PORTUGAL.

HC Deb 11 June 1847 vol 93 cc382-469

MR. HUME

In submitting the Motion of which I have given notice, I can assure the House that I have seldom risen in my place to do what I consider a duty so unpleasant to myself. Because my object is to complain of Ministers, and to complain of their measures, on the ground that they are dangerous to constitutional government, and likely, if I can read them rightly, to lead to most disastrous consequences, not only to this country, but to the civilized world. It is necessary, I must premise, to maintain the principles on which the British Government is founded; and we are to recollect that we owe the liberties we possess to the struggle between the people and the Sovereign. We were enabled, after a long struggle, to settle among ourselves under what form of government we would live; and the Sovereign of this day owes her throne to the Revolution of that day—of the year 1688. If any monarch of Europe of that time had taken the course recently pursued by the British with regard to Portugal, where would our liberties have been? I object, then, to the interference which has taken place by our Government with the affairs of Portugal; and in doing so, I challenge, as I must challenge, the whole of their proceedings, at least the whole of the latter portion of them. The vast volume of papers we have here, consists, for the greater part at least, of hearsay news, rumours from newspapers, tittle-tattle from the different officers, reports from detachments one day, contradicted by other reports the next day. In short, instead of taking ten or twelve days, not to say more, to prepare it, I venture to say that any hon. Member, with ordinary industry, might have collated the whole contents, and sent it ready to the press in four-and-twenty hours. Sortie, perhaps, may have been frightened by the bulk of the volume from giving due consideration to the matters it contains. The really important contents might have been compressed into very few sheets indeed; and I cannot understand why or wherefore we should he loaded in this way, having our attention taxed, and our time taken up, by looking over the details of petty and trifling matters of transitory interest only in Portugal, and not at all connected with the principle which it is important that this House should keep in view, serving no end, in fact, but to cause a great loss of time. No doubt there might have been an object in this. Some desire has probably been entertained to know what the events of our interference and its success have been. This morning we have received the account of the results; and I hesitate not to say, that I think them melancholy for England. If ever a stain was cast on the honour and character of a British Government, the news of this day will cast one. I was asked by an hon. Member, on coming into the House, whether the news arrived this day would not alter my determination to bring forward the resolution; but instead of altering my determination to ask the opinion of this House on this great principle, it appears to me that the urgency of the necessity of proceeding becomes ten times stronger. The proposition I intend to submit is very simple and plain; it consists but of three lines— That in the judgment of this House, the armed interference of this Government between political parties in Portugal is unwarrantable in principle, and likely to lead to serious and mischievous consequences. As the Motion was first worded, I had set down "unwarrantable in all cases, and at all times;" but it was suggested to me that that was a very wide assumption—as if no circumstances could ever occur which might justify an interference—and therefore I have confined the Motion simply to the proceedings taken in the present conjuncture of Portuguese affairs. I hope there may be no mistake as to its meaning, and that no difficulty will be found by hon. Members in making up their minds whether such interference be or be not unwarrantable, and likely to lead to mischief. I object not only to the principle on which our interference has been based, but to the manner in which Her Majesty's Government has set about interfering. I consider that it was the duty of Ministers, before they began a measure involving consequences of such immense importance—seeing that Parliament was sitting—to have come down to this House and asked for its opinion, as to whether such measures could with propriety be adopted. When I say they are to blame, am I without a precedent? Why, even in my own time, and in a Parliament wherein I sat, I can find a precedent. Hon. Members will recollect what took place in 1826, on a very memorable occasion. It happened to he my fortune, even then, to dissent from the principle that intervention at that crisis was just. But the facts were these. Mr. Canning, on the 11th December of that year, brought down to this House a Message from the Crown, which stated— His Majesty has received an earnest applica- tion from the Princess Regent of Portugal, claiming, in virtue of the ancient obligations of alliance and amity subsisting between His Majesty and the Crown of Portugal, His Majesty's aid against an hostile aggression from Spain. And again— His Majesty makes this communication to the House of Commons, with the full and entire confidence that His faithful Commons will afford to His Majesty their cordial concurrence and support in maintaining the faith of treaties, and in securing against foreign hostility the safety and independence of the kingdom of Portugal—the oldest ally of Great Britain. A fact was there before us to deal with, as stated by Mr. Canning. There was an actual invasion of Portugal; we had treaties existing as old as 1661, when Charles II. married the Infanta of Portugal, by which we were bound to assist Portugal with troops when required; and we had the Treaty of 1703, by which Holland, England, and Portugal, became bound to assist each other, and protect Portugal against France and Spain—Franco and Spain having then a common interest and object to obtain possession of Portugal. It is quite true that that treaty did bind us, if the casus fœderis, as stated, had actually occurred; but on that occasion, although the House of Commons sanctioned the interference of our Government almost unanimously—for I think that on putting the question, there were not four individuals who cried no—we knew that the threatened irruption from Spain consisted only of refugees out of Portugal, and we knew that Spain rather allowed than commanded the intervention. Did any delay take place on that occasion? No: the Cabinet of that day—not a Liberal Whig Cabinet, but one that we used to suppose was too much attached to the Holy Alliance, from which Mr. Canning had the merit of detaching them—showed a due respect to the House of Commons, and a fit sense of the importance of having its sanction to their proceedings. On Friday, the 8th of December, the news arrived, and then Government obtained the actual information of invasion having taken place, as they considered it. On Saturday, a Cabinet Council was held, and a resolution adopted to give assistance, and, further, on Monday to send a message on the subject to the House of Commons. So that the news was received by Ministers on one day; a resolution to afford the help solicited was taken the next day; and on the first day that Parliament met thereafter a message announced that resolution to the Legislature. On Tuesday the debate took place; and Mr. Canning on that occasion declared, that if we were called upon to interfere in the internal affairs of Portugal, or any other country, without any treaty existing, or any valid claim upon us, he should be the first man in the House to refuse. Mr. Canning explained the manner in which he considered that our treaty bound us to afford assistance. I must say that what passed on that occasion reflected nothing but credit on the Administration, inasmuch as, if they were in error, the whole House of Commons, nay, both Houses of Parliament, concurred with them. The other House, on a Motion submitted by Earl Bathurst, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, adopted unanimously a similar resolution to that adopted by the House of Commons. I yielded my opinion at once, and thought I must be in the wrong, when Lord Holland—almost the only Peer who spoke on that occasion—declared that he considered our intervention was called for by the faith of treaties. Thus took place what was considered to be a necessary intervention, and it proved to be essentially useful to Portugal. We did it without setting any bad precedent, being called thereto in order to maintain the faith of treaties, and the honour and character of England; and I should be the last man in this House to urge the violation of good faith. For although temporary advantage might be obtained, depend upon it that in the long run the only safe course is to act honestly and in good faith. For us it is of immense importance that we should not, on such a subject, set a bad example. I think that on the present occasion we are setting a bad example. I am anxious, however, that the House should just hear one sentiment of Mr. Canning, before I proceed with the case. In the most distinct terms he repudiated any pretensions on the part of the British Government to interfere with the internal political arrangements of Portugal. Mr. Canning said— I have already stated—and I now repeat—that it never has been the wish or the pretension of the British Government to interfere in the internal concerns of the Portuguese nation. Questions of that kind the Portuguese nation must settle among themselves. Speaking of the grant of the free constitution, which was brought over from Portugal by Lord Stuart de Rothesay, and occasioned considerable excitement in this country, he said— Great Britain did not suggest this measure. It is not her duty, nor her practice, to offer sug- gestions for the internal regulations of foreign States. And afterwards he speaks of it as —"sanctioned in its outset by the glad and grateful acclamations of those who are destined to live under it. Now, if under the circumstances of the case, the intervention of Mr. Canning was a just and proper proceeding, what must be said of the intervention by the Government of the present day, after that sentiment of Mr. Canning's? We have no treaty, and no casus fœderis. Spain has not invaded Portugal. France has not invaded Portugal. A civil war has existed in that country for a number of months past; and, being unable to settle it, an appeal has been made to us. Those who are the aggressors have called on us for aid; and I wish, therefore, that the House should see how the civil war originated. It is impossible, however, for me to look at the manner in which this business has been carried on without complaining very much of the conduct of our negotiations with Portugal. But lest I should be supposed to throw more blame on the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Department than he deserves as a Member of the Cabinet, I must say that on looking over the whole of this volume, until I come to the 5th April, there is not one of Lord Palmerston's despatches in which I am not prepared to concur. I find that he repudiates in the strongest manner all interference, and every attempt and request for it that was made. Therefore, it appears to me that, as a Cabinet question, some overwhelming power and influence has been brought to bear on Her Majesty's Government. Evil advisers have influenced the Cabinet; a sudden change has taken place; and I therefore think on that account it is a matter of increased importance that we should arrive at the truth. I take up the question from the 6th October, 1846, when the change of Government took place, and when the despatches now laid before us begin; but I think it right to explain what that unfortunate country has been subjected to. I find that the national charter, which I am about to quote, has been violated in the grossest manner by the Queen of Portugal; and in every instance where the lives, liberties, and interests of the people are concerned, she has set the provisions of the charter at nought, and consequently has raised the nation as a nation against her. It is not, therefore, for those who enjoy the benefits of a free government to come in at the last moment, when she was about to yield, and uphold her wrong doing. It appears from the despatches that if the English Government had not interfered, the Government of Portugal would have yielded to every fair and reasonable demand. Nothing irregular was ever asked of Her Majesty; her throne was never threatened, her person or liberty never endangered, and the only demand was that she should dismiss those evil councillors who had advised Her to supersede the liberties of Her country, and should secure the Portuguese the advantage of that constitution to which they were entitled. In 1826, upon the death of John VI., the Portuguese constitution was established, and it is for the violation of the charter embodying that constitution that the people of Portugal are in arms; and if they had not taken means for resisting the arbitrary measures of the Government, I think they would have deserved to be despised and hooted by all the civilized world. I will from the papers furnished by the noble Lord (Lord Palmerston) state what did take place, and then I will ask the House whether such proceedings deserve to be sanctioned by this country. Lord Howard de Walden, on the 8th of October, when enclosing a note which he had received from the Marquess de Saldanha, notifying that the Queen of Portugal had been pleased to name him Minister of War and President of the Council, with the portfolio of Foreign Affairs ad interim, said— This change of Government had taken most people by surprise. It was known that a short time ago the Duke de Palmella was willing to transfer the Government to the hands of the Marquess de Saldanha; but it was also certain that the latter then felt that he had no force of his own, and that he should be made a mere instrument to serve the ends of the Cabralista party, by whom he would ultimately be sacrificed when it might suit their purpose. Under these circumstances, for want of a chief, the Cabralista party were unable to carry out their designs for a counter-revolution, for which they had been so long working among the troops. It appears, however, that the programme which I herewith enclose of the Septembrist party created such alarm that in the emergency the Marquess de Saldanha at last consented, though very unwillingly, to undertake the formation of a new Government. Accordingly, on Tuesday night the Duke de Palmella was summoned to the palace, was asked whether he had power to make a stand against the Septembrist party, and on an unsatisfactory reply was informed that under these circumstances he must transfer the government to other hands. Count de Bomfim, military governor of Lisbon, had also been summoned. The Duke, as well as the Count Bomfim, were then required to sign decrees already pre- pared, naming the new Government and displacing all the, military authorities in the interest of their party; and the former officers who had been displaced being already in waiting, they proceeded at once by night to take possession of their commands. The next morning the Duke de Tereeira appeared at the head of the troops in the Commercial-square, which had been previously gained over in the night. There was on the first summons hesitation on the part of some corps, but on receiving more formal orders in the name of the Queen, they acknowledged their new commanders without any display of feeling. The town is perfectly quiet, though great sullenness is observed among the people. Lord Howard do Walden says further— It is much to be regretted that this change of Government has been effected in a manner to create universally the impression of a military revolution. In my opinion it was quite unnecessary to have gone such lengths, as the country would willingly have accepted the Marquess de Saldanha in the first instance at least, as Minister, until the Cortes should decide upon a Government; but it would appear that the result of the elections being questionable, it was thought, after the appearance of the programme of the Septembristas, that the Crown was in such danger that there would be less risk by a counter-revolution than by allowing the elections to take place uncontrolled, as had been proposed by the late Government. And what did Lord Howard de Walden say further?— It is expected that the name of Marshal Saldanha, together with the Queen's proclamation, will keep the country in general quiet; and indeed the measures taken of suspending personal guarantees, and suppressing all newspapers, except that of the Government, will very much check for the moment the means for immediate agitation in the provinces; but still, considering the small military force at the disposal of the Government, and the facility with which the soldiery can be gained over to either party, I contemplate the future with great anxiety. The elements for revolution of a character dangerous to the Queen have now certainly been created; though the efforts of the party vanquished may not, in immediate result, be effective in Lisbon, they will not fail to work successfully towards serious mischief in the provinces. Lord Howard do Walden went on to say that he —"enclosed a list of the principal persons, warm partisans of the Cabrals, reinstated by the Marquess de Saldanha. I ask the House, then, is it prepared to sanction the conduct of a Minister upholding a Government, the first act of which was a violation of the charter? I have gone over the charter which is appended to the volume of papers, and I will state a few of the violations which the Ministers of the Crown of Portugal had carried into effect. Throughout the whole or greater part of these papers, however, I must first remark, those anxious to encourage the Crown and depress the popular party have made on all occasions allegations that the Miguelites were the persons to he dreaded, in spite of the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary having stated again and again that Don Miguel was in England, living in retirement, and not likely to leave England. But the effect of these acts of violence, of the unconstitutional measures of the Portuguese Government, was to unite the Miguelites and Liberals, as the only means of protecting the interests of the nation at large; and instead of rendering the difficulties of that unfortunate country fewer or less, had increased to a great degree the obstacles to the Government of the Queen of Portugal, unless she submitted to the constitution. I find by the 5th chapter of the charter that those not having an annual income of 100 milreas, from commerce or otherwise, shall not be electors. One of the first measures taken was, in defiance of this provision of the charter, to strike out in some of the parishes of Lisbon and other places the electors actually qualified, and put in their place others who were not, with the view of carrying the elections, several having been carried on a former occasion by similar means. That was one of the violations of the charter forcibly effected by Costa Cabral, who seems to be a firebrand capable of setting any country, under such circumstances, into a flame. Another provision is to the effect that "the Ministers of State shall be responsible for bribery, subornation, extortion, or other abuses of power." It turns out that there is not a practical act of subornation or other abuse of power which has not been perpetrated by those Ministers, so that the people have been deprived of protection and guarantees which the constitution gives them. There have been arrests, imprisonments, dismissals, and transportations, without the semblance of law, or interference of courts, on the very word and simple will of the Minister. I have seen to-day a person who was among those arrested: he was one of 700 political prisoners heaped together in a prison adapted to contain only 500, and escaped on the 29th April, on the disturbances at Lisbon, when the gaols were opened, and the political prisoners set free. He and others escaped; but eighty or ninety of them were butchered in the streets, though returning quietly to their houses without arms. Article 118 stated, that— The judicial power is independent, and shall be composed of judges and juries, which shall be instituted as well for civil as for criminal cases, &c. In violation of this article, many of the judges had been removed from their places. In fact, such a long catalogue of crimes had been committed, that I will not occupy the time of the House by doing more than merely alluding to them. Juries have been suspended, and the liberty of the press, although granted by this constitution, have been put down. No newspapers are allowed to he printed except under the sanction of the Government. I am surprised that the noble Lord should have inserted in the volume of papers a number of extracts from the Diario, the organ of the Government, and such trash too as they are—as if Members of Parliament had not common sense enough not to know the little value attached to extracts from a partisan newspaper. No form of justice has been observed, and the right of habeas corpus has been entirely done away with. Again, the charter said, that every citizen should have in his house an inviolable asylum, which shall not he entered without his consent. The domiciliary visits by day and night have been innumerable; the prisons have been filled thereby, and there has been no guarantee for personal safety. In the Limoeiro prison, 780 individuals, many of them respectable persons, have been looted up with felons of the worst description. So much for the Government we had taken under our protection. There are a number of other small items, to which I might call the attention of the House. I call them small, but they are of immense importance to the liberty of the subject. The administration of the Post Office has been interfered with; the letters of the people have been opened; no correspondence has been held sacred; in fact, it is scarcely possible to name a single guarantee of protection, or a single privilege of any value to a freeman, which has not been swept away. And yet we have prevented the people, driven to desperation, from doing what we ourselves had done on a former occasion—we have stepped in to prevent the formation of a constitutional Government in Portugal. That is not all; the Queen has declared herself dictator, and put an end to every court and tribunal in the country. On the 7th of April that suspension was declared; her Consort has also been appointed, contrary to law, commander-in-chief of the army, for by the Charter of 1838, he is forbidden to fill that office. Our own Ministers report that those proceedings have from day to day filled the minds of men in every corner of Portugal with alarm and terror. I will not weary the House with any further details on this point. There is scarcely any department of the Government which has been conducted as it ought to have been. There have been bribery and corruption—the levying of taxes without the consent of the law; they have sent bonds to this country similar to the bonds which were considered good claims against the Government, to be sold here, to the injury of the creditors of Portugal; they have been driven to the most desperate courses to raise money. According to the latest despatches the army is greatly in want of money; and there is no opportunity or chance of retrenchment. Every act, in fact, has been unconstitutional; and yet this country is called upon to support them. I remember the time when Lord Grey's Administration, of which the noble Lord was a Member, succeeded to power under a pledge to be the advocates of reform, retrenchment and economy carried to the utmost possible point, and above all, noninterference in the affairs of foreign nations. [Lord JOHN RUSSELL: Peace!] If we wished to he at peace, we must maintain the principle of non-interference, for that interference is one of the means by which we are most likely to he drawn in. Lord Grey in a speech made in the other House immediately before his accession to power (November 2, 1830), declared— The revolution in France has been rendered necessary by what I must call an unjustifiable attack on the liberties of the people. As an Englishman, owing the benefits which I at present enjoy to a similar measure, similarly provoked, I rejoice in the resistance of the people of France to the attack upon their liberties; and I rejoice in the character of their whole conduct, from the first moment when resistance became necessary to the expulsion of the reigning family. In such a cause resistance was necessary—was noble; and I cannot conceive a more heart-stirring scene than that of a people entering upon so holy a contest with courage worthy of the cause, and using victory, when achieved, with such unparalleled moderation. Lord Grey made use of that expression when the French had expelled Charles X., for acts not one-twentieth part so bad as those committed by the Queen of Portugal. Surely, if ever infatuation possessed any man, Louis Philippe is that man—he who owes his crown to this very cause—he who, but for the Duke of Wellington, would not have been allowed to keep it, because the Holy Alliance was then ready and anxious to interfere. The Duke or Wellington was the man who acknowledged the power of the people, and who would not allow that interference; and I believe that no other man at that time—no other man living at that moment but the Duke of Wellington—could have stopped the intervention when that revolution took place in France. Is it not therefore remarkable that a man so shrewd, keen, and careful of his own interests as Louis Philippe should be a party to join in any measure of this kind? For I understand the only excuse is, that France was going to do something, and Spain was going to do something. Let us see what they were going to do; I have not yet found it out; but we shall hear what it is they were going to do. But is it possible that any man of common sense or consideration—is it possible to believe that a man, owing his throne to the circumstances described by Earl Grey in the words I have just quoted, could be a party to the oppression of the people of Portugal? And yet what are France and England doing now? The people of Portugal are ten times more oppressed than wore the people of France. I am bound to believe, too, from all I have heard, that the leaders of the revolution in Portugal are men of the highest character. I have seen them called, in one of the newspapers, "a class of Chartists;" though where they got the name I do not know. Generally speaking, they are men of high character, possessing the confidence of the people among whom they live. I think it cruel, in the highest degree cruel—setting the policy of the question aside—that the flag of England should be used to crush those people. Lord Grey approved of the ready recognition of the new Government of France by that of the Duke of Wellington in 1830; but have we taken any step to recognise the proceedings of the popular party in Portugal. Lord Grey hoped that our recognition of the Government of France would lead to such a mutual good understanding between the two countries, as would enable them to use their joint influence practically to settle the disputes prevailing in other countries, and added, that he hoped we should not again have to repeat what he could not but consider as approaching to an interference in the internal affairs of Portugal. This was Earl Grey's language when out of office: that which he bold when in office may be learned from the speech delivered by him on the 22nd of November, 1830, in one passage of which he says— My Lords, I now repeat in office what I before stated as my opinion out of office, that the first object, interest, and duty of the British Government, ought to be to maintain peace by all means consistent with the honour of the country. Our true policy is, to maintain universal peace, and therefore non-interference is the principle—the great principle—which ought to be and will be heartily adopted by the present Administration. These were the principles on which the Government of Lord Grey was formed, and which every Administration ought to keep in view. It may be thought by the noble Lord and his Colleagues who have counselled this interference with the affairs of Portugal, that because they have taken Das Antas with 2,000 or 3,000 men, this will promote peace. Why, it is only the beginning of troubles. Is the House of Commons prepared to maintain a fleet and army to suppress insurrection in Portugal? That is a question which every man must put to himself when he considers this matter, and on this account also I deprecate in the strongest manner the proceedings that have taken place. But is that my only authority? I will beg leave to refer to an opinion expressed by the Duke of Wellington in 1833 upon the very subject of Portugal; and the House will perceive that the opinions of the public men of former days were concurrent upon the question now raised, and were diametrically opposed to the policy pursued by Her Majesty's Administration. The Duke of Wellington himself, in 1833, on the 3rd of June, moved an Address to the Crown, praying— That His Majesty would he pleased to give such directions as were necessary to enforce the observance by his subjects of His Majesty's declared neutrality in the contest now going on in Portugal. And the noble Duke, in order more strongly to impress upon the House what he meant, quoted the opinion of Lord Stowell, which was expressed in these words:— Strict neutrality is a neutrality consisting of a complete abstinence not only from interfering in warfare, but from giving any kind of assistance to one side or the other. And, further, Lord Stowell said— The practice of giving succour to either side by individual acts, is unjust to one of the parties, by depriving him, while in a state of amity with us, of the preponderance of power which he would otherwise enjoy. I beg the House particularly to remark the opinion of Lord Stowell, adopted by the Duke of Wellington, but now rejected by Her Majesty's Ministers. Lord Stowell added— No country could be released from the operation of her neutrality unless she gave notice that she would change her line of conduct. While nations remained in this situation they could not in practice act contrary to it; and if they interfered, they must do so by giving an open notice, or by a declaration of war. Sir, I ask, have we done that? Have we given open notice, or made a declaration of war? The reference to a notice contained in the opinion quoted by the Duke of Wellington reminds me that something like a notice of our intention to act in favour of one of the parties was indeed given to the Junta; but, although dated Lisbon, May 20, it was not delivered to the body to whom it was addressed until eight hours after their fleet and troops had been captured by Her Britannic Majesty's forces on the 31st of May. Have the British Government and Navy fallen so low that they condescend to entrap the unwary? Are they afraid to declare what their intentions are until the party to whom they are opposed have fallen into the trap prepared for them? Of all the proceedings which have come under my notice, this appears to be the most revolting. Lot Ministers explain, if they can, how it happened that Sir G. H. Seymour's notice, though dated the 20th of May, was not delivered to the Junta until eight hours after its fleet was captured. Surely Sir G. H. Seymour might have found some person to be the bearer of his notice. Where was Colonel Wylde, who had been so ready to report everything which was unfavourable to the constitutional party? Could not he have carried the notice to the Junta? It would be absurd to suppose that the Junta would have allowed their ships and troops to go forth if they had been aware that the British forces would capture them. It is true that the newspapers contained rumours that the British Government meant to interfere against the constitutional party; but the Junta, entertaining no suspicion that Great Britain would be guilty of so gross an act of injustice, fell into the trap which was laid for them. That act is a stain upon the British name—a stain which the youngest man amongst us will never live to see effaced. The papers before the House do not contain the Order of the Day under which the British forces acted upon that unfortunate occasion; but it must be produced. There is a short letter from the Admiral, but not the Order of the Day under which the proceeding took place. Upon the occasion of the Duke of Wellington's Motion, in 1833, Earl Grey said— We sent Admiral Parker to the Tagus with the strictest orders to enforce neutrality between the belligerent Powers; and, in consequence of those instructions, that officer manifested a strong desire, strictly, fairly, and conscientiously to observe that neutrality. Why should the British Government act a less honourable part now than in 1833? If we had landed 5,000 men in Portugal, and excluded the Spaniards from all interference, the Portuguese might have submitted with some degree of patience to the disgrace of being coerced by a strong Power like England; but it will be difficult to describe the feelings of hatred and disgust with which the entire Portuguese nation contemplate the invasion of their territory by Spanish troops. A strong feeling of animosity constantly exists between the Portuguese and Spanish nations, which in bitterness far exceeds the old border feuds between England and Scotland. The idea which now possesses the Portuguese of every class is, that they are degraded in consequence of Spaniards being allowed to overrun their country. But for Spain to do this! Spain, which at the present moment is unable to attend to its own interests—which is actually unable to carry on its Government—to think of such a Power threatening the Portuguese people would be ludicrous, if it were not for the reflection that the British Government has sanctioned the proceeding. I am inclined to believe that Louis Philippe is at the bottom of it. I beg now to call the attention of the House to one of Mr. Southern's despatches to Lord Palmerston, marked 101 in the papers, which is important, as affording the House and the public the means of judging whether the constitutional party in Portugal had just grounds for appealing to arms. Mr. Southern's despatches are written in a spirit of fairness, and on every occasion manifests a desire to devise the means of remedying the evils which afflict the unhappy country in which he was officially employed. In the letter from Mr. Southern to Lord Palmerston, dated December 29, he says, after describing the state of the parties— The elements of this dangerous species of resistance no doubt exist, but it is very dubious whether open insurrection can long be maintained before the victorious march of an army so numerous for Portugal, as that which Marshal Saldanha will be able to lead to the north. The great fear is that these forces, destitute of legitimate supplies, will, as is too much the custom of Portuguese soldiery, and especially of troops in the state of this army, he driven to live upon the country, and by their devastation and violence produce a fatal irritation among the people. The resources and means of supply from the capital, which were too limited even to keep the troops of Marshal Saldanha in a moderate supply of food only a few leagues from the capital, will diminish at every step he recedes from the centre of Government, and enters upon a country much more decidedly hostile even than the neighbourhood of Santarem. This very general and rooted hostility against the Queen's Government, as far as the inhabitants of the provinces are concerned, is based no doubt in part on a kind of passive attachment to old institutions; but it has been chiefly caused by excessive or unequal or misunderstood taxation, by the increase of the burdens on property and products, the oppression, corruption, and injustice practised in every town and village by the few individuals in the place, in whose hands all authority was placed by the late Government of the Queen, on the condition of complete submission in the choice of representatives in the Cortes. Now it behoves us, when we are called upon to give an opinion as to how far the measures of Government are proper and fitting to the occasion, to take into consideration the position of the parties in the country. I do not know this gentleman, Mr. Southern; but his letters are marked with a considerable degree of talent, and give a very good idea of the state of the country. Mr. Southern proceeds to say— While taxation has been greatly increased, while it has been imposed in unaccustomed forms and with irritating circumstances, nothing has been done to favour the development of the resources of the country. Heavy rates have been levied for the making of roads, and there is not a tolerable road in the whole country. Produce perishes on the spot, or whole districts he uncultivated and abandoned for want of an outlet, even in those parts of the country where roads might be made without difficulty. While the means of seeking a market for produce are so few, and so embarrassed by local taxation exterior commerce has been almost suffocated, not only by a system of high duties for the protection of a few manufactures, and the production of a scanty revenue, but by the high port dues in Portugal; and, what is worse, by an inquisitorial system carried on against masters of merchantmen and their crews, under pretext of preventing smuggling, which induces all persons who can do so to avoid contact with a Portuguese custom-house. These considerations will in part explain the existence of an extreme spirit of hostility against the Queen's Government. Other causes, however, have prevailed, such as the idea that the taxes, which are levied with so much difficulty, when they arrive at Lisbon, are not employed in the legitimate objects of government. In the letter 102, dated December 30, 1846, Mr. Southern said— I have the honour to enclose a copy of a decree which has been promulgated in the official journal of this morning, by which trial by jury is abolished in Portugal. The decree is supported in the unofficial part of the Diario by a declamatory article in favour of the system of legislation which formerly prevailed here, and in vituperation of the legislation and jurisprudence intro- duced into this country under the charter, as more in harmony with liberal institutions. The abolition of trial by jury undoubtedly places British subjects in Portugal on a different footing from that contemplated by Articles 17 and 18 of the Treaty of 1842, and in consideration of which the British Government was induced conditionally to give up the exorcise of the rights connected with the Conservatorial Court. By this measure, and the assumption of dictatorial authority by the Queen, under the decree of the 27th of October last, the subjects of Her Most Faithful Majesty are put entirely at the mercy of the Executive Government. It appears that our Government did not interfere to protect the rights of British subjects when they were invaded by the despotic authority of the Queen of Portugal, though they subsequently had shown such a readiness to interfere on behalf of that despotic authority. Mr. Southern stated truly, that by the assumption of dictatorial authority on the part of the Queen, the people of that country were "put entirely at the mercy of the Executive Government." And this tyrant was our dear ally and brother! "sister," I should have said; but brother or sister, the connexion was not one to be proud of. Another individual holding a distinguished position at Madrid, Mr. Bulwer, wrote a letter, dated October 27, 1846, which expresses sound opinions relative to foreign interference in the internal affairs of Portugal. The letter was addressed to M. Isturiz, who, after doing all the mischief he could in his own country, had come over here to watch the results at a distance. Mr. Bulwer's letter to M. Isturiz was as follows:—

