ADDRESS MOVED.

HC Deb 04 May 1858 vol 150 cc44-106

MR. GLADSTONE

Sir, I am not in the habit of troubling the House with Motions upon questions relating to our foreign policy, and if upon this occasion I depart from that rule, I do so under the double conviction that the subject to which I am about to invite your attention, is one of the utmost interest and importance; and, on the other hand, that the time is urgent, the danger arising from possible miscarriage great; in short, that if the House does not direct its attention to the question now, while the opportunity is yet open to it to do so, we may have cause to rue our neglect, and may hereafter feel ourselves, in consequence, involved in heavy responsibilities. I trust it will not be said upon this occasion, as it has so often been said with reference to questions of foreign policy, that the House had better not interfere on the subject which I am about to bring under its consideration. We sometimes bear speeches made within these walls which treat the whole question of our foreign relations as if they were something too sacred for the touch of Parliament. There is a sort of general warning off issued, in such cases to the House of Commons, and we are led to suppose at one time that it is too soon for us to express a judgment upon the position which we may happen to occupy in reference to a foreign State, while at another time we are told that the point at issue has been brought to a conclusion, that we are too late to attain the object which we may have in view, and that all that remains to us is to pass a vote of censure on the Minister, should we deem his conduct open to reprobation. I trust, however, that I am not upon the present occasion obnoxious to any charge for inviting the House of Commons to take cognizance of the question of the Danubian Principalities, inasmuch as that which I am about to ask the House to do is not to dictate to the Executive Government in regard to a policy in reference to which no authoritative course has been marked out. It is, on the contrary, to beg them to recognize the communications which have been made to us, in the most formal manner, by the Executive Government, and to obtain their judgment upon the tone and propriety of those communications. It will be seen, I hope, as I proceed, that I am able to make good this proposition, that this is a matter strictly within the province of Parliament, and I am convinced if the House will give its attention to the subject it will also come to view it as a matter which deeply touches the principles of European policy, of public faith, and which deals with questions nearly and vitally touching the happiness of millions of our fellow creatures. Now, Sir, the propriety of the Address which I am about to propose, perhaps requires some verbal explanations. In the first of the two paragraphs of that Address it is proposed that we should acquaint Her Majesty with our acceptance and approval of the policy in respect of the Danubian Principalities which was announced by the Government in 1856. In the second paragraph, going a step further, I propose to the House that we should express our wish in general terms that due weight and consideration may be given to the wishes which the people of the Principalities have expressed through their representatives, elected in conformity with the provisions of the treaty of Paris. The general effect of the Address is, that it will express the opinion of the House of Commons—not an original opinion, but one seconding the judgment of the Executive Government—announced two years ago in favour of what is called the union of the Danubian Principalities. Now, Sir, for the reasons why we should take a step of that kind. The first reason I have to submit to the House in support of this Motion is, that the union is the wish of almost the entire population of the Principalities. That is a fact which bears greatly upon this question; it is a fact which has become more and more conspicuous as time has proceeded. It is a fact deeply rooted in the history of these Principalities, and that history is one that gives them every claim to the attention of Parliament. The people are men attached to the religion which we profess; they are men attached to the liberty which we cherish; they are men who have suffered during a long course of years in consequence of the ambitious policy of aggrandizing neighbours; they are men whose interests, by the treaty of Paris, we have bound ourselves to consider and to promote; they are men in whose grateful attachment we may hope to receive the reward for our labours. I need scarcely, under these circumstances, add that these men inhabit a country with which our commercial relations have, even under a bad system of government, attained to great importance, and which would probably, under a better system, attain to much greater importance. Now, Sir, let there be no question or dispute in this House as to the desire of the people of the Principalities that those two countries should be united. The Principalities, as the House is well aware, are those territories on the Danube called Wallachia and Moldavia. They are relics of a territory that was once considerably larger, inhabited by that old Dacian race which in former times was the terror of the Roman empire, and which afterwards, having received a strong tinge of Roman civilization, in no way departed from its ancient military fame, so that, at the time when the flood of Turkish conquest set in from the East, this people, and this people almost alone, by their own good swords and their own stout hearts and arms, were able to vindicate their liberty. In times of darkness, of oppression, of blood, of misery and crime, almost unequalled in the annals of mankind—in those times the people of the Principalities vindicated their own freedom; and that freedom they enjoyed up to a period comparatively recent, when they, their rights, and interests came to be bandied to and fro between the contending claims and intrigues of Austria, of Russia, and of Turkey. What says Sir John M'Neill. Writing in 1853, he tells you this in a summary way:— During the last eighty-five years they have been occupied—for more than thirty by Muscovite myrmidons, and have been the battle-field of the Russian and the Turk in not loss than twenty campaigns. And by the struggle you made, and justly made, for the independence of Europe, what, did you do for them. Unfortunately, the struggle increased the miseries of this people. The Emperor of Russia played his old game, but not with his ancient skill, when he was, as we justly say in a political sense, about to inflict injury upon Turkey—an injury which was inflicted by the invasion of the Principalities. No doubt, politically, that was an injury to Turkey; but the political injury to Turkey must not lead us to forget the deep suffering, the degradation, and the misery caused by a frightful military invasion, which did not fall upon Turkey, but upon the people of those unhappy Principalities; those people who fought for and won freedom for themselves; who held that freedom during a long course of centuries; and whose freedom has only been impaired, and to a great extent lost, since the time when Russia began to extend her dominions, and, for her own ends, chose to back up the claims of Turkey over the Principalities, in order that she might afterwards obtain them from Turkey by insidious negotiations for herself. I say the union of the Principalities is the ardent desire of the people of those territories. I fun anxious to make good that proposition, because, although it is not conclusive upon the question, yet I speak in the British House of Commons—I speak in that assembly to which, I will not say alone, but to which almost alone, every lover of liberty in the world has now to look for the vindication of his rights—and I implore the House of Commons to do full justice to the wishes, to the rights and interests of these people, if those interests be compatible with justice and the welfare of Europe. Now, Sir, let me quote an authority upon this subject, which appears to me to be entirely beyond dispute. It is from a document of the utmost importance, because it carries with it not only the assent of the people and the authorities of the Principalities, but also the assent of the suzerain power—namely, the Sultan of Turkey. The date of the document is 1834. It has no relation to the recent struggle in the East. The case for the union has been infinitely strengthened since then; but in 1834, in that instrument called the Reglement Organique, and which is upheld by the sanction of a hatti-scheriff, the union of the Principalities received the sanction of the ruling Power itself:— The origin, the religion, the usages, and the conformity of tongue among the inhabitants of the two Principalities, no less than their common wants, involve from of old the elements of an intimate union, which has been hampered and retarded by accidental and secondary circumstances. The advantages and salutary consequences resulting from the union of those two peoples cannot be brought into doubt. That, Sir, I say is a public authoritative document recognized as a part of the public law of the Principalities, and having the assent of the Sultan of Turkey. It is of course natural that the repeated and aggravated sufferings of the people of Wallachia and Moldavia since that time should have increased that sentiment. The Russian occupation was well calculated to give it still greater force, and when the Russian occupation ended, I am sorry to say that the public necessities of Europe obliged us to acquiesce in the substitution for it of what I believe was a still heavier infliction—an occupation by an Austrian army. There is something in the thing itself and something in the manner of doing it, and the Austrian army has the unenviable reputation of placing in the most odious form those circumstances which must always be afflicting enough to the hearts and spirits of a people who cherish a love of freedom. It was natural, therefore, that the people of the Principalities should rejoice at the interest which was taken in their condition by the Powers of Europe both during the negotiations which preceded the war, and likewise during the negotiations that were instituted for a peace. I believe I am correct in stating that when the Plenipotentiaries assembled at Vienna in 1855 there was submitted to them, through the medium of the French Plenipotentiary, evidence which demonstrated clearly, as he considered, the desire of the people for a union of the Principalities. But it is not to that meeting that I refer as constituting a declaration of the European Powers to which I now ask this House to give its adhesion. Those negotiations failed; they were resumed in 1856, and then it was that the question took the form which ought, I think, to be decisive as to its ultimate issue. In the sixth protocol of the Conference of Paris in 1856 the views of the different Powers are fully explained, and, although I shall endeavour to avoid wearying the House by a reference to documents, yet this one record of the proceedings at Paris in 1856 is so vital in its bearing on the question that I hope the House will permit me to refer to it, as it will put them, not in very full, but at the same time in sufficiently accurate possession of what occurred. In the sixth protocol we are made acquainted with the discussion which took place at Paris on the union of the Principalities. There were assembled at that period the representatives of six or seven Powers who gave their several judgments; but out of those Powers there were many whose judgments, though they might be important with reference to the knowledge which the parties giving them possessed, should carry little weight of moral authority, inasmuch as they had cross interests of their own, which made them bad judges of the interests of the Principalities. I am not about to hold that the view of Russia on the question of the union should be safely taken as a guide and authority. Still less could the judgment of Austria be taken as a guide and authority. Both Austria and Russia. are in the condition of holding and enjoying territory that was once part and parcel of the territory of Moldavia. They stand, therefore, in a false position towards the Principalities, for each of them may well be suspected of a desire to extend their influence in that direction. But Austria is, if possible, in a position more false, than Russia, and for this reason. Russia, whatever else she may be, is an empire compacted by an organization of wonderful and extraordinary strength, and I do not know that there is anything in their condition that need make her particuliarly afraid of seeing the Principalities free and flourishing on her boundaries; but Austria, on the other hand, is as ill-compacted and hangs as loosely together as Russia is firm in her tissues, and the position of Austria in her own dominions is not owing to her own power to hold them, but to the military aid that she received from the Emperor of Russia. In that state, combining absolute Government in the most rigid form with the extreme of internal weakness, it is natural that Austria should view with the utmost jealousy anything that tends to give freedom, vitality, and strength to her neighbours on the Danube. It is impossible to blame her On that account; but it is probable, it is natural, it is reasonable and right that we, at least, should beware of being drawn into her policy, and should view with suspicion and jealousy the policy she may recommend with regard to what is good for the people of the Principalities. Well, there were, in fact, but three Powers in the assembly at Paris to whose judgment we can assign great moral weight. It is impossible to assign great moral weight to the judgment of Turkey, because it is natural enough that selfish motives should make her a bad judge in her own case, But France, England, and Sardinia—the last of secondary consideration, but perhaps equally to be trusted as an impartial State—but, I say, there were the two great Powers of France and England whose judgment was sure to carry with it the mass of European opinion. That judgment was not wanting. The French Plenipotentiary introduced the subject. When the Congress proceeded to the examination of the propositions relative to the organization of the Principalities, Count Walewski gave his judgment thus:— Before touching on this important point of the negotiation it is indispensable to deliberate on a question which is or paramount importance, and on the solution of which must necessarily depend the further labours of the Congress on that subject; tide question is, whether Moldavia and Wallachia shall henceforth be united in one single Principality, or whether they shall continue to possess a separate Administration. The first Plenipotentiary of France conceives that, as the union of the two provinces satisfies the requirements brought to light by an attentive investigation into their true interests, the Congress should admit and proclaim it. Thus France, taking the initiative, delivered her judgment in the clearest terms. England followed in the same path. The Earl of Clarendon, speaking for himself, for his Government, for Parliament, and for England, expressed himself in these terms:— The first Plenipotentiary of Great Britain shares in and supports this opinion, relying especially on the utility and expediency of taking into serious consideration the wishes of the people, which it is always right, he adds, to take into account. In these words it is obvious that the Eari of Clarendon referred either to the statute of 1834, or to the evidence which had been produced by the French Plenipotentiaries at Vienna, in proof of the desire of the people of the Principalities for the union of the two provinces. The other Powers gave their judgments. Sardinia supported the views of France and England. Austria opposed them, and declared that she did not believe that the people of the Principalities did wish for the union. Turkey likewise declared that it was quite a mistake to suppose that the people of the Principalities desired the union. The Russian Plenipotentiary, with very considerable tact, reserved the expression of his opinion until everybody else had spoken. It is impossible too highly to compliment the sagacity with which he acted. It was dangerous for Russia to support the union, if the union was going to be carried; but if there was going to be a set opposition to it, it was desirable for her to support it, for she would thereby gain the credit with the people of the Principalities of being their friend, and of pursuing the policy they had at heart; and, should the opposition of others to the union prove successful, she would at the same time enjoy the advantage of seeing the Principalities disunited and remain in a state of weakness and degradation, the advantage of seeing in them an arena for the prosecution of her own intrigues, and the advantage of knowing that they would be incapable of forming any safe or effectual barrier between her and Turkey. Coming in at the end of the day, then, Russia supported the union. I have now shown what was said with regard to the wishes of the people at the Conference at Paris. But the Powers were careful to make adequate provision on this subject in the Treaty of Paris. There are articles in that document providing for the maintenance of the privileges of the Principalities, for the revision of their laws, and for the appointment of a Commission, who should undertake the consideration of the manner in which these should be ratified. But the 24th Article of the