ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. (BILL No. 1.)

HC Deb 23 April 1841 vol 57 cc1023-55

House went into committee on the Administration of Justice, (Bill No. 1.)

The clauses to the 6th inclusive agreed to.

On clause 7 being proposed,

Sir E. Sugden

said, that he understood this clause as transferring to the Accountant-general of the Court of Chancery the funds standing in the name of the Court of Exchequer. This arrangement, and the greater amount of business got through under the new system, would, he apprehended, very largely increase the emoluments of the Accountant-general, though the present amount of his income seemed quite sufficient for the office. The expense of the additional clerks would have to be defrayed out of the suitors' fund, or, in other words, by the public, while the increased fees and emoluments would be received by the Accountant-general. He (Sir E. Sugden) thought it desirable, that before this clause was adopted, the House should have some information as to what the future income of that officer was to be.

The Attorney-General

was not prepared to give this information, but he did not imagine the addition to the Accountant-general's income would be considerable, for the fund of the Court of Exchequer was not large. It was to be recollected, that the labour and responsibility of this officer would also be increased by the new arrangement.

Sir E. Sugden

said, he should propose to have the clause postponed until the information he asked was obtained.

The Attorney-General

could not agree to this course. It was most desirable to avoid any further delay with this bill.

Mr. Richards

said, the Exchequer fund was somewhere about two millions and a half. Certainly under three millions.

Sir E. Sugden

said, he had not the slightest wish to cut down the salary of this very useful and efficient officer, but at the same time there was no reason why it should be unduly increased. The salary of the Accountant-general was at present about 4,500l. or 5,000l. a-year, made up of fees and the profits of brokerage. Before consenting to any increase of that salary, he wanted to have full information as to what that increase would be. He wanted to have an account of the average income of the office during the last two or three years, and an estimate of the amount which would probably be added to it by the transfer of money from the Exchequer to Chancery. When a proper explanation was given, he should be ready to agree to the clause.

Mr. Goulburn

thought the money ought to be applied to compensate the officers of the Exchequer, instead of giving it in the shape of increased fees to the officer of the Court of Chancery. The present bill contained provisions for compensation to the officers of the Court of Exchequer.

Lord J. Russell

understood the right hon. Gentleman to say, that this being an office which was already sufficiently paid, anything added to its emoluments ought rather to be applied, as the right hon. Gentleman said, to compensate officers who would lose their employments by this bill, or as the hon. Member for Ripon had suggested, in the payment of clerks for the accountant's office. That was a reasonable proposition, and he saw no objection to it. But the proposition of the hon. Member for Ripon, for the rejection of this clause was of a totally different nature.

Sir E. Sugden

said, the noble Lord had only to insert a proviso in the clause, that any additional fees which should go to the Accountant-general's office, should go towards the payment of compensation to officers, and it would then meet with his approval. What he objected to was, that the clause should pass without some such explanation as this, and that the provision should be left till afterwards.

The Solicitor-general

said, that no fees would go by the transfer of this business of the Court of Exchequer to the Accountant - general; but the additional profit would be by the brokerage. The broker would give him half his fee for the preference, the suitor paying no more. He had not heard one word said against the reasonableness of the objects of the clause under consideration, and it seemed to him, that the proposed introduction into it of matter having no connection with these objects was at the present moment unadvised. The facts relating to the mode in which the profit was made, could not furnish a reason why the funds should not be transferred to the Court of Chancery. They might take away the whole salary of the Accountant-general if they pleased, in consideration of the brokerage, but he put it to them whether it was expedient in considering the question of the transfer of the jurisdiction to mix up another question which had no necessary connection with it. Therefore, although he might admit the propriety of the object which the hon. Gentleman had in view, still he submitted, that it would be more expedient to postpone the consideration of it till a future period.

Mr. C. Buller

thought the House much indebted to the right hon. Gentleman, the Member for Ripon, not only for what he himself had brought before it, but also for that which he had caused the hon. and learned Gentleman, the Attorney-general, to bring forward. He could not, however, see why the right hon. and learned Gentleman, the Member for Ripon, should divide the House against his right hon. and learned Friend, because his proviso was not introduced. The right hon. Gentleman might feel assured, that if he brought forward a clause embodying the views which he had stated, it would find ample support in that House. The mixing up the subject with the matter now under discussion, he looked upon as impolitic. He hoped, therefore, that the right hon. and learned Gentleman would take the trouble of preparing a separate clause, and when the subject came under the consideration of the House, he should not think, that the House did its duty, if it failed to provide other means for the payment of a public officer.

Mr. Briscoe

thought it monstrous, that the salary of a public officer should be dependent on a division of profits with a broker.

Mr. O'Connell

could see no reason whatever for voting against this clause. The jurisdiction of the Exchequer had already, by a former clause, been transferred to the Court of Chancery. All that now remained, therefore, was to transfer the money to where the jurisdiction was. They were going to divide on a clause to which no one objected. He would ask, how could they prevent the sharing of profits between the Accountant-general and the broker? If they did not divide the profits, the broker would get the whole. Perhaps they might think it advisable to attach the broker to the Court of Chancery? If so, let them appoint him. He objected to this opposition, which seemed to him to be used as an instrument of pressure on the Attorney-general.

Mr. Hume

thought, that the noble Lord had risen to give the House the assurance, that though the jurisdiction was transferred, the emoluments ought not to be increased, for the transfer of the money brought with it the transfer of additional emoluments. He submitted to the Government, whether it would not be more creditable to appoint a fixed salary for their officers, than to allow these fees to continue, a system which had been abolished in so many cases. He thought, that the noble Lord ought to satisfy the public wish by bringing forward a measure to that effect.

Lord J. Russell

said, that the hon. Gentleman had understood him rightly. He should be most glad to hear from hon. and learned Gentlemen any suggestions which they might have to make, and he would be perfectly willing to assist in carrying them into effect, if introduced in a separate clause, in such a manner as to make the emoluments a means of affording compensation, to clerks for loss of salary.

Sir E. Sygden

said, that the noble Lord should find him no captious objector. He was perfectly satisfied with the view taken by the noble Lord, and willingly withdrew his opposition.

Clause carried.

