HC Deb 02 July 1840 vol 55 cc373-403

On the motion that the House go into Committee on the Registration of Voters (Ireland) Bill

Mr. O'Connell

rose to move an instruction to the Committee, in order that the franchise might be defined. He said, that they had yet forty-six clauses of the bill before them, and if any amendment was necessary, it was quite impossible that within the space of thirty days the noble Lord could expect to get through with those clauses. The noble Lord had, no doubt, the right to persevere with his bill, bt whether he had used that right dis- creetly he (Mr. O'Connell) very much doubted. Was it consistent with common sense to persevere in making arrangements as to how persons should vote, without first ascertaining what the qualification for voting ought to be? It was reversing the proper order of things. It was as absurd as if a manufacturer should order a machine to be made without first determining whether he meant the machine for cotton or for flax. Let them, then, first ascertain the qualification: this was so obviously the proper mode of proceeding that in the bills which the Government had brought in to amend the registry, the franchise was so defined that everybody could understand whether he had the franchise or not. It had been asserted that the judges had so limited and defined the qualification, that no man could possibly doubt it. He denied that there was any such judicial decision. The noble Lord had expressed his regret that a minority of the judges stood out against the opinion of the majority and seemed to consider this a highly deplorable state of things; but there was a worse state of things than that. It was when the judges had been selected for their partizanship, and when the suitors found their best counsel on the bench. In no country was the minority of the judges bound by the majority, except in cases of appeal to a higher tribunal. But there was no such power in the majority of the judges in Ireland to bind the minority—it was an opinion described in law as an aliter dictum, but it was not a legal decision, nor ought it to bind the minority, if they were convinced the decision was wrong. Two of the judges had declared that it was not their opinion. What, then, was the state of the law in Ireland? It might be said to depend on the assistant barrister, and whatever judge went the circuit. On the point alluded to there was a difference of opinion among the twelve judges, five being; one way and seven another. Two changes had since taken place; and if the two gentlemen substituted held the same opinions on the bench as they did at the bar, they would have the Lord Chief Baron opposed to the opinion of the ten on the one point, and the seven on the other. The opinions of the other gentlemen raised to the bench he did not know. The law, then, could not be said to be settled. If we were addressing a legal tribunal of perfect im- partiality, he did not hesitate to say, that he could demonstrate the legality of the beneficial interest as opposed to the solvent tenant test. He would premise that the freehold was so arranged as to make it necessary for a person coming forward to state that he paid 10l. per annum, otherwise he could not be registered. He would show that the Reform Act intended something different. There was a familiar distinction which contained nothing of law, and well known to all—the difference between the rent a tenant paid, and his beneficial interest in the land. First of all, there was no rational person who would take land without expecting to have a beneficial interest in it. In England the political economists divided the beneficial interest thus:—they calculated that a person taking land, supposing at a rent of 10l., ought to derive from it three rents—10l. for the rent, 10l. to replace the labour and capital expended in its cultivation, and 10l. of clear income or profit. This distinction was so well known that every Gentleman would understand him. Now, if the test was the rent paid by the solvent tenant, the House would perceive that this result would follow: that he ought to be able to extract 30l. a year out of his land. If they took, then, the solvent tenant's rent as the value, they doubled his income before they allowed him to vote. The noble Lord (Stanley) in 1828 had said, that it would make a 20l. of every 10l. franchise, and he had said perfectly right. According, then, to this test, the tenant must have 20l. profit before he was enabled to register, whereas, according to the beneficial interest, a profit of 10l. would suffice. By the act 10 of George 4th, which accompanied the Roman Catholic Emancipation Act, the 10l. franchise was introduced for the first time. By the second section, chap. 8, it is declared that no person should be admitted to vote unless he had a freehold estate of the clear yearly value of 10l. over and above all other charges and expenses. Now that 10l. is stated to be of the value of 10l., and the act did not say in what manner it was to be tested. He would, therefore, remind the House that it was open to be argued whether this 10l. ought to be considered as a rent, or as a 10l. beneficial interest, which would, in fact, be 20l. In the words of the statute, they did not state that it was to be an interest of 20l. but of 10l., and the construction, therefore, was against the solvent test and in favour of the beneficial. He admitted that there were other clauses in the act which made this appear somewhat doubtful, but he wished the House to understand that these words were not introduced in that part of the act which touched the question of freehold, but they were inserted in the clauses that related to the registry. By the seventh clause the revising barrister was required to examine the lease, and determine the nature of the estate, and whether the solvent tenant could afford to pay the annual sum of 10l. That was the first time that they had introduced the examination concerning the rent test on the occasion of the registry. The oath to be taken by the freeholder was contained in the sixth schedule, to the effect that his property was worth 10l. a year over and above all charges. Under these circumstances it was, that the noble Lord (Stanley) had shown that he understood the difference when he brought in the Irish Reform Bill, which provided that any person having a lease for a term of not less than twenty years, and having, therein the beneficial interest of the clear yearly value of 10l., over and above the rent charges, should be entitled to the franchise. There was a plain distinction between the words of the Reform Act and the 10th George 4th, chap. 8. In the one it was a clear yearly value of 10l., while in the other it was a beneficial interest of not less than 10l. Any fair judge would say, that the meaning of the 10th George 4th was only more distinctly expressed by the Reform Act, and that it required a 10l. beneficial interest. The whole of the 10th of George 4th was not only no longer required, but it was no longer part of the law. The question had come before the judges in Ireland as to whether the oath prescribed by the 10th George 4th should be the issue mentioned in that statute, or whether the beneficial interest should be sent to the jury, and there were ten judges to two upon that point. Was it right that ten judges should be at liberty to say, on an appeal to them from the decision of an assistant barrister, that every part of the registry under the 10th of George 4th, should be considered as annihilated, except the mere fragment of allowing an issue to go to the jury? Three of the judges admitted that the 10th of George 4th was repealed as to the juror's oath as well as in other particulars, and yet they came to the unheard of conclusion that the test of qualification was the profit rent test, and not the beneficial interest test as in the Reform Bill. The decision of these judges was given in private, in the absence of the parties and of the counsel. Baron Richards had declared this in a judgment he had delivered on circuit, and had declared that he did not consider a decision so given to be binding on him in his judicial capacity. It would be worse than the revival of a Star Chamber if judges were to be allowed to deliver their decisions in the absence of either the party or of counsel. Mr. Baron Richards felt this, and declared that after consulting the highest legal authority— of course he meant the Lord Chancellor and his brother Mr. Justice Perrin, who concurred with him—he was not committing any judicial indiscretion in acting upon his own individual opinion, although opposed to the majority of the judges on a case decided in private, and that in the instance then in question he felt bound to do so. The claim was accordingly admitted, and the man was registered. All he (Mr. O'Connell) wanted to show was, that the question was not yet decided. The greater number of the assistant barristers had decided it upon the point of beneficial interest. Several had decided upon the point of beneficial interest, and that was enough for his argument; while some had decided upon the profit rent test. That was the state of law in Ireland. It was a question of litigation between the judges on the circuit; and it was a question of difference between the superior judges; and being so, he called upon the House to put an end to it, in order that it might he longer be held out and known that if a man claimed before one individual he would be registered, and if he claimed before another he would not be; that the evidence being the same, the decision would be different. Were they to aggravate that state of the law by erecting a new registry before disposing of so fruitful a source of dissatisfaction and of disrespect to the judicial authority? Let the House decide in favour of defining the qualification, and then, indeed, they would be right in going on with the Registry Bill: otherwise they would be making the franchise a source of angry dispute—the law a matter of chance and not of decision, and creating a feeling of disaffection and disregard for the law, instead of its being respected as a distinctly defined and pronounced decision of the Legislature. The question next arose whether he had any mode to propose to arrive at this definition. That was matter for consideration in Committee. He, however, deemed it right to offer one or two suggestions to the House. The opinion of the hon. Member for Mallow might be taken up, and the definition of the franchise be founded upon the poor-rate. He was afraid great inconvenience would be felt in Ireland from the adoption of that mode. Another course might be to decide at once that a profit rent should be the test. If they did that they would take away the benefit of the Reform Bill, and make it a 20l. franchise instead of a 10l., and incur still greater inconveniences. But all these might be spared if they adopted the beneficial interest test. By taking that test a man would have to shew first, that he had paid 10l. rent; second, that he had replaced another 10l. (say) for capital and labour; and third, that he had realised 10l. above these two sums, which would constitute his beneficial interest. How would he do this? He would give in detail the number of days' labour he had himself bestowed, the money he had paid for wages, the number of acres grown of oats, of potatoes, and of rye; the number of cattle fattened on the land, and what they sold for, and so forth. These were data which, being matters of fact, any man acquainted with vulgar arithmetic could readily produce. But if they took a profit rent test they would wander at once into imaginary ground. It would be a most fruitful source of every species of contradictory swearing. He had before him to-day an account of the Leith and Edinburgh railway. A claim for compensation was made by the trustees bf Heriott's Hospital for a certain extent of ground required by the railway company. The company contended that the damages ought to be awarded at 1,500l. —500l. for damages and 1,000l. for the land. Five surveyors were produced by the trustees. The first valued the land at 9,000l.; the second valued it at something less; and the fifth came down to 7,000l., making a difference of 2,000l. between the witnesses for the trustees. The jury gave 1,800l, being 700l. for damages and 1,100l. for the land. Yet nobody would for a moment suppose that either of those persons meant to perjure himself. Yet such was the effect of an imaginary valuation. The profit rent test necessarily mingled itself with the imagination of the person valuing it. But let them take the beneficial interest test, and the party would have simply to prove by figures the items he had mentioned, and thus furnish something like accurate materials upon which the judge could act, and particularly upon which the jurors could calculate. It would diminish litigation and the propensity to exaggerate on the one side, and to depreciate on the other. It would be for the Committee to decide which of these tests it would take. For the present he did not call upon the House to decide on any of them. His only object now was to show that some one of them ought to be adopted, and he had taken the liberty of suggesting what he thought was the easiest course to be followed by the House. He bitterly regretted that the noble Lord (Stanley) should not have allowed the English and Scotch bills to have preceded the Irish bill. Had the English registration bill been first carried, the House would not have heard the noble Lord repeatedly adverting to the practice of England in all that made against the Irish nation; but the whole question would have been fairly before them. The English Members would have been more anxious upon the subject; they would have been more alive to their own interests; and would have sought rather to extend the franchise among their constituents than to have curtailed it. At all events, they would not have been acting under the influence of an inclination, as it was almost impossible for them to avoid when legislating for Ireland, to limit, if not to annihilate the franchise. It was established before the fictitious votes committee for Scotland, that gross frauds were committed, and that 400 votes were, on one occasion, created without one shilling of value ever having passed from the voters for the property, or one shilling ever received by them. And was not England, too, dissatisfied with the registry? Why, then, was Ireland selected to be the victim of a process of registration before they had ascertained what system ought to be adopted in England, or what ought to be done to remedy the crying evils in Scotland? It was utterly impossible that there could be any gross frauds committed in the creation of votes in Ireland. The numbers on the registry would show this. In England, twenty out of every hundred of the male adults had a right to vote: in Ireland only four and a fraction out of every hundred of male adults had a right to vote. In Westmoreland, with a population of 44,000, there were more registered voters than in the county of Cork with a population of 700,000. Was it fair, then, that they should come out upon Ireland with their Registration Bill; and, above all, was it not imperative on them, under such circumstances as he described, to define the qualification before they pressed the bill upon the Irish people, in order that they might at least know what to ask for when they came before the assistant-barrister? He begged to move, That it be an instruction to the Committee to define the qualification, entitling persons in Ireland to be entered on the registry