Treaty of Paris solemnly, and under the sanction, I may say, of united Europe, refers the question to the judgment and to the opinion of the people of the Principalities. It is in these terms:— His Majesty the Sultan promises to convoke immediately in each of the two provinces a divan ad hoc, composed in such a manner as to represent most closely the interests of all classes of society. These divans shall be called upon to express the wishes of the people in regard to the definitive organization of the Principalities. Now, there is not only the pledge given by Count Walewski on the part of France, and by the Earl of Clarendon on the part of the late Government and of England, but there is this most solemn pledge of reference embodied in the Treaty of Paris; and I now ask the House of Commons whether they are prepared to recognize and adopt it, or to stand by in silence and see these interests made the sport of subtle intrigue, and the faith of Europe, pledged to this article, nullified and frustrated in accordance with the selfish designs of interested parties. The reference to the people of the Principalities was made in due time; it was delayed through a variety of causes, and, most unfortunately, the Austrian occupation of the Principalities was prolonged to a much later period than it ought to have been. At length the time came and the elections took place. When those elections were held it appeared that the sentiments of the Wallachian representatives were almost entirely favourable to the union; but the Moldavian representatives, on the contrary, were believed to be opposed to the union. At the same time there arose a most painful controversy on the subject of the Moldavian elections. France cried aloud that those Moldavian elections had been carried by the most shameless and wholesale exercise of intimidation and force. Documents were published, from which I quoted in this House without contradiction, and from which I do not hesitate to say it appeared that a series of proceedings had been taken by those who were in the exercise of temporary authority in Moldavia as shameful as any that are on record. Through the medium of those proceedings the Moldavian people of all classes Lad been intimidated from voting, and a mere handful of those entitled to vote gave their suffrages. The consequence was, the picked divan was returned, ready to misstate and deny the heart's desire of the people. But the people were not without champions, and the language of France on this subject produced such effects that after the conference at Osborne it was determined in this country that the Moldavian elections should not be supported, and must be quashed. I am sorry to say that Austria and Turkey were united in steadily op- posing the quashing of the Moldavian elections, but still quashed they were. The question was referred to those who by law were entitled to give their votes, and the votes were given by all orders of the people in very large numbers. The divan which met in accordance with this second election exhibited the most singular unanimity. It was more strongly in favour of the union than the divan of Wallachia. It will be difficult, indeed, to find many instances more remarkable than the declaration of the sentiments of that people. It is a case of a most singular character in this respect, because the elections are made in classes, of which there are four—the nobles, the clergy, the citizens, and the peasantry, and these classes have questions of the most painful and difficult nature between themselves. The class of peasantry are in a most painful position, and much inferior to the peasantry of other countries in regard to the sufferings which they have to endure in the present condition of the laws. They are are, I believe, in a worse condition than the peasantry of France were before the Revolution, and therefore there was every opportunity of making the different classes fall out with one another; but, instead of that, there was but one sentiment and one desire among the entire population, without any distinction of high or low, rich or poor. All were animated by the same sense of duty with regard to the one vital struggle in which they were engaged. All felt that if they hoped to be free and wished to keep the soil of their country unpolluted by the heel of the stranger, it could only be by the union of the Principalities. And this people, not trained up as we are to the use Of free institutions, whom we hear denounced for profligacy and corruption, whose conduct, no doubt, reflects innumerable evils—the necessary inheritance of all they have suffered for several generations—this people, with one heart and one mind, elected by their free votes a popular assembly to decide the question of the union; and the result was, that in the divan of Wallachia there were only three dissentient voices, while in the divan of Moldavia the vote in favour of union was, I believe, unanimous. Now, observe the course of policy pursued on this subject. This question was opened in the most solemn manlier in a great European Congress, and the duty of Europe to this suffering population was discussed and acknowledged. The policy of the three Western Powers, who alone were in a condition to give an impartial judgment, is formally proclaimed. France leads the way, England and Sardinia follow. Provision is made in the Treaty to refer to the judgment of the people the question of their future organization. The answer of the people is returned with an unanimity almost unexampled in history. That is the point to which we are now come. Well, Sir, it may perhaps be said, that besides the provision that the people of Moldavia and Wallachia should be consulted, it was also provided that a Commission should be appointed. Well, it was provided that a Commission should be appointed, and that that Commission should collect information with regard to the state of the country, and should suggest the measures to be taken in respect of those future arrangements. But I, for one, must respectfully demur to any such doctrine as that a Commission should have placed in their hands the virtual disposal of the vital interests of 5,000,000 people in these provinces. There are three things here to be considered—first, the solemn declaration of French and English policy; second, the reference in an article of the Treaty of Peace to the judgment of the people; and, thirdly, the appointment of Commissioners. The idea that these Commissioners were to decide this question appears to me self-convicted by its own absurdity. If the Commissioners were to decide the question of the union, why had France and England declared their policy to be in its favour? Why had the Earl of Clarendon declared that the union was desired by the people? And why was a reference to that desire imported into the Treaty? After having consulted the people through their representatives, and asked them what was their prayer, you choose to refer the whole question to the disposal of five or six Commissioners. There is a saying of the late Mr. Charles Buller with respect to the working of representative institutions in the Colonies which appears to me to be peculiarly applicable to the circumstances to which I now refer. That saying had regard to the theory that prevailed twenty or thirty years ago with regard to our Colonies. It was said you may give your Colonies representative institutions, but after giving them representative institutions the question whether the wishes of the people getting those institutions will be attended to must still he decided in the recesses of the Colonial Office. That was the theory; but, said Mr. Buller, "Well, that is like lighting a fire and stopping up the chimney." Sir, do not let us, in regard to this question of the Provinces, light a fire and stop up the chimney. Do not let us light up the fire of a people's hopes and desires—do not give the promises of Europe, and the public faith of Europe, and the sanction of Europe, to a reference to them to learn what they wish on a question so vitally affecting their interests, and then take six Commissioners, and stick them up the chimney. I think I am justified in assuming that it will not be disputed that the union of the provinces is desired by the people. It would be easy to dwell at great length on that question; but, as I stand on public facts and documents of the most unimpeachable kind, I will assume that proposition, and proceed to consider the rest of the case. There is one objection, if this Motion be opposed, that may be fairly taken. It may be fairly said, that the provinces have expressed their desire for union, but that they have also expressed their desire for something more. It is perfectly true that the divans gathered in the Principalities have addressed themselves to all the points which appear to them material for a thoroughly satisfactory settlement of their future political organization. They have asked, in the first place, for a full and formal recognition by the Powers of Europe of what they expressively call their autonomy, that is, their entire independence in regard to internal legislation; but that is recognized in the Treaty of Paris, Where it is said they are to have an independent national administration. The second, to which they addressed themselves, and of which they make prayer, is the neutrality of their territory. I do not know that the neutrality of their territory is expressly indicated in the Treaty of Paris; but it has been discussed and vindicated by high authorities in this House. About the close of the Russian war the present Chancellor of the Exchequer explained his views on that subject in considerable detail, and he appeared to me to show that the establishment by an European understanding of the neutrality of the territory of the Principalities would, in all probability, prove to be a wise and an efficient measure for interposing a barrier between Russia and Turkey. In the third place, they express their desire for that union of the Principalities in favour of which the declaration of the Western Powers had been made. Another, and the fourth, point was, that the Principalities should be governed by representative institutions; and so far as those points go, I must say I hardly can conceive in what quarter a doubt should arise as to the wisdom and reasonableness of the wishes they had expressed. The fifth proposition is, I grant, one of a more doubtful character. It is this, that when the provinces are united, they shall, in order to avoid local jealousies, have a Prince or Chief taken from a foreign family. I do not ask the House to give a judgment on the question, and it is one on which England has given no pledge. The great Powers of Europe reserved their decision upon this point, and they have given no expectation to the people of the Principalities that could at all fetter the freedom of their judgment, while, as respects the other four points, they have behaved with great moderation and prudence. But supposing that the opinion of the House should Co that it is not safe that the Principalities, when united, should be under a foreign Prince, do not let us be told that on this account we intend to overlook the pledges that were given with respect to other matters more important. If the reign of a foreign Prince is desired, depend upon it he is sought for as a means of avoiding internal jealousy. No people in its senses ever preferred the rule of a foreign Prince except as a means of avoiding internal dissension. There can be no doubt that the union of the Principalities is the one great, main, and paramount object of the people by whom they are inhabited. The union of the Principalities, which has been thus all but promised on the part of France and England, which has thus been all hut sanctioned by the most authoritative declarations of the people of those countries, is now to be decided at Paris. But it will not be said that it is enough for you to show that this union has been promised and desired, unless you can also show that it is also a good and safe measure. Now, Sir, I frankly own that I think it is a good and safe measure; and not only that, but that no other measure will be good or safe under existing circumstances. I think it will not be denied that for the Principalities themselves union is the best measure possible. They have Turkey on one side, Russia on another, and Austria on another, they themselves being isolated as a people valuing and enjoying freedom. Habitually made the sport of foreign intrigues, constantly invaded by foreign armies, worked one against the other by those who have their own purposes to serve—can anything be more natural than that they should desire to seek strength in union? Does their desire need to be justified in this House? Are we not speaking in a Parliament which has found strength in these islands and in this kingdom by unity? What were the old relations between Scotland and England? They appear to me to have been very much those of the Principalities when those intrigues of foreign Powers made Moldavia the instrument of their combinations. The result was, that so long as Scotland and England were disunited, Scotland was the ready tool of France, and the prevailing national sentiment in Scotland was much more French than English. But by uniting the two countries we did away with that sense of disunion, and we added liberty, power, prosperity, and happiness to the two portions of the United Kingdom. We have acted on that principle in our own time and in our own Colonies. What did we do in the two Canadas? We bid them seek strength in union, and they found it. To our provinces in the remotest corners of the globe we have held the same encouragement. We have by our legislation for Australia declared that if those provinces choose a union, there are in our Acts of Parliament the facilities and the powers that may give effect to that principle of union. Sir, if I thought it likely to be disputed that the union of the two Principalities is the natural and necessary means of developing their resources, of realizing the idea of national existence, of strengthening the organization of their Government, of diminishing their expenses, of attaining every internal political object that reasonable men can desire, I should then enter into a more detailed argument; but I assume that the union of the Principalities is to be desired as far as the welfare of the people of those provinces is concerned. If that be so, I beseech this House to consider well before it determines that the fate of these two countries is to be governed by considerations other than the welfare of the people. It will be a dangerous and slippery course on which to embark when we refuse that which is suited to four and five millions of men, and when we say that God Almighty sent them into the world, not to pursue their own happiness and welfare by such lawful and reasonable means as are in their power, but to he made the victims of those whose public and private interests are subserved by other views, extraneous to their interests, but which an overpowering force has determined to carry into effect. Well, Sir, I will assume that the union of the Principalities is good for the Principalities themselves. For whom, then, is it not good? I am not prepared to say that it is good for Austria or Russia. I will not undertake to say that it is convenient to Austria to have freedom in conjunction with prosperity close by her threshold; but that is her fault, and not mine. I am very sorry for it. I believe that the Principalities, if they are not united, will be a constant source of danger and uneasiness to European policy. If you do unite them, the question, whether the example they will set of good government will be convenient to the States that have different ideas of good government, is not for us to settle. Then, with regard to Russia, I am not prepared to say that the union of the Principalities will be for the interest of Russia, considered as an aggrandizing and conquering power. I trust and believe that for the moment the self-aggrandizing plans of Russia are in abeyance, because the lesson that has been read, and the chastisement that has been inflicted upon her, and the waste of her material resources, will act for the time upon the policy of Russia. But I suppose I must assume that at some period or other the ambition of Russia will be again awakened. Sir, in so saying, while I recognise such an event as probable, I will not assume the right of speaking of Russia as if some peculiar stain of essential immorality attached to the ambition felt and experienced by Russia, and which is not felt and experienced by any other country. No doubt Russia is an ambitious and self-aggrandizing Power; but I should be sorry to imply that some other countries and nations if they had been settled down on that particular portion of the surface of the earth inhabited by the Emperor of Russia mid his people would not have shown just as great a wish to expand and to enlarge their borders to the east and south as Russia herself. But, still, that is the policy of Russia, and as such you must take cognizance of it; and if so, how do you mean to check and resist it? Do you think that, under all circumstances, we shall have the power of resisting it by another union with France? I am not sanguine in that opinion. I believe that such a union was owing to a very rare con- juncture of circumstances, and one little likely to occur again. It was an uncommon rashness on the part of the late Emperor of Russia that made it possible to check Russia by the united action of France and England. Russia will watch her opportunity, and will seize it better next time than in