On the 19th clause, which relates to the appointment of two new Vice-chancellors, being read,

The Attorney-general

said, that by the preceding clauses, they had abolished the jurisdiction pf the Court of Exchequer, and they were now to consider how many new judges it would be necessary to appoint in Chancery. He proposed, that the blank in the clause should be filled up with the word "two," He would state shortly why he proposed, that there should be two new judges. The bill which came down from the House of Lords, last year, proposed, that there should be two, and the number had been determined on after very full consideration in the House of Lords, That House, after full deliberation, thought two necessary. Lord Brougham had been of a contrary opinion, but gave way to that of the Lord Chancellor, Lord Langdale, and Lord Lynd- hurst. There had been a committee of the House of Lords on the subject, and they had examined witnesses of great experience and intelligence, and capable of giving the best information on the subject. Those witnesses were unanimous in the opinion, that two new judges were necessary. The first witness was the Vice-chancellor, and he seemed to think two hardly sufficient. He was asked whether one would be sufficient, and he said it certainly would not. He was asked, did he not think two would be sufficient, and his answer was that he thought two would be sufficient at first. An eminent chancery practitioner, Mr. Sutton Sharpe, and others, whose competency to form a correct judgment, the right hon. Gentleman opposite would not question, were of the same opinion. But if two judges were necessary when that evidence was given, they were now quite as much so. In the returns of arrears there was a slight difference. The Lord Chancellor having disposed of several causes, had struck others out of the lists, because the parties not expecting them to come on so soon, were not ready for the hearing. But these causes must, of course, come on again, and then the amount of arrears would be much the same as before. The House would recollect, that in abolishing the jurisdiction of the Exchequer, they had increased the business of the Court of Chancery. To appoint only one additional judge in Chancery, would, therefore, be giving comparatively little relief. It had been suggested, that when once the arrears were disposed of, the two judges, if two were appointed, would become unnecessary. But it was to be expected, that getting rid of the arrears would lead to a considerable increase of business. New powers had been given to the Court of Chancery, which would certainly produce this result. At present, it was an undoubted fact, that unless the sum in dispute amounted to 1,000l. it was vain for any one to seek for justice in a court of equity. When claims were for a less amount, professional men advised their clients rather to relinquish them than go into the Court of Chancery. He believed, that this reproach to the administration of justice in England, would soon be wiped off; but the consequence would be a large increase of business, and he agreed with the Vice-chancellor in thinking, that though two judges might be sufficient at first, it would be afterwards found necessary to increase them. He, therefore, proposed that the number contained in the bill of last year he adopted, and that the blank be filled up with "two."

Mr. Hume

said, that when the precept bill was first brought in he had had an opportunity of conversing with Lord Brougham on the subject. He had spoken to him shortly before he quitted London, and his Lordship then expressed to him his opinion that it was not necessary to saddle the public with two new judges, as he thought one enough. The Government, the noble Lord thought, ought to have profited by the experience which they had had in the creation of the Court of Bankruptcy and its four judges.

The Attorney-General

begged leave to correct his hon. Friend. The remark of the hon. Gentleman respecting the Court of Bankruptcy was inapplicable. There it was a question of one court with four judges, while the present clause proposed to create two courts with one judge in each. He begged to remind the hon. Gentleman also, that only one vacancy could be filled up, for when the second occurred it could not be filled up without the sanction of Parliament.

Sir E. Sugden

thought it most impolitic, unless under circumstances of the very greatest necessity, to create two new courts of justice. The learned Attorney-general said, in reply to the hon. Member for Kilkenny, that this bill differed from Lord Brougham's, inasmuch as it created hut two new judges, one for each court, whereas by the bill of the noble Lord four judges were created for one court. But that did not get rid of the objection to two new courts, instead of one. Whether there were four judges or but one, there was still an additional court of justice too much, which would of course require an additional bar and additional attornies; so that unless they took great care this country would become a lawyer-ridden country. The opening of two new courts would create such a rush of barristers and attornies into them that he feared much of the business of those courts would not be done in a manner creditable to the administration of justice. The learned Attorney-general said, he would give power to the Lord Chancellor to alter the practice in the Master's Office, and that the alterations would be satisfactory. He should, however, like to know what those alterations were before he sanctioned the creation, not merely of two new judges,, but two new courts, whereby they would have five separate courts of equity sitting concurrently, while there were but three common law courts. He had already on former occasions shown to the House the state of the appellate jurisdiction, both in the House of Lords and Court of Review, and, taking that jurisdiction altogether, it, was a great reproach to the country that it should have been so long allowed to remain in its present state. But what would the consequence be of creating two more courts? Why, that they would have four judges, not only of co-ordinate, but, of subordinate jurisdiction, sitting at the same time; and it was utterly impossible to suppose that those judges would not be deciding different ways upon different questions of law. It would consequently require great pains and great length of time to keep right the law of England with so many different judges adjudicating in those different courts, The Lord Chancellor had already more than he could do; and yet either he must hear all the appeals from three courts, which of itself would suffice to occupy the whole of his time, or they must be brought to the House of Lords. Then, if they happened to have a Master of the Rolls superior in legal knowledge and experience to the Lord Chancellor, they might find the opinions of the better man overruled by one less versed in the law, and less approved of by the profession. If they went to the House of Lords to decide between the two, they still had but the self same man who decided in the court below, against a court of inferior jurisdiction. He had before shown that there was no necessity for those two additional courts. The Vice-Chancellor, he believed, was of opinion that one additional judge in the Court of Chancery would be quite sufficient. Even if two could be proved requisite, why create them both at once? The appointment of a new court of justice was a great and serious alteration. He saw no reason, therefore, why, even admitting the necessity of two courts to exist, they should not postpone the appointment of the second until they saw how the first would operate co-ordinately with the three already in existence. For his part he firmly believed that the creation of those two courts at the same time would lead to an incalculable amount of mischief. It was provided by this bill, that upon the demise of the first judge the office should be filled up, but not upon the demise of the second. It must be observed, however, that then they would have brought into practice an additional number of barristers and solicitors to meet the demand of that court. What was to become of those gentlemen? What was to be their employment? These were questions which led him to believe that plenty of reasons would be found and strongly advanced for continuing that second court; for he was of opinion, that whatever number of courts they created, the business to be done would accommodate itself to that number, however well it might be done with less. The right hon. Gentleman concluded by moving that the blank be filled up with "one" instead of "two."

Mr. Lynch

was of opinion, that suitors without courts was a much greater evil than courts without suitors, and was the particular evil which now pressed upon the public, and which it was now sought to remedy by the creation of two new courts. Without this assistance it was quite impossible that the Vice-Chancellor and Master of the Rolls, could get through the enormous heap of business that was now before them; and, looking at the nature and amount of that business, he had no hesitation in saying, that less than two new courts would be insufficient. His right hon. and learned Friend said, that there were now only three courts of common law, and why, therefore, was it necessary to appoint two new equity judges? Why, his right hon. and learned Friend forgot that now, besides the three courts of common law, there was the Bail Court, and a separate judge of each court almost sitting daily at Nisi Prius; so that there were fifteen common law judges constantly employed, at an expense of 75,000l. per annum, and why should any objection be made to the establishment of five equity judges at an expense of 24,000l. per annum, when it should be remembered that in the Chancery Courts more real and substantial business was done than in all the other courts put together? This measure would put an end to all the mischiefs and delays which now existed in the administration of justice in the Court of Equity, and he therefore trusted that the clause as proposed would be agreed to.

