CONSIDERED IN COMMITTEE.

HC Deb 25 February 1859 vol 152 cc882-944

(In the Committee.)

SIR JOHN PAKINGTON

Sir, I now rise to state the views and intentions of Her Majesty's Government on that subject which touches more closely, perhaps, than any other, the national pride of English-men and the safety and welfare of England. And, Sir, I can assure the Committee that I approach the discharge of the duty which now devolves upon me with feelings of the greatest anxiety. I cannot but feel that the public interest and attention have of late been directed to the state of the navy, and that therefore I am called upon to fulfil this duty under more than ordinary degree of responsibility. I shall be obliged to trespass on the attention of the Committee with considerable details; but I trust I shall receive that forbear- ance without which it would be very difficult to lay before them with clearness the views which it will be my duty to explain, and the intentions which on the part of the Government I have to announce.

Before, Sir, I proceed to explain the Estimates which it will be my duty to submit to the consideration of the Committee I hope the Committee will not think that I am unduly or inappropriately occupying their time if I venture to enter into seine explanation of the gradual increase in the amount of the Navy Estimates, and of the great amount which those Estimates have attained. The hon. Gentleman who has been prevented addressing the House (Mr. W. Williams) had given notice that he would move to refer these Estimates to a Select Committee. I am bound to say that the hon. Gentleman intimated to me, a short time before the Speaker left the chair, that it was not his intention to proceed with that Motion, and I believe his only motive in rising a few minutes ago was simply for the purpose of making a similar announcement to the House.

MR. W. WILLIAMS

.—Not exactly. I wished to say that I should not interfere with your proposal of a vote for men and Pay.

SIR JOHN PAKINGTON

That is the same thing in substance. I feel no surprise that it should be the desire of the hon. Gentleman to refer those Estimates to a Select Committee. The amount of the Estimates for the present year, 1858–9, is no less than £8,851,371. The whole Estimates which it will be my duty to move for the ensuing year, 1859–60, are so con-siderably increased as to be no less than £9,813,181. There is in round numbers an increase on the Estimates for the present year of about £1,00,000. It will be my duty, before I sit down, to offer to the house an explanation of that additional million; but there remains the very large sum of nearly £9,000,000 for the current year, with regard to which I think it natural the public should feel a great desire for further information. When they are called upon to furnish these very large sums from year to year, it is very natural that the public should desire to be informed, and they have a right to expect that they will be informed on these points—namely, that they derive the full advantages of these immense sums being expended, and that Ministers are not asking for more than the public service requires. I think, therefore, that I shall only be discharging my duty if I venture to offer some explanations with regard to the mode in which these large sums are expended for the public service.

It will be in the recollection of those Members, especially of those who are apt to refer to their favourite year 1835—that in that year the Navy Estimates had fallen to little more than £4,000,000 (£4,434,700), while the number of men voted was 26,500 seamen and marines. At that time, it must be remembered, there were none of the expenses of a steam navy. I have already said that that is a very favourite year with the economists: but I am very much disposed to think that it would have been better for the country if the Navy Estimates had never been allowed to fall to that low amount. I believe that they were then lower than was consistent with the interests of the public service. Certainly they did not remain at that amount; for, by 1845 they had risen to £7,000,000, and the number of men voted had risen to 40,000 seamen and marines. This gradual increase went on from year to year, and in 1848 it led to the appointment of a Select Committee, presided over with great ability, by Lord Seymour, which investigated the whole of our expenditure under the heads of Army, Navy, and Ordnance, in the closest possible manner. The hon. Member for Lambeth himself must allow that if he had succeeded in persuading the House to refer these Estimates to the Committee which he proposes to move for, he could not have hoped for a more searching inquiry into our expenditure under these heads than was entered into by this Committee. The result of that inquiry was that the Navy Estimates were reduced, and in the following year they did not exceed the amount of £6,000,000. They afterwards went on slightly increasing, but they did not rise above £6,000,000 until 1852. Between that year, however, and the present year there is a great difference, and I desire to enter into a comparison of the expenditure of the two years, which, I trust, will satisfy the House and the public that the great increase is owing to causes over which we have had no control. I name the year 1852–3 for two reasons:—first, because I was in office then, and consequently am more familiar with the expenditure of that year, and also because it was the last before the expenditure of the country became seriously affected by the late war with Russia. The year 1858–9 is again a year of peace,—if not of entire peace, at least undis- turbed by any war or by any great preparation for war. In the year 1852–3, the Navy Estimates were £5,835,588; in the present year they have risen to £8,851,371, being an increase of no less than £3,016,783 or 51 per cent. Both being years of peace, it is natural and fair that the House should desire some explanation of the great difference between them, and I hope to be able to state such causes as will satisfy even the hon. Member for Lambeth, that the increase has been forced upon us, and has not been caused by the extravagance of any Government, or by the mismanagement of any particular Minister. I will take first the item of wages of seamen and marines. In 1858–9 this item is £2,401,599; in 1852–3, it was £1,543,025, being an increase of 55½ per cent. This is an item of increase with regard to which there can be no objection, unless you object to the policy of increasing the number of men; because, the number of men being increased the amount of wages is necessarily increased. The next item is the cost of provisions, and by an accidental rise in the price of provisions the increase of this item is in a greater ratio than was to be expected from the increase of the number of men. It has risen from £544,507 to £1,027,357, the increase being 88½ per cent. I ought to have added, with regard to the increase of the number of men, that since 1852–3 the cost of the Coastguard has been added to the Navy Estimates, being nearly 8,000 additional men to be provided for—and also that during the intervening years the pay and allowance of the navy had considerably increased. The cost of the Coastguard and the Royal Naval Coast Volunteers is £178,592, and it applies entirely to this year, there being no such item in the year 1852–3. It is entirely new. The next item is the Vote for the wages of Artificers. It is now £966,921; in 1852–3 it was £666,929, being an increase of 45 per cent. A large increase in this Vote has been caused by the addition of steam factories to our dockyards, which has arisen entirely from the increased adoption of steam power in our navy during the last few years. This is a circumstance, of course, entirely beyond the control of any Government; but the main cause of the large difference in this Vote is the increased size and cost of our ships and the increased efforts which are being made now as compared with 1852 for the extension of our navy. On the item of Naval Stores there is an in- crease of 57½ per cent. In 1852–3 it was £882,495, this year it is £1,389,742 This increase is clearly owing to the great additions which have been made to our steam navy. The items under the head of Miscellaneous have been increased in the same manner; but I will not detain the House by going over all these details. I think I have referred to the cause of the great increase in all these Votes between the two years I have referred to, and I hope that the explanation I have now given will be satisfactory to the House and to the country, and will show that the causes of this increase have arisen not from any extravagance on the part of the Executive Government or of the naval Department, but that they were causes beyond our control, and rendered necessary by the course of events. As some further illustration of the causes of this augmentation in the cost of our navy, the House will perhaps allow me to compare the cost of manning sailing and steam vessels in the years 1852–3 and 1858–9. In 1852 the average pay of all ranks of officers and men was £39 14s.8d.; in 1858–9 the average has risen to £43 2s., being an increase of £3 8s. 4d. per man. In 1852–3 it required a complement of 970 officers and men to man the Britannia, a first-rate sailing ship, and the cost of that ship was £26,693 yearly. It requires 1,100 officers and men to man the Marlborough, a first-rate steam vessel of the present day, and her cost annually is £35,248. The Committee will therefore see how enormously increased is the expense of the ship nominally of the same rating. Take the frigates. The Arethusa, a 50-gun sailing frigate of 1852–3, required 500 men, and cost annually £14,585. The Shannon, of the same nominal rating, in 1858–9, requires 560 men, and costs £19,341. I can give the Committee still another proof of the great increase of expense as respects the rate of wages. The cost of building the hull of the Indefatigable, a 50-gun frigate, in 1852–3 was £51,836; but the Shannon, also a 50-gun frigate, cost £71,112; and the Orlando, a new steam frigate launched last summer, cost £99,375. These figures go far to explain the great difference of expense in one part of the Estimates at least. I can give another proof of the same thing in a different way. The construction of the Britannia, 121 guns, required 4,550 loads of rough timber and the labour of 218 shipwrights, while the Marlborough, the same class of vessel, recently built, required 6,068 loads of timber and 334 shipwrights. So that hero again you have a proof in the items of building, stores, and artificers' wages, of how much more costly it is to build ships in these days than it was a few years ago. The Rodney, again, required 3,610 loads of timber and 219 shipwrights; while the Renown, a vessel of the same class, but lately built, required 4,680 loads of timber and 277 shipwrights. The immense increase in the size of our ships will prepare hon. Members for a great augmentation in another item of our Navy Estimates, which has been the subject of remark on several occasions—I mean the Vote for new works. Between 1852 and 1858 the increase in new works has been from £265,140 in 1852 to £585,862 in 1858, or 120 per cent. The cause of this must, upon consideration, be obvious. As your ships increase in size you find that the slips and docks, which were perfectly sufficient a few years ago, have now become insufficient, and that you must therefore go to the expense of reconstruction, and I need not say that the building of new slips and docks is a very costly affair. We have in the whole of Her Majesty's yards forty-two building slips, and at this moment only nine of them are large enough for the construction of first-rate ships. We are increasing the size of ten others, and, of course, a large amount of money is required for this purpose. The case of docks is still more remarkable. We have thirty-three docks, of which four only, in Her Majesty's yards—and I hope hon. Members will bear the statement in mind when the Vote comes on for discussion—will accommodate ships of the largest class. We are therefore obliged to alter and enlarge the docks, and we are now engaged in enlarging five of them; but, after all, when these are altered, that will only give us nine docks capable of holding first-rate ships. But we cannot attain that object without the expenditure of immense sums of money, and those Members who look to this Vote will find that a very large sum is asked for to attain these objects.

Sir, having entered into this explanation with regard to the difference in the Votes of 1852 and the present year, I wish now to refer to an observation which was made by myself when moving the Estimates on a former occasion. It may be in the recollection of hon. Members that on that occasion I drew attention to the immense amount of money expended in the purchase of steam machinery, and that we had then spent little less a sum than £4,000,000 sterling in providing steam engines for the royal navy. I stated then that I thought it desirable to ascertain how far the national property so obtained had been taken care of, and whether the engines for our vessels was constructed on the best, most approved, and most scientific principles. I have redeemed the pledge which I then gave to the House, that there should be an inquiry into these subjects, and in the course of last summer I appointed a Committee consisting of Admiral Ramsden, Mr. John Ward, and Mr. Nasmyth, and I intrusted to them the duty of investigating the state of the steam machinery of the navy. This Committee report that the result of their inquiries is, that the steam machinery of the Royal Navy is in a very creditable state, and that in this respect the money has been well expended, and the public have been faithfully served. I am bound, however, to say that this able paper contains several recommendations, some of which at least it is the intention of the Admiralty to adopt, as we believe that they will tend to the advantage of the public service. One of those recommendations is that in taking tenders for the supply of steam engines there ought to be more scope for competition among the manufacturers than has hitherto been allowed. Considering the magnitude of these requirements and the immense mischief that might arise from any defects, it is certainly a grave question whether it is not best to confine the invitations to a few manufacturers in London, or to extend the competition more widely. My own opinion is that the public object will be best attained by a wider system of competition than has hitherto been allowed; and we propose, therefore, to invite tenders from engineers in Liverpool, in Scotland, or wherever there are houses of known eminence. I have also thought it my duty to appoint another Committee to inquire into the labour in our dockyards. The sum expended in our dockyards is enormously large, and it is most important that in expending such sums economy should be practised, and the full value of our expenditure be obtained. I by no means state that I have any suspicion that wrong practices have existed in the dockyards; but the Committee which sat in 1848 recommended an inquiry into this subject, and I wish particularly to ask the attention of the hon. Member for Lambeth to this. They state in their Report that is idle to suppose that a Parliamentry Committee could really investigate the details of dock yard expenditure—that it is altogether out of the question—and that any efficient inquiry must be conducted by some body of men appointed especially for the purpose. In consequence of that Report a Committee was appointed soon after; they closely investigated the expenditure in the dockyards, and as a result great economy and many improvements were introduced. But that took place ten years ago, and I thought it desirable that we should have another inquiry into the expenditure of the dockyards, in order to ascertain whether the money was laid out in the most judicious and economical manner, or whether there was still room for improvement. That Committee was headed by Admiral Smart, and it has been engaged in the investigation down to the present time. I regret that Report is not yet finished, but I understand from the Chairman that the result of the inquiry will be the recommendation of very considerable changes, which, in his opinion, will lead to a much more economical and judicious expenditure in the dockyards in future. I mention these facts to show—and I hope they will be accepted by the Committee as showing—the desire there is on the part of the Government to secure the most advantageous expenditure of the large sums intrusted to their care. I have thus detained the Committee with this explanation, comparing the year 1858 with the year 1852, and trust the result of the comparison I have instituted will be to impress the Committee and the public out of doors with the idea that as far as it is in the power of the Executive Government the expenditure of these sums has been regulated by a sense of duty and by a desire to exercise the utmost practical economy.

