HC Deb 30 June 1853 vol 128 cc978-1074

Order read, for resuming adjourned Debate on Amendment proposed to be made to Question [23rd June], "That the Bill be now read a Second Time:"—And which Amendment was to leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "in the opinion of this House, further information is necessary, to enable Parliament to legislate with advantage for the permanent government of India; and, that, at this late period of the Session, it is inexpedient to proceed with a measure which, while it disturbs existing arrangements, cannot be considered as a final settlement," instead thereof.

Question again proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

Debate resumed.


said, that he had been early in life associated with India, and consequently felt a strong interest in the welfare of the people of that country, which induced him to take a more prominent part in the discussion than, under existing circumstances, he might otherwise have done. His right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty had put the question on its true footing, when he said that the entire system of government hitherto adopted should be judged by its fruits. To enable them, however, to form that judgment, it was their bounden duty to obtain sufficient information from authentic documents, and from the reports of the Committee that was specially appointed for that purpose. There was a fallacy that ran through the speeches of the right hon. President of the Board of Control, and, indeed, of every speaker who defended things in India as they were. This lay in assuming as special that which was general, and which necessarily would have resulted from any Government that England might have given to India. When India first came into our hands, the two great empires—the Mahratta and the Mogul—were crumbling, and their fragments waging war against each other. Surely, then, it stood to reason that whatever Government England should impose, would, by its strong arm, introduce order and security for property, and so attain many of those general benefits which were now represented as specially appertaining to government by the East India Company. No one doubted the importance of this question of Indian Government; why, then, was it not approached and treated as all important questions in this country usually were treated? The Reports of the Select Committee should have been concluded and published. Time should be afforded for their discussion in the various publications of the day, and for the formation and action of public opinion. But all this had been omitted, therefore he was decidedly in favour of further delay, unless some overruling excuse could be shown for such precipitate legislation. The advanced state of the Session, and the jaded condition of the House, already surfeited with business and recent excitement, were, without opening the wide question of India, enough to obstruct many of the important financial measures which had been so ably proposed in the comprehensive statement of the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and which the general interests of the country required should pass without delay. He could not but believe that the report which had been alluded to by the hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Bright) was well founded, and that legislation for India had actually or virtually been postponed for another year, until in an evil moment some rash and wilful Members of the Government took advantage of the oft-cited, but never seen, letter of Lord Dalhousie. Now, the House ought not to lay any great stress upon this letter; for undoubtedly Lord Dalhousie merely expected some slight modification of the present system, and when he said, "Whatever the Bill may be, pass it in this Session," those words were not to be taken in a literal sense. The subject of Indian reform had sprung up and gained importance with surprising rapidity. Not four years ago, Lord Broughton, then President of the Board of Control, when asked to appoint a Select Committee upon India, stated that there was no intention of altering the then existing state of things; and this answer was received without remonstrance. When the Committee was appointed, there was even then but little whispering about reform; and it was not till after Lord Ellenborough gave his remarkable evidence that public attention was awakened. But a far greater impulse was given by the Amendment proposed to the Select Committee by the right hon. Gentleman now the First Lord of the Admiralty, who was thus the parent of the present reform movement. Inquiry, even so little far as it had gone, had elicited matters which had compelled the introduction of the present measure of reform, which, small and narrow as it was, was far from being acceptable to the Court of Directors, although they submitted to it, knowing full well if this were thrown out, the progress of public opinion would next year produce one of a very different character. He could not see any danger in delay. Reference indeed had been made to the disturbed state of China, and of Central Asia; but when were these countries not disturbed? and it was not for the House of Commons, by a fanciful and far-fetched fear, to be diverted from the sound practical course of waiting for the fullest evidence on a subject before it came to a conclusion. There was not the slightest apprehension that delay would cause any attempt or even thoughts of insurrection; but it had been said that it would weaken the Government of India. He should very much like to be told how. No one ought to diminish the power or authority of the Governor General, in whom substantially resided the sovereignty; and that would remain unimpeached, unimpeachable, by delay. The main issue lay with the Court of Directors as representatives of the East India Company. Now, he wished to speak of that body with all possible respect. No one could consider the dangers they had encountered, the laborious tasks they had accomplished, and their glorious career of victories and conquests, without feelings of admiration and respect: still these reflections must not divert our minds from the consideration of what mode of government will be most beneficial for our Indian fellow-subjects, and whether the state of that empire, both internal and external, is not such as to require a change. To many it seemed that the uses of the East India Company had almost passed away, and that its very success had undermined its power. When the Government of India was confided to the Company, it was a small English colony; now, the people subject to its rule form no inconsiderable portion of the population of the whole globe. The commerce of India had been thrown open—it was daily brought into new relationships not only with many of our own distant dependencies, but almost with all nations; it was within three weeks instead of three months of London, and being mixed up more and more intensely with Imperial questions, it should necessarily stand under the Imperial Crown. Now, would the fact of transferring the Government of India from the hands of an incorporated body of merchants to the British Grown, weaken the authority of the Governor General? Would he be less able to enforce his commands, because he was the servant of Victoria, Queen, and not of the hon. Member for Honiton (Sir J. W. Hogg)? Would the native Princes of India be less disposed to make treaties, or would native Princes adhere less to treaties, because they were made with a great Queen, instead of a great Company? The hon. Member for Rochester (Sir H. Maddock) feared, that if the present Bill were thrown out, there might arise some triumph or excitement among the natives; but even should this occur, it would be but evanescent and trifling compared to the risk of passing an offensive, exclusive, and inefficient measure. In considering the present Bill, he had been anxious to examine it with reference to the wants of India; to the shortcomings of our administration; to the fruits, as it had been said, of our Indian tree. First, he found, with regard to the Indians themselves, that they were systematically excluded from every situation of honour, trust, or emolument. Then also law was asserted to be bad in itself, and badly administered; taxation was declared to be alike injudicious and excessive; education inefficient, and public works disregarded. Such were the more prominent complaints of the present system. With regard to the Home Government, it was stated that the use of patronage had a vicious effect in the election of Directors, and that they themselves were frequently powerless and always irresponsible. The system of double government, as it was called, was found to be cumbersome, dilatory, and impervious to all practical, constitutional responsibility and restraint. The consequences of this had machinery were found to be—and he coincided in the statement—a normal state of warfare and debt, arising out of a normal desire for the acquisition of almost worthless territory. How were these evils to be met by the present measure? With regard to the exclusion of natives from places of trust, he had hoped that the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Control would have rendered them eligible. That hope had, however, been completely crushed by the speech of the First Lord of the Admiralty. Still he hailed with great satisfaction the announcement that writerships were to be open to public competition, for that was at least a step in the right direction, and if persisted in and firmly carried out, would be found perhaps of wider sequence than any which had been made since the Reform Act. But unhappily this was only a home question, for the provisions of the Bill practically excluded the natives of India. The present Bill did not promise much towards reforming the law. The last Bill appointed a Corn-mission of Inquiry in India into the state of the law; but the expense incident to that Commission was great, while the fruits were small. Bearing that in mind, he could not augur much good from the appointment of a similar commission at home. With regard to education and public works, he would not go into them at that period of the debate; they had been discussed already, and the carrying them out would depend on the motive power that could be given to the new Government. The hon. Member for Inverness-shire (Mr. Baillie) had described the elective body of the East India Company as little better than a corrupt borough, into whose proceedings one of our Parliamentary Commissions might profitably inquire, and the present Bill left it all untouched. The system of patronage, perhaps personally the most pinching and offensive, was merely mystified to be preserved or rather to be increased. It had been asserted that the present Bill would diminish the patronage of the Directors; but by reducing their number in a greater ratio than the total amount of patronage, it was evident that the patronage of each individual would be increased. Hitherto each Director had at his disposal many cadetships and a few writerships; but hereafter each single Director would have a much larger number of cadetships at his disposal than he formerly had of writerships and cadetships combined. In his opinion it was not desirable to confer any patronage at all upon the Director's. Patronage as a payment for services was confessedly the very worst possible mode of remuneration. But for whatever cause patronage might be bestowed upon them, he saw no reason whatever for increasing its amount. On the contrary, if it were right to deprive the Directors of the patronage of the writer-ships, why not also take from them the patronage of cadetships, for the one stood on the same footing as the other. It was proposed that the Government should nominate six Directors, and these were to be persons intimately acquainted with Indian affairs—probably functionaries returned from India. These nominees would be generally the working men of the Direction; and thus indirectly would the standard requirements of the elected Directors be lowered, for proprietors, believing that the interests of India would be attended to by the Crown-appointed Directors, would thenceforth nominate and elect their own friends, no matter how unfit they might be. He feared the nominees would be subservient to the Government; and he should, therefore, prefer seeing their tenure of office limited to a fixed term of years after their return from India—say five years—leaving them to be followed by fresh men with fresh minds and more recent Indian experience. The noble Lord the Member for King's Lynn (Lord Stanley) said it was not only necessary that the Directors should be independent, but that the world should think them so. He (Mr. Rich) would ask any hon. Member to-day whether he believed that a Director, nominated by the Crown, having a seat at that Board, with 15,000l. in direct patronage, and with the knowledge that, as now proposed, their renomination depended absolutely on the Minister of the day, was likely to be substantially independent? The argument of the right hon. Member for Edinburgh (Mr. Macau-lay) in favour of the double government was not conclusive. The right hon. Gentleman said it was necessary the Indian Minister should have the Court of Directors to advise him, because of the extent of the Indian territory, and the great variety of matters which required to be considered in connexion with it. The same observations would apply equally to the Colonial Secretary and the Foreign Secretary. He should have liked to see the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton (Viscount Palmeston), when at the Foreign Office, receiving a Board of Directors from the Dover Railway Company, or the General Steam Navigation Company, to advise and control him? Yet these Boards and their constituents would know quite as much about foreign affairs as many East India Directors and proprietors knew about Indian affairs. The right hon. Gentleman himself (Mr. Macaulay) practically condemned the existing system when he said that Lord William Bentinck, in the course of fourteen months, enforced five important orders in defiance of the Directors. One great advantage, at least, would result from abolishing the Court of Directors—the Board of Control would then be unveiled. It would stand face to face with the Governor General and with the House of Commons, and we should have clear and undivided responsibility. The right hon. President of the Board of Control attached much importance to the annual financial statement respecting India, which would be made to the House under the provisions of the Bill. If we had to provide for the Indian expenditure, such a statement would doubtless be listened to very attentively; but, having nothing to do with payment, with the ways and means, the probability was that the House would listen listlessly to the statement for the first two or three years, and then leave it to become once more, as now, a nullity. Another mischievous characteristic of the Bill was, that its operation was not limited to any fixed period. This was holding out a premium to agitation, for experience showed that organic reforms were seldom effected except by agitation; and successful agitation on such a subject in India should assuredly be guarded against, instead of provoked. For some time, however, all would go on smoothly, for so ingeniously were the arrangements respecting the distribution of patronage dovetailed between the President of the Board of Control and the Directors, that those parties would have mutual interest in maintaining a system which had worked so well for them. If we were to have this Bill at all, he would, with the hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Bright), limit its duration to five years. During that time the Indian Government would be on its trial, and might be expected to behave well; but the wisest course would be to defer legislation for the present. One great principle which should govern our legislation for India, was the admissibility to office of every subject of the Queen, without distinction of colour or creed. This, though disregarded by the India Directors, was a distinctive feature of their Charter, and once much lauded by the right hon. Member for Edinburgh, who now shirked its enforcement. The right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty delighted the House the other evening when he painted in glowing colours the glories of Nott and Pollock rising from the lower stations of life; but the right hon. Baronet was not justified in attributing the employment of such men, and the honours to which they had attained, to the Indian system. Far from it; for this had been the law, the practice, the boast, and, he would add, the safeguard of England for centuries. But the East India Directors specially sinned against this noble principle, for they jealously excluded all but their own: there was something specially against it in the India Company, for they had rules which prohibited any but English-born covenanted servants from rising and distinguishing themselves as Nott and Pollock had done. Not one of the 100,000,000 of the Queen's native subjects could hope to rise above the ranks, or the lowest employments. The subhadar who had contributed to the heroic defence of Jellalabad, who had sustained the spirits of his comrades on that Sikh night when the honour of the Governor General and of our Indian empire depended on the discipline and devotion of the troops, might now be on picket in a pestilential jungle in Burmah, instructing a raw ensign in the elements of his duty. Long and honourable service, zeal, ability, courage, ambition, might centre in him; but he must die as he lived—in the ranks, always subordinate to the youngest ensign. There are the same hearts, the same emotions, under a black as under a white skin; what, then, must be his feelings—what those of his comrades—under such circumstances? The suspicion and jealousy displayed towards the natives were justified by no experience. This was a subject well deserving the serious consideration of the House. What had the hon. Secretary of the Board of Control said? Why, that there was a growing divergence between the European and native servants of the Company, and an increasing want of respect between them. Lord Ellenborough and Sir Charles Napier spoke still more strongly. We all knew of rankling discontents and suppressed mutinies. Our Empire was one of opinion; and we had a large native army. If distrust and dissatisfaction were by continued exclusion to become rooted in it, we should not hold India long. That we might depend upon. If you wish to make men better than they are, you must treat them as if they were better than they are; trust and confidence were twice blessed—they blessed those who gave, and those who received. In early days we trusted them. Clive, at Plassey, trusted them; during the whole of the Carnatic war, when Hyder Ali and his son were thundering at our walls, the sepoys were officered by natives; and what said Sir John Malcolm upon this subject? He distinctly said, and he published his conviction, that the army of Madras never was in such an efficient state as it was during the wars with Hyder Ali and Tippoo Saib. That army was a sepoy force, officered and commanded by natives of high caste and high enterprise. He therefore contended that, judging from experience, there was no danger but much security in officering some of our battalions with natives of high character and approved service. The present was the time to do it. But if the case as to the native military was a strong one, it was much stronger as to civilians. It had been admitted that 95 per cent of the administration of justice was discharged by native judges. Thus they had the work, the hard work; but the places of honour and emolument were reserved for the covenanted service—the friends and relations of the Directors. Was it just that the whole work, the heat and labour of the day, should be borne by natives, and all the prizes reserved for Europeans? Was it politic to continue such a system? They might turn up the whites of their eyes, and exclaim at American persistance in slavery. There the hard work was done by the negro, whilst the control and enjoyment of profit and power were for the American. Was ours different in India. What did Mill lay down? European control—native agency. And what was the translation of that? White power—black slavery. Was this just, or was it wise? Mill said it was necessary. Necessary! in order to obtain respect from the natives; but he (Mr. Rich) had yet to learn that injustice was the parent of respect. Real respect grew out of common service, common emulation, and common rights impartially upheld. We must underpin our Empire by such principles, or some fine morning it would crumble beneath our feet. So long as he had a voice in that House, it should be raised in favour of admitting our native fellow-subjects in India to all places to which their abilities and conduct should entitle them to rise. Another branch of the subject related to official responsibility. The right hon. President of the Board of Control must be made responsible; he must be checked by Parliament, and not by an irresponsible Court of Directors, elected by an irresponsible Court of Proprietors. The principle of Parliamentary supervision must no longer be a dead letter—it must be effectually carried out. His right hon. Friend (Sir C. Wood) had affected to accomplish this by means of an annual statement. An annual statement might be all very well; but it ought to be accompanied by livelier checks, by an active debtor and creditor account on demand. The keystone of our constitutional practice was the purse. If we ourselves had to pay for Indian wars, we should not enter upon them so readily as we now did. As the case stood at present, there was every inducement to war. Take the case of the Governor General. His right hon. Friend had given a list of five Governors General, for whom he (Mr. Rich) entertained respect, who, no doubt, had zealously served their country. Every one respected them; but what had been the result of their administration? War and debt. Lord Auckland went out, full of peaceful projects; but in Calcutta he was surrounded by the influences of war, and acted upon by secret instructions from home. He had not the strength to resist, but entered upon one of the most unjust and disastrous wars in which this country had ever been engaged. He was made an earl. Lord Ellenborough entered first in a predatory war with Scinde, and then with Gwalior. He was recalled, and received an earldom. Lord Hardinge encumbered us with the Sikh war. He went out a commoner, and returned a viscount. Lord Dalhousie encountered a second Sikh war, and was made a marquess. He was now waging war with the Burmese, and might become a duke. But what was the course pursued towards the only truly pacific Governor General? Lord William Bentinck maintained peace, reduced the debt, fostered education, encouraged the natives, and effected great reforms; but he returned, as he went, the great and honest commoner! Thus, then, the highest honours were lavished upon four men who involved their country in war and debt; while the one man of peace and good government received—nothing! Lord Ellenborough declared that the Governor General was surrounded by those only whose interests were most frequently adverse to the interests of India, and of England too. Their whole interests, and, he was afraid, their instincts, were for war. Soldiers wanted pay, promotion, and prize money; civilians, the moment territory was obtained, became Commissioners, at enormous salaries, with almost boundless power; and the Court of Directors, who had no responsibility in the matter, had their brothers, cousins, and friends in India, all profiting by it, all acquiring honour, reward, and distinction. Who then should cry for peace? The President of the Board of Control, sitting in his arm-chair in Cannon-row, fancied himself the Great Mogul, responsible to no one. And he was right, for he and the Governor General wielded the awful power of an immense Empire without let or hindrance; and it was something for a haphazard politician to say as he lounged down St. James's-street, or into his club, "I have conquered a province this morning." Thus, almost every one person connected with India was interested in the prosecution of war except the black man, who shed his life's blood in it without the hope of promotion, and who left his orphans to pay for it by the sweat of their brow. He maintained that such things ought not to be, and that an immediate stop should be put to this corrupt, demoralising policy. He would himself rather forfeit India altogether, than continue such a system. Such a consummation, however, need not be dreaded. The remedy lay in the breeches pocket. It had been contended, that the greater part of the wars in which we bad engaged had been quite as much of a European as of an Indian character. If so, let us, as honest men, pay our share of the cost. The Indian debt, it had been asserted, would ultimately fall upon us. He had little doubt of that; and had we assumed it twenty years ago, it would not have exceeded 30,000,000l. At present it was above 50,000,000l., and if the proposed Bill continued in force for twenty years, it would, at the end of that time, reach 100,000,000l., for the House had been told by his right hon. Friend that he had no hope that wars would not go on as heretofore. War, then, was looked upon almost as a normal condition of our Empire. It therefore required to be checked by greater penalties than we now applied: if we took the debt upon ourselves, we should find them there. Then, every constituency in the country would be hammering at their Members against war, that is, against war taxes; and every Member would be hammering at the Minister, whence there would be such a hammering as would hammer Indian war more out of favour than it unfortunately now was. No one would ever persuade him but that the preservation of peace in Europe since 1815 was mainly due to a fear of the consequences of an addition to the pressure of our overwhelming debt. That pressure, in fact, was a providential working to keep men from devastating each other with war, for war and devastation were convertible terms. At all events it was our bounden duty to bring to bear upon India the civilisation of a great and Christian country; and he trusted this would be done by the adoption of the principles of legislation he had endeavoured to sketch. Those principles were—accessibility to office in India of all without respect of caste, colour, or persuasion, according to merit; the constant, working responsibility of the Minister of India to Parliament; and the liability of this country to its share of the debt for the wars in which it engaged. He regretted to say he could not find the embodyment of one of these principles in the present Bill, which appeared to him to be drawn in a hesitating spirit. The Government seemed willing, yet afraid, to act. It behoved, therefore, the liberal party to give them an impulse, and that could be best done by bringing public opinion to bear more strongly upon Indian reform. Delay would do this. There might, or might not, be some inconvenience in this short delay; but it was as nothing compared to the immense object of conferring a generous, elevating, peaceful, and commercial government on the people of India. With this view, he should vote against the second reading.