"Madrid, October 27, 1846.

"Sir—I have to thank you for the prompt and frank explanation you have given me as to the movement of Spanish troops to the frontier of Portugal. I confess to you that I heard with much regret both of the request made by the Portuguese Government to that of her Catholic Majesty, and of your Excellency's compliance with this request, because such examples of interference, however limited, by one State in the internal affairs of another, tend generally in the long run rather to favour disorder and confusion than to promote tranquillity in the countries thus requesting or granting foreign assistance; besides affecting the independence of separate monarchies, and altering thereby the relations of Europe as now established. At the same time, it would be unjust in me not to admit that the explanation which you have given of Her Catholic Majesty's Government's intentions, and the restrictions which you impose upon its action, modify, in my opinion, though they do not destroy, the evil consequences to which I have alluded; and I shall lose no time in forwarding the correspondence which has taken place between us to Her Majesty's Government."

Mr. Bulwer forwarded copies of his corre- spondence with M. Isturiz to Lord Palmerston; and his Lordship referred to them in the following letter addressed to Mr. Bulwer, and dated London, November 11, 1846:— I have received your despatch of the 30th October, inclosing copies of a correspondence which has passed between you and M. Isturiz, with reference to the assurance which he had given you that the Spanish troops ordered to the Portuguese frontier should not, under any pretext whatsoever, enter Portugal; and I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve of the letters which you have addressed to M. Isturiz on this subject. In that letter Lord Palmerston expresses his approbation of all that Mr. Bulwer had written against foreign intervention in the affairs of Portugal. There is another despatch from Mr. Southern to Lord Palmerston, dated December 19, as follows:— I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship a translation of authentic papers, which contain a minute account of the circumstances attending the taking of the fort of Valenga by the Portuguese detachment which marched through the Spanish territory from Vigo. These instances of interference on the part of the Spanish authorities cause a very general irritation among the Portuguese people. The communications I receive to this effect from different parts of Portugal are very numerous, and prove to me, in the most decisive manner, that this kind of aid produces in the end considerably more evil than good to the Queen's cause. I beg the House to mark that this is the opinion of a public officer left on the spot. Mr. Southern goes on to say— It is rapidly giving a national colour to the present contest, and may be said to have been one of the proximate causes of the resuscitation of Miguelitism in those parts of the country, as it also undoubtedly tends to draw nearer the insurgents in the Minho and Tras-os-Montes to the adherents of the permanent but dormant cause of Carlism on the north-east frontiers of the two countries. If the state of feeling described in Mr. Southern's letter was the result of trifling interference by the Spaniards, what must be the feelings of the Portuguese people towards us, now that we had captured their ships, and upwards of 2,000 of their troops? Looking through the documents in the book before us, I say no hon. Member can contend that the course taken by the Ministers has not added to the perplexities of the case, and increased the difficulty of bringing the affairs of Portugal to a satisfactory settlement. But I must except from that censure the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton, up to a certain time; for the noble Lord, in a despatch dated No- vember 26, being in answer to one received from Mr. Southern, said— Your despatch of the 19th instant has been received at this office; and Her Majesty's Government have seen with much regret, from the contents of that despatch, that there was not, at the time when you wrote it, any prospect of an early termination of the civil war which has broken out in Portugal. I have, however, to instruct you to take every opportunity of impressing upon the Portuguese Government the urgent expediency of endeavouring to bring that war to a speedy termination, by some amicable arrangement with the leaders of the discontented party. It appears from the information which Her Majesty's Government have received, that the greater part of Portugal is in a state of insurrection against the Government;"— (I beg the House to observe that expression, "the greater part of Portugal is in a state of insurrection against the Government." The despatch proceeds)— —"and that a considerable portion even of the regular army has taken part with the discontented; that the strong position of Santarem is in their hands; and that Marshal Saldanha with the Queen's force is not strong enough to recapture that important place. It behoves, therefore, the Portuguese Government well to consider, first, what are the questions really at issue between the Government and the great body of the nation; and, secondly, what prospect there is that the Government can put down the insurrection by force of arms, and succeed in preventing it from bursting out again. Now, Sir, I ask the noble Lord to-night what security there is now against the insurrection breaking out again? The reasons assigned in this despatch appear to be fully as applicable now. The noble Lord's despatch goes on— It seems to Her Majesty's Government to be very doubtful whether the Portuguese Government is strong enough to put this insurrection down. The military force now at their command appears to be insufficient for that purpose; and as no reinforcements can be drawn from the revolted districts, any sources of fresh supply must be extremely scanty; while, on the other band, any defection among the troops at present faithful to the Queen, would at once decide the contest in favour of the other side; but a prolonged contest would be ruinous to the country, and an early defeat would be most dangerous to the authority of the Queen. The practical question, then, is, whether the Queen can, consistently with the dignity and security of the Crown, consent to any arrangement which would be satisfactory to the nation, and would put an end to the civil war. That is a wise and just principle. The despatch goes on— Her Majesty's Government are not sufficiently informed of the particular points in dispute to be able to give an opinion, or even to offer specific suggestions, on the matter; but you are instructed earnestly to press upon the Government, and, if you should have an opportunity of so doing, upon the Court, that the Queen could of course feel no objection to give to the nation the most distinct and binding pledges, that it is Her Majesty's intention to govern according to constitutional forms, and in a constitutional spirit; and the best assurance and proof which Her Majesty could give of such an intention would he the appointment of an Administration consisting of men who, while on the one hand they should deserve to be trusted by the Crown, should on the other hand possess the confidence of the nation. Unless some such arrangement as this can be made, and unless it is accompanied by a general amnesty for all political offences connected with the late outbreak, it is much to be feared that matters may take a turn which all well-wishers to the Royal Family of Portugal would most deeply deplore. You will make the contents of this despatch known to Colonel Wylde, who will consider it as equally addressed to himself; and you will also communicate it to Sir William Parker. The British Government must abstain from taking any other part in this civil war than that of a friendly mediator, desirous, by the employment of good offices, to heal the differences now unhappily prevailing be-between the Crown and a part of the nation in Portugal; and any endeavours which either you or Colonel Wylde, or Sir William Parker, may be able to make for the accomplishment of that purpose, will receive the approbation of Her Majesty's Government. Now, I ask what change can have come over the minds of Her Majesty's Government since the date of that despatch? I fear I trespass too much upon the patience of the House; but I request their indulgence while I read one more extract on this subject from a despatch of the noble Lord to Mr. Bulwer, dated January 4:— I have to instruct you to state to the Spanish Government, that it is now pretty well ascertained that the Miguelite movement in Portugal has no support from any respectable or leading persons connected with the Miguelite party in Portugal; and that many persons suspect that it has been secretly encouraged by those who thought it might afford a pretext for foreign interference, in the civil dissensions now existing in Portugal; and, consequently, the Miguelite movement cannot be considered by Her Majesty's Government as forming any justification whatever for an interference by Spain in the internal affairs of Portugal. The noble Lord had good information on this point, which was subsequently confirmed; and I believe the noble Lord was perfectly correct in the view he took. Indeed, that he was so, is shown by a despatch from Mr. Southern to Lord Palmerston, dated the 10th of January, in which he says— I have the honour to inform your Lordship that Marshal Saldanha is still at Coimbra, and where he proposes to remain several days longer, in order to re-establish the authorities of the Government, and otherwise organize the country, that his resources may not be intercepted in his rear on his proceeding further north. It will probably be the seventeenth of this month before the Marshal arrives in front of Oporto. And further on he says— Lisbon is perfectly tranquil, with the exception of the natural sensation caused among the lower classes by the continual pressing for soldiers, which still goes on; and among the higher class by the numerous imprisonments lately made amongst the representatives of the principal Miguelite families in Lisbon. It appears that some suspicion has been attached to them in consequence of letters intercepted from persons at Braga, and addressed to them. I understand they are not charged with any act, but are to be immured as a matter of precaution, which is the favourite system here for maintaining order and preserving the peace. Already every prison in Lisbon is full to overflowing with persons supposed to be attached to the party of the insurgents, and who have generally been arrested merely as known political conversationists in that sense, or on information and denouncements. The families of the nobility considered as Miguelite in Lisbon, have taken no part in any political questions in this country since the deposition of Dom Miguel, and have been remarkable for the extreme quietness and respectability of their deportment. It is possible that the Government may be now under some apprehensions of their favouring the idea of a union between the Miguelite and Septembrist parties against the Queen; but I do not believe they have any grounds for suspecting them of having taken any part in promoting so discreditable an alliance. The persons of this class already in prison are—Dom Joao Vieira Tovar de Albuquerque, brother of Count Mollelos; Viscount Balsemao; Dom Christovao Manoel de Vilhena, nephew of the Duke of Saldanha: Antonio Lucio Tavaros Maggesi, son of General Maggesi;"— and so on through a long list of names of the principal nobility. Probably I may i have failed in properly setting forth what I intended—the causes of complaint on the part of the people, and against our interference; and I will therefore mention one or two particulars. By the constitution from which the Queen of Portugal derives her rights, it is laid down in Article 15, sections 8 and 9, that to the Cortes, the national Parliament one, belongs the power of granting or refusing permission of entrance into the kingdom of foreign land and sea forces. The British Government, therefore, by countenancing any such introduction, supports a violation of that charter, and gives to the Portuguese people great and just ground for complaint. What will these men think of the Liberals of England? There is one act of violence which I omitted to state, but which ought to be specially remembered. On the 3rd of November last the old decree of August, 1833, was called into force. It is as follows:— Taking into consideration that in the present circumstances it is highly necessary to consult public security, and deliver as soon as possible the Portuguese nation from the horrors of civil war with which a wicked faction pretend to annihilate it, I have been pleased to order, in the name of the Queen, as follows:— Art. 1st. The ecclesiastics or laity apprehended with arms in their hands, and likewise the military officers commanding irregular forces of any denomination, or who might have joined them, shall be immediately shot. With that end the commanding officer of the troops who capture them will form a court-martial, composed of three members, which having heard verbally the criminals, will give final sentence, the execution of which will only depend on the same commanding officer, if said officer deems it convenient. The moment that decree was known to the British officers, remonstrances were made against it, and the noble Lord sent a despatch generally condemning this course. There is another circumstance which marks the character and spirit of the faction which promulgated this decree. When Bomfim was defeated at Torres Vedras, and taken prisoner, together with thirty or forty officers, they were considered to have laid down their arms with the honours of war, and they were allowed to wear their swords. But when they expected to be placed on parole they were shipped off to the coast of Africa, to the penal settlement of Angola, a most unhealthy spot. The noble Lord remonstrated, and called the attention of the Portuguese authorities to the injustice of the proceeding; but they did not care a fig for the noble Lord, and they went on their own way. Those officers were crammed on board a sailing vessel, so small and close that they could not have arrived at the place of their destination without disease being produced among them. The captain of that vessel, however, showed more humanity than his employers, for when he found who his passengers were, he said that when he had consented to take so many on board he was under the impression that they were criminals, probably accustomed to such a mode of transhipment, and he had no idea that they consisted of noblemen and gentlemen of rank, convicted of no offence unless a political one. There was the certificate of a captain and surgeon as to the effect of the confinement of the prisoners on board of this vessel. But, nevertheless the prisoners were sent off, and are now, if they are still alive, suffering at Angola. I really fear I am wearying the House; but I have still to request their attention to some further passages from these documents, and I will now read from a despatch addressed by the noble Lord to Sir Hamilton Seymour, being No. 212 in the papers, and dated the 5th of April:— Her Majesty's Government have taken into their deliberate consideration the application which the Government of Portugal has made to the Powers who were parties to the Treaty of Quadruple Alliance in 1834, for assistance under the stipulations of that treaty; and I have to instruct you to state to the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs, that after the most attentive examination of the grounds upon which that applicaation has been founded, Her Majesty's Government cannot persude themselves that either the letter or the spirit of the Quadruple Treaty can justly be deemed applicable to the state of things now existing in Portugal. The Treaty of 1834 was concluded for two purposes. The first purpose was to put an end to a war in regard to the succession of the Crown of Portugal, which had then been waged for some time between the Emperor Don Pedro, who contended for the rights of Her present Majesty Maria II., and the Infante Don Miguel, who had usurped the throne. The second purpose of that treaty was of a similar kind, namely to expel from the Peninsula the Infante Don Carlos, who disputed with Her present Majesty Isabella II. the succession to the Crown of Spain. Both Don Miguel and Don Carlos were at the time within the territory of Portugal, and at the head of troops armed and organized for the purpose of supporting by force the pretensions of those two princes. Questions of disputed successions have always been deemed matters which might justly be considered as involving the political interests of foreign States; and in such questions, wherever arising, the Powers of Europe have from time to time, according as their interests impelled them, held themselves at liberty to take an active part. Spain and Portugal bad in 1834 a common interest in regard to those matters; and Great Britain and France thought it also conformable with their political views to unite with Spain and Portugal for the expulsion of the two Infantes from the Peninsula. But when both the Infantes were finally so expelled, the letter of the stipulations of the treaty and of its additional articles was, as regards armed interference, in the affair of the Peninsula, entirely and completely fulfilled. If, however, either Don Miguel should re-appear in Portugal, or Don Carlos in Spain, with a view to put forward again, and support by force of arms their respective pretensions, the spirit of the Quadruple Treaty would certainly be applicable to such a case; and it would be fitting that the Four Powers who were parties to that Treaty should, in such an event, enter into concert with a view to frame now articles applicable to what might be the then existing state of things. But Don Miguel is not in Portugal, nor has there been any insurrection worthy of account in his name, and in support of his pretensions to the Crown. The civil war which has now unhappily for nearly six months afflicted Portugal has not sprung from the pretensions of Don Miguel, nor did it originate with his partisans; it arose from very different causes, and among a very different political party. The contest does not turn upon the question who shall be the Sovereign of Portugal, but upon the question who shall be the responsible Ministers of the Crown in Portugal, and by what principles of administration the country shall be governed. I defy any Member of this House to state the case more fairly and clearly than the noble Lord has done in this despatch. The noble Lord goes on to say— These questions are widely different from questions of dynasty and succession. These questions are purely domestic in their bearing, and with them Foreign Powers, except in very extreme cases, cannot be entitled to interfere. And although it is certainly laid down by writers on the law of nations, that when civil law is regularly established in a country, and when the nation is divided into conflicting armies and opposing camps, the two parties in such war may be dealt with by other Powers as if they wore two separate communities, and that such other Powers may take part with one side or the other, according to their sympathies and interests, just as they might in a war between separate and independent nations; yet the cases in which such interference would be justifiable are rare; and it is better and safer in general to leave each nation to decide for itself upon questions which relate to its own internal organization and interests. If, therefore, on the one hand, Her Majesty's Government do not think themselves justly called upon, in virtue of the stipulations of the Quadruple Treaty, to interfere in the civil war now going on in Portugal, neither on the other hand do they deem it consistent with the general principles which have invariably guided the policy of Great Britain in regard to such matters to afford unconditionally to the Queen of Portugal direct assistance for the purpose of coercing that part of the Portuguese nation which is now in armed resistance to Her Majesty's authority. Sir, the whole of that despatch, dated 5th April, contains principles which I greatly approve; and I deeply regret to see any change in a departure from them. A grosser violation of the sound principles propounded in that document could not by possibility be perpetrated, than that which is comprised in the act of taking such a number of men into captivity without any declaration of war, and without the slightest intimation, on the part of the British Government, that such a proceeding was in contemplation. It is a proceeding in respect of which I apprehend that there cannot be the least difference of opinion in this House. But the outrage on the nonintervention principle was not confined to this act gross as it is. The principle was again most flagrantly violated, when, not content with making the forces of the Junta captive, and imprisoning them at Fort St. Julian, we even went the length of assuming the command over that fort. Sir William Parker declares that the fort must be delivered over to the British, who have already landed their marine force and taken possession of the fort and of the prisoners as well. That is the second violation of the non-interference principle of which we have been guilty. I understand—and I am willing to give the Government the benefit of the admission—that the prisoners are treated with every consideration, and that no complaints of maltreatment have been made by any of them. It is possible that Sir William Parker may justify his occupation of the fort, and his assumption of its command, on the ground that he wished, by taking the sole supervision into his own hands, to prevent undue severity. That may have been the motive of the gallant Admiral; but his act is not on that account the less a violation of the non-interference principle to which the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Department professes to be so much attached. I feel that I am scarcely justified in trespassing at such length on the attention of the House. I do think that I have made out a case of gross and inexcusable violation of the principle of non-intervention. I have shown that in our own country we have ever claimed the right, and exercised it unrestrictedly, of managing our own affairs; and I have ventured to advocate for the people of another land the same liberty that we prize so dearly in our own. I have spoken strongly on this question, be-cause I feel deeply, and because I see no prospect for the preservation of the world's peace if such principles as have on the present occasion actuated our policy are to be adhered to. If Russia, Prussia, and Austria were to send an army next month into Paris to restore the old regime there, and to reinstate the ancient dynasty, we could say nothing against it. We would he powerless to resist, for our own conduct on former occasions in interfering in the affairs of other nations would be cited, and very fairly so, as a precedent against us; and so our remonstrances would be wasted. I confess I am at a loss to think where all this is to end. If you want interference, why did not you interfere to prevent Mexico from being overrun by the Americans? Cowards, they say, are over bold in attacking the weak and defenceless. We would not dare to attempt such interference in the case of Prussia, Russia, or Austria; but we do not hesitate to undertake it in the case of a weak State like Portugal, and all he-cause, forsooth, she happens to be our oldest ally. That appears to be the great reason for our interference—our exclusive justification; and, indeed, I will say that a more amusing motive for persecution I never heard of. I, for one, most emphatically protest against it. Having been one of those who approved of the policy of the Duke of Wellington when the revolution took place in France, and having also approved of the policy which this country pursued with reference to the revolution in Belgium, I conceive that I should not he acting consistently with those principles to which I have invariably declared my devoted attachment, if I were to he a silent witness of such transactions as have recently obtained in Portugal the sanction of the British flag. The course which we adopted in the cases of the French and Belgian revolutions had my approval, because I felt that we were acting consistently with that principle in virtue of which we hold the tenure of liberty in this country ourselves—the principle that every people should be allowed to he the best judges of their own affairs. If that principle is to hold good in our own case, and in the cases of France and Belgium, why should we deny it to that of Portugal? Shall it be said that we, who ourselves enjoy the benefit of the principle, shall deny it to other nations? If we take upon us to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations, what is to protect us from similar aggressions on the part of others? If we will insist on interfering in the internal affairs of Portugal, why should not Portugal, in her turn, interfere with us, and lay hands on Ireland in the event of any civil commotion arising in these countries? Believe me, the principle we have established is fraught with danger. I know no limits that can be assigned to its disastrous consequences. It is because I am myself the friend of peace that I attach so much importance to those proceedings. I trust the House of Commons will not hesitate to express its disapproval of them. If it do not, farewell to the rights and liberties of this country. I have no hope for England if we be so dastardly as not to declare fearlessly the opinions which we hold honestly. It is with these feelings that I move this resolution. I make this Motion with regret; for I am sorry that the occasion for it should have arisen, and sorry to cast censure on those with whom I am in the habit of acting; but I should not be true to my duty if I were to act otherwise than I am acting. If you can, as English freemen, conscientiously approve of the proceedings of the Portuguese Government—if you think that the Sovereign of this country may discharge Parliament at will—alter the mode of the elections—crush the liberty of the press—make Judges subservient to the caprice of a Minister—and do other arbitrary acts of a similar tendency—I want not your votes; but I do expect a fair and unbiassed expression of opinion on the part of those who value the blessings of freedom, and would do unto others as they would wish to be done by.