the year 1852. Does any one believe that it is by England being always ready to spend £50,000,000 or £100,000,000, that Russia will be kept in check? Does any one believe not only that the people of England will be always ready to make this sacrifice, but that we shall also find the people of France similarly disposed? It is not altogether unlikely that the people of England, bearing in mind the feelings and traditions of the late war, would make great efforts for a similar purpose; but the combination of France with England is not, I think, to be depended upon as affording a permanent check to the ambition of Russia. Surely the best resistance to be offered to Russia is by the strength and freedom of those countries that will have to resist her. You want to place a living barrier between her and Turkey. There is no barrier, then, like the breast of freemen. It is true that the people of these Principalities are not accustomed to take a part in the military operations of Europe; but the Americans, when the War of Independence broke out, were not a military nation, yet they proved themselves more than a match for your well-trained and disciplined armies. If you want to oppose an obstacle to Russia, arm those people with freedom, and with the vigour and prosperity that freedom brings; but, after the pledges that have been given, and the wishes that have been excited and stimulated, do not keep them in this miserable state of weakness and disunion. Do not palter with them. After the pledges which have been given, do not withhold that which alone can satisfy their desires and vindicate your fame; but give them that which, if you will give them, will raise up in that quarter friends for you, and antagonists to the ambition of Russia, more powerful than any that you can buy with money. Now, let us consider what will be the effect of the union of the Principalities with respect to the interests of Turkey; and here, Sir, I do not enter into the question, what is the internal state of the Turkish empire—I do not on this occasion inquire whether or not the Mahomedan power in Europe can be permanently maintained. What I assume is, that it is a great object of European policy to prevent the extension of the Russian power in the direction of Constantinople, and that the Power which now occupies that city is to be maintained as a matter of European policy, I give no opinion, I only recognize the obligations of treaties. The treaty of 1856 imposed upon the Powers of Europe the duty of maintaining the integrity of Turkey as against foreign aggression, and I therefore assume and assert that we are not to take measures for the purpose of invidiously weakening or destroying her. Now, has the union of the Principalities the slightest tendency to inflict injury upon Turkey? I confidently assert that it has not. That, however, is a proposition of great importance, because I grant that there are certain views of the right method of governing men according to which you might, very properly, come to an opposite conclusion. There are those who think that the best mode of governing men is to rule them by force. There are those who think that there is no such thing as reason in the masses of the population. There are those who think that, if you gratify the desires which a people have expressed, the only effect of your concession is, that you encourage them to advance other and more extravagant demands. To all those who entertain these opinions I have nothing to say; but in addressing the Rouse of Commons I assume that I am addressing the professors of an opposite creed. The legislation of this country has habitually been founded upon the belief, that the best way of securing the institutions of a country is both to consult the interests and to meet the moderate and reasonable wishes of its inhabitants. Let us apply to the question of policy, which is now on our hands abroad, the principle upon which we act in respect to matters of British Government and legislation. Now, Sir, the history of the relation between Turkey and the Principalities is a very memorable and a very instructive one. I do not believe that there are any portions of the territories connected with the Government at Constantinople which have caused less care and anxiety to the Ottoman empire than have the Principalities. I do not now speak of instances in which they have been made the instruments and the tools of foreign intrigue. I am only speaking of the conduct and management of the relations of Government. In point of fact, the history of the relations between the Principalities and Turkey is, that it has been a relation extremely liberal hi its character. It originally rested upon treaties, in which nothing is stipulated on the part of the Principalities, except the acknowledgment of a nominal supremacy and the payment of a moderate tribute. In this country there prevailed, and I am afraid there still prevails, a belief that the Sultan of Turkey is the Sovereign of the Principalities; and I have seen with an astonishment which I cannot describe, that through some gross error or blunder—for it cannot possibly be attributed to design—a Turkish Minister has, in a recent despatch, described the Sultan as a Sovereign over the Principalities. That is an assertion which, if it were to be considered as serious, involves such a monstrous violation of the European law of centuries, that I am convinced it is an unhappy blunder, and I only refer to it because it might have the effect of misleading hon. Members as to the real state of the ease. The truth is, as I read in the work of a French jurist, that even the word Suzerain, which in its judicial effect is entirely different from Sovereign, is a word of most recent application to the relations between the Sultan and the Principalities. In fact, it never found its way into any public instrument connected with that relation before the Treaty of Adrian ople in 1829. What I want to point out is, that Turkey has always found her freedom and her safety on the side of the Principalities, not in the pursuit of measures intended to rivet her hold upon them; but, on the contrary, in maintaining an easy and liberal relation towards them. And how is it possible for us to suppose that we should serve the interest of Turkey by refusing to fulfil our own pledges, and to meet the wishes of the Roumanian population in regard to the matter of the union? Why, Sir, is it by her own strength that Turkey can keep the people of the Principalities in subjection? Turkey has, as far as I can see, a twofold interest in the Principalities. The first is, the very limited one that her tribute should be regularly paid. The second is a more important interest, and that is, that the Principalities should not become the property of other Governments. It is not the might of Turkey that could keep them in that position. If they wanted to be free it is not Turkey that could prevent their emancipation. What keeps Egypt in subjection to the Porte? Not the strength of Turkey, but the policy of Europe. What would keep the Principalities in subjection, in their qualified subjection to Turkey? Just the same power, and no other, if, indeed, the feeling of the Principalities were opposed to Turkey. But the sentiment of the Principalities is not unfavourable to Turkey; it is not unfavourable to the connection with Turkey understood in the manner in which it is defined by European law; because the bonds which they bear are, one may say, silken bonds if they consist only of the payment of a moderate sum of money and the acknowledgment of a nominal supremacy. The relation to Turkey leaves to the Principalities almost everything that a people can most earnestly desire. Their practical liberties, their powers of self-government and legislation, are entirely theirs. Their religion is so entirely their own that the Mahomedan creed and worship are not tolerated within them. The Sultan of Turkey himself has no right to enter the Principalities unless by permission and agreement of the inhabitants. Of course, I need not say that he has no right whatever to send any armed force into them, either by the ancient law of Europe, or by the Treaty of Paris. The consequence of this has been that in the Principalities there has prevailed a good feeling towards Turkey. They have not been friendly to Russia. Turkey has had great trouble with her Christian subjects in other parts of the empire. During the late war there was very great alarm in Bulgaria. Efforts were made there to create a strong Russian feeling and movement. In the neighbourhood of the Greek frontier, too, and in other parts of the empire in which the Christians feel that Turkish interests and their own conic into sharp collision, they view the Turkish power with great jealousy; and, no doubt, the growth of the Christians combined with the regular decline and decay of the Turks in these countries constitutes a real danger for the Ottoman empire. But in the Principalities the feeling is favourable to Turkey, and the reason why it is favourable is not that the people are inclined to the creed or traditions of Turkey, but that the relation between these countries and Turkey is one founded upon a liberal basis and that there has been no sensible collision of interests between them. Therefore, I say that the real safety of Turkey lies in maintaining, in the relation between the countries, that spirit which has hitherto governed it, and that if you want to defend Turkey you will best accomplish that object by keeping up an amicable feeling between her and the Christian population to the north of the Danube, and by giving to that Christian population, so far as it depends upon measures to which you are to be parties, that growth and expansion and that sense of political and national existence which may qualify them to imbibe the ideas and acquire the habits of freedom, and, by virtue of those ideas and habits, to become an efficient barrier against the aggrandizing schemes of Russia. That I believe to be the true state of this question with regard to the policy to be pursued and the different parties who are concerned in it. I believe it to be quite undeniable and not to be questioned in any quarter that union is a measure which is obviously and naturally suited to promote the interest of these 5,000,000 of Wallachians and Moldavians. As respects European policy in regard to Russia, I cannot but conceive that common sense teaches us to endeavour to develope in them a sense of freedom and a consciousness of political existence as tending more than anything else to make men efficient opponents to aggressive despotism; and as respects Turkey, I say that we stand upon the ground of history as well as on that of law when we endeavour to maintain that amicable and liberal character which has heretofore for the most part, and except during certain passages of her history, governed the relations between the Ottoman Power and the people of the Principalities. These are the reasons for which I hope that this House will think fit to associate itself with the policy which has been formally declared on the part of the British Government. I may be asked, "If that policy has been formally declared on the part of the British Government, and if you approve it, why are you in a hurry? why do you invite Parliament to interpose?" I invite Parliament to interpose for this reason, and to this extent. I invite it to interpose to the extent of affirming that which has been declared and announced. The reason why I invite it to interpose is because, although no communications have been made to Parliament since the protocols of 1856, yet all those who watch the course of European politics, and avail themselves of the miscellaneous sources of information which are at our command outside these walls, cannot but be aware that a strong impression has gone abroad that the policy of Great Britain, so formally and so solemnly announced—announced to France, announced to Europe, announced to Parliament—is without reason, without explanation—I will add, in defiance of good faith, about to be changed. We must not trifle with this question. I, for one, will be no party to trifling with the reasonable expectations of five millions of men. Neither do I think that Parliament ought to be trifled with in such a way as we shall certainly have to lament if we are told "that in 1856 the Ministers, after careful consideration, made known to us a certain definite course on a vital question of policy immediately connected with the great warlike struggle in which we had been engaged; but that now, without explanation and without reason, they are to abandon their own formal and publicly-announced conclusion, and to march in exactly the opposite direction." It was for that reason that, having had suspicion and alarm more or less excited a fortnight ago, I inquired whether Her Majesty's Government were about to present any further papers on this important question. I was answered no, and of course Ministers were the judges whether it was proper to present those papers or not. But under those circumstances, not being able to obtain any satisfaction or any assurance that the policy such as had been announced to Parliament would remain unchanged until another announcement was made, there was no other alternative for me, except to give notice of a Motion in the House of Commons. As respects the time of this Motion, the House must understand that it is a question of now or never. Next week the Conferences will meet in Paris. We shall have no cognizance of what takes place at those Conferences. In the course, perhaps, of a few days we shall be told that the whole matter was over, and that it had been decided that the Principalities were not to be united—in fact, that the little word "not" was to be inserted in the declarations of Count Walewski and the Earl of Clarendon. I hope the House of Commons will understand what the bearing of such a policy will be upon the relations of the Principalities to Russia. It is by the united judgment of England and France that this question must be settled. If England should unfortunately, at the approaching Conferences, oppose the union of the Principalities, France will be obliged to give way, however much against her will. In spite of pledges and promises, in spite of the wishes of the people freely asked and clearly expressed, the union of the Prin- cipalities will then be frustrated. Russia will in that case be friendly to the union of the Principalities, and, knowing that the union is the wish of almost every man, woman, and child, in the country, she will lay for herself new foundations of power on the banks of the Danube. She will lay those foundations in the affections of the people, and the name of Turkey and the Sultan will become odious from one end of the provinces to the other. I cannot conceive a measure more suicidal after all we have done. It would have been better to have said nothing about the Principalities, to have given no promises, to have announced no policy, if, after stimulating the feeling for the union up to the highest pitch, and holding it out by public authority at Paris as the one thing which, above all other things, was necessary for the welfare and prosperity of those countries, we are now to reverse that policy. I must really say that if it were our desire to embroil the East, to sow the seeds and create the elements of permanent difficulty and disunion, to aggravate every danger which threatens Turkey, to pave the way for Russia, and to prepare willing auxiliaries for Russia in her projects southwards, we could not attain those objects by any scheme better laid down than that of abandoning, our pledges and promises, and giving in to the Austrian policy. It is upon these grounds that I entreat the House to consider well the position in which they stand, and either to hold the Government to the policy announced by our representative at Paris, or if that policy be abandoned rigidly to extract from the Government the reasons, though I confess I cannot conceive what reasons there can be, why it is abandoned. Rely upon it on us much depends, and the attitude we assume. This question is a small question to us. It comes in among questions of more popular and domestic interest, and it is almost eclipsed by the gigantic subject of the Indian Government, upon which we were occupied last night, and to which we shall soon return. It little affects our happiness, our feelings, our families and households, or our public arrangements, whether we do anything or nothing, whether we keep faith or break it—that is, until the time of reckoning comes. At the present moment I grant it is a small question to us, but to them it is everything, and for the Conferences next week the judgment of England is everything. France is ready to do her part. She has never departed front her policy. She is now what she was in 1856. I see an hon. Baronet (Sir B. Lytton) shake his head. I do not know whether he expresses the mind and spirit of France, but I think I am justified in asserting what I ant justified in believing. Although his shake of the head is equal in historical importance to that of Lord Burleigh, it will not induce me to surrender as a fiction what rests on public notoriety. I say that France cannot resist; France must give way. She cannot carry the union against Austria and Turkey, led by Austria, if England deserts her. The question whether England shall desert her is a question now to be decided, and the question of that desertion on the one hand, or of perseverance in her policy and redemption of her pledges, is the question which with earnest hope and confidence I this night submit to the House of Commons.