Mr. Lefroy

said, that all that part of the argument of the hon. and learned Gentleman which related to the comparison of the different criterions with respect to qualifications might be dispensed with, because if he could answer the first part of the hon. and learned Gentleman's observations, it became quite immaterial what sort of qualification existed in Ireland. If he could show, that that qualification had been defined and settled by every branch of the Legislature, and that it was binding and conclusive upon the question, it was unnecessary to consider any other criterion than that which had been established. It was admitted on all hands that a decision had been come to by a great majority of the judges in Ireland, in the proportion of ten to two, upon the nature of the qualification. He was prepared to show to the House that the twelve judges had as complete an authority and jurisdiction to decide upon the question of franchise when reserved, for them under circumstances like those under which this question had been reserved, as the fifteen judges in England, or the twelve judges in Ireland had to decide upon any question of criminal jurisdiction. Under the civil bill jurisdiction the appeal was to the single judge, and yet it was the practice for the judge at the assizes to refer any question of difficulty under that juris- diction to the appeal of the twelve judges, and their decision was held to be final and conclusive on every question so referred to them. All the most eminent judges, from the 36 Geo. 3rd., had adopted that practice, and it had remained to the present time unquestioned and unquestionable. Indeed there was a case or two at the present moment under the consideration of the twelve judges arising out of the civil bill jurisdiction which had been referred to them from the Sligo circuit by Mr. Baron Richards himself. The power of reference was not given in exact words by the act of Parliament, but it had arisen from the necessity of the case. The very same case occurred with the appeal given to the judge of assize under the Reform Act; the appeal was from the same parties, the assistant barristers; it was to the same party the going judge of assize, and the course of proceeding adopted was the same. And accordingly ever since the Reform Act, and indeed ever since the 10th George 4th. it was the habit of the single judges at assizes to reserve for the opinion of the other judges all cases of difficulty on the 10th Geo. 4th., and under the Reform Act, in short, on every question of difficulty upon the registration or the qualification. This had been done without question by every judge until Mr. Baron Richards came upon the bench. The decisions thus given had been quoted in all the courts of law as authority, and had been recognised by most of the individual judges in their appellate jurisdiction. What, then, was to constitute the law, if it were not a long and uniform train of decisions by the twelve judges for a series of years from the year 1829 to the year 1838, and if they did not recognize the decision of the twelve judges on questions reserved for them? He said, then, that the law must be deemed to be settled by the twelve judges; it was the necessary result of the individual appellate jurisdiction given by the Reform Act. It was not denied that they had decided by a majority of 10 to 2 the question of the qualification. There was, therefore, no occasion for a declaratory act, and for that statement he was sure that he would have the acquiescence of the highest legal authority in that House. But the hon. and learned Member for Dublin said that Mr. Baron Richards had differed from the remainder of the bench on this point, and that he had thought fit, in his individual appellate jurisdiction, to act upon his own opinion, against the opinion of a majority of the judges. He believed the fact was so; but he hoped that the learned judge would not persevere in a course which would render the law incapable of being settled—for although they had to-morrow a declaratory act, yet if a single judge could set up his own opinion against that of a majority of the judges, they might have a single judge setting up his individual opinion against the majority on the construction of the declaratory act. On the question of jurisdiction, also, he would rely on this decision of the judges as much as on the question of qualification. Under the tithe acts the twelve judges had no express jurisdiction given to them, yet they had upon reference decided a point, and the Lord Chancellor, in a case reported in Alcock's Reports, p. 36, had respected that decision. A similar decision under the Reform Act was cited before the Galway committee, reported in Perry and Knapp, and no man on either side had doubted the power of the judges to give that decision, and it had been acted upon by the committee. Under these circumstances, he hoped that he had established his position that the law was settled, and therefore that there was no ground for the hon. and learned Member's calling upon the House to define the franchise, unless, indeed, the law had been changed. The hon. and learned Member said that the qualification had been changed, and effectually changed by the Reform Act. He hoped that he should be able to show that it was not the intention of the Reform Act to change the qualification. It did intend to change the test for registration. In order to entitle a voter to exercise a franchise in Ireland two things were necessary—he must have a certain qualification, and he must have his vote registered according to certain prescribed rules. The 10th George 4th., made an alteration in the franchise, and it required a certain form of registration. The Reform Act did not make any alteration in the qualification, but it did change the method or mode of forming a test of the qualification by registration. This was very evident by a reference to the different sections of the two acts. Under the former there was an oath, by which the voter first swore to the value, and then to the solvent tenant test. Under the Reform Act the solvent tenant test was dispensed with, and the words "beneficial interest" were not in the act. The Longford case was a decision on this very point. The committee in that case determined that the right to vote was in such freeholders or leaseholders, when the property in respect to which they claimed was of the actual value of 10l., and was actually able to yield that amount over and above the sum paid for the rent of the same. Not only was it necessary that the voter should have property of the value of 10l., but that he should be able to make that sum; and again, it was not sufficient, that he could obtain the sum of 10l. for it, but there was the further question, whether the property was of the full value of 10l. in itself. And in the Longford committee, the witnesses who were examined were those who could give the value of the property in the market, as well as the inherent value; and this was what was required as a qualification as well under the 10th George 4th, as by the Reform Act. So it had been decided by the Longford committee, and he was not aware that there had been any other committee that had come to any decision upon this point. If, then, the judges had a jurisdiction for deciding this question, and if it had, in fact, been decided by them, he could see no grounds whatsoever for calling upon the House to entertain this question now, or to legislate upon it.