LORD H. VANE

admitted the consistency with which the hon. Member for Montrose had maintained the principle of non-interference, and stated that he agreed with the general principle; but there were cases of exception to it, to be justified by special circumstances. He believed that the maintenance of the constitution of Portugal would be secured by the very conduct pursued. An examination of the despatches now before the House informed them that the diplomatic agents had all expressed themselves in the quarters to which they were accredited as opposed to interference. Mr. Southern, in the early part of the negotiations, had laid down a very just principle on that point. Mr. Bulwer, at Madrid, in a conversation with the Count Thomar, stated that the British Government did object to interference; and on being requested to interfere, refused to do so. It was signified to our Minister that, under the circumstances, France and Spain were likely to unite. France, he admitted, did not wish to act in opposition to England; but in the position of Spain it was in the highest degree probable that the Government of that country would adopt the principle of intervention. She had already advanced her troops to the frontiers; and though an antipathy, in many respects, existed between Portugal and Spain, yet, as nothing occurred in the one country without having its effect in the other, there was every reason why Spain should watch with distrust the events then in progress in Portugal. The hon. Gentleman assured the House that there was no cause for fear, inasmuch as there was no Miguelite party abroad; but Mr. Southern, in his despatches, clearly entertained a different apprehension: he alluded to the circumstance of the general belief, and he remarked that that must have a very considerable effect in Spain. The noble Lord (Lord Palmerston), it was true, had declared that the Quadruple Treaty of 1834 was at an end, because it had accomplished the objects for which it had been entered into: but, still doubts were entertained on the other side of the Channel. M. Guizot, in one of his despatches, raised the question as to whether or not that treaty was still in existence, when alluding to the fact that some Miguelite generals were in the insurgent ranks, and that they were probably looking to the anarchy which would ensue to take steps to attain their own ends. It was to prevent the effect of such a state of things in Spain that the Spanish Government felt the necessity would hereafter arise, without reference to the Quadruple Treaty, of deciding upon a very different intervention from that which was now taking place. That actual intervention might be open to some of the objections made to it by the hon. Member; but the Junta had now surrendered, though he did not know in what way, and he had only the newspapers to rely upon; and he could not but deem it fortunate that this was the result of our interference, and that the Junta should in this wav have submitted in the presence of that allied Power, with whom it would have been impossible for them to contend with anything like equality. What, in fact, had been the real character of that intervention? The hon. Gentleman had detailed undoubtedly some very arbitrary acts on the part of the Queen of Portugal. That she had been guilty of very arbitrary conduct, proving the badness of her government and the weakness of her administration, he did not deny; and he was not at all surprised that, having pursued such a policy, public indignation had been excited, and that a popular party had arisen. The British Government, however, were not her apologists; they had acted in the first instance only as mediators, and when entering upon that course there was ground for the confident anticipation that such mediation of itself would have been successful. The British Government, in his opinion, were fully justified in what they had done. They had taken up a perfectly impartial position; and the terms they offered were such as would in no respect have favoured the Queen to the injury of the popular cause. The first article of the Treaty offered was a full and general amnesty for all political offences committed since the beginning of October last; and an immediate recall of all persons who, since that time, had been sent out of Portugal for political reasons. He agreed with the hon. Member that the breach of faith on the part of the royal forces, in sending prisoners of war to the coast of Africa, had not afforded much reason for reliance on the promises of Her Majesty in future; but, so far as concerned the English mediation, this article was fair and impartial. The second article was an immediate revocation of all the decrees which had been issued since the beginning of October last, and which infringed upon or conflicted with the established law and constitution of the kingdom. If, therefore, this mediation had been successful, there would have been full justice done to the Junta; and all those acts of which the hon. Member complained would have been effectually revoked. Every possible security had been taken that the Queen should not have the power, if she had the inclination, to resume that form of government which had previously existed. The people, had the terms offered by the English agent been acted upon, would have had the means of sending their own representatives to the Cortes, and so securing the required reformations and a Government acting in accordance with the real necessities of the nation. And, in judging of the propriety of the course pursued by the noble Lord, they must remember that if the Miguelites, subsequent to the success of the insurgents, had become possessed of power, there would inevitably have been a Spanish interference. And what would have been the consequence of such an interference, if not limited by the obligations of the protocol signed by the Four Powers? A Spanish army would have marched to accomplish a particular purpose, and would have taken the means to ensure the predominance of an exclusively Spanish policy; while now we had the means of regulating the operations of that army, and possessed a guarantee against any such thing as a conquest of the country. Supposing that from a fastidious over-squeamishness England had held aloof as a spectator, and that Spain had of necessity interfered, the certain result would have been that in the end we should, however desirous, have been unable to rescue Portugal from that species of foreign invasion from which, at former periods of her history, we had preserved her. He trusted, with his hon. Friend, whatever had been the precise nature of the termination to the events in Portugal, that when they were in the possession of further and more ample accounts, they would be found to differ in some degree from the representations in the newspapers, from which alone, so far, they had been enabled to gather any information. He trusted it would be found that those Spanish troops which seemed to have entered Portugal, would, by this time, have withdrawn beyond the frontier. The hon. Gentleman declared, that in doing what had been supposed to he our duty, we had committed a violation of the Portuguese constitution. It was sometimes necessary to violate a constitution, in order that they might preserve it; and there had existed that necessity in this instance. It could never he contemplated in any constitution that an intervention would at any time he required; an intervention, however, would sometimes he called for; and, though a semi-species of war, the justification must be looked for in the attendant circumstances. He contended that the circumstances in this case had not only justified but demanded our intervention. The hon. Gentleman might maintain the opinion that there was no danger of destruction to Portugal, and little cause for concluding that there would have been a Spanish invasion or a French interference, independent of the assistance of England; hut he could not coincide in that opinion. He thought there had existed all those dangers, and he was confident that had we not interfered when we did, the necessity would afterwards have arisen of interfering in a much more emphatic manner. Instead of keeping up a force of 300 marines on the coast, we might have had to land an army; and such a proceeding would hardly have squared with the views of the hon. Gentleman, who of course would have objected to the expense. All the facts were not yet before the House; and events might yet occur supporting his argument, and affording a still more decisive justification of the Government. There had been a choice of evils, and the Government had adopted the least dangerous alternative. England first appeared as a mediator; the success of the effort did not answer the expectations which had been formed; and then, contrary to all the hopes of the British agents, and contrary to all the wishes of the noble Lord, intervention became absolutely necessary. He considered, therefore, that a case had been made out absolving the Government from the charge or suspicion of wanton interference; and the despatches before the House declared to the world that the principle of non-intervention was that on which they desired always to proceed. The less this country interfered the better; but considering our vast commercial relations, which extended to every country in the world, and with our ships in every harbour, it was impossible to say that we ought never, in any circumstances, to interfere with foreign matters, or that we should on all occasions remain passive spectators of passing events. It was perfectly impossible for a great country like this, mixed and bound up as her interests were with those of so many various nations, and bound as she was by solemn treaties of ancient obligations, not to find herself closely connected with those countries in their general relations; and though he held that they could not in those circumstances always steer clear of foreign interference, still he held the great principle of non-intervention should be maintained. With these views he felt himself constrained to oppose the resolution which had been proposed by the hon. Gentleman.

[No Member rising to address the House, there were loud calls for Lord Palmerston, and "Question!" and the gallery was cleared; but immediately afterwards]