said, he thought, before the hon. Gentleman who had last spoken referred in terms of disparagement to the Burmese war, and to the distinguished Nobleman who now governed India, he should have obtained better information than he seemed to possess. It was known that the last accounts from India gave us every reason to hope that that war was in the progress of being amicably settled; and when he spoke of the impolicy of that war, it would have been well to reflect that our empire in India was an empire of opinion, that the Burmese were a conquering nation, and that the prestige by which our Indian Government was supported, would have sustained great injury if, in the case of the Burmese, that had been passed over which we had severely chastised in others. He entirely concurred with his hon. Friend the Member for Inverness-shire (Mr. Baillie) and other hon. Gentlemen, that if in these debates there was one thing more desirable than another, it was that they should carefully exclude all considerations and influences of party politics. And certainly the speech with which his right hon. Friend the late President of the Board of Control concluded the debate on the first night of this discussion, showed that by the leaders of the late Government the question had not been considered with reference to party. Speaking for himself, he also wished to be relieved from any such influences, and to look at the two questions before the House—namely, the Bill of Her Majesty's Government, and the Amendment of his noble Friend (Lord Stanley)—solely on the ground of their merits. He was one of those who entertained the opinion that the present was the time when it was extremely desirable to legislate with regard to the Government of India. He came to that conclusion on two grounds: in the first place, because the Committee appointed to inquire into the subject, had reported favourably of the operation of the Act for renewing the present Charter; in the next place, that being so, he thought it extremely desirable that this subject should as soon as possible, consistently with that due deliberation which its importance deserved, be withdrawn from the arena of public discussion. And certainly the turn which the debate had taken had tended to confirm, and not to weaken, that impression. Hon. Gentlemen of the school of "Young India," as the hon. Member for the University of Oxford (Sir R. H. Inglis) termed them—better known, however, as the Manchester school—had indulged in one continued series of most exaggerated, envenomed, and bitter attacks upon the whole system, as well as every one connected with it, to which we owed the possession of our Indian Empire. The hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Bright) complained the other night that public opinion was not sufficiently informed on the subject. Now, what was the sort of enlightenment derived by the public from discussions of this kind, which the hon. Member said were instructing public opinion? It was an inherent virtue in the mass of our countrymen that they unhappily never read more than one side of a question. In discussions like these they were all more or less hero worshippers; they set up a political idol for themselves, they read his speeches, and with them that usually decided the question. Now it happened that at Manchester, whatever the hon. Member for that city, with his attractive style of pugilistic eloquence, said, was received as gospel. Well, the hon. Member for Manchester had informed them that the East India Directors were revelling in corruption from the patronage which they enjoyed. Was that a just charge? Why, the patronage was given to the Court of Directors because Parliament would not give it to the Crown; and how could he complain of the Directors exercising their patronage in the very way which seemed to have been expected of them? He (Mr. C. Bruce) believed that that patronage had been administered in a way that was most honourable to the Court of Directors. Then the hon. Member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden) told them that the double government of which he (Mr. C. Bruce), by the way, greatly approved, was a delusion and a sham—a thing without power. But what was the fact? Why, that within a short period they had exercised the supreme power of recalling the Governor General of India; and in his (Mr. C. Bruce's) opinion, they had exercised that power alike to their own honour and to the advantage of the country. Then the hon. Member told the people of the West Riding, who of course believed everything he said, that the whole system had been one for carrying on expensive and unjust wars, wasting the resources of the country, and creating a debt which they and their children would have to pay. But the hon. Member forgot to add that one of those wars—and that the most expensive—was rendered necessary by the fierce irruption of a warlike foe across our frontier, with an army of from 60,000 to 70,000 men, and a train of artillery which none but our own could have resisted; and that, if that unprovoked irruption upon our territory had not been driven back—if it had not been for the prompt, the gallant, and the judicious energy of Lord Hardinge, and the bravery of our army, led by that old and gallant soldier, who never knew defeat—he spoke of Lord Gough, than whom a braver man never drew sword in the service of Queen or country—events might have ensued which would have obviated the necessity for this discussion as to how best to retain our empire in India, and have led to responsibilities of a pecuniary nature for the people of the West Riding and their children to meet of a very different sort from those to which they were now liable. Then the hon. Member for Leominster (Mr. J. Phillimore) had referred to the question of the land tenure, and the distress and poverty into which the native inhabitants of the several Presidencies were plunged. But the hon. Member omitted to mention the fact that the systems of land tenure, the permanent settlement of Lord Cornwallis, the ryotwar system of Munro, and the mixed system now in operation in the North-western Provinces, were the result of the anxious and earnest consideration by the best informed and most powerful minds as to what system could be devised for the advantage of the people of India. The right hon. Gentleman (the President of the Board of Control) said it was not necessary to wait for the Report of the Committee to legislate on Indian affairs. He (Mr. C. Bruce) had listened to the statements of the right hon. Gentleman; but though he concurred in his view as regarded the double government, he considered that to make that Government effective two essential measures should be carried out—namely, to strengthen that Government in the first place, and in the second to give it permanency. To the system of double government, this country was indebted for the retention of its power in India; while its action had also had the most beneficial effect upon the condition of the natives. The plan of Her Majesty's Government, which did neither of these things, therefore, greatly disappointed him, because it appeared to weaken that system where it should have strengthened it, and it strengthened it where it should have weakened it. In his opinion the system of nominees tended entirely to the subversion of the independence of the Court of Directors. What was wanted with respect to India was a body to control the local Government, to make it work in harmony with the Imperial Government, and to be a sort of intervening body, not subject to party influences, but, by embracing all the knowledge, and vast and various interests which ought to be represented, to possess such weight and authority with public opinion as to serve as a sort of breakwater to resist the interested speculations of powerful individuals—whether connected with the cotton or any other trade, with Manchester or the West Riding—being urged on in a direction unfavourable to the people of India. It ought also to be a check against the overbearing power of a wilful, and against the submission of a weak Government. But how did Ministers propose to secure the independence of this body? By appointing a set of nominees, who could not possibly enter the Court of Directors without carrying with them a strong leaning in favour of the Government that sent them there. He was surprised to find that the hon. Gentlemen who objected to the Court of Directors and the double government opposed the Ministerial plan, and he was still more surprised that the hon. Baronet the Member for Honiton hailed it with so much complacency. [Sir J. W. HOGG: I support the principle of the Bill.] He regarded the Ministerial plan as consigning the Court of Directors to the "tomb of all the Capulets;" and he thought that the proper place for Ministerial nominees was not the Court of Directors but the Board of Control, which he was sorry to see was falling into abeyance—though it never could be a nonentity so long as it was presided over by the right hon. Gentleman. If the Crown wanted to reward distinguished services in India, to confer honour on its Indian servants, or to secure the services of men having a knowledge of Indian affairs, the Board of Control was the place for them. If such men were to get a seat in the Board of Directors, they would carry with them party feeling. In confirmation of his views, he (Mr. C. Bruce) had received a letter from a relative who had long resided in India, and was well versed in Indian affairs, which was to the effect that the introduction of nominees into the Court of Directors would cast upon the Ministry of the day the responsibility of the acts of that body; that the India Board, therefore, would become an object of attack on the part of the political opponents of such administration; that the Government of India would consequently become an open arena for party contests; and that weakness and division would, therefore, take the place of that union and strength which was the foundation of British power. The writer added, that after the first choice the nominees would be the mouthpieces of the Ministers. He (Mr. C. Bruce) entirely concurred in these views, which, however, were those of a gentleman who differed widely from him in general politics, and who was more radical on these points than most hon. Members of that House. With all its faults, the Court of Directors was free from party contests. The plan of the Government was, therefore, worse than the system which prevailed in that body. Another objection to this plan was, its rejection of the principle of permanency. It left the whole system of Government for India to be scrambled for at the will of political parties in that House. He could, therefore, conceive no plan more likely to be mischievous in its every consequence. If a Government energetic and strong was wanted for India, it could not be obtained under the plan, because the basis of such a Government was inevitably settled power, permanent in its character, and not fluctuating. For such a Government, twenty years was only a short period; but Her Majesty's Government only proposed one year. That, in his opinion, was fatal to the plan. At the same time, he was by no means satisfied with the Amendment of his noble Friend (Lord Stanley). That Amendment pointed rather too much to a section of that House called "Young India," for him to support it cordially, though he believed his noble Friend gainsaid that inference in his able speech. If he (Mr. C. Bruce) could propose an Amendment, it would be to the effect that the House, concurring in the Report of the Committee that the tenor of the evidence was favourable to the East India Company's government, considering the period of the Session and the state of the question, resolved that the Act empowering that Government should be renewed, and be of force until Parliament should otherwise determine. His noble Friend had, however, adopted the suggestion of two years, and for that reason he was not satisfied with the Amendment. In his opinion the present system had been most unfairly assailed—it had been attacked with the most unmeasured and the most unjustifiable abuse—and Her Majesty's Government had introduced a measure which was a virtual denial of that system, and which was calculated to give it its death-blow. It should not be forgotten, hewever, that under that system our great Indian Empire had been consolidated and maintained; and it could not be denied that while it gave greater power and prosperity to the State, it also gave greater security to the persons and property of the Natives than they had ever enjoyed under the rule of their native princes or Moslem conquerors. There were evils in that system to be remedied, beyond doubt, as well as benefits to be enforced; but the wonder was, that with a Government differing in language, religion, and habits, from the Natives, the evils were so few, and the remedies for them so promptly and efficiently supplied. As the servants of that system acquired greater experience, those evils became less, and there was every prospect, if it continued, that the result of this knowledge would be a perfect administration of that system. Twenty years were but as an hour in changing the character of a nation, and therefore Parliament should pause before it proceeded to sweep away a system which had been so beneficial in its action. The advantage of this system was shown by the fact, that there had been no instance of rebellion since the older provinces came under British rule; and that, even in the more recent acquisitions—in Scinde and in Lahore—the functionaries of the Indian Government were received with willing submission, if not with ready welcome. A system that produced such men as Lawrence, Conway, Thomason, Cotton, Dixon, and Macpherson, should not be rashly thrown aside. If the Bill were confined to the simple arrangement of the home machinery of the Government, it might be applied. The Committee had, however, not reported on the branches of inquiry connected with the local Government of India. But it was through the local Government alone that those ameliorations deemed necessary could be applied. He was not ready, therefore, to legislate on the subject of the local Government; and, what was more, he thought that House ought not to legislate on it until the opinions of the Governor; General and the Governors of the several Presidencies were obtained. To obtain these, legislation should therefore be postponed for the present Session, for to legislate without them would be to legislate in the dark. What was to be guarded against in India, was the too great centralisation of Government. He would suggest, therefore, that every Governor General, every Governor of a Presidency, every Commissioner, every collector even, should have the power of suggesting and originating legislation for the jurisdiction over which they presided, and also a consultative voice in all legislation which affected another district, or province, or Presidency, than that over which they presided. As to the patronage, he entirely differed from his noble Friend (Lord Stanley) and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Edinburgh (Mr. Macaulay) in their opinion of throwing it open to competition; he thought that that was a system that would endanger and ruin the civil service, and he would be no party to it. They were going to open a great State lottery with very few prizes and a great many blanks. A more demoralising system he could scarcely imagine. The first effect of it would be, that every respectable attorney and person in the middle class of life, who had got a promising son, would rush into this competition with the idea that this son might rise to be Governor General, and the result would be, they would have a vast number of educated men disappointed in the objects of their ambition. They all knew that nothing had led more to the disturbances in France than the immense number of highly-educated young men beyond the wants of the country, who looked to the Government service and employment as a source of support and advancement. That was the very element of the revolution in France. He had no fear of a revolution in this country, because we had Australia and Canada to send them to; but he greatly objected to a system which had such a tendency. At the present day, in every walk of life, the number of educated men was out of proportion to the offices to be bestowed, and he doubted whether they would get a better set of men. He denied the position of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Edinburgh, that a man was better qualified for such offices as those in question by mere literary distinction. He could find instances to the contrary even among those quoted by the right hon. Gentleman. He could refer to one whom he had named, a distinguished prize essayist at college, who was obliged to be recalled from India for the confusion he had created there. The right hon. Gentleman had referred to Lord William Bentinck. He had known that nobleman, and had the highest respect for him—he was an able, upright, and honourable statesman, and a most excellent governor; but he was not distinguished by any means for literary acquirements. Then take the case of Lord Clive—he was scarcely literary enough to hold his seat at a clerk's desk, and yet he had laid the foundation of our dominion in India. But he would give one name against the long array the right hon. Gentleman had quoted. There was the Duke of Wellington. Who was his equal as a great military conqueror, a civil administrator, or a wise and judicial statesman? Who in our time had come near him? But he was not distinguished at school or at college. The proposal was a mere claptrap and delusion to gain votes below the gangway. He thought it so mischievous, so likely to destroy the civil service, that nothing should ever induce him to vote for it. He would dispose of the patronage thus: He would take one-half, and of that he would give a portion to the Commander-in-chief, calling for an annual return to Parliament from him as to the manner in which he had bestowed it; the rest of the half he would give to the Universities and great schools of the United Kingdom. The other half he would leave in the hands of the individual Directors; they had hitherto used it well, and their possession of it could only be productive of good to the community. As to the Court of Directors, he would place them on such a basis as to give them weight and influence in the public opinion of the country. As that Court was now constituted, he thought it too weak, and yet they proposed to weaken it; its constitution was too narrow, but that they did not propose to touch. He thought a single Chairman and Deputy Chairman, even if permanent, and with all the acknowledged ability of the hon. Member for Honiton (Sir J. W. Hogg), could not master the business of all the departments; they necessarily must be almost ludicrously ignorant of much upon which they were called upon to advise Ministers. Then the Committee of the East India House wa3 not constituted at present so as to render to the Government all the assistance they might render, and, from the constant state of fluctuation they were in, it was impossible they could form or follow out comprehensive views on any great question. Then he objected to the system of "P.O." (private communications); it roust lead to a great deal of idle, undignified, and sometimes mischievous meddling with small and unimportant details. The President of the Board of Control and the Court became compromised to certain opinions, without having had the advantage of the research and discussions which all great questions ought to undergo in the Court of Directors, and it led, in fact, to a system of government by clerks; and, although he Boost readily admitted that the clerks of the Board of Control were most able men, yet he objected to a system which forced the Board to decide on questions of which its chiefs could not have that knowledge which was necessary to enable them to decide properly. Again, he thought the Government of India should be conducted in the name of the Queen, rather than of the Company. He thought, too, that to make such a senate as was required, the number of the Directors should be extended instead of being diminished, as was proposed; and that the authority and influence of the elective body should be greatly enlarged; he would maintain all existing votes with one exception—he would relieve the fair sex from the solicitations of their friends—he would abolish all cumulative votes; but then he would give votes to all persons residing in this country who possessed property in India, real or personal, to the value of 100l. a year; he would add all retired Indian officers, whether in the military or civil service, who enjoyed pensions of 100l. a year; and he would include another class—all men who had ventured to the extent of 2,000l. in the trade of India. That would let in the manufacturing and commercial classes, and would altogether create a pretty numerous body of electors. For the Directors elected by that body he would require a qualification, in a certain number of them, of a certain number of years of service in India; he would not require it for all, because it would give a narrow and limited character to the body. He would have altogether thirty-six Directors, and would divide them into six bodies, or committees, of six each—the military, the financial, the political, the revenue, the judicial, the miscellaneous—and of each of those bodies he would have a Chairman, and Deputy Chairman, who should be handsomely paid, and should be working men; the other four Directors of the committees would be extremely valuable for their advice on the various questions that arose; but it would not be necessary to remunerate them if they had a share of the patronage. The proceedings of such a Court would be so well matured when they were carried to the Board of Control, that it would not be necessary for the President of that Board to alter them. He would take the Chairmen of the military, financial, and political committees, and constitute a secret committee to go to the Board of Control with all secret despatches, and who should be authorised and empowered to act with the President in the same manner and with the same power as the Supreme Council in India acted with the Governor General. Then he would propose one thing more. He would oblige them to sit once a week in open court, and hear complaints on all such matters of injustice or oppression as were not capable of receiving redress in the ordinary course of law. The matters upon which the Home Court would decide would be very important. They would have to consider not only all wrongs which did not admit of ordinary redress, but the laws proposed by the Governor General in Council—matters of removal from office, and resumption of political power;—in short, everything which was in its nature judicial, but for which there was no other remedy. These were the notions he entertained, which, if the Bill of the Government were limited to the subject of home government, they might have embraced in it, and carried through. With regard to the education of the people of India, and the extension of religion, he hoped the Government of India would give their own religion fair play. Hitherto they had very grievously discouraged it; for instance, by giving assistance to schools in which no Christianity was taught, and by refusing assistance to schools in which Christianity was taught. This was discouragement of their own religion, And most unfair discouragement. The great aim and object, which, in his conscience, he believed were in the contemplation of a just, and gracious, and wise Providence, in having assigned to us the government of this great country, were, that we should be instruments in civilising and in improving it Now, he begged the House to remember that the great civiliser was Christianity; and again he would implore the Government not to discourage the dissemination of that religion, but to encourage, by all fair and legitimate means, the action of those devoted men who went out as missionaries to extend its blessings.


said, that in justice to the proprietary of the East India Company, from whom he had received many favours, he wished to he allowed to say a few words in their defence, believing that his experience as to the votes given by that proprietary was of as great weight as those vain assertions with which the House had recently been indulged on the subject. During the long canvass he had made as a candidate for a seat in the Court of Directors, only two offers of votes had been made to him in return for promises of appointments. And yet the hon. Member for Inverness-shire(Mr. Baillie) would wish the House to presume that this was the universal system pursued between the constituency and the canvasser. With regard to the assertion that a number of votes were always at the disposal of the banks, with which to oblige their customers, he would ask the hon. Member how it was that the eminent banking firm with which the hon. Member for Inverness-shire had the good fortune to be connected, had given him (Mr. Marjoribanks) their best wishes, but had only assisted him to one vote? As to the hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Bright), he congratulated him upon the manner in which he had out-Heroded Herod upon this question. It was his firm belief that not all the bankers in London, both in the City and at the West end, could give over 300 votes in the way the hon. Member described. The hon. Member declared that no gentleman of standing would condescend to the degradation of a canvass. All he (Mr. Marjoribanks) could say was, that when his (election was finished, he could with the greatest confidence have given his canvassing book into the hands of any of his opponents, and would have defied any one to point a single vote purchased either by a direct or an implied promise. Such being the fact, it was simply ridiculous—nay, more, it was monstrous—to assert that a highly-educated proprietary of nearly 1,900 persons were a most corrupt and most useless constituency. Another assertion, or rather complaint, made by the hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Bright) was, that a Report in reference to the public works of India, which had been moved for by the hon. Member for Montrose (Mr. Hume) some months before, had not, although in circulation at the India House, been laid upon the table of that House. Now, the fact was that the Report in question had been laid upon the table of the House on the 27th of last month, and therefore the hon. Member had only himself to blame for his ignorance. Having, as he hoped, completely exonerated the proprietors from the unjust attacks made upon them, he would now say a few words with respect to the Amendment of the noble Lord (Lord Stanley). That Amendment he viewed as simply a measure for delay, and he could not agree with those who considered that delay was desirable. As to the assertion that the Directors wished for the Government Bill, because its tendency was favourable to them, he would rather say that if the Court of Directors merely regarded their individual interest, they would unanimously support the noble Lord's Amendment; for each day, each counter-assertion made in regard to their conduct, had proved the absurdity of the charges brought against them. He would say, in conclusion, that even if he could not support the Bill, still less could he support the noble Lord's Amendment.


said, that after the most anxious and candid consideration of this question, and after availing himself of all the means in his power of coming to a correct conclusion, he found himself bound in honesty to support the Amendment of the noble Lord the Member for King's Lynn. He would state at the outset the grounds on which he proceeded. If he accepted the Bill of the Government, he must pronounce that Bill to be sufficient and meritorious; if on the contrary, he accepted the Amendment, he did not by so doing repudiate the Bill, and condemn it. He only said the Bill is of such importance, and concerning the happiness of so many of my fellow-creatures, that there ought to be no precipitancy, but we ought to satisfy them and ourselves that we have given the question full consideration before we determined on the course we should pursue. He could not entirely agree with the views of the last speaker but one, who condemned both the Bill and the Amendment. The proposition before the House was not, he repeated, to condemn the Bill; the Amendment only asked them to suspend their judgment until they were completely and fully informed, and were enabled to give a satisfactory decision upon the subject. The measure was presented to the House on the 9th of June; the only evidence with which he had been supplied came to him dated the 16th of June, and then a day or two afterwards they were asked to give their assent to this Bill, while the materials upon which they ought to base their decision were yet accumulating. He was not prepared to say that the Bill ought to be altogether repudiated, but he would not be a party to the passing of such a measure upon the imperfect information now before the House. When the evidence taken before the Lords Committee was presented to him, knowing the ripe experience of an early friend of his, Sir Erskine Perry, and the great interest he had always taken in the affairs of India, he had turned at once to the evidence given by that gentleman to obtain the materials for the formation of an opinion upon this question. The hon. Baronet the Member for Honiton (Sir J. Hogg), in the defence he had made as to the administration of justice in India, had referred more than once to a work published by Mr. Norton. He would read one passage from the evidence of Sir Erskine Perry upon the same subject. In reply to a question put to him, Sir Erskine said— I believe the judicial system of the Company is extremely defective. I received a pamphlet yesterday from a trustworthy gentleman, Mr. Norton, of the Madras bar, which gives a list of examples of the extreme ignorance in judicial matters displayed by the Company's Judges, which quite condemn the system. My testimony from Bombay is to the same effect; I lived on terms of great intimacy with the civil service in India, and I had great opportunities of knowing what they think of it, and they, also, generally condemn it. In 1833 Sir Edward Ryan stated that the Judges of the Supreme Court in India had made various suggestions for the amendment of the law; those suggestions, in connexion with the whole subject, were taken into consideration by the Home Government and the Legislature, with the result that in 1837 a code was framed for India. Had that code been carried into effect? Nothing of the sort; it had been since bandied about, battledore and shuttlecock fashion, between Cannon-row and Leadenhall-street and India, for consideration and reconsideration; and now, in 1853, the Government proposed to send it the round once more, so that a system, which had engaged the earnest attention of so many able men, and had cost so many thousands of pound's, was still to remain in abeyance for an indefinite period, although it was the distinct intimation to them of the most competent authorities, of Sir Erskine Perry, of Sir Edward Ryan, and others, that this code was one of the most crying wants of India. But after thousand's- upon thousands had been spent in perfecting it, in order that it might supply all the wants of India, what was the remedy proposed with respect to that code? Why, it was stated that such and such reports had been transmitted to the Board of Directors, but that as to the general principles no final decision had been given, so that it now remained for Her Majesty to appoint a Commission to consider the recommendations of the India Land Commission, and to report from time to time what laws and regulations should be proposed for the enactment of Parliament. Accordingly most eminent men from this country, and some of the most eminent members of the bar at that time, had been sent out. Their suggestions had been sent to the Court of Directors, and there they remained. Now, he might ask where were those codes, and why had they not been furnished to the Members of that House now that they were about to legislate for India? If Parliament was not competent to legislate for India, in God's name let them abdicate their authority at once; but if they were to legislate, it was their bounden duty to apply their minds to the subject, and if they were to come to a distinct and sound conclusion, they ought to have been furnished with all the information it was possible for them to have. Now, however, they could do nothing for India but give them this meagre measure. He would refer to one or two opinions which had been given with reference to this code. Sir Erskine Perry and Sir Edward Ryan, who had been Judges in India, were, as he had previously stated, most favourable to this code. Twenty years ago Sir Erskine Perry and Sir Edward East had called attention to the great evils prevailing in the administration of the law in India; and was it creditable to the country, after these authorities had pointed out these facts, to be now legislating under such circumstances on a question that was looked upon with such interest by the people of India? The people of India considered that the fact was of the greatest importance, how the Legislature would deal with the civil and criminal codes. It was impossible that they could provide a suitable Government for India by so meagre a measure as this, by passing an Act merely to satisfy their political exigencies at the time, whilst they left all the real grievances unredressed, and by passing a measure which not only invited but involved further discussion. If this were their ultimatum, it might be depended upon that when farther concessions were wrung from them, they would far more shake the establishment of the Government of India than anything that could be done at the present time. Whatever decision they might come to, it ought to be done after giving the subject the largest and most liberal consideration. Nothing, indeed, satisfied men's minds more than the consciousness that their case had been fully heard; and if they were debarred from that, nothing could possibly irritate them more than the belief that justice had been denied them because their case had not had a sufficient hearing. With respect to the system of judicature, Sir Edward Ryan had suggested the establishment of a Civil Court at Calcutta, and that in the event of the trial proving favourable, it should be extended over the rest of India as it was found applicable. That scheme had been sent home; it was approved of by the law officers of the day here, but it was rejected by the Court of Directors. On another point, with respect to the judicial capacity of the natives, both Sir Erskine Perry and Sir Edward Ryan spoke highly of them. The right hon. Baronet opposite (Sir C. Wood) had said that the tree must be judged by its fruits. He (Mr. Napier) was willing to accept that; but the right hon. Baronet had judged rather by the foliage and not by the fruits. In whatever cases the natives had been called upon to decide as judges, they had exhibited great sagacity in picking out whatever points there were when the question was one of a conjectural nature. He asked, then, was it fair to treat 200,000,000 of our fellow-subjects in this manner, and to reject the only opportunity which would enable them to achieve for themselves some portion of good and benefit. In reply to Question 2,528 of the Report, Sir Erskine Perry, when asked his opinion with respect to the amalgamation of the two systems, stated that he was favourable to the amalgamation, if it could be done in a large and comprehensive measure forming a part of an organic change in the system of government, and, above all, passed in this country. Now he asked, was this dealing with the question in a large and comprehensive measure? He would just point out one of the most extraordinary methods he had ever hard of, of training their judges. They were first placed in the courts of appeal, and young Europeans, of twenty-three or twenty-four years of age, might be frequently seen overruling the judgements of others of twice their age and experience. Referring, again, to the code of criminal and of civil law, and the other matters which he had stated it was necessary should be passed in this country, all, it had been said, depended upon an organic change in the system. It had been said that a change in the system of judicature was essential, and that the adoption of the codes was also essential. Now if a change in the judicial system was essential, and if that change depended on an organic change in the Government at home, why should they be asked to pass a Bill like the present, which took no notice of these proposals? It was not dealing fairly with the natives of India. It was true that the peculiar nature of the religion of India offered great obstacles to even secular instruction; and he admitted that it was a dangerous thing to destroy one form of religion before being prepared to offer another; but he still asked the question, what had they done to plant Christianity, civilisation, or a good system of laws in India? Now, to do all this, the Bill provided was, as they had been told, a reconstruction of the Court of Directors. What they wanted was an energetic and vigorous Government, to strike a blow at once, and put the code directly into force, which Sir Erskine Perry, Dr. Duff, and Sir Edward Ryan, were all agreed in pronouncing to be the crying want of India. He (Mr. Napier) objected to this Bill as the ultimatum of what they proposed to do; and if this meagre measure was all that they could offer, he, for one, could only agree to it under the sternest necessity—when all the evidence had been gained, when all inquiry had been closed, when India and her undefended people, who had no power beyond the justice of their case, had had a full and fair hearing. It was the duty of the independent Members of that House to look to the question on the broadest principles of justice. If no party feelings were mixed up in the question, it was their duty to take care that they were furnished by Government with all the materials necessary to insure the best measure which the case admitted. They had been told that they could amend the measure in Committee. He would ask, would they be in any better position when in Committee next week, than they were now? The Amendment of his noble Friend (Lord Stanley), in his opinion, was founded on justice. He did not ask the House to reject the measure, he merely asked them to suspend their judgment upon it until they had obtained the materials necessary to enable them to come to a just conclusion. He implored hon. Members, as they valued the character of the country—as they valued the character of the House—and as they valued the welfare of 200,000,000 of their fellow-creatures, not to suffer this Bill to pass in its present state, but to do justice to those whom they were bound to protect.