Motion made— That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, to submit to Her Majesty that this House, bearing in mind the obligations imposed by the Treaty of Paris, so far as they affect the Danubian Principalities, has observed with satisfaction the general tenor and spirit of the Declaration recorded by Her Majesty's Chief Plenipotentiary at the Conferences of 1856, concerting the future organization of those Territories; and humbly to convey to her Majesty the earnest hope of this House that in the further prosecution of this important subject just weight may be given to those wishes of the people of Wallachia and of Moldavia which, through their representatives elected in conformity with the said Treaty, they have recently expressed.

MR. SEYMOUR FITZGERALD

said, he felt that indeed he had an arduous task before him. It was not only that he had to reply to one of the most eloquent speakers who had ever adorned the House, to attempt an answer to a speech Which for more than an hour had enchained their attention, to follow a Gentleman whose position and authority on all subjects, whether of foreign or domestic policy, entitled him to respect, to address himself to a subject to which few Members had given the attention it deserved; but in that reply lie had to meet the right hon. Gentleman on a still higher vantage ground, because the Resolution appealed to the sympathies of a popular assembly as supporting the expressed wishes of an entire people. He trusted, therefore, the House would sympathize with him in such a position, and give weight to opinions which, though expressed feebly, were the sincere convictions to which, after the most attentive consideration, he had at last been compelled to come. The right hon. Gentleman, in the early part of his address, had expressed the hope that he should not be met with the trite objection that he was calling upon the House to interfere in matters of foreign policy. He was not going to find fault with the Resolution upon ground so wide as that, and yet, at the same time, he must say that he could not sufficiently express his astonishment that the right hon. Gentleman, who had been so long engaged in public affairs, and under whose notice, when holding high office, some of the most important negotiations of modern times must have passed, should have ventured upon a course, which was not only utterly unprecedented, but calculated to lead the House and the country into the most serious embarrassment. He begged the House to consider what, even by the right hon. Gentleman's own statement, the position of affairs was at the present moment. The right hon. Gentleman had told them that the question was invested with peculiar solemnity from all that had preceded it, that it had been brought before the Congress at Paris, that the opinion of the inhabitants had been solemnly asked, that a Commission had been sent out to obtain the best information, and to report their opinions to the Conference; but he had omitted to point out that the Plenipotentiaries were on the eve of meeting in Paris to weigh the evidence collected by the Commissioners, and to give full weight to the expression of the wishes of the population of the Danubian Principalities as far as they were consistent with the interests of Europe. Yet, at the very time when the question was about to be decided, the right hon. Gentleman thought it right to call upon the House, not to give an instruction to their own Government or their own Minister, but to come to a vote on a Resolution which must be considered as an instruction of the English House of Commons to the assembled representatives of independent Europe. The right hon. Gentleman's Resolutions commenced by calling on the House to bear in mind the obligations imposed by the Treaty of Paris, so far as they affected the Danubian Principalities. In the first part of that sentence he went along with the right hon. Gentleman, but he could not, with him, call on the House to consider the obligations of that treaty simply, so far as the Danubian Principalities were affected by them. What were the obligations of the Treaty of Paris? For what end, in other words, had we lavished so much blood and treasure in the war which preceded that treaty? That war was undertaken for the maintenance of the independence and the territorial integrity of Turkey. That also was the object of the treaty as stated in the preamble, and in one of the most solemn articles the assembled Powers of Europe gave a pledge that whatever might impair that integrity and independence should be regarded as a matter affecting the whole of Europe. If that were so, what would be the effect of the present Motion? The right hon. Gentleman was one of the Ministers of the Crown when that war was commenced, and what was the language of the right hon. Gentleman then? The Principalities, he said then, were an integral part of Turkey—we must maintain the independence of Turkey, and therefore we will resist this attempt on the part of Russia to occupy the Principalities. But, tonight, he said, the Principalities were wholly independent of Turkey.] Mr. GLADSTONE: No, no!] Quasi-independent then. [Mr. GLADSTONE repeated his dissent.] At least the right hon. Gentleman treated them as though they ought to be independent, and throughout the whole course of his speech he refused to recognize those rights of Turkey over the Principalities which at the time of the Russian war he was the first to assert. The right hon. Gentleman called on the House to sanction this Resolution, which would in fact, acknowledge the independence of the Principalities and be the first step towards the dismemberment of that empire, the integrity of which he was formerly so ready to maintain. He asked them to sanction this Resolution on the ground that it was the express wish of the people. On this point, as a matter of fact, he was entirely at issue with the right hon. Gentleman. According to the shape in which the right hon. Gentleman put the case, these Principalities had expressed an unanimous opinion in favour of an union, and they had also expressed a wish that the united states might be put under the rule of a foreign prince. The right hon. Gentleman put these questions before the House as though they were separate questions, and as if the population of the Principalities had expressed a wish for an union, under a foreign prince if possible, but at any rate—an union. If that had been the case there would have been some ground for the Motion, but the very reverse was the fact. All the five points to which the right hon. Gentleman alluded were put to the vote in the Principalities as a whole, and the sanction of the people was given to them as a whole; and nothing occurred at the time of voting to lead any one to believe that their wish was, as the right hon. Gentleman had stated, for an union; under a foreign Prince if possible, but at all events for an union. On the contrary they had declared in unmistakeable language that no other union but an union under a foreign prince would satisfy them, and that an union under a native prince, or under a prince nominated by the Porte, was the last thing they should wish for, as it would not ameliorate, but would in effect add to all the evils under which they had been suffering. Such was the declaration of the Divan of Wallachia on this point, and the Divan of Moldavia had made a similar declaration:— The jealousies of any family of native princes would be such as to make perfectly conclusive the impossibility of anything like a stable Government under one of these princes, and prove the imperious necessity of placing on the throne of Moldo-Wallachia a prince from a foreign country. The High Powers will appreciate that without a foreign prince the sufferings of the country, so far from being made to cease, would be only greatly aggravated. The right hon. Gentleman, therefore, who had called upon the House to give full weight to the opinions of the people of the Principalities must himself admit that it was impossible for the Powers of Europe to consent to any other union of the Principalities but an union under a foreign prince, on the principle that such other union would not meet the desires of the people. If, then, the only union possible was an union under a foreign prince what would be the character and complexion of such an union? It would render the Principalities practically independent. It would be totally inconsistent with the territorial integrity of Turkey—it would be totally incompatible with our obligations to Turkey under the Treaty of Paris—with that for which we went to war and which all Europe was pledged to maintain. Suppose the Principalities united and a foreign prince placed on the throne, what would be their position? Our armies could not get there, our fleets could not get there, diplomatic intervention on our part would be almost impossible; moral weight and influence, too, so far as we were concerned, would also be next to impossible—but there was one power on whose part it would be possible. With a Sovereign on the throne supported by an European alliance, ruling over a people having perhaps some cause of alienation from the Ottoman Government, and connected with the Russian Government by community of religion, even if the mere name of subjection to Turkey were preserved, it would be possible to look upon such a State in any other light but as being disenthralled from the rule of the Ottoman empire. Suppose that State strong enough to resist Turkey but too weak to resist any other Power, then, instead of having raised a barrier against Russian interference and aggression we should have done our best to weaken Turkey, whom we were bound to protect, and we should have given to Russia a fresh weapon, a fresh occasion of quarrel, and a fresh field for the exercise of what his right hon. Friend had called her aggressive policy. How, then, could the right hon. Gentleman call upon the House of Commons to support the wishes of the people for the union of the Principalities on the ground that that wish had been expressed in accordance with the invitation addressed to them by united Europe? The very reverse of that was the case. They had expressed a wish totally incompatible with the obligations of the very treaty under which the Divans met in the Principalities, and under which the Commissioners of the Great Powers were sent there. Again, ought the House to be asked to support the wishes of the population of Moldavia and Wallachia merely because they were in favour of independence? Did the right hon. Gentleman mean to take this ground—that, simply because a people declared its desire for independence, it was therefore for the English House of Commons to step forward, and, by an authoritative Resolution, to say that full weight should be given to that declaration of opinion? That was a course far more dangerous than any on which they had ever before been invited to enter. We might give to a people with these aspirations our sympathy; we might, when the fitting time arrived, lend them our moral assistance in obtaining what they desired; but under existing circumstances we could only defer to their wishes as far as was compatible with those general and preponderating interests of Europe which it was the object of the Treaty of Paris to place upon a sound basis. On the other hand, if the House were merely to express its approval of the aspirations of the people of the Principalities, it would adopt a course barren indeed of benefit to them, but fraught with embarrassment to ourselves. By declaring this desire through an authoritative Resolution to aid that people in securing from the Conference of Paris a recognition of their independence, the House, so far from doing them any good, would do them a fatal injury. It would do its best to obtain for them an independence which they were incapable of maintaining, and which, while it would not serve the interests of this country, would be prejudicial to those of the Principalities themselves. On these grounds he hoped the House would not assent to the Resolution of the right hon. Gentleman. It was incompatible with our solemn engagements under the treaty of Paris—it invited us to do that which it was the object of that treaty to prevent—it invited us to be parties to the partition. of Turkey. ["No, no!"] That was his own opinion, and it would be perfectly competent for hon. Gentlemen to express a different one. Moreover, the Resolution asked the House to do that which was not for the interest of the very people whom the right hon. Gentleman wished to serve. Thanking the House for permitting him to make these observations, he called upon it to reject the Motion.

MR. SERJEANT DEASY

said, he thought the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs had failed to give any answer to the conclusive case established by the eloquent speech of the right hon. Gentleman; not however from any want of ability, for the exertions made by the hon. Gentleman, on that as on former occasions, fully justified the Government in their choice of him for his present office. The inherent weakness of the case which the hon. Gentleman had been instructed to advocate was the sole cause of the failure of his advocacy. Complaining of the time at which the right hon. Gentleman brought forward this Motion, he had said the House was asked to pronounce an opinion on this important subject just as the Conference at Paris was about to meet for its settlement. Why, the very fact that the Conference was on the eve of assembling to pronounce an opinion—an irrevocable opinion on this question proved that the right hon. Gentleman was bound to bring this Motion before the House, and that those hon. Members who agreed with him were bound to support him. If the right hon. Gentleman waited until the decision of the Paris Conference was taken, in what position would the House of Com- mons be placed? They would be told by the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs that their interference was perfectly useless; and they would have no remedy except that which would, perhaps, be very disagreeable—namely, the pronouncing of a censure upon the hon. Under Secretary himself, or his chief. Again, it was said the House of Commons was asked to give instructions to the assembled Plenipotentiaries of Europe at the Conferences of Paris. No such thing. What the House was asked to do was, to express its opinion respecting the instructions which ought to be given to the English Plenipotentiary, and as to the course which that Minister ought to take in conformity with the honour and the obligations of this country. And after the speech of the hon. Under Secretary, unless the House expressed its opinion on this important question, there was reason to fear that instructions would be given, by which the honour of England would be tarnished, and its obligations unfulfilled, or rather violated. The hon. Gentleman had said, they were asked to become parties to the dismemberment of Turkey. It would, therefore, seem that he had not looked at the peculiar relation by which, and by which alone, the Danubian provinces were bound to the Sublime Porte. Those provinces never were a part of the Ottoman dominion. They were not acquired by conquest but by contract. Those contracts strictly defined the limits within which the Ottoman Porte was to exercise its privileges. The first of them was the capitulation with Wallachia, by which the Sultan consented, for himself and his successors, to defend that province against every enemy without exacting anything except the supremacy over the sovereignty of that Principality—the vaivodes, or princes, binding themselves to pay to the Sublime Porte a tribute of 10,000 piastres. The Porte was to have no right to interfere in the local administration of the Principality; no Turk was allowed to enter Wallachia without an ostensible motive; every year an officer of the Sublime Porte was to receive the tribute; the vaivodes were to continue to be elected by the archbishop, the bishops, and the boyards, their election to be confirmed by the Porte; the Wallachian "nation," (as it was called in the original) was to continue in the free enjoyment of its own laws; the vaivodes were to have power of life and death over their subjects, as well as the power of making peace and war, without being subjected for any of these acts to any responsibility towards the Sublime Porte. After that how could Wallachia be called part of the Turkish empire? How could it be said that by this Motion they were advocating the dismemberment of the Turkish dominion? [Mr. S. FITZGERALD: What is the date of the treaty?]—1460.—[A laugh.] But he would come to documents of later date immediately. The use which he was making of this was to show the origin of the relation, and that it was a relation by contract. In the capitulation relative to Moldavia, the Porte allowed that that province was a free, not a conquered country, and undertook that the Christian religion should never be troubled; that Moldavia should be governed by its own proper laws; that its princes should hold for life, being elected by the nation, and confirmed by the Porte; that the domination of the princes should extend over their entire territory, and that they should be allowed to maintain, in their own pay, a force of 20,000 men, strangers or natives. In sign of submission, the prince was to pay 11,000 piastres to the Porte as a present. When he was asked for the date of these treaties, he was disposed to ask in reply, whether they ever had been modified by any subsequent treaty. He maintained that they still regulated the relation subsisting between the Porte and these provinces. But as some hon. Members called for later documents, he entreated their attention to the treaty of Paris of 1856. There was no treaty by which these stipulations had been modified. What had the Sultan recently acknowledged before the Powers of Europe by the treaty of Paris? It was held that by the war all the previous treaties with Russia had been annulled; and it was declared by that treaty that the Danubian Principalities should continue to enjoy, under the "suzerainty" of the Porte—not under its "sovereignty"—and under the pledge or guarantee of the contracting Powers the privileges and immunities of they were in possession. No exclusive protection was to be exercised over them by any of the guaranteeing Powers; there was to be no right of interference in their internal affairs; and the Porte engaged to preserve their independency and national administration as well as their full liberty of worship, legislation, commerce, and navigation. The laws and statutes up to that date in force were to be revised, hut under the promise that there should be a special Commission on the constitution of which the contracting Powers should agree. There was also to be established in the Principalities an armed national force, organized to maintain the security of the interior and to protect the frontier. Then came the stipulation in which the Sultan promised to summon Divans ad hoc in the Principalities which were to include a distinct representation of all classes. In considering the effect of that article it was most important to look to the bearing of the protocol to which the right hon, Gentleman had referred. Count Walewski proposed the union of the two provinces into a quasi independent State, and the British Minister seconded that proposal. Now, what was the objection made to that proposal? Why, the only objection made to it by Aali Pasha, the representative of the Turkish Government, and the Austrian Minister, was, that possibly such an union might be opposed to the wishes of the inhabitants of the provinces themselves, and particularly to those of the smaller province who might object to being absorbed in the larger. it was suggested, therefore, that no definite decision should be arrived at upon that subject until the wishes of the people of Moldavia and Wallachia were definitely ascertained, and the Treaty of Paris was signed without any decision being arrived at upon the subject. In order, however, to deal with it, subsequently an article was inserted by which the Porte bound itself to convoke representative assemblies, for the purpose of ascertaining definitively and authoritatively what were the wishes of the inhabitants of the Principalities, in order that the whole question might be settled at the next meeting of the Congress. Such was the position in which the question stood at the time of the signature of the treaty, and how did it stand at present? Why, the Porte, after an attempt to evade that article of the treaty, an attempt which was frustrated by France, convened fair representative assemblies, and he considered that House should always regard with respect the deliberately expressed opinion of a fair representative assembly. Now, what were the constitutions of those assemblies? The Divan in Moldavia consisted of 3 bishops, who sat de jure, 7 deputies of the clergy elected, 28 deputies of the owners of large property, 14 deputies of the owners of smaller property, 18 representatives of towns, and 14 representatives of the peasants; making altogether an assembly of 84 members, all of whom, with the exception of the 3 bishops, were elected. In Wallachia the Divan consisted of 4 bishops, sitting de jure, 6 deputies of the clergy, 34 deputies of the owners of large property, 17 representatives of the owners of smaller property, 22 representatives of towns, and 17 representatives of the peasants; all elected, and forming an assembly of 100 members. Now, what was the result of the deliberations of those divans? Why, in Moldavia 81 out of 84 voted for the union, and in Wallachia 94 out of 100 voted in the same way. Such, then, was the definitive and authoritative exposition of the wishes of the inhabitants of the Principalities, and he had the written testimony of a Scotch gentleman who was then travelling in the Principalities, and had attended the meeting of the Divans as to the order, skill, and aptitude with which those assemblies transacted business. How could the country, after having made itself a party to the Treaty of Paris, refuse to give effect to wishes thus definitively expressed? Why, to do so would be a direct violation of the contract which had been entered into, and yet it was now proposed, in contravention of that contract, to refuse to those people the Government for which they wished, and to impose upon them, by force or menace, a form of Government to which they were most strongly opposed. The subject was one in which that House had a special interest and a special duty. There was a large commercial interest involved, for this country depended upon those provinces for a large supply of food, and, therefore, it was to the interest of England to see them in a state of prosperity and advancement. There was a political interest involved, also, as regarded making a solid barrier against Russian aggression, for the right bank of the Danube would be best defended on the left by a nation of 5,000,000 freemen. The only other way of raising an effectual barrier was to hand over the provinces, bound hand and foot, to Austria, but that was a course which few at the present day would venture to suggest. The two provinces were, from circumstances, well adapted to form a united State, for there was in them an identity of origin, of race, of religion, and of language, accompanied by a well defined frontier and an extensive territory, and a considerable population, and having, through the sea, access to those resources which the maritime powers might think it necessary to render available. He trusted, therefore, that the House would agree to the proposition of the right hon. Gentleman, for if the contrary were the case, if the old Procrustean policy were reverted to, by which nations were fitted to a Government, and not a Government to a nation, much mischief might result. Such a principle had been acted upon after the peace of 1815 in the case of Holland and Belgium, and the subsequent result was a violent disruption which seriously endangered the peace of Europe. He believed that the course which the Government appeared disposed to adopt would lead to a similar result. If a form of Government were forced on the people to which they were opposed, a revolutionary fever, which seemed chronic in Europe, would sooner or later break out, and the Government would be forcibly ejected, and then the only way to quell the disturbance would be by means of an Austrian or a Russian occupation, the evil effect of which would not be confined to the provinces themselves, but which might, perhaps, be felt even in Manchester or Birmingham. A proceeding similar to that, which the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman affirmed, had taken place on the banks of the Nile in the formation of the Pashalic, and no one would pretend that that had weakened or dismembered the Turkish Empire. He wanted to see a similar proceeding on the banks of the Danube, as he believed that it would be for the interest of the Turkish Empire and for the interest of humanity and civilization.