MR. M. MILNES

rose and said, although he did not entirely concur in all that had been said by the noble Lord who had just sat down, yet he considered his speech to be an effective reply to that of the hon. Member who opened the debate. He nevertheless might be permitted to add a few words to the speech of the noble Lord. He contended that it would not be wise for this country to lay down any general rules by which it should be restrained from interfering with foreign countries in cases of emergency. If they had entirely, absolutely, and universally reprobated the principle of interference with the affairs of foreign countries, we should at the present moment have no Portuguese constitution about which to be talking; we should have no Queen of Portugal whose rights could be the subject of defence. If the principle of the hon. Member for Montrose was really just, that under no circumstances should this country interfere with foreign countries, he would ask the hon. Member where now would have been the constitutional liberty, such as it was, of Portugal; where would have been the constitution of Spain; whore would have been the constitution of Greece, with all those efforts which had been made by that people to establish themselves under a free, constitutional system, and in which efforts they had succeeded chiefly by the interference of this country? If they were to admit that this country had absolutely no right whatever to interfere, we should have no subject for the present discussion. In all probability the two kingdoms of the Peninsula would now have been under the sway of an absolute monarchy; and, instead of having to find fault with Coletti or Mavrocordato, we should have to regret the continuance of Greece under the semi-barbarous sway of the Ottoman Court. But he contended that the interference of England in Portugal, so far from being unacceptable to the people of England, had been the reverse. He believed that that interference had been in strict conformity with the principles of constitutional liberty. He believed that we owed it as a debt to the human race to extend as far as we could those principles of self-government which we ourselves enjoyed. He did not believe that any intervention on the part of England with the affairs of foreign countries would be found fault with by the people of England, if the object of that intervention was the establishment of constitutional principles in those countries. Starting, therefore, from these premises, he did believe that the interference of the noble Viscount (Viscount Palmerston) on the present occasion had tended in a great degree either to establish or to confirm constitutional liberty in Portugal. If he believed, on the other hand, that the intention of the noble Lord was to establish or confirm despotic authority in that country in the least degree, or that such would be the result of his interference, there was no Member in that House prepared to offer a stronger, firmer, or more undeviating opposition to the noble Lord than himself. It was because he believed that this intervention of England in Portuguese affairs would tend to the extension of constitutional liberty, whatever appearances the hon. Member for Montrose might attempt to put upon that intervention, and because he really believed that what we had done was the best that, under the difficult circumstances of the case, could have been done, he was prepared to support the Government on this occasion. The history of this matter did not commence with the blue book before them. Large as it was, it formed but a part of the historical events of Portugal. The man must know very little of human nature and history who was not aware that the blessings of self-government could not be enjoyed by a people without great schooling. When hon. Gentlemen complained of the effects of constitutional liberty in that country, and said how different it was from what might be expected under a pacific system of absolute government, he (Mr. Milnes) was not shaken in his conviction that whatever appearance of difficulties there might be, these were only necessary steps to be taken, necessary difficulties to be gone through, and necessary responsibilities to be encountered, and that it was only by that means that that people, or any other people, could attain to that state of self-government which this and a neighbouring country now enjoy. Therefore he thought it was utterly unbecoming to say that the difficulties which had arisen on the subject of the Portuguese Government did in any way imply the unfitness of that people for constitutional liberty. Nevertheless that those difficulties had been very great, that the Constitutional Throne had great difficulties to contend with, no person could deny. Indeed they could have no right to suppose, in a country where the constitutional principle was so new, and where the Sovereign was so inexperienced, that they could accomplish at once all the objects in view, or that the wheels of the constitutional government could go round with that regularity which they witnessed in this country. There had been in Portugal a very powerful aristocratic party, who had attempted, as had been the case in other countries, to obtain aristocratic advantages, and in a certain degree to limit the power of the Crown. On the other hand there had been a democratic party who had struggled to abolish hereditary peerage, and in some degree to assimilate the Government of Portugal to that of Prance. Now, he thought that in this case we had no right to judge very severely the attempts of the contending parties. There had been manifested unwillingness on the part of the Portuguese Sovereign to submit to those restraints which constitutional principles justly imposed upon her. No doubt it was the desire of this country, and of all those who wished well to Portugal, that the Crown of Portugal should really understand that it was to its real interest to keep its powers within constitutional limits, and that it ought in justice to submit to the wishes of the majority of the people of Portugal. It was no doubt their desire that the Crown should understand that it would be for its real interest not to do any act which might lead to or encourage any of those factions which had distracted Portugal. But if we supposed that in a country like Portugal, the Sovereign of which was very inexperienced, those constitutional privileges which we enjoyed should be at once obtained, we should prove ourselves to be very little experienced either in men or in history. He admitted that the infractions of constitutional liberty in Portugal had not been all on one side. The Constitution of Portugal, as granted on the 29th of April, 1826, had since undergone a very considerable change. A very great democratic change was made in it, by which the influence of the Crown had been for some time, so to say, completely defeated. Another reaction took place, in which the Crown gained the ascendancy. Those reactions were accompanied by circumstances on the one side and on the other which in this country we should regard with very great horror and disgust. The case which they had now to consider was the Administration of the Duke of Palmella, in October, 1846, when he was superseded by what might be called the ultra-Tory party of Portugal, when the Marquess of Saldanha was called in the place of the Duke of Palmella to the administration of affairs. That change was brought about under circumstances of apparent violence and venality, such as this country must have observed with great regret; but he thought the House would perceive that there was something connected with that change which might fairly create a suspicion on the part of the Crown. The Opposition part of the Chambers at that time met, and drew up a programme of principles which they agreed among themselves should be maintained by the deputies in the Cortes; that was to say, it was understood that all persons returned on the liberal side should conform themselves to that programme. Now, he would merely observe, that that programme anticipated very great changes in the constitution. He would say nothing further upon it, for that was a subject we had no right to interfere with. Considerable changes were to be effected in the original charter of the constitution by that programme. For instance, one change proposed was, that the deputies should meet to confer as often as it might be deemed expedient. Again, the ratification of treaties was to receive the previous sanction of the Cortes; and no public office was to be filled hy any party that had not by examination been found to be properly qualified for the office. Now, he believed that that programme was a most unconstitutional act; it was an act that it would be impossible to perpetuate in this country or in France, or any other where constitutional principles were firmly established. That act brought about a violent reaction on the part of the Crown. What was the consequence, when the Marquess of Saldanha was proclaimed Minister of the Crown? The Marquess of Saldanha was appointed Minister on the 6th of October; and on the 11th of that month a Council was held, by which the Conde das Antas was elected President. So that he hoped the House would understand that there had been illegality on one side as well as on the other; all he wanted to prove was, that the illegality and the violation of the charter were not all on one side, but that the Septembrist party had just as much inclination to break the charter, and depart from constitutional government, as was exhibited on the part of the Crown. They were not to consider this from the beginning as the infraction of the constitutional principle on the one side, and the resistance of the popular principle on the other; but it partook of that confusion of political principles in which both parties were considerably in the wrong. It would be most tedious to the House who had [holding up the blue book] this interesting volume in their hands, to make any general comment upon it. He would merely direct their attention to what he thought bore most on the subject of debate, namely, the conduct of the English Government and the English officials in this matter; and he was glad to hear the hon. Member for Montrose bear that testimony in which they must concur—with respect to the admirable spirit which pervaded the despatches of Mr. Southern. The contest began on the part of the Junta, he must say, with great dignity and moderation. It appeared from a letter of Mr. Southern, that he had ascertained that no hostile demonstration was made by them against her Most Faithful Majesty's throne, but that the persons engaged had introduced the Queen's name in all their acts, and declared her Majesty to be in a state of compulsion. But behind this moderate party of the Junta, there grew up a party of a very different kind: some of them were violent and some of them were desperate men, who, perhaps, caring little for the political part of the matter, threw themselves energetically into the contest, and had all through acted with much coercion on the Junta themselves. It was impossible to see that the actions of the Junta had not been free in this matter; but that if they could carry out what they desired, they would have acceded much earlier than they had done to the terms proposed. He would not detain the House with any details, but refer to a correspondence between Mr. Southern and Lord Palmerston, from which it was quite clear that the Court of Portugal at that time was entirely disinclined to any constitutional arrangement, but looked forward either to a party contest, or intended to demand the intervention of Foreign Powers. It would then have been perfectly right and just for them to give the Portuguese Government advice in that matter; but to have proceeded any further at that time was beside their province. That was strongly felt by the noble Lord opposite. They would find in a despatch from Lord Palmerston to Sir H. Seymour, in the month of February, the following statement:— But however desirous Her Majesty's Government may be to see an end put to the civil war which is now wasting the resources, paralysing the industry, and destroying the social happiness of Portugal, yet in a civil dissension of such a kind, touching the internal affairs of an independent State, the British Government can only interfere by moral agency, and in one of two ways. First, Her Majesty's Government, as the organ of a Power bound to Portugal by the ties of interest and by the obligations of treaty, might offer its-good offices, as a friendly channel of communication between the Lisbon Government and the Junta of Oporto, with a view to convey from the one to the other any propositions which might be calculated to bring about an accommodation, leaving each of the two parties to form its own decision upon the propositions made by the other; and Her Majesty's Government have already authorized Colonel Wylde to declare himself ready to undertake this duty. But, secondly, if the Lisbon Government and the Oporto Junta should each agree to refer the matters in difference between them to the decision of Great Britain, Her Majesty's Government would cheerfully accept the task thus imposed upon them, and would use their utmost endeavours to settle those matters in a just and permanent manner, with all due regard to the dignity of the Crown on the one hand, and to the constitutional liberties of the nation on the other. It was clear that, up to that time, the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Department did not think himself competent to interfere in this matter; and so long as there was any hope of a constitutional arrangement between those parties in Portugal, he did not think it came within the province of England to offer anything but moral interference. But they found almost from the beginning an inclination on the part of Portugal to demand the intervention of Spain. In a letter from Mr. Bulwer to Lord Palmerston, in the month of March, Mr. Bulwer gave an account of a conversation with Count Thomar, in which he stated it to be the intention of the Spanish Government to interfere in this matter. In his letter of the 2nd of March, he says— I informed Count Thomar yesterday of the despatch I had received from your Lordship respecting the affairs of Portugal, with which he declared himself to be already acquainted. Count Thomar then asked mo whether our Government would consider that the fact of the Miguelites joining the Septembrists would be considered sufficient to warrant British intervention, if these parties united did not put forward the name of Don Miguel? I said that I could not answer him as to any details respecting this question, but that I could say, as a general principle, that England would not interfere by force in Portuguese affairs merely to re-establish the Queen of Portugal's Government; and that it must have before it some particular case, such as a new attempt on the part of Don Miguel and his adherents, whom it had formerly opposed, in order to justify the renewal of its exertions in the support of Donna Maria's throne. Count Thomar said, he did not understand matters so; for that if the rebels knew that we should oppose them if they took the name of Don Miguel, they would not take it; and that if they vanquished the Queen, it would not much signify to Her Majesty in whose name or in what cause they did so. I told Count Thomar that, according to what he was then saying, he wished England to support the Queen of Portugal's throne against her own subjects, whatever might be the policy Her Most Faithful Majesty might pursue towards them, or the reasons they might have for resisting it; in which case the Sovereign of Portugal would be imposed upon Portugal by foreign force; and that I did not think that either the Portuguese nation would approve of this sort of presumption on our part, or that the English nation would sanction the principle on which it was founded. They found Lord Palmerston agreeing in the principle that it would be much better to leave the matter to be decided by the Portuguese themselves; but what was Count Thomar's answer to Mr. Bulwer. Mr. Bulwer says— Count Thomar said, 'Well, then, if you do not interfere in this way, you have no right to prevent another nation from so interfering.' I replied, that we had the right of a great State in Europe, which did not choose that the balance of power in Europe should be disturbed, which it would be if the nature of the Portuguese Government were so changed, that the Queen of that country had merely to depend for her authority on Spanish intervention, which intervention was the one, I presumed, to which he alluded. It was soon after determined upon by the Spanish Government to interfere in the affairs of Portugal, and the representations of Mr. Bulwer had no effect whatever. It would be difficult for the English Government to make a casus belli of the intervention of Spain in Portugal. The Spanish Government saw that it could interfere with impunity, and it was quite clear that it was determined to do it. He would next call the attention of the House to a letter addressed, in the month of March, by Sir H. Seymour to Marshal Saldanha, and which he was sure would he read with the greatest pleasure by every Member of the House. Sir H. Seymour urged upon the Marshal in the strongest way how important it was that he should come to terms with the party of the Opposition, and he said— This may appear strong language when employed by an humble individual like myself to Marshal Saldanha; but this humble individual has a duty to perform, which no feeling of false delicacy will prevent the performance of, at a crisis like the present. Here is here the Minister of the most ancient Ally of Portugal—an Ally whose friendship has been proved, not by empty "words, but by most unequivocal acts; he is heart and soul in the cause, which, according to his feeble means, he wishes to support; and he is convinced that he cannot give better proof of his feelings than in entreating Marshal Saldanha to reconsider his first determination—than in laying before him how much higher his name will stand as the pacificator than it could ever do as the conqueror of his country. Up to that time the position in which they stood towards Portugal was this: they had done all in their power, by persuasion both with the Court, the Ministers, and all the powers of Portugal, to conciliate these unhappy differences, and induce them to come to terms with the Junta; hut all those attempts failed. Every effort was made to establish things on a satisfactory basis, but those efforts had totally failed; and when the Portuguese Government became determined to call in foreign intervention, surely a new course of events came to be considered, and it became the duty of the British and every other Government to consider how they should act. About that time they would find, in a despatch from Don Manuel do Portugal, communicated to Lord Palmerston by Baron Moncorvo, the following statement. The writer, after referring to the bonds of alliance that had formerly moved Great Britain to sustain the Queen's throne, says— The same political bonds of intimate and ancient alliance, which in that war moved Great Britain to sustain the Queen's throne, still exist in their whole vigour; and the same interest ought to move Great Britain and its Government to terminate, as quickly as may be, so desolating a war, which, if it should be protracted in this manner, will ruin the country, so as that its 3,000,000 of inhabitants will lack the wherewithal to pay for the British produce and manufactures which they have hitherto been in the habit of consuming. After asking the assistance of England, he threw out some hints as to the assis- tance they expected to get elsewhere, and says— By the present opportunity I must request your Excellency to inform Viscount Palmerston that the French Minister having a few days ago made to Her Majesty the greatest assurances of the good disposition of the King his master to assist the Queen's cause, Her Majesty has by this packet directed Her Minister in Paris to thank the King of the French for these generous and friendly offers, and to assure His Majesty that if the succour of France should in the present crisis be deemed necessary by the other Allies of Her Majesty, Her Most Faithful Majesty would not fail, in concurrence with them, to call for it. The matter did not seem to come to any conclusion; they were not certainly authorized to say that the French intervention would have actually taken place independently of the English; but when they regarded the present views of France towards the Peninsula, it would, he conceived, be most dangerous on the part of Great Britain to give an excuse for that intervention, which might very naturally have transferred itself from Portugal to the neighbouring country; and it would be very difficult for them to prevent that if they permitted it in the former case. At all events, the French Government, whatever might he its own intention towards Portugal, entirely agreed as to the intervention of Spain; and they had arrived at this state of things in which the question proposed to the English Government was this—were they willing the Government of Portugal should ask and receive intervention wherever they could obtain it? or, would they, by giving their assistance in that intervention, so regularize and limit it, that the evil, such as it was, might be kept within the smallest possible limits—that it might, as soon as possible, be stopped, and made as beneficial as possible, instead of being injurious? He would next refer to the despatch of April 5, which expressed what he believed to be the best policy. The noble Lord distinctly laid it down in this letter that Her Majesty's Government did not think themselves justified in interfering under the stipulations of the Quadruple Treaty. He said this as distinctly as the hon. Member for Montrose; for the contest in Portugal did not turn on the question as to who should be Sovereign, but as to who should be the responsible Ministers of the Crown in Portugal. If the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs were to state the case against himself, he could not do so more strongly than in the despatch of the 5th of April. The noble Lord began that despatch by enu- merating the course of events since the Treaty of Quadruple Alliance in 1834, and then said— But the British Government, adverting to the close connexion which ancient treaties have established between the Crowns of Great Britain and Portugal, and bearing in mind the many and great interests by means of which the relations of commerce have knitted together the two countries, cannot see with indifference the calamitous condition to which the continuance of civil war is fast reducing the Portuguese nation, and cannot but feel the most ardent desire to make every possible proper effort to co-operate in bringing that war to an end. Such were the plain, distinct grounds on which the noble Lord deemed British interference justifiable. He considered it the moral duty of the Government of this country, if possible, to bring this civil war to an end; and he believed that, in a diplomatic point of view, they were perfectly warranted in making the endeavour. If England declined or hesitated to interfere, but another country did so, in what position would England then find herself? In a position which would be highly censurable. But in what way did our Government interfere? Did they seek to strengthen, or promote, or confirm the encroachments of the Crown? Did they seek to diminish the liberty of the Portuguese people? Did the mode in which the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs acted show any disposition to throw the weight of England into the scale of despotism? for that was really the question. He denied it; and he thought there was abundance of evidence in the blue book before him to disprove the allegation. Then if, in fact, they had interfered on behalf of the people for peace and good order, and on the side of the Junta, the whole case of the hon. Member for Montrose fell to the ground. Now, what were the conditions or stipulations which the noble Lord proposed? First, a full and general amnesty for all political offences committed since the beginning of October last; and an immediate recall of all persons who, since that time, had been sent out of Portugal for political reasons: secondly, an immediate revocation of all the decrees which have been issued since the beginning of October last, and which infringe upon or conflict with the established law and constitution of the kingdom. The third article was, that there should be a convocation of the Cortes, so soon as the elections, which are to take place without delay, shall have been completed. He would ask his hon. Friend the Member for Montrose, whether such an intervention with the cause of Portugal would be injurious to the liberties of that country? And, fourthly, the immediate appointment of an Administration, composed of men not belonging to the party of the Cabrals nor being Members of the Oporto Junta. These were the stipulations offered. What occurred next? Colonel Fitch was sent to confer with the Junta, and he said— We met the Junta this morning, who stated that they had no objection to the basis of the transaction forwarded by the British Government, and that the difficulty did not rest upon them, but with the Government of Her Most Faithful Majesty, who up to that time had determined not to accept the proposals of the British Government. To three of the propositions the Junta assented. Then, how could it be said that England interfered on behalf of the Crown? The very nature of the stipulations, as well as their reception by the Junta, showed that it was the greatest abuse of terms to say so. He was aware there was great difficulty between making a proposition and carrying it into effect. As long as the proposition was made without the menace of an alternative, it was little more than a sort of mediation; and it only assumed the character of active intervention when acts of violence were resorted to. But it was said, this interference was injurious to the liberties of the Portuguese nation. He would put this question—how could the Junta hope to obtain better terms from the Crown, per se, than they could aided by England? And again, if the British Government did not threaten the use of force in case the Junta refused to accept those reasonable terms, it was not at all likely the Portuguese Government would be brought to treat with them at all. The Junta, as he had already said, seemed perfectly agreed in the justice of these stipulations; and why they did not continue in the same opinion was, because they had not perfect freedom of action. Such was the impression of Colonel Wylde, who wrote to Lord Palmerston, saying— The Junta seemed to admit the justice of our arguments, but said that the conduct of the Queen had inspired the nation with such distrust that the Junta itself had not the power to make their party lay down their arms without the guarantees afforded by these conditions. We told them that the conditions being offered through the Allies, was a sufficient guarantee for their being carried out with good faith. They said it might be so to the chiefs of their party, but not to their followers; and, indeed, we have ascertained beyond a doubt that the Junta is coerced by two or three of the more violent chiefs of their party, and by the people in arms under their influence. Subsequently, as appeared by the despatches, the Junta required— That the pensions granted by the Provisional Junta of the Supreme Government of the kingdom of the 20th of February, 20th of March, and 28th of April, 1847, relative to the officers belonging to the Royalist army, shall be inviolably maintained, and that the Government of Her Majesty shall continue to accord to them the same consideration which they have deserved of the Junta. And further, that— The appointments and military promotions in the army and navy, and the nominations to various posts made by the Provisional Junta of the Supreme Government of the kingdom, shall be maintained. This shall be observed with respect to the honours and titles granted by the Junta. And the 7th of the additional articles proposed by the Junta stated that the troops of the line, as well as the regular national forces which obey the Provisional Junta of the Supreme Government of the kingdom, shall be maintained until the Cortes shall pass a law fixing the public force, and providing for its organization. These forces shall constitute the garrisons of Lisbon and Oporto. The forces subject to the Government of Lisbon shall be stationed in quarters in the provinces, &c. And the 8th of these additional articles set forth that there should be— No general supreme military command. The command of military divisions, and of bodies of the army, shall be confined to the generals and officers who have given proofs of their adhesion to the national pronouncement, or who shall not have opposed it. The effect of accepting those additional articles would be to place the Junta in a position which they could not possibly maintain. It appeared to him perfectly impossible that Colonel Wylde could have acceded to these additional articles; and what he ought to have done was what he had done, namely, to adhere to those original propositions to which the Crown would have yielded, and which the Junta would have accepted, without any compromise of honour or patriotism. Her Majesty's Government was, he thought, bound in honour to adhere to its proposals. He believed that on that very morning the noble Lord (Lord Palmerston) had the singular good fortune to receive intelligence which might be deemed conclusive of the termination of this contest. It appeared from the public journals that the Conde das Antas and 2,500 of the forces of the Junta had been made prisoners by the English fleet; which must be regarded as a piece of good fortune. [Mr. HUME: Hear, hear!] He understood the hon. Member's cheers, and wished to know where those prisoners could be safer? Did the hon. Member for Montrose think that if Spanish intervention, or the intervention of any other foreign country, had been brought to bear upon Portugal, that those forces of the Junta would be in a better position than they now were? One party or the other in a civil war must be subdued before the dreadful strife was brought to an end; and how could such a result be brought about with less of injury, less of disgrace to the conquered, or with a smaller sacrifice of any description than by this capture of Das Antas and his prisoners? Das Antas and his troops, it was true, were prisoners; but they were conquered as brave men should be. They saw an overwhelming force ready to overpower them if they resisted, and it would have been absurd and impolitic in them under such circumstances to fight. He could not tell the particular circumstances under which Das Antas and his force fell into the hands of the British. A great deal had been said about the infamy which would attach to the English name, because due warning of the attack had not been given. But the fact was that warning had been given, and given, too, as soon as the stipulations were offered. The Junta knew the alternative, and if they did not act accordingly it was their own fault. They were apprised of the ultimatum of the Three Powers—just, liberal, and fair terms were offered to them, and it was declared that if they did not accept them they would be coerced to do so. For Das Antas, the Junta, or any one else, to suppose that the Powers, or any of them, would make a formal declaration of war against armed insurgents before they resorted to measures of force, was absurd in the extreme, and such a thing as no statesman in his senses would dream of doing. In conclusion, he thought he might congratulate the House and the country, upon the fortunate issue of a state of affairs which looked so alarming. He know that some hon. Members would say that it was not a conclusion at all; but he felt confident that if the noble Lord persevered in the course he had adopted, peace would be soon restored to Portugal. The noble Lord was bound to go on in that course, and to do all he could to secure the peace and liberties of Portugal. He further thought that, as they had used force, they ought to protect those prisoners whom they had arrested. For this reason he regarded with a strong feeling of disapprobation the address of Colonel Wylde to the Junta, in which he said— I am instructed further to make known to the Junta and to their adherents that after the liberal conditions offered by Her Most Faithful Majesty, a continued resistance to her authority will exclude those so resisting from the benefit of the amnesty, and will render them responsible for all the calamities which they may bring upon their country. He hoped that this was only meant as a mere menace, and that it was not the intention of the noble Lord to act upon it. On the contrary, he hoped the noble Lord would do all he could to soften the hard fate of those poor men, for though they had been conquered, their cause had not been conquered. The Crown of Portugal was now bound by a very solemn obligation to England to carry out, to the fullest extent, the liberal and constitutional spirit expressed in these four resolutions. He trusted that every effort would be made by the noble Lord to insist on such a course being taken, and that the Crown of Portugal—if Crowns can be taught lessons at all—should by this time learn that it was neither safe nor prudent to provoke the people by encroaching on the constitutional liberties of the country. [An Hon. MEMBER: This has already occurred three times.] This might have been done three times, but he trusted the present warning had been sufficient. This country had bound the Court of Portugal, in the face of Europe, to adhere to the articles which had been entered into with the Junta. The Court, he repeated, was morally bound to adhere to the proposals made to the Junta, and he conceived that the mediation of England was only offered on that understanding. The hon. Member for Montrose deprecated foreign interference. Did he wish to see the Junta absolute—did he wish to see its forces march upon Lisbon, the Sovereign dethroned, and obliged to take refuge in England—did he wish to see Portugal desolated with a civil war, it might be a protracted one; and would he prefer any or all of these things to the bloodless and effectual measure which had been taken—did he think that a more desirable result could have been brought about in any other manner; and if so, how? The hon. Gentleman seemed apprehensive that liberal principles would be trampled upon in Portugal; but the book before him furnished abundant evidence, not only of the prevalence of liberal principles in Portugal, but of the most violent revolutionary ones, and, the most violent anti-monarchical feelings. If England had not interfered, it was extremely probable that the Queen would have been driven from her capital—that she would have been deposed, and probably a Regent appointed. What would have been the end of all this but the entire social disorganization of Portugal? When they considered what sacrifices England had made to establish a constitutional Government in Portugal—how important it was that the example of successful insurrection should not be set before the eyes of the Spanish people—and, finally, what calamities might have occurred but for the prompt intervention of England: he thought they had sufficient reason to rejoice in the step which had been taken. What he would wish was, that the present distracted state of affairs there might be brought to an end without giving entire victory to either side; that those great principles of constitutional liberty for the preservation and maintenance of which the struggle had been undertaken, might be firmly and completely established, and that they might, unshaken and uncontaminated, be in full force when the contest terminated.