I will now turn to the Estimates which I propose for the ensuing year, and to the first Vote, Sir, which I shall place in your hands at the conclusion of this statement—namely, to the amount of Men for which I we intend to ask. Before I proceed to say anything with regard to this Vote I wish to refer to the Report which has just been placed in the hands of hon. Members, and which was looked for with very great anxiety by the public. I allude to the Report of the Commission moved for by the hon. and gallant Officer opposite (Sir Charles Napier) on the Manning of the Navy. As that Report has only been in the hands of hon. Members two or three days, and I had not the advantage of seeing it more than two or three days before it was communicated to the public, the Committee, I think, will at once see that it was impossible that Her Majesty's Government could have framed these Estimates with any reference to the contents of that Report. But I cannot omit to say, and in so saying, I think I am only giving expression to a very general opinion, that that Commission is entitled to public gratitude for the manner in which it has discharged its duties. The House will recollect that when the hon. and gallant Admiral moved for the Commission, I stated that I thought there was one special object which its members should have in view—namely, that some mode should be devised for establishing a connection between the Royal Navy and the mercantile navy, in the event of any emergency requiring that additional strength should be given to the Royal Navy. I stated that so far as concerned the ordinary meaning of our fleet in time of peace, I did not believe that that Commission would be able to discover anything more effectual than the plan recommended by the Manning Committee d 1852, and carried into full effect by my right hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle, during the period when he was First Lord of the Admiralty—namely, the continuous service system. I find in the Report that the Commissioners entirely confirm the view which I then ventured to express. I think we may rely with confidence on the ordinary manning of our fleet upon that system, and I hope the House will enable the Government to carry out that system into still more efficient operation. I believe, indeed, that there is no recommendation in the Report of the Commission, from the beginning to the end of it, which is not at least entitled to the prompt and serious consideration of Her Majesty's Government; but I will not at present express any opinion On the plan recommended by the Commissioners for the general manning of the navy, but I may say that I believe it presents a fair prospect for ensuring the accomplishment of the great object for which it was devised. The Vote for mon that we are now going to propose is, I admit, of a very unusual amount. I believe it is the largest Vote of men ever proposed ill this House in a time of peace, and I admit, therefore, that we are bound to show strong reasons for its justification. I trust that looking at the present aspect of public affairs, and in the present state of public affairs and of our naval service, the Committee will not hesitate to confirm the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, that we should not have done our duty to the country if we had not boldly asked Parliament for this increase of force. But I will speak without disguise on this subject. Apparently, there is only a difference in the Vote for the coming year, as compared with the one just passed, of 3,000 men; but, in reality, the increase is much more considerable. The same demands are not now made on Our naval force in distant parts of the world Which were made twelve months ago. The force in China is at present reduced by about one-half; during the last twelve months ships have returned from distant stations, others are now returning, and it will be my duty in the course of a few days to issue further recalls. It is hardly possible for me to state the amount of men which May thus be placed at the disposal of the Government; but I think I may say that, compared with last year, the real available increase in men for the home service must amount to nearer 7,000 men than 3,000. I shall now proceed to state the mode in which these men will be employed at home. I hold in my hand a statement, showing the disposal of Her Majesty's naval forces at the different stations to which they are attached; and I find from it in the month of January, 1858, we had in the East India and China seas a force of 68 ships, With 767 guns and 10,000 men. That force is now reduced to 47 ships, with 374 guns and 4,875 men, showing a reduction of upwards of 5,000 men. But the Committee will bear in mind that this statement includes the marines attached to those ships, and thus the proportionate reduction of men under the Vote we are now considering, is considerably less than the number I have just stated. On the coast of Africa, the difference between the last and the present year is very small. We have now at the Cape and the east and west coast of Africa 36 ships, with about 200 guns, and about 3,200 men, or about 200 men less than we had twelve months ago. At present it is not our intention to increase that force; and we entertain a confident expectation that we shall enter into arrangements with France and the United States by which we shall be enabled to operate more effectually for the suppression of the slave trade, and at a less cost than we have hitherto done. I believe that by sending Out steamships of smaller tonnage, or gunboats, our objects will be more effectually carried out. We have a slight increase of 278 men on the North American and West Indian station; and we have a con- siderable in crease in the Pacific. We have at present on that station 12 ships with 281 guns and 2,845 men, being 661 more than we had this time last year. The main cause of that augmentation of force has been the discovery of gold mines at the Fraser River, and the rise of new interests in that quarter which it has become our duty to protect. We received most urgent requests from British Columbia to increase our naval force there, but some of the ships that we sent out will be shortly recalled. In the Mediterranean, also, our force has been increased. It consists of 23 ships and 5,951 men, being 777 more men than were there last year. The main cause of this increase was, that on acceding to the office I now hold, I found that our force in the Mediterranean was much below the usual amount. There were several sloops and other smaller vessels there, but no frigates, and I therefore sent them two new frigates. The result is that on foreign stations we have now 1,786 men more than we bad this time twelvemonth.

I will now advert to another heavy item in the Vote for this year—namely, the Channel squadron. Our Channel squadron at present consists of eight ships-of-the line, and four frigates. I include two ships—the Cœsar and Diadem—which will be shortly recalled from Central America, where they are doing temporary duty. The Committee will remember that a year ago it was my duty to state that we had no Channel squadron whatever; that we had no naval defence of our own coast. I stated emphatically, that in my opinion, we ought to provide a Channel squadron, and I promised that as soon as I had the means at my disposal, such a squadron should be fitted out. Before the close of the summer, the Channel squadron consisted of six line-of-battle ships and three frigates, to which was shortly afterwards added another powerful frigate. The six line-of-battle ships on the home service, were the Royal Albert, Renown, Orion, Cœsar, Victor Emmanuel, and Brunswick. I have heard it said that this Channel squadron is really too weak to be of any avail to the country. [An hon. MEMBER: Hear, hear!] My hon. Friend's cheer gives me to understand that he is of that opinion. But I hope the Committee will, at all events, admit that it is a good commencement of the defence of our coast. My hon. Friend will admit that seven of these line-of-battle ships are of the best and most powerful class. Perhaps I cannot say that the Brunswick, is a very powerful ship. But as I have stated, this squadron is at present deprived of the services of the Cœsar and the Diadem, despatched to the coast of Central America on temporary service. They are now recalled, and in the meantime I can state for the consolation of the gallant Admiral (Sir C. Napier) that very recently two powerful line-of-battle ships, the St. Jean d' Acre and the Algiers, have been added to the home force. In a short time the squadron will be further augmented by two powerful frigates the Mersey and the Doris. Therefore assuming the return of the Cœsar and the Diadem, the Channel squadron will consist of eight powerful line-of-battle ships and six frigates; and when joined by the force in the Mediterranean, of four line-of-battle ships and two frigates, the combined sqadron in the Channel will consist of twelve line-of-battle ships and eight frigates, in all twenty ships of war. The gallant Admiral may say that this force is not sufficient; but it is a stronger squadron than we have maintained for many years in our home waters, and I earnestly hope it will be found sufficient; but, if not, I am confident the House will place at the disposal of Her Majesty's Government the means of making it so to any extent required. The question now arises whether the force of men I am now asking for is on the one hand justified by our national requirements, and whether on the other hand it will be sufficient for any service it may fairly be expected to have to perform. I am perfectly aware that I may be exposed to the double charge of seeking to raise too large and too small a force. [Sir C. NAPIER; Hear, hear!] The gallant Admiral intimates that the number is not sufficient; but it is an unusually large force. The estimate prepared for last year by the right hon. Baronet the Member for Halifax (Sir C. Wood) was 2,000 men more than tho increased estimate for 1857, and amounted altogether to 37,000 seamen. The present Government found the estimate made for that number when it came into office; and, after mature consideration, thought the late Government had not asked for a greater force than the public service required; we adopted that estimate, and it is now my duty to ask for such an addition to it as will place at our disposal an additional force of 3,000 men. As to the manner in which they will be employed, I have already stated what are the demands of our foreign stations, what are our intentions with regard to the Channel squadron. In dealing With figures of this kind it is very difficult to speak with perfect accuracy. Every one at all conversant with the business of the admiralty knows that the number of men fluctuates from day to day, as one ship comes into port and another leaves it; but I think I am correct in informing the House that, after all the men are allotted to the different ports and ships in various parts of the world, we shall have a surplus force at home of about 3,000 men. This brings me to a recommendation I find in the very able Report of the Commission appointed to inquire into the means of Manning the Navy. It is substantially the same recommendation as that of the Committee of naval officers that inquired into the same subject in 1852. I will read the passage in the Report of the last Commission referring to tile advantage of having a reserve of seamen at home:— Another recommendation of the Committee of 1852, which has not hitherto been carried into effect, is the maintaining an adequate reserve of seamen in the home ports. They observed that from the information and evidence that had been laid before them 'during the progress of the inquiry, they had been led to the conclusion that it was desirable to keep a larger force at home than had been customary of late years;' and they recommended, 'that your Majesty's navy should be maintained at such a numerical force in commission as, independently of the Channel squadron, will admit of 10,000 seamen and boys (exclusive of officers) being retained in England for the protection of the ports and the coasts of the united kingdom.' The evidence before us shows that, when a ship of war is commissioned, the most costly part of her complement, namely, the officers, and perhaps the greater part of the crew, immediately become a charge upon the State, and continue so for several weeks, and even months, during which she is unable to put to sea for want of the smaller portion of her crew; while the whole expense of the ship which she was intended to relieve is going on. We are, therefore, of opinion that a reserve of seamen should always be maintained in the home ports, ready to complete the crews of ships put in commission, for the relief of foreign stations, and as the best and most prompt of all reserves in the event of a sudden armament. The number to be thus retained in the home ports should bear a relation to the number in commission; and, with our present peace establishment, we think that it should not be less than 4,000 besides those retained in the harbour guard-ships. Such an arrangement also would afford a ready means of giving a systematic training in gunnery to all the men in your Majesty's naval service. With this recommendation I most cordially concur; and I beg to add, that before I was aware that the Report would contain any such passage, the Government decided—I might say, in deference to the Report of 1852, but rather in deference to common sense and the obvious necessity of the case—not to come before Parliament with the estimates of this year without asking for such a number of men as would enable them to secure a reserve in the home ports. I believe that no one who has paid any attention to the subject can entertain a moment's doubt as to the expediency and the necessity of such a measure. Bearing on the passage I have read from the Report of the Commission, I have here a statement that will fully confirm it. From that statement it appears, that when the Ganges was commissioned she remained in harbour 110 days before she completed her crew; the Diadem commissioned in August, 1857, was detained 135 days, and did not go to sea till January, 1858; the Renown, commissioned in November, 1857, was detained 172 days for the same purpose, and then sailed with sixty-two men short of her complement; the Marlborough, was delayed 129 days, and the Euryalus 121. These are ships manned within the last few years; one of them was delayed six months, all of them an average period of four months, before they obtained their crews. Now, I ask the House whether it thinks the ingenuity of any enemy could devise anything more humiliating or more calculated to impress foreign nations with a conviction of the decay of the naval power of England than the fact that our ships of war remain in port four, five, and six months together, unable to obtain their complement of seamen? I trust there will be but one feeling in the House as to the necessity of putting an end to a state of things so humiliating. We therefore ask for such a number of men as will place a surplus force at our disposal sufficient to maintain a reserve of seamen in our home ports. In regard to the employment of that reserve, I have to state that we have exactly adopted the recommendation of the right hon. Baronet opposite and of the Commission, of which he was a member, by providing that the sailors, while waiting for active employment, shall be exercised in gunnery, and thus improved in that practice connected with guns which is so essential to the efficiency of the service. The expense of this additional force of 3,000 men is not in proportion to the number of men required. The estimate for the wages of seamen for the current year is £2,487,062; this amount would have been £44,400 more had it not been for the fact that our naval force now consists of a larger number of large ships, and a smaller number of small ones, which diminishes the average expense per man and the number of officers employed. Before I quit the subject of the men there is one other subject to which I wish to advert—I mean the practice adopted by the late Board of Admiralty of sending out sailing line-of-battle ships as the flag-ships of the Admirals on foreign stations. My opinion is, that this practice leads to a very unnecessary expense, and at the same time interferes with the efficiency of our naval force. The flagships on our foreign stations, with the number of men in each was, till lately, as follows:—Calcutta, 720; Boscawen, 650; Cumberland, 650; Ganges, 720; Indus, 650: Total, 3,390. I have received remonstrances on this point from more than one of our admirals on foreign stations, leading to the belief that sailing line-of-battle ships are not well fitted for the services of flagships, and I am sure the House will see the force of the objections taken by them. Sir Michael Seymour has complained of the unfitness of his ship—the Calcutta—for the duties in which he has been engaged. The House is well aware that at one period last year there was some probability of a difference between this country and the United States, arising out of the circumstances connected with the suppression of the slave trade on the coast of Cuba. At that time it was essential that our naval force should be in a most efficient state. But just then I received a letter from Sir Houston Stewart, stating that his flagship, the Indus, was altogether unfit for active service. This may be said of these flag-ships generally, and, in addition to their being unfit for the kind of service in which they ought naturally to be employed on foreign stations, they are taking up a number of men who might be more usefully employed elsewhere. In my opinion, it is better policy to let the admirals on foreign stations carry their flags in screw frigates. This would cause a very considerable saving in regard to men, while the screw-steamers would be really fit to render good service on the stations—the saving in men if screw-frigates were substituted for the flag-ships I have mentioned, would be sufficient to add another effective line-of-battle-ship to our force at home. Acting on this belief, I have recalled flag-ships from some stations and replaced them with screw steamers; while in other instances it has been found more convenient to allow the ships to finish their time on the stations on which they are placed. As a rule, in future the practice will be to employ screw steamers on those stations as in every way a more economical system.