LORD ROBERT CECIL

said, the arguments of his hon. Friend the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in answer to the Motion of his right hon. Friend, seemed to him to be most singular on a question of such importance, and he was afraid that his hon. Friend had used them with great reluctance, and had felt he was called upon to defend—as the present Government had already had to do on previous occasions—a bad case, inherited from the Government which preceded it. In the first place, his hon. Friend said it would be exceedingly intrusive and insolent in that House to interfere in a matter which certain Powers in Europe were about to consider, by their representatives at a Conference at Paris. This subject, said his hon. Friend, was too sacred and recondite for the weak intellects in the House of Commons. Still, although that House could not pretend to instruct the Conference, there was one person whom they could pretend to instruct and influence, without being any more guilty of intrusion in expressing their opinion on the subject coming before the Conference than a constituency in this country would be in expressing its opinion on ally subject which was to come before the House of Commons. His hon. Friend stated that, by assenting to the Motion of his right hon. Friend they would sacrifice the object for which we had waged a bloody and expensive war. His statement of that object was certainly new to him, (Lord R. Cecil), for he said it was simply to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman empire. If we had gone to war merely for such a purpose, we certainly should have acted most foolishly. But we went to war to maintain its integrity against the aggression of Russia. We went to war to prevent the expansion of the Russian empire in a manner that would be most dangerous to cur own interests. The adoption of the Motion, said his hon. Friend, would sanction the disembodiment of the Turkish empire, although the very object for which we went to war was to compel Russia to withdraw from the Principalities which she had invaded. Therefore, continued his hon. Friend, if we sanction any course which would deprive Turkey of full and unlimited power over those Principalities, we should be doing exactly that for which we blamed Russia, But he thought his hon. Friend had overlooked the fact, that it was perfectly possible for a country to belong to an empire in such a sense that the latter should have dominion over it without its being placed entirely at the mercy of that empire. He would suggest a parallel case. Suppose any of the Ionian Islands were invaded, that would be a violation of the integrity of the British empire. England would consider it as an attack upon herself, and resent it accordingly. She would make war upon the aggressor. It would not, however, follow that because she had gone to war to maintain the integrity of the British empire that she would have a right to alter the treaties into which she had previously entered with the people of the Ionian Islands as to the government. That was precisely the case as regarded Turkey and the Principalities. These Principalities had not been conquered by Turkey. It was by treaty that she had acquired power over them, and she had no more right to break that treaty than ally European law. His hon. Friend had said it would be impossible for Europe to grant the five points demanded by the Moldavian assembly, Among those points was one to the effect that the Principalities should be governed by a prince to be chosen from any foreign dynasty. That, said his hon. Friend, would he perfectly inconsistent with the qualified dependence of the Principalities upon the Turkish empire; and he further said that the mode in which they had asked for the five points, precluded the granting of any one of them, without granting all. To show that they laid as much stress upon a foreign prince being placed over them as they did upon the union, he cited a paper which he alleged to be in favour of that view. That paper was not upon the table of the House. It was not therefore in the power of the House to criticize its contents or to read it. Unless, therefore, the House listened very carefully to the words quoted by his hon. Friend, it was impossible for them to have caught the exact meaning thereof. But he (Lord R. Cecil) could prove by documents that that which the Principalities demanded above all other things was their union, that all the other points were merely subsidiary, and that they would be very well satisfied if they could not succeed in any other point than that of their union. The preamble with which the Moldavian assembly passed the five points stated that their most important and most generally entertained wish was that the Principalities should be united into a single State, and that such union was indispensable for their civilization, their prosperity, and the protection of their frontiers. They then went on to ask, considering that that union would produce all the happy results which they expected from it, that a prince from one of the families of a foreign dynasty might be introduced. This document sufficiently showed that their object in demanding a foreign Prince was merely subsidiary to demanding a union of the Principalities, that they hoped thereby to secure a more permanent and effective union, and that there was nothing to prevent the acceptance of one proposition and the rejection of the other. At the same time he should be sorry to say anything which would lead to the idea that he agreed with the hon. Gentleman in thinking that such a permission would be dangerous to the existing state of the Turkish empire, or to the relation which the Principalities legally bore towards that empire. By the treaties which had been read, and by the ancient constitution, the Principalities had always enjoyed the power of electing their own Hospodars, and no limitation was imposed as to the source whence those Hospodars should be drawn. They had always had a right to choose them from foreign families, and there was nothing in that proposition, therefore, to which the Porte could object, as being calculated to imperil the integrity of her empire. The House should consider maturely what would be the fate of those Principalities, if the Motion of his right hon. Friend should be rejected. If the vote of England should be against the Principalities, it was impossible that they could remain in their present position as mere debateable ground for the pretensions of Russia and Turkey. They must be absorbed by one or other of those Powers, of whose despotism and tyranny, oppression and rapacity, it was unnecessary to speak. The probability was, that if the strong assistance of Europe were given in aid of the claims of Turkey, the Principalities would be handed over for the present to Turkey, the most oppressive and rapacious of all Governments. As long as Turkey lasted they would be subjected to her rule, and when Turkey fell, as she ultimately must do, they would become a prey to some other Powers, who would divide her remains between them. He trusted that the House of Commons would show themselves upon this occasion to be the supporters of freedom. They had made many efforts and had talked a great deal about propagating the principles which they professed and spreading the institutions which they revered in other countries. To do that they had engaged in very questionable diplomacy, and had often violated the rights of other Powers, with very little benefit to the cause of freedom. Neither in Spain, nor in Portugal, nor in Italy had any commensurate advantages resulted from our efforts, nor had freedom been advanced by our interference. The consequence was, that on the continent of Europe our claims to be regarded as the champions of liberty were looked upon as hypocritical boastings, for while we were loud in our professions we were lax in our practice. There was now an opportunity which might never recur of supporting those principles which we revered, of establishing those institutions to which we owed our own happiness, and of securing the freedom and welfare of thousands of our fellow-creatures. That opportunity had been afforded in consequence of a pledge given by ourselves, and if it should be neglected and thrown away, the responsibility would fall upon us, and all would feel that it had been lost by our betrayal and our falsehood.

MR. ROEBUCK

Sir, it is a saying which reflects no great honour upon this country, but is nevertheless too true, that our interference has not been an advantage to the nations whom we intend to support; that we proclaim loudly the principle of freedom, bat are very weak in giving them our support. It appears to me, however, that we now have an opportunity which may never occur to us again. In the midst of despotism there exists a nation amongst whom are preserved principles of freedom and of good government, and who may, with our support, largely contribute to the political welfare of mankind. But at present, says the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, we ought not to interfere. Now, Sir, I want to know what is the meaning of that statement? The House of Commons, the governors of England, are about to see their representatives in Paris, in conference with other European Powers, speak in the name and on behalf of England, and we are told we are not to express an opinion to our representatives—that we are not to tell those gentlemen how far we are agreed upon this occasion. Now, it appears to me to be the duty of the House of Commons to tell those gentlemen who speak in the name of England what they ought to do; how they ought to speak; what principles they ought to maintain; on whose behalf they ought to exert themselves. And I, Sir, ask the House of Commons upon this occasion to exert their influence, to raise their voice, and say to the representatives of England that we call upon them to say to the assembled Powers of Europe that we will support a free people in the attempt to govern themselves. Now, Sir, upon what occasion are these representatives to meet, and upon what matters are they to deliberate? It appears that, some years past, the Emperor of Russia thought fit to make war upon Turkey, and in so doing the first thing he did was to transgress certain limits, and the first people whose territory he invaded were the Principalities on the borders of the Danube. We said that, by so doing, he had violated the rules of the law of nations, and we declared war upon tie Emperor of Russia. What did we mean by taking this step? We said that the Emperor of Russia should not invade anybody connected with Turkey; and, so far as the Principalities were connected with Turkey, we opposed the intrusion of Russia into the Principalities. But thereby we did nothing as between the Principalities and Turkey. Those Principalities were connected with Turkey in a peculiar way—they were connected with her by treaty. It was a very old treaty, and it stated that the Principalities entered into it of their own free will, and maintaining their own independence; and there was nothing said in it which would amount to anything more than a truce between Turkey and the Moldo-Wallachian Provinces. Now, this truce maintained simply that Turkey should hold over the Moldo Wallachian Provinces certain powers or suzerainty, but that they should maintain their own dominion over the Provinces. But this suzerainty did not invade at all the independence of the Principalities; the powers given to Turkey were established merely for the purpose of defence, and did not cause the Provinces to form any part of the Turkish empire. What had been done since? The war was concluded; Russia had retired within her frontiers, Austria within hers, and Turkey within hers. Then the Moldo Wallachian people appealing to Western Europe said, "Weave a people in the Eastern countries of Europe but we are a people of Western origin, we are very different from the Turks. We ask you to maintain our individual and peculiar rights." This, Sir, was what they said. And upon that account they were supported by France, and on account of the opposition they would offer to Russia on one side, on another side to Austria, and on a third to Turkey. France said, knowing to what sympathies she was appealing in this country, "Will you not aid us in establishing a free people against these three despotic Powers?" Now, what do this free people ask? I ask the House of Commons to listen to this statement. This is a free people, deriving their origin from a peculiar source, namely, the old Roman empire, who planted the standards of their legions in foreign and barbarous countries, carrying with them the orders and the laws of the Roman empire. Those legions maintained their individuality and their independence throughout ages of tyranny and misrule. Eventually they became subject to the Turkish monarchy then in the ascendant, and this was effected by a treaty which now exists; but they never submitted by conquest to Turkey, but by free and independent union with the Turkish empire. In so doing they never lost sight of their Western origin. They speak a language nearly Roman; they have the religion of the Eastern Church of Rome, and they have preserved the institutions of the Roman empire. From that time to the present they have maintained their individual existence; and when we confound them with, and consider them as a part of, the Turkish empire, we forget their origin and the true connection between them and the Turkish empire. Well, then, what blame ought to attach to this people for desiring a self-elected government? When the Russian war ended, this people applied to the Western Powers of Europe, and said, "We are a Western people, we are separated from the Turkish empire, and we apply to you to protect us against the encroachments of despotism." They asked first for their independence as a people; and then they said that in order to insure that independence they thought they ought to have a king selected from one of the monarchies of Europe. But then it has been said by the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for the Foreign Office that the latter part of the statement was inseparable from the whole statement, and thus rendered it totally impossible to accede to their demand. Sir, I recollect, in reading the history of Europe; that the Italian republics did exactly the same as these people. They said, "We cannot elect one of ourselves to be a governor; we will go abroad to choose;" and the Podestas of the Italian republics were thus selected almost universally from foreign States. And, following this example, the Rouman citizens of the Danube have said they wish a foreign despot—I use the word in its Greek sense—to rule over them, preferring him to any individual chosen amongst themselves. Sir, I feel from physical reasons I am unable to carry out this argument—but t cannot help believing that the Roman system has descended to this people, that they are in origin a Western people, that they have a demand upon us for representative institutions, and that they wish also to be governed by European prince. But then it is said by the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of the Foreign Office, "This cannot be dune;" and the argument which seemed behind all others was that he believed if we did this we should throw them into the arms of Russia. Now, I want to know if we have 5,600,000 of free men governed by a chief chosen by themselves, whether we do not erect a barrier against the empire of Russia greater than by annexing them either to Austria or Turkey? They have the means of improvement; they possess an extremely fertile territory. If the hon. Gentleman tells me that it is not accessible to England, I say that by the arts of peace it may be made so. Down the Danube we have the means of bringing them into connection with Europe, and once so connected we should oppose them as a formidable barrier alike to Austria, Russia, and Turkey. Sir, I feel myself so incapable of doing justice to this strong case, that I depend rather upon the strength of the case than upon myself. The case is one which appeals to every free man in Europe. it is one which ought to raise a sympathetic feeling in the breast of every Englishman. We are not now determining the position of a State that endeavours to govern by anything like despotism. We have learnt the opinions of the people by their Divans. Both these Divans have declared that they wish to be united, to be independent, to have their own laws, and to be under a foreign prince. All these things they have said, and simultaneously; anti I am sure that if England ever wishes to take up any place or position in Western Europe expressive of her dignity and power, let her aid the expressed wishes of a free people, who desire to be governed in a free manner, and by representative institutions. Let us do all this, and we lessen the power of despotism in Europe, by showing our conviction that we ought to support the Moldo-Wallachian people in their attempt to obtain representative institutions. If England ever wishes to take part in the affairs of continental Europe in such a way as to assert her own dignity and conduce to the interests and happiness of mankind, she can only do so by aiding a free people in their endeavour to obtain for themselves representative institutions. Upon these grounds I contend that if we do not accede to the Motion of the right bon. Gentleman we shall be doing all that in us lies to aid despotism in Europe—that the House of Commons will be doing more than ever it has done before to forward bad government in Europe—and that if we wish to support the cause of representative institutions we ought to assist the people of Moldavia and Wallachia in their attempts to be united and free.