LORD W. PAULETT

was understood to say, that he thought the Government perfectly right in endeavouring to mediate in every way they possibly could; but on looking at this great question, and considering it in all its bearings, he must say, that, in his opinion, there had been no ground for armed interference. He put out of question the arbitrary acts which had been committed by the Sovereign; he was quite sure that the noble Lord (Lord Palmerston) would not be the apologist of the Queen in this respect. He looked upon the question in a broad international point of view, and must again say, that he could see no reason which could justify armed interference. If there was any violent opposition to the Portuguese Sovereign, she might have taken refuge in a British ship of war; but that, he thought, was the utmost they should do. Entertaining those opinions, he regretted to say he must, upon this question, with old his support from the Government.

MR. WARBURTON

said, if the principle of Government interference in the policy of a foreign State were once admitted, he thought no interference could have been conducted with greater propriety than that of the noble Lord. But, in his opinion, that interference was not justifiable; for when our Government under- took to interfere in the affairs of Portugal, they made themselves responsible for all the consequences. The upshot of that interference was to place the Government of another country entirely in the hands of this Government; and the interfering State was thereby rendered responsible for the acts of that foreign Government, and, in short, virtually undertook the administration of that foreign State. It appeared to him that the consequences of this system of interference with the affairs of other countries was to induce the Governments of those foreign countries to look to ours for support; thus teaching them to depend, not upon themselves—not upon a just and beneficent rule—not upon dispensing justice and mercy to their own subjects, but upon foreign force. Upon this point Sir Thomas Monro and others had given such intelligent opinions, elicited by the Committee appointed to inquire into the renewal of the East India Company's charter, that he would briefly quote a few passages. The Secretary of the India House, on being examined, said— I cannot so well describe the evils incident to the system, as by the following quotation from a letter, addressed by the late Sir Thomas Monro to the Marquess of Hastings, dated the 12th of August, 1817:—'There are many weighty objections to the employment of a subsidiary force. It has a natural tendency to render the Government of every country in which it exists weak and oppressive, to extinguish all honourable feeling among the higher classes of society, and to degrade and impoverish the whole people. The usual remedy of a bad Government in India is a quiet revolution in the palace, or a violent one by rebellion or foreign conquest; but the presence of a British force cuts off every chance of remedy, by supporting the prince on the throne against every foreign and domestic enemy. It renders him indolent, by teaching him to trust to strangers for his security; and cruel and avaricious, by showing him that he has nothing to fear from the hatred of his subjects. Whenever the subsidiary system is introduced, unless the reigning prince be a man of great abilities, the country will soon bear the marks of it in decaying villages and decreasing population.' The late historian of India, Mr. James Mill, said— In this awful state of things in India, the only check upon the despotism of princes was awe of their subjects. Insurrection against oppression was the regular practice of the country. The princes knew that gross mismanagement or oppression would almost certainly produce a revolt, when they would probably be tumbled from their thrones, and the successful leader of the insurgents put in their place. But all this awe was checked and done away with by our intervention. The people knew well that their puny power would be utterly unavailing against the overwhelming might of a British army; and the consequence was, they were forced to submit to every species of oppression. It was found by experience that, in consequence of this cause, misgovernment had reached its utmost pitch—in fact, far beyond its ordinary limits. Such were precisely the effects he anticipated from resorting to such interventions as the present. The noble Lord said, he had a dislike to interfere. If this were the ease, why did he go into the matter? Every consequence which was pointed out as having resulted in India was likely to arise in this case. If our Government misconducted itself, there was some means of obtaining a remedy. We had been long habituated to a regular Government, and admitted that the resort to the ultima ratio was the most objectionable, as it induced kings and subjects to have recourse to arms on the most uncalled for occasions. Englishmen could not place themselves in the situation of the Portuguese people; for what might appear to us to be immaterial, might be to them of the most serious consequence. It was evident that the greatest distrust existed between the Junta and the Queen's Government; and, from reading the correspondence, he considered the former body was justified in looking on the latter with suspicion. It appeared in one of the despatches that Sa da Bandeira had yielded to the armistice; but during the suspension of arms, and under cover of night, a battery was secretly erected opposite the fortress where he was. How, then, could he trust a Government which had recourse to such unfair proceedings? He was not prepared to put the Government out, and put the noble Lord (Lord G. Bentinck) and the Protectionists into the Government for the purpose of conducting the elections; but he entirely condemned the conduct of the British Government in this proceeding.

MR. H. J. BAILLIE

confessed he had not attached so much importance to the production of papers as some hon. Members. He knew that their production would cause delay, and he knew that delay was an old habit of the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary. So long ago as 1831, he found that great complaints were made with regard to the production of certain papers from Portugal, which the noble Lord had promised to deliver, and which had been too long delayed. But that was not the only reason why he thought that the Motion ought not to be postponed till the production of the papers. For it appeared to him that it was not the question whether the one party or the other party in Portugal was right or wrong—that was not the question which the House of Commons had to decide. The Chartists, the Cabralists, the Juntaists, might all or each of them, in their turn, have violated the charter of Don Pedro. That might be a very interesting subject for the people of Portugal to discuss; but it was not an interesting subject to the people of this country. The question which they had to decide was, whether the Government of this country could be justified under any circumstances in adopting an armed interference in the internal affairs of Portugal—under any circumstances short of an attempt upon the liberty and independence of Portugal by a foreign Power. That was the point which they had to decide, and upon that point he wished to make a few observations. He was very anxious to know on what ground the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs would justify his interference? He was anxious to know whether the noble Lord was prepared to detail all the advantages which the people of this country had already derived from our former interference in the internal affairs of Portugal? He was anxious to know whether the noble Lord was of opinion that all the blood and treasure which of late years had been expended in maintaining and upholding the existing dynasties of Spain and Portugal, had been attended with any corresponding advantages, whether commercial or political, to the people of this country—whether the course which we had pursued there of late years had added to our military reputation, or added to the respect which was entertained for the people of this country by the three great nations of the world? He confessed he was anxious to hear the sentiments and opinions of the noble Lord in reference to this subject; and he trusted that he would give the benefit of his great knowledge and experience in this respect. But, under any circumstances, he (Mr. Baillie) must feel it his duty to remind the House of some of the consequences which had followed what he could not designate by any other term than the unjust, the unnecessary, and the uncalled-for interference of this country in the internal affairs of Spain and Portugal. He would not go further back than to the period when Don Miguel assumed the royal authority in Portugal. [Lord PALMER-STON: Hear, hear!] The name of Don Miguel seemed to excite the noble Lord. At the time to which he had alluded, the Government of the day pursued the objectionable course of exciting and promoting a bloody civil war in Portugal. It might be remembered that at that period the whole of Portugal, with the exception of the small island of Terceira, was under the actual sway of Don Miguel. Such was the state of affairs when Don Pedro arrived in this country from the Brazils. He raised a loan in London for the express and avowed purpose of fitting out a fleet, and raising a body of troops in this country for the conquest of Portugal. That fleet was to be manned by English sailors, and commanded by a naval officer of talent and experience in the navy of this country. The troops also were to be commanded by an English officer—in short, it was perfectly manifest that the Government of the day gave—not openly, but secretly—every encouragement to the expedition. The expedition left the shores of England, and it was unnecessary that he should enter further into any of the details that might be pursued. Suffice it to say that after a bloody struggle Don Miguel was deposed, and the existing dynasty of Don Pedro was established in his place. Now, allow him to ask, what advantages had been gained by the people of this country by this very objectionable mode of interference? Had it obtained for us the love, or the respect, or the gratitude of the people of Portugal, or even the good will of the Government which we had established? If he might judge from the results, the very reverse was the fact. They had not even gained the poor advantage—if, indeed, modern theories would allow it to be any advantage at all—of a commercial treaty. Remember that while Don Miguel was de facto the Sovereign of Portugal, they had a commercial treaty with that country—a treaty which gave considerable advantages to the people of this country—which at least conferred great privileges upon the English merchants that were established in Portugal. But when that treaty expired, the Government which we had established not only refused to renew it, but they declined to enter into any treaty with this country which the Minister of the day could judge to be fair or just to the people of this country. So much, then, for the feelings with which the Portuguese people regarded us, or rather, he would say, the Government which we had established. Now, see the results of our interference in the internal affairs of Spain. In that country, at least, we could not be accused of having stirred up promoted a civil war. The Government of this country found a civil war existing, and undoubtedly they lost no time in taking part in it, and adopting the cause of one of the contending parties. In that country we again adopted what he must say was the objectionable course which had, however, proved so successful in Portugal. It was proposed to the Spanish Government that they should raise a large body of troops in this country, to be commanded by an English officer of talent and experience. By the Quadruple Treaty it was proposed to afford arms and ammunition of every kind to the Spanish Government; they also sent out a fleet to the shores of Spain, and they landed a large body of marines in that country. He would not, however, he again said, enter into a detail of the operations, and narrate the misfortunes which befell that unfortunate expedition. Suffice it to say that the energy and ability of a British officer were mainly instrumental in saving Bilboa, and in preserving the Crown of Spain to the existing dynasty. Now he would not ask whether the course which had been pursued with respect to Spain had gained either the gratitude or the respect or the love of the people of Spain. The events which had taken place during the last few months were significant enough, and were sufficient to answer for themselves. They had seen the Government which they had contributed to establish, prostrate at the feet of Louis Philippe—they had seen the advice and the councils of England spurned and rejected—they had seen the protests of England ridiculed and contemned—they had heard the French Minister declare and boast that having carried the great object which he sought in Spain, he had recalled his Ambassador, but that he was prepared to maintain the predominant influence of France whenever it suited his object or purpose so to do. Such were the consequences and such the fruits which they had gathered from their interference in the internal affairs of Spain. Now, in spite of all their former experience, they were about once more to plunge into the chaos of Peninsular politics, in order that they might embrace the empty shadow of their traditional influence and connexion with that country. Could they not leave the people of Spain and Portugal to fight out their own disputes by themselves without the interference of this country? Of what importance was it to us which party became predominant, or what form of Government was established cither in the one country or the other? But what rendered interference on the present occasion still more objectionable was this, that we had taken the initiative—we had set the example of an armed intervention in the internal affairs of Portugal, and by that means we were precluded hereafter from protesting and denouncing the Government of France, provided it should adopt a similar armed interference in the affairs of Spain. He knew there were some who contended that, if this country had not interfered, other parties were prepared to do so. He presumed that by other parties it was meant that Spain or France would have interfered. But so far as he had been able to collect from these papers, neither the one Power nor the other had the slightest intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Portugal. It was true that at the commencement, when there was a probability that the movement would become a Miguelite one, the Government of Spain had some thoughts of interfering. But so soon as it was ascertained that the Miguelite chief was destroyed, and the party dispersed, the Government of Spain frankly avowed that they had no intention whatever to interfere single-handed; and it was clear that they never would have done so unless they had been supported by France on the one side, and England on the other. It was also clear from these papers that the interference had taken place at the invitation of England—that France and Span only followed in our wake. He knew there were some hon. Gentlemen in the House who thought that the House had no business to interfere with the course of policy that might be adopted by the Foreign Minister of this country—that they ought to wait till events unfolded themselves—till the papers and correspondence were laid upon the Table—in fact, until the events had become matters of history; and then that they should take a review of the whole subject, and, if necessary, withdraw their confidence from Her Majesty's Government. He confessed he was one of those who entertained a different opinion. He thought that if they perceived that the Government of the country was about to adopt a course of foreign policy which they believed was likely to prove injurious to this country, it was their duty to interfere and to warn the Ministry that such a course of policy would not be supported by the House. If they were to fail in their duty in this respect, they might become involved in engagements with foreign countries which, whatever might be the sentiments of the people of England—however distasteful it might prove—however unfortunately it might be received—it would be impossible for them afterwards to evade or to retire from with honour. That, he feared, was already the case on the present occasion. Let not this consideration, however, deter the House from supporting the Motion of the hon. Member for Montrose, and thus sanction the principle which he believed was a popular principle in the country—that they ought not to interfere by force of arms in the internal affairs of another country.