Mr. Pemberton

said, that though he thought the House and the country were much indebted to his right hon. and learned Friend (Sir E. Sugden) for having brought the matter so fully under their considertion, still he was not prepared to give his assent to all the propositions which had been urged by his right hon. and learned Friend. It was, however, only in deference to the evidence which had been given on this subject before the Select Committee of the House of Lords—in deference to the opinions held by those learned persons of all political parties who had held judicial offices—in deference also to the opinions expressed by those members of the profession who were better judges than himself of the extent of the impossibility of obtaining justice in the courts of equity as at present constituted—opinions expressed in a petition signed by between sixty and seventy of the principal firms in London—he did not feel prepared to oppose the proposition of her Majesty's Government, made on their responsibility and after a consideration of the evidence which had been adduced on this subject. When he said this, he must at the same time state that he thought the country had great reason to complain of the mode in which this measure was now brought before the Legislature. When a bill precisely similar to the present was brought down from the House of Lords at the close of last Session, the noble Lord opposite postponed the consideration of that measure, because he told the House and the country that there was not then sufficient time to consider a bill of such deep importance. The noble Lord also stated, that this change was connected with many others that were in the contemplation of the Government, and which would have a material bearing upon the particular measure now under consideration, and the noble Lord told the House and the country, in language stronger than he should like to make use of, that the mode in which the business of the judicial committee of the Privy Council was administered was a discredit, not to say a disgrace, to the country. The noble Lord on that occasion also agreed, that the Court of Review was another establishment which of necessity must undergo investigation. That court, it was true, had been allowed to dwindle down from four judges to one judge, and he was sure that it would meet with universal approbation if that court were wholly abolished, and the solitary judge that was left, appointed to some other office for which his learning and acquirements fitted him. The amendment or improvement of the supreme court of appeal, the House of Lords, was also a matter closely connected with the subject now under consideration, and yet of this the noble Lord was now silent. If the Court of Review was to be abolished, surely this bill ought, to provide for adding its jurisdiction to the new judge in equity to be appointed under this bill, and thus, if there was any deficiency of business for the new court, this arrangement would furnish a supply. But he asked, was it fair on the part of the Government towards the country, when bringing this isolated measure forward, not to tell the House what were their views on these important subjects? Was it right, after the first Minister of the Crown in that House had pronounced such a sentence upon one of the most important tribunals, that it was a discredit, if not a disgrace, to the country, that the House and the country were now unable to learn from the noble Lord, or from the law officers of the Crown, whether it was intended to make any alterations in that court, and if so, what those alterations would be? With respect to the particular question now before the committee, considering as he did the absence of even more important topics, he would state very shortly the reasons which induced him, in deference to the evidence which had been given, and to the facts and documents now upon the Table, not to oppose the proposition which had been made by his hon. and learned Friend, the Attorney-general. Look at the evidence which had been adduced before the committee of the House of Lords. Some of the leading Members of the profession had there been subjected to a strict cross-examination by some noble and learned Lords who sat upon that committee. The effect, however, of that evidence went to prove that the average arrear of causes in the Court of Chancery was between 600 and 700. In the Vice-Chancellor's Court a period of from two to three years must elapse between the lime at which a cause was set down for hearing and the time at which it would be heard, and that in the ordinary course of business some causes came on twice, and sometimes oftener, for hearing. Now, he believed that his right hon. and learned Friend was right when he said that these delays not unfrequently led to compromises; but still, if 24,000l. per annum, would enable justice to be administered without delay, it seemed to him that the expenses of two additional judges would be compensated by the relief from delay which would thus be given to suitors. Such then had been the evidence which had been produced from all quarters to satisfy those who were but little disposed to be satisfied, but who finally arrived at that conclusion. Had anything since happened to alter that determination, and what was in point of fact the real state of business at present? The total number of causes in a state for hearing in the Rolls Court was 139. Undoubtedly, ibis was an arrear, but nothing of an arrear compared with what they were accustomed to see, not only in the Court of Chancery, but even in the courts of law. But still that was not a satisfactory position of affairs. The cause, for instance, which had been heard to-day, was set down for hearing so long ago as the month of July last. And during these long delays, look at the accidents by which the hearing of a cause might be still further postponed. Suppose twenty parties to a suit, and one of those parties, unhappily for the rest, should happen to die in the meantime. Why, in that case, a new suit would be superadded, because the old original suit was rendered defective by the death, and although eight or nine months might not be long to wait for the recovery of a demand, yet a further extension of delay became a grievance and a hardship upon the suitors, from which he for one should be glad to see them relieved. He thought it was desirable that the state of business in each court should be such, that when they rose for the vacation, no suitor who was ready for a hearing should remain unredressed. But if this was the state of things in the Rolls' Court, what was it in the Vice-Chancellor's Court? His hon. and learned Friend the Member for Galway (Mr. Lynch) had underrated the number of cases in arrear in that court. He presumed that his hon. and learned Friend excluded from his calculation causes which were abated, but the number of causes set down in the book he held in his hand was 619. Now, what was the progress made in hearing causes, as shown by the returns which had been obtained by his right hon. and learned Friend (Sir E. Sugden)? The progress made in disposing of causes in the general paper last year was 173, excluding all short causes. Now there was on the roll of the Vice-Chancellor's Court 619 causes set down, and disposing of them at 173 or 200 causes each year, from two to three years must elapse before they were all heard. He fell very sensibly the inconveniences of such a system of delay, and he trusted they would be obviated by the appointment of two new judges. If he did not anticipate an increase of business by this addition he should be ready to join with his right hon. and learned Friend in the objection to a multiplication of courts, which might be unnecessary. There was one point in this bill of which he highly approved, he alluded to the provision for enabling the Lord Chancellor to make rules and regulations for the improvement of the practice of the Court of Chancery. He (Mr. Pemberton) was well aware that several members of the bar of opposite politics had most honourably devoted themselves to that subject, and were now, and had been for months engaged in considering alterations and framing regulations and rules which might be introduced into the practice of the court, and be productive of the greatest possible benefit to the suitors, and induce a great influx of business, by not only removing the delays in the hearing a cause, but the delay in the final prosecution of a suit in the Master's office. In this state of things, he thought that when the Government took upon itself to have two new judges appointed, when they were backed by all the authorities as derived from the witnesses who had been examined, and though he felt forcibly some of his right hon. and learned Friend's objections, still, on the whole, he (Mr. Pemberton) was not inclined to oppose the proposition of the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite.