said, he very much condemned the proposal of the hon. Member for the county of Elgin (Mr. Cumming Bruce) as most rash and revolutionary, and one which, if carried out, could not fail soon to destroy the power of this country in India. He considered that there was one great error generally entertained by that House in discussing this question. That error consisted in the belief that they were legislating for the people of a country like the United States of America, or of Lancashire, and not for the people of India. There never was a country that, previously to 1757, had been subjected to such perpetual and bloody wars as India. The British Government had done hard and cruel things in India; but he, for one, could not overlook the good it had done, considering the population they had to deal with. The spirit and practice of our Government had been mercy itself, compared with that of the Hindoo, Mogul, and Mahratta Governments. The condition of the people of India had, indeed, been more wretched and miserable before British rule commenced in India, than that of any people recorded in history. Among the difficulties of the question was the fact that we had had to do with from thirty-seven to forty nations speaking different languages, and that we had to introduce Hindoo and Mahomedan. law into our administration. One-third of the produce of the-soil had, under the Moguls, been considered as revenue belonging to the sovereign; one-third as belonging to the zemindar or proprietor; and one-third as belonging to the ryot or cultivator of the soil. This was a far more oppressive system than that which existed now, which, however, he admitted, was susceptible of improvement, especially with regard to abolishing the duty on salt, which was a tax on a prime necessary of Indian life. To come to the Bill which was now before the House, he did not consider that it was the best which could be framed; but, on the other hand, he thought it was dangerous to make suddenly sweeping changes in the government of a population of 150,000,000, professing different religions, and speaking no fewer than fourteen different languages, with traditional hatreds entertained one against the other, and where the division of the Hindoo population into castes tended to prevent their moral and social improvement. The most common error that was entertained in England with respect to distant possessions was this, that they were perpetually legislating for them according to the British constitution, and as if the inhabitants were Christians and Europeans. Even with regard to the Continent, they thought everything wrong that did not square with British ideas. But in legislating for India they ought to have a twofold object in view—first, to advance the intelligence and civilisation of India; and, next, not to come into violent antagonism with the religion and traditionary usages of the natives. For his part, he had no sympathy with the cry which had been raised about want of information about India. In 1833 a great mass of information respecting India was laid before the House of Commons, and ever since that time full details of all that had taken place had been laid before the House; so that if men were ignorant of the affairs of India, it could only be because they would not take the most ordinary pains to inform themselves. His objections to delay in legislation were these. In the first place, he believed that in India itself new legislation was now expected. In the second place, his noble Friend the Marquess of Dalhousie, with whom he had acted in office five years, considered that immediate legislation was necessary; and he had the greatest confidence in the knowledge, sagacity, and judgment of Lord Dalhousie. He therefore thought that the plan of doing something during the present Session was a wise and good policy, and that the course adopted by the Government, of not fixing any particular period for the expiration of the Bill, but leaving the question of the government of India open for future revision, was a wise and good one. He would not go into the merits of the Bill, though he believed it had practical merits; but he must say, he doubted whether the system proposed with regard to the Directors would permanently work well. As a temporary plan, he thought that it would work better than the present form of government. On the question of appointments to office, he must at once say that he doubted whether the system of competition would succeed as thoroughly and satisfactorily as its friends anticipated. When he looked at the high character and the admirable conduct of most of those who were sent out under the present system, he was afraid that the proposed plan of competition would not give them better servants than they had already. The right hon. and learned Member for the University of Dublin (Mr. Napier) had stated one or two circumstances which he could not pass over without notice. He complained that the code of Indian law proposed by the right hon. Member for Edinburgh (Mr. Macaulay) had never been laid before that House, nor had it been brought into operation in India. Now the fact was that a code of law might be considered to be the most perfect code in the world for India, but on being taken out to India it might be found to be perfectly incompatible with the habits and feelings of the people of that country. The celebrated Mr. Locke drew up a morally perfect constitution for Carolina of 152 articles; but it was found, on being sent to the colony, to be impracticable for a new American colony, and it was never acted upon. He thought Parliament ought to carry out the spirit of the Act of 1833 with regard to the employment of the natives, and that they ought to have all the benefit of the covenanted service. With regard to another question, that of the power of making war in India, he must say that the power given to the President of the Board of Control, and to the Secret Committee, was a most solemn, and, under most circumstances, a most dangerous, power; and the wonder to him was that it had really been executed with so little of precipitation and of injustice. But then they ought to look to the conduct of the men who had been entrusted with that power in this country; because, after all, the power was vested in the hands of the Ministers of the Crown, and no man could be a Minister of the Crown who did not possess the confidence of the House of Commons. It was on this ground he was surprised at the course taken by the hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Bright); because, as they were promised a Reform Bill next year, which might be expected to increase the power of the people, the hon. Member, and those who thought with him, would then have it in their power to improve the Bill more than they could do now. Much had been said about the aggressive wars which had been pursued in India; but before altogether condemning those wars, let them look at what had taken place in America. At the time of Wolfe's victory there were not more than 2,000,000 of the British race scattered along the coasts of the Atlantic; but since that time the whole of the northern American continent was governed and peopled by men speaking the English language. Nor could we in India prevent the extension of our territories. He firmly believed that until they possessed the whole of the Indian peninsula, from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin, and from the Indus to the Burrampootra, they would never establish that tranquillity in India which would be the necessary consequence of their dominion. He believed there were circumstances at work which would compel them, in spite of themselves, to take possession of the whole country. He did not consider that the natives of India were sufficiently prepared for any but a gradual change. When they were so, he would be prepared to go as far as any practical man could go; and he believed the time not to be far distant when the whole government of India must be invested in the Crown. He was willing to admit that the government of India had worked wonderfully well, considering the manner in which it was constituted. It was an absurdity to confide the Government of India to men who were elected by about 2,000 stockholders, who took no interest whatever in India, provided they received fair dividends; and the Company had long ceased to be a trading association, and had become territorial lords. On the other hand, the Directors so elected had been long connected with the Government of India; and, that being so, he considered the course proposed to be pursued by the Government the most safe and practicable. Reserving to himself the privilege of supporting and endeavouring to redress the grievances which had been stated in the petitions of the natives from Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta, he would give the principle of the Bill before the Committee his support—a support which, he could assure the House, was given in a perfectly independent spirit, and speaking only as the unfettered representative of one of the largest constituencies in the country, and one that wa3 deeply interested in the prosperity of the people of India.


said, he always felt considerable diffidence in intruding himself upon the attention of the House upon any question, but he felt it the more in addressing them on the present occasion on a question not only affecting the interests of his constituents, but of several millions of his fellow creatures. He had lately had the honour to present a petition from the corporation of Sunderland, praying that the House would pause in its legislation on this subject, and that it would not pass any Bill for the future government of India till there was time and opportunity given for the taking the evidence of the natives of India. Now, if shipping were the child of commerce, and if commerce were the result of prosperity and peace, and if prosperity and peace depended upon good government, it would not surprise the House that his constituents in Sunderland, themselves intimately connected with shipping, should take a deep interest in the result of this debate. He had himself, after well considering the matter, arrived at the conclusion that the Amendment proposed by the noble Lord (Lord Stanley) ought to receive the support of the House, and that some time should be given to enable the House to come to a conclusion on this important subject from the elements which might come to their hands. It was undoubtedly right, that, in coming to that conclusion, they should consider the interests of this country, but it was no less incumbent upon them to consider the interests of the inhabitants of India. Shortly after the Act had passed in the year 1833, under which the government of India had since been conducted, William IV., in a speech from the Throne, said— I have the most confident expectation that the system of government thus established, will prove to have been wisely framed for the improvement and happiness of the natives of India. The question to be considered now, was, whether that prognostication had turned out true, and whether the system which the Government of that day introduced, and which became law, had tended to the improvement of the people of India. The system established in 1833 was now put upon its trial, and the point to be considered was, whether from the apparent results of that system it was one which ought to be perpetuated, or whether it ought to be discontinued. The right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty had stated that the tree ought to be judged by its fruits. He believed if the House did so, it would be found that those fruits were not wholesome and delicious fruits, agreeable to the appetite and pleasant to the taste, but those fruits that were found in the fabled garden, and which Milton assigned to the rebellious spirits—within they were bitterness and ashes. An hon. Member had complained that he (Mr. D. Seymour) and other hon. Members sitting below the gangway—the Young India school, as he was pleased to call them—who had certainly carefully studied this subject, and had used every endeavour to obtain the best information upon it, were in the habit of taking exaggerated views of things connected with India, and of always looking at the worst side of the picture. That might be accounted for in two ways: it might be either from ignorance of where to turn to see the bright side, or it might be that the picture presented no bright side at all. What were the tests they ought to take, in order to try the merits of the system? He would ask whether, by the present system, peace was encouraged—whether the works of peace, such as canals and roads, the means of transit and internal traffic, flourished—whether there was a sound and upright judicial code—whether a system of law was established that was cheaply administered, and that agreed with the wants and habits of the people—whether education was promoted and religion aided—whether, in a word, the social and political good of the people was effected or not? If he reviewed the history of the last twenty years, he found, that instead of peace, the system had been the instigation and the cause of war—that instead of creating works of peace, it had fallen short of the works even of the uneducated and untutored chieftains of ancient times—that in the Presidency of Madras one-fifth of the canals had fallen out of working order—that education had been neglected—that"the judicial system was a disgrace to the country—that law was overborne by technical difficulties—that forgery, fraud, and falsehood were perpetrated and encouraged. If he found that these things were so, then he said he must exercise his right as an independent Member, and vote for the Amendment which the noble Lord opposite had introduced in such an able and lucid speech. Now, look at the first test, the question of peace and war. He asked the House what they had gained by the last five wars—four of which were aggressive wars, waged against independent and unoffending neighbours? What had they gained by the Affghan war? What by the war with the Beloochees in Scinde? What by the war with the Mahrattas in Gwalior? What by the war with the Sikhs in the Punjab? What would they gain by the present Burmese war? What was the Affghan war, but an unprovoked aggression upon an independent neighbour, in which 12,000 men, the lower of our army, were offered up, a hecatomb, as it were, to our ambition and avarice? What was the war with Scinde? The excuse made, was, that it was for the purpose of obtaining the command over the navigation of the Indus, and thus to promote commerce with the central part of Asia; but the result was that the Ameers of Scinde were cajoled—conditions imposed upon them which it was impossible to comply with; and, finally, they were deposed, and their territories annexed. In the Punjab, taking advantage of civil dissensions, an army was marched to the Sutlej, and, after four pitched battles on the banks of that river, at succeeded in gaining possession of the country, but, from misgovernment, it became once more necessary to march an army of 35,000 men to the banks of the same river. But had the means of supporting the Government been increased by that expedition? On the contrary, it added glory to the British arms, but did little service to the commercial interests of the country. The assumed revenues of the Punjab were about 1,300,000l., and the civil charges amounted to 1,120,000l., thus leaving a surplus of 180,000l.; that charge did not, however, include military charges, which might probably amount to a burden of 800,000l. per annum. In Sattara the case had been almost similar, and in 1852, in a communication from the Court of Directors to Lord Dalhousie, it was stated we were not prepared to find that the annexation of Sattara would entail a charge on the general resources of India. The hon. Member for Montrose (Mr. Hume) had attempted to vindicate the Court of Directors from the Affghan war, and letters had been published, written by some of the Directors, deprecating the war; but Sir John Hobhouse, now Lord Broughton, then President of the Board of Control, avowed that he was the author of the system under which that war was commenced. The system had been weighed in the balance, and ought to be condemned by the House. But he would now advert to the financial position of India. In 1842, Sir Robert Peel, speaking upon the affairs of India, said— Depend upon it, if the credit of India should become disordered, if some great exertion should become necessary, then the credit of England must be brought forward in its support, and the collateral and indirect effects of disorders in Indian finances would be felt extensively in this country. What had been the condition of the revenue during the interval between 1838–39 and 1850–51? Except in the year 1849– 50, when an accidental increase of revenue took place on account of the opium trade, which was always very precarious, there had been a deficit. When the last Act for the Government of India became law, the national debt amounted to the sum of 30,000,000l., while in the year 1853 it had increased to the sum of 50,000,000l. During the existence of the late Government, the then President of the Board of Control, in speaking of India, said— There cannot be a doubt that India will be able to fulfil any expectations that may be formed of her. We are now at peace, and may well expect that the future resources of India will have an opportunity of developing themselves undisturbed by the miseries of war. At the very time that the right hon. Gentleman thus spoke—when he said, "We are now at peace"—we had opened batteries against the walls of Rangoon, and British cannon were sounding the alarm of the Burmese war. He would now call the attention of the House to a few statistics, which he would read. The public debt of India, bearing interest, as it stood before we commenced our career of conquest and annexation, was, in 1792, 7,129,934l, After commencing that career, it stood as follows:—In 1814, 26,970.786l.; in 1829, 39,377,880l.; in 1850, 50,847,564l. To which last-mentioned sum must be added 5,000,000l. supplied from the commercial treasury of the Company in aid of the Indian finances during the currency of the Charter, which ended in 1834. The average annual deficiency in the last five years of the Charter—years of peace—which terminated in 1814, was 134,662l.; in the next five years, principally war, which ended in 1818–19, 736,853l.; in the five years of peace which ended in 1823–24, 27,531l.; in the five years ending in 1828–29, three of war, 2,878,031l.; in the ten years ending 1849–50, 1,474,195l. The estimated deficiency for 1851–52 was 780,000l. This, then, was the financial condition of India under the present system, which, he maintained, had brought the Exchequer of India almost to a state of insolvency. The opium trade had been the means of keeping up the revenue of the country, precarious as that trade was. Now, look at the condition of the land revenue. From Mr. Dickeson's work he found that in the four years between 1849– 50 and 1845–6 the land revenue in Bengal had fallen off nearly 30,500,000 of rupees; in Agra 25,000,000; in Bombay 21,000,000; and in Madras, 24,000,000. That was the state of the land revenue. Let them look to the state of the salt duties. He had no complaint to make against the reduction of the salt duties, which all agreed was the great necessary of life in India. But, in consequence of that reduction, the receipts had fallen off in Bengal twenty-three lacs of rupees, in Agra two lacs, in Bombay two lacs. The revenue was, then, decreasing, and nothing-was taking its place. Let them look next to the customs duties, which, between 1849–50 and 1845–6, had increased in Bengal 12,000,000 of rupees, and in Agra 10,000,000. But in Madras the customs had fallen off upwards of 18,000,000 of rupees, and in Bombay more than 6,000,000. Now, if these figures were correct, he would ask the House if it did not show the deplorable condition of the Indian Exchequer? These were some more of the fruits by which the tree was to be judged. Then again the return showed a great falling off in the Indian imports and exports. Such a falling off, when England had been making such great advances, ought to induce the House to pause before perpetuating a system which had involved the revenues and the exchequer of India in a state of almost hopeless insolvency. Now, what was the House called upon to do to meet this state of things? Were they to put on fresh taxes? In this country the population were taxed at the rate of>2l. per head; in India the taxation was at the rate of only 4s. 5d. per head. Would any one be bold enough to assert that the taxpaying powers of the people of India could be extended? On the contrary, he believed they were taxed to the very utmost. The house tax had been tried at Benares, and a double salt tax at Bombay, but without effect; and he believed that all attempts to impose new taxes in India must fail. The people were groaning under the system of rackrent of land—under the ryotwar, and under the zemindary systems—systems which reflected eternal discredit on this country, and which must continue, unless their rulers should have the wisdom to remedy the evils caused by the rash legislation of our forefathers. There was nothing left for India but that which had been suggested by the hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Bright), and which was comprised in three words—economy, retrenchment, and reform. It was impossible to lay on new taxes, or to increase the taxes at present in existence, for the people at this moment were overtaxed. But by pursuing a system of economy and retrenchment a great deal might be done, and ere long the people might be better able to bear the necessities of the country. He would now turn to the question of public works. When Lord Auckland went out to India, he boasted that he would encourage and be the patron of public works in that country. There was something in the circumstances of the past history of India, and in the appearance of the remains of ancient works of art, to encourage him in such an enterprise, for he could not help seeing most important specimens of the skill and industry of the inhabitants of that country in the embankments then broken down, and the artificial canals then choked up. Under such circumstances, what was the duty imposed on the Government? Was it not to spend a fair proportion of the nuances of the country upon the development of its works—upon irrigation, upon canals and reservoirs, and other means of subduing the great water-power to the use of the inhabitants? But nothing of the kind had been done. And on this point he had a remarkable statement, to which he wished to call the attention of the House and of the hon. Member for Honiton (Sir J. W. Hogg) in particular. It was an extract from the Friend of India, alluding to a speech made by the Chairman of the East India Company, on the subject of the state of intercommunication between Bengal and the North-western province, in 1850:— A previous mail brought us the report of a speech delivered by the Chairman of the East India Company, relating to the expenditure on public works. We venture to say that no statement from India has been received in this country with greater astonishment and incredulity. We have made it our business carefully and diligently to notice every public work executed in India during the period under review; from their extreme rarity they can scarcely escape notice; and we can appeal to any one whether, if he were told that even one-half the sum had been expended between 1837 and 1846 on these subjects, he would not consider a very unreasonable demand had been made upon his credulity. The hon. Baronet felt the force of the extract. [Sir JAMES w. HOGG: I was not Chairman at the time.] The hon. Baronet said he was not the Chairman at the time that occurred. He would assume that the allusion was to a Chairman of the East India Company, and that Chairman was clearly refuted by that writer on the public works in India. He now came to a passage in which the hon. Member (Sir J. W. Hogg) was expressly named. It was contained in a book written by Mr. Chapman on the state of cotton and the roads in India. Mr. Chapman said— A gentleman high in the service of the East India Company wrote home in August 1850, and said, 'I was very much surprised to read so bold an assertion by Sir James Weir Hogg, that we had roads in Guzerat. There is not a single mile of made road there. You should send out a few questions, the answers to which would remove such ideas.' [Sir J. W. HOGG: Hear, hear!] He was informed that Colonel Outram and Major French, who had both been in India, and who were now in this country, joined issue with the hon. Baronet; and if there was boldness in his assertion, there was equal boldness in his cheer on the present occasion. He now came to the condition of Madras; and any one acquainted with British India would bear him out in this—that the prosperity of that Presidency depended peculiarly upon the condition of public works and irrigation, because the waters of the Godavery and Kishna were greatly affected by the monsoons, and required artificial channels to correct their overflow. But it would scarcely be believed that it was not until the year 1848 that the Government of India first directed its attention to the actual condition of the works in Madras. The land which in 1803 produced 206,000l., in 1344 produced only 177,000l.; and the population during that period had fallen from 700,000 to 400,000. And to what was this falling off attributable? To the deficiency of public works. In 1848 something was done to alleviate the condition of the people of that district, but by an expenditure of only 50,000l. He would just cite one important fact, to show the importance of the extension of inter-communication with India. Mr. Chapman had framed a sort of statistical table, showing the bearing which our relative intercommunication with distant countries had on our manufactures which are sent to those countries. From that statement it appeared that the consumption of our manufactured goods per head was—in the British West Indies, 14s.; in Chili, 9s 2d.; in Brazil, 6s. 5d.; in Peru, 5s. 7d.; in Central America, 10d.; whilst in India it was no more than 9d. He considered that fact worthy of the attention of the House, and as proving the case with which he started. Again, let the House look at the importation of Indian cotton. For the last eleven years the import of that article had been stationary, whilst the import of American cotton had increased from 1.018,0001bs. to l,784,3881bs. How was that to be accounted for? America had 11,000 miles of railway; but in India, for which so little had been done, the expenditure for railways had not been more than sufficient to place 100 miles in course of construction. After what had been said on the condition of law and justice in India, he would not trouble the House with many observations on that subject; but he must be allowed to recall to the recollection of the House an observation made in 1833 by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Edinburgh (Mr. Macaulay). The right hon. Gentleman said— I believe that no country ever stood so much in need of a code of laws as India, and I believe also that there never was a country in which the want might so easily be supplied."—[3 Hansard, xix. 531.] But the right hon. Gentleman had recently made a speech, which, notwithstanding its great eloquence, he could not help saying savoured much of sophistry, because he was found dwelling on the one redeeming feature of the Bill—namely, competition and patronage. He would ask the right hon. Gentleman where was the code of which he was so confident in 1832? It was ready in 1837; but, in consequence of the battledore and shuttlecock game played between the Board of Directors and the Board of Control, under the name of a "double government," it had never become law, and the prophecies and hopes of the right hon. Gentleman had been entirely without foundation, while the code was probably reposing quietly on some of the shelves of the Council in India. He would not stop to inquire into the police system; which had been described as in a state of coma; but he hoped the result of this debate would teach all parties that they must awake, and that the whole administration of law and justice in our Indian Empire must be placed on a different footing. With respect to education, he agreed in the remarks of the hon. Member for Manchester, and deprecated the introduction into India of religious prejudices, which were a disgrace to this country, and which had long been such a festering sore in the condition of Ireland. It was notorious that under the old Hindoo rule every village had its educational school; but in the Madras territory of 140,000 square miles there was not one single educational school, and in Bombay a very small sum indeed had been expended for the purposes of education. One word as to the land system pursued in Bengal. He considered it a most gross and outrageous confiscation, and its evils were borne testimony to by Mr. Campbell and the Friend of India. Then let the House look at the condition of Madras, where the ryotwar system was in force—a system under which the wretched people were made to pay all they were able to pay, the Government then taking credit to itself for not taking more. By that system some 700,000 square miles were placed under one or two collectors, assisted by some incompetent subordinates and a gang of informers. Of that system Mr. Campbell said—"If the collector were one of the prophets, and lived in the same district to the age of Methusaleh, he would not be fit for the duty." Now, with regard to the Native States of India. The army of the British Government—Royal, European, and Native—was maintained at a cost of 289,529l., paid by 100,000,000 of its subjects; whilst the armies of the Native Princes were maintained at a cost of 398,918l paid by 53,000,000 of people. Our system in that respect was stamped by the grossest injustice. Besides all these matters, these wrongs in India, which showed that one great maxim of this country was not applicable to India—for these wrongs existed without a remedy—wrongs to the Native Princes and the royal family—wrongs to the Rajah of Sattara—wrongs to the plundered Parsee merchants, and he might be permitted to allude to one case which had especially been brought under his attention, and which reflected eternal discredit on the system—he alluded to the case of the Carnatic stipendiaries. He believed that in the whole record of our history as a nation—in the whole history of our rule in India—nothing more disgraceful, more calculated to rouse the outraged feelings of humanity, had occurred than the mode in which the East India Company had robbed the Nabob of Arcot of the throne of his forefathers, and put in his place their nominee to be the fitting engine in the hands of the Government (to quote the words of the Governor) "for carrying out their objects of plunder and annexation." A treaty was entered into in 1801 with the Nabob of Arcot, which treaty was still in existence, by which a sum of money was vested for ever in the royal family of the Carnatic. And what was the condition of that family now? The East India Company had broken faith with them, and had trampled on that treaty, and some of the descendants of the Nabob Arcot were at this moment suffering upon one rupee per month—exhibiting a living and appropriate instance of the fraud, treachery, and injustice by which our rule had been extended in our Indian Empire. In 1846 the Carnatic stipendiaries petitioned the Governor of Madras, asking that Governor to send their petition home; but they received no answer. They then sent over a representative to seek redress in Leadenhall-street; but he was sent back without being successful. He would just say, in conclusion, with regard to the Home Government, that the only two powers which the East India Company, according to Mr. Mill, could exercise, were the power of suggesting measures, and the power of commenting on measures after they had been resolved upon; and this was quite in harmony with the admission made by Mr. Jones, that, "after all the labour and thought that might have been bestowed on Indian affairs at home, India must nevertheless be governed in India." He could use no better argument against this double agency at home, the only effect of which could be to keep up a mask and a sham, and to shift from the proper shoulders the load of responsibility which they ought to bear. Then, as to the Secret Committee, Lord Hardinge had spoken of it as "a mystery not understood by the public, why the Board of Control should give an order to the Secret Committee." And he adduced as an instance of this, an officer of high position and ability in India having written a letter couched in somewhat indignant terms to the President of the Board of Control, complaining of the conduct of the Secret Committee; and it was not until named by Lord Hardinge, that the President was in fact the Secret Committee, that the writer of the letter was made aware of the fact. This was only another illustration of the mask and the sham which was kept up to hide from public view the real source of responsibility. But if the power of commenting on measures was a nullity, and if the present Bill stripped the East India Company of the whole of the patronage, then, he asked, what was left to the Company but interference without influence, and rights without responsibilities? In conclusion, he would say that, if we were true to ourselves and the trust that had been reposed in us, and if India were true to herself, self-confident, and self-sustained, she would not lag behind in the path of progress that lay before her, but would be seen coming up from the wilderness leaning on the arm of British sympathy, and guided by the genius of British reform.