The Attorney-General

rose, to enter his protest against the assertion that the law upon this subject was settled, certain, and decided, and that consequently there was no occasion for a declaratory bill. On the contrary, he maintained that the law was unsettled, uncertain, in a complete state of confusion, and that some legislative settlement was necessary. How could any one say, that the question was settled when those to whom it had been referred differed?—when judges had decided differently, when assistant barristers had decided differently, and when committees had decided opposite ways? The Longford committee had decided the beneficial interest to be not that of the 10th George 4th, viz., such a rent as a solvent tenant could pay, but the rent that the property was worth to the claimant. That was the beneficial interest, and so far as that case was concerned, the hon. and learned Gentleman was entirely mistaken. It was, therefore, strange to hear it said, that there was no necessity for a declaratory bill when they found judges and assistant barristers and committees of that House deciding in different ways. There were strong arguments to show that a new law was introduced by the Reform Act, and it was these arguments which had weighed with some of the judges, assistant-barristers, and the committees of the House. If there were no intention to change the law, why was not the qualification under the 10th George 4th adhered to in the 2nd and 3rd William 4th? The words, "beneficial interest," were introduced, and the oath was altered. When he argued a case in Westminster-hall, and found that the words of one act were not followed in the words of another, the inference which he drew was, that it was intended by the Legislature to alter the law. The words of the former act were not adhered to, the oath was different, the definition of the qualification was different, and there were, therefore, strong arguments to show that there was an intention to make a difference in the qualification. If the hon. and learned Gentleman would refer to what had passed in that and in the other House of Parliament, when the Irish Reform Act was agreed to, it would be difficult for him to say, that it was not the intention of the noble Lord that the franchise should be altered. But then the hon. and learned Gentleman said, "However these two acts may clash, and whatever argument may be drawn from the difference in the oath it is res judicata. The twelve judges of Ireland have decided the point, and it has now become at any rate judge-made law." To that doctrine he most strongly dissented. If the act of Parliament had referred this question to the decision of any tribunal, and if the majority of that tribunal had decided that question, the decision of that tribunal would have bound all mankind. If the hon. and learned Gentleman had been able to establish his premises, his conclusion would have been perfectly right. But how did the hon. and learned Gentleman show that the twelve judges in Ireland could form a tribunal to decide this question? They had no power to make any such decision. All disputed questions were referred, by the act of Parliament, in the first place to the assistant-barrister; if he had any doubt they were next referred to the going judge of assize. It was not to the twelve judges as a tribunal that the appeal lay, but to the individual, who, by the commission, might be appointed to go the circuit, and it frequency happened that he was not one of the twelve judges, but a Serjeant or barrister. He might decide upon the case so long as the assizes lasted, but when that was over his power ceased. They were no more a tribunal, therefore, for the determination of these cases, than the assistant-barristers or than the revising barristers were, in England. There was nothing illegal in the judges giving their opinion upon such subjects, but the question was, whether that opinion was to be binding on those who differed from it. For his own part, most undoubtedly he should attach great weight to the opinion of a majority of the judges upon any question, but he should by no means consider himself bound by it, if he were called upon conscientiously, upon his oath, to declare what was his impression; and he thought that the Lord Chancellor of Ireland had given very sound advice, when he said, that the opinion of the majority of the twelve judges of Ireland was not binding upon those who dissented from it. There was no ground, therefore, for saying that this question had been settled by any tribunal, for there was no tribunal in Ireland entrusted with its conclusive decision. Then was there no necessity for legislating upon the subject? He thought, that where so much contrariety of opinion existed, it could not be taken that the question was settled, and that it would be far better that some conclusive provision should be introduced. He had thought it to be his duty to protest against the doctrine which had been laid down so confidently by the right hon. Gentleman who had last spoken, and he thought, that if he would review the whole of the subject with a little more deliberation, he would find that there was a marked distinction between a case of this description and one where, by the common law of the land, a reference of some point to the whole of the judges took place.