Mr. C. Buller

felt it was great presumption in him to intrude himself upon a debate on the practice of a court with which he had no acquaintance, but he looked on this as the first step towards a great and useful series of law reforms. He was glad the commencement had been made with the Court of Chancery, because its delays had been, and still were, productive of great misery. He was quite prepared to agree with his hon. and learned Friend who had just sat down, that the reform would be incomplete with this measure only, and until the Government proceeded to introduce those measures which had been promised last Session. The present bill was, however, a safe measure to introduce by itself, for it merely added two new judges to those who were insufficient for the work to be performed. To show the hardship of the present system he would mention a case with which the hon. and learned Member for Ripon was no doubt well acquainted, that of "Day v. Croft." A person died, and left property of the estimated value of 400,000l. The wife and daughter made an application to the Master of the Rolls for relief, under the following circumstances:—they had each an annuity of 3,000l. bequeathed to them by the testator, but in consequence of some litigation with which they had nothing to do, the property was tied up in Chancery, and they could not touch a single penny of it. They had been compelled to borrow money to the amount of 12,500l., and were paying interest at the rate of 625l. a-year. More than that, they had insured their lives by way of security. Their claim was utterly undisputed, and yet they were deprived of their property. There were several other annuitants under the same will, who were suffering in consequence of the property being in Chancery, some of them being reduced to extreme distress. For instance, one of them having received 40l. a-year from Mr. Day during his life, had the same amount bequeathed to him, but his income was now stopped, and he had no other resource, and nothing in prospect but the workhouse. He would ask the hon. Member for Kilkenny, and those hon. Gentlemen who were lovers of economy, whether, looking at such cases as these, they could object to the expense of additional judges as a remedy? There was another case in which the parties had been kept out of their property for forty years, although a considerable sum had been paid into court. The fight hon. Gentleman had objected to the measure on the ground, that it would cause an increase of litigation; but he (Mr. Buller) considered that it was better to increase litigation than not to do justice. Property in Chancery might now be regarded as property in reversion. It was common in the city to threaten parties who would not consent to a compromise that the matter in dispute should be thrown into Chancery. Out of 100 bills filed not more than sixty would be set down for hearing, and before the hearing came on, at least a third of them would be disposed of. Such a terror was entertained with regard to the Court of Chancery that people would rather submit to a compromise, than wait for its adjudication. Would not the right hon. Gentleman himself, if he had a legacy of 10,000l. left to him, rather accept of 8,000l. than go into Chancery? He believed he would. He concluded by declaring his conviction that there could not be a worse kind of economy than that of refusing justice because of the expense which would be incurred in providing a sufficient number of judges to administer the law. He trusted then, the House would consent to the measure which had been called for by the almost unanimous voice of the profession, as well as by the public at large.

Sir E. Sugden

said, that if a thousand more judges were called into existence, still the evils complained of by the hon. Gentleman would not be removed, because they did not originate with the judges, the fault being partly in the rules of court and partly in the complicated claims of the different parties who were not agreed among themselves, as in the case referred to by the hon. Gentleman. The widow might say—"Give me my annuity." But the answer to that was, naturally enough, "Stop until we see that the estate is sufficiently clear of all liabilities to afford you the full amount you claim." The hon. Gentleman had asked, supposing a legacy of 10,000l. were bequeated to him, would he not take 8,000l. rather than stay in the Court of Chancery? To be sure he would, lint he would then file a supplemental bill to make the adverse party account, for the difference. He must say, that a more in sensible and absurd project had never been launched in that House than this bill, which proposed to abolish the Exchequer Equity Court. Why, Mr. Baron Alderson had stated, that the Court of Exchequer did fifty days' work in a year, and that by a little arragement between the four judges, the whole time of one judge might be saved and made otherwise available to the public. He could not understand why a permanent court should be abolished to set up a temporary court, but if they proposed to do away with one permanent court to establish another, that would be intelligible. He ventured to prophecy, that if the noble Lord's two new judges courts were once established, they would not be temporary but permanent courts. If two new judges were appointed, he thought there would be a gross breach of duty on the part of Government, if business were not provided for them by abolishing the Court of Review, and transferring the bankruptcy business to the Court of Chancery, the establishment of which would then be quite equal to the additional amount of causes. He should not divide the House upon the clause, but it was his firm opinion that Government was taking a wrong course in this matter.

The Attorney-General

said, the right hon. Gentleman thought that the equity jurisdiction of the Court of Exchequer should be retained, and quoted Mr. Baron Alderson as an authority in support of that opinion. Now he would refer the right hon. Gentleman to Mr. Baron Alderson's evidence, question 494, in which he was asked, Is it your opinion that the Court of Exchequer will make an effective court of equity without an additional baron, devoted exclusively to that department. The answer was, I should say certainly not; that is my decided opinion; there should be one judge who should lake the whole of the equity business, if the court is to be retained as an equity court. If, then, it was necessary to have an additional judge, it would be much better to make him a Vice-Chancellor and abolish the Equity Exchequer, thus making the equity jurisdiction uniform and harmonious.

Mr. J. Stewart

could inform the House 'that although Lord Brougham had formerly thought that the appointment of one judge would be enough, that noble Lord was now firmly of opinion that the appointment of two was necessary. He was of the same opinion, because at present there was a delay of three years between the setting down of a cause and its hearing—a delay which induced many persons to allow themselves to be robbed rather than incur the expense, and trouble, and delay of a Chancery suit.

Mr. Wakley

said, he had little hopes of good from this reform, which originated with the lawyers. But was it not to lawyers that all the scandalous abuses and delays which disfigured the present system of administering justice were to be ascribed? It had been remarked, that it was the rules of court which stood in the way of justice, in the case of "Day and Croft," to which allusion had been made. Did not common sense then enjoin, that before appointing new judges the existing judges should be made to do their duty? Why did not the judges remove the obstacles and impediments to justice which were created by inefficient or pernicious rules of court? He feared that the increase in the number of judges would cause an immense increase of barristers and solicitors. The principal difficulties in reforming the administration of justice were caused by the too great number of barristers, and the present bill he feared, would do nothing towards removing the real source of the evils complained of.

The word "two" was inserted, and the clause agreed to, as were also the clauses up to 24 inclusive.

On the 25th clause,

Sir E. Sugden

asked, if it were intended to make the two judges independent of the Lord Chancellor. He thought it would be derogatory to the dignity of their office if that were not done.

Lord J. Russell

replied, that they would be placed on the same footing as the present Vice-Chancellor.

Clause agreed to, as were the following to the 28th inclusive.

On the 29th clause,

Mr. Aglionby

inquired if any alteration were to be made in the offices of the courts, especially those of the six clerks?

The Attorney-General

said, the Lord Chancellor was now preparing, with the assistance of able and experienced advisers, a set of regulations for the conduct of the business in those offices, which, it was hoped, would prove beneficial to the suitors, and satisfactory to the public.

Clause agreed to, as were the succeeding clauses to the 35th. On that clause, and on the question that the blank be filled up with the sum 5,000l.,

Mr. Pemberton

thought it would be necessary to give a higher salary for the additional Vice-Chancellors. Considering the enormous weight of the duties which they would have to perform, and in which they would be deprived of the assistance and advice which were available to other judges; considering, too, that the Master of the Rolls had a salary of 7,000l. a year, he should move that the salary of the Vice-Chancellors, instead of 5,000l. a-year, as proposed by the clause, should be 6,000l.

Lord J. Russell

remarked, that the salary proposed by the clause was the same with that received by the Puisne Judges, who had many and great expenses to defray out of their income.