hoped the House would excuse him if he asked them to descend from the elevation to which they had been led by the poetic imagination of the hon. Gentleman, and turn away from that sight in the wilderness, of India "leaning on the arm of British sympathy," to the more practical question whether they were or whether they were not to read a second time the Bill for the Government of India. They were drawing, he hoped, to the close of this discussion, in which, looking to the state of the House, not only that night but on previous evenings, it would appear that a majority of the House took but a small interest. He hoped, therefore, they would be able, before that evening closed, to come to a division on this most important question. He would trespass on the patience of the House for a very short time; but, holding the position which he had the honour to fill, there were some observations which he felt it incumbent upon him to make in answer to statements that had been brought forward in the course of the debate. It was remarkable that in the course of this discussion very little indeed bad been said in favour of the Motion of the noble Lord the Member for Lynn, and still more remarkable were the diversities of opinion and the contradictory arguments that had been urged in its support. Probably it was foreseeing this would be the case that led the noble Lord to say the onus of proof lay with the promoters of the Bill; for if his Motion were to depend upon the arguments brought forward in its favour, one set of those arguments might be made to pair off against the other. He denied that the onus of proof lay with the promoters of the Bill. It was Incumbent on the House to provide for the future government of India, seeing the present system of government would come to an end next year, and the onus of proof, therefore, obviously lay with those who opposed the natural and ordinary course of proceeding. The noble Lord said that in former times, when the Charter expired, a Suspension Act was passed—that previously to the expiry of the Charter the Government came forward and provided for the future government of India by a temporary measure—[Lord STANLEY: I did not say so.] He had only to say that he took down the words used by the noble Lord at the time, and he added that there was no insurrection in India in consequence. If he did not make this statement, then he must say he had grievously misapprehended what fell from the noble Lord on that occasion. The argument of the hon. Member for Montrose was, that there ought to be delay in order that communications should be received from the Board of Directors. He complained that the Court of Directors had only very recently been informed of the nature of this Bill, whereas in 1833 a long correspondence took place previous to the Bill being introduced. But the question was now very different from what it was in 1833. The Act passed in that year involved an interference with the privileges of the East India Company as a commercial body, and with their interests as traders; and a considerable time was required to enable them to wind up the commercial concern. But now there was nothing of that kind. They were merely trustees for the Government of India; and it rested with the House to say in whose hands the Government of India should be placed for the future, and what the nature of that Government should be. The hon. Member for Montrose said, he considered it of importance to wait for evidence from India; whereas the noble Lord, on the contrary, said, he attached little or no weight to the evidence that might be derived from India. He bad listened with the greatest attention to the speeches which had been delivered in the course of that evening, as well as on previous occasions, and had heard a great deal of detail and many opinions given as to the various modes in which the Government of India should be conducted, both at home and abroad. Among others, the right hon. Gentleman the late President of the Board of Control went into considerable detail with regard to the mode in which he would govern India; but not a single word had been urged as a reason why they should delay proceeding with this Bill. There had been proposed various Amendments to clauses of the Bill; but little or no argument had been adduced in favour of delaying the Bill itself. The only real argument he had heard urged in favour of delay was that brought forward the other evening by the hon. Member for Manchester, who gave a reason, which, whether good or bad, was at least intelligible, and he was supported in it by the hon. Member for Richmond. The argument amounted to this, "Give us two years' delay, that we may agitate to pull down the East India Company." Now, this might be reasonable enough argument on the part of those who wished to pull down the East India Company; but the hon. Member for Montrose, who wished to keep up the Company, nevertheless joined the hon. Member for Manchester in asking for delay—the object of the one being to pull down, and of the other to keep up, the East India Company. Now, that those who thought the Government of India nearly perfect, and wished to perpetuate it, and those who attributed to that Government every abuse that occurred in India, should both unite in wishing for delay, seemed to him to be the most contradictory kind of support that could be given to any proposition. It did not seem to him that agitation was the proper mode of settling a question of this importance. To decide what the future Government of India should be was a question second to none that could be brought forward, and it was one that required the calm and deliberate consideration of that House. He trusted, therefore, the House would not be led away from the fair and full consideration of this question on the ground of an appeal to public opinion. Such was not the proper mode of obtaining the calm and deliberate judgment of that House, and he hoped they would not jeopardise those important interests that were at stake by refusing to deal with the question as it now came before them. The ground on which the hon. Members for Manchester and Richmond desired delay was, that the subject might be submitted to public opinion; and they seemed to consider that that public opinion, agitated by such speeches as had been delivered on this question, would be the best mode of settling the whole controversy. He did not think, however, that that would be the wisest mode of determining a question of such importance as the future government of India: and he believed a majority of that House would see the propriety of not giving in to such a proposal merely in order that the system of governing India might be pulled down by agitation. Reference had been made to an expression which he quoted from Mr. Mill, that enlightened public opinion was the best security for good government. To that opinion he subscribed; but he believed, also in accordance with Mr. Mill, that unenlightened public opinion was the worst authority to which they could appeal; and he must say that if public opinion was to be enlightened by such statements as were made in that House on this subject, it would he very greatly misled indeed. He must say that the misstatements that had been made, embracing, as they did, every prejudice that could be excited against those who administered the government of India, exceeded anything that he ever remembered to have been made in that House. The hon. Member for Manchester told them, the other night, that a report on public works, which had been received in this country, had not been laid on the table of the House; and then he imputed to the East India Company the most unworthy motives for withholding such a report from the House. Now, he thought the hon. Gentleman might have had the charity to suppose that the Company were not actuated by any improper motives; and if he had referred to the Votes of the House, he would have found that the report in question was laid on the table in August last, and that his complaint was entirely without foundation. Then the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Blackett), on a former occasion, stated that the financial accounts of the East India Company had not been laid on the table of the House according to Act of Parliament, and argued that they had, in consequence, forfeited their Charter. [Mr. BLACKETT here gave an explanotion of his statement.] The hon. Gentleman was bound to ascertain from the best possible authority what the fact was, and if he had referred to the Votes he would have found that on the 14th of May that report was laid on the table of the House, three days before the time prescribed by the Act. Then, in taking his information from the appendix to the Committee's Report, his hon. Friend had made what he must call as ludicrous a mistake as it was possible to make. In giving an account of the outstanding arrears of rent for twenty years, the amount of arrears was stated at the end of each year; but his hon. Friend had added the outstanding balance at the end of each consecutive year, and then came down to the House and said the sum of the whole was the amount due from the land revenue of India that had failed to be collected. They had heard a great deal about the salt duty, and more than one Gentleman had referred to the diminished consumption of salt as a proof of the miserable condition of the people of India. The hon. Member for Manchester quoted from an Indian newspaper a statement to the effect that there been a great falling off in the consumption of salt; but he did not take the trouble to refer to the next number of the same newspaper, which stated that an unwitting mistake had been made to the extent of 40,000 tons. But the great mistake committed was taking the revenue as a criterion of the falling off of the consumption, totally forgetting, in the comparison which had been made of one period with another, the fact that in the meantime the duty had been reduced. In Madras, where there was no reduction of duty, the revenue had increased; in Bombay it had also increased; but in Bengal there had been a reduction of 25 per cent in the duty, and the amount of revenue showed a diminution. The hon. Member for Sunderland spoke of the miserable condition of India, and of the consequent impossibility of the people taking so many of our goods as other countries did. But the hon. Gentleman forgot that there was a considerable domestic manufacture in India, and that if we sent manufactured goods there, we displaced, to a great extent, the domestic manufacture of that country. To suppose, therefore, that our manufactures should go there, and that the quantity exported should increase as rapidly as in Brazil, and other countries where little or no native manufacture existed, was to show a total disregard of that which must necessarily be the state of the exchange of their respective produce between two countries. Notwithstanding this, however, within the last ten or twenty years our exports from India had increased far more in proportion than the total exports of this country. From India they had increased about 112 per cent, while the total exports of the United Kingdom had increased in nothing like that proportion. Then the hon. Gentleman referred to a quarrel between a couple of zemindars which was fought out with spirit, and a policeman who was looking on never interfered to prevent it. This the hon. Gentleman quoted as a proof of the wonderful deterioration which had taken place under our rule in India. Well, he was sorry that that should have taken place; but he had heard in this country of the inefficiency of parish constables, and of faction fights in Ireland which had not been interrupted, yet he had never heard such things alleged as reasons for altering the whole of our constitution, and abolishing the system of King, Lords, and Commons. But, supposing it to be true, even to a greater extent than the hon. Gentleman alleged, was it or was it not an improvement on that state of things when they were exposed to a troop of Sikh horsemen dashing over the whole country, and plundering every village? He certainly felt justified in saying that whatever external war there might have been, internal war and dissension had entirely given way under the dominion of British rule in India. The hon. Gentleman had read some account of the miserable state of the ryots in Bengal, from, he believed, the Calcutta Review. But if the hon. Gentleman would turn to the pages of the Quarterly Review, or to Blackwood, he had a very strong impression he would find descriptions of the miseries of this country—of deserted homesteads, and famishing labourers—owing to free trade and the abolition of the corn laws, quite as harrowing as any which he had quoted. If he went no further even than the speeches of the hon. and learned Member for Suffolk, not more than six months ago, he would find accounts of misery in this country quite as appalling as that which he had read of the state of the ryots in Bengal. After all, too, that misery existed under the system which the hon. Member for Manchester recommended. That hon. Member always confined his indignation to their not establishing a system of landowners in India similar to that which existed under the permanent system of Bengal. Yet it was under that permanent system, so created, that the misery existed of which he had read an account, and which was to be attributed, not to the exactions of the Government, but to the exactions and extortions of those landowners of whom the hon. Gentleman so highly approved. The hon. Member for Manchester referred to some evidence which he said had been taken before the Committee, though it had not been reported, depicting the miserable state of the inhabitants of Bengal. At all events, there had been one witness who, in the strongest language and with the utmost fervour, had contrasted the condition of the people in the British dominions in India with that of those who were still under native rule. The hon. Member for Sunderland went at some length into the state of the revenue of India, and described it as all but bankrupt. He (Sir C. Wood) should not have thought it necessary to take much notice of that, except that statements of the kind, if allowed to pass uncontradicted in that House, might alarm the people of India, or those who depended for their incomes upon the interest of the Indian debt. He would state, therefore, how little foundation there was for the apprehensions in which the hon. Gentleman had indulged, and which had been sanctioned, also, by the hon. Member for the West Riding. It was perfectly true that, since the last Charter, India had been engaged in a very considerable and expensive war, and, no doubt, a great addition had been made to the debt in that period; but the whole Indian debt at this moment was less than two years' revenue of India, and that, certainly, looking to what we were accustomed to in Europe, was no very formidable amount. The increase in the debt, since 1833, was about 500,000l. per annum, while the increased land revenue from the same territory was upwards of 2,000,000l. per annum. The additional charge, therefore, was one-fourth of the additional income, independently of the income of the new territories, which amounted to about 1,500,000l. more. The hon. Gentleman had corrected him when, on a previous evening, he stated the Indian revenue at 26,000,000l. He (Sir C. Wood) knew at the time, however, that he was rather understating than overstating it. On looking at the returns of the last three years, he found that the revenue in 1850–51 was 27,000,000l.; in 1851–52, 28,000,000l; and in 1852–53,29,000,000l. In 1849–50, there was a surplus of 354,000l.; in 1850–51, a surplus of 415,000l.; in 1851–52, a deficiency of 469,000l.; and in 1852–53, paying the probable expenses of the Burmese war, a surplus of 544,000l. With an income, then, increasing at the rate of 1,000,000l. per annum in the last three years, with in three years out of four a surplus, and with the whole debt less than two years' income, he could not say that such a state of the finances ought to inspire them with very great alarm of total and immediate bankruptcy. There was another remarkable statement as to our acquisitions in Scinde. An able officer had the command there. He had taken up his quarters at a small mud port, with very few inhabitants. The exertions of that officer, in laying out roads, and promoting irrigation, had been such that that place was now a flourishing town with 10,000 inhabitants. That was the manner in which the country had been improved under our rule; and so much for the accuracy of the statements which were made to prove the inefficiency of the present system of government, which, nevertheless, the hon. Gentleman who had attacked it wished to preserve by supporting the Motion of the noble Lord for delay. He confessed that he thought every argument which had been used tended in favour of the second reading of the Bill, and against delay. They had not in the least impugned the authority of the Marquess of Dalhousie's opinion, which had not been given in answer to any leading question from him (Sir C. Wood), and which he thought, therefore, was entitled to the greater weight; but they had referred to the opinion of the editor of the Friend of India. Now, he would read one short extract from the letter which that gentleman had addressed to Mr. Bright upon this subject of delay. That gentleman knew what had taken place in that House, what the arguments both for and against delay were, and this was his deliberate opinion:— I will venture to assert, after witnessing the mode in which the Indian campaign has opened in Parliament, that nothing could be more disastrous for India than to prolong this 'agitation' for two years, during which the 'intelligent natives' would be led, however erroneously, to imagine that their representations would be welcome to their friends in England in exact proportion to their virulence and unscrupulousness. Two years of such unhealthy agitation, by raising hopes which must be disappointed, and fostering a spirit of disaffection to the British Government, might even tend to shake the principle of loyal obedience in the native community. He trusted that those who were not prepared to trifle with this great question, but who had regard to the safety of that empire, would take that opinion of a person who was competent to give an opinion, if any one was, and who was quite independent of the Government, and would not be led away into supporting a Motion for delay from which no possible good, but much mischief, was likely to arise. One of the first objections which had been taken to the Bill was, that it was enacted for no fixed term; and upon that question of the effect of there being no fixed term, nothing could be more absurdly contradictory than the opinions which had been given by the various Members who had spoken. The noble Lord said, that the measure of the Government was clearly an experimental one; the hon. Member for Montrose said that it was merely a provisional one; and the hon. Member for Manchester said that it was more permanent than a lease for twenty years. It was difficult to answer arguments on both sides. If they would only tell off one against the other, he should know where he stood; but, really, the mode in which the hon. Gentlemen who had argued it contradicted themselves on this question was quite ridiculous. The noble Lord thought that one great advantage in a term was, that the attention of the country became at that period concentrated upon India, and they then must legislate, whatever were the circumstances. Was that the best mode of arriving at a deliberate conclusion upon a matter of this nature, determining that, whatever the circumstances, whether there were war or what not, they must deal with a question of that vital importance? The hon. Member for Montrose said, that they proposed a "provisional government." Why, they proposed to place the Government of India upon the same footing as the Government of this country. Was the Government of this country provisional? The hon. Member for Elginshire said that they were putting it upon a footing so fluctuating and insecure that it depended upon the "Aye" or "No" of that House. Was that putting it upon the footing of this country? When they placed the Government of India upon the same footing as the Government of this country, as the government of our colonies, and of everything else which we possessed, he could not think that they were open to the charge of putting it upon a fluctuating and unstable basis. The hon. Member for Montrose had certainly used an extraordinary argument for him, for he had advocated the exploded doctrine of finality, and had stated as his objection to the measure that it was one which might be altered and amended as time and circumstances might require. Such an argument to come from so ardent a reformer as his hon. Friend, he confessed he had never yet heard. He had heard many declamations against finality; but such a bold assertion in favour of it he had never heard in that House or elsewhere. What said the noble Lord? He said that this measure was— so obviously experimental that it was left open to alteration from year to year. It would have been better to come forward with a well-considered plan, and to say 'Here is a constitution for India; be it good, be it bad, let it have a fair trial.' That was exactly what the Government did. Here was a measure which they considered to be the best that they could give. In their opinion it was the most wise and prudent that they could adopt. They believed it to be good; and, if good, they believed it would be permanent; but if experience should prove it to be bad, and if it should not answer their expectations, it might be altered as time and circumstances might require. Were they to be told, then, that it was an objection to any measure for the government of any country, that those who proposed it believed it to be the best they could propose, but that if time and circumstances showed amendments to be necessary, they would not be deterred from amending it by any doctrine of finality such as was proposed by the hon. Member for Montrose? Several hon. Gentlemen had referred to the opinions of natives of India; but the natives appeared to have come to a much wiser conclusion than the hon. Gentlemen who attached such importance to their views; for since the discussion of the present question a second petition had come home from the Native Bombay Association, and this was the opinion which they expressed with regard to a term of years:— Your petitioners, not foreseeing the chance of arousing the interest and attention now bestowed on Indian affairs, petitioned your hon. House to limit the period of existence of any future Government of India to ten years; but your petitioners are now emboldened to ask your hon. House not to debar them for any period of years from requesting a revision of what may be injurious in the coming India legislation. It is simply necessary to pass an Act providing for the best form of government both in England and in India, without limiting its duration to any number of years—an Act which like any other statute, might, if deemed requisite, be modified, altered, or repealed as occasion might require. It cannot be necessary to embrace all the subjects involved in the discussion of Indian affairs in one Act; and the constitution of the Home Government, the constitution and powers of the several local governments, the construction of a new judicial service, and each independent branch of inquiry, if made the subject of separate legislation, would, in all probability, receive more careful attention, and be more satisfactorily disposed of than if the entire mass of Indian information be gathered together in one, and thrown into a single enactment. That was exactly the course which they were taking. They proposed a Bill for the Government of India, not embracing the whole Indian question in one Act—one which, if it answered their expectations, would be permanent, and, if not, might he altered as circumstances required. He did not think that he need make any observations upon the subject of patronage. The noble Lord said, that he entirely concurred in the principle of admission by competition. The noble Lord, indeed, suggested some alteration in the mode of regulating that; and all he (Sir C. Wood) could say was, that there was nothing in the Bill which prevented the consideration of those points in Committee. The last question upon which the noble Lord had given an opinion was as to the form of the home government; and it must be observed that, not only was the noble Lord himself in favour of a double government, but that scarcely any one in the House had advocated a single government. The noble Lord said, that the double government ought to be reformed, and that the Board of Control should be a constituent part of the Government of India. His hon. Friend the Member for the West Riding had quoted Mr. Halliday's opinion; but he had not exactly quoted that gentleman's words, but had made him say that the double form of government was exceedingly bad and mischievous. What Mr. Halliday had said was:— I have a very high opinion of the mode in which the Government of India has been conducted in all its branches. … I would recommend nothing like organic change, nor anything beyond careful, and even, I may say, experimental alteration at present, in a matter of such very great importance. To substitute a single for a double government, however, would be an "organic change" of a most radical description. In the course of the present discussion it had been said to them tauntingly, "You contend everything is so good, why do you change anything?" He was not aware that he said everything was good, or that he had not admitted that many things had been ill done, and many others omitted to be done in India. Still, he had thought it right to defend the Government of India from the indiscriminate charges which had been made against it; and he asked, was it not wise to make use of the Court of Directors, a body which did and must exist for the next twenty years, and against whose administration, so far as they had a share in the administration, no case of gross mismanagement had been proved? Almost every witness who had been before the Committee, whether connected with the Court of Directors or not, had pointed out, as the great fault of the constitution of the Court, that the necessity of a long and tedious canvass had deterred the best Indian servants from coming forward as candidates for a seat at the direction. That was the evidence given by Mr. Shepherd, one of the ablest Directors of the Court, by Sir H. Maddock, by Mr. Willoughby, by Colonel Sykes, by Lord Ellen-borough, by Lord Hardinge, by Mr. Melvill, by Mr. Bird, by Mr. Robertson, and by Mr. Mill, every one of whom had great experience, and spoke with much authority upon such a question. That blot the present Bill endeavoured to remedy by the Government placing in the Court six experienced Indian servants. These, some might say, ought to be elected by the Court of Directors, and approved by the Crown. The Government thought that they ought to be nominated by the Crown; but this again was a question which ought to be discussed in Committee. There was another very important portion of this question, which was, the changes that were proposed to be made in the government—not at home, but in India. He entirely concurred in the statement that India must be governed in India, and that what we did at home was of far less importance than what was done there. The hon. Member for the county of Elgin said, that he would confine the changes to the Home Government, because with that they were acquainted, while they knew nothing of the Government in India—


