THE NAVY CIVIL DEPARTMENTS' BILL.

HC Deb 27 February 1832 vol 10 cc765-832

Sir James Graham moved the Second Reading of this Bill.

Mr. Croker

begged to ask the right hon. Baronet, whether he did not propose entering into some explanation of the Bill now, or whether he intended to wait until the motion for going into Committee.

Sir James Graham

said, that he had already discussed the principle of the Bill on its introduction, and did not see that he had any other explanation to make till the Bill should be committed.

Mr. Croker

said, that as the right hon. Baronet declined at present entering into the merits of the Bill, but stood on the general grounds which he had taken in his former speech, he (Mr. Croker) also must abstain, on this occasion, from examining the details of this most extraordinary measure, but would confine his observations to the equally extraordinary speech delivered by the right hon. Baronet on the introduction of the measure. He did not mean, on the present occasion, to apply himself to the details of this most extraordinary measure. He entirely agreed with the right hon. Baronet, that it was within the prerogative of the Crown to revoke, for any good reason, those patents, and dissolve those Boards, for the future execution of the duties appertaining to which the present Bill was brought in; but he meant to contend that, if the right hon. Baronet had advised the Crown to dissolve those Boards, and annul those patents, for no better reasons than those which he had laid before the House, the right hon. Baronet was totally mistaken in the facts he had advanced, and in the advice which he had so given, and that the measure was as groundless as it was impolitic.

The right hon. Baronet founded his proposition for overthrowing at once a system which had stood the test of a century and a half, on three distinct and separate reasons. He began by stating certain historical facts, which, he contended, justified the course which he had adopted; he next proceeded to state certain recent transactions on the part of subordinate Boards, which, he said, rendered the remedy he proposed necessary; and finally he enlarged on the advantages which he anticipated to accrue to the country from the adoption of the new system. After the best consideration he (Mr. Croker) had been able to give the subject, not only on the occasion of the introduction of the Bill, but ever since, he was obliged to say, that he differed from the right hon. Baronet in every particular, and most positively and distinctly in respect to the facts on which he relied as the groundwork of his plan. The right hon. Baronet began his statement by referring the House to the "Memoirs of Mr. Secretary Pepys," with the view of showing that some similar arrangement had taken place at an early period of our naval history. Now, not finding in any of Mr. Pepys's works the slightest colour for such an assertion, he was sorry to be obliged to ask the right hon. Baronet to what "memoirs" he referred? [The right hon. Gentleman here paused for a reply, but none was given.] He thought that the behaviour of the right hon. Baronet was not very courteous or candid in declining to answer the question he put to him. He believed that it was the first time in the annals of Parliament, that any Member had quoted an authority, without being able and willing to state where the quotation was to be found. But, not withstanding the prudent silence of the right hon. Baronet, he should be able, he thought, to show, that in fact no such authority existed any where. On introducing the Bill, the right hon. Baronet referred the House "to the period of the Restoration of the Stuarts, when, as it appeared in Mr. Pepys's Memoirs, the then Duke of York, afterwards James 2nd, on his appointment to the office of Lord High Admiral, dismissed the subordinate Boards, and kept the power and control in his own hands."* And again, "that when the Duke of York went abroad, the subordinate Boards were restored, to the great, detriment of the public service; but on the Duke's return they were again dismissed." The right hon. Baronet had not thought ^* Hansard's Debates vol. x. p. 350. proper to inform him in what "Memoirs of Mr. Pepys" these statements were to be found: this obliged him (Mr. Croker) to trouble the House with something of a critical search after the right hon. Baronet's authority. It was well known, that Mr. Pepys kept a private Diary, which was published a few years ago in rather a bulky form; but it might not be so well known, that there was published, in 1689, a very small book, written by Mr. Pepys, which was called Memoirs of the Royal Navy. Whether it was to either of those books the right hon. Baronet had referred, by the name of "Mr. Pepys's Memoirs," he could not say, but he would maintain, that, in neither of them was there any pretence or colour for the assertion of the right hon. Baronet. If the right hon. Baronet meant to refer to the small volume of Memoirs of the Navy, he would tell him at once, that no such occurrence was or could be described in that work, which does not mention any event antecedent to the year 1673, and, therefore, it could mention nothing relative to what had passed at the Restoration in 1660, or on the Duke of York's going abroad in 1668; and he would take upon himself to state, in the broadest terms, that there was not in that book the slightest foundation for the right hon. Baronet's assertion relative to the dismissal or re-establishment of the subordinate Boards, at those periods. But if the right hon. Baronet should turn round and say, that he founded his statement on some passage in Mr. Pepys's voluminous Diary, commonly called his Memoirs, he would be equally unfortunate; for the assertion of the right hon. Gentleman was not only, that the Duke of York abolished the Boards at the time of the Restoration, but that, the Boards having been restored upon that Prince's going abroad, they were again abolished upon his return. Now, unluckily for the right hon. Baronet, as the first events were previous to the commencement of the Memoirs, so the latter events happened to be subsequent to the last date of the Diary of Pepys, which contained no occurrence of a later date than 1668. So that here was chronological certainty, that the right hon. Baronet's reference to either of "Mr. Pepys's Memoirs" was entirely unfounded.