The next Vote is that of the Victualling of the Navy, amounting to £995,647. Last year it was £1,027,357—showing this year a saving of £31,000, notwithstanding the increase of men, which is principally to be attributed to the reduction in the price of provisions. The next Votes relate to the Admiralty Office, the Coastguard Service, the Scientific Branch, and Her Majesty's Establishments at home and abroad, being numbered respectively 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. These all vary more or less from the rates of last year, some being increased and some diminished; but it is unnecessary to enter into the details, though I shall be ready hereafter to offer any explanation that may be required. Vote 8 refers to Wages of Artificers; and I shall afterwards explain to the House the large increase that has taken place in the Vote, believing that I shall best consult the convenience of Members by separating in this way the extra from what may be called the ordinary portion of the expenditure under this head. On No. 9, the Vote for the expense of Wages in Establishments abroad I shall follow a similar course. Vote 10 is always a heavy item relating to Naval Stores. Here, again, I shall defer my explanation of the causes of the great increase that is proposed, only observing for the present that in ordinary circumstances the increase would have been £95,488, in consequence of the necessity of maintaining our stores of timber. Vote 11, for New Works, is a heavy item; but there is no material alteration from last year. Votes 12 and 13, for Medicines and Medical Stores, and for Miscellaneous Services, require no particular remark. Vote 14, relating to Half-pay, brings before me a subject on which I wish to make a few remarks. The change in the Vote itself is very small, amounting to an increase of £12,361; but I am desirous of stating the opinions which I entertain with regard to the present state of the Navy List. I cannot help thinking that this is a very serious question, deeply affecting the welfare and efficiency of the navy. Hon. Members who have ever looked into the Navy List must be aware that it is one of the most complicated and unintelligible documents that ever was compiled. It is difficult, if not, indeed, impossible, for those who have not devoted their lives to the study of the Navy and Retired List to understand the details with which it is encumbered. And what is the result of such an examination of it as can be given? Is the present state of our naval force, with respect to officers as put down in that list, in a condition of efficiency? My belief is—and I say it with a full sense of the difficulties of the case, and without wishing to say anything rash or imprudent—that the state of the Navy List is not satisfactory—it requires revision, and if revised with a judicious hand it may tend greatly to the efficiency of the service and the economy of the public money. There are on the list about 3,700 officers, of whom 1,700 are on the reserved and retired lists, and the remainder on the active list. Out of the list of 100 admirals, 39 are between the ages of 70 and 87, while of the whole number, excluding the Board of Admiralty, only 14 are employed. Out of 358 active captains, 31 are above the age of 60, and while out of the whole number only 90 are employed, 180 of the remainder have never served afloat in their present rank. Out of 507 active commanders, 56 are above the age of 60, and while out of the whole number only 179 are employed, 290 have never served afloat in their present rank. Take next the lieutenants. Out of 1061 active lieutenants, 120 are above the age of 60, and of the whole number about 500 are employed in sea-going ships, and 190 in the Coast-guard and Packet Service. Of the remainder, a large proportion are either unwilling to serve without some prospect of promotion or of increased half-pay, in consequence of such servitude when they become unfit. This is the state of the upper part of the Navy List. It is overcrowded. These officers cannot get employment, and, as we have seen, a large proportion of them have never served afloat in their present rank. Now, simultaneously with this state of things it so happens that in the lower ranks of the navy we have not enough officers for the ships that are in commission. At this moment the ships in commission in the navy are nearly 400 short of their complement in regard to mates, midshipmen, and officers of that class. There must be something wrong in a state of things that over crowds the upper list and leaves an insufficiency of officers in those below. Some reform is wanted. Promotion in the navy is almost stagnant. It is true that there are what are called Board promotions for "brilliant service," which have of late years been pretty freely given. But the generality of officers, who are employed in the ordinary duties of the profession, reap no benefit from this system, and can only look for their advancement to the few promotions which I may have at my disposal under the Orders in Council under which I act. By these orders I am at present limited to one promotion to the rank of Captain and Commander for every three vacancies on those lists, and the result has been, since I have had the honour of holding my present office, now twelve months, that I have had but two vacancies on the Active Captains List, to meet the large number of just claims for promotion to that rank. We have, at the same time, a variety of Reserved and Retired Lists; but with the exception of one list, called the Reserved Flag List, every one of these are either completely choked, or else they have ceased to exercise the effect for which they were intended. It is only on the most important of these retirement lists that vacancies can now be filled. I shall not dwell longer on this matter. I admit its difficulty, but it seems to me that that difficulty must be grappled with. The efficiency of the public service requires it. My belief is, without pledging myself now to any details, that the sound principle is to follow the rule already adopted, to a considerable extent, in the army. Naval officers, like all other human beings, must yield to the force of time; a regular flow of promotion should exist, and it is essential to the well-being of the navy, that we should have the services of active and vigorous officers, capable of performing their duties. I believe, therefore, that the best system for the service will be to adopt the principle of retirement at a given age, and thus secure the advancement of younger men to posts which their age and physical strength qualify them to fill.

In answer to a question put to me yesterday, I stated that I should avail myself of this occasion to allude to a subject which has lately excited very great interest—namely, the present position of the surgeons of the Royal Navy. I am sorry to find that my former answer has been very much misunderstood. I by no means intended to imply that I had any doubt or hesitation as to the course to be adopted. On the contrary, I then meant, as I mean now, to express in distinct terms my opinion that the present position of the surgeons in the navy is not satisfactory. But I go further. The complaints we now hear from these officers are, no doubt, much founded upon the late warrant issued in respect to the army; but I think that even before the date of that warrant the surgeons of the navy were not relatively placed on an equality with their brethren of the army. Now, however, they have an unanswerable claim to the consideration of their country. Nothing in the naval service could be nobler or more gallant than the manner in which the medical officers of the navy have discharged their duties under the most trying and painful circumstances, and they are entitled to more liberal treatment than they now receive. Their claim is based upon two grounds—first, it is due to them, as officers, that their position should be improved; and, secondly, public policy requires that the services of this most useful branch of the profession should be more highly appreciated and better requited, so that able and competent men may not be deterred from joining the navy. It is, therefore, our intention, in spirit and in substance, to concede to naval surgeons the advantages which they justly seek to obtain. At the same time I will not, and cannot, now commit myself to the exact mode in which that object shall be carried out. The peculiarities of the naval service may render it inconvenient to follow the precise rule pursued in regard to the army; but these and other points of detail will be duly considered before our plan is finally decided upon. The naval chaplains have preferred a very similar claim, as have also the masters and paymasters, and it is my desire to take the whole of these questions into simultaneous consideration, carefully examining them in their relation to each other before arriving at any definite conclusion.

The next Vote is that for Transport of Troops, on which there is a considerable reduction. It has fallen from £410,500 last year, to £200,000 for the present year. The item for the Packet Service differs little from the corresponding charge for the last year; but I think this Vote ought not to be included in the Navy Estimates at all. It should be comprised among the Votes for the Post Office department; and I only wonder that the right hon. Gentleman opposite did not get rid of it long ago.

The general result of a comparison between the Estimates for the present and those for the next year is, that supposing we did not take any extra money for shipbuilding, and did not add 3,000 men to the navy, there would he a saving of more than £138,000 in favour of the next year. Including the expense for this 3,000 men, but deducting the charge for extra shipbuilding, there would still remain a saving of £23,897 upon the Estimates for the next year. The real addition, therefore, to our naval expenditure, as shown in the Estimates, on account of the proposals we intend to make, will amount to £1,009,604.

With the permission of the Committee I shall now turn to the increase of the navy which we recommend; and here I may observe that throughout this statement I wish to deal with the House with the most perfect candour. I must therefore say that this sum of £1,009,604, which appears to be the additional cost we are to incur for ship-building, does not represent the whole of our proposed expenditure under that head. Besides that amount there will be postponed payments to the extent of £260,000. Of that money £100,000 will he made up by postponed instalments for steam machinery, Which will net be paid for dining 1859–60, but will be brought into the accounts for the commencement of the following year. There will also be payments of £160,000 for final instalments of vessels built by contract. Thus, the entire expense of the increase we propose to make in the navy is not exhausted by the sum of £1,009,000 which stands on the paper, but, in fact, will amount—though it will not all be required for the ensuing financial year—to £1,269,604.

The question then arises: Why is it that we want this addition to our navy? Are there sufficient reasons to justify us in asking Parliament to grant an increased expenditure for this purpose, in round figures of nearly £1,300,000? My belief is, that neither in this House nor in the country will there be any hesitation as to the propriety of this outlay. I am sure it is my duty, as it is the soundest policy, to treat the House with perfect frankness on these subjects. I did so last year, and I intend to do so now. I have previously stated my conviction that the extent of our naval force is known to foreign Powers. Foreign Governments are perfectly well aware of what goes on in this country. If there is any concealment at all, it is a concealment from the people here. It is right that the people should know what is the real state of affairs, and why they are called on to make these great efforts. I may state then, at once, that we ask for this great addition to the cost of shipbuilding, because I am bound to say that when I succeeded to the office I have now the honour to hold I did not find the navy of this country in a proper and adequate state for the defence of our coasts and the protection of our commerce. I beg here, in the most explicit terms, to disclaim any intention to cast censure upon former Administrations. If there is one thing which I am more anxious to avoid than another it is any appearance, on this occasion, of party spirit or party controversy. I cheerfully do justice to former Governments, and especially to that which immediately preceded us, to which, in regard to many points, great credit is due; and while they left many things still to be done, it is but fair to say that there were strong and obvious reasons connected with the Russian war why certain reforms should not then have been adopted. The right hon. Baronet the Member for Halifax (Sir Charles Wood) lately moved for a Return showing the number of ships of all descriptions which during the last few years have been added to our navy. It will be seen from that statement that during the time that that right hon. Gentleman was at the Board of Admiralty, considerable additions of the smaller vessels were made, such as corvettes, sloops, and, above all, gun-boats. I am not sure whether the addition of gun-boats had not commenced during the Administration of the right hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir James Graham), but our present gun-boats were chiefly added by the right hon. Baronet the Member for Halifax, and I do not think a more valuable addition has ever been made to the navy than those gun-boats. They are extremely popular; and, since I have held office, I have received applications for them from almost all parts of the world. But the additions made by the right hon. Baronet opposite (Sir C. Wood) had reference to the emergency in which they were made. Those additions were chiefly made in 1856; they had special reference to the war then going on with Russia; and the right hon. Gentleman very naturally added vessels of a class suited to the emergency of the moment. But while a considerable force of those gun-boats and sloops was added to the navy, the line-of-battle ships and frigates did not increase in the ratio which the interests of the public service demanded. On the contrary, the result of the war was actually to check the progress which ought to have been made in augmenting the number of line-of-battle ships in the navy. I hold in my hand a statement of the proposals made by the Surveyor of the Navy for an increase of line-of-battle ships and frigates during the last ten years. I have the programme submitted and the orders given thereon, but those orders were not carried out. In the course of the last ten years the orders for ships in the line amounted to 37, but the number of ships of the line actually built during those years was only 25; and, therefore, when I came into office, I found 12 line-of-battle ships less than we should have had if the intentions of the Admiralty from year to year had been carried out. In late years, I believe, the falling off originated in the requirements of the Russian war, which, to a certain extent, had the effect of diverting labour from the building of line-of-battle ships to vessels of a much smaller class. With regard to frigates, that is a stronger case. During the last ten years proposals were made for building 37 frigates; the actual number built was only 23, so that there was a deficiency of 14 frigates in that period. All this has made a very material difference in the positive and relative state of the navy. I am now going to deal, not with small boats, but with the great arm of the service, our line-of-battle ships and frigates, in regard to which I found, on my accession to office, our navy in a most unsatisfactory condition. I attach no blame to the late Admiralty for having built those smaller vessels, but we must recollect that in contemplating the future action of our navy, we must have regard to the possibility of a naval war. We cannot look for a repetition of a war similar to that with Russia. We must, I say, contemplate the possibility of a naval war; and should we ever find ourselves involved in a naval war, it will be absolutely essential to have line-of-battle ships and frigates in such numbers as will enable us to conduct such a war with honour and success. Very shortly after I came into office we received at the Admiralty a paper called a "submission," from Sir Baldwin Walker, the Surveyor of the Navy, calling our attention in very strong terms to the unsatisfactory state of Her Majesty's naval force in respect to line-of-battle ships. This "submission" was laid before the Admiralty, I think, in the latter part of March last. Again, in May we received from Sir Baldwin Walker another pressing "submis- sion" calling our attention to the deficiency of line-of-battle ships. In consequence of this second "submission" we placed the workmen in the dockyards on the system of task and job, and made those efforts which enabled us to equip the Channel squadron. In the course of the summer we thought it our duty to institute inquiries into the state of the navy of France. We felt, as I shall soon show, that the navy of England was not in a satisfactory condition; but we thought it our duty to make inquiries in reference to the condition of the navy of France. In July we again received a strong "submission" from Sir Baldwin Walker, urging on us the necessity of making vigorous efforts for the safety of our own shores in the building of powerful ships of the line. From that document I will read an extract. Sir Baldwin Walker says,— The information recently received from France having fully confirmed the accounts previously obtained of the state of the French navy, and shown the additions contemplated during the ensuing year, it is now beyond a question that, although a few years ago we were far a-head of them in respect of screw line-of-battle ships, they are now, for the first time, equal to us, and unless some extraordinary steps are at once taken to expedite the building of screw-ships of the line, the French at the close of next year will be actually superior to us as regards the most powerful class of ships of war. Again, he says,— This condition of things would not have occurred if the successive programmes of the last few years could have been carried out, but the exigences of the late war so interfered with the building of ships, that it was found utterly impossible to do so. I now wish to state to the House that last summer, when my attention was drawn to this state of affairs, the effective line-of-battle ships in England were in number only 29. With respect to block-ships, of which we have heard a great deal, and of which I scarcely knew how to speak when I first came into office, I must say I have now no hesitation in stating that these block-ships are wholly useless—they are good for nothing as seagoing men-of-war; they may be useful perhaps as floating batteries; but as men-of-war to go to sea, I say, they are perfectly useless. Several of them are rotten, and all are very nearly worn out. We must dismiss block-ships, then, and sailing line-of-battle ships from our consideration. The effective line-of-battle ships in England, as I have said, when I came to the Admiralty, were reduced to the low number of 29. The House will permit me to state what the number of the navy in England has been in former times. In the Seven Years' War (1760) there were 113 ships of the line in commission, with 86,626 seamen and marines; in the American war (1783) there were 126 ships of the line in commission, with 105,443 seamen and marines; in the French Revolutionary war (1799) there were 120 ships of the line in commission, with 120,409 seamen and marines; in the war with France (1809) there were 113 ships of the line in commission, with 144,387 seamen and marines; and in the war with Russia (1856) when we had no enemy on the sea—when we fought no naval action, and when our ships of war were generally employed in the transport of troops and military stores, or in attacking stone walls, there were 42 ships in commission (including block-ships and sailing ships) with 67,791 seamen and marines. Those sailing ships and block-ships answered the purpose when there was no enemy on the sea; but you cannot calculate on them in case of another war; and, in the event of a naval war, when you want effective ships, although the lowest number yon had in the war with Russia was 42, your force is reduced to the lower number of 29. That was in the summer of last year; and we have since added four ships, which were then taking in their engines, which has increased the number to 33.

