DIVORCE AND MATRIMONIAL CAUSES BILL.—COMMITTEE: (Hansard, 6 August 1857)

§ MR. DRUMMOND
said, he had objected to the Bill from the commencement, but in the observations which he made upon the second rending he confined himself strictly to the principle of the Bill, and had been no party to two attempts to throw obstructions in the way of what he considered to be the decided opinion of the House. On the contrary, he wished to contribute whatever part he could to make the Bill, not such as he fancied the Bill should be, 1154 but such as it was declared the Bill ought to be, by those who originally brought it forward. The clause before the Committee constituted the Court. He thought it must have struck every one, except the framers of the Bill, that such a Court could not possibly do any business, and if any doubt had existed, the statement of the hon. and learned Member for Wallingford (Mr. Malins) proved incontestably that it could not work. The statement was that a cause in the Court of Chancery was obliged to be postponed from May to November, although the Judge and every one connected with it were exceedingly anxious to have it settled, because the Judge could not go on until a Common Law Judge could be got to sit with him. It occurred to him that if there were only one Judge in all the other courts this court might be presided over by one Judge, for, in point of fact, the House of Lords was really nothing more than the machinery by which the Lord Chancellor pronounced judgment in these cases. He therefore proposed to substitute one Judge for all these Judges, and the only way he could do it, according to the forms of the House, was to move to leave out Clauses 8, 9, and 10, for the purpose of substituting other clauses, which he could not move until the end of the Bill. The clauses which he should propose at the end of the Bill were— The Judge of the Court of Probate shall be also Judge of the Court of Matrimonial Causes and Divorce, and shall have full authority to hear and determine all matters arising therein. Suitors who are dissatisfied with the decisions of the Court of Matrimonial Causes and Divorce in suits which have come before it in the first instance, may appeal to the Judicial Committee of Privy Council; but suitors who have applied to the County Courts can only appeal to the Court of Matrimonial Causes and Divorce. His object was to reserve cases involving a great amount of property for the new Court, but to give to the poorer classes the power of instituting the same suits in the County Courts, which was the only possible way of providing a cheap court. He should also move the addition of the following clauses: the first of them being intended to meet the case of a suit for a separation being instituted in a fit of passion or ill-humour, by giving the parties a twelvemonth to cool and reconsider the matter:— The parties who under the provisions of this Act are entitled to seek judicial separation through the County Courts in the district where they reside may give notice of their intention to apply for the same to the clerk of the said court, who 1155 shall enter such notice in a book to be kept for that purpose, and the Judge of the said court shall forward a copy of such notice to the Judge Ordinary of the Court of Marriage and Divorce, but no further step shall be taken therein until after the expiration, of one year from the date of the notice. In any suit before the Court of Marriage and Divorce, or County Courts as the case may be, if either of the parties to the same, demand that the cause shall be heard in private, it shall be so heard accordingly. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to limit or curtail any redress which might be obtained by a wife against her husband for cruelty before the passing of the present Act. It shall be lawful for the Lord Chancellor for the time being to issue such rules as may be needful for regulating the proceedings in the County Courts in all suits for judicial separation, in such way as to bring them into conformity with the proceedings in the Court of Matrimonial Causes and Divorce, and also to regulate the mode by which appeals may be made against the decisions of the said County Courts, which appeals shall be heard only before the Court of Matrimonial Causes and Divorce.

LORD JOHN MANNERS
said, it was understood the other evening that the Attorney General would reconsider the constitution of the Court, and submit a more mature proposition to the Committee. Perhaps the hon. and learned Gentleman was prepared to state to the Committee what he proposed to do.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
said, that when the other evening, his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Wallingford (Mr. Malins) called attention to the constitution of the Court, and suggested that it would be better to have a larger number of Judges from which to choose in order to render more certain the expeditious proceeding of the Court, he thought the suggestion a very good one, and it tallied with ideas which he had previously entertained. He wished, therefore, to have the clause postponed, to have an opportunity of considering it. He had since considered it very maturely with the aid of those who had given the subject much consideration when it was before the House of Lords, and he thought that unless changes were introduced into the Bill it would be better to adhere to the constitution of the Court as it stood. It certainly did occur to him when the question was first mooted that there might be some difficulty in getting together a Court constituted of one of the Chief Justices and of the Lord Chancellor in addition to the Judge of the Probate Court. The Lord Chancellor had had a particular conversation with the Lord Chief Justice, and the 1156 opinion entertained—of the accuracy of which he was perfectly satisfied—was that there would be a, certainty of the Court, constituted according to the Bill, meeting without inconvenience or difficulty a sufficient number of times a year for the despatch of the business committed to it. The Committee would observe that the business which would come before it consisted only of final judgments. Supposing a petition were presented alleging adultery, the first and ordinary order of the Court, where the case was contested, would be to direct a trial at law. The full Court would not come into operation until after that trial, because the full Court would dispose only of petitions for dissolving marriage, on which the final order of dissolution would be pronounced, and application for new trials of questions or issues before a jury. There would be no difficulty, therefore, in the Court as at present constituted, sitting at the end of every term for a sufficient number of days to dispose of the whole of the business. The Lord Chancellor justly observed that he had no difficulty in disposing of the divorce Bills which now came before the House of Lords. No inconvenience would ever result from his having one of the Chief Justices to sit with him, because, under an existing Act either of the three Chief Justices might appoint a Judge to sit for him at nisi prius in the sittings after term; and this power might of course be exercised so as to secure the requisite number of days. In all probability the range of business would be very small indeed, and according to every reasonable expectation it would not demand more than two or three days at the end of every term. He found that one consideration which weighed very much with the House of Lords was, that it was desirable that the country should know what was the composition of the Court to which such important matters were to be referred; and he wished to avoid anything like hap-hazard legislation in reference to the new tribunal. For these reasons he had determined to adhere to the clause as it stood. If it should hereafter appear probable that there would be a large number of applications to the new Court through the adoption of the Amendment of the bon. Member for Surrey, making it a Court of Appeal from the County Courts, or from any other cause, it might then become desirable to reconsider the matter, but he was satisfied that the clause was adapted to the Bill as it stood.

LORD JOHN MANNERS
said, that he did not see how the reasons assigned by the hon. and learned Attorney General for adhering to Clause 8 could be reconciled with the provisions of Clause 11. The Committee were told that in so delicate and difficult a matter as the composition of the Court, it was desirous to avoid uncertainty, and therefore they were asked to approve the Court as constituted in Clause 8; but Clause 11 empowered the Lord Chancellor to appoint one out of a very large list of Judges to supply the place of the Judge Ordinary in his absence. The list from which the Lord Chancellor might make his selection included the Vice Chancellors, the Lord Justices, the Judges of the Superior Courts at Westminster, the Master of the Rolls, and the Judges of the Admiralty Court, any one of whom might be called upon to take the place of the Judge Ordinary. What, then, became of the certainty which, according to the hon. and learned Attorney General, it was important the public should have in regard to the constitution of the Court? Another argument advanced by the hon. and learned Gentleman in favour of Clause 8 was that, as the Lord Chancellor now found no difficulty in dealing with the divorce cases that came before the House of Lords, so the proposed Court would have little difficulty in disposing of the business coming before it. What then became of the allegation of those who supported the Bill, that it would extend to the middle and lower classes a relief which had hitherto been confined to the upper ranks of society? If the Court, as constituted in Clause 8, was adapted merely for the number of cases that at present came before the House of Lords, what security had they that it would not become unworkable in the event of the number of divorce and matrimonial causes being increased to any considerable extent? The hon. and learned Attorney General had not referred to the important point raised the other night by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dublin University (Mr. Napier.) It would be recollected that upon the Attorney General declaring that a separate Bill would be necessary for Ireland, and that he had it in contemplation to introduce such a measure, the right hon. Gentleman stated that, as the Courts of law were constituted in that country, great difficulty would be experienced in calling upon the Irish Judges to 1158 administer the new law of divorce. Several of the Judges were Roman Catholics, and their religious tenets might prevent them from carrying out the provisions of such a Bill as that which the Committee had now under its consideration. Moreover, there was nothing in the law of England to prevent some of the Judges nominated in Clause 8 being Roman Catholics—a reason sufficient of itself to induce the Committee to pause. The practical effect of such a law in Prussia, according to Baron Von Gerlach, was that the Roman Catholic Judges, feeling that they might expose themselves to the anathemas of the Council of Trent if they were to take part in the administration of the law of divorce, had begged to be excused from adjudicating upon any matter involving divorce in the Courts over which they presided. That was a very inconvenient and even unconstitutional state of things, and Baron Von Gerlach, in his speech to the Prussian Chamber, called upon the Roman Catholic members of that body to assist him in relieving their co-religionists, who happened to be Judges, from the onus which the law imposed upon them, and from which they had hitherto escaped only through the kindness and connivance of their Protestant fellow-Judges. If a Court were to be established in Ireland similarly constituted to that which was proposed in this Bill, it was out of the question to suppose that the Judges would be uniformly Protestant. If the Roman Catholic bar of Ireland continued to receive a full measure of justice, it was clear that some of the Judges must inevitably be Roman Catholics, and if that were the case how was the difficulty to be met? Was there to be a proviso especially exempting those Judges from adjudicating on matters of divorce and substituting Protestant Judges for those matters, or was the power to be given to the Lord Lieutenant or the Lord Chancellor of Ireland to vary the constitution of the Court according to the religious convictions of the various Judges? If that were to be done, then this Bill, dealing as it did with English Judges, ought to give them the same opportunity of being relieved from the discharge of duties to which they entertained conscientious objections. He did not say that would be a proper course to pursue, but it would be the only way to meet the difficulty which would arise from an extension of this law to Ireland. He could not see that the Attorney General had at all overcome the 1159 religious difficulties which met him at every point. In Clause 12, power was given to the Queen to make the new Court a Court of Circuit, and if it were really intended to bring the law of divorce to every man's door that must be done. Was it, then, the intention of the Government to send the Lord Chancellor and the other Judges travelling through the country to administer the law of divorce? If that were intended, he could only say that it would be the first time the Lord Chancellor was ever sent travelling through the country. If he were told that the Lord Chancellor would not travel, but that the other Judges would, then there was at once a fresh circuit created, and it would be well to know when and how often the Judges would traverse the land to confer upon the people this inestimable boon of divorce. If, on the contrary, the Court was not to travel, but was to remain located in London, and simply to devote two or three days in the course of a year to the consideration of divorce matters, then it would be puerile to assert that the Bill would give great relief to the various classes of the people. It would be a mere blind and delusion if only the three or four cases which were now annually disposed of by Parliament were to come before the new Court, and it would be preposterous to say that this was a Bill of sufficient importance to keep Parliament sitting until September, in order to pass it. Upon that aspect of the matter he submitted to the Committee whether it was worth while to go on considering all the vast questions raised by the Bill, which had been solemnly introduced as effecting a change in the application of the law to the great benefit and relief of the middle and humbler classes, while, in fact, there would be no enlargement of the class which now enjoyed the dubious advantages of the privilege of divorce.