I did not say that we knew nothing of the Government of India, but that we should have the opinion of the Governor General, and of the local governors, before altering the system there.


continued: He had already stated that he had had the opinion of the Marquess of Dalhousie, and that the Bill had been framed in accordance with that opinion. He had had also the opinion of persons connected with the Government of India, and he did not know that they should gain anything by sending the Bill back again. The changes which they proposed were in entire accordance with the whole of the evidence. The Bill had now been in the hands of Members a considerable time, and he had not heard any material objection made to one single change that was proposed in the Government of India. With regard to a complete code of laws, none had been drawn up in a complete shape. One had been prepared by his right hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh, which was now under the consideration of the Legislative Council in India, who were trying whether they could pass it into a law. The hon. Gentleman had found great fault with the Government for disregarding the opinion of Sir Edward Ryan, and other great law reformers; but if the hon. Gentleman had entered into the subject with his usual care, or had listened to his (Sir C. Wood's) opening statement, he would have known that the Commission to be appointed in India was at the suggestion of those very gentlemen; that the most ardent Indian law reformers were to be upon that Commission; and that it was in deference to their opinion that he had been obliged to postpone the Bill for improving the judicature in India. The great evil of having one legislative system for one part of India, and a different system for another part of the same country, could only be obviated by constituting one legislative body for the whole of India. He would not go further into these matters, though he must say they were questions of a most important nature. He would only say, that no objection having been raised to this measure which might not fairly and freely be discussed in Committee, it did not appear to him that any sound argument had been urged against the second reading of the Bill. He thought if they were to deal with the question as the noble Lord opposite proposed, they would be merely trifling with a most important subject—with the welfare, and possibly with the security, of our empire in India. That empire was of a most anomalous and extraordinary description. If well governed, it might be the strongest empire in existence; while, if ill governed, no one could deny that its position might be most critical. Now, what were the measures taken by Her Majesty's Ministers for promoting the good government of India? They had adopted, with regard to Indian government, all the suggestions of the most experienced Indian servants, which they thought calculated to provide for the security of our Indian empire. Lord Ellenborough had told them that they held the empire of India by the superiority of mind and intellect possessed by the persons whom they sent out to govern that empire; and Her Majesty's Government endeavoured, by their proposals with regard to the system of education, to improve still further the mental superiority of the persons employed in the public service in India. They had also been told that their power in India depended in a great measure upon the conviction of the people that they were better governed under the sway of the British than they would be under native rulers. That there were defects in the system of Indian government he was willing to admit. These defects Her Majesty's Ministers had taken the best means in their power to deal with, and he did not know any defect for which this Bill did not endeavour to provide a remedy. The questions relating to land tenures, improvements in public works, and other matters, were subjects which could not be dealt with here, but which must be dealt with in India; and Her Majesty's Government had, in this Bill, proposed the establishment of that machinery which they thought best calculated to promote in this respect the welfare of that important empire.