I have stated to the House that during last summer we thought it our duty to ascertain the state of the French navy. We had heard much and justly of the progress made by France in increasing her naval armament during the last few years. We took means of ascertaining what were the facts, and we found that the line-of-battle ships of France were exactly the same in number as our own—namely, twenty-nine. The French had fewer three-deckers, first-rates, than we had; but of our twenty-nine ships there were nine which were inferior to any of the French. Therefore, in July last the screw line-of-battle ships of France were to enty-nine, and those of England also twenty-nine in number; but, that in point of power and efficiency, the line-of-battle ships of England were, to the best of my knowledge and belief, inferior to those of France. The nine ships to which I have referred are sailing 80-gun ships, which have been converted into screw 80's, and consequently have not room for their engines, and are generally inferior ships. In a Report, dated in December last, Sir Baldwin Walker says,— With the exception of some of the more recently built frigates there is scarcely a sailing ship which in its present state is fit to go to sea, and most of them require such extensive repairs that it would not be desirable to incur the expense of repairing them. As regards the screw vessels, all the 80-gun screw ships which from necessity were converted have the same armament as they had as sailing vessels, and are consequently so much pressed with their weights, and cramped for stowage, as to render them bad sea-boats.…. All these 80-gun screw ships ought not therefore to be considered as forming part of the effective screw force, but can only be regarded as vessels fit to replace the block-ships for home service. The latter, from their great age, are so defective that they will not be worth repairing after their present commission. To show the superiority of the French ships of the corresponding class, 80-guns, it may be stated that five were reduced from 100 and ten from 90-gun ships, and are, therefore, not only more powerful sailing ships but better enabled to stow their machinery, &c., than the English 80-gun screw ships. Having thus shown the opinion of the Surveyor of the Navy that in July last out of twenty-nine ships we had nine of a very inferior quality, I will now turn to what our prospects were with regard to the year 1859. We had four ships receiving engines, and during the year 1859 there were two new ships to be launched and one to be converted, which would have raised the number of our line-of-battle ships to thirty-six. We found that the progress of the French navy was not to be at all in the same ratio. At the close of the year 1859, the comparison would have stood—England, thirty-six line-of-battle ships, with 3,400 guns, and 19,750 horsepower, nine of these strips being of inferior quality; France, forty line-of-battle ships, with 3,706 guns and 27,510 horse-power. There would have been a clear decided superiority on the part of France at the close of the year 1859. I hope it will be clearly understood that in making these statements I am not speaking in an unfriendly spirit towards France. No man can desire more than I do, for the sake of France, for the sake of England, and for the sake of the world, that the friendship and alliance between the two countries may long continue. Nor do I intend to blame France for the efforts which she is making to increase her naval power. On the contrary, I respect the spirit with which the French Government have carried out these additions. But my argument is, that we are bound to do the same thing; that it is inconsistent with our naval power and with our national safety and dignity that we should allow such a state of things to continue. When this state of things was brought under my notice last July, when I found nominal equality but real inferiority with respect to France, and learned that that inferiority would, as time went on, be increased, I felt it my duty to lose no time in bringing that state of things under the consideration of my colleagues. I did so in the month of August last,—a time when it was impracticable to take any action in reference to this House. At that time Parliament was just about to be prorogued,—the Appropriation Act had been actually introduced,—and it would, for obvious reasons, have been extremely unadvisable to come to the House of Commons with additional Estimates for an increase of our force. The Government, however, felt that this was a state of things which we could not allow to continue, and we therefore consulted the Surveyor of the Navy what arrangements could be made to enable us, with the labour at our disposal, and without exceeding the Estimates to which we were pledged, to increase the number of our line-of-battle ships. The result of our deliberations was, that we determined to with-draw from the ordinary building and repair of ships a force sufficient to enable us at once to commence the conversion of four powerful three-deck line-of-battle ships—namely, the Neptune, the St. George, the Trafalgar, and the Queen into two-deck screw-ships, with 90 guns and 500 horse-power each. This we found was as much as we could do with the available labour at our command—but this we did at once. Those orders were given in the month of August last. During the course of the winter these ships have been rapidly advancing to completion, and in the course of the spring they will be launched, and added to the strength of the British Navy. They are as powerful ships of their class as could be built. In addition to these four ships we now propose to convert five others—namely, the Lion (which was ordered to be converted by the right hon. Baronet opposite (Sir C. Wood), but with which no progress has been made; the Nelson, the Royal William, the Waterloo, and the Rodney. The Nelson, the Royal William, and the Waterloo, three-deckers, will, in the course of the ensuing year, be converted into ships of ninety guns, and the Rodney at present a 90-gun ship, will be converted into a (screw line-of-battle ship of the same class. I should have hesitated about the expediency of converting the Rodney, had not a sister ship of hers, the London, lately been so treated with great success. I will now mention the new line-of-battle ships which we propose to add to the navy during the ensuing year. Had no extraordinary exertions been made only two ships would have been launched in the course of the year 1859, namely, the Hood and the Revenge, both of ninety-one guns; the Hood having 600 and the Revenge 800 horse-power. Gentlemen who have looked at the returns of the navy will see that there are included in them ten ships as in course of building. These would have been launched at different periods during the next few years; but we have selected those which were the most forward, and therefore could be operated upon most easily, and with the least expense, and propose to launch four of them during the ensuing year. In all, therefore, there will be launched during the year six screw line-of-battle ships—namely, the Hood, 91 guns, and 600 horse-power; the Revenge, 91, 800 horse-power; the Victoria, 121, 1,000 horse-power; the Howe, 121, 1,000 horse-power; the Duncan, 101, 800 horse-power; and the Prince of Wales, 131, 800 horse-power. The result will be that the Royal Navy will, in respect of effective line of-battle ships, he increased by fifteen, or about 50 per cent on the number I found in existence last year.

I now come to the question of frigates, and I am sorry to say that, in respect to that class of vessels, our position in comparison with the French navy, is stil more unsatisfactory than it is with regard to line-of-battle ships. In the course of the autumn, I found that instead of being upon a par with France, in point of numbers, as was the case with regard to line-of-battle ships, we were in a positive numerical inferiority of 12 frigates. The English navy comprises 17 screw frigates and 9 paddle frigates, 2 receiving their engines and 6 building, making a total of 34. The French navy reckons 15 screws, 19 paddlewheels, 3 receiving their engines, 1 converting, and 8 building, making an aggregate of 46. I cannot help hero calling the attention of the Committee to a comparison of the naval forces of England and France at various periods in former years. In 1812 England had 245 line-of-battle ships, while France had 113. We had then 272 frigates and France 72. In 1820 England possessed 146 line-of- battle ships and France 58. We had 164 frigates and France 39. In 1840 England had 89 line-of-battle ships and France 44. We had 180 frigates and France had 50. In 1850 England had 86 line-of-battle ships and France 45. England had 104 frigates and France 56. The Committee will observe that the relative superiority of England remained very nearly the same—that is, about two to one—until the present period I have shown to the Committee that while France is nearly on an equality with us in line-of-battle ships, she now very decidedly exceeds us in frigates. I have at the same time to state, for which the right hon. Gentleman opposite in some degree deserves the credit, that among our frigates are some of the very finest ships of that class that ever floated. Two very remarkable frigates, the Mersey and the Orlando, have just been launched, carrying 50 and 40 guns respectively. It is true that they are experimental ships, and that their value is not yet fully ascertained, but I have every reason to believe that they will be splendid men-of-war. Some of the French frigates, too, are not so strong in respect of horse-power as ours are. When we discovered our inferiority the Government felt, and, I believe, the Committee will also feel, that we really had no option but to endeavour, as soon as possible, to redress that inferiority, and, therefore, the plan which the Government now asks you to enable them to carry out is this. I may first observe that we have some twelve or fourteen sailing 80-gun ships, which, as of that class, are, I fear, almost useless. but which I had hoped might be converted into good frigates. I am sorry to say that they are so old, averaging upwards of thirty years, as not to be worth the cost of conversion. Upon the other hand, we have about twelve or thirteen 50-gun sailing frigates which are comparatively young, only averaging about eight or ten years of age, and they will be converted and lengthened, and will be most valuable vessels. Our proposal is, as to frigates, instead of launching three, which is the usual number each year, to hurry on two which are building, and so launch five new ones this year. They will be the Galatea, of 26 guns and 800 horse-power; the Ariadne, of 32 guns and 800 horse-power; the Bacchante, of 50 guns and 600 horsepower; the Narcissus of 50 guns and 400 horse-power; and the Immortalité of 50 guns and 600 horse-power. In addition to these we propose to convert four of the sailing frigates to which I have adverted—the Phaeton, Severn, Sutlej, and the Phœbe—to lengthen them amidships, at the bows, and at the stern. I believe these ships will become as efficient and as valuable as it is possible for converted ships to be. I fear they will be very costly ships, hot most valuable and effective, carrying the same armament they now bear—50 guns. The cost will be for the labour of conversion about £42,000 for each ship, and for the engines of 500 horse-power, £30,000, so that each ship will cost about £72,000. If, however, we were to construct new ships of the same size they would cost at least, each £40,000 more; and, moreover, these converted frigates can be added to our navy in a much less time than it would take to build new ones. We thus propose to add nine frigates in the course of the year.

I now have to beg the attention of the Committee to a portion of this subject which is the most difficult, but upon which I am bound to be candid—I allude to the subject of iron-cased ships. In referring to the French navy I made no mention of what they were going to do in respect to such ships, but it appears that they have laid down at Toulon, at an enormous expense, two vessels upon that plan, which are far advanced towards completion. They are to be about the size and tonnage of the vessel which they consider to be their finest line-of-battle ship, the Napoleon, upon which I understand they have been modelled. They are only to carry 36 guns, but those guns are to be of the heaviest calibre, and the vessels are to be coated with 4½-inch plates of iron or steel, it not being yet decided by them which metal shall be adopted. In this state of things the Government felt it to be their duty in the course of last summer to institute experiments as to the power of certain metal casings to resist shot. The Committee will perceive that it would not be proper in me to enter into detail at present upon that subject, and I can only say that the experiments were most carefully made with all varieties of metal and in all ways. In the course of the autumn, as every gentleman who reads the newspapers must know, some wonderful inventions were made in artillery, and it then appeared to me to be my duty to ascertain how far the previous experiments would be affected by the recent discoveries. The Committee will not expect me to give in detail the result of these experiments; but I am bound to say that it has convinced the Admiralty that, whatever be the cost, we Lave no option in the discharge of our duty but to commence the construction of iron-cased ships. I shall not conceal from the Committee that they will be the most costly ships ever built for the British navy; but still, assuming that of which I have no doubt, that our plans will receive the sanction of Parliament, we have resolved that it is our duty to lose no time in building at least two of these vessels. I am bound to say, also, that we feel it to be no less our duty to throw away no chance whatever in endeavouring to make these ships as effective as possible. We have called upon the most competent parties in different parts of England connected with private trade to give us their designs and counsel. We have likewise called upon our officials in the dockyards, upon our able master shipwrights, of whom I am glad to say we have a considerable number—to furnish us with designs. The determination of the Admiralty is to leave nothing undone, to take every precaution that prudence and caution can suggest, in order that the large sums which these ships will cost shall not be thrown away. We are equally resolved at the same time to lose not a moment in bringing these ships into existence. They are the ships which appear in our Estimates under the head of "Ships to be built by contract." We have not room to build them in our dockyards. From the mode of construction which we propose we have no hesitation in confiding their construction, under our own superintendence, to those who will build them by contract; and by the close of the year upon which we are now about to enter, I hope these two ships may also be added to the strength of the British navy.

Such, Sir, are the proposals to which we ask the consent of the House. If they are sanctioned the result, as regards ships, will be this—in the course of the next year fifteen line-of-battle ships, nine heavy frigates, and two iron-cased ships, which will be as powerful as we can make them, will be added to our navy. The general result will be an addition to the naval force of the country of twenty-six powerful men-of-war. Such is the use we propose to make of the sums which we ask you to vote. I have been perfectly open and candid with the Committee. I have stated to them our necessity, and I have also explained how we propose to meet it. If I am asked why we propose to do so much? I answer is not more than the case requires. If I am asked why we do not propose to do more? I say these proposals are the limit of our power, our dockyards could not do more within the year. But I tell you frankly that when these ships are completed, when we have added fifteen to our line-of-battle and nine to our heavy frigates, and when we have built the two iron cased ships to which I have referred—I, for one, shall not be content with the strength of the British navy. At the end of next year, instead of thirty-three, as now, we shall have forty-eight line-of-battle ships. But there are four more new ships on the stocks; there are four more line-of-battle ships which will bear conversion, and I hope that in the ensuing financial year of 1860–1 Parliament will consent to the completion of these eight vessels, thus raising our force at the end of that year to fifty-six line-of-battle ships. I trust also that Parliament will sanction a further addition to our frigates, so that ere long our naval supremacy may be thoroughly re-established.

I feel greatly indebted to the Committee for the patience with which they have heard my protracted, and, I am afraid, in some respects, dull statement. I trust they will consider that we have done no more than our duty in making these proposals to them. We have made these proposals from a conviction that it is our duty to invite the House of Commons to aid us in our attempt to restore the naval supremacy of England. We are bound to recollect the vital importance of this question. We are bound to recollect that we have not only, like Russia, or France, or the other great continental Powers, to provide for the protection of our own coasts and maintain our position in Europe, but we have to protect an empire and a commerce that extend over the four quarters of the globe. Our naval force is of necessity divided, and therefore it is essential for England not to allow her navy to fall, as it has fallen, down to the lowest amount ever known in our history—an amount not exceeding that of a neighbouring Power without anything like the same demand upon its force. It is our duty to take care that our naval force is not only adequate to preserve our position in Europe, but sufficient to answer the demands made upon us in all parts of the world. Let me add, above all, that we make these proposals in the interests of peace. I am convinced that if England wishes to be peaceful she must be powerful. The best guarantee for peace is to show that we are prepared for war; and I cannot, I think, conclude my speech in more appropriate terms than those which I find in the advice of Sir Francis Bacon to Sir George Villiers:— God is the God of Peace,—it is one of his attributes; therefore by Him alone we must pray And hope to continue it; there is the foundation. And the King must not neglect the just ways for it. Justice is the best protector of it at home, and providence for war is the best prevention of it from abroad. The right hon. Gentleman formally moved Vote—

(1.) 62,400 Men and Boys, including 15,000 Marines.