§ MR. MALINS
said, it appeared that the Attorney General, after consultation with noble and learned personages who had promoted the Bill in another place, had arrived at the conclusion that the Court to be formed according to the provisions of his Bill would be an efficient tribunal. He agreed with the noble Lord (Lord J. Manners) that the question, whether the proposed Court would be equal to the work imposed upon it, depended upon whether there was any necessity at all for the Bill. If there were to be in future only the three or four 1160 cases which now came annually before Parliament, the new Court would be able to dispose of them, but if there really were an urgent necessity for this measure—if it were essentially necessary to give greater facilities for divorce—then numerous applications must be expected, and the Court would not be able to do the work. The hon. and learned Attorney General had told them that at present the Lord Chancellor disposed of all the divorce business which came before Parliament. That was true, but he did so as one branch of Parliamentary business over which he presided during the Session; but if the Bill were passed, the Lord Chancellor would still have to preside in appeals, to attend in the Court of Chancery, and in addition to preside over the new Court. It must be remembered that there were many actions for crim. con. tried which were not followed up by applications for divorce, the verdicts in some cases being against the plaintiff, in others only nominal damages were given, and in many the parties were not possessed of the means to enable them to apply for a divorce. All those cases must come before the new Court with the Lord Chancellor at its head. Then, again, issues might be directed, and the applications for them and for new trials, with the other business, would constitute an amount of labour to which he believed the Court, as proposed in the Bill, would be unequal. That, however, was a question of responsibility upon the Government, and if, after mature consideration and full debate, the Government was convinced that the Court they proposed would be competent to dispose of the business, he was not inclined to offer any further opposition. When he found his hon. and learned Friend the Attorney General telling them one day that he was afraid the Court might not be sufficient, and another day that he thought it would, he was afraid that the Bill had not received that full consideration which its importance demanded.

MR. NAPIER
said, that with reference to the observations of his noble Friend (Lord J. Manners) concerning the Irish Judges, he would beg to remind the Committee that at present the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas and the Chief Baron of the Exchequer were both Roman Catholics. He did not think the number of divorce cases was likely to be great in Ireland. He had never been engaged in a crim. con. case himself, and had never 1161 heard of one when he was on circuit. Considering the other duties which the Judges had to discharge, he was afraid that there would be great objections to this Court,

§ LORD JOHN RUSSELL
I entirely, agree with the principle of this Bill. I think Her Majesty's Government are perfectly right, after the measure has received the sanction of the House by a second reading, in their endeavours to pass it into a law; but I must say I should consider it a great misfortune if Parliament was called on again in a short time to reconsider this subject. I hold that opinion for many reasons, but among others because I should be sorry to see the cases of divorce greatly extended beyond the number that at present take place. I do not think there will be any great increase in the cases of divorce in consequence of this Bill, but if Parliament is from any cause called on to reconsider the question, and should a notion begin to prevail in favour of giving greater facilities for divorce, we might find ourselves in a downward path that I should be sorry to witness the country enter upon. I think it is not desirable that we should have to consider the subject again, and I hope, therefore, that the Government will take care to give in reality the remedy which the Bill proposes to provide. I understood from the statement of the Attorney General on the second reading of this Bill that it is not proposed to change the law; but that the law which has been applied hitherto by Parliament, in a judicial manner by the House of Lords, and by the House of Commons according to the opinions of the House of Lords, should hereafter be applied by a regular tribunal to be constituted under the Bill. The object proposed is that we shall no longer be open to the reproach that the rich man alone is able to obtain that which he is sure to obtain if he has sufficient cause—namely, a divorce, but that the same remedy shall be open to all classes of Her Majesty's subjects—that if a poor man is desirous to obtain a divorce in consequence of his wife deserting him or committing adultery with another person he shall be able to obtain it on terms that, are within his reach. I observed only the other day in the newspapers what seemed to be a strong reason in favour of a remedy of this kind, though, perhaps, if I knew all the circumstances, it might not be so. A wife having deserted her husband, that husband 1162 was excited to such a pitch of passion that both his wife and her paramour had nearly fallen victims to the attempt he made to assassinate them. In such a case, the feelings of a husband in the humblest ranks of life being as acute as those of a husband who belongs to the higher orders of society, I think he should be able to avail himself of the same remedy. I expected therefore—this clause having been already under the consideration of the House—I expected to hear to-night from the Attorney General, either that he considered that there were sound sense and wisdom in the clause as it stands, or that some alteration would be made in it. Now, I must say, that the statement he has made to the House, and which has been derived from the Lord Chancellor, does not appear to me to have been very satisfactory. I wonder that a person of so acute a mind and so much knowledge of the world as the Attorney General should be satisfied with the conclusion to which the Lord Chancellor has come. It appears that that learned personage, finding that there have been but few cases in the House of Lords, thinks that if at the end of term he can get two Judges, perhaps one of the Lord Chief Justices, and the Lord Chief Baron, he could dispose of the cases that would come before them in a few days. This is meant to be a general remedy; but I cannot see that this is the way by which a poor man can hope to obtain that remedy. I can understand that when a Judge is going circuit—that when he goes to an assize town, a man may present a petition to have a case tried, and, a jury being summoned, have his case disposed of. It does not appear to me that that would be a difficult process, or one wanting in practical sense; but if a poor man in Cornwall or Northumberland is to be told that he must employ an attorney to present his petition to a court of learned Judges that would sit at some time at the end of the term in London; that possibly the Judges would, from physical reasons, be unable to consider his case; that they might want a vacation in order to recruit their exhausted frames, and that, therefore, in all likelihood the case would be postponed till another term, and that when that term arrived an issue might either be directed to be tried in London or be sent down to a Judge at assizes for trial—I cannot think that the poor man would be disposed to avail himself of a remedy so operose; I think that, having probably some experience of an 1163 attorney's charges, he would be so alarmed at the thought of the expense of employing an attorney in the country to set in motion an attorney in London, however much he might wish for a remedy, he would forego the remedy which Parliament had provided. Now, in my opinion, nothing can be worse than to profess to give a remedy and not to give it in reality. I have come to the conclusion, rather painfully I confess, that it is necessary there should be a Court of Divorce instead of the exceptional legislation we have had on this subject. The question in point of justice lies between having such a Court and giving up the granting of divorces altogether. Now, that is what will never be done. The rich man is sure to prosecute his divorce in Parliament, and to obtain it. Therefore I come to the conclusion that we ought to have a Court of Divorce, though not without feeling that the change will be attended with some risk to the morality of the country. But being ready to undertake that risk, in order to give to the poor man the remedy which we give to the rich, I think that remedy ought to be given fairly and freely, so that he should not afterwards find, when he hopes he is about to reach the goal, that the way is twisted and tortuous, and that the tolls are so heavy that he cannot hope to reach the terminus, in order to procure the remedy which he is in search of. Now, I ask if it would not be possible to enable persons desirous to obtain this remedy to present their petition to courts in the country—to the Judge of assize, for example, in the assize town? The issues do not seem to be difficult—the facts could be ascertained by witnesses competent to give evidence, and the Judge could make his report of those facts to the Court sitting in London, where an ultimate decision could be given. I would rather run the risk of having various and discordant decisions and considerable uncertainty than take the course now proposed; but if the Government chooses to insist on the course they are at present taking I shall not oppose it. I hope, however, that during the progress of the Bill the Attorney General will look to its practical working and take care that he does not defraud the people of this country of the remedy which he proposes to give them. This is a subject of vast social importance, and if we should hereafter find the people come to us and say, "Your remedy is too expensive—you professed to give what you have not given," and if in consequence we 1164 are obliged to reconsider the subject I do feel that serious injury would be inflicted. I cannot agree with many of the doctrines which have been laid down with regard to divorce and the dissolution of marriage; but, at the same time, I cannot help thinking that if we were to adopt the views acted on in Prussia and some other countries, with regard to the dissolubility of marriage, we should strike a great blow at the morality of this country. Therefore I do hope, that while the Bill is passing through this House, the Government will take care that it passes in such a shape that we shall not soon be called upon to reconsider our legislation and to extend the remedy.

§ MR. HENLEY
observed, that he thought the words of the noble Lord would go far to open the eyes of the people as to the real nature and character of this Bill. The noble Lord said he was anxious to take away from the law the reproach of denying to the poor man the benefit of the remedy which it afforded to the rich, and he added—and with perfect truth—that as the Bill stood it was in that respect a delusion upon the poor man—that it would not give to the poor the remedy which the law gave to the rich—that it held out a promise of something to the poor which it did not give to them. The noble Lord said they must go further, and that this measure was a step in a downward course. That was undoubtedly true, and what would be the consequence? The poor, finding that they could not obtain the remedy which they were promised, would come forward with a mixed demand. They would say that the remedy must be more complete and easy, and the grounds of divorce must be enlarged. That must have been what the noble Lord meant when he suggested that the Bill would be a step in a downward course. With regard to the amount of business which the proposed Court would have to transact, there had been fifty-four divorce cases determined by one Court in London during six years, and if they added to those the cases decided by the Arches Courts and the country Courts, numbering not less than fifteen or sixteen in the year, they had something as a foundation for business, supposing that no increase in sin and crime took place, and that the number of applications remained the same as it would do if there were no such change in the law. Well, the Bill required that the parties should in the first instance petition the full Court, which was to determine whether or no the adulterer was to be 1165 made the co-respondent—of course after hearing his defence. Then the Court was to determine how the case was to be tried. They might send it to a jury, or the parties might claim to go before a jury by right. This too, would have to be argued before the full Court, and if the result was the sending the case to a jury it would then be tried by a single Judge. Then in the event of an application for a new trial or other proceeding, the case would have to go before the full Court again, which, having heard nothing of the evidence, was to determine. Now, with all respect for the authority of the hon. and learned Attorney General, he (Mr. Henley) did not believe that all this would be got over in two or three days at the end of the term. The Attorney General moreover said, that it was desirable that the new Court should be certain in its character, but how could it be otherwise than fluctuating when a quorum of three Judges out of five was to be sufficient for judicial purposes? It was not for him to say how the Court should be constituted, but of this he was persuaded, that, as here proposed, it would not get rid of the blot which, by the promoters of the Bill, was said to rest upon our legislation. With regard to the promise of bringing the remedy within the reach of the poor man, it was an utter delusion. Whether it might be done by referring such cases to the Judges at the Assize Courts, as the noble Lord suggested, or in any other mode, it was not for him to say; but it was quite impossible that by the means the Bill provided a divorce could be obtained without an expenditure of several hundred pounds.

