pensioner staff, each bidding against one another for recruits and often in the same town. With respect to our fortifications, he should only say that the highest authorities pronounced them to be comparatively useless while left in the unfinished state they are at present. A work, which it was estimated would cost £200,000, was sometimes adopted by the House, while there was annually voted for its completion perhaps only £20,000, or even £10,000: what a time, then, must it take to finish such a work, and during that time it could not be considered a useful defence. Why not, if these defences were to be made, finish them at once? He found that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had not forgotten to extend the income tax to Ireland, but it seemed the Government did not attach much importance to the defence of that country or repose unbounded confidence in the loyalty and warlike ambition of the Irish, for he did not find in these Estimates a single shilling voted for Ireland, yet in Ireland many of the forts were fast going to decay. He should, therefore, recommend the Government seriously to direct their attention to the defences of the country. There were several other topics to which he should wish to advert, but at that late period of the night (a quarter to 12 o'clock) he should abstain from trespassing at greater length on the time of the Committee.

MR. MONSELL

thought the observations of his hon. and Gallant Friend (Colonel Dunne) must apply to the state of things which prevailed when he had been connected with the Ordnance Office, rather than to that which at present existed. He had, at all events, made statements in reference to the manufacturing department, which by no means tallied with his (Mr. Monsell's) experience. He, under those circumstances, wished to ask his right hon. Friend the Secretary for War whether, in the principal manufacturing departments for small arms, only one stock arm—the Minie rifle—was made? and whether it was the fact that the influence of their manufacture on the trade generally was such that the Minie rifles made in the Enfield factory were purchased at a lower proportionate rate than those which were obtained by contract? If that were so, that disposed of some of the objections of the hon. and gallant Officer Colonel Dunne. Then, as to Alderney, after expending £190,000 upon the fortifications of Alderney, besides £10,000 upon the citadel, it had been said that there was a hill in the neighbourhood which commanded the works and he should like to hear if any statement had been made on the subject by any official personage. Again, it was said that much money had been expended on the works at Gibraltar and Malta, which, he believed, had been carried out through the recommendations of a Commission sent out by General Peel. He would further ask upon whose authority the right hon. Gentleman relied for the construction of fortresses? The Director General of Ordnance was formerly the official adviser in these matters; but that office had now been abolished, and it was therefore desirable to know on what authority the Government proceeded.

COLONEL GILPIN

said, he willingly bore testimony to the success by which the erection of a camp at Aldershot had been attended—a success which was, he must say, to a great extent attributable to the gallant officer who filled the post of commandant, notwithstanding that observations depreciatory of his merits had found their way into the public prints. It was owing to the exertions of that gallant officer that the raw levies which had been sent to the camp had been so soon transformed into well disciplined soldiers, and that the review which had taken place there a few days ago was as perfect as anything of the kind could be expected to he. His object in rising, however, was not so much to bear testimony to the success of Aldershot as to put a question to the Government with respect to the disallowance of forage to a certain extent to the officers of Militia and Staff generally. The sum originally allowed fur the keep of a horse to particular officers was 2s. a day, but that allowance had since been reduced to Is. 6d. Great complaint, however, was occasioned by the reduction, and the amount allowed had subsequently been raised to 1s. l0d. Now, he believed the forage contract for the whole army was at the rate of Is. 9d. a day; and if that were so, he should like to know how the sum he had mentioned could be supposed to be adequate in the case of the officers to whom he referred?

MAJOR STUART

complained of the inadequate accommodation of the barracks at Dovor and the want of a school-house there?

GENERAL PEEL

hoped he would be allowed to answer the question put by the hon. and gallant Member for Bedfordshire (Colonel Gilpin) with respect to the forage for horses. There was 1s. 6d. a day allowed for forage, with the addition of 6d. for the stable to those officers who had no stables. Those who had stables had been, however, receiving 2s. a day likewise. Finding that the latter were receiving more than they were entitled to, the allowance to such officers was reduced to 1s. 6d. It having been represented to him that that sum was insufficient, he added 25 per cent to the contract price, which made it 1s. l0d. Those who had not stables received 6d. in addition, which made the allowance to them 2s. 4d. In respect to the school near Dovor, the hon. Gentleman would find that there was a Vote taken for it in the general Estimates.