Sir, the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down has complained of the imaginative powers of the hon. Member who preceded him in the debate; but he has himself shown that even in that respect he can successfully vie with the Member for Sunderland, for in his reply he appears to me to have answered several speeches which have not been yet delivered. The right hon. Gentleman has consequently occasioned several Gentlemen on both sides of the House to interrupt him in the statement which he has just made. It will be my lot, in the observations I shall presume to make, to have to comment on some statements that have been made by some hon. Members who have preceded me; but I shall endeavour to make those remarks in so fair a spirit that they shall not, I trust, call for the interference of any hon. Gentleman until I resume my seat; for I can assure the House that, when I consider the all-important subject before us, I would wish for nothing more in its discussion than that I should be able to imitate in some degree the example set by my noble Friend (Lord Stanley), in the temperate speech with which he introduced his Amendment to our consideration. I agree with the First Lord of the Admiralty in remarking with satisfaction the many intimations that have been given during this debate, of a desire, on both sides of this House, to come to the consideration of this subject in a calm and unimpassioned spirit. But, at the same time I must take the liberty of observing that I cannot but feel that hon. Gentlemen, in attempting to express so laudable a disposition, have been somewhat inadvertently betrayed into remarks which may lead to very inconvenient, very disagreeable, and even very dangerous misconceptions. We have been told frequently in this debate that this subject is not a party question—as if a party question were necessarily an improper question. We have been told frequently in this debate that the subject is not considered in a party spirit, as if a subject considered in a party spirit were necessarily considered in a partial and unjust spirit. Now, Sir, as we are all of us Members of that which is a House of party, and which, if it were not a House of party, you may depend upon it would not long exist in this country, I think this is a point on which there should be a clearer conception than at present prevails in this assembly. I look upon a purely party question as a question which concerns the distinctive principles of the two great parties into which a popular assembly is necessarily divided. Aristocracy or democracy—protection or "unrestricted competition"—an endowed Established Church or complete dependence on the voluntary system—these are principles perfectly distinct; they are professed by different parties; they are party principles; and if brought into discussion, the questions in debate are purely party questions. But it is taking a very limited view of a party question to confine it within the description on which I have ventured. Hitherto it has been supposed that, when any great legislative difficulty has been brought under the consideration of Parliament, there has been a noble and generous emulation between the two great parties who should solve the difficulty in the most satisfactory manner; and when there is a question of controverted policy, who should recommend the course most for the honour of the country, and most for the advantage and welfare of the people. Sharing these views, I confess myself that I cannot understand how a great party in this House can take refuge in neutrality on a subject like that which is before us, and shrink from expressing, without equivocation, the views they entertain. If we approve the proposition of Her Majesty's Ministers, we are bound, in my mind, to give to that proposition not only our support, but our cordial and complete support. If, on the other hand, we believe that it is a course of a very questionable character—if, further, we believe that it may lead to disastrous results—I deny that it is in our power to refrain from expressing our opinion. I say, we owe it to our constituents—to those who sent us here, and to the country—I say, we owe it even to ourselves—fairly to place before Parliament and the country the reasons why we differ from the course recommended by the Government, and to give Parliament and the country an opportunity of expressing their opinions between the two policies that are placed before their consideration. I know I may be told that party government tends to great excesses. It is my opinion that the excesses of party government are not greater—perhaps they are not so great—as the excesses which are experienced under despotic government; but, for my own part, I prefer the excesses even of party government to the excesses of despotic government; and I believe, Sir, we shall find in this country, the more enlightened it becomes, the greater and more powerful will be the check that party excesses will receive from the common sense of this House, and from the influence of that omnipotent opinion, the power of which we all recognise. I say, with these views, I feel it absolutely necessary that I should frankly express my opinion on the subject before us. I make these observations because I have the misfortune to differ on this question from many Gentlemen for whom I entertain great respect, with whom I act in political connexion, and for whom I feel great personal regard. For my own part, I cannot incur the responsibility of giving my approbation to the measure which the right hon. Gentleman has submitted to our consideration. The consequences of this measure will sooner or later be brought before us. Even if this government which we are now planning lasts for the space of twenty years, which has heretofore been the allotted time, there are many now present who may be here at the expiration of that period. I may probably not be here—it is not impossible I may—but there are many Gentlemen in this House, young men, devoting their time and their talents to the service of their country, who will probably be then taking an active part in public transactions; and when that time comes I shall be sorry if they should refer to the debates of this year, 1853, and regret that they were so wanting in sagacity and in moral courage, that because party inconvenience might accrue, they shrunk from expressing their opinions upon one of the important subjects that can engage the attention of Parliament. Now, there has been some controversy in this debate as to the exact subject which is under discussion. The Secretary to the Board of Control accused my noble Friend (Lord Stanley) of introducing a second subject into our debate. Now, Sir, it appears to me that that was an observation—that that was a criticism on the part of the Secretary to the Board of Control which was not well founded. It appears to me there can be no mistake whatever as to the question which is before us. It appears to me that that question is accurately, completely, and precisely expressed in the title of the Bill on the table of the House. What is the title of that Bill? It is, "A Bill to provide for the Government of India;" and an Amendment has been moved, which in effect says this, that this plan to provide for the government of India, while it disturbs much, really settles nothing; and that, if that be the case, considering the late period of the Session, and considering that a Parliamentary Committee has for two years been sitting investigating the condition of India, but which at this moment has not half fulfilled its office, it is expedient that we should wait for the increased information to be gained from the inquiries of that Committee, and that considering the late period of the Session, we should virtually continue the existing Act for the government of India, and hesitate before we pass a precipitate proposition, the consequences of which, we believe are not adequately understood by those with whom it originates, and which we think is not adequate to meet the necessities of the case. Shall we do this, or shall we not? That is the question before us. A plan for the government of India is proposed by Her Majesty's Ministers; we join issue on the point that it is an adequate and sufficient plan, and we say that under the peculiar circumstances of the lateness of the Session, and of the imperfect state of the Parliamentary investigation that we have ourselves authorised, we should pause in our progress. And this is a proposition that has been described as something singular and unprecedented—as something dangerous to England and perilous to India—a weapon borrowed from the enemy, an arrow from the quiver of Indian reformers—so gross and unheard of as not to be tolerated, certainly without authority, and likely to be attended with consequences which must be deprecated. Now, in the first place is it an unprecedented course? What my noble Friend wishes is this; there has been some talk of a term of two years being allotted to a Continuance Bill of the present Act; and some hon. Gentlemen have argued as if two years were to elapse before we began to legislate for India. On the contrary, what my noble Friend anticipates is, that Her Majesty's Ministers should take advantage of their autumnal recess—that they should mature a Bill which probably both Houses of Parliament would approve—that they should introduce that Bill to our notice when Parliament meets in February next—that it would perhaps pass in a month, and that it would receive the Royal Assent before the existing Act expires. That is what we propose, that is what we wish; and that is considered an unprecedented proposition. Let me see if it is an unprecedented proposition. Twice in this century has this question been under the consideration of Parliament. The Government of India has been the question submitted to Parliament twice in the present century, namely, in 1813 and in 1833. Now, what occurred in the year 1813? Among thoughtful statesmen it had been long a subject of lamentation and regret that, by a combination of peculiar circumstances, Parliament had ever been called on to legislate for India in a hurried and precipitate manner. I could quote—if at this time of the night, and having some other remarks to make, I could presume to quote—the opinions of some of the greatest statesmen and some of the gravest writers to that effect; but the authority to which I am going to refer is at least one which will not be questioned by a considerable portion of Her Majesty's Government. Late in the Session of 1813, in the month of June, a Bill for the Government of India was introduced into the House of Lords; and what was the course taken on that occasion by no less a personage than Earl Grey? Earl Grey came forward and said, "It is impossible to entertain this important question so late in the Session; this system of discussing Indian subjects—and the most important of all Indian subjects, the Government of India—at the fag end of a Session, ought no longer to be tolerated. I recommend that a Continuance Bill of the existing Act shall be passed, and that Her Majesty's Ministers, the Parliament, and the country should have the intervening space to consider a measure adequate for the occasion." Was Lord Grey alone in his opinion on this occasion? I am speaking, mind you, of the first instance when Parliament was called upon to consider this subject during the present century. I am speaking of the year 1813, when we were in the heat of the great European struggle, and when, certainly, if a Ministry could be excused for legislating somewhat precipitately, they might have found every apology that was necessary. We have been referred to another high authority by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Edinburgh (Mr. Macaulay), and by the First Lord of the Admiralty (Sir James Graham), namely, Lord Grenville. Now, Sir, except Mr. Burke, there is probably at this moment no greater Parliamentary authority than my Lord Grenville. It is one of those names that not only suggests but commands respect. His reputation rises, which shows that Lord Grenville was a man beyond the age in which he mainly flourished; but, great as was his reputation—and though as a political economist and diplomatist he had no superior perhaps at any time—there was no subject on which he was so pre-eminent as the subject of India. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Edinburgh referred to that noble Lord's last speech on this subject as a masterpiece. Well, what did Lord Grenville say in 1813? He said he could not for a moment sanction such a proposition that Parliament should be called on, in the month of June, hurriedly to discuss a subject so important in its nature. He entirely agreed, he said, with Lord Grey; he did more, he delivered an indignant protest against the policy recommended by the Ministry; and when the Ministry—for Ministries generally are very unwisely obstinate—would not consent to the sage counsel of men like Lord Grey and Lord Grenville, what did they do? Openly and publicly, in the most solemn manner in the House of Lords, they said they considered! the policy of the Government on that occasion so objectionable that they would no longer attend the debates on the subject, and they accordingly absented themselves from the House. I do not say that that is a course of conduct that we ought to follow. I have no doubt that it is a Whig precedent, which some right hon. Gentlemen would be very glad that we, in this hot month of June, should pursue:—but this-is a harder age than 1813; and I suspect Ministers will find a legitimate but prolonged opposition to this measure. Now what happened in 1833? Mind, I am urging this in answer to those criticisms of which we have heard of late, as to the unprecedented course, the almost factious proceeding, the something almost perilous to the commonwealth, which we are adopting; and I show you the authority we have for the course we are taking. I respect authority as much as any man in this House; but I do not wish to lay too much stress on authority; the argument from authority has its necessary limit. We respect authority; but certainly in this House—which, after all, is the atmosphere of free discussion—we cannot prefer authority to the conviction of our own senses, or to those results which reason, knowledge, and information force us to adopt. But what happened in 1833, the very period when the present Act was passed? When it was introduced into this House by Mr. Charles Grant, supported by the right hon. Member for Edinburgh, there still remained in the House of Commons, in opposition then to the Government, a most distinguished man, Mr. Charles Wynn—a real statesman—a connexion in blood, and one deeply united in political career, with Lord Grenville—the last of the Grenvillites—a man of very enlightened mind—of great capacity—perhaps unrivalled for his general Parliamentary information, and recognised as the first authority on Indian subjects. Mr. Charles Wynn had been a Member of the Government that preceded the Government of 1833—he had been President of the India Board. What did Mr. Wynn say in 1833, when in the mouth of June the Bill for the Government of India was brought into this House? Observe the unfortunate circumstances under which we always have to legislate for India. In 1813, continental war; in 1833, domestic revolution. Mr. Charles Wynn was sensible of the extreme difficulty of having a proper discussion on the affairs of India under the circumstances that then existed; and what did he do? He recommended Ministers to carry a short Bill on those points that were necessary for the continuance of the Indian Government, and to proceed to legislate in a maturer spirit, and after an interval, upon all the other great questions which, resisting his advice, they ultimately included in the Bill of 1833. Well, what Lord Grey and Lord Grenvilie recommended in 1813, what Mr. Charles Wynn recommended in 1833, is the course which my noble Friend, consulting with those with whom he chiefly acts, has thought it not unreasonable, at the end of the month of June, to recommend to the House of Commons in 1853. Now, Sir, I beg the House to recollect what happened in 1833. I take it, the House will agree that all our arguments, all our illustrations, and all our inferences, should be drawn from the law of 1833. In 1813 and 1833, by a gradual process, the East India Company had ceased to be a commercial corporation. The trade with India was opened in 1813; the trade with China was opened in 1833. The Directors became, in 1833, the representatives only of the proprietors of a joint-stock company. Their books were closed, their accounts were cleared, and they were entrusted with certain political functions. Beyond 1833, I maintain, we have now no necessity for a moment to advert. It may be interesting to appeal to the character of Lord Clive, and to the deeds of the heroic men who rose in his school; but they really have nothing more to do with the matter in discussion than the ignominious disgrace of "the blackhole" of Calcutta. In 1833 we established a form of government, or we provided—to use the title of the present Bill—for the government of India, and we provided for that government with as much knowledge as was then furnished to Parliament and the country by the Ministry. There were great admissions made by the Ministers of that day, and by the most eminent authorities of that day, on the state of India; and upon those admissions the Bill of 1833 was introduced. Now, what were those admissions? It was complained, in 1833, that the Government of India had been one that necessarily led to ruinous wars—that was a great complaint. It was said that the consequence of that system of warfare was a condition of finance which prevented our improving the condition of the people, and improving also the condition of the country. It was said also, that from this want of resources the education of the native population had not only been neglected, but had not even been commenced. It was said, fifthly, that the maladministration of justice was of such a character that it was necessary that a code should be immediately constructed and introduced. Now, I am giving no opinion upon these points at present. I am representing to you the statements that were made by men of the highest authority in and out of office at the period of 1833, and in consequence, or rather with a clear admission of which statements, the Bill of 1833 was recommended to your notice. Now what is the state of affairs in 1853? How is it altered on these five main points? Now, observe, I am not now entering into any argument; I am not stating my own views; I am merely attempting to place before you what I believe to be an impartial narrative of the situation we have to encounter. Twenty years have passed; the interval has elapsed for which you had legislatively provided. What do we find? We still have great complaints. What are they? Constant wars; constant deficits: no education—few public works—maladministration of justice. Well, but these are the five pleas that were urged in 1833. Why do we hear of them again in 1853? Are these to be the five points of the Charter? I say that when we find that in 1833 and in 1853 the same complaints are made on subjects of such vast importance, it becomes Parliament to consider the question. Well, but we have, although imperfect, still a great body of evidence before us. We have had our Committee, and we have had a Committee of the House of Lords, that for two years have been taking evidence on these very important points. What do we find there? We find this remarkable characteristic in the evidence taken before the Committee of the House of Lords and before the Committee of the House of Commons—that those evils are not denied. They are explained—they are apologised for—extenuating pleas are urged in favour of those who exercise power: but the most experienced servants of the Company or of the Crown will not come forward and tell you that there have not been wars, and almost continual wars; they will not come forward and tell you that the native population of India is a wealthy and thriving population; they do not come forward to tell you that the condition of the country is changed; that the means of communication which were wanting have been provided; that all those works which in 1833 it was said should be accomplished have been accomplished. They do not say this; these great authorities—these men who have been employed, and justly employed, by the Crown and by the Company, do not come forward to say that the native population is educated; they do not come forward to say that the administration of justice is satisfactory. All that they do is to pour in upon us a flood of information and of light which springs from knowledge on these topics. They give us the means of forming an opinion—and I hope not a prejudiced or an extravagant opinion—on them; but still the result remains the same, that in 1853 you have the same complaint upon those great and cardinal points as you had in 1833, and that you have a body of evidence—of authoritative evidence—from the highest quarters upon your table, the general result of which is to prove that these complaints are well founded, although the witnesses may account for the calamities which all appear to acknowledge. Well, then, I ask, is it possible that under these circumstances we can proceed to legislate, "to provide a government for India"—as if we were legislating for a railroad? Are we to be told that this is a question upon which discussion should not be indulged in? Are Ministers to be allowed to triumph in the fact that the Parliament and the people of this country take no interest in this question? If they really do take no interest in this question, more shame for them. And rest assured that when the House of Commons does not take an interest in the good government of India, the time is not far distant when they will lose that India of which they are so careless. If I were a Minister, and it were impressed upon my painful conviction that the House of Commons was not interested in a discussion upon India, I would not at all events, as Her Majesty's Ministers do, triumph in that circumstance; I would not take the opportunity of letting Europe and America know that the House of Commons took no interest in the affairs of India. Why, it only proves what we have too much proof of, that we are becoming yearly more and more a meeting of delegates—less ambitious, and perhaps less competent, to fulfil the part of Imperial Legislators which was once our pride. I say that under these circumstances the House of Commons and the Parliament of this country are bound to attempt to discover what is the cause of this misgovernment of India—this chronic misgovernment of India—a misgovernment acknowledged by the very witnesses whom you bring forward to substantiate the claim of the Ministry, that the same authority shall exercise again the power which it did before, and who, no doubt, conscientiously give us their opinion to that effect. I do not presume to name one cause as the cause of what may be called the misgovernment of India. I do not moan to say that several causes may not be fixed upon; but I say, generally speaking, that if a country is misgoverned, that is at least primâ facie proof that the constitution of that country is an injurious constitution. Misgovernment—chronic misgovernment—cannot exist, in my opinion, unless the general scheme of administration has in it something essentially defective. Now, has the government of India as it at present exists something in it essentially defective? Well, when I consider that form of government—of which we all have heard, and read, and thought so much, and definitions of which in this debate, of so contrary a character, have been given by Members of equal and of high authority—I find that that government is cumbrous—that it is divided—that it is tardy, and deficient in that clear and complete responsibility which is the sole and essential source of all efficient government. Now, these are charges that I do not make but with reluctance, nor have I used a word the justice of which I do not think can be demonstrated. Let us advert for a moment to the descriptions of that government which have been given in this debate—and observe what the debate has consisted of. Although the debate has been derided by Her Majesty's Ministers, although we have been told night after night that a House could hardly be collected to listen to the debate, I have remarked this characteristic of the present discussion—that no Member has taken part in it who has not had either local or administrative experience of India. ["Oh, oh!"] Well, I shall be extremely glad to be corrected, as I trust I always am. It is possible I may have made some mistake in the course of a four nights' debate—but I say I do not, at this moment, recall a Gentleman who has addressed Mr. Speaker in this debate who has not had either local or administrative experience of India. Perhaps the First Lord of the Admiralty and myself may be exceptions; but I believe that we have officially both been Indian Commissioners. Well, whom have we had? We have had gentlemen who have served on the Board of Control; we have had gentlemen who have served as military men in India; we have had East India Directors; we have had gentlemen who I believe have occupied nearly the highest civil posts in India; and at the present moment I do not know an individual who has addressed the Speaker who does not come under one of the categories I have mentioned. However that may be, I am not going to quote any gentleman who has not been in India, or who has not had official connexion with that country. We have had the constitution of India described. One hon. Gentleman got up for that purpose—and he certainly will come under the category I have endeavoured to describe—and that hon. Gentleman says it is a mistake to suppose that the East India Company do not exercise, virtually and bonâ fide, authority in India. That occurred on one night of the debate. What happened on another? A Gentleman of equal authority gets up and says, "Oh, what's the use of this talking about the East India Company; the East India Company is," to use the elegant phrase that now forms part of the rhetoric of the House of Commons, "a sham—the Government of India is the Board of Control, and the President of the Board of Control." What happened next? Why, a right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Macaulay), who ought upon this question of all others to be the highest authority, for he was once Secretary to the Board of Control, and afterwards a Member of the Council in India, rises in his place and says, "You are wasting your breath and your time, neither the East India Directors nor the Board of Control have anything to do with the matter—the Government of India is the Governor General." Now this is a subject of very great interest. It is very odd you should have three high authorities rise up and entirely contradict themselves upon this question. This is a curious but it is not the most important part of the matter; and I mention it to show the difficulty there is in fixing where the government of India can be found. Here is the right hon. Member for Edinburgh, who tells us that neither the East India Directors nor the President of the Board of Control are the government of India, but the government of India exists in the Governor General of India—observe that. Well, a very short time ago—a very few years back—when many Gentleman whom I am now addressing were Members of this House—and even if not Members of this House, the event to which I refer must be still fresh in their memories—the state of India was most perilous and critical. We had encountered the greatest military disaster which the English arms had experienced in recent times. At that period England was governed by a strong Ministry, consisting of some of the ablest men that this country has ever produced; and they were, under these circumstances, summoned to Council to consider what steps should be taken in this moment of unprecedented peril for our Indian empire, and what was the course to be pursued. Fortunately for this country, two of the most eminent statesmen which the country has ever possessed directed the Councils of the State. They were those two statesmen whom the First Lord of the Admiralty, with justifiable pride, as is his habit, referred to as his Colleagues in his speech the other night—Sir Robert Peel and the Duke of Wellington. Sir Robert Peel and the Duke of Wellington had to consider, what, in the greatest crisis of our Indian empire, was the wisest and most prudent course, and the step of the most absolute necessity to take. They selected a Governor General for India; and they selected him at the greatest personal sacrifice, for in choosing him they deprived themselves of a Colleague of great talents, of commanding eloquence, and whose talents and eloquence were wanting in the other House of Parliament, where their cause was not so well supported as it was in this. They selected him, therefore, not from favour, but from the full opportunity of knowing his commanding talents—they selected him at a personal sacrifice, and they knew they sent him to the scene of imperial danger with all the advantages of accumulated and previous knowledge, for he was at the time the Minister of India. He went to that country. I shall not enter into any criticism of his career. This I know, he went with the entire satisfaction of his Colleagues—this I know, that he succeeded in all he undertook—and this I know, that in the very heart of his enterprise, he was rudely, abruptly recalled from his government. And by whom? By his Sovereign? By Her Majesty's Ministers? By the President of the Board of Control? Not at all; but by the Court of Directors. We saw this strange and startling thing—that Lord Ellenborough, selected for such an office by such men, and, under such circumstances, was recalled by the Court of Directors, with all the circumstances of shame, and that the very next day his Sovereign elevated him in the Peerage, and decorated him with the Red Riband. Now, I want to know, who is the Government of India? Now, I want to know, where is that clear and complete responsibility the want of which I deprecate? That is a question which I think ought to be answered. Have the Board of Directors the same power under the present Bill? I have read the Bill. I certainly cannot pretend to be learned in such matters, and I have not had the advantage of the counsel of my learned Friends whom I wished to consult upon it; but I have read the Bill, and it appears to me, that, so far as you can draw any conclusion at all from it, the Court of Directors can recall any Governor General to-morrow. To tell me that the Court of Directors, who can recall the Governor General, do not govern the country, is absurd; because they can in an instant change the whole policy which a Wellington or a Peel may approve; and even if a policy is not pursued which they disapprove, yet they well know that the power of recall must influence that policy. I think I have shown, then, that the Government of India is not that simple instrument of policy which we have been informed during this debate that it was. We have been told that the President of the Board of Control was the ruler and governor of India. I have shown you a memorable instance—one, too, of recent experience—in which the Sovereign and Her Ministers have been disregarded, and their policy entirely counteracted by the Board of Directors. I am not blaming them, or making this a charge against the Board of Directors. If they have the power, they have a right to exercise that power; hut when I am told that the Board of Directors have no power, and when I have shown you they can exercise the greatest act of power, and when, so far as I can gather from this Bill—though I speak under correction from the noble Lord if I am in error—that this power is reserved to them, that is a very important consideration when we come to consider the elements of which this government is to be formed. Remember, it is not a question, as has been so conveniently thrust forward in debate, where you have to decide upon maintaining the present form of Indian government, or adopting some great change. You cannot, sooner or later, avoid the organic change which you are taught to consider so perilous. You may, if you like, terminate the power of the Court of Directors to-morrow; but whether you choose to do it or not, at a stated period, which is prepared beforehand, the Court of Proprietors ceases to exist, and of course their representatives must also vanish from the political scene. Sooner or later, therefore, you must make an organic change, and the question for you to decide is, not whether you will make an organic change, or adhere to a system, the benefits of which will last but a limited period, but it is whether this is a fitting time to make that change, or whether by postponement you may not place yourselves in a much worse position than you now occupy. I think you may place yourselves in a worse position than you now occupy, for this reason. If it be true—no matter whose be the fault—that the condition of India is not a satisfactory condition; if it be true that the system that prevails there is a system that leads to a vast expenditure, which the resources of that country cannot sustain; if it be true that in consequence the condition of the people and of the country is not only not improving, but is deteriorating every day; if it he true that all those objects which you have considered of great importance in the government of India, are not in consequence attained—you must remember this—Her Majesty's Ministers must acknowledge this—that there is no reason why in the next twenty years any of those causes which have tended to the degradation of that country and its population should be diminished under the Bill which Her Majesty's Ministers have placed upon the table. But what will be your position in the year 1874? You must take India then. Whatever the debt of India is then, you must adopt that debt as your own. India, with all its obligations, with all its politics, with all its treaties, all its incumbrances, will become a part of your general government; and therefore it is a matter of urgent and imminent interest that we should decide at once whether we can afford, for the sake of India, and for the sake of England particularly, another twenty years like those which are about to expire. If the House will permit me, I will proceed to touch upon the Bill upon the table; and to examine whether it makes those changes, and whether it provides for those changes in the government of India which may be some remedy in the premises to which I have adverted. Remembering the hour of the night, I will curtail as much as possible the observations I have to make. I will not touch upon the changes you propose in the local government of India itself. There are many clauses with regard to this head to which I have objections, but they are not objections that would make me oppose the second reading of the Bill; virtually, as the right hon. Gentleman has said, this Amendment is an opposition to the second reading of the Bill; I will, therefore, concentrate my criticism upon the plan which is proposed for the home government of India. I find such objections to the plan that is proposed by Ministers for the home government of India, that they alone, in my opinion, fully warrant me in offering a complete resistance to this measure; because, as I shall show the House, I hope, this plan aggravates all the disadvantages of the existing system, and, it appears to me, deprives it of many of the advantages which the existing system undoubtedly possesses. In the first place, I must call the consideration of the House to the new constitution which is here made in respect to the Court of Directors. The first objection I make to this scheme, which is of a very peculiar nature, is, that by the introduction of Government nominees, that Court becomes immediately dependent. Whatever the faults of the existing system, whatever the faults of the Court of Directors—though their machinery may be cumbrous—though it may tend to delay, and even to corruption—it has one, if only an isolated virtue—it is independent. I greatly object, then, to the principle of introducing Government nominees into the Court; and I would remind the House, as authority has been so often appealed to, that this is not a new proposition. Mr. Charles Wynn, in the year 1833 proposed that there should be certain members of the Court of Directors nominated by the Government, and serving for four years—nearly the identical proposition—virtually the identical proposition, of Her Majesty's Ministers contained in the present Bill, so eloquently supported by the right hon. Member for Edinburgh. Now, how did the right hon. Gentleman in 1833 meet the proposition of Mr. Charles Wynn? How did the right hon. Member for Edinburgh, who the other night gave such valuable support to the proposition of the Minister, meet the proposition of Mr. Charles Wynn, that there should be nominated members of the Court of Directors to serve for four years? Mr. Macaulay said, "The plan suggested by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Montgomery shire, is, I think, the worst that I have ever heard." The House must recollect that the right hon. Gentleman, in 1833, was as great an authority on India as this year; for he had delivered upon it a speech of surpassing power, and the House looked up to him with all the consideration that he deserves; therefore these were no light words:— The plan suggested by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Montgomery shire, is, I think, the very worst that I have ever heard. He would have Directors nominated every four years by the Crown. Is it not plain that these Directors would always be appointed from among the supporters of the Ministry for the time being?—that their situations would depend on the permanence of that Ministry?—that therefore all their power and patronage would be employed for the purpose of propping that Ministry, and, in case of a change, for the purpose of molesting those who might succeed to power?—that they would be subservient while their friends were in, and factious when they were out? How would Lord Grey's Ministry have been situated if the whole body of Directors had been nominated by the Duke of Wellington in 1830? I mean no imputation on the Duke of Wellington. If the present Ministers had to nominate Directors for four years, they would, I have no doubt, nominate men who would give no small trouble to the Duke of Wellington if he were to return to office. What we want is a body independent of the Government, and no more than independent—not a tool of the Treasury—not a tool of the Opposition."—[3 Hansard, xix. 516.] This is the very proposal of the Government, which the right hon. Gentleman so earnestly advocated the other night, and which he declared in 1833, having then studied the subject with great profundity, was the very worst plan he had ever heard. Well, Sir, it is unnecessary for me to remind the House of the peculiar arrangement by which the numbers of the Court of Directors are to be reduced. I advert to it, of course, with reluctance in the presence of hon. Gentlemen who are members of that body—but I feel that the freedom of debate warrants the allusion. At present virtually, as hon. Gentlemen will recollect, the Court of Directors consists of thirty members; they are to meet in April, and to select fifteen out of their own number; and the selected fifteen are suddenly to become the Directors of the East India Company. At first there was an idea that the President of the Board of Control had dealt hardly with the Court of Directors; it was deemed a device on his part of so ruthless and remorseless a character, that there was some sense of public indignation expressed against Her Majesty's Ministers on this score. But I confess that after considering this clause, I entirely acquit Her Majesty's Ministers of this imputation. I am sure that the original idea of this clause must have been found in Leadenhall-street. I know there is a very valuable body of papers—they have been examined by a friend of mine—in the records of the Court of Directors relating to a subject in which I believe the Indian Government greatly distinguished itself, I mean putting down the system of Thuggee. The House knows, I am sure, what a Thug is. A Thug is a person of very gentlemanlike, even fascinating manners; he courts your acquaintance, he dines with you, he drinks with you, he smokes with you; he not only shares your pleasures, but even your pursuits; whatever you wish done, he is always ready to perform it: he is the companion of your life, and probably a member of the direction of the same joint-stock company; but at the very moment when he has gained your entire confidence, at the very moment when you are, as it were, reposing on the bosom of his friendship, the mission of the Thug is fulfilled, and you cease to exist. I confess I shall be curious to see who are the fifteen Thugs—I want to know who will be the first innocent victim to be selected. Sometimes I fear it may be the venerable Member for London. I will not pursue this hypothetical anticipation; but when we meet next Session, I think there will be a strange thrill of curiosity and horror when the hon. Gentlemen who shall be members of the first new Court of Directors enter this House. But now, practically, what are you gaining by this process? You are to have fifteen gentlemen of the old Court, to whom the Crown, in the first instance, has the power of adding three, and ultimately naming six, or one-third of the whole. There will be eighteen members, twelve of the old body, and six Government nominees. The object of having these Government nominees—by which, mark you, the independence of the Court is lost and abrogated—is to secure a certain superior knowledge of India, its necessities, and its circumstances. Well, now, do you gain that? I looked this afternoon over the list of the East India Direction, and I observed that a majority of them were gentlemen who had local and official experience of India. More than half the present Directors are men who have been eminent as Indian lawyers, like the hon. Baronet the Member for Honiton (Sir J. W. Hogg), or who have had great experience in either the military or the civil service of the Company; so that at present, with this extremely criticised Court of Directors, you have a mass of Indian experience and knowledge represented by more than half the members of the Court. But by the arrangement contemplated by Ministers, you only secure that one-third of the members shall possess that information and experience; because it is perfectly obvious that when this change which you project shall have taken place, none of the twelve members in future will be elected with any regard to their Indian experience. It will always be their standing in Lombard-street that will be looked to—the directors of insurance societies will be chosen—when a City Director is wanted, you will go on 'Change to find him. There will be no moral obligation then on the proprietors of this joint-stock company to elect men of Indian experience; and therefore the result of the change will be that, instead of having half, or more than half, men of Indian experience, you will have by this newfangled scheme only one-third. How will this act? Try it with the three new members nominated by the Crown. Probably the result of the election will be that the best men will remain in office, and you will have three men of consummate Indian experience added by Government. Well, what do you gain by that? I say that you have at this moment three men, and more than three, equal to any whom Her Majesty's Government, with the most praiseworthy anxiety and the purest motives, for which I give them credit, could select. I take my hon. Friend the Member for Honiton (Sir J. W. Hogg), twice Chairman, and a gentleman of great authority and credit—Ministers cannot for a moment suppose they would be able to select a better man—I give him the precedence. Is it probable that you will get a better man than Sir Richard Jenkins, or a man with more Indian experience than Sir Henry Willock? These are now members of the Direction, all of whom may not be members of the new Court; and I say it is not at all probable that Ministers will be able to add three to the fifteen ultimately selected who will be equal to these. I say, then, by the plan you are now pursuing, you are not improving the Court, if you wish to make it a council of Indian experience and knowledge; whilst, at the same time, you are doing that which will be most fatal to the ability and character of anything professing to be a council—you are introducing the element of dependence. I maintain that the two main elements of an Indian Council, whatever form it may take, whether a Court of Directors, or a collegiate council, are independence and permanence. You should secure independence and knowledge in every man who is to be a member, and you can only do that by making his position permanent. For these reasons, were there no others, if I were to choose between the existing system and the curious one proposed by Her Majesty's Ministers, I would much prefer the existing one. The existing system gives an Indian controlling council, independent, which is the first element in such a body; it secures a greater mass of Indian knowledge and experience, probably at least one-half against one-third; it furnishes a Government comprising certainly three men of greater experience and ability than the Crown could probably select. That is the great objection I have to this plan of the Home Government. It appears to me to possess all the evils of the old system, and none of its advantages. Now, I must omit many objections to the principle of the Bill, because I feel that time is precious, and I am bound to answer the defence set up for this measure by those who have preceded me. There is one curious feature of this debate—not a single man has risen on either side of the House to defend the Bill of Her Majesty's Ministers excepting Gentlemen in office; and what is the worth of their defence I will proceed to attempt to ascertain. There are many Gentlemen who have said they will not vote for the Amendment; but there is not one of those who have opposed it who has not told you at the same time that he entirely disapproves of the Bill. That is a very remarkable circumstance. There is the hon. Baronet the Member for the University of Oxford (Sir R. H. Inglis); he is not going to support the Amendment, indeed he very rarely does support any Amendment of ours; the hon. Baronet looks on the Bill in a spirit of devout reprobation—he says there never was one of which he so entirely disapproved, and he is willing to vote for the second reading in order that we should enter into Committee, in order that he may strike out all the principal clauses. There is my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdonshire (Mr. T. Baring)—and I always regret to differ from him—he is not going to support the Amendment, but he says he very much disapproves of the Bill. There is the hon. Member for Rochester (Sir H, Maddock), a great Indian authority, a writer as well as a speaker on this subject; at first he seemed rather to incline in favour of the Amendment, but at the end of his speech he had made up his mind not to vote for the Amendment, but at the same time he thoroughly diapproves of the Bill. Then there is my right hon. Friend—I do not know whether he is in his place—the Member for Stamford (Mr. Herries), a staunch opponent of the Amendment; but when he goes into Committee he will feel it his duty to show that the Bill is one of the most pernicious pieces of legislation possible to be conceived. The catalogue is much longer, but I cannot proceed through the list, because I have men of mark before me to whom I must advert. I said no Gentleman had defended the Bill who was not in office; there was the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Edinburgh, to be sure (Mr. Macaulay), but he ought to have been in office. He spoke, not for his Colleagues, but his clients. He defended the Bill; and I appeal to the House, who listened to him with all the attention which every word that falls from him commands, whether they ever heard a more agreeable speech, or a feebler defence. The right hon. Gentleman laid it down that the real powers of the government of India lay with the Governor General; he said he had seen how the Home Government worked in England, and he had seen, as a Member of Council, how the system worked at Calcutta. He told us four important measures were passed by the Council of India when be was at Calcutta, none of which was suggested, and some of which were afterwards disapproved, by the Court of Directors —the measure for the promotion of education, that for the abrogation of the transit duties, that for unlicensed printing, and the memorable measure for uniform coinage; and the right hon. Gentleman argued from this that there is no substantial power in the Court of Directors. I think I have shown the House there is reason to believe there is very substantial power in that Court. But there is another measure on which, as he was imparting to us all the secrets of State of the Council of India, I should have been glad if he had given us some information—a measure more important even than that concerning printing or coinage. I should like to have obtained some information from the right hon. Gentleman, when, with such unguarded frankness, he gave us all the secrets of State, to whose fault it may be attributed that we have not a code for India? The right hon. Gentleman is practically acquainted with that subject. In 1833 he thus expressed himself—"I believe that no country ever stood so much in need of a code of laws as India, and I believe there never was one in which the want could be so readily supplied." I do not give that as my opinion. I think it was a very bold assertion of the right hon. Gentleman, though received with loud and enthusiastic cheering. But twenty years have passed, and it may be a test of statesmanship not to have sanctioned that code. But I want to know who it was that prevented that code from being published—was it the Council of India or the Court of Directors? I think he should favour us with some information on this point. But the right hon. Gentleman proceeded further. He said, "It is neither the Court of Directors nor the Board of Control that governs India—the Court of Directors have nothing to do but to choose the Governor General—that is the only business they have to do." Now, if the only business which this elaborate and cumbrous Home Government has to do is to select the Governor General, according to the high authority of the right hon. Gentleman, then I maintain you want no Board of Control or Court of Directors—that the Minister of India, without any Council, can perform that office. Why, Sir, to choose a Governor General is exactly the duty which would be most fitly and most efficiently performed by the Prime Minister of England. It requires a first-rate knowledge of man, a thorough acquaintance with human character, a fine discrimination of human conduct—and the best judge of these qualities ought to be the First Minister of England; or that man is not fit to be First Minister, because knowledge of character is the chief quality we expect in the First Minister of the Crown, and that is the quality which should preside over the selection of a Governor General of India. Therefore the argument of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Edinburgh goes against the home government of India altogether, both the Board of Control and the Board of Directors; because, if the only duty they have to perform in this country is to select the Governor General, then, I maintain, you want neither a Court of Directors nor a Council for India. It is unnecessary for me to touch, at this late hour, upon other topics in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman. The right hon. Gentleman demonstrated many points which nobody questions, and illustrated many things which are not obscure. He did this, indeed, in so agreeable a manner, that I, for one, could have listened for ever. It was one of those bursts of conversation which would have charmed the breakfast or cheered the dinner table. But in my mind, so far as the case before us was concerned, the right hon. Gentleman totally avoided the whole question; or, if he noticed it at all, he made an admission, and established an admission, by proofs perfectly fatal, to having any Court of Directors or Council for India whatever. I must notice, late as it is, a still more important personage, not for his abilities, because no one pretends to exceed those of the right hon. Gentleman, but eminent equally for his abilities, and his great and responsible position—and that is the First Lord of the Admiralty. Now, the speech of the First Lord of the Admiralty consisted of one of the most complete panegyrics of the existing home government of India that I ever listened to—that I ever read. Not in all the pamphlets, not in all the histories, not in all the pamphlets which take the shape of histories, which have so abounded of late—not in all the specimens of composition in every size and form that in the last three or four months have been showered into the rooms of any Gentleman who happens to be a Member of Parliament, either not petitioned against or petitioned against, can any one find a more unqualified panegyric on the East India Company, of the Court of Proprietors, and of the Court of Directors, than fell from the practised lips of the right hon. Gentleman. It appeared to me, that rhetorical inconsistency never arrived at a more culminating point than it did towards the close of the right hon. Baronet's address. Indeed, as I observed him, he seemed at last like some rapid rider, who, at the close of a furious and blind career, suddenly finds himself at the brink of an unseen precipice; for when he had exhausted all his arguments, urged with his usual facility, the conclusion that stared him in the face was, that he ought to be the first man to vote against his own Bill. It pervaded, throughout its whole course, the speech of the right hon. Gentleman. The home government is a perfect government, said the right hon. Gentleman, and therefore I propose to alter it. The army of India is an heroic army. Think of Pollock! Think of Nott! These are men of whom any country might be proud; and therefore we are going to introduce a Bill which for the first time degrades these men, and makes them subordinate to a Queen's officer. ["Oh, oh!"] You say Oh, oh! but you cannot deny that there is a provision in this Bill which for the first time makes the Pollocks and Notts of the Indian army subordinate to a Queen's officer. If you are going to vote for a Bill which you have never read, the greater your responsibility. That is not all. The right hon. Baronet says—"I acknowledge that the state of Indian finance is not satisfactory. I cannot deny that there is great debt, though not so great as the exaggeration of Indian reformers makes it out." The right hon. Gentleman should be lenient to the raw statistics of these young Gentlemen. Statistical inquiry is a subject which requires practice, and we should forget a slight error for the laudable purpose. The right hon. Gentleman says, "I know there is a a great debt, that there is an ugly deficit in the year's account, though not so much as some hon. Gentlemen say it is, but we are going to settle that in this great Bill." You are to have an Indian budget, a financial statement every year, and you will have the advantage next year of having it from one who has been Chancellor of the Exchequer as well as President of the Board of Control, who will thus, of course, combine in his statement all the magnificent imagery incident to the one capacity, with the perspicuity of financial detail appertaining to the other. I really did think that my ancient antagonist was doomed to more glowing subjects than those of which we have some dreary recollections; but I find he is to give us an Indian budget. This is the plan of the First Lord of the Admiralty: Indian finance is not in a satisfactory state, so you shall have the ways and means of India yearly before you, though you have not the control over a single shilling. Is anything more dreary than a financial statement? What is it that at all excites attention, but the desire to know how much we are going to receive, how much we are going to pay? But we are to have an Indian budget when we can receive nothing, and cannot control the expenditure. The powers of the Government to maintain a House are remarkable; but I think that their House-collecting, or House-containing powers, will be tasked to their utmost on the night when the Indian budget of the right hon. Gentleman is coming on. I have condensed, as much as possible, the observations I have to make, and I have omitted many; but if the House will be indulgent, I will, before I sit down, touch, however briefly, on the arguments urged against delay. There are reasons against delay first urged on the ground of authority. I have ventured to say before, that argument drawn from authority is an argument which, though valid and efficacious up to a certain point, is of a limited character. We recognise authority—we are-all influenced by authority; but we cannot be influenced by authority against the strong convictions of our reason. The first authority which is brought forward to control us is, that of the present Governor General of India. I yield to an authority in which, like one of the Homeric contests, one has to encounter a cloud. I cannot fight, I cannot struggle, against the authority of Lord Dalhousie, when I am not aware of the language in which it is couched, or at this moment the precise conclusions which it recommends. It used to be held to be very unparliamentary, not to say unconstitutional, for a Minister to appeal to a State paper which is not in the public cognisance of Parliament. I do not want to urge that point severely, but I do protest against authority like that of Lord Dalhousie being brought forward to influence this House, when not a Member of it can really tell us what Lord Dalhousie says, what is his counsel, upon what data it is founded, or really what he advises. The name of Lord Dalhousie has been brought into the debate; but, so far as influencing opinion, it ought not to be listened to. Such authority, I repeat, is a cloud. Another Governor General is brought forward. Lord Ellenborough. Lord Ellenborough has said, very recently, he is in favour of immediate legislation; and the authority of Lord Ellenborough, even though he has changed his opinion, is no light one. But when I remember that three months ago Lord Ellenborough was against immediate legislation, I cannot, in weighing the value of Lord Ellenborough's opinions, or reading a statement of them, very much appreciate authority offered under those circumstances. Lord Ellenborough in three months had changed his opinions; I want to know what are his reasons. They may be reasons which, in my mind, may not be of sufficient force, and founded on assumptions which are not valid. Therefore the opinions of Lord Dalhousie and Lord Ellenborough are mere shadows. Then there comes a third Governor General, my Lord Hardinge; but Lord Hardinge did not state his opinion before the Committee. If Lord Hardinge had given his opinion in favour of immediate legislation before the Committee, it would have been open for any Member of it to ask the grounds on which he founded that opinion; but we are told that in a conversation—for such is the strange mode which now prevails of introducing the names of eminent men—Lord Hardinge expressed an opinion in favour of immediate legislation, which he did not express before a Committee of this House, Therefore, if you wish to influence this House, summon Lord Hardinge to the bar, and ask him to instruct the House of Commons upon the reasons for his opinion on this subject. There are one or two other persons of great authority whom I must also notice. There is my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr. P. Baring). I acknowledge he is of great authority on this question. He was the Chairman of the Committee, and, as chairman, exhibited all the talents which those acquainted with him were not surprised at his showing; but my hon. Friend, at least, so I understand, is a supporter of the Home Government of India as it exists, and therefore I can comprehend his feeling that the sooner we legislate, the better chance there will be of getting something like that we at present possess. Nothing can be fairer than the course of my hon. Friend; but though I do not agree in half the statement made by hon. Gentlemen opposite—though I do not attribute peculiarly to the East India Company the state of India-looking upon the Company only as part of a cumbrous Government that has produced that state—yet I do not see why the present Government should be continued, nor do I find that to be the wish of Her Majesty's Ministers. Then there is another authority which has been very much talked of in this debate, and that is the opinion of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Stamford (Mr. Herries). My right hon. Friend the Member for Stamford has stated, so far as I can collect his statement, that he approves of immediate legislation for India, and that it is his intention to have proposed immediate legislation; and that observation or admission has been made much of by hon. Gentlemen opposite. They have taken every opportunity of stating in their speeches that the late Government had intended to legislate immediately for India, and, that, therefore, our arguments for delay are of recent adoption. I know well my right hon. Friend would never make a statement which he was not perfectly convinced was accurate, and that he is incapable of stating more than strictly has occurred. But I am bound to say, with every feeling of courtesy and kindness for my right hon. Friend—there ought to be no misconception on a subject of this kind; and I beard the declaration—if that be the declaration—that the late Government were prepared to legislate immediately, I myself heard that declaration for the first time. But I am not the only Member of the late Government who heard that statement for the first time; for I had the opportunity of conferring with almost all my late Colleagues, and among those with that one in particular without whose sanction no such course could have been adopted or announced—the First Minister of the Crown—and I have the authority of my Lord Derby to say that he never heard of such an intention, and that he was equally surprised at the public statement made by Her Majesty's Ministers as to the statement of my right hon. Friend, namely, that the late Government intended to legislate immediately with regard to India. Far be it from me to dispute the authority of the Member for Stamford. I am not attempting to depreciate his authority—I think it a very high one. I give all the advantage of that authority to Her Majesty's Ministers; but I think there ought to be no misconception on a circumstance of that character. And remember, with regard to the right hon. Gentleman, the same observation applies as that which I have made with respect to my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon, that he is in favour of the existing system without change, and he indulges in the almost Quixotic views of the hon. Member for the University of Oxford, that when in Committee the objectionable parts of this Bill can be struck out. I have noticed those arguments against delay which are drawn from authority. I must now touch for a moment upon those reasons which are urged against delay by the First Lord of the Admiralty and others upon grounds of the present state of India. The state of India has been urged as a state which does not admit of any delay in legislating for its Government. Well, now, Sir, I entirely differ—with great respect let me say it—from the right hon. Gentleman on that point. There may be good reasons for not delaying this measure for the government of India, or there may not; but I deny that any good reason can be found for precipitate legislation in this respect, derived from the state of India. Why, Gentlemen in this House speak of India as if it were a small country, in which insurrection could occur the moment the second edition of the newspapers took out word that this Bill, brought in for immediate legislation upon the government of India, had been postponed. But just remember that India is a country which is in size equal to a third part of Europe, and is inhabited by twenty-five nations, differing in race, differing in religion, and differing in language. What are the elements of combination among the people of India under these circumstances? Why, Sir, take the case of Germany. There you have a considerable country, but one that is not to be compared for a moment in extent with India. You have it occupied by seven or eight nations of the same religion, the same race, and the same language. You have a country there with all the advantages which modern science affords for the intercommunication of man, and for the communication of intelligence. You have railroads, electric telegraphs, and a universal press. And what did the efforts four or five years ago of attempted concert and combination in Germany end in? Why, it was found to be totally impossible to make Austrians and Prussians, Bavarians and Hanoverians, combine in any manner; and that, although they were of the same race, religion, and language, the conflicting prejudices were so great, the interests so different, from the diverse configuration of the soil and other causes, that the whole broke up like an illusion. And yet we are afraid of an insurrection in a vast empire like India, which is equal in extent to one-third of Europe, and is inhabited by twenty-five different nations. But, says the right hon. Gentleman, warming with his subject—and in this he was supported by the Secretary to the Board of Control (Mr. Lowe)—whom otherwise I should not have noticed, looking upon the assertion as only one of those dashing statements with which he sometimes winds up a speech—"Look at the state of Asia—look at its peculiar and unprecedented state—that renders it more important that your legislation with regard to India should be immediate." Now I say that the state of Asia is not peculiar, nor is it unprecedented. What was the statement of the hon. Gentleman—a statement in great detail, and not a general allusion? He adverted to the condition of Arabia, the condition of the Turkish empire, the condition of Central Asia, and the condition of China. He said that their state was peculiar and unprecedented. He said that Arabia was in a state of uncontrolled fanaticism—that the position of the Turkish empire was most perilous and critical; and I was very sorry to hear that—I was very sorry to hear that the coalition has brought things to such a pass in the Levant. But I have heard it laid down as a rule of law that no man has a right to take advantage of his own wrong, and it is no argument for misgoverning India that you have misgoverned your foreign affairs. He said that in Central Asia the Khan of Bokhara was making war upon the Khan of Khokan;—as if there had not been war from all time between these or some other Khans; and then he asked us to look at the state of China, which is now ravaged by a successful insurrection. Now, Sir, I say that at all times such circumstances have been prevalent in these countries; they have never been much less so; and I will take the year 1833, when the last India Bill was brought in, and try the period by all the tests which the hon. Gentleman mentioned, and I will show to him that in every respect the state of things to which he referred existed, and existed in a more aggravated and more serious form; and yet it was not brought forward as an argument for hurrying on imperfect and precipitate legislation with regard to our Indian empire. What was the state of Arabia in the year 1833? You had not merely a condition of fanaticism, such as the hon. Gentleman referred to—you had a new religion, which had arisen in the Desert—a religion of conquest, which, after many years of vicissitude, had been just crushed by the Pacha of Egypt—I mean the insurrection excited by the new religion of the Wahabees. Again, what was the condition of the Turkish empire, which we are told is now encompassed with mighty perils? Why, the Pacha of Egypt, at the head of 100,000 disciplined troops, was invading the Turkish empire. While the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Edinburgh was delivering an eloquent speech upon the state of India, the Pacha had already fought a great battle in Asia Minor, which made him master of the Turkish empire, and the Russian fleet was at the entrance of the Bosphorus, and a Russian army was encamped on the heights above Constantinople. Yet, six weeks before, Mr. Charles Grant had introduced the India Bill of 1833, and nobody then talked of the state of the Turkish empire, or of Arabia being in a ferment or commotion—no one urged these circumstances as a reason for passing a law which should for twenty years regulate the government of an immense empire. Then as to the state of Central Asia, instead of a mere contest between two Tartar Khans, had you not at that time the commencement of that mysterious combination in Central Asia which afterwards ended in the invasion of Affghanistan as the only means of warding off the perils which threatened our empire in the East? Then as to the state of China—why, at this period of 1833 those misunderstandings had commenced which made every man acquainted with the state of China foresee that a war could only terminate the controversy; and a few years afterwards we had the greatest war in which we have been concerned for a long period in the East, and which was followed by the China debate, in which the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty took so prominent a part. I say, then, that, taking the state of Turkey, of Arabia, of Central Asia, and of China in the year 1833, in all these instances, the circumstances of peril and foreboding were considerably graver than those that now exist; and no man then rose, and no man will again, I hope, rise, and base an argument for passing an imperfect and impolitic measure for the government of India, upon the ground of the danger in these or in any other parts of Asia. Well, I will only touch upon one more topic in this debate—and I am deeply thankful to the House for having listened to me so patiently. There is another and a fourth reason which has been given why we should not sanction delay in legislating for India. I have referred to the argument drawn from authority, to the argument drawn from the state of India, and to the argument drawn from the state of Asia. There is a fourth argument urged why you should not delay legislation in this respect, and that is because next year we are to have a measure of Parliamentary reform. Sir, I know well that Her Majesty's Ministers are hound, not merely as statesmen, but as men of honour, not only to bring forward a measure of Parliamentary reform at the commencement of the next Session, but also a large measure of Parliamentary reform. I know that the right hon. Gentleman (Sir James Graham), with a candour which I think quite became him, informed the country that the only condition on which he could be induced to serve his Sovereign and the State was, that the present Prime Minister should introduce, as soon as convenient—certainly not later than the commencement of the next Session—a large measure of Parliamentary reform; and I know that we have the authority of the right hon. Gentleman—an authority unimpeachable—that the Prime Minister completely consented to his condition—that he virtually formed his Government upon the principle of Parliamentary reform, and that he engaged with the right hon. Gentleman that a large measure of Parliamentary reform should be introduced. Well, Sir, one word upon that as a reason why we should not delay legislating for India. The subject of Parliamentary reform, let me remind the House, is not of that complicated character that it was in the year 1830. The nature of the suffrage, the elements of the franchise, the principles of representation, all these things are pretty well known now and understood. There is hardly a combination with respect to these things which a Minister can make that has not been anticipated; and although we are to have a measure of Parliamentary reform—according to the right hon. Gentleman's estimate, a large measure of Parliamentary reform—I have no idea that it need take up the whole Session in its discussion. I think the Government may introduce a well-matured project for the government of India in February, and pass it in this House, and yet bring in their large measure of Parliamentary reform before Easter. But, Sir, I hope the House will remember the circumstances in which this engagement of Ministers has been made. It is two years ago since the noble Lord, then the First Minister of the Crown, announced to us his settled conviction that there should be a measure of Parliamentary reform—not as a theory, mind you, but as a practical opinion at which he had arrived, and which he was prepared to act on. Well, let it not be said that for the sake of personal and political convenience a measure of reform that was necessary for England in the estimation of the noble Lord, is to be put off for a year or two years, but not the slightest delay can be brooked in regard to a measure which concerns the good government of 150,000,000 of our fellow-subjects in India. Are we to be told that India is to continue to be misgoverned, or not to have the chance of a better government, because the noble Lord, who thought Parliamentary reform necessary two years ago, is content to postpone it for political and personal reasons till another year? Why, the argument drawn from the state of India and the argument drawn from the state of Asia are valid, forcible, powerful, respectable, in comparison with an argument alleged for delaying the good government of India, because the political convenience of the Government would not allow them to bring in a particular measure. No, Sir, I cannot believe that the House of Commons would sanction such a proceeding. I am sure they will hesitate before they seem in any way to authorise such conduct on the part of any Government. I have now placed before the House as clearly as I could from the hour at which I speak, but far more imperfectly than I could wish, the principal reasons why I shall support the Amendment of my noble Friend. It is an Amendment brought forward, not in compliance with any newfangled ideas, or in connexion with any that are not the legitimate political allies of my noble Friend. It is brought forward in deference to the highest precedents that can be supplied by the conduct of the most eminent men. It necessarily leads to no substantial delay in providing a government for India before the existing Act terminates, although for security it is advisable that a Continuance Bill of two years should be passed. Before the existing Act terminates, there is no reason why a government for India should not be provided by Parliament which may be worthy the exigencies of the occasion, and which may show that the Parliament of this country is not entirely unworthy of its office, nor entirely unfit to do that which the country requires. Nor when I am told about party questions, do I hesitate to say, that I think it would be no discredit and no disgrace to the Government if they had themselves made this suggestion, or even if they were now to avail themselves of it. They have been in office but a few months. They have had much to do. The right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Control—great as his experience may be—has not been peculiarly attentive to the subject of his present office until he now administers it for the first time. These are valid reasons why the Government might have taken the course which we recommend. Sir, I do not know what may be the fate of this Amendment; but when I hear of party questions and party feelings, I remember how often we have struggled here, animated by such party feelings upon subjects which, although they may excite our passions for the passing moment, are but of a transitory and fleeting nature. We have had our party struggles, the subjects of which have often been consigned to oblivion, but we are struggling now for something that will not be soon forgotten; and however I may go into the lobby, however my noble Friend may be attended, I shall be supported by the consciousness that upon a great occasion I at least attempted to do my duty by those who have deemed me worthy of their political confidence, and I shall at least do my utmost to connect their names with a course of policy which I think will be honourable to themselves, and which I believe will be beneficial to the country.