§ SIR GEORGE GREY
said, he begged to remind the Committee that the question before them was that the 8th clause stand part of the Bill. He rejoiced to find that, the second reading of the Bill having passed, there was a disposition to make it as effective as possible, and to extend its benefits to all classes; and he would suggest that that object would be best promoted by their assenting to the clauses referring to the constitution of the Court, and if it was considered that the proposed constitution was not likely to be efficient—and he himself thought much might be said in favour of the enlargement of the Court—some means might be devised for meeting that objection on bringing up the Report.

§ MR. PACKE
said, that if they were to alter the clause hereafter, he saw no reason 1166 for passing it now. After the able and convincing speech of the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell), which showed that this clause would be entirely ineffectual for its object, he was surprised to hear that the noble Lord proposed to give his assent to it. He thought the Government ought to state at once the manner in which they proposed to enlarge the Court. Without information on this point it would be useless to go on discussing the Bill, as the constitution of the Court was a material portion of the measure. He suggested the postponement of the clause.

§ MR. WARREN
The court which is to administer the new law is surely the very mainspring of the whole machinery, and its due constitution a matter consequently of great moment. Now, by the 8th section of this Bill the Lord Chancellor, the two Chief Justices, the Chief Baron, and the Judge of the new Probate Court, are to constitute the full Court of Divorce and Matrimonial Causes. This last Judge is, by section 9, to be called "the Judge Ordinary"—who is to have full authority, either alone, or with one or more of the other four Judges, to exercise all the powers of the court, except in two cases—hearing petitions for dissolution of marriage, and applications for new trials of questions, or issues before a Jury. The last two cases are to be determined by three or more of the Judges, of whom the Judge Ordinary is to be one; but, by section 11, during the temporary absence of the Judge Ordinary, the Lord Chancellor may authorize the Master of the Rolls, or the Judge of the Admiralty Court, or either of the Lords Justices, or Vice Chancellor, or any of the Judges of the Superior Common Law Courts, to act as Judge Ordinary, and execute all such power as he might exercise alone. Three Judges, therefore, are a quorum, and there is no provision for requiring the Lord Chancellor to be one of them, although they are to exercise such supremely important jurisdiction as that relating to the dissolution of marriage. This ought to be otherwise ordered. Again, by the 12th section, the court is ambulatory; and is it consistent with the other duties of the Chancellor—with the dignity of the Great Seal—that it should be dragged every now and then into the provinces—from London to Cornwall, or Cumberland for instance?

§ MR. COLLINS
observed, that now that the principle of the dissolubility of marriage had been so fully established, it would 1167 be well to insert a provision in either the 8th or 11th section of the Bill, declaring that the County Court Judges were to form a portion of the judicial staff called to decide in divorce cases. The County Courts were the only courts to which the poor man could apply for relief in the circumstances supposed by the Bill, but if they were to be closed against him the measure was a mere farce.

§ SIR WILLIAM HEATHCOTE
said, that with reference to the suggestion of the right hon. Baronet the Secretary of State for the Home Department, that this clause should be further considered upon the Report, as a great deal of minute discussion in the shape of question and answer might be needed it would be better that the clause should be further considered in Committee. The proper way to secure that would be to negative the clause at present, and to allow it to be brought up in an amended form, after the other sections of the Bill had been considered.

§ MR. GLADSTONE
said, he must express a hope that the House would be favoured with a clearer expression of the views of Government. His right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department had indicated that the Government were open to consider whether further provision should not be made in regard to the subject-matter of this clause. In saying that, he contradicted what had just fallen from his (Sir G. Grey's) hon. and learned Friend the Attorney General, who himself had occasion to contradict what he stated two nights ago. This showed the existence of a very indistinct and fluent state of mind on the part of the Government, and as this was a question of great importance it was natural that the House should look with some impatience for a declaration of what were their intentions with regard to it. Though he could not say that he was very anxious for the extension of a boon which he thought to be of a very doubtful character, yet it must be remembered that the extension which this Bill promised to the country began with a contraction; that it cut off a great deal of the remedy which was now accessible to the people. Besides the divorce a vinculo, there was the minor divorce a mensâ et thoro, which was not open to the particular objections which applied to the former class, because no man or woman sought it from corrupt motives, but only to obtain relief from actual suffering or from the contamination of an evil con- 1168 nection. Yet, while the facilities for obtaining a divorce a vinculo were to be increased, the power of getting this, for which alone he believed that persons among the lower classes were anxious, was to be greatly curtailed. All those facilities which were at present afforded through the numerous local courts scattered over the country the Commitee was now going to cut off; and the only answer given to that was, that the new Court should hold its sittings "at such place or places in London, or Middlesex, or elsewhere, as Her Majesty in Council might please to appoint." They had not yet had one satisfactory word from the Government, as to the substitution they proposed to make for the existing facilities which were to be destroyed by the Bill, independent of the additional facilities they were bound to provide, in fulfilment of the promises they made when the Bill was brought in. One point more. It was assumed that the cases of divorce were to continue the same as they were now; but do not let it be forgotten that they were now introducing a new chapter, because there was the question of divorce for adultery coupled with desertion, which was entirely novel to our law; and it was possible that under that new principle a very considerable addition would be made to the number of divorce cases.

§ SIR GEORGE GREY
observed, that he thought it would be a most inconvenient course to negative the clause, as suggested by the hon. Baronet the Member for Oxford University (Sir W. Heathcote), because if that, were done they would be obliged to postpone, as they came to them, the other clauses which had reference to the Court. The Government were desirous, and he thought he might assume that a large majority of the House were equally desirous, to extend the existing remedies of divorce us widely as possible, and they were therefore anxious so to constitute the Court that it would be able to despatch satisfactorily all the business that would come before it. He admitted there was some force in the argument that it was now proposed to constitute the Court almost entirely of Judges who had other functions to discharge than those which the Bill would impose on them. The Government would, therefore, be ready to propose an enlargement of the Court, such as had been suggested, at a future stage of the Bill. With that assurance, he trusted the Committee would not press upon them the inconvenience of now striking out the clause.

§ SIR WILLIAM HEATHCOTE
said, if the right hon. Baronet (Sir G. Grey) would undertake to bring up another clause with that view in Committee, and not on the Report, he should be satisfied.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
said, that there would be no necessity for convening two Courts in these causes. The Judge Ordinary would grant decrees in the first instance, and the full Court would only be convened in the event of a new trial being applied for, and for pronouncing the final sentence of divorce. He sincerely congratulated hon. Gentlemen opposite for at length so dealing with this Bill as to wish to enlarge and make it accessible to all descriptions of persons. [A laugh]. He repeated that he congratulated them; and if his right hon. Friend the Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Henley), who was so anxious for facilitating divorce to the poor man, and his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Wallingford (Mr. Malins) who had professed a similar sentiment, with the addition of the hon. and learned Member for Midhurst (Mr. Warren), and lastly the hon. and learned Member for Knares-borough (Mr. Collins), would form themselves into a little auxiliary sub-committee and frame a clause for the purpose of carrying out their views in that respect, he would give it his best consideration. Let not the poor man be driven to try his question of divorce before one of the Judges at an assize town, but let him have the power, in the first instance, of originating a plaint in the County Court, which should afterwards be sent up to the Court in London for the purpose of having sentence pronounced. If these hon. and learned Gentlemen, with his right hon. Friend the Member for Oxfordshire would be auxiliary to him in framing such a clause as that, he would consider the matter, and when they had framed it the Committee would be able, with their assistance, to consider the constitution of the Court. Reference had been made to the time occupied under the present practice of hearing divorce cases in the House of Lords; but it should be borne in mind that the House of Lords only examined witnesses in such cases, and, as the examination was conducted there in no very rapid manner, divorce suits frequently ran through a month or six weeks, or more, at intervals. But the new Court would proceed very differently; the evidence of witnesses would be taken at the trial, and according to the result of that trial, the Court would have to pronounce 1170 judgment at once, unless there were an application for a new trial; and if there should be an application for a new trial that application would be disposed of with as little delay as such applications were now dealt with in any of the Courts of Common Law, in Westminster-hall, where five or six applications for new trials were frequently heard and decided in a single morning. They must not, then, estimate the time which would be occupied by the new Court in dealing with these cases by the time the House of Lords took to hear and decide divorce cases now. He did not anticipate that there would be any such great addition to the number of divorce cases under the new law as some hon. Gentlemen on the other side seemed to anticipate, nor did he believe that the expense of the proceedings would be so alarming as had been suggested. In Scotland, where divorce was easily obtained, the Court of Session was as expensive as this new Court in England was likely to be. He found that there had been among the poorer classes in Scotland in five years ninety-five cases of divorce, and that the average cost of rescinding a marriage in that part of the kingdom was £30, though where there was no opposition, £20 would suffice to defray the expense. He could not promise that, under this Bill, £30 would be the price, but possibly, with the aid of the hon. and learned Gentlemen to whom he had referred, the thing might be done for £30. With these observations he trusted the Committee would not obstruct the passage of the Bill by any unnecessary discussion.

§ MR. HENLEY
said, he for one emphatically declined the invitation made to hon. Members on his side of the House by the Attorney General, to employ their leisure time in helping the Government out of the dilemma in which they found themselves, and to assist them in fulfilling the promise which they had trumpeted all over the country, that they were going, by this Bill, to remove the scandal and reproach which attached to it of only affording facilities for divorce to the rich and denying them to the poor. They on his side of the House had made no such promise. It was the Government who had held that language, and it remained with them to give effect to it. The hon. and learned Attorney General, with the true Chancery instinct, had given it out as a great wonder that the House of Lords heard witnesses before they decided a 1171 divorce case. But what did the hon. and learned Gentleman invite hon. Members on his (Mr. Henley's) side of the House to do? The hon. and learned Gentleman said, "You want to provide for the case of the poor man; let him go to the County Court, where the trial of each case lasts three minutes on an average; and, after the County Court Judge has taken the evidence, let it be sent up to the Court in London for judgment." That was the remedy which the Attorney General proposed to give the poorer classes throughout the country. The hon. and learned Gentleman actually invited them on his (Mr. Henley's) side to occupy their leisure in framing a clause which should give the Judges of the new Court in London the power of deciding in the case of the poor man, without the assistance of a jury, and without ever seeing any one of the witnesses; while he made provision by this Bill that no application for a divorce by a rich man should be dealt with except by a jury of his country, and in the hearing of the Judge who was to decide it. And so, by way of arriving at what was recommended by the noble Lord the Member for the City of London—that the poor should have access to these new Courts—there was to be no jury for the poor man; he was to be handed over to the tender mercies of the County Court, where his case would be decided, after the fashion and the boast of that tribunal, in three minutes. Now, he thought that, if there was one class of cases more than another in which oral testimony was essential to the elucidation of truth, it was divorce cases. They had the most extraordinary cases sometimes trumped up; but, under the racket of cross-examination by the cunning old Judges in the House of Lords—not Chancery Judges—those cases broke down. It was no business of his to supply the defects of the Government. The Government had held out that this was to be a Bill for the poor as well as the rich. It was no business of his whether it was right or wrong. They had made the promise, and, if they were honest, they ought to fulfil it.