SIR MORTON PETO

wished to call attention to the want of harmony in our military arrangements, which operated as a great impediment in the Administration of the War Department. During the Crimean war, when the attention of every one was directed to the efficiency of the service, he paid a visit to one of the camps in this country, and found that though the huts were erected the means of access to the camp by roads were quite neglected. The next thing which struck him was the fact that a regiment of cavalry was ordered there, although there was not a stable to receive the horses. Such an oversight could not arise if proper communication was maintained between the different departments. He paid a visit to the camp at Shorncliffe last week, and although it had been established four or five years there had been no drainage whatever, and it was only now that they were laving down pipe-drains, although any person with the slightest knowledge or foresight would have done so before he began to build. The House was now voting money without stint for the two services, but unless these practical questions were grappled with there would never be that efficient direction of affairs which would be necessary upon any emergency. Now, his engagements upon public works in Sardinia had led him to observe the admirable administration of the French army during the war just happily ended, and anything more opposite to our Crimean experiences he could not conceive. The reports of his agents and the result of his own observation showed that the administration of the French army was characterized by just that sort of conceit and forethought which would be displayed by any mercantile firm; and unless our military authorities would put aside the routine which only enabled them to walk in a certain track, and unless they would deal in a businesslike way with the questions which came before them, depend upon it when another time of crisis came there would be the same difficulties and the same disasters as were experienced in the Crimea. He recollected perfectly well that during the Russian war a member of the Government who went on board of one of the steamers going out to the East for the formation of the Balaklava railway inquired the use of a quantity of tarpauling that was on board. When told that it was quite impossible to have huts ready for the use of the large number of workmen directly on landing, and that the tarpauling was therefore allotted among them so that they might at once have shelter while their huts were building, it was thought an admirable arrangement, and he (Sir Morton Peto) was asked if it was possible to make the same provision for the army. His reply was that as his influence with the railway companies would give him the command of all their stores, he would undertake to provide any quantity during the next two or three days. Immediate application was accordingly made to the War and Ordnance Departments; but they were referred to the Tower, and it was found so impossible to get through the routine which was interposed that he went to the Duke of Newcastle and asked him to break through this routine, the result of which was that a great quantity of tarpaulings was sent out. In making these observations he did not intend to impeach the conduct of this or any Government, but there was evidently a great fault somewhere in our military organization, and he repealed that unless the authorities transacted their business in the simple and practical manner of mercantile firms, their administration, when another emergency arose, would be found as much wanting as it was in the Crimea.

COLONEL NORTH

said, the hon. Baronet's praise of the French military organization was perfectly well deserved; but was not the perfection of that system due to the fact that the office of Minister of War was always held by one of their most distinguished military commanders. He did not refer to his right hon. Friend, because under no Administration had the army benefited more largely than under his. But according to our system the army, generally speaking, was in the hands of men who probably did not know whether a soldier wore his pouch over his left shoulder or his right. In this country, where the War Secretary must be in Parliament, it might be difficult to carry out such a system; but he believed that the reason the French and Sardinian armies were in so efficient a condition was because those armies were administered by officers of experience and distinction, and not as in England by civilians, who knew nothing of the feelings and the prejudices of the soldier.

SIR MORTON PETO

said, that nothing could be more lamentable than the administration of the army during the Crimean war—the horses eating off each other's tails, while there was plenty of hay on board the ships in Balaclava harbour. He was sorry to see distinguished persons, who had served their country with great distinction, rising up in that House and making alarming speeches about the intentions of the Emperor of the French. He thought we should do well to imitate the administrative ability of our powerful neighbour, and put the country at once into an efficient state of defence without talking so much about it.