SIR CHARLES WOOD

Sir, I have listened, as I am sure the Committee must have done, with the greatest interest to the statement made by the right hon. Gentle. man opposite; and, if I say that I have not listened with great satisfaction, it is because he has stated in stronger terms—in consequence of circumstances having changed within the last year—what in a smaller degree it was my duty to state on a former occasion: namely, that we are not progressing as fast as we ought in the con struction of the larger class of ships. The right hon. Gentleman has alluded to one or two topics of minor importance, such as the state of the Navy List, which may form the subject of discussion at some future time, but upon which I shall not trouble the House at the present moment. I think I shall best consult its wishes by confining myself to the two great topics which the First Lord has brought before us: namely, the number of our men and the number of our ships. These are the two matters upon which our naval strength depends; they are, however interesting other subjects may be, of vital and paramount importance, and I think on the present occasion we ought to confine our attention to them. I need hardly say that I do not intend to offer the slightest opposition to the amount of money which the right hon. Gentleman proposes to vote, although I may have some observations to make upon the manner in which he means to expend it. The right hon. Gentleman has truly stated that his Vote for men is larger than has hitherto been taken in time of peace. The same remark has been made with equal truth in reference to every Vote that has been proposed since the conclusion of the war. It was my duty when the war with Russia was concluded to consider what proposals we should make for the number of men in the first year after peace. At that time, namely, January, 1857, I believe the prospect of peace was as promising as it had been for many years past. Russia had entered into a treaty with us, we were in the strictest alliance with France, and we fairly thought we might reduce the navy to a peace establishment. For four or five years before the war, the peace establishment of the navy had been 28,000 seamen and 11,000 marines; but we and the country had learned that we were not, when the Russian war broke out, in a proper state of preparation, and, therefore, we did not propose to go back to that which had been the peace establishment before the war. We proposed an addition of 5,000 seamen and 4,000 marines—9,000 men altogether above the previous peace establishment—and, accordingly, we took a Vote at the beginning of 1857, of 33,000 seamen and 15,000 marines. That was no inconsiderable increase on what the Government of my Lord John Russell and the Government of my Lord Derby had considered to be in time of peace an adequate naval force as far as men were concerned. But in the course of the same year the Chinese war and the Indian Rebellion broke out. The intelligence arrived here after the Estimates were voted; but, nevertheless, we did not hesitate to propose to the House an additional Vote of 2,000 men, making the entire force 50,000 men. Last year I proposed a further addition of 2,000, and the right hon. Gentleman, when he came into office, adopted that proposition; and, accordingly, we voted 37,000 seamen and 15,000 marines. The right. hon. Gentleman has stated that since that time—in the course of the present year—there have been returned from the East India stations something like 5,000 or 6,000 men. I think he understated the amount of force on the East India stations, which was between 10,000 and 11,000 men; and the addition made to our home force by returns from China must be rather larger than he represented it to be. It appears from his own statement that there will be, in point of fact, an additional force at home of about 7,000 men. My own opinion is that it will be even more than that. The naval force which we ought to maintain must be regulated by the circumstances of the time—by the prospects of war or peace. But, notwithstanding the satisfactory assurance as to the increased chances that the tranquillity of Europe will be preserved which we have heard from the Chancellor of the Exchequer this evening, I must say I entirely concur with the right hon. Gentleman Who has just spoken in the opinion that to be prepared for war is the best possible security for the continuance of peace. In that belief I have myself on various occasions proposed a large augmentation of Our naval force, and I will give my vote with pleasure for the proposed increase in the number of men for that service. There is, however, one portion of the speech bf the right hon. Gentleman, which I do not quite understand; mean that in which he alluded to a surplus of 3,000 men—that is to say, a reserve consisting of that number—to be kept in readiness on shore, to be put on board a ship when commissioned, either as a relief, or for any other purpose. There is connected with the maintenance of such a force a practical difficulty, which the right hon. Gentleman has not solved; namely, the manner in which those 3,000 men are to be lodged while they remain on shore. On referring to the Report of the Committee on Manning the Navy, I find that considerable fault is there found with the state of the hulks in which the men are lodged at our ports. Indeed, the system of lodging them in that way is one which I believe to be both uncomfortable and expensive. Even the improved method which, at the suggestion of Admiral Martin, I caused to be adopted at Portsmouth, is open to that objection. For my own part I have not the slightest doubt that by far the cheapest and most comfortable provision which could be made for the purpose would be to construct barracks at the different ports. The great obstacle which stands in the way of erecting such buildings at Portsmouth is that the must convenient site which is to be found there has already been appropriated to the use of the convicts; but some other, I have no doubt, may very well be selected. As to Devonport, I actually inserted in the Naval Estimates last year a sum of £25,000, for the purchase of land near Keyham, a portion of which I intended should be set apart for the erection of barracks. That sum, however, was, unfortunately struck out of the Estimates, in his great zeal for economy, by the right hon. Baronet opposite; but I would now urge upon him the expediency of providing cheap and comfortable lodgings for that force which the Manning Committee deem it desirable should be kept on shore. I perceive in the Estimates a sum of £25,000 for the purchase of land at Keyham, and therefore that the right hon. Gentleman now proposes to repair the error which he committed last year in omitting this sum from the Estimates. In every port we are cramped for room, while the adjoining land increases in value every year: and I hope the public will not lose very considerably by the Vote having been postponed even for one year. While speaking upon the subject of the number of men for the navy, I cannot help expressing my regret that the right lion. Baronet has omitted this year to make any reference to the Coast-guard. That force was, with the concurrence of the House, placed in 1856 under the control of the Admiralty, and my experience has led me to the conclusion that no more useful measure could have been adopted as a means of maintaining a valuable reserve for the navy, of men well trained and available for service at the shortest notice. There has never been any difficulty in maintaining the numbs of men voted by Parliament—the difficulty is how to raise men in the event of any sudden emergency, and the Coastguard are a twist valuable reserve for such a purpose. Of course it was not only undesirable but impossible to provide so large a number at once as 10,000 men, inasmuch as the greater portion ought to consist of seamen who have done duty for a certain period in the navy, and have been discharged with good characters on their ships being paid off. I therefore placed the number at 8,000 for 1856, and I placed it at 9,000 last year; and I certainly expected the right hon. Baronet would have asked for the full number this year. I regret, however, to find that there is no increase in the number of seamen in this force whether employed afloat or on shore, as compared with last year—that number being £7,400. [Sir JOHN PAKINGTON: There is an increase of £500 in the numbers borne afloat.] That is no answer to my observation that the whole number of seamen is not increased and, I am sorry the right hon. Baronet has not proposed an increase of 1,000 men in this most valuable branch of the service. Indeed, the Committee on Manning the Navy, recommended that the force should be raised to 12,000; but that is a recommendation which, for the reasons which I before stated, cannot at once be carried into execution. I may further observe that I last year inserted in the Estimates a Vote of £10,000 for the purpose of providing lodgings for the Coast-guard; but that the item was subsequently struck out by Her Majesty's Government. I am glad, however, to find that they have thought it right this year to rectify the omission, and have even increased the sun to £30,000, and I may, perhaps, add that it is obvious, that if the Coast-guard force is to be raised to the number of 10,000 or 12,000 men a larger extent of buildings will be required for its accommodation. As it is, the men are very poorly lodged, although some cottages on an improved plan, which I had approved, were in progress of construction. I do not know whether they are yet completed. Thus much for the Coast-guard. But the right hon. Baronet also omitted to make any allusion to the Naval Coast Volunteers. I have not yet read the evidence taken by the Commission on Manning the Navy on this subject; but from the Reports sent to me before I left the Admiralty, the force was in excellent condition. They had profited much by being called out for their twenty-eight days' training, and some of them have acquired a great competency in naval gunnery. Two hundred of these men put on board any line-of-battle ship, possessing, as they do, some acquaintance With a seafaring life, and fairly trained in the gull exercise would do good service. And then, it must be remembered they are men whom you can always lay your hands upon. Hardly any were missing when the muster was made in 1857, and I believe that considerably to increase the number of Naval Coast Volunteers would be a most politic measure. But this, again, is a resource which can only be gradually brought into play. I will not give any opinion as to the plan of the Commission for Manning the Navy, though it seems a very promising plan, because it would be premature to do so before seeing the evidence on which it is based. I think, however, that we have every reason to be indebted to the gentlemen who sat upon that Commission for the pains they have taken in examining into the subject, and I have no doubt that many of their suggestions will be found most valuable. Some of them, however, have been anticipated, and have to a certain extent been put into practice. I now come to the proposal of the right hon. Gentleman respecting the building of ships, and I am glad that he has had the wisdom to drop that wonderful expression by which we were startled at the commencement of the Session—"the reconstruction of the navy." In his proposal to increase the number of available ships I entirely concur—as to the extent, though not as to the mode of doing so. The right hon. Gentleman says that on assuming office he found the navy in a very bad state, as regards large vessels, though he does not blame the late Government. Now I cannot admit the assertion. During the war we employed all the shipwrights we could get at full wages and on full time, and if we did not do more it was because it was quite impossible. We also constructed a considerable number of vessels in private yards. That is a measure to which it is frequently necessary to have recourse in a moment of pressure, but it is almost always an expensive proceeding. It is impossible for shipbuilders to keep a large stock of seasoned timber of the scantling required on hand, and the consequence is that we hardly ever build to any great extent in merchant yards, without finding the vessels thus built subject to dry rot. The right hon. Gentleman said we added a considerable number of small vessels to the navy during the war. Of course we constructed the class of vessels which were wanted at the time. It would have been very absurd to build large ships for service in the Baltic, where they could not be used. In 1855–6, therefore, a large number of small vessels and gun-boats were added to the Navy in addition to mortar vessels. We built forty-two gun-boats in 1855, 108 in 1856, besides fifteen of a larger class in the former and five in the latter year. But the right hon. Gentleman speaks of the necessity of increasing the number of our line-of-battle ships. Now I think the number of these ships added to the navy of late years is not so small as he seems disposed to imply. Thus, six were added in 1853, eight in 1854, four in 1855, two in 1856, two in 1857, and in 1858, eight. But I am glad to find that the right hon. Gentleman has adopted the doctrine that it is necessary to have ships of a large size. That was the opinion I held, but I was always told that in building large vessels I was wasting the public money, and that I ought to build nothing but gun-boats. I rejoice to hear that the right hon. Gentleman is of a different opinion. No doubt it is necessary to have vessels of a small size for service on our shores, but of these we have at present an abundance. While the French have next to none, we possess from 160 to 200, and it is quite right, therefore, that the attention of the Admiralty should be directed to the construction of larger vessels. The right hon. Gentleman has truly stated that the necessity for this increased expenditure has become apparent, not of late years, but almost of late months; because two years ago a comparison drawn between the English and French navies was not so unfavourable to us as that which has now been presented. I have always said here that I was comparatively indifferent about the number of men to be Voted, but I have always warned the House that our fleet must be put into a proper state of efficiency by an adequate amount of building. This again, however, is a work of time, and I am sorry that the reductions made last year oblige us now to use greater exertions than would otherwise have been necessary. Last year, it may be remembered, the right hon. Gentleman attacked what he called my extravagant Estimates, and soon afterwards, when he came into office, proposed a reduction upon the amount which we had asked for. I warned him then that the time would come when he would repent of that reduction; but I was certainly not prepared for so early a repentance. However, I am glad the right hon. Gentleman has at last become aware that the reduction which he enforced was an impolitic one. The fact is that it is impossible to get up a fleet all at once. You can only build at a certain rate. Perhaps the best test of the extent of building is the amount of timber consumed; and I find that in 1853, 20,289 loads were used; in 1854, 29,651; in 1855, 34,944; in 1856 40,287; and in 1857, 30,167; that is to say, the building in our yards had increased 50 per cent. between 1853 and '57. As I said just now, we built in 1855 and '56, to the utmost extent possible with our establishments. The number of men on the establishment in our dockyards was in 1853, 9,621; in 1854 the right hon. Baronet (Sir J. Graham) increased it to 10,850; and in 1858 the number we proposed was 12,190 What the late Government did at the close of the war was to return to the ordinary system of day work in the yard. We struck off the extra hours and extra pay; and that I believe was the wise course. The Government however found that the establishment was not adequate to the work required, and they proposed, therefore, to add to the establishment in the Estimates of last year. The right hon. Gentleman opposite refused to adopt that suggestion, reduced the sum proposed for wages and continued the system of extra hours and extra pay. The right hon. Gentleman had quoted, not with more approbation than it deserved, the Report of the Committee presided over by Lord Seymour; but one of the recom- mendations contained in the Report of that Committee was to the effect that if objects of public policy required an increase of the means of building, it ought to be an increase of establishment, and that the system of extra pay ought not to be continued. The right hon. Gentleman, however, has not adopted the recommendation of the Committee. Even now, when the experience of last year had shown how much below the requirements of the service the labour in the dockyards was, the right hon. Gentleman still refuses to act on the recommendations of the Committee, and to increase the establishments. He thought that the right hon. Gentleman was in this respect pursuing an unwise and mischievous course. The difficulty of manning the fleet was well known, but the difficulty of fitting out a fleet was as great. During the whole of the last war the merchant builders gave such wages that not only the Government could nut get more shipwrights than they had, but many young shipwrights, who had not sufficient standing to be entitled to pensions, left the Government yards in order to work for private shipbuilders. Thus an increased number of shipwrights during war could not be depended upon; but on emergency the work might always be increased by employing the men on piece and task work. Therefore he maintained that it was of primary importance for the Government to keep in their own hands the power of increasing the amount of work done in the dockyards. lf, however, in time of peace, they employed the men in piece and task work, they were doing as much as possible to cut off that power of increasing the labour which it was so desirable to possess. Nothing could be more confused than the way in which its was proposed to provide the money for labour in the yards. He found that the ordinary wages of the artificers and others employed in the dockyards amounted to £680,000. Then there was a sum of £50,000 put down for extra time to established workmen and for hired artificers. Again, for earnings for the established workmen beyond day-pay, a sum of £131,000 was provided; and for wages of hired artificers another sum of £165,000 was required. All this was simply an increase of labour in the dockyards, but it was done in this confused and anomalous manner. He entirely agreed with the right hon. Gentleman that even when the Vote of £1,000,000 which he now proposed to take, and the additional half million which he proposed to take next year had been applied, the British navy will not have been brought up to the state in which it ought to be. He quite agreed that the best way of providing ships for the immediate demand of the service was by conversion in the way proposed by the right hon. Gentleman; but after the conversion of all the proposed ships the British navy would still not be as efficient as it ought to be. The right hon. Gentleman had condemned the block-ships en bloc, but no one ever maintained that they were ships for sea-going purposes. It would be utterly impossible for them to keep their places in line-of-battle, or to form part of a cruising squadron; but they were valuable ships for the defence of our coast, and were useful for raising men and training men and boys. The right hon. Gentleman had referred to two vessels, the Orlando and the Mersey, the construction of which he (Sir Charles Wood) ordered after the American model, He believed that both of them were exceedingly fine vessels, and lie maintained that this country ought not to allow other nations to have anything better than we possessed of any class or description of ships, otherwise we could not hold that maritime superiority which we ought to maintain in time of peace and in time of war. The inference be drew from all this was, that this country must, for some years to come, increase its building very considerably; and he did not think that the right hon. Gentleman was right in not making a considerable addition to the establishment of the dockyards. With regard to the steam machinery, last year, the right hon. Gentleman reduced the Vote by £50,000. He thought that at the time it was unjustifiable. The right hon. Gentleman now proposed to increase the Vote for steam machinery by £330,000. It appeared under two heads—one Vote of £250,000, and another of £335,000. This division seemed to be merely an attempt to blind the house, and he thought it would have been much better if it had appeared in one sum. In 1856 they voted £600,000 for steam machinery. In 1855 they voted £650,000. The two sums in this year's Estimates would make £585,000 less in amount than either of the sums he had mentioned, and might just as well have been stated together. The right hon. Gentleman really meant that it was necessary to increase the pur- chases of steam machinery, and should have stated it in a straightforward way. The same observations which he had made as to large frigates and line-of-battle ships applied to iron-eased vessels. It was not a proper arena for discussing the powers of ordnance and the different descriptions of guns which were being brought into use—they saw enough of those discussions in the newspapers—but everybody knew that the greatly-increased power of ordnance rendered it necessary that something should be done to meet it in some way or other. He did not believe that any opposition would be made to the Vote for the number of men, but he had felt bound to make these observations as to the mode in which it was proposed to spend the money in building. He thought the mode proposed by the right hon. Gentleman unwise. There was, of course, a temporary pressure and a demand for hired artificers, but he should have infinitely preferred to see a permanent addition to the establishment of the dockyards, because he believed that was the true policy with a view both to good and economical work.