MR. B. OSBORNE

had expected to hear an official statement from some Member of the Government, as to the grounds on which the present intervention in Portugal had taken place. He should have felt satisfied if some of those "mute inglorious" Lords of the Treasury, of whom they saw so much and heard so little, had replied to the objections which had been urged against the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government. It was true that the Government had been defended by the hon. Member for Pontefract (Mr. M. Milnes), and the noble Member for South Durham (Lord H. Vane); and he presumed that Her Majesty's Ministers were so well satisfied with the able, though somewhat cloudy statements of those hon. Members, that they were content to say, "Gentlemen of the House of Commons, this is our defence; we require your answer; and at the end of the evening we shall be prepared to wind up." The hon. Member for Pontefract had, in his own person, exemplified the great importance of which an intervention might sometimes be to a Government; for, if that hon. Gentleman had not made his appearance, with his red box at the critical period when he entered the House, it was not improbable that they might have gone to a division, and that the Government, judging from the aspect of the benches at the time, might have been left in a woful minority. The hon. Member for Pontefract had drawn, in some measure, upon his poetical invention, in order to furnish a defence for what he considered a most unjustifiable interference on the part of Her Majesty's Government. The hon. Gentleman had said, that young countries required schooling in constitutional government. He did not know what idea the hon. Gentleman might have formed of this schooling; but if the hon. Member meant that trial by jury should be abolished—that people should be immured in prisons without any sanction of law—and that Sovereigns should be allowed to trample on the constitutional rights of their people; and if this schooling—which was the schooling the Portuguese people were required to go through—was defended by the noble Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, he would say that the sooner that noble Lord quitted his office, the better it would be for this country. It could not be denied that great indifference, amounting almost to apathy, existed in the country, and even in that House, with reference to questions of foreign policy; but he thought, if there was one subject connected with foreign policy which ought to interest the people of England and that House more than another, it was any question relating to the affairs of Portugal. For upwards of 400 years there had been an intimate connexion between that country and England; and some of the brightest pages in the history of our glory were entwined with the name of Portugal. In his (Mr. Osborne's) own case he had felt that indifference towards questions of foreign policy, arising from the great and strong confidence he had felt in the wisdom of the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Department—in the knowledge which that noble Lord possessed of the wants and wishes of the people of the Peninsula, and in the deep interest the noble Lord had ever exhibited and the desire he had shown to aid the struggles of liberty on all occasions. He felt further bound to say, that so far as the words and the despatches of the noble Lord went, they redounded to his credit and his honour; and he only regretted that the noble Lord had, after all, arrived at such lame and impotent conclusions. But there was one matter which required observation. In the year 1845, when the late Government had been broken up, and a new one was about to have been formed, a certain noble Lord bad exhibited great disinclination to take office in the same Administration with the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office, in consequence, as it was freely said, of the meddling tendencies of the noble Lord. A great commotion had been excited amongst the Whig party by the occurrence, and a great outcry was raised against the noble Lord (Earl Grey) who had started the objestion, and who was called a "crotchety and an impracticable man." There could be no mistake as to whom he meant. Well, that noble Lord had been described to be an impracticable and a crotchety man, and it was said that no Cabinet could last in which he was. When the present Administration was formed, however, that noble Lord was found to be a Member of it; and he (Mr. Osborne) was perfectly astonished to learn that upon the present occasion the noble Lord had not made those objections to the interference of this country with Portugal which the noble Lord's former conduct had led him to expect. The noble Lord, who in 1845 was frightened at the shadow of interference, was now, in 1847, prepared to embrace the actual reality. There was but one reason that appeared at all satisfactorily to account for such a fact, and it was that which Mr. Burke explained when he said—"If we only allow one person to tell us his story continually every night and morning for a twelvemonth, that person will then become our master." On no other ground could he account for the noble Lord clinging to a Cabinet of which he refused to become a Member in 1845, because of the meddling capabilities of the present Foreign Secretary. It might be very fairly said by the hon. Gentlemen who supported this intervention, that they looked upon it as a great scheme for the pacification of Portugal; hut if it could be proved, as he hoped it would that evening, that so far from this intervention pacifying Portugal, it was, in fact, laying the seeds of a general war through Europe—if it could be proved that it perilled the very existence of Portugal as an independent State—and if it could further be proved that by it this country was supporting nothing less than the principles of despotic monarchy and absolutism—then he would say that every Member of that House who represented a liberal constituency was called upon to express by his vote his reprobation of the conduct of Her Majesty's Government. It seemed passing strange, and the more so after reading the eloquent and able despatches of the noble Lord, that it was not till the 21st of May that he arrived at the conclusion that Portugal must be coerced by force of arms. It was impossible to account for the conduct of the noble Lord by reference to the motives which usually guided people in ordinary affairs. There were whispers of mysterious influence—of back-stairs intrigue—which he only mentioned to pass them by. But he was forced to the conclusion that the noble Lord was averse to the whole proceeding, and had been outvoted in the Cabinet. How could the House expect, after the despatches read by the hon. Member for Montrose, that the noble Lord would join in carrying out the principles of the Holy Alliance, and countenance the junction of Three States for the coercion of another? But through all the despatches except those of the noble Lord, the same idea prevailed—that the Queen must be supported at all hazards, and the rights and liberties of the people set aside. What was the meaning of non-intervention? A statesman of great experience, whose name was sufficient to give weight to his definition, had described it as the principle— That every nation has a right to manage its own internal affairs as it pleases, so long as it injures not its neighbours; and that one nation has no right to control by force of arms the will of another nation in the choice of its Government or ruler. To this principle I most cordially assent. It is sound—it ought to be sacred—and I trust that England "will never be found to set the example of its violation. Such was the language of the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, on the 1st of June, 1829. Interventions had always been carried on secretly, otherwise they could not have been effected. They were so ruinous to the interests of the country and of mankind, that if at once avowed they would never be permitted. A great fuss had been made about the production of papers. At the very minute the hon.. Member for Montrose was pressing for papers the protocol was published in Paris. The noble Lord spoke of the proper time for producing those papers. The proper time, it might be presumed, would be when the act was accomplished, and a vote of estimates to pay the current expenses demanded. There was no case analogous to the present. The only one, indeed, was to be found in Moliére's play Les Fourberies de Scapin, Scapin got hold of a good natured man, whose life, he said, was in danger, and whom he persuaded to hide himself in a sack. When the man was in the sack Scapin told him that two conspirators were present, and then kicked and flagellated his unfortunate friend, throwing the blame on the imaginary conspirators. In the present instance the part of Scapin had been performed at the cost of the Junta of Oporto, which occupied the position of the unfortunate gentleman in the sack. There was one great name which did not appear in the transaction; but when there was any dirty work to be done, he was ever ready, like another Mephisto- philes, to push his instruments and victims deeper into the mire. The time, it might be predicted, would yet arrive when that great character would, reap the advantage of the recent transaction, and the noble Lord would be left to bear all the odium. The Queen of Portugal, it was affirmed, had forfeited her throne when she demanded foreign aid to coerce her subjects; and from Title 4, Article 9, of the Charter of 1836, it would appear that such was the case. What, it might be asked, was the course taken by Mr. Canning in 1826? What did he say when he sent a. force of 6,000 men to Portugal? [An Hon. MEMBER: 5,000 men.] This was a question of principle, not of numbers. He declared that it never was the intention of the British Government to interfere unless with the sanction of the Cortes. A British Minister in 1826 had such a reverence for the constitution of Portugal, that he said not a single British soldier should go on the expedition till requested by the Cortes; but in 1847 the noble Lord, putting aside all charters and treaties, looking only to the absolute monarchy, did not wait to ask any consent of the Cortes, before the British fleet actually captured the ships and army of the Junta. But it would be said the Cortes were not meeting. For a very good reason they were not. The Queen had refused to convoke them. From the letter No. 3, from Lord Howard de Walden, the determination on this point manifestly appeared; so the argument was only made stronger that the Queen had trampled on the charter and broken her oath. The despatches showed that from the 6th of October, 1846, the whole object of the Portuguese Court had been foreign intervention and counter-revolution. Marshal Saldanha said to Mr. Southern, "I have no doubt this is a Miguelite insurrection." Mr. Southern expressed his doubts, and wished to see the proofs. "Oh," said Marshal Saldanha, "I was in such a passion, I tore the document in pieces." Mr. Southern wrote home and said the movement was no Miguelite movement. From his despatches, it appeared that he attributed it to the despotic conduct of the Queen; and he evidently thought, though he did not use so strong language, that the great curse of the country was the Cabral Administration. Were hon. Gentlemen aware what that Administration was? Costa Cabral started in life a furious Liberal. He was gained by the Court; and then turned a furious partisan of abso- lute monarchy. Of such transformations there were some humbler instances on this side the Channel. Some Gentlemen, loud in opposition, took a different strain in office, though they never rose so high as Costa Cabral. The charter of 1838 was upset by the intrigues of Cabral—it was supposed because it contained articles which prevented him from effecting his designs. By the Septembrist charter of 1838 the King Consort could not hold the command of the army. That he should hold it, Her Majesty was represented as having much at heart. Costa Cabral was in power, and, not like Gentlemen in that House, he was to be governed; he was subject to Court influence. He got rid of the charter. His first act thereafter was to appoint his brother, Don Jose Cabral, whom Dom Pedro had declared incapable of holding office, Minister of Public Justice. Then taxes wore exacted without asking the consent of the Cortes; people were imprisoned without trial. On every occasion he broke through the charter which he had substituted for that of 1838. He at last had recourse to a plan which at all times had, when attempted, provoked resistance on the part of the people. He imposed unjust and oppressive taxes—one on salt, and another on burials. It was light to allude to these facts, because they had been the proximate cause of the revolution. The tax on burials was particularly obnoxious. The friends of deceased persons were obliged to produce a certificate, for which they should pay 10s.; and without which no priest dare allow the burial to proceed. A revolt took place in consequence, in the province of Minho, at which the soldiers were beaten. The Ministers were in consequence dismissed, and the Duke de Palmella sent for. He was a man who, for sagacity and rectitude in the world of diplomacy, was not to be equalled by any man in this or any other country. He accepted office with the best intentions; and as he (Mr. Osborne) understood, he had a scheme in contemplation for the total reformation of the Cortes and of the finances of the country. He was revolving these schemes in his mind, when on the 6th of October he was sent for to the Palace, and desired to sign his own dismissal. He hesitated at first, but he was told to consider himself a prisoner, and after being confined for one night in the Palace, he signed the decree of his own dismissal. In the mean time, the King Consort had been round to all the barracks in Lisbon, and harangued the troops; and, in some instances, substituted creatures of his own for the commanders. A despatch was forwarded to the Conde das Antas, offering the highest honours if he would take part in this counter-revolution; but to his eternal honour he refused; and he was sure that, if his hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract had been as celebrated in war as he was in verse, he would have followed the same course. He omitted to state that, when the Cabrals were dimissed on account of this popular rising, the Queen, so far from disgracing Costa Cabral—to use a common phrase—kicked him up stairs; created him Conde de Thomar, and sent him ambassador to Spain; where, it could be proved from the blue book, he had concocted the whole of this convention, and had brought, at the same time, eternal disgrace on the British name. It was tiresome even to read, and much more so to listen to quotations from that blue book, otherwise he could quote a letter from Mr. Southern, in which it was stated that the whole matter had been brought about by these Cabrals, and that a sum of 60,000l. had been sent by the Conde de Thomar. At this very moment it was Cabral who ruled Portugal—it was Cabral who ruled this country. ["Oh, oh!"] He would repeat it. He believed that however well-intentioned the noble Lord was—and he fully admitted the goodness of his intentions, and the purity and excellence of his motives—still that he was but a child in leading-strings in the hands of Cabral and Louis Philippe. He wished to read an extract from these despatches to the House; and he hoped the House would grant the same indulgence in this respect to him as it had shown to his hon. Friend the Member for Montrose, who certainly took advantage of the liberty extended to him, in order to read the whole blue book through. They would find at page 200 what it was that this Count Thomar asked Mr. Bulwer to do. The letter was from Mr. Bulwer to the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office, and was dated the 2nd of March, 1847:— I informed Count Thomar yesterday of the despatch I had received from your Lordship respecting the affairs of Portugal, with which he declared himself to be already acquainted. Count Thomar then asked me whether our Government would consider that the fact of the Miguelites joining the Septembrists would he considered sufficient to warrant British intervention, if these parties united did not put forward the name of Don Miguel? I said that I could not answer him as to any details respecting this question; but that I could say, as a general principle, that England could not interfere by force in Portuguese affairs merely to re-establish the Queen of Portugal's Government, and that it must have before it some particular case, such as a new attempt on the part of Don Miguel and his adherents, whom it had formerly opposed, in order to justify the renewal of its exertions in the support of Donna Maria's throne. Count Thomar said, he did not understand matters so; for that if the rebels knew that we should oppose them if they took the name of Don Miguel, they would not take it; and that if they vanquished the Queen, it would not much signify to Her Majesty in whose name or in what cause they did so. I told Count Thomar that, according to what he was then saying, he wished England to support the Queen of Portugal's throne, against her own subjects, whatever might be the policy which Her Most Faithful Majesty might pursue towards them, or the reasons they might have for resisting it, in which case the Sovereign of Portugal would be imposed upon Portugal by foreign force; and that I did not think that either the Portuguese nation would approve of this sort of presumption on our part, or that the English nation would sanction the principle on which it was so founded. Count Thomar said, 'Well, then, if you do not interfere in this way, you have no right to prevent another nation from so interfering.' I replied, that we had the right of a great State in Europe, which did not choose that the balance of power in Europe should be disturbed, which it would be if the nature of the Portuguese Government were so changed, that the Queen of that country had merely to depend for her authority on Spanish intervention, which intervention was the one, I presumed, to which he alluded. I then concluded the conversation by observing that it was only in England that all these matters could be discussed; that he might be sure that Her Majesty's Government in England had a strong desire to assist the Queen of Portugal where it could do so properly and justly, and that I thought it would be ungracious, if, when we came forward, as on the present occasion, with the expression of an intention to support Her Most Faithful Majesty in a particular case, it was stated that the Portuguese Government would not be satisfied unless we supported Her Majesty's authority in some other case. Costa Cabral was the man who, from the beginning, had been the cause of the movement; and who was now actually plotting for this intervention. The hon. Member for Montrose made out a most crushing case against the Government. But he failed to point out the abominable cruelty and wicked exactions which had marked the policy of the Court party. He dwelt somewhat lightly with the cruel case of the prisoners taken at Torres Vedras, of the Count do Bomfim and the Count de Villareal. These were acts which took place under the authority of, he might say, without discourtesy, the despotic young lady who was Sovereign of Portugal. What would the wives and daughters of these men think of their Queen? A letter had appeared from one of the suffer- ers, who had lost a limb in the defence of her Royal father. She consigned them to a convict ship, and they were sent to a penal colony. Mr. Southern, whose excellent conduct and just views throughout were to he commended, remonstrated, without waiting for orders from his Government. What was the conduct of the other parties? They deliberately lied to him. ["Hear!"] There must be speaking out here. They deliberately lied, as they had done from first to last. Mr. Southern was left under the impression that these persons were sent to Madeira. He would pass over the petty spite of dismissing the gallant captain who complained of the confined nature of the accommodation, and appointing another. He would come to the graver question of whether the conduct of that Court was worthy of being supported and bolstered up who consigned those unfortunate victims to a penal colony, where life was at best uncertain for a month, and then endeavoured to deceive a British Minister by saying they had sent them to Madeira? Mr. Southern gave a strong opinion of the despotic conduct of the Court of Portugal. Among all the papers quoted by his hon. Friend (Mr. M. Milnes), he took care to quote none which said anything against the Court of Portugal. Mr. Southern said— Measures which your Lordships long since recommended, I feel convinced would even now, if promptly and efficaciously carried into execution, paralyse the sinews of the rebellion. An immediate change of Ministers, appointing men known for their moderation, their honesty, and their constitutional principles; solemn pledges on the part of Her Majesty of her resolution to govern constitutionally; a general amnesty, and the promise of elections as soon as peace was restored to the country—would at the eleventh hour produce, I believe, the immediate abandonment of all the criminal projects"—he begged the House to mark this—"now in embryo, save the throne of the Queen, and preserve the peace of the Peninsula. Such was the character given of the Court by Mr. Southern. Why, nobody could have believed that the Queen, who started in 1846 with an army fully equipped, and with all the resources of the bank of the capital, should, in 1847, be driven into a corner, and be obliged to rely on a British fleet in the Tagus for protection to her policy—for the voice of the nation had never been raised to hurl her from the throne. In spite of the hints about Don Miguel being connected with the Junta of Oporto, he begged to assert, in contradiction to what had been stated by the hon. Member for South Durham (Lord H. Vane) that the authority of the Queen had never been questioned. All that the people asked was, that their constitutional rights and privileges should be preserved. They had never sought to sweep away the Throne; but they were determined—and he honoured them for the determination—that the caprices of the Court should not rule in spite of the will of the people. Several things had been mixed up with this transaction, which he thought unfortunate; for although he acknowledged the great European reputation of the gallant officer (Colonel Wylde) who had been sent out to Portugal, he thought the selection had been injudicious. The noble Lord (Lord Palmerston), in his instructions to that gallant officer, said he had selected him to give a military opinion on the movement; but it was remarkably strange that while throughout the whole of the documents the military opinions of Colonel Wylde were very few—the best military opinions were given by our Consul at Oporto—from first to last he was found meddling with the petty politics of the Court. He was a man who was sent out as a mediator; and he turned out nothing more than a mere partisan. He said nothing more than he was ready to prove from the blue book. He passed over the unworthy conduct of Marshal Saldanha in making use of Colonel Wylde's name in a public document, as "Aide-de-Camp to the Queen of England;" but he could not pass over with such slight mention the disgraceful conduct of that gallant officer in deliberately asserting the falsehood that Colonel Wylde had expressed himself disrespectfully of the Count das Antas's troops and his cause. By turning to pages 88 and 89 of the blue book, hon. Members would see that Marshal Sandanha had issued a document saying, that Colonel Wylde had expressed himself with contempt of the Count das Antas and his small party. Colonel Wylde denied in the most express terms that he ever gave a scintilla of opinion prejudicial to the Count das Antas, or to the equipment of his troops. He stated this, however, calmly and moderately. Although he had detected Marshal Saldanha forging his name to what was not the fact, he had remonstrated with great discretion. Marshal Saldanha replied in a curious passage, because it proved that instead of being sent to Portugal to give a military opinion on the movement, as had been pretended, he had in reality been sent for the purpose of supporting the cause of a dynasty. After having been convicted of stating what was not the fact, he stated that he was sorry for it, and added, "You were delicate enough to tell me that if I thought your visit to the ex-Count das Antas might he injurious to us, you would not go." So here it turned out that the gentleman who was sent by the Foreign Office to give a military opinion of the state of parties, stated to Marshal Saldanha that if he thought his visit to Count das Antas would do any harm to the cause of the Queen, he would not go. He (Mr. B. Osborne) would leave the House to see through this flimsy veil. He had admitted that Colonel Wylde was a person of great experience; hut surely, when the interest of a dynasty was at stake, when the peculiar circumstances of the Queen of Portugal were considered, it was not a judicious thing in the face of Europe to send a person so intimately connected with the English Court. There was another point on which the missive of Colonel Wylde de-served the reprobation of Her Majesty's Government; and he confessed he should have liked to see in some of these despatches a few nervous sentences from the noble Lord (Lord Palmerston) reprobating in direct terms the conduct of Colonel Wylde on the 1st of May in threatening Viscount Sa da Bandeira that if he should obtain a victory over Count Vinhaes, the British forces would open upon him. What authority had Colonel Wylde on that occasion to take the name of his Queen and of his Government in vain? That was on May the 1st. The protocool which had since astonished all Europe was not signed till the 21st. Were the House to conclude that there was some secret understanding between the Foreign Office and Colonel Wylde on this subject; for in his instructions there was no mention made of threatening either side with our forces? He was told merely to go out as military inspector; not to commit himself to anything; to mediate between the parties, but not to guarantee anything to either. Rather strange instructions to give: but the first opportunity Colonel Wylde had, he threatened Viscount Sa da Bandeira with the British forces. He called upon the noble Lord to say distinctly why he suffered the name of our country to be used in this way for the mere purpose of promoting a Court intrigue? After an attentive perusal of what his hon. Friend (Mr. M. Milnes) called the "interesting book," he thought he detected that, after Sir Hamilton Seymour took up his position at the Court of Portugal, the whole policy of our Government was changed towards Portugal. Mr. Southern and Lord Howard de Walden, in all their despatches, enforced one thing on the noble Lord, and that was, that the Queen had broken through every constitutional pledge and oath, and that it was impossible to rely on anything Her Ministers said—that there was no binding them. But directly Sir H. Seymour went there, the whole scene changed. [Mr. M. MILNES: The Government was changed.] He knew that the Government was changed; but was the hon. Gentleman aware how the Government was changed, and what it was composed of? With one exception, they were all creatures of Cabral. Even the noble Lord would not have the hardihood to say that the present Government of Portugal were anything more than the creatures of Count Thomar, who was ruling them from the Court of Madrid. The Government was changed in name, but the principles remained the same: when Sir H. Seymour made his appearance at Lisbon, all his despatches were rose water. He told the noble Lord that the Queen went out to attend the wounded soldiers; but all her acts of despotism were kept in the background. He had gone to make out a case for the Count, and he had done his best to do so. He seemed a man of a nervous temperament. He wrote home to the Government a cock-and-bull story, as it had turned out, about French intervention, for it was impossible to make out from the blue book that there was any such proffered intervention. Sir H. Seymour did not mention the circumstance on his own authority; it would appear that he had it from some old lady connected with the Portuguese Court, but he sent it home to the Government, and drove the noble Lord almost beside himself. The story was now denied. M. Guizot had since explained that he never intended to interfere; that his views under the Quadruple Treaty still existed in spirit, but that he had no idea of interfering, unaided by the concurrence of Spain and England. Sir Hamilton Seymour was evidently the victim of his own fancies. He had altogether exceeded his authority. We were pledged to give protection to the Queen, in case her person was in danger; but we were not pledged to guarantee the throne of the Queen. He found Sir H. Seymour, however, in one of his letters, guaranteeing the throne. When it was expected than an emeute was to break out in Lisbon, and the throne was not considered safe, and the Queen was about to take refuge on board the ships, he said, addressing Don Manoel de Portugal— I beg to acquaint your Excellency, that Her Majesty's forces now in the Tagus, will be prepared and ready to render assistance, according to the utmost of their power, for the protection of the person, the family, and the throne of Her Most Faithful Majesty, if endangered by such tumultuous risings. Well, what was the answer of the noble Lord (Lord Palmerston) to that? The noble Lord took no notice of the word "throne;" but merely said, "With reference to your despatch of the 9th instant, I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve of the steps taken by you in conjunction with Vice Admiral Sir W. Parker, for affording protection to the Queen and the Royal family of Portugal, and the persons and property of British subjects, in the event of a troublous rising in Lisbon." Not a word about "the throne" of Portugal. The noble Lord knew well that whatever treaties had passed between this country and Portugal, there was no guarantee to support any particular dynasty or rulers. The only guarantee was, that we should interfere in the affairs of Portugal if it was menaced by foreign invasion. He would not go over the old treaties of 1651 and 1703, but would merely state that they did not guarantee any particular dynasty. They only said that Great Britain would defend Portugal in case it was menaced by foreign intervention. Mr. Canning, in 1822, when he was applied to, declared that he would not interfere in the internal affairs of Portugal; and he declined to guarantee any particular succession. When 5,000 men were sent to that country, the officer in command of those troops was distinctly instructed by Mr. Canning that he was not to interfere in the internal affairs of that country. If he needed any authority to prove that this had always been the policy of Great Britain, he could quote one that would be quite conclusive with the House; and he would ask the right hon. Gentleman whose opinion he was about to adduce, whether the present intervention in the affairs of Portugal was consistent and agreeable to the course which this country took in 1829? He thought that right hon. Gentleman must condemn the course taken by the present Government; and, that in spite of any wish he might hare not to displace the Government, he was bound to put aside all such considerations, and say—"Here is a great principle at stake, between constitutional liberty and absolutism, and I am bound to give my vote against the Government." The right hon. Gentleman to whom he was now alluding (Sir R. Peel), on the 1st of June, 1839, speaking on this very subject of Portugal, in reply to the noble Lord (Lord Palmerston), who had attacked the intervention at that time, said, that the uniform answer of this country had been, to applications for assistance, that the guarantees given by this country had only been against foreign intervention, and that the rule laid down by England was not to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. The right hon. Gentleman had laid down the correct rule in 1829; and he therefore hoped that in 1847 he would support the same principle by his vote. The Quadruple Alliance of 1834 did not call upon Great Britain to interfere in behalf of any particular dynasty; but it appeared that this intervention did not take place under the Quadruple Alliance. He had styled this "a convention;" but he hardly knew what to call it. He had, however, heard it suggested as a grave doubt whether they were warranted under this protocol taking away human life. And although the number of lives lost had been but trivial, he had heard it maintained that with respect to the three men killed in the late interference of the British forces, some one was liable to an action for murder. He stated no authority for this opinion, but he had heard lawyers argue it. For himself, he did not know whether this country was at war or not. One thing that astonished him greatly was, how the Foreign Minister of France could put his name to such a protocol as that recently signed in London; and still less was he able to conceive how such a proceeding could have been assented to by the King of that country. That a Monarch who had been the creation of a popular tumult—for Louis Philippe was popularly called the King of the Barricades—that he should say to the Portuguese people, "I have risen upon the ruins of the throne of Charles X., who outraged the principles of a constitutional monarchy"—and who, by the by, had not done half as much as the Queen of Portugal—"and you shall not resist the sway of the Queen; you shall be in fact her slaves," astonished him. This might be the language of the King of the French; but he did not believe that France would continue to tolerate it. He thought it the most unwise step the King of the French had ever taken to secure the dynasty of Orleans on the throne, when he commanded his Minister to put his name to that protocol. If there were any feelings for constitutional liberty left in France, the people of that country would ask what would be their fate when the Monarch who could do this was able to encompass Paris with his fortifications, and to procure the noble Lord's intervention with his English fleet? He doubted whether the Government would be able to escape from this damning fact, that a Ministry calling themselves liberal, had proved themselves the friends to the most absolute principles in Portugal—that they had pandered to the prejudices and caprices of the Court, and put the liberty of the people of that country on one side. What had this country ever gained by these conventions? He held in his hand the six conventions to which this country had been a party since 1836—the Conventions respecting Greece, Spain, Central Asia, Syria, the Dardanelles, and the present protocol of May 21, 1847. What had either this or any of the other countries who had taken part in these conventions gained by them? But perhaps the noble Lord might ask him, what he would have done or proposed to do? He would answer in the language of the noble Lord's own agent, Mr. Bulwer, that the peace of the world was of too great consequence to warrant us in interfering in the internal affairs of Portugal. If he had been the Foreign Secretary, he would have said when these old women's stories came from Lisbon, and Count Thomar attempted to play the same game at Madrid that he had played in Lisbon, that as soon as the first Spanish soldier crossed the frontier of Portugal, Great Britain would march an army into Spain. If the noble Lord had only told the Spaniards they should smoke no cigars from the Havannah, they would not have been so eager for interference in the affairs of Portugal. What would be the result of Spanish intervention? There was a considerable party in Spain and Portugal favourable to the union of the two countries; and when the Portuguese saw that the intervention and protection of this country was a mere farce—that it was a mere shadow from which they derived no benefit, but which was merely used to keep a despot on the throne—they would probably join the party who were favourable to a union of the two countries. The Portuguese would say, "directly we assert our constitutional rights, the British Government take part against us." Was there no fear that, under such circumstances, they would fraternize with the party in Spain in the project he had mentioned? Indeed, he was told that such a conjuncture would most probably arrive, if a Spanish force made its appearance in Portugal. But the noble Lord might suppose he had succeeded in his policy. 3,000 men, who had fought for liberal principles, had been taken; the Queen of Portugal had sent to demand that they should be given up to her, and the fleet was probably already freighted which would take these prisoners to Angola. The noble Lord, therefore, no doubt assumed that the matter was settled. But how could he believe that the question was settled? The noble Lord know that such was not the case. Let them turn to page 304 of the Papers, and read a letter from the Marquess of Normanby to Lord Palmerston, dated Paris, May 7, 1847. The noble Marquess said— After having failed in two attempts to see M. Guizot, both yesterday and to-day, in consequence of the press of business he has had both in the Chamber and out of it, I have just returned from reading to him your Lordship's despatch to Sir Hamilton Seymour of the 4th of May, in conformity with the instructions conveyed to me in your Lordship's despatch of the 4th instant. M. Guizot said that he perfectly concurred in everything there stated; that he felt the same regret as I had already expressed that there should have been any necessity to press the Queen of Portugal on such a point as that which had been under discussion; but that he quite felt that such necessity had existed. His Excellency then informed me that he had just received a telegraphic despatch from Count Jarnac, announcing that your Lordship had received intelligence to the 28th ultimo, that the Queen had accepted the mediation of England in the terms it had been proposed. M. Guizot then asked whether I thought in such a country the settlement would be permanent; whether it might not all begin again in three months? I said that he had put to me a very difficult question, which I had no better means of answering than he had himself; that one's opinion could only be of the nature of an expectation, and that expectation could have no other foundation than one's hopes or one's fears. Much must of course depend upon the prudence of all parties, over none of whom could we pretend to exercise any permanent control. The noble Marquess was very much puzzled to answer that question; perhaps the noble Lord could answer it now, and state what probability there was of a permanent settlement. He did not hesitate to say that Her Majesty's Ministers, in wishing to preserve the present dynasty of Portugal on the throne, had done more to unsettle the affection of the Portuguese people, and to strike a blow at royalty, not only in Europe, but throughout the civilized world, than any Ministry that ever took office under the Crown. It was well known that the power of England was not based on military force. The noble Lord now at the head of the Foreign Office, in his speech on the 1st of June, 1829, said, that England need send no army on the Continent, and that the power of Great Britain arose from her superior sympathy with constitutional liberty, and her horror of slavery. But, what was her conduct now in Europe? Would not every petty despot rejoice, and calculate on the assistance of England against his own subjects? Mr. Bulwer, in one of his despatches said, that the Spanish Court rejoiced in the prospect of British intervention in the affairs of Portugal, and in the anticipation that Portugal would have an absolute Queen, who would defy the people and their claims. There was something in the blue book respecting Angola, which showed the treacherous nature of the Portuguese Government. It was attempted on the part of the Minister for Foreign Affairs in that country to show that Angola was an uncommonly healthy country, and that there were the greatest number of applications for offices in Angola. But, although Don Manuel de Castro was able to convince Mr. Southern, the noble Lord (Lord Palmerston) knew more about Angola than his agent, and wrote to protest against the removal of the prisoners thither. The speech of the noble Lord in 1829, to which he had already referred, went directly contrary to every act which he had now adopted relative to Portugal. When speaking on this very subject of Portugal, and reading a lecture to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Tamworth, the noble Lord said— Those statesmen who seek to check improvement, to cherish abuses, to crush opinions, and to prohibit the human race from thinking, whatever may be the apparent power they wield, will find their weapon snap short in their hand when they most need its protection. And the noble Lord went on to complain, that— England, instead of being looked up to as the patron no less than the model of constitutional freedom, as the refuge from persecution, and the shield against oppression, had her name coupled by every tongue with everything on the Continent that is hostile to improvement and friendly to despotism, from the banks of the Tagus to the shores of the Bosphorus. That was what the noble Lord (Lord Palmerston) said in 1829. What would he say now? Would he treat the House to a recliauffée of his speech of 1829, and maintain that, in his recent interference in Portugal, he had been defending constitutional liberty "from the banks of the Tagus to the shores of the Bosphorus?"