But—no matter where the right hon. Baronet's information was or was not to be found—was it the fact that the Duke of York abolished the subordinate Boards at the Restoration? No such thing. On the contrary, one of the first Acts of the Restoration was, to re-establish the Navy Board. The Restoration took place upon the 29th of May; and, on the 29th of June, 1660, being only one month after the Restoration, Mr. Pepys states, in his Diary, that he himself was sworn as Commissioner of the Navy Board, and took possession of the Navy Office: and, from that hour until the present moment, the Navy Board had never been abolished. He, therefore, gave as direct a contradiction to the fact stated by the right hon. Baronet, as he had done to the allegation of his authority for that statement. The right hon. Baronet next proceeded to say, that the effect of this abolition (which had never taken place, be it remembered) was the dawning of an era which ended in raising the British Navy to the highest pinnacle of glory. He supposed that the right hon. Baronet alluded to the engagements off Lowestoffe and in South-wold Bay; and meant to imply that those victories—which, however, he (Mr. Croker) did not rate quite so high as the right hon. Baronet seemed to do—were obtained by the vigorous administration of the Navy which had abolished the subordinate Boards—a complete and ridiculous mistake, for not only was it notorious from history and from official records, that there were Commissioners of the Navy at that time; but if the right hon. Baronet had examined the Journals of the House, he would have found that Mr. Pepys himself, whose authority is so strangely misquoted, and other members of that Board, had been called to the Bar of the House about that period, and had even been committed into custody in consequence of the Dutch having burnt the ships in the Medway. He therefore repeated, most positively, distinctly, and boldly, that, since the re-establishment of the monarchy, in 1660, down to the present hour, the Navy Board had never once been abolished; and that there never was any restoration of these Boards, in 1668 or at any other time, because there never had been any abolition of them. He had been very much puzzled to know what could have induced the right hon. Baronet to make such a statement as that which he had thus refuted; and had endeavoured to discover what could have given rise to so flagrant a mistake. He found that, when the Duke of York was obliged to go abroad, in consequence of the Test Act, the Admiralty was put into commission. Perhaps the right hon. Baronet might have fallen into the same error as Pepys's editor, by mistaking the Admiralty Board for the Navy Board; though that, even, would not account for the right hon. Baronet having stated that the Navy Board was abolished at the Restoration. When the Duke of York returned from abroad, he induced his brother to revoke the Commission of Admiralty which had been issued; but, as to the Navy Board and the Victualling Board having been abolished, nothing of the kind occurred. In fact, the Victualling Board was created about that time; at least, it appeared, according to Beatson and other authorities, that the first patent for the constitution of that Board was issued at that period, although he believed that it had been established previously. If he could not give a better explanation of the extraordinary error into which the right hon. Baronet had fallen, it was because the right hon. Baronet had not been so courteous as to tell him from what book he had quoted; and he really almost suspected that the right hon. Baronet did not himself know. Certain it was, that he had, by some extraordinary blunder, mistaken, mis-arranged, and misstated all the dates and all the facts to which he had alluded. Perhaps, also, the following circumstance had been so misunderstood by the right hon. Baronet, as to have contributed to his series of historical mistakes. After the Duke of York returned from abroad, he induced his brother to issue a new commission for the Navy Board, with some special provisions for inquiring into the affairs of the Navy for the purpose of putting them on a better footing. But was this an abolition of the Navy Board? No; he added, as Commissioners, four practical men, such as those whom the right hon. Baronet wished to get rid of. For instance, amongst the four individuals appointed on that occasion, by the influence of James was Sir Anthony Dean, who was originally a common shipwright, and as eminent a man in his profession as Sir Robert Seppings in our day. And it was, by a curious blunder, that the right hon. Baronet justified the dismissal of that practical and able shipwright Sir Robert Seppings, by the appointment of his able and practical predecessor Sir Anthony Dean in the time of Charles 2nd. But even this slight alteration in, or rather addition to the Navy Board was not meant to be permanent. It was rather in the nature of our Commissioners of Inquiry. Within two years after their appointment, the additional Commissioners were abolished by James 2nd, who wrote a letter to the Commissioners, thanking them for having completed the special duty temporarily assigned to them. The Navy Board itself, therefore, had never been abolished but had continued from that time down to the present. So much for the right hon. Baronet's reference to ancient authority, and historical facts.