Sir E. Sugden

thought there was no analogy between the case of a Vice-Chancellor and that of a Puisne Judge. The committee had no idea of the immense amount of labour which the former would have to go through. He had not like other judges, the advice and opinions of other persons to help him. He had nothing to depend on but his own learning, ability, and industry. If the noble Lord placed the rank of these judges too low, and at the same time gave so low a salary, he feared there would be a difficulty in finding men of proper standing and character to accept the office. Such a course would be calculated to lower the character of the office. For his own part, he would declare, and the noble Lord would admit him to be a fair witness—that no human inducement would make him undertake the immense amount of care and labour appertaining to the office. If new courts, with single judges, were to be appointed, they should bear in mind the difference between the position of such functionaries and that of judges sitting in courts with perhaps, four or five others, and allow a fair remuneration.

Mr. Hume

hoped the noble Lord would not listen to the recommendation of the right hon. and learned Gentleman to reconsider this subject. Indeed after the lecture on economy delivered by the right hon. Member for Tamworth last night, he thought that the noble Lord could hardly be expected to listen to any suggestion of the kind coming from the other side of the House. The right hon. Baronet had reproached the Government, and reproached their party with extravagance; let the noble Lord take warning in time, and not fall into similar errors for the future. With respect to the salary proposed by the clause, he thought that it was quite sufficient; 5,000l. ought to buy the services of any man in England—he meant of any lawyer. Why the President of the United States had only 5,000l. a-year. He repeated again his hope that the noble Lord would not listen to what he must term the unreasonable proposition of the right hon. and learned Gentleman opposite,

Amendment withdrawn.

5,000l. inserted. On the question that the clause be agreed to,

Mr. Pemberton

said, that there was at present some difference of opinion on the state of the law with respect to masters in Chancery, and certain other judicial functionaries holding seats in Parliament. The question, he remarked, ought to be arranged in some settled manner.

Mr. Hume

said, that Lord Brougham had declared to the committee up stairs, at the time the former bill was under consideration, that Masters in Chancery should be excluded from seats in the House. He thought that a functionary, who was paid by the public, should give his time to the performance of his duties in Court, and not neglect those duties by taking part in the proceedings in that House. He did wish to interfere with the seat of the existing functionary, but his successor should certainly be excluded.

Lord J. Russell

said, that having conversed with his hon. Friend, the Attorney-general, they were both of opinion, with the right hon. and learned Gentleman opposite, that the seat of the existing master should not, at any rate, be disturbed. The question raised by the hon. Member for Kilkenny, as to the successor of that functionary, was a distinct one altogether. Some understanding should be come to, but he retained his opinion, that it would not be advisable to exclude Masters in Chancery. His hon. Friend, the Attorney-general, had other occupations as well as the master, and yet no one could say that he should be excluded. He could not help thinking, that the more they excluded persons qualified to give correct and proper legal opinions, the more they would lower the character of that House.

After a few words from Mr. Hume,

Mr. Lynch

said, he considered his holding a seat in that House would not disqualify him for performing his duties as Master in Chancery.

Sir E. Sugden

said, the difference was, that his hon. and learned Friend sat for a place in Ireland, and it had been decided that he could do so. But it had not been decided that a Master in Chancery in England could not, as the representative of any English constituency.

Sir W. Follett

said, he perfectly agreed with the noble Lord (J. Russell) that nothing would be more injurious to the character of that House, than laying down the principle, that persons holding judicial stations should not sit in it. He thought that the more persons of station and learning they had in the House, the more its character and usefulness would be increased. A judicial office should not act as a disqualification, unless there were other circumstances which would make it impossible for a functionary to fulfil his duties properly.

Mr. Ewart

reminded his hon. Friend, the Member for Kilkenny, that judges were not excluded from the Chamber of Deputies in France.

Mr. Jervis

only regretted, that his hon. and learned Friend, the Member for Exeter, had not made his very excellent speech last session—when, by what he considered a most unwise decision, the Judge of the Admiralty was excluded from sitting in that House in future Parliaments. He hoped he might give notice, on his hon. and learned Friend's part, that his hon. and learned Friend would make a motion to remedy the blunder of last session.

Sir W. Follett

could inform his hon. Friend opposite, that he had not voted for the exclusion of the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets. If he had been in town when the decision alluded to was come to, he should hare voted against it. He considered it a most unwise decision. He thought that case, in which the holder of an old-established office, whose occupiers had so long sat in Parliament, was thus excluded, fell precisely within the range of the present question. And if his hon. and learned Friend brought forward any proposition to alter or rescind the decision of last Session, he should have his (Sir W. Follett's support.)

Mr. Hume

said, whatever might be the opinions of the learned Members of the House, he must again protest against the admission of judges to seats in Parliament.

Clause agreed to.

Clauses to the 52nd agreed to.

On the 53d Clause,

Mr. Hume

said, that it would save him the necessity of making an annual motion, if a clause were inserted in the present bill, providing that an account of the Suitor's Fund should every year be laid before Parliament.

The Attorney-General

had no objection to insert such a clause.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer

then proposed to substitute the following clause for clause 56, which had been expunged:—"And be it enacted, that it shall be lawful for any officer of the Court of Exchequer, who was appointed to his office or employment in that court prior to the 14th day of March, 1840, whose office will be abolished or affected by the operation of this act, to make a claim for compensation within six months after the passing thereof, to the commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, and the Lord Chief Baron of the said court for the time being; and the said commissioners and the Lord Chief Baron shall proceed, in such manner as they may think proper, to inquire whether any compensation ought to be made to any such claimant, and, if any, what were the lawful fees and emoluments in respect of which the same should be allowed; and in every case in which such claim shall be established to the satisfaction of the said Commissioners and the Lord Chief Baron, they are hereby authorized and empowered to fix and determine, by an order under their hands, the amount of the annual compensation which shall seem to them to be just and reasonable for the loss sustained by such claimant, not being in any case, where his office is wholly abolished by, and he shall not be appointed to any other office under this act, less than three-fourth parts of the full net annual value of the lawful fees and emoluments of the office so abolished, and the amount of such annual value as aforesaid shall be ascertained and fixed by the said commissioners and the Lord Chief Baron, according to such an average of yearly receipts and disbursements, prior to the passing of this act, as they shall think proper; and the said commissioners and the Lord Chief Baron shall have full power to award, in any case in which they shall think fit, such annual sum by way of compensation, to any such claimant who shall be appointed by or under this act to any office or situation in the Court of Chancery, in addition to the salary attached to such office or situation, so long as he shall hold office under this act; and also, an annual sum by way of compensation, to become payable when he shall, with the sanction of the Lord Chancellor, have resigned such office; and all the compensations, fixed and determined as aforesaid, shall be issued and paid and payable by the accountant-general of the Court of Chancery, by virtue of an order or orders for that purpose to be made by the said Court of Chancery, out of the interest and dividends that have arisen or may hereafter arise from the Government or parliamentary securities, now or hereafter to be placed to two several accounts in the Bank of England, standing in the name of the said accountant-general of the Court of Chancery, and intituled, 'Account of the monies placed out for the benefit and better security of the suitors of the High Court of Chancery,' and 'Account of securities purchased with surplus interests arising from securities carried to an account of monies placed out for the benefit and better security of the suitors of the High Court of Chancery,' or either of them (but subject and without prejudice o the payment of all salaries and sums of money which by any act or acts how in force are authorised to be paid thereout): Provided always, that an account of all such compensations shall, within fourteen days next after the same shall be so granted, be laid upon the Table of the House of Commons, if Parliament shall be then assembled, or if Parliament shall not be then assembled, then within fourteen days after the meeting of Parliament then next following: Provided also, that no person who was appointed to his office or employment in the said Court of Exchequer, after the said 14th day of March, 1840, shall claim or shall be entitled to any compensation whatever, in consequence of the said office or employment being abolished, or affected by this act." [Mr. Hume. Why was this clause preferred to the other?] The clause was proposed on his part because there was much objection to the clause as it now stood, which left the decision entirely in the hands of the Treasury; and because, also, he wished the House to decide on the question as it affected certain officers of the Court of Exchequer in Equity rather than the Treasury. The point at issue in respect to one of these gentlemen, Mr. Scarlett, of whom he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) desired to speak with all possible respect, was, whether a person appointed to an office, after such notice had been given of the abolition of that office as the introduction of a bill by the highest legal officer of the Crown was calculated to convey, was entitled to any compensation for such abolition; and, if so, at what amount should it be fixed. He did not desire to say anything in the slightest degree personally unplea- sant to Mr. Scarlett; but he apprehended that the rule on which the Treasury had always acted in such cases was adverse to such claim. That rule was the same as had been applied to the analogous cases of corporate officers appointed after the first introduction of the municipal bill. In the beginning of the last year the Lord Chancellor had brought in a bill for the abolition of the office held by Mr. Scarlett, in conjunction with the creation of two new courts, and he considered the case of that gentleman perfectly analogous to that of those corporate officers appointed under similar circumstances, and that it should be dealt with in the same manner. That was one ground on which he rested his argument against this claim. The other was on its analogy to the case provided for by a bill, the 1st of Wm. 4th, introduced into the House by the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth. That bill received the Royal Assent on the 4th of July, 1830, and yet it provided that compensation should be claimed for fees affected by it after the 24th of May, thus giving an ex post facto operation to it, on account, of course, of the previous notice-given to all claimants by the introduction of the bill, He hoped, therefore, that the House would decide the point, and he-hoped still more that they would do so as judges, not as partisans. It would be most painful that the head of the Court of Exchequer and the Treasury should be at issue on the point, and he thought it best for the House to decide it. It had been stated that in law it was necessary that the vacancy to which Mr. Scarlett had been appointed should be filled up, but it seemed to him (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) that, after such notice of the intentions of the Government as had been given, in good sense it would be far better that it was not, or, if it was imperative to do so, that it should be filled provisionally—the holder to render himself liable to certain conditions connected with the abolition. It was a very common case to give an appointment subject to such conditions, and, therefore, in his opinion, the necessity was not at all established. He trusted, however, that the House would, in dealing with the question, dismiss all party feeling, and act in the spirit of judges alone. With this hope he should leave the question to their decision.

Sir W. Follett

trusted that the hope of the right hon. Gentleman would be rea- lised, and that justice, not partisanship, would guide the decision of the House on the question. He thought, however, that the speech of the right hon. Gentleman was not greatly calculated to lead to such a consummation of his desires. The right hon. Gentleman had stated that the clause before the House was introduced because the Treasury did not wish to decide on the question; but he had instanced three decisions in the cases of corporate officers under the municipal act, as a proof of those powers to do so if they had chosen. Now, he did not well know what was the power of the Lords of the Treasury, but this he knew, that they had no power at all to decide who or who were not entitled to claim compensation under the municipal act, because it was expressly provided that all persons holding office at the passing of that act, were entitled to compensation. The right hon Gentleman, therefore, could hardly have recollected the provisions of that act, or be must have acted disingenuously in stating the case as be did. The right hon. Gentleman was also mistaken in his other case. But, without entering into any precedents, the abolition of the office gave the holder a title to claim compensation for his deprivation. The right hon. Gentleman had alluded to the 1st of William 4th but the ease before the House rested on a very different, foundation. In that act, however, the right hon. Gentleman had forgotten to state that the claim for compensation, though apparently retrospective, was in reality, not so at all, for it was only barred from the period of the introduction of the bill, the 24th of May, 1830. The right hon. Gentleman's clause, unlike that, however, was purely retrospective, and went back, not alone from the latter end to the middle of a Session of Parliament, but from one Session to another, instead of being prospective, as all such measures should be. Sufficient importance had not been attached to the consideration whether it was possible that the place could remain vacant. It was true that there was every reason to suppose that some bill more extensive than the one which had been proposed would pass, but could the Lord Chief Baron in the meantime allow this office to remain vacant? Under the 1st of George 4th c. 35, it was actually imperative in the Lord Chief Baron to appoint some one to this office; but, independently of that obligation, how was it possible that it could remain vacant? If no one had been appointed the whole business of the Court of Exchequer must have stopped; but the right hon. Gentleman (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) said that it would have been easy to get a gentleman to fill up the gap, with an understanding that he should not receive compensation. The person appointed must be a barrister of a certain standing, and it was not easy to get a person in a profession to give up that profession without some adequate advantage. Whom could they get to fill up the gap? He was satisfied that no one could be found to fill the office with notice that he was to receive no compensation. Well, the office had been filled up, and he asked whether there had been any precedents in which, under the same circumstances, compensation had not been given? The right hon. Gentleman had searched for precedents, but, none were to be found, for the case which he had quoted was one of a prospective notice that no compensation was to be given, whereas this was retrospective. In that case compensation was given to all persons holding offices that were abolished, and the same was done with regard to the Corporations bill. He must say that it was very unfair towards the hon. gentleman who filled this office that he should be singled out to make a precedent in the first instance. The right hon. Gentleman had said, too, that he was willing to grant compensation to the purchasers of offices; but surely the case of persons acting under the obligations of an Act of Parliament was stronger. He hoped, then, that in the absence of all precedent, the House would not make anything like a personal affair of this, but, when they found that it was necessary that the vacancy should be supplied, that they would deal with this as with every similar case, and give compensation to all those whose offices they took away, and he might be permitted to say that he could not conceive anything more unwise than that that House should lay down narrow rules with regard to grants of compensation. Their object was to effect beneficial changes, and to do so without injury to individuals. But if they drew the line of compensation too narrowly they would raise up opposition, and probably powerful opposition, to these changes. The Legislature, however, had always dealt liberally with such cases, on the ground of vested interests; and he hoped that the House would feel that this was a vested interest, and deal with it accordingly. He would, therefore, move as an amendment, that the date proposed to be inserted by the right hon. Gentleman should be omitted, and that all persons holding any office abolished by this Act might claim compensation according to the modes and forms of proceeding provided in the act.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer

concurred to a certain degree in the policy of the hon. and Learned Gentleman. He would never be a party to dealing harshly or unfairly with persons who, without notice, were deprived of their offices by the power of Parliament; but he could not regard in the same light parties who had taken their offices with a full knowledge that they were to be abolished; and he should say that it was a dangerous principle for the House of Commons to sanction—that whatever the time at which the appointment was made, whatever might be the known intention of Parliament, if the act had not actually passed, and a life dropped and the vacancy was filled up, then the holder of the office should receive the same amount of compensation as if he had held it for forty or fifty years. With regard to the appointment of Mr. Brougham, he understood that that took place several years before the bill passed; the appointment, he was informed, was in March, 1831, and the bill passed in August, 1833. Now, he asked, was there a gentleman in that House who seriously believed that parties could not have been found to fill this office upon the understanding that they were not to receive compensation if Parliament abolished the office? He had no personal feeling on the matter; he was only desirous of ascertaining the opinion of the House on the subject.

Mr. Goulburn

said that on former occasions he had opposed similar attempts to give a retroactive operation to Acts of Parliament. When the noble Lord opposite had introduced a bill as to the residence of the clergy and pluralities, he had sought to give the measure a retroactive operation for three sessions, because he had given notice then by bringing forward a bill; but he (Mr. Goulburn) took the objection at once, and the noble Lord acquiesced in the arrangement which he then suggested, and altered the date of the bill. The Ecclesiastical Benefices bill was also pending before Parliament for a considerable time; and the noble Lord, not being able to pass it in the particular Session, brought in a bill which prohibited the conferring of the benefices in question until the subject had been discussed; and so in this case, if the Attorney-general had intended that no compensation should be given, he ought to have brought in a bill prohibiting the appointment, or have warned the Chief Baron, who was bound by law to make the appointment, of that intention. He objected to this system on principle. There was no justice in giving notice of a bill in one Session, not passing any measure till three or four Session afterwards, and then denying compensation to parties appointed in the interval. Upon these grounds he should support the amendment of his hon. and learned Friend.

Sir Robert Peel

—Did I understand the right hon. Gentleman to say that the purchasers, to whom he is willing to grant compensation, purchased their offices after the notice had been given of the intention to abolish them? He says the salaries of these offices are but small; but this is a question of principle, and I understand the case to be this:—After this notice had been given, two persons purchased offices with full notice that they were to be abolished. For them the right hon. Gentleman proposes compensation, but where is the distinction between that case and the case of the Lord Chief Baron exercising, in the case of a death, that duty which the law imposed upon him? If these purchases were made after the notice, on what principle does the right hon. Gentleman propose to deprive of compensation the person appointed by the Lord Chief Baron?

The Chancellor of the Exchequer

said, that the offices to which the right hon. Baronet had alluded, were small appointments attached to the office of hereditary usher of the Court of Exchequer, which that officer had always had the power of selling, as much as any other part of his property; and the House would draw a distinction between a man holding property of that sort, which might be a subject of family arrangements, and a public officer, a Judge, who merely had the appointment in trust for the country.

Lord John Russell

said, that he recollected a case bearing some resemblance to the present, which arose with regard to the provision for compensation made in the First Fruits and Tenths Act. Before that bill passed a vacancy occurred at the board, and he appointed a gentleman who had been acting as his private secretary; but when the bill passed, although compensation was granted to some gentlemen, as to that particular office none was claimed or expected, and he, in his position, should have considered it wrong to hold out to that gentleman any prospect of compensation—but certainly the Lord Chief Baron did not stand exactly in the same position. He did not complain of the hon. and learned Gentleman for bringing forward this subject. It was a question upon which two opinions might fairly be held; and all that his right hon. Friend wished was that the House should decide it.

Mr. Pemberton

could not agree with the Chancellor of the Exchequer in thinking that there would be no difficulty in procuring gentlemen to fill this office for a few months, without any prospect of compensation when it was abolished. He most sincerely believed that no barrister of sufficient standing would have taken the office on those terms. Suppose, session after session, the bill should not pass, would the case remain the same? Would the holder of the office still have no title to compensation? He asked then whether it were wise, in a case that was admitted to be doubtful, to risk the success of a measure of this importance for so small a matter. With regard to the precedents, they were all in favour of the amendment of his hon. and learned Friend; for he was quite satisfied that he was correct in stating that Mr. Brougham had been appointed after a distinct notice had been given by the Lord Chancellor in the House of Lords of the intention to reduce the salaries of the Masters in Chancery. What course had been adopted when they took away a portion of the patronage of the Lord Chancellor. They made compensation by adding 1,000l. a year to his retiring allowance. Their loss of patronage was made the subject of pecuniary compensation; now they were abolishing all the Chancery appointments of the Lord Chief Baron; and they not only gave him no compensation, but they refused it to the officer, whom he was by law compelled to appoint, and whose office they abolished. It was a harsh, unwise, and unjust course, in which he hoped the right hon. Gentleman would not persist.

Lord J. Russell

—I thank the hon. and learned Gentleman for what he has so explicitly stated as to the fate of this hill. I have said, and I repeat, that I shall be satisfied with any decision to which the House may come on this question, hut if we are to be told that important bills of this kind will be rejected by the House because it differs in opinion as to the arrangements and money matters, it amounts to this—that no great measure is to be passed unless the House of Lords, and the House of Lords alone, has the power of granting compensation and settling the money questions. It is not a question of a compromise with the House of Lords as to our giving up the privileges which we have assumed in this respect, for that might be advantageous; but it is an absolute transfer of that privilege; it is saying that if you mean to have judicial reforms of importance, with regard to all matters of compensation the House of Commons is to pronounce no opinion of its own; and Mr. Scarlett may be entitled to compensation or he may not, the House of Commons is only to record the supreme judgments of the House of Lords.

Sir E. Sugden

did not think that anything which had fallen from his hon. and learned Friend at all justified the observations of the noble Lord—and he begged to remind the noble Lord and the committee that the bill had been sent down last year by the House of Lords without the compensation clause. He mentioned that to show that the House of Lords, thinking it right that these offices should be abolished, had been content to originate a measure on the subject, though they had no power to provide compensation for those who held the offices which they proposed to abolish; it was impossible, therefore, that the House of Lords could be obnoxious to the observations of the noble Lord. The noble Lord the Chief Baron of the Exchequer was bound to make the appointment ha had made, and to fill the office with a competent person, and therefore it would be most unjust to deprive the person accepting of it of a fair compensation.

Mr. Jervis

said, that he meant to vote for the amendment proposed by the hon. Member for Exeter, on the ground that Lord Abinger had a right to appoint a person to the office, and that the individual so appointed had therefore a right to compensation on being deprived of it.