LORD J. RUSSELL

Sir, I was anxious that the earliest possible day should be given to the hon. Member for Montrose, that he might have an opportunity of bringing forward his resolution before the House concerning the course which Her Majesty's Government has pursued. But, Sir, after hearing his speech and that of the hon. Member who has just sat down, I own I am in doubt whether our natural anxiety to have this question brought before the House, and not to shrink from any accusation that might be made against us, has not brought on the House the inconvenience of Gentlemen preparing their opinions and speeches on the subject without reference to the facts on which they had to speak. Because, Sir, both the hon. Gentleman the Member for Montrose, and, more especially, the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down, spoke entirely from a reference to some papers which do not exist, and in total defiance of that which they might have read plainly in the papers before the House. The hon. Member for Wycombe has founded his speech and his censure entirely on the supposition that Her Majesty's Government have engaged in establishing an absolute Government in Portugal—that it was their view to maintain a despotism in that country; and he therefore broke out into declamations and invectives against a Ministry that could be guilty of such proceedings. But the simple fact is, that no such object has ever been held in view by Her Majesty's Government—that, on the contrary, of the proposition, which my noble Friend made, first to the Queen of Portugal, and afterwards to the Junta of Oporto, the terms were, that all arbitrary decrees should cease—that everything done since the 6th of October should be revoked—that the Cortes should be called together, and the constitutional law of Portugal have full effect. And that simple observation destroys three-fourths of the speech of the hon. Gentleman. As to intervention, it appears, as I shall afterwards remark, that he certainly cannot blame us for interfering when he would himself have interfered in this manner, that he would have told the Crown of Spain that no Spanish forces should enter Portugal. Sir, what I have to contend in opposition to the hon. Gentleman who has made this speech is, that it was necessary to interfere, first, for the welfare of Portugal; and secondly, for the interests of this country. And further, I am ready to maintain that by that interference we have averted the danger of an European war. These three propositions, I think, can he proved from the papers which have been laid before the House, and from the events which have taken place within the last few weeks. Sir, I will not follow the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down on the subject of the previous Ministers of Portugal up to the time of the Cabrals. Their Ministry had been destroyed by a military revolution, similar to others that had taken place in the Peninsula. The Duke de Palmella was at the head of an Administration, when placards appeared and meetings were held, which gave great alarm to all the party which was then out of power, threatening the subversion of the constitution, and the destruction of the power of the monarchy. The Queen thought it necessary—being acted upon by those alarms, partaking of the fears thus entertained, and joining those who formed a considerable party in Portugal (Chartists)—thought it necessary to ask the Duke de Palmella whether he could save her from the dangers she apprehended; and he consented to continue Minister; but, not knowing what might occur in the next Cortes, she desired that he would resign, and at once formed another Ministry. So far there was nothing unconstitutional. There might be something imprudent in the conduct of the Queen; but, so far as the dismissal of the Ministry was concerned, that was an act of the sovereign power which any Sovereign in any country might have recourse to. Lord Howard de Walden, who was then at Lisbon, seems to have supposed at first that the nomination of the Marquess de Saldanha would be favourably received. He speaks of the Septembrists waiting on him, asking whether they were safe, and whether they could depend on the execution of the ordinary law of the country; and he thought that affairs would be conducted without tumult or revolution. But, in a few days after, a fear opposite to that which had excited the Crown of Portugal to the change of Ministry seems to have possessed the Count das Antas and the Septembrists. They formed the Junta of Oporto, and sent certain addresses to their Sovereign, in which they demanded that the new Ministry should be dismissed, and expressed their fears of what is called the Cabralista faction in Portugal. On their demands being refused, they placed themselves in arms against their Sovereign. I am not now to argue whether they were justified in their fears—whether what they apprehended would have taken place; hut I am quite ready to admit that no sooner had the insurgents appeared in arms at Oporto, and in other places, than the restraints of the constitution were entirely thrown aside, and decrees the most arbitrary, and acts the most despotic, were countenanced and sanctioned by the Government of Lisbon. The hon. Member for Montrose went through a narrative of these various acts, as if they were acts which Her Majesty's Government were bound to defend, and of which they were to be the apologists. Why, Sir, they form a part of our case. It is to put an end to them, and to prevent the continuance of such an arbitrary and despotic system of Government in Portugal, that my noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs wrote the despatch of the 5th of April, in which he proposed terms to both the Queen and the Junta. Take the acts in succession as they arise. You will find that our Minister at Lisbon, and my noble Friend in London, disapproved of them one after the other, and remonstrated earnestly with the Government at Lisbon on the arbitrary character of those acts. Take one of them, the deportation of the prisoners who were taken at Torres Vedras—an act unjustifiable in itself, and extremely cruel to the persons who suffered. Unfortunately, the Crown of Portugal had placed itself in the hands of a party which seemed to have thought that the indulgence of their resentments should be a part of the policy of the State, and continued those acts in spite of every remonstrance. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Wycombe has said much in favour of Mr. Southern, and much against the conduct of the Queen of Portugal. I beg to read to the House the account Mr. Southern gives of his note on the subject of Torres Vedras:— The note which I addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on this subject, and which is enclosed in my despatch of the 30th of January, was delivered to Don Manoel de Portugal at eleven o'clock in the morning of the 29th ultimo; and I find it has been the subject of repeated deliberations of the Cabinet. I am happy to think that the benevolent feelings of their Majesties induced them to support the views I had thought it my duty to lay before the Foreign Minister; but the opinion of the Cabinet, to which some extraneous persons were admitted, finally prevailed, on being backed by a threat of immediate resignation on the part of the Ministry. And so it was with respect to every act that was then adopted. When my noble Friend wrote to propose that terms of mediation should be offered to the Junta, the Marquess de Saldanha said in a similar way that he would resign the command of the army, and retire into private life, if that course was adopted. In this country, we consider that those who advise the Sovereign are responsible for the acts of the Crown. I think it was an unfortunate thing that the Queen should have put herself into the hands of the party who have governed Portugal for several months; but I think it is too much for the hon. Member for Wycombe to lay the blame on the Sovereign principally, and not to consider that the party which had the Ministry in its hands, and imposed law on the Queen, both as to the government and the direction of the army, is also responsible. It appeared to us that the only thing we could do was to advise that such acts of violence should be discontinued, and that such terms should be offered to the Junta as they would be able to accept consistently with the maintenance of the liberties of Portugal. That course was accordingly taken by us; but, I am sorry to say, without effect. On the other hand, the Junta of Oporto become less and less a body representing persons alarmed at the loss of their liberties, and only asking protection for their liberties from the Throne, to which they were determined to continue always loyal. I have already quoted Mr. Southern, who is certainly a most able man, and whose despatches do him the highest credit, and I will again quote from him a description of the change which took place in the state of parties in Portugal. Mr. Southern says, in a despatch dated January 19, 1847— It becomes daily better ascertained that the intelligence entered into between the liberal insurgents and the Royalists amounts to co-operation, with the common object of overturning the Queen and the Government. At the same time there is still more reason for believing that the restoration of Don Miguel is not an event contemplated by the party who took arms against the Government appointed under the coup d'état of the 6th of October. This connexion, such as it is, however, has caused the most serious alarm in Lisbon, not merely to the adherents of the Government, but likewise to the constitutional and chartist states- men, of whom there are some under persecution—some in concealment—some tolerated in public—who sympathize to a certain extent with the cause of the insurgents; but while they condemn the conduct of the Government, disapprove, or at least take no part in the appeal to arms made by the Count das Antas and his companions. The first class, the adherents to the Government, dread the great additional strength which the insurgents will acquire by the coalition, and the increased sources of resistance to the Government, of every kind, which will be opened by an address to the prejudices and bigotry of the mass of the people. The second class, the constitutional public men, who have taken no part in the insurrection, tremble before the probable ultimate consequences of this coalition. Scarcely any of them doubt that such an union, if fully carried out, will be fatal to the Queen's throne; and they see in this connexion the dishonour, and the consequent feebleness and degradation, of the party which forms so discreditable an alliance. They foresee that in the day of triumph an overwhelming force, both moral and physical, will be vested in the leaders of the Royalists, who will make the natural use of it by asserting their own principles and carrying out their own measures, the first victims of which will be the men who, at the sacrifice of their political honour, called in an aid of so treacherous and so disgraceful a character. Such is the description given by Mr. Southern of the party assembled at Oporto—of the Junta of Oporto, and those who obeyed it. The Miguelites, who, according to an existing convention, could not hold certain military rank, obtained that rank from the Junta of Oporto, acted with that body, commanded their troops, and, according to the opinion of Mr. Southern, would ultimately have had the advantage by that coalition. The country, therefore, was evidently divided between three par-ties: first, that which immediately adhered to the Queen, and governed in her name; secondly, the party of the Junta, formed of men some of whom were of violent democratic principles, and who professed to have taken up arms in defence of their liberties, although, in fact, they had done so before their liberties had been menaced; and the third was the Miguelite party, who were very numerous in Portugal, and, when joined to the party of the Junta, added enormously to their forces. Still, the superiority of Marshal Saldanha in the field was unquestionable. He had gained a victory at Torres Vedras, and proceeded to besiege Oporto. Things went on in this state, and neither party appeared likely to prove victorious. In the meantime Portugal was disturbed to its centre. Her commerce languished—her fields were untilled—dangers arose on every side—the whole country was divided among soldiery who were destroying the peasantry—and every account which proceeded from men of moderate opinions deplored the continuance of such a system. Now, I say that, in these circumstances, we were justified in thinking that if the civil war could he brought to a termination which would secure a constitutional government to the country—which would give an act of oblivion to all who had taken part in one side or the other—which would have procured the recall of the persons sent to Angola—and would have provided for the immediate convocation of the Cortes—an immense boon would thereby be conferred upon Portugal. And such, in fact, was the proposition which my noble Friend made to the contending parties in his despatch of the 5th of April. In that despatch my noble Friend said, in substance— This is not a case which comes within the terms or spirit of the Quadruple Alliance, because Don Miguel is not in the field; but the evils which afflict Portugal are of so serious a character, that we feel it necessary to offer to mediate between the contending parties upon terms of fairness; which we hope will be accepted. The terms were offered to the Queen, who immediately assembled her Council to consider them. Although Her Majesty's Council was not an ordinary Cabinet, they thought the terms proposed were so degrading to the Queen, and so advantageous to the Junta, into whose hands they believed they were certain to place power, that they advised their Sovereign to ask for additional terms, involving the banishment of the leaders of the insurrection. Sir H. Seymour, who has been represented, most unjustly, as willing to do anything which the Court of Portugal proposed, but who acted with the greatest ability throughout these transactions, and with as much honesty and firmness as ability, immediately declared that he could not accept the proposed addition to the terms—that the persons pointed out must all receive the benefit of the general amnesty—and that if, on the meeting of the Cortes, the leaders of the insurrection should prove to be in a majority, power must be placed in their hands—that we would not interfere to prevent that consequence—that we would not enforce the terms which required that those persons should be sent out of the country—and that our interference was at an end if that condition was insisted on. Sir H. Seymour wrote to this country an account of what he had done, and the Cabinet approved of it. We thought that the terms originally proposed were fair to all parties, and were calculated to settle the country on a constitutional basis, and we would not depart from them. Before our answer reached Sir H. Seymour, the Queen had accepted the terms offered to her. She also received the resignation of her Ministers, and replaced them by an Administration of a moderate character. Therefore, one of the securities which we desired to obtain for Portugal, namely, the nomination of a Ministry which had had no share in the acts of arbitrary and violent government that had occurred, was gained. Our proposition to the Queen was, that if she would consent to he bound by our terms—if she would call the Cortes—if she would revoke all her arbitrary decrees—if she would recall the persons who had been banished—then the British Government, in connexion with its allies, would employ force in order to compel the Junta to submit to those terms. Then the question comes, were we justified in so doing? I will not weary the House by quoting numerous despatches in those papers; but I think they contain evidence which shows that so miserable was the condition of Portugal, our ancient ally, with whom we have long maintained the most intimate relations of commerce and the closest brotherhood in arms, as to justify us in imposing such terms upon the contending parties, if the happiness and freedom of Portugal could thereby be established. But there was another question which we felt ourselves hound to consider, and that was what were the interests of England in the matter? We were bound to consider how the interests of England would be affected by the adoption of the course which we have taken, and how they would he affected by our refusing to adopt it. And, looking at the subject in this point of view, let mo remind the House both of our ancient relations with Portugal, and of the manner in which, during the various difficulties and dangers of this country, Portugal has been our ally. Since the commencement of the last century, I think there have not been less than four wars, in which the greater part of Spain joined with France, then at war with this country, whilst Portugal maintained her alliance with England. At the end of the seven years' war, Spain joined in the confederacy against England, but Portugal remained firm in her alliance with us. At the end of the American war, Spain united with France against us, and the combined Spanish and French fleets swept the Channel triumphantly. Then again, during the French revolutionary war, although nothing seemed more unnatural than the union of the Bourbons of Spain with the French republic, yet, in a short time, the Spanish Bourbons did enter into that alliance, and became parties to the general war against Great Britain; but the alliance of Portugal, her friendship for this country, could not be shaken, and she remained faithful to England throughout that long and perilous war, and England derived great support from that alliance. But in the present question, what was the condition of Portugal as compared to Spain? Any one who will look through these papers will see, not only what was the state of Portugal, but what was the wish, and what, I must confess I think, was the natural policy of the Spanish Government. The Portuguese nation was divided between three parties: on one side there was Marshal Saldanha, at the head of a victorious army; and the Junta, and the Miguelites with a great body of troops on the other. The Spanish Government from the first saw in this revolution a danger to the throne of Donna Maria, and, in the danger to the throne of Donna Maria, danger to the throne of the Queen of Spain. Very early in the civil war, be-fore Saldanha applied to the Spanish Government for assistance, Mr. Bulwer had to report—which he docs on various occasions from November to April—that the Spanish Government had informed him they were disposed to interfere—that it would become a matter of necessity for the Spanish Government to interfere in the contest going on in Portugal. Neither can it well be doubted, that if a Spanish army had joined one of these two parties, then nearly equally balanced, Marshal Saldanha by that junction would have had much the best side in the contest. In all probability he would have triumphed with the forces of Lisbon over the forces of Oporto; and, as the result of that victory, the Spanish and Portuguese Governments would have done as they thought fit. And what would those Governments have done? because that is an important question for the House to consider. They would hardly have insisted on the immediate calling of the Cortes; but they would have insisted on the immediate banishment of the loaders of the Junta; they would probably have permitted that Ministry, which fell because we objected to its acts, to continue, and then indeed the liberties of Portugal would have been prostrated. They would have been prostrated likewise with all the irritation which hon. Gentlemen seemed to dread so much, rendered ten times worse by the interference being that of a Spanish army alone. Spain would have interfered with all the consequences of ill-will and national dislike that must follow any intervention made ten times worse from the interference coming from a Spanish army alone. But let me ask, first, what was the answer given to Mr. Bulwer by different Spanish Ministers—the Duke do Sotomayor and M. Pacheco? and let me observe, it is far from true that the Spanish Government, though disposed at first to interfere, gave up the intention at last. On the contrary, M. Pacheco used stronger language on the subject than the Duke de Sotomayor. He said he could not allow the throne of Donna Maria to be overturned, and that if any sudden emergency should arise, a Spanish army would be sent into Portugal, in spite of the declarations of England on the subject. Such being the statements of the Spanish Government, Mr. Bulwer answered in return, that the English Government expected and required the Spanish Government would not interfere without consulting with England: that answer was repeated over and over again. He said there could not be an interference with Portugal, without so strong a case as to overhear all scruples against it; but in that case England would be ready to concert with Spain what kind of interference it should be, how far it should be carried, and what should be the objects of it. That was the language employed; because, if Mr. Bulwer had said, do not interfere without the consent of England, and it had been the determination of England that in no case should an interference take place, that would have been deceitful conduct. Mr. Bulwer would have been guilty of treachery towards the Spanish Government, and would not have acted with that good faith with which, I trust, the English Government will always act towards all other nations. Mr. Bulwer said, we require you to wait until England is prepared to act. On the 5th of April my noble Friend wrote the despatch that has been alluded to, saying, if the terms proposed should be agreed to, England was prepared to carry them into effect by force. On the same day M. Pacheco wrote a note from Madrid, saying, the Spanish Govern- ment found it necessary so to interfere. He said— Her Majesty's Government, entirely foreign to the motives which may have originated so lamentable a situation, is now obliged to prevent its fatal consequences, and judges that the moment has arrived to employ for that purpose whatever measures may he in its power, not excepting armed intervention, so often asked for, and even recently with the greatest urgency, by the Court of Lisbon. But before having recourse to an extremity which is so repugnant to it, Her Majesty's Government is willing to employ conciliatory measures, and hastens therefore to seize the idea given by the Duke of Saldanha, to mediate between Her Most Faithful Majesty and the insurgents, in order to arrive at an arrangement which, without infringing the rights or the prerogatives of the Crown, may be acceptable to those who are enlisted under the banners of the Junta of Oporto. The project pointed out by the Marshal, of which you have probably heard, may serve, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, as a basis for the conditions to be drawn up, and to accelerate as far as possible the conclusion of the negotiations. Her Majesty's Government has determined to send immediately a new Minister Plenipotentiary to Portugal, with the special mission of carrying out that idea. Nevertheless, as it would not be surprising that this mediation may not produce the desired result, this Minister Plenipotentiary will also be duly authorized to negotiate in Lisbon respecting the possible intervention of our arms; neither ought I to conceal from you, that, although the Spanish Government will be delighted, that in this negotiation the representatives of the Allied Courts, accredited at that of Her Most Faithful Majesty, and who signed the treaty of the Quadruple Alliance, should take part, yet this will not hinder, should it by any event not be possible for the Four Powers to agree and act upon a common and thorough understanding, should a case of urgent necessity occur, that the indispensable remedy would be applied, particularly endeavouring to do so in accordance with Great Britain, and to carry out the intervention in the manner and on the basis which might be determined on between the two Governments. I must, however, state to you that, in the event of a sudden crisis, during which the throne of Donna Maria da Gloria might be overthrown, the Spanish Government could not possibly consent to such a catastrophe, and would act alone, and of its own accord. That was the determination of the Spanish Government if England longer delayed; if we had not proposed to interfere at that time, such