MR. LYGON
suggested that, as it had occurred to the hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney General to make mention of a sub-committee, it might be as well to refer the Bill at once to a Select Committee.

§ MR. AYRTON
said, that he entirely coincided in the principle of the Bill, that divorce ought to be brought within the 1172 reach of all the people of this country. He thought that the question which had been raised by the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) ought to be seriously considered. He was very much struck by the circumstance that, the Bill having been framed in the House of Lords, it seemed to have been framed entirely for the benefit of their Lordships, without any reference to the condition and circumstances of the great masses of the community. It appeared to him that the very strongest objection to the Bill, as at present constituted, had not yet been noticed. Let him ask, what was the present protection of an Englishman against the assaults of his rich neighbour upon the chastity of a beautiful wife? As the law stood, if the wife of a poor man were seduced by a person of wealth and station, the poor man could go into a court of justice, which he knew in the period of six months would come to his door, and obtain exemplary damages, besides holding the seducer up to public contempt. The action for criminal conversation was the real protection of the poor man's wife; but this Bill had taken away that action; and what was the substitute for it? It was no answer to the poor man that the seducer of his wife could be fined; for it was trifling with a grave question to say, that men in the condition of the six millions, who were the basis of the strength and wealth of the country, could ever reach the Court which it was proposed to constitute. It was impossible to decide what the Court was to be till it was known what sort of justice it was to administer, or until it was determined whether there were to be local courts, or some machinery by which every man could, for £10 or £20, bring his case before some tribunal for trial. He believed that, under this Bill, a cost of £100 or £200 would be incurred before a man could get redress. He saw with regret the complicated procedure which this Bill proposed, the bandying of the case from one court to another before it was brought to an issue; and even that the verdict of a jury was not to be conclusive, but the ultimate decision was to rest with the full Court. In short, the procedure had evidently been framed on that of the Court of Chancery, and was so complicated with petitions, and issues, and new trials, that with an inexhaustible purse there might be almost inexhaustible litigation. He believed that the poor man, in going into this court, would find himself involved in years of litigation, and he 1173 might sit down and fold his arms, cursing the upper classes of society for taking away his wife, and also the only remedy he had against her seducer.

§ MR. POWELL
said, that he thought it would be less difficult to get together three puisne Judges than three Chief Justices; and as, by a recent enactment, the Lord Chancellor could call in the assistance of Common Law puisne Judges in Chancery, he did not see why they could not be members of this Court. So far as regarded the bringing home the remedy of divorce to all classes, he thought that they ought to proceed in such a matter by degrees—to go step by step—and, if it was found that the procedure which was adopted worked well for the public good, then the influence and the jurisdiction of these Courts might be extended. With regard to the suggestion of giving the power of divorce to the County Courts, he should wish to know from whom that suggestion proceeded, whether from the friends or enemies of the measure? He thought there was something of sarcasm in the suggestion, that it was intended as the reductio ad absurdum, and to throw ridicule on the principle of the Bill; and he, having given his support to the principle of the measure, deprecated any notion of giving a jurisdiction in divorce to the County Courts.

§ MR. DRUMMOND
said, he begged to remind the Committee that the question of giving a jurisdiction in this matter to the County Courts was not before the House, but it would come before them at the end of the next clause, and then he would undertake to show the hon. Gentleman who had just spoken that doing that was the only way to make the Bill work.

§ MR. MALINS
said, his hon. and learned Friend the Attorney General had invited him to form one of a Committee to frame clauses for facilitating divorce; but if his hon. and learned Friend thought that he wished to extend the facilities for divorce, he had very much misunderstood him. What he said was, that they had brought in a Bill professing to be a poor man's Bill, and that any expectations of that sort which might be raised would end in delusion. He felt more than ever that giving greater facilities for divorce would be one of the greatest social curses that this country had ever been visited with. He must utterly decline to become a member of a Committee for any such purpose, and on the Government the blame must rest of 1174 deluding the people with regard to this measure.

§ MR. BUTT
said, the question before the Committee was, whether they should now adopt the 8th clause. Before they could do so, they ought either to approve the clause as it stood, or to feel satisfied that the alterations required to make it perfect were so immaterial that they could be discussed on the bringing up of the Report. In reality this provision was the very essence of the Bill; and it would be better for them to debate the clause night after night—he would almost say week after week—than to pass a measure establishing a tribunal which would be wholly inoperative. When the Attorney General said that the Judge Ordinary would administer all the common jurisdiction of this Court, he must have forgotten the 51st clause of the Bill, which gave to parties dissatisfied with the decision of the Judge Ordinary the right of appeal to the full Court. Litigation of this kind must be expected to be peculiarly exasperated, and few husbands or wives would be found disposed to submit to the judgment of a single Judge, if it went against them. Therefore, the Judge Ordinary must call in the aid of two of the other Judges, who had their own proper duties to perform; and the sitting of this new tribunal would be made to depend on the convenience of four other Courts. Supposing the Lord Chancellor could attend on a given day, the Lord Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench might then be engaged on an important case elsewhere, while the Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas was also hearing an important trial at Nisi Prius. In fact, the problem was, out of four Judges already fully occupied, what were the chances of finding two of them disengaged on the same day? To press the clause as it stood, therefore, was to say that the new Court should hardly ever meet. He was for bringing home divorce—for the same cause as it was given to the rich—to the cottage of the poor man; but, certainly, this clause as it stood would not effect that object. He should be very glad to postpone the clause, if he could; but he thought the only way of so doing, at that stage of the Bill, was by negativing it. Another question was, had they settled what were to be the limits of the jurisdiction of this new Court? Could natives of India, who had never been domiciled in England, apply to this tribunal without coming in person to this country? If so, 1175 could persons living at Edinburgh or at Cork do the same? In short, was this jurisdiction to extend throughout the United Kingdom and the whole of our dependencies? Until this point was decided, they could not satisfactorily determine upon the component parts of the Court. They had no right to take away tribunals to which the subjects of the realm could now resort for relief, without substituting other courts well adapted to the due administration of justice. He thought, therefore, the best course would be to negative the clause, and for the Attorney General to bring another in Committee constituting a better Court.

§ LORD JOHN RUSSELL
had understood his right hon. Friends the Home Secretary and the Attorney General to promise that, while they wished this clause to be adopted, they would consider whether other clauses might not be introduced, not upon the Report, which would be an unsatisfactory mode of dealing with it, but in the course of Committee, with a view to amend this provision. Upon this assurance the hon. Baronet (Sir W. Heathcote) agreed not to propose the rejection of the clause. If the Government fulfilled their promise the House might fairly leave this clause, and defer till a later stage of the Committee the discussion upon the best mode of extending to the poor classes the remedy now open to the rich. It was not surprising that the august body from which this Bill proceeded, having great leisure and great resources at their own command, should not have very carefully estimated the little time and the small amount of money which the poor man could afford for proceedings of this kind. But it was hardly the duty of those who opposed this measure to frame clauses for giving effect to its object or to amend its provision. It was incumbent on the Government, with their knowledge of what was required, and being themselves, as all hon. Members are, representatives of portions of the people, to devise the proper machinery for carrying out their own Bill. When that machinery had been devised its details ought to be printed, that the Committee might really know what it had to vote upon, for, as had been said by the hon. and learned Member for Youghal, this clause was of the essence of the measure. If the machinery was efficient and satisfactory the Bill would be just, and he hoped popular. If, on the contrary, the proposed tribunal should be 1176 dilatory and expensive, then the measure would be a failure, and there was no saying what might be the consequences.

LORD JOHN MANNERS
said, the further this discussion went the more clearly was it apparent that all those who had supported the principle of the Bill on its second reading, with the exception of the hon. Member for Wigan (Mr. Powell), were opposed to its provisions. That hon. Gentleman, indeed, supported this clause, but he did so at the expense of the principle ostensibly involved in the measure. The hon. Member did not wish to bring home the facilities for divorce to the poor; while his argument, on the contrary, was experimentum fiat in corpore vili. The corpus vile in this case, according to the hon. Gentleman, was now the wealthier classes of this country; and he had insisted that the measure would not effect what its advocates had told the whole country was its principal object. So much for the one speech they had had in favour of the provisions of the Bill. With great respect to the noble Lord he (Lord John Manners) doubted whether the noble Lord had understood the pledge given by the Secretary of State for the Home Department. What the right hon. Gentleman had promised amounted merely to this—that when all the clauses had been discussed, if it should turn out that other duties were thrown upon the Court beyond those imposed by the Bill as it stood, then the Government would not refuse to consider the constitution of this tribunal. With regard to what had fallen from the Attorney General, even if the hon. and learned Gentleman were willing, it was doubtful after his opening speech of that evening whether he would be able to accede to the views of the Committee as to the reconstruction of this Court. Would any hon. Gentleman tell him when it was likely they would arrive at the end of this Committee, and whether it was probable that half the hon. Members now in the House would be present at that discussion upon the constitution of this Court, which it was proposed to postpone until the rest of the Bill had gone through Committee? He thought that the Committee would be guilty of great imprudence if they sanctioned the clause as it now stood. The usual Parliamentary course would be to negative the clause, and reconsider the subject when the Attorney General introduced the new clause which the accumulated wisdom of the Government might 1177 frame with the assent of the Lord Chancellor, for it was in vain to hope that any clause would be agreed to by the Government which was not in accordance with the opinion of that high dignitary. With the declaration of the right hon. Gentleman and the Attorney General before them the Committee would not be justified in giving a hasty and unintentional sanction to the present constitution of the Court.

§ SIR GEORGE GREY
said, he was not about to repeat for the third time the statement he had made, but he would only express his regret that though he had twice explained the course the Government wished to pursue, he had not been understood by the noble Lord. What he had said had been quite misrepresented, for he had not made the slightest reference to any additional duties which it was proposed to cast upon the Court.