MR. SIDNEY HERBERT

said, the gallant Officer opposite (Colonel Herbert), who observed that the whole of the force which the War Department enumerated as being in England was not directly available. He was ready to admit there was some truth in that statement, and that the men composing depots could not be reckoned on the same footing of efficiency as trained men serving in battalions of the line. As to the remark of the gallant Officer that the constitution of the battalions had been altered for the worse, there were now 950 men in the battalions, and nothing was so easy as to augment the number at a comparatively small cost, should circumstances render such an increase desirable. Again, it had been said we were losing the ten years' men. It was not, however, the fact that we were losing them from any unwillingness to re-enlist them. He might be permitted to say that some years ago, when in office, he proposed to constitute a reserve of such of those ten years' men as did not wish to continue in the service, by offering them some annual payment. Circumstances prevented that arrangement being carried out, and during the war the Government exercised the power of continuing the service of the men beyond the ten years. The result had been to give rather an additional inclination to the ten years men to leave the service than to continue in it. A measure, however, was now under consideration by which the Government hoped to be able to secure the services of those men. With respect to the complaint as to the number of manufactories carried on by the Government, he admitted that he himself had a bias against those establishments, for it was asserted that in many of the departments in which the Government were their own manufacturers they could get contracts from the trade at a cheaper rate, but at the same time no doubt that cheaper rate was obtained by the check which the Government manufactories had upon the private establishments. In particular branches of manufacture where there was no civil demand running concurrently with that of the Government it might be advantageous to have recourse to a Government establishment. He would remind the hon. and gallant Member for Queen's County (Colonel Dunne) with a view to correct a misapprehension he appeared to be under, that our army was scattered all over the world, that we had 90,000 in India, for instance; and, of course, there must be a certain interval between the creation and supply of vacancies, but there was not so great a deficiency in the number of effective men as the hon. and gallant Member seemed to suppose. The Parliamentary Vote was for 229,000 men in round numbers. We had got 220,000 as the number of effective men, and considering how large a part of the army was employed in our distant possessions, he did not think 9,000 men consti- tuted a very great deficiency. His hon. friend (Sir M. Peto) had referred the Committee to the Crimean war; but he thought it was not quite fair to refer for examples to a system excessively cumbrous in itself, and which had grown rusty, against one that had entirely supplanted it. The various departments of the army were not then under one head, and there was no doubt that the system was inapplicable to the purposes of war. It might be true that our existing system was faulty; but if it was faulty, he was ready to learn, and, having learnt, he should be ready to propose the necessary changes. He advised the Committee to lose no time in getting the best information they could from the most competent witnesses to enable them to come to a practical conclusion as to the best organization of the War Department. He had recently served on a Commission which had visited many of the barrack establishments in England and Ireland, and he might say he was almost appalled at the amount of work to be done in order to place them on a satisfactory footing. They were not only deserving but having the most earnest attention of the Government, and he hoped he might count upon the support and assistance of the House in carrying the work forward to completion. He trusted the Committee would now allow the first Vote to be taken.

CAPTAIN LEICESTER VERNON

said, he wished to draw attention to one great fact—that they were about to vote £12,000,000 upon the Army Estimates, and out of that large sum only £3,500,000 went towards the fighting men. The whole of the rest went to the Staff and such like, and thus the mere fighting men only received l–27th of the whole. The home Staff cost £131,951; the foreign Staff, £180,326; the total Staff, £312,287. The department of the Secretary of Warcost £101,000; of the Commander-in-Chief, £185,000. The supplemental Staff cost £4,241 for services which could be just as well performed by the district Staff. He could point out a good many Staff appointments that were not very useful, and he trusted that the Secretary for War would look into this subject, and endeavour to reduce the enormous expenses of the Staff of the army.

vote agreed to, as were the following:—

(8.) £108,375. Wages of Artificers, Labourers, &c.

(9.) £300,000. Clothing and Necessaries.

(10.) £93,180. Provisions, Forage, &c. House resumed.

Resolutions to be reported To-morrow.