Mr. J. Jones

did not think that they could withhold compensation in this case without violating the obligations they had come under when the patronage was bestowed on the Chief Baron. That being the case, he would vote for the amendment.

Mr. C. Buller

thought, that the House ought to act liberally in compensating persons deprived of any office in consequence of improvements in the law. They ought to do so not only in justice but in policy, because the slightest disposition on the part of Parliament to act illiberally towards persons so situated, would make the passing of any measure of Reform a matter of great difficulty. What was the worth of these twopenny-halfpenny questions, compared with the great good which would be gained by a reform like the one now proposed? He thought that the Court of Exchequer had behaved admirably on this occasion, as Lord Abinger had offered no opposition to a bill which would strip him of a great deal of patronage.

Mr. Hume

said, he agreed with his hon. Friend that the House ought not to deal niggardly in granting compensation to parties who were really entitled to it, He, for one, had never refused a fair compensation in such a case. Under the present bill, every person belonging to the Court of Exchequer, except Mr. Scarlett, would be entitled to compensation. The vacancy to which that gentleman had been appointed had taken place after the question had been brought under the consideration of the Parliament, and he concurred in opinion with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that Mr. Scarlett was not entitled to compensation.

Mr. Creswell

supported the amendment. Lord Abinger had accepted his situation, with the patronage attached to it, and as the gentleman whom he had appointed to the vacancy alluded to was admitted to be perfectly competent to the duties of the office, he thought that he was fairly entitled to compensation.

Mr. Hawes

thought, that the services performed did not justify any compensation.

Mr. Villiers Stuart

begged to state one fact to the House previous to their dividing. Mr. Scarlett had actually given up a situation worth 500l. a-year, in order that he might, be able to attend to the duties of his new situation.

Major Scarlett

The situation which Mr. Scarlett so resigned was that of counsel to the Mint and to the Post-office.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer

thought, that the fact of Mr. Scarlett having resigned another situation ought to come under the consideration of the Treasury. He hoped that the clause might be so altered as to give the Treasury a discretionary power to grant a limited compensation.

Sir W. Follett

did not feel justified in assenting to the proposition. Mr. Scarlett had certainly given up the situation referred to; but he rested the claim for compensation on other grounds.

The Committee divided on the question that the words proposed by Sir W. Follett to he left out, stand part of the clause:—Ayes 70; Noes 73—Majority 3.

List of the AYES.
Aglionby, H. A.	Maule, hon. F.
Baring, rt. hon. F. T.	Morpeth, Viscount
Berkeley, hon. H.	Morris, D.
Blake, W. J.	Morrison. J.
Bowes, J.	Muntz, G. F.
Brotherton, J.	O'Connell, D.
Busfield, W.	O'Connell, J.
Chalmers, P.	O'Ferrall, R. M.
Clay, W.	Ord, W.
Dalmeny, Lord	Paget, Lord A.
Davies, Colonel	Palmerston, Viscount
Dundas, D.	Philips, M.
Evans, Sir De L.	Philips, G. R.
Evans, G.	Rawdon, Colonel J. D.
Evans, W.	Russell, Lord J.
Ewart, W.	Rutherford, rt. hn. A.
Ferguson, Sir R. A.	Salwey, Colonel
Fort, J.	Scholefield, J.
Gishorne, T.	Sheil, right hon. R. L
Gordon, R.	Stanley, hon. E. J.
Grey, rt. hon. Sir G.	Stanley, M.
Grosvenor, Lord R.	Stuart, Lord J.
Guest, Sir J.	Stock, Mr. Sergeant
Hawes, B.	Strutt, E.
Hayter, W. G.	Surrey, Earl of
Hobhouse. rt. hon. Sir J.	Tancred, H. W.
Hobhouse, T. B.	Thornley, T.
Hodges, T. L.	Troubridge, Sir E. T.
Hume, J.	Villiers, hon. C. P.
James, W.	Vivian, J. H.
Labouchere, rt. hon. H.	Vivian, rt. hn. Sir R.H.
Listowel, Earl of	Wakley, T.
Macaulay, rt. hon. T.B	Wilbraham, G.

Wilde, Sir T.	TELLERS.
Williams, W.	Horsman, E.
Worsley, Lord	J. Parker.
Wyse, T.

List of the NOES.
Antrobus, E.	Inglis, Sir R. H.
Bailey, J.	Jervis, J.
Bannerman, A.	Jones, J.
Baring, H. B	Kemble, H.
Barrington, Viscount	Knatchbull, rt. hn. Sir E.
Blackburne, I.
Botfield, B.	Lascelles, hon. W. S.
Bramston, T. W.	Lowther, J. H.
Broadley, H.	Lygon, hon. Gen.
Buller, C.	Lynch, A. H.
Burr, H.	Maclean, Donald
Burrell. Sir C.	Mahon, Viscount
Canning, rt. hn. Sir S.	Master, T. W. C.
Clerk, Sir G.	Monypenny, T. G.
Courtenay, P.	Morgan, O.
Cresswell, C	Nicholl, J.
Dalrymple, Sir A.	Norreys, Lord
Darby, C,	Pakington, J. S.
Dick, Q.	Parker, R.T.
D'Israeli, B.	Peel, rt. hn. Sir R.
Douglas, Sir C. E.	Polhill, F.
Eaton, R. J.	Richards, R.
Egerton, W. T.	Round, J.
Freemantle, Sir T.	Scarlett, hn. J. Y.
Gladstone, J. N.	Sibthorp, Colonel
Godson, R.	Somerset, Lord G.
Gordon, hon. Captain	Stewart, J.
Goulburn, rt. hon. H.	Stewart, J.
Graham, rt. hn. Sir J.	Stuart, W. V.
Grant, Sir A. C.	Sugden, rt. hn. Sir E.
Grey, rt. hon. Sir C.	Teignmouth, Lord
Grimston, Viscount	Thesiger, F.
Hepburn, Sir T. B.	Trotter, J.
Hogg, J. W.	Wilbraham, hon. B.
Holmes, W.	Wood, Colonel T.
Hope, hon. C.
Hotham, Lord	TELLERS.
Hurt, F.	Follett, Sir W.
Ingham, R.	Pemberton, T.

Original words struck out.

On the question that the words proposed by Sir W. Follett be inserted,

Mr. Hayter

said, as the clause then stood, a compensation amounting to three-fourths of the salary and emoluments was to be granted to the party during his life. Now, it might happen that, in the case of Mr. Scarlett, he might be called to the House of Lords, and in such a case it would be proper that the compensation should cease. He proposed, therefore, that the time during which the compensation then to be paid be discretionary with the Treasury.

Sir W. Follett

said, he should not object to a clause being hereafter introduced providing that the compensation should cease, should Mr. Scarlett become a Peer.

Amendment withdrawn. Clause agreed to.

House resumed. Committee to sit again.