§ MR. GLADSTONE
remarked, that he thought the declaration of the right hon. Gentleman (Sir G. Grey) intelligible enough. But what was the subsequent declaration of the Attorney General? He did not retract what he had said; but he appeared to intimate that the question of a large extension of this judicature by means of the County Courts was admissible, although he was not prepared to frame a clause to give effect to that opinion. His hon. and learned Friend therefore devolved that duty upon hon. Gentlemen opposite, not without offering some taunts between the inconsistency of their votes on the second reading and the duty which those hon. Gentlemen certainly did not volunteer, but which his hon. and learned Friend was kind enough to put upon them. The difficulty was to reconcile the text of the Secretary of State with the commentary of the Attorney General. The speech of the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) was an admirable example of what he might call favourable construction, for, mixing up the text and the comment, and throwing with the skill of a practised painter the harsh and least seemly parts of the picture into the shade, he drew from both a general statement that if the Committee passed the present clause the Government would revise the constitution of the Court, and that the House in Committee at some future day would reconsider the matter. Now, if the House were to consider the two speakers as thus welded into one person, and their contradictory declarations as reconciled 1178 into one harmonious declaration, that no doubt was a point gained. But the difficulty was to affirm the 8th clause, as the Committee appeared to be under a strong and general impression, which was partaken by both friends and opponents to the Bill, that the 8th clause was quite insufficient for the purpose. It established the superior parts of the machinery for fashionable persons, but it made no provision for that coarser machinery which was to do the business of the bulk of the community. He objected to fix the principal part of the machinery before he knew the shape of the rest, for he did not consider the superior machinery independent of that which was subsidiary, or the reverse. The hon. and learned Member (Mr. Butt) was quite right in saying that the consistent course was to negative the clause, which need not prevent the Committee from assenting to a similar clause if at a future period it should seem convenient to do so.

LORD STANLEY
said, that he thought that if hon. Gentlemen objected to the constitution of this Court as a London Court they had a valid reason for their objections; but if they only wanted to know whether the whole jurisdiction of the Court were to be a metropolitan or a local jurisdiction, the latter question was one which the Committee would be quite competent to discuss at a future stage of the Bill. If a local and inferior jurisdiction were created for the provincial business, he did not apprehend that any difficulty would be felt in putting the local Courts into communication with the London Court, or that the particular question of the Judges of the London Courts would offer any obstacle in the way of satisfactory arrangements for the local Courts. The Committee, however, were not now upon the question whether the County Courts should be empowered to deal with such cases. Before he acquiesced in such a proposition, desirable as on some accounts it would be, it must be shown that the judges of those Courts were not merely competent, but also had the leisure and opportunity necessary to enable them to transact this business. He believed that some of these Judges, sitting as they usually did without the aid of juries, and acting as judge, jury, and council in the cases before them, had their time so occupied that it would be impossible for them to undertake this difficult and important business. That question would arise upon 1179 a subsequent clause; but as a good deal had been said of the incompleteness of the measure as it stood, he wished the Committee to reflect that "rich" and "poor" were comparative terms. If the expense of obtaining a divorce were £1,000 and Parliament reduced the amount to £500, although it would not have done all that would be desired or that might ultimately be possible, yet Parliament would still have amended the law, and would have extended to a larger number of persons a privilege that had hitherto been confined to a few. There seemed to be a great and natural desire for final legislation on the subject; but in the speech of the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) there appeared to him to be some confusion between two essentially distinct things. He would admit that it would be a great evil and misfortune if they were to have discussions year after year upon the principle of the present Bill, or the causes for which divorce should be granted. It was most desirable to deal with that question once for all; but as not a single voice had been raised in Parliament for extending divorce for any cause except that recognized by the Bill, he did not expect to hear that question, raised hereafter. With regard however, to the particular composition of the tribunal which was to adjudicate upon these cases, he did not see that any injury would be done if Parliament were called upon hereafter to alter or amend the constitution of a Court, the business of which it was admitted on all hands it was impossible at present to estimate. If there were any doubt about the number of cases that would arise under the Bill the wisest course would be to limit the constitution of the Court as far as possible. If the judicial strength of the new Court were found to be insufficient nothing would be easier than to add to it, but if on the other hand they began with a large judicial establishment it would not be equally easy to reduce the number of Judges, because an adequate provision must be made for those who were removed. Entertaining those views he felt disposed to support the clause as it stood.

§ SIR WILLIAM HEATHCOTE
said, that the remarks which had fallen from the noble Lord who had just spoken would, if carried to a practical issue, render it impossible for those who disapproved the constitution of the new Court to assent to the passing of the clause in its present shape. His right hon. Friend the Secre- 1180 tary for the Home Department had, it was true, given a promise to the effect that the Government would be prepared at a later stage of the discussion to bring up a clause to vary the constitution of the proposed tribunal [Sir G. GREY: To enlarge it]; but after the observations which the noble Lord had made, it was, he thought, a matter well worthy of consideration whether any hon. Member ought to concur in the adoption of the clause unless he were satisfied with the form in which it had been laid before the Committee.

§ MR. W. EWART
said, he wished to express his disapproval of a composite Court such as that which the clause proposed to establish, as well as of the suggestion which had been made to transfer any considerable portion of the business with which the new tribunal would have to deal to the County Court Judges, whose time was already very much occupied, and who from the nature of the duties which they had to perform could not be fairly supposed to be very well qualified for the decision of the particular class of questions which would arise under the operation of the Bill. He was, at the same time, desirous that the benefits which the Bill had been framed to confer should be extended, as far as possible, in a downward direction; and, in order to carry out that view, it might, he thought, be found expedient to appoint a Judge Subordinate to the Judge Ordinary of the new Court, who would be empowered to go into the country and dispose of those matrimonial causes which might arise there; thus saving the poorer class of suitors the expense and inconvenience which a trial in London must inevitably involve. He had only to say, in conclusion, that he should support the clause, although he was of opinion that it stood in need of considerable amendment.

§ MR. BOWYER
observed, that he thought the discussion in which the Committee was engaged would tend to undeceive the public with respect to the assertion which had been so often repeated, that the measure under their notice was essentially a poor man's Bill. Looked upon in that light, the Bill was, he maintained, a sham; and if the Government was desirous to make it in reality that which it was said to be, they must be prepared to extend to the Judges of the County Courts jurisdiction in matrimonial causes. It had, indeed, been suggested that the County Courts should be made ancillary to the new tribunal, and 1181 that evidence taken before the Judges of these courts should be transmitted to the Court in London before a final decision upon the merits of a particular case could be arrived at. That however he could not help regarding as an extremely unsatisfactory mode of proceeding, inasmuch as the Judges in the Metropolis would have to pronounce an opinion upon the case without the advantage of seeing or hearing the witnesses who might have given their testimony before the inferior tribunal. If, then, the Bill were in reality that which it professed to be—a poor man's Bill—the Judges of County Courts should be empowered to grant a dissolution of the marriage tie; and if that were done what extraordinary facilities for obtaining divorces would not, he would ask the Committee, be afforded? To what an amount of collusion might not such a course give rise? If, for instance, among the poorer classes a husband and wife wished to get rid of one another, what could be easier for them than to qualify themselves in some way or another for obtaining a divorce, and then to proceed to a County Court and have their wishes carried into effect? The result, in short, would be that a suit for a divorce would soon be looked upon as a proceeding of little more importance than an action for the recovery of a sum of £5. The country would be deluged with such suits, and the House of Commons would rue the day when it had passed a measure by which such a state of things would be brought about. Having said thus much with respect to the probable operation of the Bill, if it were framed so as to be in effect a poor man's Bill, he would beg to call the attention of the Committee to the curious nomenclature with which it abounded. The Judge of the new Court, for example, was styled a "Judge Ordinary," but for what reason he could not understand. The "Judex Ordinarius" of the civil law was so called to distinguish him from the "Judge Delegate," but in our legal system no distinction of that nature existed, and, in fact, the term "Judge Ordinary" was altogether unknown to our laws. He had objected to the new tribunal being called a "Court of Marriage," because he did not deem that either to be an appropriate designation, and he was equally opposed to the substitution of the words "judicial separation, which were perfectly new to the law of this country, for the words "divorce a mensâ et thoro" which were familiar to our legal institutions. These were, however, 1182 but a few of the many objections which he entertained to a measure, which to discuss properly would involve the prolongation of the Session for a period of two months to come.

§ MR. MACAULAY
said, that the question really at issue related to the constitution of a Court, which was to discharge duties that had hitherto been undertaken by the Legislature itself, and which was also to hear appeals from the Judge Ordinary. In his opinion, however, the Government had laid themselves fairly open to the remarks which had been made in reference to the assertion that the Bill was a poor man's Bill, by the injudicious use which they had made of that claptrap observation. The fact would be found, he believed, to be that in nine—tenths of those cases in which grounds for a divorce might exist among the poorer classes they would practically be deprived of all relief under the operation of those provisions of the Bill which enacted that the proof of connivance, and want of due care should be a bar to the obtaining of a remedy. He would vote for the clause, because he thought that a capable and dignified Court established in London was preferable to a wretched itinerating tribunal, the arrival of which in each town would be hailed with ridicule and contempt. At the present moment no person could contest the title to a rood of land or bring an action for libel without coming to London, and he saw no hardship in people being compelled to resort thither for the settlement of such important causes as those contemplated by the present Bill.

§ MR. DRUMMOND
said, he wished to ask, as a matter of form, whether it would be possible, supposing the clause was carried as it stood, to amend it at a subsequent stage?

THE CHAIRMAN
replied, that it would be competent to any hon. Member to propose the Amendment of the clause upon the bringing up of the Report.

§ MR. DRUMMOND
In Committee?

THE CHAIRMAN
No.

§ MR. BUTT
said, that the clause as it stood proposed that certain persons should be the Judges of the new Court. The Home Secretary told those who objected to the constitution of the Court to pass the clause, and amend it on a future occasion.

§ SIR GEORGE GREY
observed, that what he had said was, that they proposed that the clause should then be affirmed as 1183 it stood, and that, if they should hereafter think they could devise a better tribunal they should introduce a new clause in Committee for the purpose of effecting that amendment. The House, if it should agree to a new clause might strike out the present one on the bringing up of the Report.

§ MR. BUTT
said, he must assume that the right hon. Baronet had in his own mind a process by which the clause could be amended without amending it; but he, for one, could not understand it. The clause proposed that the Lord Chancellor and four other persons should be the Judges of the new Court. Supposing that when they came to the end of the Bill the Committee should think that those persons ought not to be the Judges, he wished to know whether it would be competent to the Committee, having passed the clause, to agree to another clause, saying that five other persons should be the Judges of the Divorce Court?

THE CHAIRMAN
said, there could be no doubt that it was in the power of the Committee to pass the clause now, and then upon the Report to strike it out and substitute another and an entirely different clause.