Sir E. B. Sugden

said, that the point really lay in the smallest possible compass. The whole difficulty had arisen from expressions used in the English Reform Act, which as framed by the noble Lord, had stated the qualification of the voter to be premises of the clear yearly value to him of 10l., and the noble Lord intended by those words to fix and ascertain most clearly that a man must himself have a tenement of a clear yearly value of 10l. Now, not the same words, but words having the same operation, were introduced into the Irish Reform Bill as it first came into the House of Commons, but the House of Lords were afraid that the words, "to him would lead to the same practical difficulties, as the words beneficial interests" had led to. They therefore struck out the words "to him," wherever they occurred in the bill. The bill then enacted, that a man must have a clear yearly value of 10l. He had at the time deprecated the change; he thought it dangerous; because he thought that it might be said, that the man might vote, not because he himself had that interest, but because the tenement was of that value. However, the Lords thought that the omission would have a different effect, and they therefore omitted the words. Now, the construction of the act which passed with this alteration, had been that which authorised the view taken by the Lords. To be sure, having introduced the word "householder" into the bill among other alterations, to which the words "to him," would not have been applicable, they were properly left out under the circumstances. It was at the suggestion of his right hon. Friend, that the words "beneficial interest" had been adopted, and therefore the Irish bill, in order to arrive at greater security, enacted that the claimant must have a beneficial interest of 10l. yearly over and above all rents and charges. Now, however, it was desired to tack the words "to him," to the words "beneficial interest," which, as he had explained, had been substituted for them; to add to the words substituted, the words for which the substitution had been made! This, he believed, was a perfectly correct statement of the facts. But now with respect to the question at issue at present, that was a question of freehold; and he must be allowed to say all parties misrepresented the state of it, and especially his hon. and learned Friend, the Attorney-general. The freehold qualification was altered, his hon. and learned Friend said, by the Irish Reform Act. That he denied. The 10th of George 4th had fixed the freehold qualification of 10l. clear yearly value over and above all rents and charges. But the question was, what amount of interest was the voter to have. He said the voter must have a free sum of 10l. value, whatever be the rents and charges, meaning the "charges," as he contended, all expenses of cultivation and so on—in short, all outgoings. That qualification he asserted had not been altered by the Reform Act, and he was sure that his hon. and learned Friend could not disprove the assertion. He admitted, however, that the Irish Reform Act altered the oath prescribed by the 10th George 4th, but the question was, did it alter the qualification? How did the case stand? The Irish Reform Act expressly stated, that they were going to give additional qualification. Now, he said that the Irish Reform Act nowhere cut down the freehold qualification as settled by the 10th George 4th; it only altered the oath, omitting the oath a juror, which was now no longer required, but making it imperative that the voter should swear that he had a clear yearly value of 10l., and he, as a party to that act, could most sincerely say, that he had contemplated no other than a clear absolute yearly value of 10l. He should not have felt justified in taking any course less favourable to the Irish voter; for he wished to fix nothing in this respect on Ireland that he would not take for England. There was no difference, then, in the qualification; the oath made the only distinction. The test was just the same in the one case as in the other. It was his clear conviction that such was the true construction of the Irish Reform Act, which applied equally to the English Reform Act, which applied equally to the freehold qualification. He asked then that the same construction might be put upon the same words in each country, that construction being the construction given by the ten judges. However, he would not enter into the question whether this majority of the judges could bind the minority. It was a very nice point, and required very great research. However, his hon. and learned Friend admitted, he was glad to find, that there was no illegality in this meeting and decision of the learned judges. Nobody denied that it had been the practice for many years in Ireland, that the opinions of the majority on these occasions had been held to be binding throughout Ireland. In this case, therefore, they had the opinion of the majority; nothing could be more regular, nothing more constitutional. He was the last man who would wish to say anything that could be painful to any of the judges in Ireland, but if any judge thought that he was not bound by the opinion of the majority of the judges, he might justify his own opinion to himself, but that judge must be a bold man who did not find himself shaken in his own opinion by such a majority as ten to two. He must declare his opinion, that, in this view of the subject, it was not a safe or wholesome doctrine i to state that the opinion of the majority of the judges was not binding on the minority. He submitted to the House that there was nothing to decide; and, if there were, at all events that was not the proper time to decide it.

Sir D. Norreys

thought it was quite time the franchise should be defined. Neither judges nor barristers, nor Members of that House, had hitherto been able to agree on a definition. One party called the judges partisans for deciding one way, and another called the people perjurers forswearing another. He trusted, then, that hon. Members would look the question manfully in the face, and, throwing over the petty squabbles of Whigs and Tories, would at last let the Irish people know what amount they were really to register for. With respect to the word's "beneficial interest," the insertion of those words in the Irish Reform Bill, had been the result of an unnatural connection between the right hon. and learned Sergeant opposite, and the hon. and learned Member for the city of Dublin. It was certainly an offspring worthy of such a union. However, he did not think the present the fitting occasion for discussing the meaning of those words, but trusted that on a fitting occasion he should be able to show, that it was full time to define the Irish franchise.

Mr. Shaw

said, that in the discussion on this subject in 1835, the hon. and learned Member for Dublin had supported a similar measure to this, because it provided annual revision and an appeal both ways, and had not attempted any opposition on the ground that it did not define the franchise. He called on the House to support the motion for going into Committee, on the grounds stated in 1835 by the hon. and learned Member for Dublin, and to reject his present amendment, that amendment he was convinced not having for its object fairly to define the franchise, for the hon. and learned Member had himself stated, that such a definition ought to be made the subject of a separate bill, but being intended solely to obstruct the further progress of this measure.

Mr. Lynch

observed, that the proposition of those who opposed this instruction was simply this:—that they should at once proceed to provide for the registration of the franchise, without defining what that franchise should be, and at the same time that it must be admitted that the existing law was by no means clear on the subject. He contended that the definition of the franchise was absolutely necessary, in order to ensure the due working of any measure of registration. The noble Lord having introduced the Reform Act, by which the franchise was left in this uncertain and unsatisfactory state, it was doubly incumbent on him to accede to a proposal to define it. It was argued on the other side that the law was clearly enough laid down at present, there being ten to two of the judges in favour of one particular view. But Sergeant Green and Sergeant Moore, who sat as judges on circuit, had intimated that their opinion coincided with that of the minority. With such a state of opinion among the judges could the law be said to be in a satisfactory state? He maintained, that it was not, and therefore called on the House to define the franchise according to the intent and meaning of the Reform Act.

Mr. Litton

rose to enter his protest against the doctrine laid down by the Attorney-general, that it was competent or even decent for any single judge, or any two judges, to set themselves against the deliberate and mature opinion of the majority of the judges. Till to-night he had never heard any lawyer of eminence, at either the English or Irish bars, propound such a doctrine as this. When the English judges were specially referred to on a similar point, arising out of conflicting opinions on the point of law raised in the case of Frost, what was the reply of the judges to the case referred to them by the Secretary of State? Why, that the opinion of the majority must be held as the opinion of the whole. And when Lord Chief Justice Bushe wrote over to Lord Chief Justice Denman to inquire the opinion of the English judges, as to whether dissentient judges were bound by the opinion of the majority, Lord Denman distinctly informed the Irish judges that the universal practice of the English judges was, that they were so bound.