MR. DUFF

observed, that, as the Emperor Nicholas had said to Sir Hamilton Seymour, "the sick man" was assuredly dying, and that our duty towards Turkey was a double one, we ought to endeavour to act the part both of the family physician and the family solicitor. We were bound by treaty to do all that we could to preserve that health which was daily sinking, but, failing that, we should take such means as were in our power to secure the sick man's rich inheritance to his natural heirs—the Christian population who were subject to his rule. Moldavia and Wallachia, by seeking their independence, were only following the example set by Servia nearly a century ago, and they ought, if possible, to be placed peacefully in the same position in which Servia had been placed after a long and bloody war. By such a course we should at once do what was best for this population, and, at the same time, should set an example which might be followed with advantage when Bulgaria and other parts of the Turkish empire were ripe to follow in the same course.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON

Sir, I have never heard a debate in which, if I may be permitted to say so, those who have taken part in it seem to me so imperfectly to understand the subject of discussion and the facts of the case. To hear what has passed one would suppose that the question at issue was whether these Principalities were to be subjected to the tyrannical or oppressive internal government of a Turkish pasha, or whether they were to have self-government, to be ruled by chiefs of their own, and to have representative institutions. That seems to be the alternative which the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck) appeared to consider the matter at issue. The hon. and learned Member for Cork (Mr. Serjeant Deasy) apparently thought the question was, whether we should comply with the wishes of the Danubian Principalities by placing them in the same relation to Turkey in which Egypt stands, or whether we should make them more strictly subject to Turkey. Sir, none of these questions are the real ones at issue. The real question is that which was very ably and clearly stated by the hon. Member the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs—namely, whether we should adopt a course which would infallibly be the first step towards the separation of those provinces from the Turkish empire, and thereby commence the dismemberment of Turkey. The right hon. Gentleman who has made this Motion endeavoured to establish a distinction, a refined distinction, between the condition of a country which is ruled by a Sovereign and one which is ruled by a Suzerain and, if I understood his argument, it was that, inasmuch as these provinces were under the Suzerainty of Turkey, that meant nothing at all, and they were practically free and independent and formed no part of the Turkish empire. Well, the hon. and learned Member for Cork referred to a treaty, from which it appears that in the year 1460 those provinces acknowledged that the Sultan should have supreme power over their own Sovereign. Now, that seems to me to be something very like suzerainté for if the ruler of one country is supreme over the ruler of another country—call it what you please—the country so situated is a portion of the dominions of the supreme ruler. But if these provinces are not part of the Turkish empire, how came my right hon. Friend the Member for the University of Oxford (Mr. Gladstone) to be party to a war which could be justified only upon the ground that it was undertaken to repel an invasion upon the Turkish empire? Can it be supposed that the Government of that day called upon England—that the French Emperor called upon France, and that other Powers of Europe were invited to enter upon that war, merely for the purpose of protecting Wallachia and Moldavia against Russian aggression? Why, if those provinces had been separate and independent States, much as we might have regretted the invasion of their territories and the annihilation of their rights, the nations or Europe would not, I think, have taken up arms and made those sacrifices of blood and treasure which they have made in their defence. It was because they were outposts of the Turkish empire, and because their invasion was a menace to that empire, the integrity and independence of which we deemed to be essential to the interests of Europe, that my right hon. Friend and the Government of which he was a Member called upon the people of England to take up arms and to resist tile Russian encroachment. Then, if we look to the ancient history of those provinces, we shall find that from the time when they ceased to form part of the Roman empire down to the present period they have constituted, with the exception of one short interval, two separate States, and that which we are now called upon to sanction is therefore something totally different from anything which has hitherto existed in the case of those provinces. But now let me ask whether their connection with Turkey hiss been marked by oppression? I believe that such has not been the case. I am, upon the contrary, of opinion that if those two provinces have suffered at all, their suffering has been owing to foreign aggression, and their military occupation, in the first place by Russia and then by Austria, though, I admit, for a purpose entirely different from that which existed in the case of the former Power. To their occupation by foreign troops is, I think, to be attributed those grievances and that impoverishment of which they complain, and not to their relations with Turkey. I say, not to their relations with Turkey, because, as has been stated over and over again by those who have taken part in this debate, the condition of their connection with Turkey was that they should be self-governed; that no Turkish troops should be stationed within their limits; that they should be ruled by native chiefs, and should be at liberty to frame such an internal organization as they might think fit—they at the same tune acknowledging the supremacy of the paying to him a certain amount of tribute, and affording him military aid in case of any foreign invasion. I contend, therefore, that that is a fallacious position which assumes that we are now called upon to decide whether those provinces should or should not be free. Free they have been, and free we intend them to be. The question is not whether their internal freedom shall he taken away from them, and they shall be subjected to the internal tyranny of a Turkish pasha, but what shall be the conditions of that internal freedom which all the Powers of Europe are by the treaty of Paris pledged to secure to them? It is said we are called upon by a sense of regard to our national honour and engagements to agree to the Address which my right hon. Friend the Member for the University of Oxford has submitted to our notice. I entirely deny the justice of that proposition. The treaty of Paris entered into no engagements in. regard to this particular question. It is quite true that, at the conferences which took place at Paris, the opinion was expressed by the French and English Plenipotentiaries that certain arrangements might be desirable; but no decision was taken upon the point, and further deliberation was deemed to be necessary. The question that was to be referred under the article of the treaty of Paris was not simply the question of union or separation of the provinces. It was the question of internal organization, and it is a misapplication of that word to confine its meaning within the limits by which it has been sought to be circumscribed. We are told that the reglement organique provides for a union of those two provinces. I should like to know the author by whom that union has been foreshadowed. Why, that was a Russian document, the terms of which were acquiesced in by the Russian Court; and it cannot, therefore, be regarded as embodying the inclinations of the people of Wallachia or Moldavia. Sir, it is quite true that this question of a union was not one which the Divans were precluded from considering as constituting a feature in their organization. We are told that if this question had not been included in their deliberations, faith would not have been kept with these provinces, and the conditions of the treaty of Paris would not have been fulfilled. But what were the conditions of the treaty of Paris? That the Divan should be called for purposes ad hoc, as they were termed. Well, they were summoned; and, according to a letter which had been read to the House, their proceedings were admirably well conducted. It is, however, in my opinion, very easy to imagine what was the nature of proceedings in the case of persons unused to a system of election got up by foreign agitators for particular purposes excited by the circumstances in which they were placed. Indeed, I may observe that the accounts which I have heard of their debates do not altogether tally with the representations made in the letter to which I have referred. It is also said that subtle intrigues were set on foot. Sir, they were not subtle, but open; and it is, I believe, known to everybody that during the whole course of these transactions foreign agency was the cause of the great excitement which prevailed in the Principalities with respect to this question of their union or separation. The Divans, however, did petition for an union; but not in the first instance, inasmuch as the Moldavian Divan was known to be adverse to the union. It was, however, sent about its business. Another was elected, but elected under influence which was paramount, and the Divan so elected joined the Wallachian in voting for an union. But what sort of union? Why, an union, as was stated by the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, under a foreign Prince. And why was that the case? For this most obvious reason—that Moldavia would never submit to be ruled by Wallachia; that Wallachia would not submit to be ruled by Moldavia; and that neither the one nor the other of them would consent to be governed by a Prince appointed by the Sultan. Under these circumstances they asked for a foreign Prince. And who is that foreign Prince to be? The inhabitants of those provinces nearly all profess the Greek religion, and I am strongly of opinion that Russia would have an insurmountable objection to placing any other than a Greek Prince in the position of a governor of those united States. And where, let me ask, are you to find a Greek Prince? Why, to be sure, among the members of the Royal family of Russia. The House may therefore rest satisfied that the union of Wallachia and Moldavia under a foreign prince means nothing less than their union under the sway of the Russian Royal family, or of some one dependent upon Russia. To the appointment of a Catholic Prince I doubt whether all the five Powers would assent. If, moreover, a Catholic Prince were appointed, he would have to maintain himself against the powerful Greek influence which would be brought to bear upon him, by leaning on that power which can best control the Greek Church. We may be sure, therefore, that whether a Greek or a Catholic Prince were selected, he would be forced to become subservient to Russia—to occupy the position of her vassal—in order to secure obedience from his subjects. The appointment of a foreign Prince, then, I contend, to rule the Principalities, would be the first step towards effecting that separation to which some hon. Members are opposed. For can any man believe that a Prince fit to govern 4,000,000 or 5,000,000 people would long submit to be the vassal of the Sultan? Impossible! He would aspire to independence, and independence he would soon obtain. Well, then, fancy a country extremely small as compared with the adjoining countries, having Russia on the one side, Austria on the other, and Turkey upon a third, and see how such a country can maintain her independence. It is impossible, in my opinion, that she could avoid becoming the vassal of one or the other of her more powerful neighbours. Escaping that destiny she would follow the fate of Poland, and be partitioned between them. It is perfectly absurd to think that a State so situated could bear up against the colossal power of Russia. Possessing no fortresses, no frontier defences, Russia would in a moment overspread her territories, as she has done whenever she chose to exert herself for that purpose. So situated, she would become a scene of intrigue and confusion to the detriment of her peace and welfare, or would, as I said before, follow the fate of Poland, and be either altogether absorbed by Russia, or divided between her and Austria. I say, we can all enter into the feelings of men for whom all wish a better political condition—that is to say, for a political condition of more honour and glory, and especially one sympathises with individuals belonging to that country who may think that in a united state there would be a better field for the display of the talents with which they are endowed; but I say it is a short-sighted view, even for the Moldavians and Wallachians themselves, if that which the right hon. Gentleman now asks this House to urge upon the Government to support were indeed established. We are told we ought not to deny them representative assemblies. They had them even by the organic statutes; they ought to have had them, only the jealousy of Russia took care that those assemblies should never meet, or, if they met, that they should be but mere shadows of representative assemblies. But, the Congress of Paris intended to record the opinion that they should have real representative assemblies, and it was fur the purpose of asking them what conditions of internal organization they thought most conducive to their political and civil welfare, the development of their resources, and their internal prosperity. It was for that purpose the Divans were called, and their wishes asked, in order that they might be carried out. But these unhappy Divans, carried away by agitations and the intrigues of those who had other views than those who merely had the interests of the country at heart, refused to go into the real points upon which their wishes were sought to be known, and confined themselves to this unattainable object, the separation, as I may call it, from Turkey under the rule of a Christian prince. Then, I say, it is not for the interests of the Principalities themselves—it is not for the interest of Europe, it is not in conformity with the engagements of the Treaty of Paris, by which all the Powers bound themselves to maintain, as far as they could, the integrity of the Turkish empire—it is not consistent with any of those circumstances that we should assent to the proposition of the right hon. Gentleman, and that the representative of England at the Paris Conference should be instructed to urge the union of the two provinces. We are dealing with this matter really as if we were met at the Congress of 1815, when a map of Europe was spread out upon the Congress table to he divided according to the good will of the parties concerned. But, Sir, it must be remembered that the Government made war, Parliament agreed to that war, and the nation supported it for the purpose of maintaining the independence and integrity of the Turkish empire—that war was brought to a successful termination, and we concluded the Treaty of Paris, by which all concerned pledged themselves to maintain and to respect the integrity of the Turkish empire. And yet here we arc called upon as the result of a successful war waged in order to maintain the independence of Turkey, as the execution of a treaty in which a most distinct pledge was given to maintain that integrity and independence, to take a step which the Turkish Government considers, as I think every reasonable man will pronounce, to be the first step towards a dismemberment of that empire. That would be stultifying ourselves, acting in opposition to all the rules of policy which this country has of late years uniformly maintained, and it would be, I think, contrary to the great and manifest interests of the Principalities themselves, if this House should be led away by the eloquence of the right hon. Gentleman whom we always listen to with pleasure, although we may differ as to the conclusions at which he arrives. I trust the House will not be led away by that eloquence to accede to the Motion, which would be adverse to the fundamental policy of this country, which would be contrary to the engagements of this country, which would not be for the benefit of the unhappy people for whose advantage it is intended, and which would lead to consequences probably entailing European dissension, if not European war. As I have said, this union would confer no benefit upon the Principalities, because they would receive without the union the same internal organization, the same representative assemblies, and the same internal self-government which they would have if united. They would receive all the benefits, whether of commerce, trade, military arrangements, or internal legislation, as separate provinces which they could hope for if united; only in the former case they will continue to enjoy the additional security which the connection with the Turkish empire gives them under the treaty by which all the European Powers are bound, whereas if they were cast loose to become a little Poland in the midst of despotic military States, I say their fate would soon be sealed, their independence would cease, their representative assemblies would be quashed, and the jealousy of neighbouring arbitrary and military Powers would soon put an end to their internal freedom, which those who support this Motion are so anxious to secure, and they would either become the conquest of Russia, or they would be partitioned between the two great Powers of Austria and Russia, by whom they are surrounded.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL

Sir, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs asks us how it is that the House should be called upon to interfere in this matter of the Danubian Principalities, and has found fault with my right hon. Friend the Member for Oxford University as if he were proposing that the Hone should dictate to the Powers of Europe in conference assembled. To the first of these questions I answer, that here is a question to which the good faith of England is pledged; and I ask, can it be a matter of indifference to the House of Commons that the good faith of England should under any circumstances be called in question? I hold that, whether our character for good faith stands high, or is justly impugned, is a matter that the House of Commons must necessarily feel some interest in; it is not one that they can afford to pass by as if it did not concern them. But with regard to the hon. Gentleman's second question, I should say that my right hon. Friend (as I understand his Motion) does not propose to say what the Powers of Europe should give as their opinions in the Conferences of Paris, but merely says what in the opinion of the House of Commons should be the language of the Plenipotentiary of England. If that opinion be given, it will be the limit of the power of this House; and it is not my right hon. Friend's wish to say what should be the language of the other Powers of Europe. But if we are informed correctly, I believe I am right in saying that the language of Great Britain in these Conferences has not been confined to expressing her own views, but has been used to influence other Powers. Coming, however, to the question itself, I look upon it as one of great magnitude, and as one that must cause considerable anxiety. I agree with the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State, that we ought not to set up any power in the Principalities that should be in any way a rival to that Power whose integrity and independence we are bound by the treaty, in common with the other Powers to that treaty, to maintain. We are bound in good faith not only directly to protect the integrity which we guaranteed, and for the sake of which we went to war with Russia, but we should not make any arrangement by which that integrity would be indirectly impaired and the independence of that Power diminished. So far, I agree with the hon. Gentleman. But let us see what the condition of the Principalities is, and what it is that we have undertaken. In the fifteenth century, as has been well remarked by the hon. and learned Member for Cork (Mr. Serjeant Deasy), certain stipulations were made between the Sultan and the rulers of these Principalities, by which a certain tribute was to be paid to the Sultan, but in which the largest powers of self-government were reserved to the rulers of these Principalities—powers extending even to the making of treaties and to the declaring war and making peace with the neighbouring States; and these powers, such as usually indicate independence, were reserved to the Christian rulers of the Principalities. These regulations, it is true, were not very strictly observed; the Sultan frequently violated them, and Russia found an opportunity, during the reign of Catherine, of interfering, and of asserting a power of interference and a power of meddling with that portion of the Turkish empire by treaties she made after successful wars. Those powers of interference had been carried so far by various treaties—by that of Kanardge amongst others—that at length there was hardly any transaction in any part of the internal government of the Principalities with which Russia did not claim the right of interfering. That being the case, when the war between Russia and France and Great Britain broke out, those Principalities, according to their organic statutes and according to treaties, had complete power of self-government. They could make their own laws as to religion—no Turk was allowed to settle in the country. They could make their own laws for regulating commerce and trade, and their own laws respecting the administration of justice. In short, their whole internal government, so far as the Porte was concerned, was independent. But the interference of Russia, as I have said, was frequently employed in intriguing with respect to the internal affairs of those provinces, and against the influence of the Porte. Well, Sir, when we had settled what should be the terms of peace, if the first object was that Russia should no longer have the power of control and perpetual interference which she had formerly exercised, the question naturally arose what was to be the state of the Principalities themselves. That was a question of great difficulty, because, when the Powers of Europe were ready to place themselves in the position in which Russia had previously stood, so far as guaranteeing the privileges of these Principalities as against Turkey, it led to a discussion of what those privileges should be; and besides being the duty, it was the interest of the great Powers to make those privileges as safe with regard to their internal position and their internal peace, in order to prevent the necessity of the interference of any other Powers, as in their wisdom they could do. Those Powers, especially England and France, might have taken one of two courses. They might have said, the will consider what is best for the Principalities—we will review this organic statute which contains many excellent provisions, and we will guarantee the statute so revised and altered—leaving the Principalities with all the privileges they have hitherto enjoyed, and with such improvements as they may make. No doubt the Principalities would have submitted to that arrangement if it had really been one that would have contributed to their happiness and to the safety of their internal organization. Or we might have taken another course—we might have said we will consult the people of the Principalities themselves—we will go to the people of Wallachia and Moldavia and ask them to elect representatives—let them say what they will have, and then grant their wishes so far as they accord with the treaty we have concluded. Neither of these courses did we take. But we took a third course, the most unwise and irritating that could by any possibility have been adopted. We assembled the Divan—the representatives of the Principalities—and when they had deliberated and expressed their feelings, wishes in clear and unmistakeable language and with an unanimity rarely seen in a popular assembly, then we turn round upon them and say you are a disorderly set—you don't know what you are about—you have been acted on by external and by private influences—you have acted under excitement and in ignorance of your own interests, and therefore we will cast to the winds all that you propose and entirely neglect your wishes and requests. Now, that appears to me to be the most unwise and irritating course that could have been taken. There has been a great deal of talk here—my right hon. Friend, my noble. Friend, and every hon. Member who has spoken in this debate has talked about the power and influence which Russia will have if these Principalities are united as they desire. Why, Sir, it seems to me that we have paved the way for Russia—we have opened the road for her. Last year I stated that it was quite obvious that without your interference the influence of Russia in the Principalities was secured. For if you set up a prince over Moldavia he would naturally look to Russia to increase his power by uniting the two provinces. He would know that the other great Powers could not forward his views He would be dissatisfied, and the whole of the inhabitants of the province would become discontented because Great Britain and France hail refused their desires, and they would turn to Russia as the only Power that could assist them in attaining their object. So that you have so contrived it that whether you grant or refuse the wishes of the Principalities you increase the influence of Russia. The only way, as it appears to me, to get out of this dilemma is the course proposed by my right hon. Friend. The Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs tells us (and he read a paper to the House upon the subject which I had never heard of before) that Wallachia will not hear of this union unless she has a foreign Prince to rule over her. Is that to be understood as the formal declaration of the two provinces Have they come to any formal resolution to that effect; and, if so, what has been said to them? Have we no Commissioner there? I believe that we have employed there one of the ablest men in our whole diplomacy. Hive you said to them, will you take the union without the foreign Prince, or will you accept a Prince from some part of the Turkish empire? Has that question ever been put to them? Have they ever been asked, and if so, have they ever refused? For unless they have it is most unfair for a Secretary of State to come down here and say if we grant four-fifths of their demands they will not be content unless we grant the other fifth. That appears to me to be a proposal that might be made. I believe it is a proposal they would accept, namely, to have an union of the Principalities, but with some person to rule over them not connected with either of the great Powers of Europe—one that should not be a Prussian Prince or a member of any of the great families of Europe, but one who is acquainted with their habits, manners, and customs. I think the hon. Gentleman said they would not like to have a Prince who would be liable to be deposed, and it is no doubt the constant deposition of their Hospodars that has been the great cause of the discord and difficulties of these Principalities. The Sultan reserved to himself the right of deposing, and there was in consequence always a number of families intriguing against the reigning Hospodar, who would get up complaints, and carry them to the Sultan, in order to get him deposed. In that way the state of these provinces was constantly disturbed, in consequence of the intrigues of the nobility against the reigning family. Then they say, and I think very reasonably, let us have a Prince who is not subject to these influences—let us have a foreign Prince. Let us imagine what would be the state of things then? They would have that self-government which but for the interference of Russia they would have enjoyed very many years, and they would increase in wealth and prosperity. But, says my noble Friend, that would be no barrier against the designs of Russia. It appears to me, on the contrary, that ft people enjoying the benefit of self-government, increasing in wealth and prosperity—a people in the enjoyment of liberty—that such a people form the best barrier against foreign aggression and foreign conquests that can be devised—a barrier far better and more effective than any treaty. That has been the result in other parts of Europe. In the division of Europe in 1815 those wise persons by whom that arrangement was finally made, it is well known, departed from the plan of Mr. Pitt, with regard to uniting Belgium with Prussia—in that final arrangement Belgium was joined to Holland, and what was the result? Everybody who travelled in those countries at that time knows that Belgium speedily became discontented and demanded a separation. The Dutch, though they governed themselves very well, had not the art to govern the Belgians, whose language, religion, and habits differed from theirs. There was general discontent; and at last, in 1832, Belgium was erected into an independent kingdom under King Leopold. That was an arrangement made by my noble Friend the Member for Tiverton, who was then Foreign Secretary; and ever since then there had been a strong national spirit in Belgium. They have enjoyed their own constitution, their representative chambers, and their free press. They value those institutions, and I believe nothing would be so irksome to them, or so likely to create resistance, as any attempt to extend French or any other foreign influence in that country. These are matters which those who negotiate diplomatic treaties sometimes neglect to take into consideration. But they ought to remember in making these arrangements that the content of a people, the love of a people for their institutions, form a barrier against foreign foes more successful than the most skilfully drawn treaties. These, then, are my opinions as to the arrangements which ought to be made. I think the House ought to feel itself indebted to my right hon. Friend for bringing forward the subject. I feel that those who at Paris made an engagement to consult the Principalities, did, to a certain extent, commit the faith of this country. I feel also the justice of the statement made by the noble Lord opposite (Lord R. Cecil) that we are too often accused of giving encouragement to nations to assert their liberties and to proclaim their independence, and then calmly and coldly deserting their cause. Pudet hæc opprobria nobis Et dici potuisse. Well, Sir, one would not much mind that, but for the conclusion of the quotation ct non potuisse refelli. One would not mind the "opprobria" if it were not for the painful reflection, "non potuisse refelli." But it is painful, in such a case as this, coming forward at the time when the case of Sardinia is exciting attention, to find that after giving encouragement, we are about to withdraw front the Principalities the support of this coun- try. It will give rise not only to disappointment, but the complaint of want of faith. I think that Her Majesty's Plenipotentiary should have instructions not to support the placing of a foreign Prince over the Principalities, whose aim it would be to extend his dominion into Bulgaria, but that they should have a united Government—a united Legislature; and I believe that, under such a Government and such a Legislature, the Principalities will flourish and afford a security to Turkey and an additional security to Europe.