§ MR. GLADSTONE
Have you ever known an example of such a proceeding on the part of a Committee of this House?

THE CHAIRMAN
An example of that kind has certainly not occurred within my experience.

§ MR. BUTT
said, that he might as well state at once that he intended, if allowed by the rules of the House, to propose at the end of the Committee that certain persons different from those nominated in the clause should be the Judges of the Divorce Court. In the meantime he was anxious to know whether, if he permitted the clause to pass now, the Chairman would call him to order when he came to submit the proposition which he had indicated?

§ SIR GEORGE GREY
had no hesitation in saying that if the hon. and learned Gentleman thought that the Lord Chancellor and the three Chief Justices should not be the Judges of the new Court, he ought to vote against the clause.

§ MR. WHITESIDE
said, he felt the force of that remark, and thought it would be disgraceful for the House of Commons to pass a clause which it intended to expunge at a subsequent stage. The Government had no right to bring forward a clause by which they did not mean to 1184 abide. It was only the other night that the Attorney General expressed his disapproval of the Court as constituted by Clause 8, and as he understood, engaged to create a working useful Court—in fact, "one good Court instead of three bad ones." It was now universally admitted that the clause would not answer, and there was an impression in the House that the hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney General would, in accordance with his promise, bring in another clause to let in a wider range of Judges. No one at all acquainted with the profession believed that three Chief Justices could be got to sit with the Judge of Probate. He would be no party to passing the clause in the delusive hope that the Government would find a better clause to substitute for it, and, therefore, adopting the advice of the Home Secretary, he would vote against the clause.

§ MR. HENLEY
said, he rose to ask the hon. and learned Attorney General a question with regard to suits for nullity of marriage. It was true that those suits were not of frequent occurrence, but they involved serious consequences as regarded the legitimacy of children, and he wished to know whether under the clause as it at present stood those suits might not be heard by the Judge Ordinary alone.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
said, that a very serious question might arise as to suits for nullity of marriage, but he was not quite prepared to state whether by the Bill, as it at present stood, those suits might not be heard by the full Court. There was a subsequent clause upon which the question might be more fully discussed.

§ MR. HENLEY
said, that at present those suits were first brought in the Consistory Court, from which there was an, appeal to the Court of Arches, and from that to the Privy Council; but if the Bill gave power to the Judge Ordinary, as it appeared to him that it did, to decide in, those suits, the only appeal would be to a Court consisting of himself and two other Judges, and he could not think that in such cases that court of appeal would be satisfactory to the suitors.

§ MR. GLADSTONE
said, he would be 1185 glad to know if it was the opinion of the Attorney General that suits for nullity of marriage should be heard by the full Court? If the hon. and learned Attorney General thought that such suits ought to be placed under the same restrictions as suits for the dissolution of marriage, no doubt he would make proper provision for that purpose.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
said, that it was clear that the exceptions in the present clause to the authority of the Judge Ordinary did not include suits for nullity of marriage.

§ MR. GLADSTONE
remarked, that if it was felt that such suits should be heard by the full Court, the proper time to provide that that should be the case was upon the present clause, which laid down the distinction between the jurisdiction of the Judge Ordinary and that of the full Court, and he would therefore suggest to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Oxfordshire to move the insertion of words which would carry out the view which he entertained upon the question.

§ MR. HENLEY
then moved the insertion of the words so as to include suits for nullity of marriage among the suits excepted from the jurisdiction of the Judge Ordinary.

§ MR. AYRTON
said, he thought some explanation was required of the language of the clause taken in conjunction with the words of the 10th clause. The Judge of the Court of Probate was to have full power to hear and determine all matters excepting petitions for dissolving marriage, and the 10th clause provided that all petitions for dissolution of marriage should be heard by the full Court. He wished to know whether it was intended that not only petitions, but all incidental proceedings attaching to such petitions, should be heard by three Judges, or was the petition to be finally heard only when sentence was pronounced? He could not understand how three Judges could be required to decide upon interlocutory matters.

§ MR. COX
remarked, that he did not think there was any such difficulty as the hon. and learned Gentleman had suggested. He agreed with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Oxfordshire, that if it was necessary to exempt from the decision of a single Judge petitions dissolving marriage, petitions for annulment of marriage should also be exempted.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
said, suits for nullity of marriage would frequently lead to issues, and if that issue were followed up by an application for a new trial, which application, under the words of the clause, must be heard by the full Court, he thought it would be better, perhaps, to adopt the proposition of the right hon. Gentleman, and to insert the words "or annulling." With respect to the objection of the hon. Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Ayrton), he understood that according to the Bill as it stood the petition in the first instance would be of an informal and inexpensive character. If it were opposed there would be a trial directed. The Judge Ordinary would have power to hear the preliminary application and to make an order for a trial, but the ultimate decision after trial could only be made by the full Court.

§ MR. MALINS
said, he was rather alarmed at the idea which the hon. Gentleman seemed to entertain, that there could be any unopposed petitions for divorce. It might be that a husband asked for a divorce, to which the wife made no objection, but it would be the duty of the Court in the interests of public morality to investigate such an application. The Attorney General put the case of a husband petitioning for a divorce, his wife having run away to a foreign land, neither she nor the paramour appearing in Court; what should be done in such a case? It became a petition with no opponent, which the Court would deal with as it might think fit, of course requiring evidence to be given; but it could not send such a case for trial. The final order dissolving the marriage in such cases must be made by the full Court.

§ MR. HENLEY
asked whether the full Court of three Judges was to make a decree and determine the cause without hearing it. Who was to take evidence in cases where there was no opponent—the Judge Ordinary or the three Judges? Greater care should be taken in cases where there was no defence than even in cases where persons appeared to defend themselves. In the House of Lords they always heard the evidence.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
repeated, that the question of fact would be tried before a jury upon an order to that effect made by the Judge Ordinary. That was in contested cases. If, however, no respondent appeared the case became uncontested; but he imagined it would still be the duty of the Court to take evidence 1187 to satisfy itself as far as possible of the fact of the adultery, and that being done, the Court would proceed at once to pronounce sentence of divorce. He understood the clause to signify that such evidence must be heard before the full Court which would pronounce the sentence.

§ MR. GLADSTONE
said, he admitted the explanation of the hon. and learned Gentleman was intelligible enough, but it did not appear to harmonize with the words of the clause, which seemed to prescribe that all proceedings for dissolving marriage should be before the full Court.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
said, the words of the 10th clause were that all petitions for dissolving a marriage should be heard before the full Court. The order for giving a preliminary inquiry was not a determination of the petition.

§ MR. GLADSTONE
remarked, that the words in the 10th clause were that petitions should be heard by the three Judges, while those in the 9th clause appeared to show that the exceptions were to be heard by the Court.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
said, all formal proceedings with regard to the dissolution or annulling of marriages would be decided in the new Court, where every suit would originate by petition.

§ MR. BOWYER
said, he wished to warn the House that if they abolished all the pleadings of the Ecclesiastical Courts great confusion might be created. Before proceeding further they should have some explanation of what was to be substituted for the present pleadings. He objected also to the introduction of the words "or annulling," as improper words. The phrase should be "or nullity." The word "annulling" implied that the Court annulled the marriage, whereas they could only declare that the marriage was a nullity.

§ MR. WALPOLE
said, it was a mere dispute about words. The words, however, used in the 105th canon were "dissolved or annulled."

§ MR. GLADSTONE
said, they appeared to be synonymous terms.

§ MR. WALPOLE
said, he was glad to hear his right hon. Friend say so, for thus he hoped to be able to prove to him that the canon, approved of dissolution of marriage.

§ MR. BOWYER
observed, that the canons of 1603 were not law. He would ask the hon. and learned Attorney Ge- 1188 neral whether the Queen's Advocate had seen this Bill, and whether it had been submitted to him?

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
said, that if an end might be thus made of the matter, he would propose to insert the words, "a petition for the dissolution or for a nullity of marriage."

§ MR. MALINS
said, that he had no objection to this proposal, which seemed to him to meet the objection, and to be an improvement in point of composition.

§ MR. BOWYER
said, there were some doubts as to the actual words inserted, and he would be glad therefore to hear from the Chairman the exact result.

THE CHAIRMAN
said, that the words inserted were "or annulling."

§ MR. DRUMMOND
, in moving the following addition to the clause,— And the said Court shall alone have jurisdiction in all cases where either of the parties to any suits before it is a peer or heir to an hereditary peerage, or where the property settled at the time of their marriage consisted of charges on land of the annual value of; but in all cases where there are no hereditary peerages in remainder, and where no realty has been settled on the marriage, and where the parties do not reside in London, the said Judge Ordinary shall authorize the Judge of the County Court in the district where the parties reside to try the case, and pronounce a decree for judicial separation"— said he thought the right hon. Gentleman might have saved himself some trouble if he had read the Amendment formerly proposed, and had considered the difference there really was between a judicial separation and a dissolution of marriage. To a dissolution of marriage he (Mr. Drummond) had been always opposed. It had been said, however, that there were no means of giving relief by this Bill to the poorer classes, except by extending the jurisdiction of the Court. But that was to be obtained not by giving the County Court Judges the power of dissolving marriages, but by confining their powers to granting relief by judicial separation in cases of gross oppression. Now he perfectly agreed that poor and rich were relative terms; and he was quite willing to leave the rich to the Court in London, but his object in proposing his Amendment, 1189 was to afford relief to a numerous body of ill-treated people with whose habits and feelings and circumstances he was afraid that the great mass of hon. Members were not so well acquainted as with those of the higher classes. Out of many instances of hardship which had come to his knowledge he would only trouble the Committee with this:—A labourer who had been convicted of poaching fled from home, leaving a wife and three children, one of them at the breast. He was lost sight of and was thought to be dead, and she grew old, being supposed by all to be a widow. Through her exertions to maintain her family she became crippled with the rheumatism, and received relief from the parish. By and by the guardians discovered that her husband was alive and keeping a public-house with some land attached to it in a, distant county, cohabiting with a woman who passed as his wife. They told him that he must provide for his wife, but the cunning fellow had taken the house and land in the name of the woman who was living with him. He told his wife that she might occupy a hovel on his land and come to his house for her dinner—a pauper receiving scraps doled out to her by the woman who occupied her place. This woman ought to have had some cheap and easy redress, either in a County Court or at petty sessions, he did not care which.

THE CHAIRMAN
said, he thought that this Amendment was irregular. It would be better to bring it up as a separate clause at the end of the Bill.

§ MR. DRUMMOND
said, he would bow to this decision, but he thought that his Amendment only embodied a further description of the jurisdiction of this Court.