Mr. H. Grattan

observed, that the House had for some hours had to listen to the eloquence of a number of learned Members. In the first place, there was his hon. Friend, the Member for Dublin, who was followed by the Member for the University of Dublin, who was replied to by the Attorney-general for England. That learned Gentleman was succeeded by the right hon. and learned Member for Ripon. The fifth lawyer was the second Member for the University of Dublin, who was replied to by the Member for Galway, and who was succeeded by the hon. Member who had just sat down, the learned Member for Coleraine, who was the seventh lawyer that had spoken on this question during the present evening. They had all disagreed in their opinions, and it appeared to him that no two of them attached the same meaning to the qualification. These seven learned Gentlemen were very unlike the seven wise men of the East, for it almost appeared as if they had exerted their ingenuity to see how much they could disagree on this subject. They had had the benefit of the opinion of an ex-Chancellor, and of learned counsel of the Crown, who might be regarded as acolyte judges; and when these authorities disagreed to such an extent, how could it be expected that persons who were not lawyers could agree? They had heard the ex-Chancellor of Ireland—and certainly one of the best Chancellors that Ireland had ever had—disagree entirely with the Attorney-general for England as to the present qualification, and as to the probable consequences of the present bill. In Ireland also there were eight judges on the one side, and four on the other; and the question would remain unsettled until the House took care that some definite interpretation was adopted. It therefore remained for the House to decide whether they were prepared or not, to adopt the application of the same principle to Ireland which the noble Lord, as a Cabinet Minister, supported in the English and Scotch Reform Bills. The only object of the hon. and learned Member for Dublin was to get a specific declaration as to the nature of the franchise, and to ensure something like certainty as to the groundwork for the claim. Not less than 550,000 signatures had been affixed to petitions against this bill in Ireland, and he was convinced that the people of that country would never submit to a measure like the present, which struck at the elective franchise in that country. He had no hesitation in saying that it was a cowardly course to adopt the system that had been acted upon in that bill, while they let the case of Ludlow stand unredressed, and Cambridge remain as it was. He could not help feeling that a quotation which occurred to his mind was very applicable to the introducer of the present bill:— Cum tua prævideas oculis mala lippus inunctis; Cur in amicorum vitiis tam cernis acutùm, Quam aut aquila aut 'scorpio' Epidaurias? He was aware that he had departed from the quotation in using the word "scorpio" instead of "serpens;" but he, with his hon. and learned Friend, the Member for Dublin, preferred the former; and although the metre might not be the same, the terms were nearly synonymous, and both were in the same genus. On a former occasion the noble Lord only carried his motion for going into Committee by a majority of four, out of a House of 604; and was that sufficient to disfranchise the people of Ireland? Let them look at the recent proceedings at Cambridge and other boroughs, and ask themselves whether they could discover such disgraceful proceedings to have occurred in Ireland? The truth was, that the party on the opposite side of the House were anxious to disfranchise the Irish people, because they knew that they always stood forward to defend their own privileges and the liberties of the people of England against the Tories. It was evident that the noble Lord felt, that the state of the Irish franchise was the only impediment to his coming into power with the right hon. Baronet near him; he therefore was anxious, at almost any sacrifice, to disfranchise them. The noble Lord should change his name, and he must caution Members on that side of the House against calling him their noble Friend, for he was convinced that the proper designation to apply to him was the noble Captain Rock, for his proceedings in this matter would be nothing more nor less than the affixing a Rockite notice to the door of every voter in Ireland. He would tell the noble Lord and those who acted with him that they were very much mistaken if they supposed that the people of Ireland would tamely submit to a measure of wholesale disfran- chisement like the present. The British Parliament disfranchised 200,000 on passing the Catholic Relief Bill, and the present measure would, if carried, cut off a large proportion of the constituency of Ireland. He called upon the English Gentlemen representing liberal constituencies to stand by them in that matter. They might depend on the support of the majority of the Irish Members at present, who would stand by the Queen and the country in every case of difficulty and in every emergency. Did hon. Gentlemen think that eight millions of people would tamely give up their rights and submit to a tyrannical measure like the present? There was a growing attachment towards England, daily increasing in the breasts of the Irish, and he wished that the House would never attempt to crush it by passing such bills as the present. The whole of the charges in which this bill was founded had grown out of the Spottiswoode conspiracy. It was only renewing the agitation on the Catholic question, and when they once excited the feeling, they could not tell when they could put a stop to it. He would ask the House who were the chief contributors to this fund? On looking over the list he found that a large proportion of them were ladies, whose pockets were picked by those who imposed the most monstrous stories on them with the view of getting their money. It was clear, that the renewal of agitation on this subject would not be bloodless, but was calculated to produce the very worst effects in Ireland. It destroyed the peace of families. On referring to the list of subscribers for the Spottiswoode fund, he found that one lady had been induced to subscribe against the election of her son, a second against that of her brother, and a third against her husband. In conclusion he would only add, that a passage which occurred to his mind from a popular poet was truly applicable to the originator of this bill. It was— Oh! it grieves me to think, self-destroyed as thou art, What a rashness of temper thy spirit betrays; How a mountebank head and a renegade heart Have diverted their victim from Liberty's ways.

Lord Stanley

said, the last word he had heard was something; that diverted somebody or other; but he did not well know what. He had, however, listened to the hon. Gentleman's speech with much amusement, though but little instruction; and he felt bound in justice to the hon. Gentlemen to add, that whatever might have been the differences which existed between "the seven wise men" to whom the hon. Member had alluded in the course of his observations, the hon. Gentleman who succeeded them had not thrown any new light on the subject. But to come to the point at issue. What was the question before the House for discussion? It was whether or not the House should go into Committee on a bill which had been four times affirmatively decided before. Whether, in short, the instruction of the hon. and learned Member for Dublin, which, according to his own showing, went to introduce the elements of discord and ultimate destruction to its principle, should be acceded to, notwithstanding these four decisions of the House. The question involved in the instruction of the hon. and learned Member was by no means a new one; on the contrary, it had been already debated and decided on by a majority on a former occasion. On a previous evening the hon. Member for Mallow had given notice of a motion for defining the franchise in Ireland in connexion with the bill before the House; but he had taken the liberty of stating to that hon. Member the reasons why the question should not be then entertained, and the considerations which should induce the non-adoption of any definition of the franchise in the bill. The hon. Member was satisfied with these explanations, and courteously withdrew his motion. The hon. and learned Member for Dublin was not, however, satisfied with them; and he therefore moved, after the House had gone into Committee on the bill, that there should be an instruction as to the definition of the franchise in the same manner as he did at present. That question was debated, and the House refused to sanction or refer it to the Committee. And yet the hon. and learned Member now brought forward a motion to the same effect, having the same object, and with the same purpose, in the teeth of that decision of the House. He would not say with the view of causing delay, but certainly with the appearance, and perhaps the hope, of obtaining another day at this late period of the Session. On the occasion of the former debate on the question then under discussion, the noble Lord opposite had taken the course which he presumed he would take that night— namely, to declare himself adverse to all unfair opposition to the bill. On that occasion, too, the noble Lord stated, that he would for the future waive all opposition on his own part and on that of the Government to the bill going into Committee; and that he would neither interpose obstruction himself in the way of its progress nor support it in others. He firmly believed, that the noble Lord would now adhere to that pledge and this declaration, that would maintain his agreement; but still he could not help thinking, that it would have been a far more satisfactory course of proceeding on the part of the noble Lord if he had risen at an earlier hour of the night, and said, on the part of the Government, "We will not countenance this proceeding—the hon. and learned Member for Dublin can act as he likes, may move what he chooses, but we shall give our support as a Government to none other than a fair opposition." How far the opposition was a fair one he would now proceed to show. The Committee on the bill, the last night it was before them, were about to enter on the discussion of the 4th Clause, affecting occupiers and householders in cities: the three first had been disposed of, and the third after a heavy division. On the proposal of that clause the hon. Member for Kilkenny stated, that as it involved a question of taxation, there would be a strong opposition to it; and he thereupon waived his right to proceed farther then, though it was a far earlier hour than it was usual to relinquish bills in Committee, to give that hon. Member a full opportunity for the discussion of the question of cess and taxes. In strict accordance with the objection of the hon. Member for Kilkenny, the hon. and learned Member for Dublin at the same moment gave notice of a motion for an instruction to the Committee to define municipal cess and taxes. That was the notice the hon. and learned Member gave, as would be found on reference to the books of the House; and yet it was now changed by a singular sleight into an instruction to define the municipal function, and that changed and substituted motion was, that the House was called upon to discuss and decide. He asked the House and the country was that a fair opposition? Was that ho- nestly and openly meeting the bill by argument? It might be, no doubt, a very successful course to adopt to stave off the bill for another day or another week; but if the hon. and learned Member, or those who countenanced him in this matter, thought it would be successful with the people of England and Scotland—if they calculated it would have the effect of staving off the bill altogether, he and they very much mistook the feeling of the people. When, at this late period of the Session, they should see a bill thus obstructed by a motion for an instruction previously debated and decided in the negative—an instruction, too, foisted on the House instead of the one for which notice had been given—when they should see this, they would not be slow in expressing their opinions, nor backward in putting them in force. He should not argue the instruction before the House. The noble Lord opposite separated the franchise from the registration in his English bill; the Solicitor-general for Ireland did the same in the bills he had introduced for Ireland; and yet the hon. and learned Member for Dublin would fain foist it into this bill. Where was the consistency in that? Where the fairness? The House had, however, decided before against the instruction of the hon. and learned Member, and he called on them to adhere to that decision in the present case. He would say no more on the subject. He would not lay himself open to the taunt thrown out by the Attorney-general in the course of the debate, in delaying by long speeches the progress of the bill, though he could not help reminding that hon. and learned Gentleman that the discussion had been brought on by the hon. and learned Member for Dublin. He would say not a word to impede it; and though he was aware that nothing could be done in Committee that night, he should, notwithstanding, offer not a single observation on a bill that had already had the sanction of the House and the care of a Committee.