The right hon. Baronet had also favoured the House with some modern reasons, which, unfortunately for him, had no more foundation than his ancient authority. The right hon. Baronet urges as an argument demonstrative of the necessity of the change which he contemplated, an alleged spirit of resistance on the part of the subordinate Boards to the authority of the Board of Admiralty. Speaking of this resistance, the right hon. Baronet said, 'Doubtless the King could revoke the patents of either of them, whenever the Crown was so advised, but it was unusual. These two Boards appeared to hold their existence by a similar tenure, though different from that of the Board of Admiralty, and they had been at all times held to be subordinate to that Board; yet, nevertheless, those subordinate Boards had at all times continued to divide the power and thwart the views of that Board presumed to be set in authority over them. This was inconsistent with the good management of public affairs. The authority of the subordinate Boards was uncertain; and, in the eye of Parliament, the entire responsibility for the conduct of naval affairs rested in the Board of Admiralty, because they were nominally invested with supreme control.'* On this point, he (Mr. Croker) felt himself intitled to offer his personal testimony in direct contradiction of these allegations. He had had the honour to fill the office of Secretary to the Admiralty for twenty-two years. During that period he conducted, of course, all the public correspondence, and much of what was considered private communication, and he declared, upon his honour and conscience, that in the course of ^* Hansard's Parl. Debates, vol, x. p, 350. all that time he never knew one instance of what could be considered "disobedience," nor any course of operation which could be fairly considered "a thwarting of the views." And the right hon. Baronet well knew that his (Mr. Croker's) evidence on this point was not liable to any imputation of self-interest. He was not on his trial for any part of these transactions. In the office which he had so long held, he had no responsibility but for the execution of the orders given to him—the Secretary of the Admiralty was not answerable for measures, but only for their official execution; and on whatever terms of intimacy he might have lived with his official superiors, or however often he might have been consulted by them, of however favourably they might receive any advice he ventured to give, it was they only who were answerable to the public. In bearing, therefore, his testimony on this subject, he was entitled to say, that he had no personal interests to bias his judgment. He would then repeat, that he was perfectly astonished that the right hon. Baronet should have made such a charge against the Navy and Victualling Boards. He had, indeed, heard, that some evidence was given before a Finance Committee up stairs, about these Boards being slow to do this thing, and unwilling to do that thing—some vague and general charges of that nature he had heard of, but the evidence given before that Committee was a sealed book to him. It had been circulated amongst the members of the Committee, but never laid before the House, and he had endeavoured in vain to procure a copy of it. But he presumed that if this evidence had contained any tenable charge, the right hon. Baronet would have been but too happy to have embodied it in his speech, and if he should be able, as he trusted he should, to refute all the charges of the speech, he should not be very solicitous about the vague and obscure insinuations to which he had alluded. He appealed, then, to his own experience of two and twenty years, and, he would say, that in that period never did he see any indication of the spirit to which the right hon. Baronet alluded—never did he witness anything like the opposition of which so much had been said on the part of the Navy and Victualling Boards. If there were any such, he must say, that he never heard of it; and he must further declare his full persuasion, that if it had existed, it Could not have escaped his notice; he, therefore, was enabled to give that part of the statement of the right hon. Baronet as complete a denial as he had given to the other portion of it. It was perfectly true that the Navy Board and the Admiralty did not always agree in their views of that branch of the public service immediately intrusted to their superintendence; but the former was always composed of practical men, having peculiar and technical experience in their respective departments, and it was no matter of surprise if they should sometimes differ from their official superiors whose acquaintance with the details were not, and could not, and need not be, so minute and technical. His hon. and gallant friend near him, (Sir George Cock-burn) whose civil services had been almost as useful though not so brilliant, as his great military achievements, his gallant friend he was sure, would bear him out in the assertion, that those differences, though they sometimes created a momentary annoyance, were in the end salutary, and that the resistance on the part of the Navy Board was not pushed further than was conducive to the public service; and while he, altogether, denied the broad statements of the right hon. Baronet he believed, that no man of candour, honesty, or common sense, afloat or ashore, who knew any thing of the practical working of naval business would refuse to bear his testimony to the beneficial effects of such official checks and such occasional resistance. His hon. and gallant friend, with his long practical experience in the naval Service, and with his extensive knowledge of social life, knew that, with despotic command on the one hand, and servile submission on the other, the service would be ruined—all checks would be at an end—responsibility would nowhere exist. Nay, so much did he (Mr. Croker) differ from the right, hon. Baronet on the subject of "resistance," that had that species of servile submission, which the right hon. Baronet seemed to require, existed, he would have been amongst the very first to say, by all means abolish those slavish Boards—why should Boards, with such a nominal rank, and with such large salaries, be maintained merely for the purpose of blindly and servilely registering the edicts of the Board of Admiralty?

