HC Deb 07 August 1839 vol 50 cc3-6
Lord J. Russell

said, that before he proceeded to call the attention of the House to the Lords' amendments to this bill generally, he wished lo have the opinion of the Chair upon one of them in particular. The bill, as it had passed the Commons, contained clauses giving certain powers which were hitherto exercised by the grand juries in Ireland to the municipal bodies instituted or reformed by the bill. It appeared that the House of Lords had struck out those clauses, whereby in effect those powers hitherto exercised by grand juries, which were taxing powers, and powers of levying money, were continued to those grand juries as they had by law hitherto exercised them. That was exactly the nature and effect of the Lords' amendment; and without offering any opinion upon the question, he should be glad to hear the opinion of the Chair before he proceeded to propose any further steps.

The Speaker

said, that if he correctly understood the question, it had reference to those clauses in the bill which transferred certain powers of taxation held under the existing law, by the grand juries of the several counties in Ireland, to the newly created councils in the proposed municipal boroughs, the Lords' amendment upon which he did not think the House of Commons could agree to. It had always been most jealous of any interference on the part of the other House in cases of this description. It did not even allow the House of Lords to change the name of a single trustee in a turnpike bill. If a bill passed the Commons for the collection of rates, it never consented, and never would consent, to any alterations being made by the other House respecting the body which was to have the control of those rates. He apprehended, therefore, that the Commons having decided that these powers of taxation were hereafter to be exercised by the new municipal councils, and the House of Lords having so amended the bill as lo re-transfer those powers to the grand juries of the counties in Ireland, that the House of Commons could not, consistently with the proper maintenance of its privileges, agree to that amendment.

Lord J. Russell

begged further to know, whether in the opinion of the Chair, that amendment would be at once fatal to the bill, or whether it was an amendment to which they could disagree, and ask the other House to consent to their disagreement thereon?

The Speaker

replied, that he did not consider it fatal to the bill, but such an amendment as the House of Commons might disagree to, and signify their intention accordingly to the House of Lords, in the hope, that their Lordships might wave their amendment, and allow the clauses to stand as before.

Mr. Shaw

apprehended, that in point of form they were not prohibited from going into the consideration of the question upon its own merits; and if they might consider the question on its merits, that at once disposed of the question of privilege. He entirely concurred in the principle laid down by the right hon. Gentleman in the Chair, that the House of Lords could not, without infringing upon their privileges, change the name of a trustee in a turnpike bill; but he submitted, that that did not apply to the present case. The House of Lords had not in any degree amended or altered the clauses in question; they had only omitted them. In doing so, they were acting in perfect consistency with the privileges of the Commons. There was no doubt, that the House of Lords could throw out a money bill altogether, although they could not in any way alter it. Again, the House of Lords might amend a bill involving the imposition of taxes, but could not alter the money clauses of that bill; and further, they could not, if those clauses were essential to the bill, omit them without infringing the privileges of the House of Commons. But surely it would not be contended, that the clauses omitted in this case, were essential to the bill? They had formed no original part of it; but had been introduced in committee. Altogether omitting those clauses, did not so change the character of the bill as to prevent them, consistently with their privileges, from going on with it. Upon looking into the subject he found an authority, in the year 1835, respecting-the Southend Pier Bill, which he thought applicable to the present case. The House of Lords had omitted a clause which might have been considered as absolutely essential—a clause giving power to issue public money for the purposes of the bill. The Lords struck out the clause, and the Commons agreed to the said amendment of their Lordships, because the clause was introduced in committee upon the bill, and without the authority of the House according to its usual form when issuing public money. He had no wish to go into the merits of the amendments, but simply to state what he believed to be the proper rule respecting the privileges of the House.

Lord. J. Russell

could conceive, that there were certain cases in which the rejection of money clauses by the House of Lords, might not make it necessary for them to insist upon those clauses. But as the right hon. Gentleman in the Chair had stated, and as he (Lord J. Russell) also thought, the difficulty in this case was, that the fact of the rejection of the clause by the Lords, did not entirely get rid of the power of taxation, but did in fact, and in substance, transfer that power to another body. That he conceived, to be the point which created a difference between this case, and that alluded to by the right hon. Gentleman opposite, who was of opinion, that the course to be pursued was to disagree to the amendments altogether. Now, he conceived, that they might perfectly well disagree with these amendments, and do it on the ground of privilege. It was quite a common practice for the House to disagree to any amendments of the House of Lords, and to state the grounds of their disagreement to the Lords, subjoining, at the same time, that such and such other amendments they had rejected as being an interference with their privileges. On the view, therefore, that he took, they ought to disagree to these amendments on the point of privilege, but that disagreement did not conclude the whole question of the bill. He proposed, therefore, to disagree to those amendments which affected these privileges, and take the rest into consideration on Friday.

Motion agreed to.