Lord John Russell

I came down to this House this evening like the noble Lord opposite, thinking that the hon. and learned Member for Dublin would move an instruction to the Committee to define municipal taxes and cess, and not to define the franchise. With respect to the course which the hon. and learned Gentleman has taken, I say nothing; he can answer the charge, if charge it be, as he likes. But I am called on to say something in answer to the observations of the noble Lord respecting my not rising earlier in the night and putting a stop to this debate. Sir, I am glad I did not do so. It was quite impossible to listen to the exposition of the law as laid down by the hon. Member for the university of Dublin on the one side, and by hon. Members on this side of the House on the other, as to points involved in the question, and let it go by default. Was I to interrupt such a discussion, from whence so much information was elicited? On the contrary, I conceived that discussion to be so important, though brought on, I admit, without notice, that I ought not to interfere with it. But for my own part, I feel no difficulty in saying, that though the registration and the franchise may be better connected than disconnected, I cannot vote for the instruction. The noble Lord refuses to discuss the instruction, he declines to argue it, on the ground that it connects the franchise and the registration. But has he separated these points on his own side? Has he not, instead of doing so, rather introduced clauses into it of a contrary tendency, giving the decision of the franchise to the judges, a majority of whom have declared themselves adverse to it? It may be all very well for the noble Lord to say, he will not argue the instructions, because, that his mode of defining the franchise is the best—that, in short, his bill is perfection; but I cannot agree with his deductions that leaving the question untouched is the best mode of settlement. I must here allude to one or two points which throw some light on the bill of the noble Lord. The hon. and learned Member for Dublin said there were two main points in it, viz., providing for an annual revision and giving the appeal both ways, which were peculiarly obnoxious. For my own part, I would wish to wholly omit the latter from the bill, and to modify the former so as to make it less severe than it will be on the voters. Let us see how these points affect the franchise, and the seats of hon. Members of this House. My hon. and learned Friend (the Attorney-general) says that the voter is to be sent before a judge when his claim is disputed, even though the assistant-barrister should admit it, which judge may take a different view of the franchise from that officer, and may, consequently, not alone disallow the vote, but mulct the claimant in heavy costs. That is exactly the case; and it has been nearly so admitted by hon. Gentlemen opposite. But another result is still more extraordinary. It has long been held, that this House has the sole power of deciding on the elections of its own Members; but this bill will take away that power and confer it on the judges? Now what are the opinions of the judges? The hon. and learned Member for Coleraine said, it is settled law that the majority decides all questions as between these functionaries—the question of the franchise of course included — and I shall not contradict him, though I doubt, altogether, his inference; but it appears by the statement of my hon. and learned Friend, the Attorney-general that not only have two judges expressed a different opinion from the majority in this matter, but have also acted upon it: and further, that all future judges are equally entitled to differ on the subject. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon followed, and said the point was a very nice point, so nice that he should refrain from giving any opinion on it, which, if I were to interpret, I should say meant that his opinion was at variance with the object of the bill in this instance, and that he would not, therefore, inconvenience its supporters by disclosing them. But even if I am not entitled to draw this inference, I have the authority of my hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-general for saying that the minority among the Judges are fully justified in maintaining their opinions against the majority, which according to the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite, is "a very nice point." Thus those Judges who differed from their brother Judges, and though the minority preferred their own opinions to those of others, are wholly redeemed from the censure sought to be cast on them by implication in the speech of the hon. and learned Member for Coleraine; and I have no doubt that they will continue to decide on the franchise at each assizes in accordance with those opinions. But what says the bill of the noble Lord on this subject? If the claim of the voter be refused by the assistant-barrister, says the noble Lord's bill, the complainant may appeal to the Judge of Assize; and in the meanwhile, if an election should take place, he may tender his vote, pending the decision of his claim, and it shall be received until such claim is so decided. Now, what may be the consequence of this proceeding? If an election be carried by a very small majority, and if some of these votes be on the list of that majority, the seat of the person elected would be decided, not by a Committee of this House —not even by the select committee appointed last Session for contested election petitions—but by the opinion of the then going Judge of Assize, as to whether the claims in question were rightly or wrongfully disallowed. The seat of the candidate so elected would be at the mercy of the Judge, and depend entirely on an opinion. But on what opinion? On the settled and unanimous opinion of all the Judges of Ireland? Far from it. If decided on by Baron Richards or Mr. Justice Perrin, the Member would sit; but, if tried before Chief Justice Bushe or Mr. Justice Crampton, he would lose his seat. Now, I ask, was there ever so extraordinary a bill introduced into this House? First taking the jurisdiction away from this House, and then giving it to the Judges, to depend ultimately upon the individual opinion of a single Judge. The right hon. Member for Montgomery perhaps does not agree with me, but I can tell him that the author of the Grenville Act would have been shocked at such a piece of legislation. Sir, I am sorry to say, we have heard already, with respect to the opinion given by Baron Richards, language used in this House very unbecoming the House to listen to. But if such language be now used in reference to decisions upon the construction of the law of 1839, what may we not expect when this bill shall become law, and when each party shall be on the look out to see how the Judges will decide, for or against their respective partisans and candidates. Then we may certainly calculate on having the purity of the Bench assailed, for the disappointed party will not scruple to say that it was a political opinion, and not given in reference to the justice of the case. Sir, it is my intention, when we come to this clause in Committee, to oppose it on these grounds, and subsequently to proceed with another bill to remedy this deficiency with respect to the uncertainty of the franchise. Sir, I think it is my duty to see, that the franchise is properly and satisfactorily defined upon some clear and steadfast foundation. I think, Sir, that I shall only be doing justice to all the great interests at stake, first, to take care that some effective means be provided to ensure both speedy and substantial justice to the person claiming to exercise the franchise, and, secondly, to avoid the dangers and inconvenience that would result from giving our authority to decide on these claims into other bands. And I trust, Sir, we shall not be found in conclusion to have either betrayed our duty to ourselves or neglected our duty to others; and that we shall so conduct our legislation, that neither the supreme authority of the House in its own affairs shall be undermined, nor the purity of the Judges placed in a questionable predicament by the duties we shall delegate to them.