SIR CHARLES NAPIER

said, that never within his experience, since he first had the honour of a seat in that House, had the Estimates been brought forward in so clear and distinct a manner as they had been by the right hon. Baronet that night. The right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty had told them, which was not usual, what had been done with the money voted last year, and what he was going to do with the money to be voted this year. And he certainly deserved the greatest credit for so doing. He should not follow the right hon. Gentleman in all his reasons for increasing the navy, because everybody knew that since we had changed the system of propulsion larger ships had been built, and that this involved the construction of larger docks. The price of building a sailing ship of war was about £1,000 per gun, and he believed he was right in saying that a steamship cost very nearly £2,000 per gun. With regard to the manning of the navy he perfectly concurred that the gentlemen on that Commission deserved the greatest credit for their report, which was a clear and statesmanlike paper, and if the Government only followed it up the means of manning the navy would be perfect. There was only one point in which he dissented from them, and that was in thinking they had not gone sufficiently far. In his evidence he recommended that superior pay should be given to the petty officers, in order to encourage seamen to look for that promotion. The pay of the first-class petty officers ought to be double the seamen's pay, and the second-class petty officers' half as much more as the seamen's; and he hoped, when the report was taken into consideration, he should be able to induce the House to adopt his views. The Commission had only done what the different Admiralty Boards might have done themselves, and he wanted to know what the First Lords of the Admiralty had been doing since 1815 to render the Commission necessary. The right hon. Gentleman had alluded to the folly of sending out admirals to foreign stations in sailing ships. He concurred in the view, but as yet we had not a sufficient number of steam vessels. It was necessary to keep what steam vessels we had at home, and, therefore, he could not blame proceding First Lords of the Admiralty for sending sailing ships to distant stations. He also concurred with the right hon. Gentleman that the block-ships were quite useless. The next question was, whether the 3,000 additional men asked for were enough in the present exigencies of the times. He said they were not. It was true, that 4,000 men were on their way home from China; but even that would not be enough. The right hon. Baronet estimated the Channel fleet at six sail-of-the-line; but if they sent one of the number away to America they surely could not reckon her in the number. The smallest number that we ought to have in the Channel at any time, especially at present, was ten sail-of-the-line, all good ships, and fully manned with the best seamen, putting on hoard of them only 100 marines, and making up their numbers by 100 able seamen; then in the event of a war they could turn over one watch, or half the crew, to ten other sail-of-the-line which they ought to have constantly ready for sea. This, by filling the crews with marine volunteers and landsmen, would give them twenty sail-of-the-line ready for sea at any moment within forty-eight hours. Then if they looked at the Coast-guard men and the Naval Volunteers, which he knew could only be used in case of emergency (he was supposing an emergency) this country might have thirty sail-of-the-line fully manned in the course of a fortnight. The next point to which the right hon. Baronet went was, the state of the Navy List. He proposed a new reserve list. But what was the use of that? It would only cost more money, and he hoped the House would not grant it. If more ad- mirals were induced to retire, the First Lord would only find it an excuse for more patronage. He knew that was the nature of them all. The great cause of the list being so heavy was the long war, and if, in 1815, the Admiralty had begun to reduce the list in a proper manner, there would have now been no ground of complaint. Their admirals were at present young enough. They had now admirals at forty, and they would soon have them at thirty-six. The captains and the commanders also were young men, and there was no need for another list of retirement. If the Admiralty would only leave the list alone, everything would come right in time. The right hon. Baronet next said that he required £1,300,000 for the increase of the navy during the present and the following year. He would advise the right hon. Baronet to look only to this year, and to let the next take care of itself. He might not be sitting there next year, and it might be wiser to leave his successors to provide for themselves. The right hon. Baronet also told them that when he came into office he found that the French navy was nearly equal to ours. Then why did he not come forward at once and say so, and charge his predecessor with having neglected his duty? The House would have cheered him from one end to the other, for he believed this country would never be safe till our navy was equal not only to that of France, but to that of France and Russia combined. But then he agreed with those hon. Gentlemen who said that the money was improperly spent. There was great wastefulness caused by all Admiralties. How could it be otherwise? Whenever a new man came into the Admiralty he chose his own admirals—good or bad, it was no matter, so long as they were of his own side in politics. He knew that system had been slacked of late, and there was one admiral, he believed, who had contrived to keep in place with three Administrations; but as a rule the old men were all displaced, and the new men were bent on finding fault with all their predecessors did, and engaged in new experiments. In 1852 some forty iron steamboats were built, with which, he believed, the right hon. Secretary to the Admiralty opposite (Mr. Corry) had something to do. Where were those iron boats now? Swept off from the face of the water, though not from the face of the earth. He did not say, but it was necessary to build iron-plated ships, now that France had built them; indeed as France had built two he would build three, but he did not think the experiment of shot upon iron had been fairly tried. Last year he had proposed that an experiment should be made to test the value of these theories, and he could not understand why the experiment should not be made now. Let the Admiralty take an old three decker that was not fit to be converted or cut down. Let them take another old three decker, cut her down to twenty heavy gags, and line her sides with thick iron. Then let the two ships be brought together, and let them be allowed to fire at each other. [Laughter.] Yes, but he would move the same crew from the one vessel to the other to fire the different broadsides. They would then see whether the three-decker, with 100 or 120 guns, would destroy the smaller ship—or the contrary. There was nothing ridiculous to laugh at in that. The Admiralty would then know what was necessary to be done, and the House of Commons would not grudge the money necessary for the experiment. He would now give the state of the navy at the present time. They had a Channel fleet of six, or, as he contended, of five sail-of the line, two frigates, four corvettes, and one gun vessel. Two more sail-of-the-line and two more frigates were fitting out. Then there was a line-of-battle ship at Cork, which he admitted ought to be added. This, with the line-of-battle ship gone to America, would make the Channel fleet consist of nine sail-of the-line. The first reserve consisted of seven line-of-battle ships, three frigates, five corvettes, three gun-vessels, and fifteen gun-boats. He maintained that this country, with her present naval force, was not in a safe condition. He was credibly informed that between Brest and Cherbourg France had twenty sail-of-the-line manned, and ready to be manned, The late First Lord of the Admiralty, when in office, admitted that the French had the means of manning a fleet and that we had not. France at this moment commanded the Channel; she also commanded the Mediterranean; and he said that was a position in which this country ought not to be placed. He did not in the least mean to abuse the Emperor of the French; he thought it was very bad taste to do so. The Emperor of the French had as good a right as we had to maintain a powerful fleet. He admired his spirit; but he also believed that we ought to exhibit the same quality. He did not mean to say that France was going to invade this country, but he meant to tell that house that France might, if she pleased, invade this country, but we ought to look sharp. She had an army of 600,000 men. She had 180 commercial steam vessels on her western coast, and in the Channel, and 150 commercial steam vessels in the Mediterranean; and it was perfectly evident that the French Emperor, by placing an embargo on those steamers in his own ports, might embark any number of men, and then land those men at Portland, where we had not a single gun, and where we had built a harbour ready to receive them. Let it be remembered that the French were more expert than we were in embarking and disembarking troops, and that they had had considerable experience in such operations in Algeria. He did not mean to say that Louis Napoleon was going to invade our shores; but he said that Louis Napoleon could do so if he pleased, and that was not the position which this country ought to be in. The Admiralty ought to have 10 sail-of-the-line in the Channel, and 10 more ready to go. They ought to have 9 more sail-of-the line ready to embark the Coastguard and volunteers, and these 30 sail-of-the-line would destroy any invading army. He did not wish to cause any alarm in France, but he wished to alarm the House and the country, for we were not in a state of safety. He hoped that France had no intention to invade this country, but if he were on the throne of France, and wished to invade us, he should do just what the Emperor Napoleon was doing. A discussion had taken place in the early part of that evening in reference to the threatened hostilities between France and Austria. But why should France attack Austria at all? Austria was armed to the teeth, and the probability was that she would beat France; but here in England we were not armed. What we wanted was a navy which should make us masters of the Channel. He had been told the other day by a Member of the Government that we had 103,000 men under arms, without including marines, pensioners, or the Irish constabulary. That was a satisfactory thing to know, but the numbers ought to be reversed—we ought to have 103,000 seamen and 50,000 soldiers. What we wanted was not to fight an invading army when they arrived, but to keep them off. It was better to fight the first battle afloat and not ashore. He did not believe that France had any such intention; at any rate he hoped she had not. It was admitted, however, by all naval officers, and he believed by the Government themselves, that France commanded the Channel, and if France should send her fleet to the chops of the Channel, she might destroy our West India, our East India and merchant and American trade, and ruin almost every banker in London. He said last year, and he would repeat it upon the present occasion, that if Russia and France were to unite against us the Queen's throne would not be worth six month's purchase. The right hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich had informed them that he proposed to build a number of new ships, and to lengthen a number of old ones; and he (Sir Charles Napier), wished he would at the same time lengthen the heads of the Lords of the Admiralty. The right hon. Baronet admitted that when he came to the Admiralty we had twenty-nine ships, and France had an equal number. But why would he not at once proceed to ensure to us a superiority? [Sir JOHN PACKINGTON: I heard that in July and I went to work in August.] It appeared that the right hon. Baronet had not gone to work until he had received three warnings from the Surveyor of the Navy. The right hon. Baronet, however, deserved, some credit because when he found how imperfect was the state of that great arm of our national defence he had come down to that House, and although it was then the closing portion of the Session, he had asked for a supplemental Vote. But if he had then stated that France was equal to us in naval power, and had proposed a much larger Vote, he (Sir Charles Napier) did not believe that a single Member would have opposed the Motion. It was said that the House was ready to vote men and ships, but was unwilling to grant the taxes necessary for obtaining them; but he felt persuaded that if a First Lord of the Admiralty were to declare that if a certain sum were refused to him he would resign his office, the House and the country would cheer him from one end to the other. The First Lord of the Admiralty was especially responsible for the safety of the country, and he should not hesitate to take the fullest precautions for fulfilling the duty thus imposed upon him. He (Sir Charles Napier) could not help attaching great blame to the late First Lord of the Admiralty (Sir Charles Wood), for the manlier in which he had discharged the crews of seven sail-of-the-line on their return to our shores. That was a most unfortunate and most costly operation. It shook the confidence of the men in the good faith of the Government, and it rendered it extremely difficult for us afterwards to get up a Channel fleet. Our naval position would at present be very different from what it was if the present First Lord of the Admiralty, at the period of his accession to office, had found a Channel fleet of seven sail-of-the-line already in existence. He trusted that the present head of the Admiralty would not content himself with merely adding two ships to that force, but would insist on having a Channel fleet with ten line-of-battle ships, and a reserve of ten more for the purpose of providing for the safety of our shores.