§ MR. GLADSTONE
said, that he thought it was desirable, before passing this clause, they should know what provision the Government intended to make in substitution for the local jurisdictions which now existed in different parts of the country, and were accessible to persons to whom the Bill, by making it obligatory on them to come to London, would be a virtual denial of justice. With reference to the statement made, at an earlier part of the evening, by the Attorney General, with reference to the statistics of Scotch Divorces, he must express a doubt whether more than a portion of those divorces were obtained by persons who could properly be said to belong to the lower classes of the community, and, at the same time, contended that what they clearly showed was that the effect of a central Court was to operate as a 1190 prohibition of divorce to persons residing in remote parts of the country. If these statistics were examined, it would be found that the persons who obtained divorces were principally residents either in Edinburgh or its immediate vicinity, or in some of the large towns which had cheap and easy communication with that city.

§ SIR ERSKINE PERRY
said, that the question was most important, and he wished to know whether, by the addition of a few words to make it harmonize with the rest of the clause, the Amendment of the hon. Member for West Surrey might not be so framed as not to come within the decision of the Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN
said, that it was impossible for him to answer a hypothetical question; but, as the Amendment of the hon. Member embodied a principle contrary to that which was contained in Clause 9, it could not be added to that clause.

§ MR. W. EWART
recommeded the postponement of the Amendment.

§ LORD LOVAINE
advocated its immediate consideration.

LORD JOHN MANNERS
said, he thought that, as the clause under discussion defined the authority of the Judge in ordinary, the Amendment of the hon. Member for West Surrey was quite in order.

§ MR. AYRTON
remarked that it was quite impossible to entertain this proviso, which would be more in place if moved as an addition to Clause 10.

§ MR. DRUMMOND
said, that, to save trouble, he would withdraw his Amendment.

§ MR. SOTHERON ESTCOURT
said, he hoped that the Amendment would not be withdrawn without an assurance being given by the Government that they would, in some part of the Bill, introduce words to attain the object which was contemplated by it. It appeared to him that if the hon. Member only took the last part of his Amendment—"The said Judge Ordinary shall authorise the Judge of the County Court," &c.—that would harmonize with the clause. He hoped that the hon. Member would receive some pledge from the Government that this subject would be taken into consideration, for the clause, as it stood, took away, instead of granting, facilities for separation.

§ MR. DRUMMOND
said, he would move his Amendment, as a separate clause, at a later period.

§ MR. GLADSTONE
observed, that the Committee had been discussing in combination, at different parts of the evening, 1191 two distinct questions. One was, the moral obligation contracted by the Government, in consequence of the title of the Bill, and of the promises by which it had been introduced to make divorce a mensâ et thoro accessible alike to the different classes of the community. But there was another question apart from the pressure on the Government to make some declaration as to their intentions to provide machinery to give effect to that moral obigation. Under the present law there existed, in the Ecclesiastical Courts, in Carlisle, Chester, York, and other places, a machinery which gave to the middle classes, if not to the poorer, through the medium of local judicature, relief by way of divorce a mensâ et thoro, now to be termed judicial separation, and the present Bill, by enacting that that jurisdiction should only be exercised in London, practically took that away. The Committee had, therefore, a right to know what provision the Government meant to make in order not to rob—he could not use a weaker term—the middle and poorer classes of the facility they now enjoyed with respect to sentences of judicial separation.

§ MR. BARROW
said, that the Amendment moved by the hon. Member for West Surrey, was in contradiction to the words of the clause, as the clause gave to the Judge Ordinary business which the Amendment took away. Therefore, the hon. Member ought to negative or modify the clause if he wished his Amendment to be adopted.

§ SIR ERSKINE PERRY
inquired of the Chairman whether it was not competent for the Committee to modify the clause, so as to allow an Amendment, similar in principle to that moved by the hon. Member for West Surrey, to be put?

THE CHAIRMAN
said, that there was no opportunity of moving an Amendment now, as the question before the Committee was, "that the clause stand part of the Bill."

§ MR. HILDYARD
said, that, after the repeated requests addressed to the Government to explain their views on the subject just under discussion, their silence, under such circumstances, was not very respectful to the House. If the hon. and learned Attorney General persisted in his silence, it would be impossible that the clause could pass without a division. He trusted that the hon. and learned Gentleman would let the Committee know the views of the Government on this important question.

§ MR. MALINS
earnestly hoped that the Government would express their intention that the County Courts should have nothing to do with the matter.

§ MR. COLLINS
observed, that he conceived that, as the Bill swept away local jurisdiction, in reference to separations, some explanation ought to be given as to whether it was intended to substitute any new local Judges for the existing ones.

LORD JOHN MANNERS
said, he had, in an earlier part of the evening, asked whether it was intended, under Clause 12, to send this Court through the country, and he understood, from a shake of the head given by the hon. and learned Attorney General, that it was not the intention of the Government to make the Court a Court of Circuit. A question having been put by the right hon. Member for Oxford University, and the Attorney General having given no reply, the Committee were in darkness as to the views of the Government on the subject which had been under discussion. He ventured to repeat the question which had been put by the right hon. Gentleman, the Member for the University of Oxford, and to invite the Government very respectfully, but very earnestly, to give to the Committee that explanation which they appeared to be so reluctant to afford, but which, in the opinion of every Member unconnected with the Government, it was essentially necessary that they should have.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
said, that nothing could be further from his desire than to be guilty of any disrespect to the Committee; but he had only to say, that the views of the Government were expressed in the Bill. Those who ran might read, and those who read might understand it. There was, at present, no Amendment to the clause, but he should be happy to consider any Amendment that might be proposed by any hon. Member on either side of the House.

MR. TATTON EGERTON
said, that, considering the important principle involved in the clause upon which the hon. and learned Gentleman had been pressed by so many hon. Members to give some explanation, he thought the hon. and learned Gentleman treated the Committee in a very flippant manner, and that this was not the way in which discussions were usually conducted in that House. They had been told by the Attorney General that this was a Bill for sweeping away many Ecclesiastical Courts throughout the country, which had been in the habit of dispensing 1193 local justice, and that, everything was, to be transacted, henceforth, in a central Court in London. But if justice were to be brought home to every man's door, as had been said, he thought that it was very desirable to consider whether the power of the Judge Ordinary might not be delegated to other Courts. Unless he could get more information from the Government, he should be disposed to make a Motion for reporting progress.

§ MR. GLADSTONE
said, that his hon. and learned Friend was not warranted in taunting the Committee with slowness of Comprehension in respect to this Bill. Although his hon. and learned Friend had told them that the intentions of the Government were expressed in the language of the Bill, surely, they would not always be justified in assuming that to be the case, because, only in the previous clause, with respect to the constitution of the Court, his hon. and learned Friend himself stated that he agreed in the objections which bad been taken to it. Therefore, if, in that case, the Committee had inferred the intentions of the Government from the language of the clause, they would have been involved in an egregious blunder. However that might be, he must say that his hon. and learned Friend had now given them a very clear, and, as he thought, a very unsatisfactory, intimation of the intentions of the Government with respect to this clause. He had thought, when the answer of the Attorney General was so long delayed, that possibly the opinion of the Government might not have been fully decided, and that they had not sufficiently considered the means by which they would provide a substitute for the local machinery which they were going to sweep away; but now the Attorney General had told them, only too distinctly and intelligibly, that they were going to destroy that local machinery, and to deprive persons all over the country of the power of obtaining ecclesiastical divorce in the provinces. This was a most important point, and he must again direct attention to the information received from Scotland, from which the inference was, that, as regarded the mass of the Scottish people, the Central Court was absolutely cut off from them. Were they going to do the same thing in England? It appeared to him that such was the intention of the Government, and that the clause under discussion was intended to give form and effect to that resolution. He, for one, was entirely opposed to the centralization 1194 of these operations, because it was withholding from the community a privilege of which they were, at present, in actual possession, and to which they were, on every ground, entitled. He, therefore, called on the Committee to oppose the clause, and to protest against a proposition so unjust.

§ VISCOUNT PALMERSTON
said, that nothing was more surprising than the changes which came over the minds of men. He had listened to most eloquent speeches from his right hon. Friend who had just sat down, upon the immorality of divorce, and now forsooth he was indignant that the Bill did not give greater facilities for obtaining it. His hon. and learned Friend the Attorney General had been blamed for not explaining the views of the Government, whereupon he very properly said that those views were clearly explained in the clause before the Committee. The proof, that there was no doubt as to the intention and effect of the clause, was pretty evident from the intimation of his right hon. Friend that it would restrict in some degree facilities which were not much availed of, but which might he availed of for separation a mensâ et thoro. Undoubtedly there was considerable difficulty with respect to this matter. On one hand the arrangement of the Bill certainly did technically limit the facilities which might under the present state of the law exist; but, on the other hand, he thought that most hon. Gentlemen who had taken part in the discussion seemed to agree that it would not be desirable to give to County Courts the power of granting judicial separations, and he must say that he could not in his own mind think it very desirable to afford great facilities for those separations. The position in which man and wife were placed by these judicial separations was a most objectionable one, and if marriage were dissolved at all, he thought that it should be dissolved altogether, that the parties should be entirely set free, and that they should be able to contract other engagements. He thought that parting man and wife by these judicial separations placed both of them in situations of great temptation, where they were liable to form connections which it was not desirable to encourage. There could be no doubt as to what was the meaning of the clause. The Government thought on the whole that it was the best arrangement that could be made. No Amendment had been suggested, and the question now being that the clause stand 1195 part of the Bill, those who wished to propose Amendments had let the opportunity go by. Under these circumstances he asked the Committee to support the clause as it stood.

§ MR. HENLEY
said, that he must congratulate the Committee on having now, at all events, heard a frank explanation; but he did not think that the noble Lord was equally frank when he endeavoured to represent the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University as at one time calling out for increased facilities of divorce, and then as opposed to divorce altogether, because the noble Lord knew that what the right hon. Gentleman was contending for was, that they should not take away the facilities which now existed for judicial separations a mensâ et thoro, while at the same time he was not desirous to extend the facilities for the dissolution of marriage. The noble Lord very adroitly chose to mix up these two things together for the sake of getting up a little bit of claptrap against the right hon. Gentleman. He said now that in the deliberate opinion of the Government it was desirable to restrict the facilities at present existing for procuring the lesser separation. The country, therefore, had now to understand for the first time that judicial separations were not to be encouraged, and that what the Government wished to give facilities for was dissolution of marriage in order that the parties might obtain—he forgot the exact phrase used by the noble Lord—other enjoyments. This was a very good sample of the downward course which the noble Lord opposite (Lord J. Russell) said we were taking.