Sir Robert Peel

said,—Sir, the course pursued in this House to-night appears to me to vary from any course which we have hitherto been accustomed to. After repeated trials of the strength of each side of the House, its opinion was taken, and it was agreed to go into Committee. The noble Lord then said, he would not be a party to any unfair obstructions, but he seems now to forget that he has been producing that effect in practice. We entered into Committee, but small progress was made. We got through three clauses with some difficulty, and find ourselves unfairly obstructed in the fourth. Only look, Sir, at what course has been pursued. Notice was given "to move an instruction to the Committee on the Registration of Votes (Ireland) (No. I.) Bill, to define municipal cesses and taxes." [Mr. O'Connell —It is the notice on the paper, but is not the one intended. It is a mistake.]—I was contradicted when I said the hon. and learned Member had put such a notice on the papers; but he says it was not that intended. Now what means can we have of judging respecting an hon. Member's intentions, or the business to be attended to, except the notice on the paper? Had not my noble Friend a right to consider what was stated on the paper was the business of the night? No intimation of change of intention was given either publicly or privately; but when my noble Friend was pressed he goes on with the business. The noble Lord did not discountenance the proceedings entered on at an earlier period, but just at the moment that there was a hope that some progress might have been made, he says he intends to oppose the motion of his hon. and learn- ed Friend; but he does not end his speech there, for he commences a new discussion as to the principle of the bill. Time enough had been lost on this point before, and all possible objections and motions of delay urged in the previous debates; but all these were overruled and got rid of on the second reading of the bill. It is perfectly competent to the noble Lord to object to the decision of the Judges being made final, and to the injury which might result both to them and to the jurisdiction of this House by the delegation of our authority in the matter; but it is not fair in him to occupy twenty minutes at this critical hour of the night in discussing topics not before us, and already very sufficiently debated, apparently to serve no earthly purpose but delay, and so to gratify or conciliate the opponents of the measure. I am quite surprised that the noble Lord and his Government can submit to the humiliation that he and they have submitted to, in lending themselves to aid the covert attempt to strike a blow at my noble Friend and his bill. He is denounced as if he were guilty of the greatest constitutional enormity, because he gives a right of appeal against the claimant to vote to the Judges of Assize. Yet what does an enactment say in a bill submitted to this House, in 1835, that in the cases specified, "it shall or may be lawful for the parties to appeal to the next going Judge of Assize." This bill was not brought in by my noble Friend, but by the legal advisers of her Majesty's Government, by the then Sergeant O'Loghlen and Mr. Perrin. And yet the noble Lord who approved and supported that clause now turns round and denounces my noble Friend, because he has brought in a bill making the decision of the Judges conclusive against the House of Commons. I recollect that the noble Lord gave it as a reason for supporting that bill in 1835, that it contained such a clause, and now he comes forward to repudiate the acts of those now absent, who acted under his own authority. The noble Lord said the other night, in speaking of Mr. J. Perrin, that he was so satisfied of the identity of feeling existing between her Majesty's Government and Mr. James Perrin, that the latter was quite ready and willing to be thrown overboard if they deemed it expedient. I hope the noble Lord really knows nothing of the fact of that Judge, or any other Judge, being ready to do so; but if he does, I hope that he has, in common consistency, closed his ears against the anathe- mas poured out against that Government that would sully the purity of the ermine by converting Judges into political partisans to serve their own private ends. It is very possible that these observations of the noble Lord, may prevent any further effective discussion of the bill at present; and I must say, Sir, that I hardly regret it, for I am confident that the more consideration it receives the more support it will receive, and that the cause of right and justice must ultimately prevail. But, Sir, it is not characteristic of the cause of right and justice to proceed to discuss matters foreign to the business in hand, and so delay, and perhaps prevent, the establishment of a constitutional measure for the remedy and prevention of practical evils admitted to exist on all hands. It may be right to discuss points of principle in committee when the fitting occasion presents itself, but now when you want to discuss these points in detail, and in reference to their practical effect, you insist on going back to re-argue the principles. In conclusion, Sir, I will say that it strikes me that this course, and the very extraordinary course which has, in connexion with it, been pursued to-night, will tend to convince and conciliate supporters and friends to this measure, not only in England and Scotland, but also in Ireland, where its immediate action will take place and its good effects be chiefly experienced, and thereby lay the foundation of ultimate and lasting triumph.

The House divided on Mr. O'Connell's Motion:—Ayes 162; Noes 311: Majority 149.