THE CHANCELLOR OF EXCHEQUER

Sir, the noble Lord who has just sat down has told us that it is only by adopting the Address moved by the right hon. Member for the University of Oxford that we can extricate ourselves from the dilemma in which we find ourselves. Now, it appears to me that, if we adopt the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman, we shall find ourselves in a dilemma, because the right hon. Gentleman, in his eloquent speech which produced that full effect it was in every respect calculated to produce, animated as it was by a generous spirit and a generous subject, has warned the House that France is at this time only anxiously awaiting the sign from us to adopt the policy which his Address recommends. Now, Sir, at the present moment there is upon this subject a perfect identity of sentiment, of views, and of policy, in the widest and truest sense of those words, between the Government of Her Majesty and the Court of France, and in a few days the representatives of these two Governments will be prepared to maintain, to recommend, and to enforce that policy; but, if the House of Commons should now come forward, on the eve of the commencement of negotiations, and adopt such an Address as that moved by the right hon. Gentleman, hampering the English representatives without in any way influencing the conduct of the French representatives, that appears to me a course which may indeed place us in a dilemma. The noble Lord who last addressed us has said that the honour of this House, of Parliament, and of the country, is concerned in this question, and that we are taking a course which involves a departure from the engagement into which we have entered. That is a very serious charge. We are all guardians of the honour of our country in this House, and I acknowledge the gravity of the allegation made by the noble Lord, if, indeed, it is susceptible of any proof; but when we are reminded of the engagements into which we have entered, is it not prudent—before we come to a hasty vote, which may have an influence upon the course of events that few Members of this House, perhaps, are prepared to contemplate—that we should have a clear idea of the engagements that have been contracted by this country? I must therefore ask the permission of the House to refer to the articles relating to this subject contained in the Treaty of Peace negotiated at Paris in 1856. The 22nd article of that Treaty provides,— The Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia shall continue to enjoy, under the suzerainty of the Porte, and under the guarantee of the contracting Powers, the privileges and immunities of which they are in possession. No exclusive protection shall be exercised over them by any of the guaranteeing Powers. There shall be no separate right of interference in their internal affairs. Who is there prepared to assert or to prove that any one who is or has been Minister of this country is trying to recede from this engagement? But the 24th article of the Treaty provides,— His Majesty the Sultan promises to convoke immediately in each of the two Provinces a Divan ad hoc, composed in such a manner as to represent most closely the interests of all classes of society. These Divans shall be called upon to express the wishes of the people in regard to the definitive organization of the Principalities. An instruction from the Congress shall regulate the relations between the Commission and these Divans. Well, who denies that any expression by these Divans with reference to the definitive organization of the Principalities will not be respected? You have heard from the noble Lord that a joint Legislature is most desirable for the Principalities. But, Sir, there is no engagement on the part of this country which would prevent the establishment of a joint Legislature in the Principalities. The subject is open for the labour, the study, the thought, and the contrivance of the Conference which is now about to meet. In dealing with such a subject, we must have reference to the engagements of treaties and to the rights of Powers. You cannot settle a question of this kind by brilliant orations in a Divan ad hoc. This House, so jealous of the justice and of the honour of this country, must look in some degree, I suppose, to the rights of the Powers that are interested. That at least was the opinion of the noble Lord who has just addressed us when he was the representative of his Sovereign at Vienna. Nothing could be more statesmanlike than the expressions of the noble Lord upon that subject, when the 6th protocol was discussed on the 26th of March, 1855. I find that on that occasion, Lord John Russell observed that if in the discussion on the first point of negotiation he had not touched on several questions, such as the union of the two Principalities into one, the government for life or hereditary of the Hospodars, the opportunity for a national representation, it was not that their importance had escaped him, but it seemed to him that the initiative of propositions of this kind belonged to the Sublime Porte, and that the consideration of them ought to be adjourned to the time when the Ottoman Government was in a position to make known all its views to the Conference. We do not now, however, find such consideration on the part of the noble Lord for the views of the Ottoman Government, of whose interests, when the representative of his Sovereign at Vienna, he was so justly sensitive, At that time the noble Lord, whose mind was absorbed in the consideration of this important subject,—who did not then take it up merely in debate, but treated it with the responsibility of one representing the honour mid the interests of his country, and who was engaged in regulating the destinies of Europe—addressed a despatch to the Secretary of State, in which he expressed himself like a statesman, as when he writes despatches he always does. The noble Lord said in that despatch, with regard to the very point before us, that With regard to an hereditary Prince establishing himself by wise laws and conciliatory conduct—such a Prince would scarcely remain long a vassal of the Porte. Now, we have heard something during the debate of the Pasha of Egypt, whose case was adduced as analogous to that under consideration by some hon. Gentlemen who, I suppose, are about to vote with the noble Lord. But what says the noble Lord in the despatch to which I am referring. He says— The Pasha of Egypt has the tie of religion to bind him to the Caliph; but a Christian Prince, though he might call the Sultan his suzerain, would be for all practical purposes independent. The noble Lord at that time, having due respect for the interests and rights of the Porte,—feeling that upon such a subject Turkey ought to be consulted,—laying it down in a protocol that the initiative should be taken by Turkey, felt that for all practical purposes a Christian Prince would be perfectly independent. The noble Lord, exhausting the subject with the ability which he can at will command, and speak- ing of the Principalities as independent States, or quasi independent States, said further,— With regard to free institutions, it must be remarked that the Sovereigns of Austria and Russia would never tolerate in the neighbourhood of Poland and Hungary promoters of disturbance and rebellion among their subjects. I read this important document because when we are told that the Government and Parliament of England are about to be false to engagements which they have entered into, we should clearly understand what these engagements mean, and then examine whether the interpretation put on them by the noble Lord is consistent with sound policy and English interests. But the noble Lord exhausts the subject. Speaking, of the united Provinces as a quasi independent State, he proceeds to say:— Freedom of discussion and liberty of the press would scarcely be suffered to proceed to any large extent unmolested; disturbance would be alleged, insurrection feared, and armed intervention contemplated. It is questionable whether, in such circumstances, Great Britain could interfere in behalf of these weak provinces with any effect. It is therefore worthy of consideration how far we should promote institutions which we should not be able afterwards to protect. That, Sir, is the whole question. Nothing in the world is easier than to come forward on an occasion like the present, on the eve of the meeting of a European Conference, with the interests of oppressed nationalities at stake, and make such representations as we have heard to-night; but when you analyze them they vanish like a fairy dream. These descendants of the ancient Dacians, free, independent, brave, prosperous, a community with which any generous heart must sympathize, and to accomplish whose destinies almost every man would be prepared to make a sacrifice,—these people, painted in such glowing colours, when we ask hon. Members what security there is for the maintenance of such a state of society, every practical man in a moment sees that it is the picture of a generous fancy, and one which probably would lead, if encouraged, to consequences that would afford an awful contrast to the dreams in which we had indulged. We have to consider the position of a limited population, scattered over a considerable region, with, no doubt, great un developed wealth and resources, but not a people of such multitude as gives strength to a State. We are to remember, too, that these 4,000,000 or 5,000,000 of people are surrounded by powerful military States and all the organization of arbitrary Governments. But then we are told that they are to form a barrier to the innovations of Russia, Austria, and Turkey, when called into existence and supported by the influence—I fear only the moral influence—of the Great Western Powers. How, I ask, are we to reach them? How are we to support them? What can we do to maintain them? It is not by speeches in the House of Commons; it is not by votes in this House that we can maintain a factitious independence like this; all that we should obtain by our interference would be the remorse which, when their rising civilization was crushed, we should all of us feel, and which would be painted with admirable eloquence by the rhetorician of the day. Now, Sir, we must consider this question in as practical a manner as possible. What are the engagements into which this country has entered? I have read them to the House, and these engagements we ought to fulfil not only to the letter, but in the spirit. We ought to exert all the power and influence we possess to obtain for these provinces good government and self-government. We ought to obtain that, and I believe we can do so with the cordial co-operation of the French Government; and if we do that we shall not only fulfil our engagements, but obtain all that is now practicable to insure the welfare and prosperity of these provinces, But if we take any other course—if, on the one hand, we entirely neglect them, which would indeed be a stain on our honour; or if, on the other, we engage in fantastic schemes, or attempt to make unsound arrangements, we shall find the inevitable result to be confusion, anarchy, intervention—armed intervention, as the noble Lord says in his despatch to the Earl of Clarendon—the interference of the great military Powers with their neighbours, and on our part either the total neglect of those whose hopes we had encouraged, and whose fortunes to a certain degree we were bound in honour to guard, or a European war, the term and extent of which no person can calculate. It is impossible to conceive a course more impolitic than that recommended to us to-night—impolitic, generally speaking, if you only look at the consequences of such violent interferences, but still more impolitic if you look to the cruel results that must ensue to that very com- munity in which we are all interested, and the prosperity of which we must all wish to promote. Is there any man in this House who really believes that Austria and Russia—I need not say Turkey, because Turkey to obtain her objects, if you were to pursue a policy contrary to that which you have followed hitherto, would join with either Austria or Russia—is there any man who supposes that these great Powers would calmly and quietly submit to your fantastic interference in that quarter of the world? They would first interfere them, selves in a very different manner—and what then would be your position? If you succeed so far as to make some arrangement which may for a moment please the prevalent party in these Principalities—if you then leave them, and if there is disturbance and armed intervention, what will you do? It is a very grave question, when we hear the honour of England so strongly appealed to, to ask how far our honour will be pledged to interfere, and what may be the consequences of the engagements we are invited so carelessly to enter into. I must say that it appears to me we are asked to take a completely retrograde movement. When you heard that the Russians had crossed the Pruth, and could not conceal from yourselves that a European war was at hand, you entered into that war. In that war you underwent immense sacrifices. The blood of this country was lavished, and the treasure of this country expended. We were discussing only a few nights ago the difficulty of meeting the very pecuniary engagements incurred in consequence of that war; and now we are asked to take a course totally opposed to the well-organized policy of the country, and to take it on the eve of a great Conference at Paris. If the views expressed by the noble Lord the Member for Stamford (Lord R. Cecil) are sound—if the House accepts those political views, then you are justified in supporting the Address to the Crown. If, indeed, the fall of Turkey is to be looked on as a realized fact—if all that the Parliament of England has done during the last five years—if all that the people of England have suffered during the last five years on this subject is entirely an illusion, then you would be justified in ratifying the sentiments of the noble Lord the Member for Stamford. But, as I believe the opinions of the noble Lord are raw and crude opinions, as I believe they are not the opinions of any one who has sufficiently thought on the Subject on which he has spoken with so much authority, I must decline to follow his example. But that such opinions should be in any degree sanctioned by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University, a Member of the Cabinet that incurred the awful responsibility of entering into a war to maintain the integrity of the Turkish empire, is to me matter of deep astonishment. On the ground of high policy I would deprecate the House sanctioning this Address. I can assure the House that at this moment it would be impossible for the House of Commons to take a step more embarrassing than with regard to the Conference at Paris,—more embarrassing to the conduct of the Government of this country, that conduct being in entire unison with the policy which Parliament has so long sanctioned, No moment could be more inconvenient—I am not putting it on the plea, so often and justly ridiculed, that it is always inconvenient for Parliament to offer an opinion before an event; but I say that if, indeed, such strong feelings have impressed the right hon. Gentleman, the Member for the University, as he has expressed on this subject, it is deeply to be regretted that any delay has taken place in bringing the question under the consideration of Parliament, That at this very moment when there exists between the Governments of France and England a complete identity of political feeling on this subject, and that when their views are well considered and matured, an Address like this should be offered to the consideration of the House, I must ever deplore. Not taking, however, that larger view of the subject, but taking one which, however we may differ on the subject before us, touches, I am sure, the feelings of every hon. Gentleman present on whatever side of the House he may sit—namely, one connected with the condition of the Principalities themselves, I equally lament and deprecate the Motion. I think there is at this moment a prospect—I would say more than a prospect,—not of raising up in the Danubian Principalities a fantastic kingdom, not of establishing in those countries what indeed would he but the phantom of independence, but of securing for the inhabitants the enjoyment of a greater share of civil rights, and even of political liberty, than was ever yet enjoyed by any of the populations in the neighbourhood of that great stream. Believing this, and believing that there is more than a prospect of attaining these great ends, I must entreat the House for every consideration, both of the highest political character, and also of a character less in importance, but yet intimately connected with the future prosperity of these countries—I must entreat the House not to sanction an Address the consequence of which, if carried, will, in my mind, be of the most painful nature to this country and Europe.

MR. GLADSTONE

I feel it necessary to remind the House of the nature of the ease really before us. The right hon. Gentleman has been, indeed, most liberal of praise to myself and others on the subject of the eloquence we have displayed. That appears to have made a great impression on his mind, and he has lavished compliments upon the "rhetorician of the day." I will not be guilty of the affected modesty of pretending to be ignorant that that designation was intended for myself. [The CHANCELLOR Of the EXCHEQUER: I beg your pardon, I really did not mean that.] The right hon. Gentleman has satisfied my mind, and has thus spared the House some two minutes comment, with which, I am sure, they can well dispense. But the right hon. Gentleman has drawn largely himself on his stores of oratory, for what else were the sesquipedalian words and the long catalogue of horrors which he has placed before us? The right hon. Gentleman has said, in inflated language, "Do not let us have violent interference or fantastic interference, for the consequence thereof would be confusion, anarchy, armed intervention, and European wart;" and then, relieving the dark side of the picture by another view which is cheerful, he intimates to us, in emphatic phrase and in words from which I wish I could extract a single grain of meaning, that, if only let alone, he will shower down blessings on the Principalities with a hand more liberal than has ever yet been opened for their welfare and prosperity. Now, what does all this mean in reference to what the House is invited to do? I affirm that there is no violent interference, no fantastic interference, and no interference at all asked for on the part of the House. We are not now going to decide anything, we are not going to attempt to bind the hands of the Conference at Paris, or to pretend that an independent State ought to be erected in the Principalities. We are not going to say or imply that the Principalities ought to be placed under a foreign Prince, Not one word in this Address can legitimately bear any such construction, and in point of fact, all this language about violent and fantastic interference, and about horrors and alarms, is applicable only to the phantom which the right hon. Gentleman himself has conjured up. With respect to the Government of France the right hon. Gentleman has been so enigmatical as to leave me without the slightest guide for my conduct. The right hon. Gentleman says that the Governments of France and England have come to the same point. I never denied that, but stated strongly my conviction that if England persisted Franco must give way; but the right hon. Gentleman did not tell us that France had receded from the declarations which she made to Europe in 1856. In that year the Government of France and the Conference at Paris declared that the union of the Principalities was salutary and indispensable, and our Plenipotentiary supported that opinion. Surely these facts have passed from the recollection of the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton, for that noble Lord says that if the House adopts the Address, which cannot be considered as going further than expressing in mild and moderate terms a favourable opinion in respect to the union of the Principalities, that would be the first step towards the dismemberment of the Turkish empire. If so, I ask what was the meaning of the declaration of the Earl of Clarendon, made on the part of the noble Lord to the effect that the union of the Principalities was needful for the prosperity of those countries? The right hon. Gentleman asks why did we go to war, and I also ask why did we go to war, if, after peace is established, we, by violating our pledges and disappointing the expectations we have deliberately raised, exasperate the minds of a population which never can be held in permanent connection with Turkey unless it is placed in a state of contentment? That is the question now submitted to the House, and that is the basis of the policy laid down in a public document in the most solemn manner by the English and French Ministers, the English Minister being the Earl of Clarendon, who must necessarily be supposed to have expressed the views of the noble Lord the Member of Tiverton and of his Administration. The effect of the Earl of Clarendon's declaration was that union was salutary and needful for the Principalities, and the declaration, throwing a light upon the intentions of the Conference, having been made, an article was afterwards inserted in the Treaty of Paris, providing that the Principalities should be consulted. Well the Principalities have been consulted, and have returned an almost unanimous answer in favour of the union; and now the question is whether you are going to abandon at once the policy which you yourselves declared, and likewise the pledges you held out to that population. The House is called on, at the latest moment, I grant, for patience and forbearance dictated the postponement of the question as long as possible, to say whether, now that the matter has become a question of national honour and good faith, it approves or disapproves the solemn conclusions deliberately taken and announced at Paris. The right hon. Gentleman may think that from some cause, not clearly explained, evil may arise from the adoption of the Address, but I, on the other hand, hope he will give credit to those who support the Motion for a sincere and conscientious conviction that to place England in opposition to the union of the Principalities, desired by almost the whole of the population, and to drag France through the influence of England into a similar position, in flat contradiction to the pledges and promises which those two powers have given, is indeed to take a step towards the dismemberment of the Turkish empire, and to adopt effectual means to drive the people of the Principalities to arms, or rather to lay them at the feet of the Emperor of Russia.

Question put.

The House divided:—Ayes 114; Noes 292: Majority 178.