Mr. Speaker, I am sorry that in the present exhausted state of the House I shall have to trespass on their attention before a division is taken on this subject. But I feel that the question before the House is one of so much importance, and that the observations which the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Disraeli) has made are directed so much against the measures of the Government, that I should not be fulfilling my duty if I did not ask your attention to listen to some observations which I feel bound to make. In so doing I will promise the House that I will make no reference to the question of Parliamentary reform. This great question of India seems to me sufficient on the present occasion to engage our attention. My right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty said that, in fact, this discussion divided itself into two branches: the one, the question of delay; and the other, that of the double government. These are, in fact, the two questions which the House has now to determine. Before I address myself to these two questions, I cannot avoid remarking upon the lesson that the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Disraeli) seemed disposed to give to his party in the commencement of his address to the House. Now, Sir, from the general observations which the right hon. Gentleman made upon party, I shall be one of the last to disagree. I can conceive nothing dishonourable, nothing that is not highly creditable when two parties have a difference of principle, when one party is committed to one principle and the other to the other—each conscientiously believing that the welfare of the country can be promoted by the promotion of that principle—I can, I say, conceive nothing more natural than that each in favour of their own should struggle for ascendancy. But the right hon. Gentleman's position has its difficulty in this—that a party ought to have some settled purpose and some decided policy, in favour of which they ask their friends and supporters in Parliament and in the country to aid and assist them. But this is a political occasion in which the noble Lord (Lord Stanley), who brought forward this Motion, and whose candour and fairness I admit, and the right hon. Gentleman who closed this debate on that side of the House, are both entirely wanting in the preference of any policy that they can recommend to the House. They tell us to delay the passing of this measure. The noble Lord's address was characterised by an inconsistency that has been pointed out by my hon. Friend the Secretary to the Board of Control (Mr. Lowe), for the noble Lord adds, I will now discuss the measure before the House. Upon the great question, whether we will continue the government of India in the hands in which it has already been placed by Parliament, we have scarcely any light from the noble Lord, and very little from the right hon. Gentleman who has just resumed his seat, and therefore it is that in adopting the Motion of the noble Lord, the right hon. Gentleman had to endeavour—a painful endeavour I should think it must have been for him—to prop it up by diminishing the authority, by weakening the influence, and combating the arguments of a right hon. Gentleman of great knowledge and experience (Mr. Herries) whom the Earl of Derby intrusted with the Ministry of India, and pitched upon as President of the Board of Control, and who, therefore, is the man of all others to whom the Earl of Derby and his Cabinet would have listened when he propounded his views on legislation for India. That is the first authority which the right hon. Gentleman has endeavoured, but, I think, unsuccessfully, to weaken. The next authority on this subject whom the late Government would have been disposed to consult, is the hon. Gentleman the Member for Huntingdon (Mr. T. Baring), whose unwearied attention to this subject, as Chairman of the India Committee, whose knowledge, whose experience, and whose sagacity the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Disraeli) ought to be the last man to call in question. And yet his case is, that the authority of these two persons, pre-eminently the highest authorities of his party, are to be neglected and set aside in order to accomplish some object which the right hon. Gentleman has in view. Why, Sir, that is the way in which a great party is weakened. It is not that party will cease in England, but that when the leader of a party like the right hon. Gentleman has no clear and settled policy to state to his party, the more intelligent members of that party, who have considered this subject, find it necessary to act for themselves, and express such opinions as we have heard in the course of this debate—opinions which, if they do not agree with this Bill, yet derive much strength from the fact that while the hon. Gentlemen who express them are not willing to support the Bill, yet they have a decided opinion on this subject—that we ought to proceed to legislate for India during the present Session, and that legislation for India is the main principle and the first clause of the Bill of the Government. Why, Sir, it was difficult to find out by whom the Motion of the noble Lord was adopted. The noble Lord's Motion states that the House requires further information before they will be prepared to legislate permanently for the Government of India. That is the first and main part of the noble Lord's Amendment. But is that the meaning of the Motion? By no means. Hardly a Member of the House who has spoken has really and sincerely taken up that view of the question. It would certainly be a very intelligible course if hon. Gentlemen really were in that position, and were not decided whether the Government of India were to continue unaltered—whether the Government should be altogether subverted—whether the Bill should be adopted—or whether a single Government by the Crown should be adopted—in that case I should consider them men not having made up their minds, and wishing for further information; but there is hardly one who has spoken in the course of the debate—that has now lasted four nights—who has not stated a clear and decided opinion as to the course he would take. Therefore the Motion is in fact entirely fallacious in its terms, and does not mean what it professes to mean. To be sure we have had an explanation of the Motion from a new supporter of the noble Lord, from the leader of the Opposition at the time when my right hon. Friend (Sir C. Wood) asked for leave to introduce the Bill. The hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Bright) has explained the meaning of the Motion. He told the House it was intended, if the Motion succeeded, to introduce a Bill to continue the Government as it is for the space of two years; and he ventured to affirm—and I think well he might venture to affirm—that if two years were allowed he was convinced that, at the end of that period, no Government founded on the continuance of the East India Company would be adopted for India by the House. I do not find fault with this declaration of the hon. Gentleman. His conduct upon this subject has been frank, direct, and intelligible. I differ from him in some of his opinions, but I am disposed to agree with him in the opinion that, if for two years you have continual agitation, excited hopes, and inflamed opinions on the subject of the Government of India—if for two years you should support throughout India the notion that the present Government of India should be displaced, and that something more grateful to the popular feeling, some representation of all classes, something perhaps wild and impracticable, should be put in its place—if in aid of that agitation you had every man who has not been successful as a lawyer, or who has been disappointed as an applicant for office—if you find these all adding to the agitation in this country, and endeavouring to indispose the people of India to expect and approve of a continuance of the present system of government, I own I am willing to avow that the enactment by Parliament of such a Government would be highly problematical. But is that all? Will nothing else be seen in that time? Is it only the continuation of the Government that would be in question? Would not the very existence of the empire itself be endangered? And, Sir, this is not stating, as the right hon. Gentleman in his speech suggested that we had intimated—that as soon as the news of the refusal of this Bill arrived in India, there would be an insurrection. No; authority would be gradually condemned, opinion would be gradually subverted, and in that way influence would by degrees be overthrown, and at the end of two years you would find that the foundation of your Indian empire had been shaken. Well, then, I think, Sir, the noble Lord is lending the aid of his arm to shake the Government, and that he has little considered what fruit he might be scattering on the ground, what branches he might shake, what roots he might loosen, if not absolutely destroy, if he were unhappily successful with his Motion. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Manchester has an object which he has stated, and he thinks he could stop short when he had secured his object of destroying the East India Company. I doubt his power to do so; but at all events, I can understand his proceedings, for he has employed his strength in opposing us in the course which we propose; but I confess I cannot understand the tactics of the noble Lord. If the noble Lord will permit me to parody a declaration of his own, I should say, "that his Motion is neither conservative nor reforming." It is not conservative, because it proposes for a long period of time to maintain existing agitation—a purpose more opposed to Conservatism cannot well be imagined; it is not reforming, because the noble Lord has not shown us even a single feature of any plan of reform. Well, then, the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Disraeli) says, "Oh, but you talk of dangers to India. The First Lord of the Admiralty talks of the state of Asia, and of China, and of other dangers that surround this question." I will show that in 1833 great, if not greater, dangers existed. Can the right hon. Gentleman say that, in the face of those dangers, the Government of Lord Grey postponed for two years, or even for two months, to legislate on this subject? No, Sir, in the face of those dangers, comprehending the full peril of the case, they introduced a Bill into the House, which was read a second time on the 9th of July, which was read a second time in the House of Lords on the 2nd of August, which passed through Parliament, and every danger was averted by the promptitude and decision of Lord Grey. Then I ask the right hon. Gentleman to complete his precedent, and, as he has adverted to the circumstances, to admit that we in 1853 should follow a similar course to that pursued by Earl Grey in 1833. This seems to me to be the great fact of the question of delay. I cannot but think that if the House agree to adopt the suggestion of the right hon. Gentleman, it would be a course attended with grave dangers. I say that circumstances themselves ought to be sufficient to convince the House that the authority of the Marquess of Dalhousie and of Lord Hardinge may fairly be acted upon as the opinions of persons of actual experience in the Government of the country. I think their opinions add additional weight to the force of the arguments which the question itself affords. Well, next comes the important question which my right hon. Friend (Mr. Macaulay) has called the double government. In speaking on this question, I beg the House to recollect what the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Disraeli) does not seem to have kept in mind—the general argument used on former occasions, used by my right hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh, and used by Mr. Mill in his evidence in favour of what had been called double government with respect to India. I beg to call this fact to the attention of the noble Lord who has brought forward the Amendment, that hitherto no one has proposed anything in effect but a double government, because no one has said that it would be sufficient to have a Minister of the Crown entrusted with the affairs of India without the assistance of some council of persons who had experience in regard to India, and who might supply that knowlege of details which the Minister would want. Let us see whether you can have any other Government for India. Let us see whether you cannot have in this country some change which shall temper and guide the Governor General, however wise, however able, and however temperate he may be—nay, let him have the abilities of a Marquess of Wellesley, all the virtues of a Lord William Bentinck—and which shall act as a check in cases where his power might require control; and then let me ask whether you can have any better check than a body of persons independent in their positions—men thoroughly acquainted with the affairs of India, and who would be able to explain to the Governor General the details of every measure proposed or adopted in India, and who would thereby oblige the Governor General to feel that every act of his must be well considered, and that if at any time he should do an unadvised or inconsistent act, he would be liable to check and rebuke. Well, Sir, I must say I think a Government of India, supported as it is by seventy years of experience, ought to have considerable weight with this House. I do not say it must be at all times the best Government, or that you may not find, as you proceed with the mechanical improvements of the present day, that some of the machinery may be simplified and replaced by better. That may be so; but what I do say is, that the course of true wisdom at the present time is to adopt that government which is sanctioned by such high authorities, upheld by such strong arguments, and confirmed by such experience. There were, however, two defects in the Indian Government which have been constantly pointed out, and pointed out by those who now find fault with us for attempting to correct those defects: one of these was, that the process of being elected to the Court of the Directors was one which occupied considerable time, and which exposed the person seeking that honour to great solicitation, and which deterred many of the ablest servants who come from India from seeking that honour. Another injustice was, that there was so much patronage in the hands of the Directors, and that, above all, the civil patronage was an object among so many of the proprietors, that it had great influence in the election of Directors. As regards the first of these, we have provided that a certain number of Directors should be nominated by the Crown—provided they had had ten years' service in India—without going through the process of election by the Court of Directors of the East India Company. I own, I think, the objection quite done away with by that proposal; nor do I think the objection once stated by my right hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh (Mr. Macaulay) would apply to this proposal. It was no doubt the proposal first made by Mr. Charles Wynn, and he put a limitation on it, which we have adopted, and which, I think, nullifies the objection which has been made against it, namely, that the persons nominated should have passed a certain number of years, and we have proposed that the term should be ten years in India. We all know that persons who come home after long service in India are not extreme partisans or party men; that they consider India always present in their minds, and, whether they are appointed by one Minister or the other, that they regard the welfare of India above all other objects. There was another proposal made by Mr. Wynn at the time, which we have adopted, and which my noble Friend Lord Glenelg wished to adopt in 1832, which is that of diminishing the number of the Directors; and Mr. Wynn gave an admirable reason for it. He said— You have twenty-four Directors divided into four committees, but three of these committees were engaged on subjects connected with trade. You are now about to deprive the Company of all business connected with trade or commerce, and, therefore, you have no need of more than the number of Directors for one of those committees—or, at least, have not so much need of them as when you had three committee sitting on trade. I think that the plan we have suggested is a very reasonable proposal, and one which should receive your assent. I now come to the other proposal to meet the other defect I have mentioned, and here I think the proposal we have to make is not only founded, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh showed, on sound principle—that those who go out as candidates for civil offices should be exposed to general competition—but that it may be hereafter of the greatest importance as regards the government of India. In the first place, I think it will serve to connect the people of all classes in this country more with India—that there will be a more general concern—a more general interest in the welfare of India in this country, where young men are taken from all classes of society here. And, in the next place, it will altogether put an end to the fears which, I confess, I nave always entertained, that some day or other it might please the Parliament to give to the Crown the Government of India, and, with that Government, the vast patronage connnected with it. I believe, Sir, there could be nothing more dangerous for India, and nothing more injurious to the constitution of this country than that course. But I have always apprehended that, without some change, such a proposal would be made. One who has written on Indian reform—a gentleman of very considerable ability, who has written on the subject last year and this—I mean Mr. Campbell—says he thinks it would be a good distribution of the patronage of India if the offices were given to persons recommended by Members of the House of Commons. I entirely differ from that proposition. I can conceive nothing more dangerous—nothing more injurious than that we should adopt that plan. If the plan we propose should succeed—and, mind, I don't say it will succeed, because it is only an experiment—whether we continue the Government in the East India Company or confer it on the Crown, you have provided a safe mode of dispensing this great patronage. I have heard hon. Members speaking in this debate with a view to amend, either with or without alterations, the present mode of the Government of India, and I have heard them speaking with a resolute determination to put an end to that Government. Some of those who have taken that line are favourable to the Government of the East India Company; but there is one extraordinary exception—my hon. Friend the Member for Montrose (Mr. Hume). I confess I was quite astonished that the hon. Member, who was wont to extol the Government of India, and to praise so highly the mode in which its affairs were administered by the Company, should give his support to a Motion of which the end was to weaken, and finally to subvert, that Government. I will not now go into the mode in which the Government of India has been conducted, I think the general result of that Government—and I state it in opposition to the right hon. Gentleman opposite—has been a flourishing condition of India—an improvement in the revenue, and an improvement in the trade of the country—greater facilities of transit than were ever known before, and, generally speaking, a flourishing and prosperous empire, upon whose fate you have now to decide. I have seen it stated that we have not now in India those great public works which the former sultans and princes of India founded, and that if we were to depart from India we should leave no monument of our power behind us. I entirely differ, Sir, both from that opinion, and from that statement. For my own part, when I look back to the government of great empires, especially in India and in other parts of the East, I can see little to admire or to approve. I see undoubtedly powerful empires, having established their power by a disregard of all obligations, founding great works for some purposes of vanity or ostentation, and erecting those works by the labour of those who were, as we see by the accounts of the sculptures of Assyria lately published, slaves—who were prisoners of war, and taken in battle with foreign nations. These works are, in fact, records of the misery, the endurance, of those prisoners of war whom, in our times, we treat with humanity and kindness. But, Sir, are there no monuments which we should leave behind us? Will history tell no tale as regards the last seventy years of our government in India? Will it not, Sir, be recorded that in that time we have put an end to those devastating wars in India in which the neighbouring princes attacked and destroyed each other to the total ruin of the people, and that the scene of the ravages of the Carnatic, so eloquently described by Mr. Burke, has not been repeated during our time? Will it not be told that, instead of this, our language has been introduced, that better notions of law and justice have been spread among the people of India, and that if we have not done what one hon. Member seemed to think, strangely enough, it was the duty of the East India Company to have done in less than a single century, and changed the whole character of the people, we have at least laid the foundations for that change of character by which the people will learn that in English estimation truth and justice are to take the place of falsehood and venality? We have introduced to the cultivated minds of India a knowledge of the science and literature of Europe, and we have thereby enabled them in future, whether they may be governed by Hindoos, by English, or by any other authority, to judge that Government by a better test than by the old barbarous rules by which one perfidious conqueror was wont to estimate another. My belief is, Sir, that, if our rule in India were to be destroyed, we should possess that consolation—a consolation better than that of having built any of those palaces, or having raised any of those stately works which sovereigns formerly erected in India. I believe and hope that the Government of this country will long continue in India; and I can see no other power so likely to maintain peace among the various nations of India, and no other power so likely to introduce improvements from time to time tending to the civilisation of India. Believing that such is our great mission, I shall decidedly, so far as I am concerned, not put that power in jeopardy and uncertainty by consenting to two years' agitation, and the anxieties attendant upon delay, and shall certainly vote against the Amendment of the noble Lord the Member for King's Lynn, and I trust that the House will assent to the second reading of this Bill.