SIR JAMES ELPHINSTONE

said, he could not but express his satisfaction at the clear and business-like statement they had heard that night from the First Lord of the Admiralty. It was a pity that that statement had not been made a few years ago, when it was apparent that steam was becoming the great propelling power on the ocean, and it proposed to supersede our old and inefficient system, and to substitute a new one. He had the honour of having served on that Commission which had been referred to in such complimentary terms by all those hon. Members who had taken part in that discussion; and he could assure the House that they had given all the energy they possessed to the consideration of the momentous questions which had been submitted to them. Much credit was due to the right hon. Member for Oxford (Mr. Cardwell) for his effective services on the Committee, which had lately sat. It was necessary to put the navy on a fresh footing, and to do away with anomalies; but although much valuable information had been obtained, they required a statesman to put it in such a shape as to make it acceptable to the House. He hoped the Report would produce its effects, and that the character of the British seaman might be elevated. He trusted the Government would carry out some of the recommendations of the Report, and that the next generation of seamen might display an improvement upon their predecessors. The difficulty, however, was as to filling up the subordinate ranks, and his opinion was, that the status of men in this position ought to be improved; for, from his experience of the command of a ship, he could say that when subordinate officers had lost the fire and vigour of youth, they were no longer effi- cient for their duties. He was sure, at the same time, that the House would never leave the invaluable services of these men unrewarded. He would now come to the question of flag-ships on foreign stations. Thirty-eight years since he bad gone to India, and he had made a list of the various flag-ships that had been stationed in India, from which list it would appear that the Admiralty had changed their minds several times as to the proper description and dimensions of those vessels. Frigates should not be sent to tropical climates, because they were unwieldly and unwholesome. How could they be otherwise than unwholesome while 500 men had to sleep on the lower deck, which was not more than five feet high? Very frequently during the monsoons one-half of the ship's company were sick. Why should not the Admiralty send out to tropical climates some of those nine ships which were acknowledged to be inferior line-of-battle ships, having first made such alterations in them as would make them comfortable to the men? Their lower-deck guns might be taken out, and stowed away where they could be had if required. He could not concur in the remarks of the right hon. Baronet with respect to small vessels, because he believed they were at this moment the most inefficient portion of Her Majesty's navy. It was a common saying that the sun never set on Her Majesty's dominions. The work of Her colonial possessions could not be performed economically by any other than small vessels. The greater part of those possessions were in tropical climates, and the health of the men ought to be consulted. But the gun-boats were not suitable for that purpose. The vessels employed on that service should be of a high speed, small draught, and with good stowage for water and provisions, and sufficient accommodation for the men in hot climates. The gun-boats were deficient in these essentials, as anybody might see who looked down into the hold where thirty-eight men were crowded together; those gun-boats were worse coffins for the men than the old 10-gun brigs were, which used to go down with all hands on board, but were comfortable vessels while they were above water. When men Were compelled to pass night after night in a temperature of 100 degrees, amidst the foul exhalations of such a confined abode, they naturally contracted disease by which they were soon removed from the service. It was necessary that when we had got the ships that were wanted we should also have a place to put them. He hoped, therefore, that when we had got a good fleet, a respectable dock would be provided for it. He had been in all Her Majesty's ports except Pembroke, and he regretted to find that Her Majesty was worse provided with docks to fit Her ships than any mercantile company in Great Britain. Look at the exertions of private individuals in London, Liverpool, Hartlepool, Aberdeen, and various other places. They would find that in some of these places they had docks sufficient to accommodate fifty or sixty sail-of-the-line. It was true Her Majesty bad a dock at Keyham of about five or six acres, and a miserable dock at Portsmouth. But, with Cherbourg staring us in the face, we ought to have a basin fit to receive twenty-five sail-of-the-line at Portsmouth. There could be no difficulty whatever about the matter. For £150,000 we could excavate a basin of thirty acres, which would contain twenty-five or thirty sail-of-the-line. We could have barracks, a station-house, a naval college, and, in fact, an entire establishment contiguous to the present dockyards, and be able to fit ships as they were now fitted, and not as in the days of Captain Cook. So far back as the year 1780 the East India Company excavated their two large docks at Blackwall. It was time to put an end to that left-handed system of fitting our ships in the stream. He hoped the day would come when we could send a fleet out of a basin like a flock of ducks. He thought the hon. and gallant Admiral had borne rather hard on the First Lord of the Admiralty, for if it were true that it was not till July that he found out the state of the navy and commenced his improvements in August he must have looked pretty sharply about the matter.

MR. SIDNEY HERBERT

Sir, it is difficult to form an estimate of the sums mentioned by different speakers as being positively necessary to put all the departments of the navy in an efficient state. The hon. and gallant Member who has just sat down says that our ships should no longer ever be fitted on the stream, and that we should make basins to hold thirty sail-of-the-line. I do not think any Board of Admiralty has yet had the assurance to produce Estimates formed upon so profuse a scale as that; but if the hon. and gallant Gentleman had been in Parliament longer than he has, he would have observed that the temper of the house of Commons differs in these respects very much at different periods. I had the honour of holding the office of Secretary to the Admiralty, and had to move Estimates in this House for three or four years. At that time it was with the greatest difficulty that we could obtain Votes for works which are now admitted to be too small. At that time we had very few steamers in the navy. The whole thing was then in its infancy. Every vessel we built was an experiment. Everything was tentative. Nothing was ascertained. The result is that the vessels which we built and deemed efficient at the time are now very properly condemned as utterly ineffective. I do not yield, however, to all the criticisms which have been advanced against that period. For example, the hon. and gallant Admiral who spoke last but one talked of that fleet of forty sail of iron which was built by the Admiralty of that period, but which has since disappeared. I have frequently heard this charge made. Of course the charge becomes more aggravated year after year. At first it was said that the Board built a fleet of twenty sail; then it was said to consist of thirty, and this year it was said to be forty. Now, I will read to the Committee the list of these forty men of war. These are their names,—Simoom, Vulcan, Birkenhead, Megœera, and Triton. It is true that some small packets were built, but instead of forty, or even twenty men-of-war, real fighting ships, having been built, not more than five were built. And this further, I may say, that these five ships were built to serve as troop ships. So far from their having disappeared from the face of the water, I recollect the late First Lord of the Admiralty saying in his place that no ships had done better service in the war than they had in transporting troops from this country to the Crimea, and that the Admiralty actually bought nine more iron ships, of which the Himalaya was one, so convinced were they of the excellence of those five ships. [Sir CHARLES NAPIER was understood to say he had been so informed by the Secretary of the Admiralty.] I cannot help the gallant Admiral having received wrong information; what I wish to state now are the actual facts. An iron ship—the Nemesis—had been employed in China and India, and with no unfavourable results, though frequently struck by shot and frequently aground. Now, as to the conversion of sailing ships into steamers, it has been said, "What a pity no Admiralty in the last twenty years foresaw the necessity of the change, and at once turned all their frigates into screw steamers!" But twenty years ago the screw was scarcely in existence. But we had foresight enough to know that both frigates and liners must eventually become steamers, and we enlarged the dock at Portsmouth to admit them, for which we were much laughed at. We also commenced the great works at Keyham, which have since been condemned by a Committee upstairs; and when the Estimate for them was asked for there was some difficulty in getting the House to vote it. Yet, now it is acknowledged they have been of the greatest utility, and they are about to be enlarged. I have been tempted to make these remarks by what has fallen from the hon. and gallant Member for Portsmouth (Sir John Elphinstone). As to the Estimates of this evening, there can be no difficulty in the mind of any one. The sums required to put the navy in a state of efficiency will be voted cheerfully; as to the number of men, I believe if a larger force had been asked for it would not have been objected to. The Government, however, is the best judge of the state of public affairs, and what is the necessary strength of the navy. One thing only struck me—the number of vessels and men the First Lord of the Admiralty states are to be kept on the peace establishment in China. He requires there forty-seven vessels and 4,700 men. I doubted the policy of the Chinese war; there have been great rejoicings over its termination; but I shall begin to have doubts of the value of the terms obtained by the treaty of peace if they are of such a character as to require forty-seven ships of war and a body of 4,700 men to maintain them. I do not know how that treaty appears to those in authority, but to me it seems a treaty of peace with a casus belli in every clause; but I trust the force employed in those distant waters, which is so much abstracted from the means of defending our own shores, may be soon withdrawn from China, and that we may concentrate at home the large force the House will place at the disposal of Her-Majesty's Government.

MR. WHITBREAD

said, he felt there was a rapidly increasing desire on the part of the people to know more of the navy than they had done. He thought that what was most required was a knowledge of our own naval strength, as compared with that of other powers. The right hon. Baronet had that night told them what he had never expected to hear from a First Lord of the Admiralty, and what the country was by no means prepared to believe—namely, that it had been in the power of France during the past six months to send a fleet into the Channel superior in strength to any we could have sent to meet them. Though the right hon. Baronet stated that he received that information only in July he had had repeated warnings before that time, from the urgent letters of Sir Baldwin Walker, to look into the navy; had be done so our naval force would not be in the relative position to that of France in which it was now admitted to be. He must say that in his opinion the Admiralty had grossly neglected its duty. The right hon. Gentleman had given a statement of the relative strength of the English Navy as compared with that of France, but he had not given them any account of the relative state of readiness of the two navies. He understood there were four English line-of-battle ships in the Mediterranean, five in the Channel, and six frigates. He did not place the French force as high as the right hon. Baronet put it on his side, but he believed there were nine line-of-battle ships in Toulon harbour, which could be got ready for sea or for action in four days. If so, to provide a force to equal that, we should have to denude the Channel of every ship we had there. But then we should leave open Brest and Cherbourg, between which two ports France had twelve sail-of-the-line in a state of perfect readiness. Then, again, France had peculiar facilities for putting her ships to sea. The vessels at Brest and Cherbourg were kept half manned, but she could send over land in a few hours men from Toulon to fill up the full complement, and send them to sea in a perfect state of efficiency. He reminded the House that if an attack should ever come from France it would be without previous warning—swift in execution; and unless we were better prepared than it was now confessed we were, the result would be most disastrous. We must not suppose that, because we did not see a large French fleet at sea, that therefore she had not a large naval force at her disposal. Her policy was to keep her ships in port till they were required, and then to send them forth on the instant. The information as to the steam reserve was not satisfactory; he presumed it was to be divided between Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Sheerness. At Sheerness we had the Royal George, the Colossus, and the Cressy; but, recollecting the effect of the Medway water in accumulating mud, weeds, and shells on ships' bottoms, it was more than probable that ships which had lain there any length of time would have to be docked before going to sea. The steam-basin at Sheerness could only be opened three days in a fortnight at spring tides, and it was only then that one vessel could get in or out, and if there was a breeze they could not get out at all; and yet this was our great eastern arsenal for watching the North Sea and checking the growing fleet of Russia. He would ask any hon. Gentleman who had been at Portsmouth or Plymouth whether those places did not look more like hospitals for old disabled ships than anything else. He did not say this neglect was the fault of the Admiralty, but of the system. All past Boards, however, had been at fault in not coming to that House for the means of keeping in hand a really efficient naval force. It was this neglect that had brought us to the sad and disgraceful position that we were unprepared to meet the only nation that could rival us on the water. There was nothing the country committed so implicitly to the care of Parliament as the navy; and there was nothing that Parliament had so blindly committed to the care of the Government in the person of the First Lord of the Admiralty as that very navy. But if there was one word of truth in the statement put forth by the First Lord that night as to the naval strength of our nearest neighbour it was high time for Parliament itself to look to the interests of the navy with a jealous eye.

ADMIRAL WALCOTT

One of our greatest statesmen, who sacrificed his life in devotion to his country, professed his was a magnanimous fear, lest the navy of England should ever sink below her emergencies. I join with the gallant Admiral (Sir C. Napier) in enforcing the condition of the fleet as an object of constant solicitude to every Government to be ever maintained in the highest state of efficiency; but I do not share his boiling anticipations. If my heart did misgive me, I would command my countenance, and endeavour to inspire confidence. I may find a more definite instruc- tion and a nigh equal numerical strength in a foreign navy, but I find my compensation on comparing our relative resources. I will maintain that we can command the Channel by our fleet, and along our coast is a permanent guard of 7,500 of efficient seamen of the Coast-guard Service. The merchant navy consists of 180,000, all men with bold hearts and willing arms. What on earth, then, occasions alarm to honourable Gentlemen? It appears to me they want a little spirit to be infused into them. An invasion is it that we anticipate? the Spanish Armada could not achieve it; the Dutch under Van Tromp and De Ruyter could not achieve it; the Conqueror of Austerlitz could not achieve it, with his tremendous demonstration, and but twenty miles of sea between his camp and the cliffs of Folkestone. I may be told the power of steam did not on those occasions befriend them; but this will equally apply in our favour. Sir, our strength lies in an island home, of which only a power that is master of the whole sea can deprive us. No; I have no apprehension of invasion; on every field, if such were to occur, would appear an English Joan of Arc; along every battlement, an English Maid of Saragossa; down to the merest stripling, England would be equal to the crisis; the enemy would have kindled the fire, and its blaze would darken him for ever. Yet, I admit, that it is a question widely debated, whether, in proportion to the augmentation of Continental fleets, and the great and extraordinary changes which have taken place in the nature of armaments—to the substitution of steam power for sails—to the increased opportunities afforded for effecting an invasion of our shores, we have redoubled our provisions for safety, adequately guarded against every possible risk which could endanger our national security and independence. It was with this object in view that at the commencement of every Session, for several years, I have endeavoured to impress each First Lord of the Admiralty with the importance of the immediate establishment of a fleet of not less than twelve sail-of-the-line; this force to be kept permanently on constant active service in the Channel, or within ready communication with officers and ship's companies of thorough seamen, effectively as numerically sufficient, by the addition of landsmen, to equip within a week, a fleet of double that number, and this, irrespective of frigates and small vessels; for the most magnificent ship is but an idle boast, unless she lives from stem to stern, animated by the presence of the practical officer, and a crew of zeal and efficiency. To secure this indispensable ingredient of a navy is impossible, unless you assure of due and certain reward the meritorious officer, and regard as sacred the promises you make our seamen to become as pledges, in return of his earnest discharge of his part of our mutual compact. It is obvious to every man of common sense and common observation, that with our insular position and mercantile character, the vast extent of our commerce, and the dispersion and remoteness of our most valuable Colonies and dependencies, the command of the seas is necessary, nay, vital, to the existence of national honour and security. Now, what is the condition of a considerable portion of our ships? In the Medway, in Hamoaze, in Portsmouth harbour lie an incredible number of vessels in ordinary, decaying piecemeal at their moorings, every day of less value, yet every year kept in order, and ventilated, at a large and increasing expenditure; with these incumbrances, only formidable on paper, and giving a delusive appearance of strength to the aggregate of the Navy List. For the same reason I hope to see in future Estimates the accounts of building and repairs of ships kept separate, to enable thereby every man of judgment to estimate the value of the outlay under either head of expenditure. At a period when science is making fresh advances hitherto unexampled, no caution can be too great, in a timely consideration, to the construction of our ships before they are commenced; economy and retrenchment must be employed in careful forethought before incurring expense, and only as they are compatible with the integrity of the national defences. Now, as regards the men, our gunnery practice has, of late years, reached a point of high perfection, but I am inclined to believe the number of perfectly practical seamen gunners, sent from the Excellent, does not exceed 2,500 to 3,000, far inferior to our requirements, for every gun in a ship requires one such man. Again, the landsman is only by long experience ripened into the seaman. What will secure the seamen we already possess, and entice others? why, these three points—encouragement to a continuous service; incentive to emulation; advance in pay commensurate with the man's increase in science, and liberal pension at the expiration of his time of service. By our past indiscriminating and irrational treatment of the indifferent and deserving seamen alike, we are suffering under a languid supply. And there is another cause—you must retrace your old policy; you must not with time, toil, and cost, convert the landsman into a good seaman and gunner, and then dismiss him on the quay of Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Chatham, unbefriended and uncared for, to carry his energy, vigour and proficiency to another country, and a kindlier flag. I fear no panic or ignoble fear, but I cannot allow a blind or false confidence, an alarming supineness to continue. I wish to see the feverish agitation on the public mind calmed; time to mature our preparations, antecedent to the pressure of an emergency. I ask the capacity of our resistance to any enemy should cease to be matter of debate; it presses itself irresistibly on the minds of all; it is superior in magnitude to any other object of public attention; it involves the interests and destinies of all Europe. In former days, not a fleet issued from a hostile port that did not supply fresh laurels to the British navy when she fought single-handed. We must be prepared in a similar way. I am quite sure that the attitude of preparation will convert apprehension of danger into a solid peace. Under the vigilant eyes of the House, the means which it places in the hands of the Government will be employed in a manner deserving the cordial support which Parliament affords, and the enthusiastic unanimity of all classes of the people, which is its sanction.