And who were the persons that were charged by the right hon. Baronet with this insubordination? Officers of the highest character, who had been called on to fill the chairs at the Navy Board, after long lives of professional eminence, and, generally speaking, selected for those offices, without any other connexion with the existing Administration than their fitness for the duties to be performed. Such was his late gallant friend, Sir Thomas Thompson, whose name was long associated with the naval glories of the country; and such was his gallant friend (Sir Byam Martin) of whom, in his presence, he would only say, that he was called to the chair of the Navy Board by no other influence than that of his character—he was selected by an administration, not one member of which had, he believed, at that time, any personal acquaintance with his gallant friend, although they, no doubt, in common with the country and the world were familiar with his long, his useful, and brilliant services; and he would take the liberty of adding, that the civil services of his gallant friend fulfilled and justified in the amplest manner the good opinion which his naval reputation had created. He could take upon himself boldly to repel from such men the charge of petty intrigue and systematic opposition, to the good conduct of a service of which they Were the brightest ornaments.

The disobedience thus made the subject of animadversion, could only refer to the non-execution of lawful commands. If, then, this supposed resistance existed, who were the parties to blame? The Navy Board? No; the Lords of the Admiralty, certainly, and no one else; for the Lords of the Admiralty might, if they had thought proper to exercise the powers intrusted to them, have prevented or punished any such insubordination. This brought him to another statement made by the right hon. Baronet who had affirmed that the members of the Navy Board contumaciously opposed the Admiralty Board, because the former held their offices by patent, and, could not therefore, be deprived of them. This was certainly a notable cause for the fancied resistance. The right hon. Baronet told the House, that it originated in the circumstance of all the Boards, whether superior or subordinate, being created by patent, and that, consequently, the inferior Boards presumed on their equality, and refused obedience. Now this argument, struck him as being absolutely ridiculous. A Lieutenant in the army was a commissioned officer; so was the Duke of Wellington; but he believed that no Lieutenant had ever been found to disregard the commands of his superior officer on the ground of his holding, as it were, under the same tenure. At least, in the course of his experience, he had never heard of insubordination from that cause, and he knew no class of men among whom subordination was more strict than those who held their various ranks by similar commissions from the same sovereign. By a strange fatality, every fact which the right hon. Baronet advanced failed him, and every height which he climbed only made his fall more deep and heavy. As a signal instance of this, he begged to call the attention of the House to the words of the patent itself. He happened to have, at hand, a copy of that by which the Victualling Board were appointed; but the Navy Board patents were, mutatis mutandis, in the same words; they were, "And we do likewise require and command you, our said Commissioners, and every of you, that you do, from time to time, observe, perform, fulfil, and