was the positive and ultimate determination of the Spanish Government if any crisis arose. The hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr. B. Osborne), who spoke against our interference—an interference which, I trust, will speedily lead to the desirable result of establishing tranquillity in Portugal—says, "By no means interfere, but threaten Spain with war if she acts contrary to your wishes." That, I understand, is the opinion of other hon. Gentle- men also; and, as far as I can gather, is the sentiment of the peaceful Member for Montrose, who makes the Motion. That is, the opinion that we ought to threaten Spain with hostilities in case she should interfere to put down this insurrection in Portugal. We have got to this alternative. It is quite evident with regard to Spain we must have taken one alternative or the other. We must either have said, we will not interfere at all, and leave it to Spain, thereby exposing Portugal to all the evils I have mentioned; or we will threaten Spain with war in case she interferes by arms in that country, as she had positively declared she would do. Now, let the House consider what the situation is. We are to threaten with war a friendly Power with whom we are at peace. Queen Isabella reigns by a title similar to that of Donna Maria; had the Portuguese Junta succeeded in overturning the throne of Donna Maria, the Spanish Government naturally supposed Don Miguel would have been raised in her place. It was felt, too, if Don Miguel reigned in Portugal, the power of the Car-lists in Spain would be strengthened; and Spain could not and would not permit such a revolution in the Government of Portugal. I think the fears of the Spanish Government might be exaggerated; I believe the idea that Miguel was to succeed, if the Junta triumphed at Lisbon, was an exaggerated sentiment. I do not think it was meant to be; but if the Spanish Government stated, the existence of the dynasty of our Queen depends on our interference in Portugal, we should have had no case that would in justice have enabled us to say, we will appeal to arms to prevent such interference. If the Government of Spain took measures for its security, let us for a moment look at the probable consequences. If we took part against the Spanish Government, I suppose the House will readily assent to this proposition, that we must have joined and connected ourselves with the Junta of Oporto—that we must in that case have fought against the throne of Donna Maria, and against the interests of the House of Braganza—that thus the intimate alliance of centuries would be set at nought and violated, and that authority overturned which we ought to wish to see maintained in splendour and security. Let us consider the nature of that cause in which we must have been about to engage, if we took our part against the throne of Portugal. Should we then have united ourselves with the leaders of the Junta? By no means. The Count das Antas and the other leaders of the Junta had at that time lost all their authority. They had ceased then to exercise any influence over their followers; those amongst the leaders who ventured to remonstrate were not even listened to, and all moderate men ceased to belong to a party which, if it succeeded, would plunge the country in anarchy and murder, and blood would soon flow in the streets of Lisbon. One Portuguese gentleman had very truly said— It is not a republic that they would establish. I should thank God to see a republic erected, or even a hope of it; but, if that party obtained ascendancy, the mob would be in possession of every town, the soldiers would be no longer under the control of their proper leaders—there would, in such a state of things, be no organized Government in Portugal. Then I will ask this House how could the Government of England undertake to defend that condition of anarchy against the legitimate powers of Portugal and Spain? We should now be surrounded with immense difficulties if we had taken such a course; and how exceedingly would those difficulties have been aggravated if the interference of Spain had in the case I am supposing been successful? If Spain had so interfered, she would have had with her, if not the active assistance, at least the cordial good wishes of France. The Minister of France distinctly stated that this case had been provided for by the Quadruple Alliance; and I apprehend there can be no doubt that the Government of Franco must have wished well to Spain in the course and progress of such an undertaking as the interference to which I have referred. If, then, Spain were to establish her supremacy in Portugal, is this House prepared for the probable results? Are you prepared for this—that our ancient alliance with Portugal shall give place to Spanish supremacy in that part of the Peninsula? I say that I should shrink altogether from asserting our influence in Portugal by joining a party so thoroughly unable to govern that country, or to form anything like a stable Government. The thought of a course so evidently against the interests of England, could not for a moment be entertained. This point we all felt deeply. I felt that after our long connexion with Portugal, I should be sorry to belong to a Government in England which, when called upon to interfere at a time like that to which I am referring, at a time too when we possessed the power to dictate the terms on which we should interfere—I say I should have been sorry if we had shrunk from giving to Portugal that assistance which we were bound by treaties to afford. I should have been sorry to have taken any part in so for ever dissolving our connexion with the Government of Portugal. There is nothing which I more fully believe than that the safety of England is founded upon her alliances. I believe that we have no security for the prevention of war unless the balance of power in Europe be preserved. Unless we stand by our ancient alliances, we shall soon be obliged to accept disadvantageous terms of peace, or else be prepared to equip a large army and send out a large fleet in order to preserve our independence. In saying this, I speak the language of those who have largely enjoyed the confidence of the English people. A great man, and a most distinguished Minister, has, before now, held the same language; and no instance of a similar kind has arisen without a similar interference having been resorted to not only in Portugal but in other parts of the continent of Europe. In the year 1786 the democratic party in the Netherlands gained possession of the government; that democratic party was then supported by France; the power of the Prince of Orange was altogether subverted; the whole force of the Government was in the hands of the party that had rebelled. England eventually interfered; but the circumstances arose thus: The Princess of Orange passing along the streets in her carriage, was insulted by the mob. The King of Prussia immediately marched an army to the support of the Stadtholder, and restored the authority of the Government and the tranquillity of the country. England instantly threatened that if France interfered to disturb the settlement that Prussia had effected, she would take an active part in the dispute. There was in this case, as the hon. Member for Montrose would say, a great people who had established a government for themselves. Now, that hon. Member would contend that such interference as I have been now describing was clearly against the principles upon which England had always proceeded. But yet the course pursued on this occasion was one which Mr. Pitt advised; and every one knows that up to that time, at least, no Minister could be more favourable to peace than he had uniformly shown himself to be; and let it not be forgotten that he had a short time previously to that event concluded a treaty of com- merce with Holland. All this occurred when Parliament was not sitting. At the commencement of the then next ensuing Session, the Minister advised the King to state all the circumstances in his speech from the Throne; and Mr. Fox, on the 27th of November, 1787, used the following words:— He took the beginning of the Address, containing an avowal that the situation of affairs in the Republic of the United Provinces seemed likely, in its consequences, to affect the security and interest of the British dominions, and that His Majesty had acted with success upon that circumstance, to he the essential substance of the Address, and to that he gave his full assent. So much for the authority of both Pitt and Fox, both agreeing as to the necessity, the expediency, and the justice of interference, not only against a body of insurgents, but against men who had actually established a government of their own, having previously overturned that of the Stadtholder. In conformity with that and other precedents, we interfered in the concerns of Portugal, and we interfered as it appeared to us, in the manner most in conformity with the interests of Portugal. But we had a right also to consider the interest and the security of England—we were bound to look at the old alliance which we enjoyed with, and the ancient influence which we possessed in, Portugal. As to the manner in which this interference is to be carried into effect, I say that the whole point made upon this subject falls to the ground, if I show that the interference has not been made upon the principles of the Holy Alliance; that it is not for the maintenance of despotism, but for the re-establishment of the constitutional charter of Don Pedro, the authority of the Cortes, and the protection of constitutional liberty. The Count das Antas himself admitted that the terms offered to the Junta were unexceptionable; and they had been told from the beginning by Sir H. Seymour and by Colonel Wylde that England would interfere if these terms were not accepted. They appeared at the time to have received advices of the failure of the negotiation. But another circumstance was, that the leaders of the Junta did not dare to disobey their followers, who, as already stated, had combined their movements; and they dreaded a danger, not only to their authority, but actual danger to their persons, if they should agree to the terms which had been proposed. Such, I believe, were the reasons why those terms were not accepted in the first instance. Sir H. Seymour, seeing the state of affairs, seeing the urgency of the occasion, informed by the despatch of the 5th of April that England intended to concert measures of interference by arms, took it upon himself to desire Sir W. Parker to send ships to Oporto. Notice had already been given, and a further letter was written, informing the Junta that their hostile proceedings could no longer be carried on. The Conde das Antas had embarked upwards of 3,000 men, I think, on board his vessels, and was about to proceed to the south, to inflict, as he said, a fatal blow on the Queen's Government at Lisbon. Sir T. Maitland, who was chief officer there, having received these orders, sent an officer on board one of the steamers commanded by Captain Salter, to inform him that if he proceeded to sea with the steamers they would be captured by Her Majesty's ships, which had been ordered to Oporto for that purpose. The knowledge that this message was given to Mr. Salter, induced the Junta to break off their proposition for an armistice; but it is true that although this full notice was given, there was another letter, which was not delivered at that time; and this has given rise to the notion that the Junta had not received the notice that hostilities would commence. In fact, however, they had received, first, a notice from Sir H. Seymour—next, a notice from Colonel Wylde—next, they were informed of the expedition sent with the America for that very purpose. There only remained that one last letter, which they had not received; but I really think the Conde das Antas and those who were with him must have been well aware what was likely to take place. Sir T. Maitland, seeing the men wore embarked, and that they had come outside the bar, then thought it necessary to carry his instructions into effect. He informed the officers commanding those ships that they must surrender to him—that he could not permit them to proceed to the south, nor to re-enter Oporto. On that intimation they, without any resistance, surrendered to Sir J. Maitland, the Count das Antas only declaring that he and his troops surrendered as prisoners of war to the British forces; and they desired to be kept in the custody of the British troops, and not to be delivered up to their own Government. These terms have been faithfully adhered to, as might have been expected from the character of British officers—from the char- actor of Sir W. Parker and Sir T. Maitland. Those men have been placed in the castle of St. Jullien's under a guard of British marines. There they are kept as prisoners of war, as they surrendered. The consequence of this must be—and I expect will very shortly be from all I have heard—that both the Junta at Oporto and Sa da Bandeira, who is in command of the forces of the Junta at St. Ubes, will accept the terms originally proposed by Her Majesty's Government; that they will accept the terms by which all political offences committed since the commencement of the war will be passed over; and that the constitution will be re-established. So far, therefore, from establishing a despotism, what we have done is to put an end to despotism; to put an end to that despotism which existed at Lisbon; to put an end to the irregular and violent authority which was substituted at Oporto; to interfere for the welfare of the people of Portugal; and, as I have said, lastly, for the purposes of European peace. Let us, in the last place, consider what would have been the danger if we had taken that course which is now recommended to us—if we had been ready to declare that Spain should not interfere—that a casus belli would occur if she did—that we would be prepared with perfect tranquillity to see the throne of Donna Maria overturned—that we would be prepared to see the family of Braganza sent into exile—but that we would not allow Spanish soldiers to cross the frontiers? I speak with the most entire conviction, when I say that such a determination of the Government of this country would have been eminently hazardous to the peace of Europe. For let us consider—I think it is impossible not to consider—that, with regard to all these questions of political constitution—with regard to all those changes in the internal constitutions of States, we are not now in a state very different from that in which Europe was placed during the wars that succeeded the Reformation. At that period it was not nation against nation, but the French Protestants sympathizing with the Government of England, and English Catholics sympathizing with the Government of Spain; so all over Europe there were divisions of religion by which men wore bound together, and States interfered and contended in arms for the sake of promoting that religion to which the main forces of the State and a majority of the people belonged. Queen Elizabeth, inter- fering in the Netherlands to promote the insurrection against the Spanish Catholic power, and Philip II. doing his utmost to raise a rebellion in England against the Protestant Queen—such was the state of Europe during the time of the Reformation. And, in this time, in the question of political constitution, I think it must be evident to those who have carefully watched the progress of events, that Governments are not indifferent, and will not be indifferent, to the name of the dynasty and the form of the constitution which are established in neighbouring nations. Those who have seen the numerous cases of interference which have taken place in the last twenty years will have come to this conclusion. In 1827 there was an interference between Turkey and Greece, the Sultan not being allowed to use his own forces against those who had revolted. What, again, was the case, in 1831, with respect to Belgium? Some hon. Gentleman—I believe the hon. Member for Montrose (Mr. Hume)—said that in Belgium we had not interfered. Why, what was the question? Belgium, Belgian people, revolted against their Sovereign, who, by the Treaty of Vienna, by all the oaths which they had taken, had a full right to their allegiance. The Prince of Orange marched with an army to subdue those in insurrection. What happened? Why, in the first place, when the Duke of Wellington was Prime Minister, when the Earl of Aberdeen was Foreign Secretary, there were protocols establishing on the part of England and France an armistice in that country; and, in the next place, at a later period, when the Prince of Orange was marching against the Belgians, and expected to gain a victory over their forces, which were more newly levied than his own, the English Ambassador, Sir R. Adair, stopped the Prince of Orange in his march, and told him he must proceed no further. Was not that interference? Was not that an instance—an interference for the welfare, for the security of Belgium—for the establishment of a free constitution in Belgium, separate from Holland, and for maintaining the peace of Europe? Was not that a signal case of interference in the internal affairs of another nation? And so, likewise, in a subsequent case, with regard to the very case of Portugal, as the hon. Gentleman to-night has complained of our interference against the beneficent Government of Don Miguel: he usurped the Throne of Portugal, and endeavoured, by the most cruel means, to uphold himself in that position. Undoubtedly there was an interference on that occasion, and Don Pedro and Donna Maria were established in their rights by the aid of England, France, and Spain, who united together to ward off dangers from that Throne. Don Carlos was driven out of Portugal, in the first instance, and subsequently driven out of Spain. Was it entirely by Spanish forces? Was it by the means of Spain? No; by British ships—by British marines—especially at that siege of Bilboa adverted to to-night. By that interference the Throne of that country was maintained. I will not argue the policy of those different cases of interference. What I am showing now is, that this country has interfered—that there is nothing new in this principle—and that we have interfered, not as did the Holy Alliance, to establish despotism in any of those instances, but to establish a limited monarchy with representative assemblies, thereby securing the freedom of the people who were to live under them. Sir, I trust in this case our interference will have a similar result. The hon. Gentleman who made this Motion, in speaking against interference, said that our Government was founded on the principle of non-interference; and he quoted a most excellent illustration of that—the Revolution of 1688. That, he said, was a proof that the people of England had asserted their rights without the interference of any foreign Power. We have had very excellent laws and great freedom from that revolution. No one respects that system and those feelings by which the House of Hanover was placed upon the Throne more than I do; but with respect to those two cases, I cannot vindicate this country for having called for and accepted, and succeeded by the means of foreign interference. I hold in my hand rather a long extract; but I will trouble the House with only a small part of it, from the famous invitation addressed to the Prince of Orange, then a foreign prince, a citizen of a foreign State, signed by Lord Shrewsbury, Lord Devonshire, Lord Lumley, the Bishop of London, Admiral Russell, and Mr. Sidney, names all famous in history; and what do they say? Do they say "The people of England are prepared to rise, and we will force James from the throne, and then we invite you to come over and be our king?" Far from it. They say the people will not rise unless some foreign force comes over to counte- nance that rising; they therefore beg the Prince of Orange to come with a foreign force, to come with some Dutch troops, to enable the English to establish what Government they please in their own way; to assist them in that particular, and to enable them to rise; and that constitutional exhortation, so far from being confined to questions of personal liberty, or a representative constitution, or the rights of the subject and the Habeas Corpus Act, concludes thus:— We need not say anything about ammunition, artillery, mortar pieces, spare arms, &c; because, if you think fit to put anything in execution, you will provide enough of these kinds, and will take care to bring some good engineers with you. That was the exhortation which those excellent patriots, famous in all history, addressed to the Prince of Orange, when they invited him to come over to this country; and then the hon. Gentleman quotes that as an instance of this country having established liberty without foreign interference, and says that the whole constitution would be lost if a foreigner was seen in arms countenancing a revolution in England. I think the hon. Gentleman has not considered with care these precedents of interference which have occurred in our own history. When we wished to establish that House on the Throne, we were not satisfied with inviting the Prince of Orange to come over and take possession of the Throne; but we made another Treaty with Holland, that if the throne of the King we proposed to establish should be in danger, 6,000 Dutch troops should he in readiness to come over and maintain that Throne, and those troops were sent. And when, in 1723, our Government endeavoured to form another treaty to have troops sent over on a similar occasion, the Dutch complained that we had kept their troops so long on a former occasion; and they hesitated about sending us the aid we asked from them. Therefore both those occasions, the Revolution of 1688 and the establishment of the House of Hanover on the Throne, were cases in which foreign interference was permitted, and in which foreign interference was, I may say, invited, by those who were the second founders of the constitution. I admit that those cases of interference should not be adopted as a rule—that they should be an exception to the general policy of nations; and therefore it is, that with respect to this particular instance we have been slow to listen either to the representations of the Ministers of the Queen of Portugal, or to the representations of Spain; that we ought sooner to have interfered. We wished, if possible, that the civil war should cease by the offer of fair terms on the part of the Queen's Government, and by the acceptance of those terms on the part of the Junta; but neither party having been willing to listen to a compromise—seeing Portugal in the dreadful state to which it was reduced—seeing that if we did not interfere we should only prolong that misery; that if we allowed Spain to interfere alone or with the assistance of France, we should inflict another kind of misery on Portugal, and injure our own alliance with that country—seeing that at last it came to be a question whether we would maintain that ancient alliance—whether we should attempt to remedy the disorders of Portugal—wo at last agreed to this interference. Gentlemen ask what kind of guarantee we can give that these terms will be maintained? I think we have given to the Junta the faith of the Queen of Portugal as a pledge to her Allies; the only security, let me say, that there is for any treaty or convention, or any act between nations. The Portuguese Government has pledged itself to the Governments of England, France, and Spain, that the terms originally proposed by us shall be carried into effect. That Government is bound to us, not only by good faith, but by its own interests, to see those terms carried into effect. It will not, in fact, have the means of doing otherwise; and by doing so, its powers will be strengthened, the nation pacified, and the people who are in arms, once having laid them down, it would be the interest of all that they should endeavour to carry out the maxims of a representative constitution, and to procure a cessation of those wretched dissensions which have so long torn Portugal, and which have destroyed her agriculture, her peace, and her prosperity. My belief is, that by the acts we have signed—by the instructions we have given—we have acted in a manner that is conducive to that end; and, at all events, I shall have the satisfaction of reflecting that I do not belong to a Government which has abandoned an alliance with which England has kept in good faith for two centuries, and which, I trust, she will maintain for centuries to come.

Debate adjourned.

House adjourned at a quarter past Twelve.