Question put. The House divided:—Ayes 322; Noes 140: Majority 182.

List of the AYES.
Acland, Sir T. D. Cavendish, hon. G.
A'Court, C. H. W. Cayley, E. S.
Adair, H. E. Chambers, T.
Aglionby, H. A. Chelsea, Visct.
Alcock, T. Child, S.
Anson, hon. Gen. Christy, S.
Anson, Visct. Clay, Sir W.
Atherton, W. Clinton, Lord R.
Bagshaw, J. Cobbold, J. C.
Bailey, Sir J. Cockburn, Sir A. J. E.
Baines, rt. hon. M. T. Cocks, T. S.
Ball, J. Codrington, Sir W.
Baring, H. B. Coffin, W.
Baring, rt. hon. Sir F. T Coles, H. B.
Baring, T. Collier, R. P.
Baring, hon, F. Coote, Sir C. H.
Bass, M. T. Corbally, M. E.
Beaumont, W. B. Corry, rt. hon. H. L.
Beckett, W. Cowan, C.
Benbow, J. Cowper, hon. W. F.
Berkeley, Adm. Craufurd, E. H. J.
Berkeley, hon. H. F. Crossley, F.
Berkeley, hon. C. F. Cubitt, Ald.
Berkeley, C. L. G. Currie, R.
Bethell, Sir R. Dashwood, Sir G. H.
Biddulph, R. M. Davie, Sir H. R. F.
Bonham-Carter, J. Davies, D. A. S.
Booker, T. W. Davison, R.
Bouverie, hon. E. P. Denison, E.
Bowyer, G. Denison, J. E.
Boyle, hon. Col. Dent, J. D.
Bramston, T. W. Dering, Sir E.
Brand, hon. H. Drumlanrig, Visct.
Brocklehurst, J. Duckworth, Sir J. T. B.
Brotherton, J. Duff, G. S.
Browne, V. A. Duff, J.
Bruce, Lord E. Duke, Sir J.
Butler, C. S. Duncan, G.
Butt, G. M. Duncombe, T.
Butt, I. Dundas, G.
Byng, hon. G. H. C. Dundas, F.
Cairns, H. M. Dunlop, A. M.
Campbell, Sir A. I. East, Sir J. B.
Card well, rt. hon. E. Egerton, Sir P.
Cavendish, hon. C. C. Egerton, E. C.
Ellice, rt. hon. E Hume, W. F.
Kllice, E. Hutt, W.
Elliot, hon. J. E. Inglis, Sir R. H.
Esmonde, J. Jackson, W.
Euston, Earl of Jermyn, Earl
Evans, W. Johnstone, J.
Ewart, W. Johnstone, Sir J.
Fagan, W. Kendall, N.
Fielden, M. J. Keogh, W.
Fergus, J. King, hon. P. J. L.
Ferguson, Col. Kingscote, R. N. F.
Ferguson, Sir R. Kinnaird, hon. A. F.
Ferguson, J. Labouchere, rt. hon. H.
Fitzgerald, J. D. Laing, S.
Fitzroy, hon. H. Langston, J. H.
Fitzwilliam, hon. G. W. Langton, H. G.
Floyer, J. Lascelles, hon. E.
Foley, J. H. H. Lawless, hon. C.
Follett, B. S. Lawley, hon. F. C.
Forster, J. Layard, A. H.
Fortescue, C. Lee, W.
Fox, R. M. Legh, G. C.
Fox, W. J. Lemon, Sir C.
Freestun, Col. Lewis, rt. hon. Sir T. F.
Gallwey, Sir W. P. Lockhart, A. E.
Gardner, R. Loveden, P.
Gladstone, rt. hon. W. E. Lowe, R.
Gladstone, Capt. Macaulay, rt. hon. T. B.
Glyn, G. C. Mackie, J.
Goddard, A. L. Mackinnon, W. A.
Gooch, Sir E. S. M'Cann, J.
Goodman, Sir G. MacGregor, J.
Gordon, Adm. MacGregor, J.
Gore. W. O. M'Taggart, Sir J.
Gower, hon. F. L. Maddock, Sir H.
Grace, O. D. J. Malins, R.
Graham, rt. hon. Sir J. Mangles, R. D.
Greaves, E. Marjoribanks, D. C.
Greenall, G. Marshall, W.
Greene, T. Massey, W. N.
Gregson, S. Masterman, J.
Grenfell, C. W. Matheson, A.
Grey, rt. hon. Sir G. Matheson, Sir J.
Grosvenor, Lord R. Maule, hon. Col.
Grosvenor, Earl Milligan, R.
Hale, R. B. Mills, T.
Hall, Sir B. Milner, W. M. E.
Hanmer, Sir J. Milnes, R. M.
Harcourt, G. G. Michell, W.
Harcourt, Col. Molesworth, rt. hn. Sir W.
Hardinge, hon. C. S. Monck, Visct.
Hastie, A. Moncreiff, J.
Hastie, A. Monsell, W.
Hayes, Sir E. Montgomery, Sir G.
Headlam, T. E. Morgan, O.
Heard, J. I. Morris, D.
Heathcote, Sir G. J. Mostyn, hon. E. M. L.
Heathcote, G. H. Mowbray, J. R.
Heneage, G. H. W. Mure, Col.
Henley, rt. hon. J. W. Murphy, F. S.
Herbert, H. A. Noel, hon. G. J.
Herbert, rt. hon. S. Norreys, Lord
Hemes, rt. hon. J. C. Norreys, Sir D. J.
Hervey, Lord A. North, Col.
Heyworth, L. O'Brien, P.
Higgins, G. G. O. O'Flaherty, A.
Hindley, C. Oliveira, B.
Hogg, Sir J. W. Osborne, R.
Horsman, E. Owen, Sir J.
Hotham, Lord Paget, Lord A.
Howard, hon. C. W. G Paget, Lord G.
Howard, Lord E. Pakenham, E.
Hudson, G. Palmer, R.
Palmer, R. Spooner, R.
Palmerston, Visct. Stafford, Marq. of
Pechell, Sir G. B. Stephenson, R.
Peel, Sir R. Stirling, W.
Peel, F. Strutt, rt. hon. E.
Peel, Col. Stuart, Lord D.
Pellatt, A. Stuart, H.
Phillimore, R. J. Tancred, H. W.
Pigott, F. Thicknesse, R. A.
Pinney, W. Thornely, T.
Ponsonby, hon. A. G. J. Tollemache, J.
Portal, M. Townshend, Capt.
Portman, hon. W.H. B. Traill, G.
Price, Sir R. Tynte, Col. C. J. K.
Pritchard, J. Vane, Lord H.
Pugh, D. Vansittart, G. H.
Ramsden, Sir J. W. Vernon, G. E. H.
Ricardo, O. Vernon, L. V.
Rice, E. R. Villiers, rt. hon. C. P
Robartes, T. J. A. Vivian, J. H.
Rolt, P. Vivian, H. H.
Rumbold, C. E. Vyvyan, Sir R. R.
Russell, Lord J. Waddington, D.
Russell, F. C. H. Walmsley, Sir J.
Russell, F. W. Walter, J.
Sadleir, J. Wellesley, Lord C.
Sandars, G. Wells, W.
Sawle, C. B. G. Whalley, G. H.
Scobell, Capt. Whatman, J.
Scott, hon. F. Whitbread, S.
Scrope, G. P. Wigram, L. T.
Scully, F. Willcox, B. M.
Seaham, Visct. Williams, W.
Seymer, H. K. Wilson, J.
Seymour, Lord Wodehouse, E.
Shafto, R. D. Wood, rt. hon. Sir C.
Shee,W. Wortley, rt. hon. J. S.
Shelburne, Earl of Wrightson, W. B.
Shelley, Sir J. V. Wyndham, W.
Sheridan, R. B. Wyvill, M.
Smith, J. A. Young, rt. hon. Sir J.
Smith, M. T.
Smith, rt. hon. R. V. TELLERS.
Smyth, J. G. Hayter, rt. hon. W. G.
Smollett, A. Mulgrave, Earl of
List of the NOES.
Adderley, C. B. Chambers, M.
Alexander, J. Cheetham, J.
Anderson, Sir J. Christopher, rt. hn. R. A.
Aspinall, J. T. W. Cobden, R.
Bagge,W. Conolly, T.
Bailey, C. Crook, J.
Baillie, H. J. Disraeli, rt. hon. B.
Ball, E. Dod, J. W.
Bankes, rt. hon. G. Duncombe, hon. A.
Barnes, T. Duncombe, hon. W. E.
Barrow,W. H. Dunne, Col.
Bateson, T. Du Pre, C. G.
Bell, J. Farnham, E. B.
Bentinck, Lord H. Fellowes, E.
Biggs, W. Forester, rt. hon. Col.
Blackett, J. F. B. Franklyn, G. W.
Blair, Col. Freshfield, J. W.
Booth, Sir R. G. Frewen, C. H.
Bright, J. Galway, Visct.
Brisco, M. Gaskell, J. M.
Brockman, E. D. George, J.
Buck, L. W. Gibson, rt. hon. T. M.
Buller, Sir J. Y. Goderich, Visct.
Burrell, Sir C. M. Graham, Lord M. W.
Cabbell, B. B. Granby, Marq. of
Carnae, Sir J. R. Greene, J.
Greville, Col. F. Oakes, J. H. P.
Guernsey, Lord Ossulston, Lord
Hadfield, G. Otway, A. J.
Halsey, T. P. Pakington, rt. hn. Sir J.
Hamilton, Lord C. Parker, R. T.
Hamilton, G. A. Phillimore, J. G.
Hanbury, hon. C. S. B. Phinn, T.
Hawkins, W. W. Pilkington, J.
Hume, J. Pollard-Urquhart, W.
Hutching, E. J. Repton, G. W. J.
Jolliffe, Sir W. G. H. Rich, H.
Kelly, Sir F. Robertson, P. F.
Kennedy, T. Scholefield, W.
Kershaw, J. Seymour, H. D.
King, J. K. Seymour, W. D.
Knatchbull, W. F. Sibthorp, Col.
Knight, F. W. Smijth, Sir W.
Knightley, R. Smith, J. B.
Knox, Col. Smyth, R. J.
Laffan, R. M. Stafford, A.
Langton, W. G. Stanley, Lord
Laslett, W. Sturt, H. G.
Lennox, Lord A. F. Sullivan, M.
Lennox, Lord H. G. Talbot, C. R. M.
Leslie, C. P. Thesiger, Sir F.
Liddell, H. G. Thompson, G.
Locke, J. Trollope, rt. hon. Sir J.
Lockhart, W. Tudway, R. C.
Long, W. Tyler, Sir G.
Lucas, F. Villiers, hon. F.
Lytton, Sir G. E. L. B. Vivian, J. E.
Maguire, J. F. Vyse, Capt. H.
Manners, Lord G. Waddington, H. S.
Manners, Lord J. Walpole, rt. hon. S. H.
March, Earl of Warner, E.
Meux, Sir H. West, F. R.
Miall, E. Whitmore, H
Moore, R. S. Wilkinson, W. A.
Mundy, W. Wise, A.
Murrough, J. P. Woodd, B. T.
Naas, Lord Wyndham, Gen.
Napier, rt. hon. J. Wynne, W. W. E.
Neeld, J.
Neeld, J. TELLERS.
Newark, Visct. Taylor, Col.
Newport, Visct. Mandeville, Visct.

Bill read 2°