MR. H. BERKELEY

said, he would beg to call the attention of the First Lord of the Admiralty to the expediency of fitting out our ships with an adequate equipment of the most improved small arms, to enable them to cope with the American and other foreign navies. He understood that the breech-loading rifles, which were so universally adopted in the American navy, had been rejected at the Admiralty. He contended that this rifle would be of invaluable assistance in boat service.

MR. BENTINCK

said, he could not but join in the eulogium that had been passed on the extreme frankness which had characterized the statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty. The full and fair manner in which he had pointed out existing deficiencies was the best step that could be taken towards providing a remedy for them. His statement was not satisfactory, however, in one particular. The right hon. Gentleman stated that he had done his best to obtain an efficient Channel squadron, and that it would consist of a certain number of ships. Now, it would have been much more satisfactory if the right hon. Baronet had been able to tell the Committee that it really did consist of that number. The only remedy for the deficiencies in our naval defences was to commission those ships which could be got first ready. Men enough could be found to man them, and money was not wanting for such a purpose. During the whole of the debate that evening they had been beating about the bush, and had never come to the root of the evil. He contended that so long as the present constitution of the Board of Admiralty continued it was impossible that there could be an efficient and economical system of administration of the naval affairs of this country. In so saying, he did not for a moment mean to reflect on either his right hon. Friend the present First Lord, or the head of the department under any former Government; but still he held that the very constitution of the Board rendered it impossible to have an efficient department so long as they placed a civilian at the head of it, and that civilian a Member of a Government, subject, as all Governments were, to political vicissitudes. The argument against the appointment of a naval First Lord was that professional men were prejudiced and bigoted, and that they would be attached too strongly to petty details. Now he did not believe that the prejudices of professional men were likely to be stronger than those of a political First Lord. It was said, however, that a civilian First Lord was assisted by the naval Lords under him; but that was a most objectionable system, for it gave the naval Lords the power without the responsibility which ought to attach to their conduct. Some of these observations applied to a civilian Secretary, though he was glad to have an opportunity of stating that his right hon. Friend (Mr. Corry) the present Secretary, who had held that office, and also that of a Lord of the Admiralty in former years, was an honourable exception, and that his zeal, ability, and intelligence in that department of the public service were appreciated in the highest manner both in that House and in the dockyards. The object in having a naval First Lord would be that he would have a practical knowledge of the subjects with which he would have to deal; but under the existing system they chose one to fill the office who was not a naval man, and as soon as he began to learn his business they turned him out. The enormous expenditure during the last few years, with so little to show for it, was, to a considerable extent, referable to the system of perpetual change in the department. He considered also that the arrangement under which all the patronage of the Admiralty was left at the disposal of a Member of the Cabinet was objectionable. Could there, he asked, be a stronger condemnation of the existing constitution of the Admiralty than that they should be compelled to resort to a Royal Commission to tell them how the navy of England ought to be manned? It was a complete admission of their incompetency to deal with the subject. He repeated he was not blaming the present or any other members of the Board; but he, nevertheless, contended that that Royal Commission was a proof that when a great emergency arose the department was compelled to have recourse to extraneous assistance, and he thought there was something fundamentally wrong and unsound in it.

MR. LINDSAY

said, he had intended to make a few observations on this important subject, but in consequence of the lateness of the hour (twelve o'clock) he must defer what he had to say to another opportunity. But, allusion having been made to the Commission for manning the Navy, he thought it necessary in justice to himself to trouble the House with a word or two in explanation. He was informed that a question had been asked on a previous evening with regard to the dissent which he had thought it necessary to express to the opinions of his colleagues on the Committee. He noticed also that a similar question bad been asked in "another place," and that the answer was that his dissent would be laid on the table as soon as it was ready. Now it was on that point that he wished to offer a few words of explanation. The House might think that the fault lay with him, but he begged to state that it was then twelve days since he had considered it his duty to dissent from the opinion of his colleagues. He had not dissented from that Report without great regret, nor had he declined to sign it until he had fortified himself with the opinions of able men of various political parties, and different orders of mind, who had concurred in the soundness of the principles which he wished to see laid down. When he declined to sign the Re- port he understood that it was the unanimous wish of the noble Chairman and of the other members of the Commission that he should send in the reasons of his dissent as speedily as possible, in order that they might be laid upon the table of the House at the same time as the Report. At great personal inconvenience he prepared a statement of those reasons in three days, and addressed them, in the form of a letter, to the Chairman. On the following day he received a proof copy, which he returned corrected the day afterwards. It was now eight days since he had handed it complete to the noble Chairman. It followed, therefore, that if his reasons for dissent had not been laid on the table, and if the House was ignorant of its contents, he thought it only due to himself to say, that the fault did not lie with him.

SIR FRANCIS BARING

said, he must decline to enter into a discussion as to the manning of the navy until the evidence taken before the Commission and the letter referred to by the hon. Member who spoke last was before the House; nor would he enter into the vexed question as to whether or not it was desirable to have a naval First Lord, which might more appropriately be raised when they came to the Vote for the Admiralty; but he would remind the hon. Member for West Norfolk (Mr. Bentinck) that when the Russian war broke out the navy, under the management of that very inefficient Board, was in as good condition and as ready to meet the enemy as was either the army or the ordnance. The hon. Member had expressed an opinion that the Admiralty were incapable of performing their duty because they had referred the manning of the navy to a Commission. Commissions were at the present moment sitting to consider matters connected with the army, and yet he would express his opinion that that did not at all prove that the gallant General the Secretary for War and the noble Duke the Commander-in-Chief were incapable of directing military affairs. The Vote now under consideration was that of the number of men, and both that and the number of ships were matters of which the Government were so much the best judges, from possessing greater information as to our relations with other countries than was enjoyed by other hon. Members, that even bad the numbers asked for been greater than they were, he should not have been disposed to refuse them. He was quite of opinion that it was our duty to keep ahead of all foreign navies; and, although it was possible that the great steel ships might not answer all the expectations which were entertained with regard to them, still we ought not to lose the advantage of any possible success by which their construction might be attended. All this would cost a great deal of money, and he was afraid that the expense would not be temporary, but would have to be continued over more years than the present. He did not say that as a reason for refusing the money which was asked for, but extravagance was not efficiency any more than stinginess was economy, and he thought that they were bound to a certain extent to inquire into the expenditure which was going on. The proposition which was sought to be made by the hon. Member for Lambeth (Mr. W. Williams) to suspend these Votes until a Committee had made its report was open to grave objections; but he thought it would be a great advantage if our naval expenditure were referred to a Committee up stairs. The subject was too large and complicated to be adequately discussed in a Committee of the whole House, but might be properly dealt with by such a Select Committee. The Report of that Committee which sat in 1848 was extremely valuable, and had been of great service, not only to the First Lord, who they were informed knew nothing, but also to the naval members of the Board and to the officers of the Admiralty themselves. Since then, however, everything had been changed, and there was now a necessity for renewed investigation. The right hon. Gentleman had referred to the confusion and difficulty which he said existed in the present Navy Lists. The confusion had, he thought, been greatly exaggerated, and might be removed by the consolidation of the orders; but he admitted that there was the greatest difficulty in dealing with the different lists of officers. He hoped the right hon. Baronet would reconsider his plan as to the compulsory retirement of officers at a certain age, which he thought would not conduce to economy, and must cause much unnecessary pain to deserving men.

ADMIRAL DUNCOMBE

said, he would say one word in favour of paying greater attention to the training-ships for boys, as he believed that on them we would ultimately have to rely for manning the navy.

SIR GEORGE PECHELL

said, he must deprecate the alarm sought to be created by an honourable and gallant Admiral opposite (Sir C. Napier) as to the Channel being in the possession of our neighbours. It was not from any feeling of alarm, but from a wish to render the navy efficient, that an increased Vote was demanded. He believed that seamen were not unwilling to enter, but they would not enter a lare experimental ship, where they had no rest. If the hon. Baronet carried out the recommendations of the Commission, with some few exceptions, as regarded the Naval Coast Volunteers, he believed that there would be no difficulty in manning the navy.

SIR JOHN PAKINGTON

said, he wished to say a few words in explanation; and, first, be begged to thank the Committee for the manner in which the discussion had been conducted; but he was sorry that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Halifax (Sir Charles Wood) had thought proper to deviate from the tone which had distinguished the general discussion, and thrown into it that party spirit which was extremely out of place in a discussion which so deeply affected the whole country. It was quite true that no increase in the Coast-guard was proposed, but the number serving afloat was increased 4,000 men. He (Sir John Pakington) had never said that the Estimates of the late Government were extravagant, but had said they were large, and that he required time to consider them. The right hon. Baronet had harped upon the word "reconstruction," but surely that was the proper term for a change which commenced with the introduction of the screw propeller into our war navy. The Government were not open to this sort of minute and not very worthy criticism, and he maintained they were at liberty to use the word "reconstruction" when, by proposing in one year to add twenty-six men-of-war to the navy, they were making such a step in reconstruction as had not been attempted by any former Administration. The hon. and gallant Member for Southwark had attributed to him words to the effect that the French had command of the Channel. He disclaimed any such idea, and he should be sorry, indeed, as a Minister of the Crown, to be reduced to the necessity of making a statement so inconsistent not only with the reputation of England, but with what he believed to be the fact. The hon. Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread) had said that there were nine sail-of-the-line ready to be fitted out from Toulon at any moment. How did that prove that France had the command of the Channel when he could state as a fact that we had a force ready and at hand of a very superior character? We had seven line-of-battle ships in commission; we had four frigates, and there would soon be six, and we had in our harbours three steam guard-ships fully rigged and equipped, and only wanting men to be able to put to sea. Besides, we had four line-of-battle ships of the first class in reserve, and the theory, and he believed the practice was, that vessels in that condition could be made ready for sea in forty-eight hours. With such a force actually available at the present moment, he thought it was too bad for hon. Gentlemen to rise in their places and say that France had command of the Channel. The right hon. Member for South Wilts (Mr. S. Herbert) had asked a question relative to the China force. Although, in stating the proposals of the Government to the House, he had truly said that forty-seven vessels with 4,700 men remained in China, he never stated that that was to be the permanent force on that station. It was the whole force for the East Indian station, which included India, China, and Australia; and although there were forty-seven vessels remaining in China, it should be remembered that nineteen were gun-boats, the very smallest class of ships. It was true, as stated by the hon. Member for Bedford, that the Government received a remonstrance from the Surveyor of the Navy that they should exert themselves to place our line-of-battle ships on a more satisfactory footing than that in which they found them. That remonstrance was received immediately after the change of Ministry last year. A second was received in May, and instead of doing nothing, as stated by the hon. Member for Bedford, the Government immediately afterwards proceeded to provide a proper Channel squadron. It was in July that they ascertained the state of the French navy—why it had not been ascertained by the former Government had not yet been explained—and in August they took steps to provide a remedy by ordering the conversion of four line-of-battle ships. He might state, in answer to the hon. Member for Bristol (Mr. H. Berkeley) that the Admiralty had given orders for a supply of breech-loading rifles, for it was their determination to put into the hands of our [seamen the most efficient arm that could be found. In conclusion, he must again thank the House for the favourable reception they had accorded to the proposals which, on the part of the Government, he had submitted for their consideration.

SIR CHARLES NAPIER

said, he wished to add a few words in vindication of his statement that France had command of the Channel and the Mediterranean. The fact was that the right hon. Baronet had included in his available naval force a ship which was at present many miles away. The right hon. Baronet had forgotten to mention the time that it would take to man the ships that were not manned at present. The two ships in commission were not manned yet, and he estimated that it would take six weeks or two months before they were manned. When he said that France had the command of the Channel he meant that the reason was, that by their system of conscription and inscription they could man their ships so much sooner than we could. When the right hon. Baronet showed him that he could man his ships as speedily as the French ones were manned, then he would withdraw the observations he had made, but not till then. France had twenty sail-of-the-line at Brest and Cherbourg, and those ships could be manned in a day or two. So in the case of the Mediterranean. We had four sailof-the-line there, but the French had ten at Toulon, and, therefore, he contended they had command of the Mediterranean as well as the Channel.

SIR CHARLES WOOD

said, he must adhere to his statement, after having examined the Estimates for the present year, that the number of seamen employed on the Coast-guard had been increased by twenty and no more.

MR. W. WILLIAMS

said, he wished to ask when it was proposed to bring on the Navy Estimates again?

SIR JOHN PAKINGTON

said, that he could not, in the absence of his right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer give a decided answer to the question. He might, however, state that they would certainly not come on before Friday next.

Vote agreed to; as was also

(2.) £2,487,062 Wages, to defray the expenses of the Wages of Seamen and Marines.

Resolutions to be Reported on Monday next.

Committee to sit again on Monday next.