§ MR. HARDY
said, he thought it much to be regretted that the Committee should only just have learned the intentions of the Government, because he ventured to say that the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) had left the House under the belief that it was intended to introduce words which would give additional facilities for judicial separations in the country. The Court however, was to be so constituted that there could be no circuits, because the Judge of the Probate Court could never leave London. There was, therefore, no provision for any local jurisdiction of any kind, and all causes must come before one central Court in the Metropolis. Now he did not say that the County Court Judges were the proper persons to exercise this jurisdiction. He was, indeed very much of a contrary opinion; but he 1196 thought the Government were bound not to look to one or the other side of the House for Amendments, but that it was their duty to provide qualified local jurisdiction, and not to confine such benefits as were conferred by the Bill to those who resided in the city of London or the neighbourhood. He should not be prepared to vote for the clause, unless the Government would undertake to give local facilities for obtaining not only a judicial separation, but also a divorce a vinculo.

THE ATORNEY GENERAL
proposed to insert the words "or for nullity of" after the word "dissolving."

§ MR. GLADSTONE
respectfully submitted that the expression "petition for nullity of marriage" was rather unintelligible.

§ MR. BOWYER
said, he hoped that, as the clause would abolish the existing system of procedure in the Ecclesiastical Court, the Government would give further consideration to it.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
said, the country would be benefited by the abolition of the prolix, extortionate, and extravagant system which at present obtained in that court.

§ MR. BOWYER
remarked, that he would not object to the Judges being empowered to modify the system of pleading and reform all things that required reform, but it was a very different thing to abolish it altogether. That ought not to be done in an off-hand manner, because the system had been formed in the course of many centuries, during which some of the ablest Judges that this country had produced presided in the Ecclesiastical Court. It might need some reform, but so did the Court of Chancery.

§ MR. MACAULAY
suggested that, inasmuch as the phrase "suit of nullity of marriage occurred" in the 6th clause, similar phraseology should be used in the clause now under discussion.

§ MR. PULLER
said, the Bill all through assumed that the proceeding was by petition, and he would suggest that that word should be retained in this clause.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
withdrew his Amendment for the purpose of 1197 proposing that the clause should run thus—"all proceedings for a dissolution or for a sentence of nullity of marriage, !c."

§ MR. BUTT
said, he wished to raise the question of the desirability of preserving in some form the existing local jurisdictions with respect to divorce a mensâ et thoro, and therefore he should propose to add words the effect of which would be to give to the County Court Judges in every county in which the superior Court of Divorce and Matrimonial Causes was not sitting the power of decreeing a judicial separation, subject to the right of appeal to the superior Court.

THE CHAIRMAN
said, the same objection applied to the Amendment proposed by the hon. Gentleman as to that of the hon. Member for West Surrey (Mr. Drummond)—namely, that it was irrelevant, and he could not therefore put it to the Committee.

MR. LYGON
said, he thought the clause under consideration was not one to which the Attorney General's remark, that "he who ran might read," was applicable, and he should like to hear from the hon. and learned Gentleman what was meant by the Court holding its sittings "in such place or places in London or Middlesex, or elsewhere, as Her Majesty in Council should from time to time appoint?"

§ LORD LOVAINE
said, he also wished to ask the hon. and learned Attorney General if there was any intention on the part of the Government that the new Court should sit at any time at any other than places in London or Middlesex?

§ SIR ERSKINE PERRY
said, though he had heard with pain from the noble Lord at the head of the Government something like an intimation that there was to be no substitute for the present local jurisdictions, he thought that was not the proper time for discussing a question so important.

§ MR. GLADSTONE
said, that after the decision of the Chairman, that the Amendment proposed by the hon. Member for Youghall (Mr. Butt) was irrelevant, he did not know whether it was open to him (Mr. Gladstone) to recur to that decision; but certainly, after that, if he had any 1198 Amendment to propose on a point of principle he should do it with fear and trembling. He thought if it were possible for the Chairman to define the principle on which he had decided that the Amendment of the learned Member (Mr. Butt) was irrelevant, it would be useful to the Committee. With his (Mr. Gladstone's) own knowledge and experience he confessed he thought the Amendment in question was in accordance with the principles usually acted on in Committee of the whole House.

THE CHAIRMAN
said, he was not aware that he was called on to do more than state the rules of the House as well as he could when he thought the occasion arose for his doing so. It was the practice constantly acted upon when an Amendment was proposed which contained matter irrelevant to the clause it sought to amend, or when it embodied a principle distinct from that contained in the clause, to rule that it should be brought up at the end of the Bill as a separate clause, and in accordance with that practice he had decided that it was not competent for the hon. and learned Member (Mr. Butt) to propose the Amendment in question.

LORD JOHN MANNERS
said, he would repeat the question which had been previously put, and ask the Attorney General whether it was the intention of the Government that the new Court of Divorce and Matrimonial Causes should at any time sit in any other part of England than London and Middlesex?

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
It is not at all intended that the Court of Divorce and Matrimonial Causes shall be an itinerant Court. That will be an effectual answer to the question which has been so often put.

§ MR. WHITESIDE
said, that what was in the mind of the Attorney General was one thing, and what was specified in the clause was another. He would suggest that, if it were not intended to make the Court erratic, they might make it fixed by dropping the words "or elsewhere."

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
said, it might be convenient to hold the Court in Surrey.

§ MR. WHITESIDE
moved the omission of the words "or elsewhere."

§ MR. HENLEY
said, he hoped the Committee would not agree to strike out the words, because it might be assumed that the Committee thought there ought to be 1199 no local jurisdictions; whereas, if the words were retained, they would enable the Government to remedy any inconvenience which might be found to result from want of a local Court. He was afraid such a power would not be used; but, at all events, the words show a reasonable belief on the part of the Committee that there would be no local jurisdictions.

§ MR. HILDYARD
said, he was in favour of the words being struck out, in order to deprive the Government of the opportunity of meeting a proposition to have local jurisdiction, by saying that the words of the clause enabled Her Majesty to send the Court to any place where it was required. From the very constitution of the Court, it was impossible for it to sit elsewhere than in London or Middlesex, or the immediate vicinity of the Metropolis.

§ SIR WILLIAM HEATHCOTE
hoped the words would not be struck out, as their omission would prevent the Court sitting where, from unforeseen circumstances, it might be required. He thought, moreover, that the power of the Crown in this respect ought not to be restricted.

§ MR. WHITESIDE
withdrew his Amendment.

§ SIR WILLIAM HEATHCOTE
said, it was important the clause should have some meaning. At present the words were:— The Lord Chancellor shall direct seal to be made for the said Court, and may direct the same to be broken, altered, and renewed at his discretion; and all decrees and orders, or copies of decrees or orders, of the said Court, sealed with the said seal, shall be received in evidence as conclusive proof thereof.

§ MR. DRUMMOND
said, it was a question of grammar, of which the framers of the Bill appeared to be ignorant. What on earth was the meaning of the word "thereof?"

MR. LYGON
said, it was rather hard that the bad grammar of the Government should go forth as the grammar of Parliament.

§ SIR WILLIAM HEATHCOTE
said, he presumed the clause meant that copies sealed should be evidence of the existence of decrees. As it stood they were to be proof of nothing but the existence of the seal.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
remarked, that he would be exceedingly glad to make a sacrifice of the last four words.

§ MR. HENLEY
said, he wished to ask whether registrars, who would have daily business to do under the testamentary jurisdiction of the Court of Probate could without inconvenience be taken from those duties?

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
said, the Court of Probate would not be sitting when the Court of Divorce was sitting, because there was only one Judge, and only one registrar would have to attend the Court.

§ MR. MALINS
said, there was no Court of Probate at present, although there might be one.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
said, care would be taken to have Her Majesty's assent given to the Probate Bill before it was given to this Bill.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
said, this was a clause which he intended to alter in conformity with the agreement entered into the other night, and in pursuance of which the House was aware that he had already added the required Amendments to the Testamentary Bill. He trusted, therefore, that the House would go on a little further until they came to Clause 18.

§ MR. WARREN
said, that he would withdraw his Motion now with the consent of the Committee, and renew it when they reached section 16, which related to an entirely new branch of the subject.

§ VISCOUNT GODERICH
asked, whether the Attorney General intended to introduce compensation clauses at a subsequent stage?

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
said, it came within the spirit, if not within the letter of the agreement entered into the other evening, that compensation clauses, in respect of the matrimonial business of 1201 the proctors, should, at a future stage, be inserted on the same principle as the corresponding clauses of the Testamentary Bill.

§ MR. GLADSTONE
said, he thought it would be better to remodel the clause than pass it and then introduce the proposed Amendments, for that course would leave it in a very clumsy and imperfect form.

§ MR. WARREN
said, he did not think the clause with the Amendments, if passed in its present shape, would be satisfactory.

§ MR. HILDYARD
remarked, it would be better to postpone the clause.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
said, be admitted that the phraseology might be abbreviated and improved; but he would undertake, if the clause were now passed, to draw up a form of words that would better express its object and intent.

§ MR. HADFIELD
asked, whether the Admiralty business, in addition to the probate and matrimonial business, was not to be thrown open to the general practitioner?

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
said, he hoped to introduce in another Session a Bill for throwing open the Court of Admiralty. That subject could not, however, be entertained at present, as it was not before the Committee.

§ MR. WARREN
moved, that the Chairman report progress.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
said, he would assent to that course on the understanding that they should resume the Committee on the Bill at twelve o'clock at noon to-morrow.

§ MR. MALINS
said, he must protest against such a proposal as most unfair. The Select Committee appointed to inquire into the construction of an Act of Parliament affecting the Jews, on which a large number of hon. Members were engaged, was to sit to-morrow.

LORD JOHN MANNERS
said, he would beg to inquire upon which of the two Committees they were to expect the assistance of the hon. and learned Attorney General to-morrow?

§ MR. HENLEY
remarked, that he did not think that the Government could be serious in suggesting that they should go on with this Bill at a morning sitting. None of the most important clauses of the measure had yet been discussed.

§ MR. MALINS
said, he wished to give notice that, if the Attorney General persevered 1202 in his intention to proceed with this Bill at twelve o'clock to-morrow, he should feel it his duty to attend in his place and expunge as many of his clauses as he could.

§ MR. GLADSTONE
said, that, as a member of the Select Committee which had been referred to, he could not attend in two places at once. He thought, moreover, that an arrangement proposed by a certain hon. and learned Gentleman within the last few minutes was not at all consistent with one which he had made in another place. He (Mr. Gladstone) could not of course allude to anything that had taken place in the Committee on Oaths.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
said, it was impossible to resist the appeal made to him by his right hon. Friend, although he had himself contemplated being in that House and elsewhere at the same time tomorrow. He would admit, however, that this was a difficult operation, and he would propose that they should go on at six o'clock to-morrow evening.