List of the AYES.
Abercromby, hn. G. R. Busfeild, W.
Archbold, R. Callaghan, D.
Baines, E. Cave, R. O.
Bannerman, A. Chapman, Sir M. L. C.
Barnard, E. G. Childers, J. W.
Barron, H. W. Clements, Viscount
Berkeley, hon. H. Clive, E. B.
Berkeley, hon. C. Collier, J.
Bernal, R. Collins, W.
Bewes, T. Corbally, M. E.
Blake, M. J. Dashwood, G. H.
Bodkin, J. J. Denison, W. J.
Bowes, J. D'Eyncourt, right hon. C. T.
Brabazon, Lord
Bridgeman, H. Duke, Sir J.
Brocklehurst, J. Duncan, Viscount
Brodie, W. B. Duncombe, T.
Brotherton, J. Dundas, hon. J. C.
Browne, R. D. Dundas, Sir R.
Bryan, G. Dundas, D.
Buller, E. Easthope, J.
Edwards, Sir J. O'Connell, M.
Elliot, hon. J. E. Oswald, J.
Ellice, E. Paget, F.
Ellis, W. Pattison, J.
Etwall, R. Pechell, Captain
Euston, Earl of Pendarves, E. W. W.
Evans, Sir De L. Philips, M.
Evans, G. Phillpotts, J.
Evans, W. Ponsonby, C. F. A.
Ewart, W. Power, J.
Fielden, J. Ramsbottom, J.
Finch, F. Rawdon, Col. J. D.
Fitzpatrick, J. W. Redington, T. N.
Fitzroy, Lord C. Rice, E. R.
Fleetwood, Sir P. H. Rippon, C.
Fort, J. Roche, E. B.
Grattan, J. Roche, W.
Greg, R. H. Rundle, J.
Grey, rt. hon. Sir C. Russell, Lord C.
Grote, G. Salwey, Colonel
Hall, Sir B. Scholefield, J.
Handley, H. Seale, Sir J. H.
Hawes, B. Smith, J. A.
Heathcoat, J. Smith, B.
Hector, C. J. Smith, G. R.
Hill, Lord A. M. C. Somers, J. P.
Hindley, C. Somerville, Sir W.M.
Hobhouse, T. B. Standish, C.
Hodges, T. L. Stanley, M.
Hollond, R. Stanley, hon. W. O.
Howard, hn. E.G. G. Staunton, Sir G. T.
Howard, F. J. Steuart, R.
Hume, J. Stewart, J.
Humphery, J. Stuart, W. V.
Hutchins, E. J. Stock, Dr.
Hutton, R. Strangways, hon. J.
James, W. Strickland, Sir G.
Jervis, J. Strutt, E.
Lambton, H. Tancred, H. W.
Langdale, hon. C. Thornely, T.
Langton, W. G. Turner, E.
Leader, J. T. Turner, W.
Lister, E. C. Vigors, N. A.
Loch, J. Villiers, hon. C. P.
Lushington, C. Wakley, T.
Lushington, rt. hn. S. Wallace, R.
Lynch, A. H. Warburton, H.
Mactaggart, J. Ward, H. G.
Maher, J. Westenra, hon. H. R.
Marsland, H. Westenra, hon. J. C.
Melgund, Viscount White, A.
Mildmay, P. St. J. White, W.
Morrison, J. Williams, W.
Muntz, G. F. Williams, W. A.
Murray, A. Wood, G. W.
Muskett, G. A. Wood, B.
Nagle, Sir R. Worsley, Lord
Norreys, Sir D. J. Wrightson, W. B.
O'Brien, C. Yates, J. A.
O'Brien, W, S. TELLERS.
O'Connell, J. O'Connell, D.
O'Connell, M. J. Grattan, H.
List of the NOES.
Acland, Sir T. D. Adam, Admiral
Acland, T. D. Ainsworth, P.
A'Court, Captain Alsager, Captain
Alston, R. Corry, hon. H.
Andover, Viscount Courtenay, P.
Anson, hon. Col. Cowper, hon. W. F.
Arbuthnott, hon. H. Cresswell, C.
Archdall, M. Cripps, J.
Ashley, Lord Dalmeny, Lord
Ashley, hon. H. Dalrymple, Sir A.
Attwood, W. Damer, hon. D.
Attwood, M. Darby, G.
Bagge, W. Darlington, Earl of
Bagot, hon. W. De Horsey, S. H.
Bailey, J. Dick, Q.
Bailey, J., jun. D'Israeli, B.
Baillie, hon. Col. Douglas, Sir C. E.
Bainbridge, E. T. Douro, Marquess of
Baker, E. Dowdeswell, W.
Baring, rt. hon. F. T. Drummond, H. H.
Baring, hon. F. Duffield, T.
Baring, H. B. Dunbar, G.
Barrington, Viscount Duncombe, hon. A.
Basset, J. Dungannon, Viscount
Bell, M. Du Pre, G.
Bennett, J. East, J. B.
Bentinck, Lord G. Eastnor, Viscount
Berkeley, hon. C. Eaton, R. J.
Bethell, R. Egerton, W. T.
Blackburne, I. Egerton, Sir P.
Blackett, C. Ellis, J.
Blackstone, W. S. Erle, W.
Blair, J. Estcourt, T.
Blake, W. J. Farnham, E. B.
Blennerhassett, A. Feilden, W.
Boldero, H.G. Fellowes, E.
Bradshaw, J. Filmer, Sir E.
Bramston, T. W. Fitzalan, Lord
Broadwood, H. Fitzroy, hon. H.
Brooke, Sir A. B. Fleming, J.
Brownrigg, S. Follett, Sir W.
Bruce, Lord E. Forester, hon. G.
Bruce, C. L. C. Fox, S. L.
Bruges, W. H. L. Freemantle, Sir T.
Buck, L. W. Freshfield, J. W.
Buller, Sir J. Y. Gaskell, J. Milnes
Bulwer, Sir L. Gladstone, W. E.
Burrell, Sir C. Glynne, Sir S. R.
Burroughes, H. N. Goddard, A.
Byng, G. Gordon, R.
Campbell, Sir H. Gordon, hon. Captain
Campbell, W. F. Gore, O. J. R.
Canning, rt hn. Sir S. Gore, O. W.
Castlereagh, Viscount Goring, H. D.
Cavendish, hon. C. Goulburn, rt. hon. H.
Cavendish, hon. G.H. Graham, rt. hon. Sir J.
Chapman, A. Granby, Marquess of
Chichester, J. P. B. Grant, Sir A. C.
Cholmondeley, hn. H. Greene, T.
Christopher, R. A. Greenaway, C.
Chute, W. L. W. Grey, rt. hon. Sir G.
Clay, W. Grimsditch, T.
Clayton, Sir W. R. Grimston, Viscount
Clerk, Sir G. Grimston, hon. E. H.
Clive, hon. R. H. Guest, Sir J.
Codrington, C. W. Hale, R. B.
Cole, hon. A. H. Halford, H.
Colquhoun, J. C. Hamilton, C. J. B.
Compton, H. C. Hamilton, Lord C.
Conolly, Col. E. M. Harcourt, G. S.
Hardinge, rt. hn Sir H. Meynell, Captain
Harland, W. C. Miles, P. W. S.
Hawkes, T. Miller, W. H.
Hawkins, J. H. Milnes, R. M.
Hayes, Sir E. Monypenny, T. G.
Hayter, W. G. Mordaunt, Sir J.
Heathcote, G. J. Morgan, C. M. R.
Heneage, G. W. Morpeth, Viscount
Henniker, Lord Morris, D.
Hepburn, Sir T. B. Neeld, J.
Herbert, hon. S. Nicholl, J.
Herries, rt. hon. J. C. Noel, hon. C. G.
Hillsborough, Earl of Norreys, Lord
Hinde, J. H. Northland, Lord
Hobhouse, right hon. Sir J. O'Ferrall, R. M.
Ord, W.
Hodgson, R. Ossulston, Lord
Hogg, J.W. Owen, Sir J.
Holmes, hon. W. A. C. Parker, J.
Holmes, W. Parker, M.
Hope, hon. C. Parker, R. T.
Hope, H. T. Parker, T. A. W.
Hope, G. W. Patten, J. W.
Horsman, E. Peel, rt. hn. Sir R.
Hoskins, K. Peel, J.
Hotham, Lord Pemberton, T.
Houstoun, G. Perceval, Colonel
Howick, Viscount Philips, G. R.
Hughes, W. B. Pigot, D. R.
Hurt, F. Pigot, R.
Hutt, W. Planta, right hon. J.
Ingestrie, Viscount Polhill, F.
Inglis, Sir R. H. Pollen, Sir J. W.
Irton, S. Powerscourt, Visct.
Irving, J. Praed, W. T.
Jackson, Sergeant Pringle, A.
James, Sir W. C. Protheroe, E.
Jermyn, Earl Pusey, P.
Jones, Captain Rae, rt. hon. Sir W.
Kemble, H. Reid, Sir J. R.
Kerrison, Sir E. Richards, R.
Kelburne, Viscount Rickford, W.
Kirk, P. Round, C. G.
Knatchbull, right hon. Sir E. Round, J.
Rumbold, C. E.
Knight, H. G. Rushbrooke, Colonel
Labouchere, rt hn. H. Rushout, G.
Lascelles, hon. W. S. Russell, Lord J.
Lefroy, right hon. T. Rutherfurd, rt. hn. A.
Lemon, Sir C. Sanderson, R.
Lennox, Lord G. Sandon, Viscount
Lennox, Lord A. Scarlett, hon. J. Y.
Lincoln, Earl of Scrope, G. P.
Lockhart, A. M. Seymour, Lord
Long, W. Sheil, rt. hn. R. L.
Lowther, hon. Col. Sheppard, T.
Lowther, J. H. Shirley, E. J.
Lygon, hon. Gen. Sibthorp, Colonel
Macaulay, rt. hn. T. B. Smith, A.
Mackenzie, T. Smith, R. V.
Mackenzie, W. F. Smyth, Sir G. H.
Mahon, Viscount Spry, Sir S. T.
Maidstone, Viscount Stanley, hon. E. J.
Manners, Lord C. S. Stanley, Lord
Marton, G. Stansfield, W. R. C.
Maule, hon. F. Stewart, J.
Maunsell, T. P. Sturt, H. C.
Style, Sir C. Villiers, Viscount
Sugden, rt. hn. Sir E. Vivian, Major C.
Surrey, Earl of Vivian, J. E.
Talbot, C. R. M. Vivian, rt. hn. Sir R.H.
Talfourd, Sergeant Waddington, H. S.
Tavistock, Marq. of Walsh, Sir J.
Teignmouth, Lord Welby, G. E.
Tennent, J. E. Williams, R.
Thesiger, F. Williams, T. P.
Thompson, Alderman Winnington, Sir T. E.
Thornhill, G. Winnington, H. J.
Tollemache, F. J. Wodehouse, E.
Townley, R. G. Wood, C.
Trench, Sir F. Wood, Colonel
Trevor, hon. G. R. Wood, Colonel T.
Tufnell, H. Wynn, rt. hon. C. W.
Tyrell, Sir J. T. Young, J.
Vere, Sir C. B. Young, Sir W.
Verner, Colonel TELLERS.
Verney, Sir H. Shaw, right hon. F.
Vernon, G. H. Litton, E.

Committee deferred.

House adjourned.