keep all and singular, the orders, rules, instructions, and directions, which you have received, or shall from time to time receive, from us, or from our High Admiral of our United Kingdom of Great Britain, and Ireland, or from the Commissioners for executing the office of our High Admiral of our said United Kingdom, or any two or more of them now and for the time being, for touching or concerning the Victualling, and Sick and Wounded Department aforesaid, or any other matter or thing relating thereunto, or to the duties imposed on you respectively." So that the right hon. Baronet asserts, that Gentlemen were encouraged to disobedience by holding a patent which enforced obedience in the most direct and positive terms; and, in point of fact, is the right hon. Baronet so entirely ignorant of even the recent history of the department over which he presides, as not to know that there have been frequent instances, and some of a late date, of Commissioners dismissed from these Boards, because the Admiralty had seen reason to disapprove of their conduct. Really this argument from the form of the instrument of appointment, is as childish as those pretending to be founded on matters of fact are are erroneous. So much for that part of the right hon. Baronet's proposition which was founded on the disobedience of, the subordinate Boards.

But, before he proceeded to notice the other charges made, he would mention that it had just occurred to him, that he thought the right hon. Baronet's mistake respecting Pepys's Memoirs,mighthave arisen, in consequence of his having quoted it at secondhand from the first Report of the Board of Revision, which was made to the House a great many years before Pepys's Diary was published. This Report referred altogether to the little book called the Memoirs of the Navy, and not at all to the larger work since published. Perhaps the right hon. Baronet had never seen the original work, and, therefore, he would show it him. The book commenced in this manner:—"In April, 1689, my unhappy master, James 2nd, was obliged to give up the throne." And then he went on to describe, not what had been done at the Restoration, but the measures of the few last years of that Prince's administration; but, as he had already said, it contained no colour for the right hon. Baronet's statements. He would not answer for the Report of the Board of Revision being the source from which the right hon. Baronet obtained his information, but he very much suspected it. If it was so, that Report had either misquoted Mr. Pepys, or what he thought much more probable, the right hon. Baronet had misunderstood the Report. In either case the right hon. Baronet was much to blame. He should not have taken the authorities on trust, he should have examined the original work which he quoted, but instead of doing so, he had been content to read with other men's eyes; and if indeed the Report of the Board of Revision had been his authority he had quoted at second-hand, and had, therefore, misquoted.

He was now about to advert to that part of the speech of the right hon. Baronet which was of the chief interest to the public, inasmuch as it charged the members of the Navy Board with a misapplication of the public funds intrusted to their management. This charge the right hon. Baronet had undertaken to prove in several instances, and more particularly in the cases of the erection of an hospital at Chatham, a Mill at Deptford, and Victualling Establishments at Plymouth and Portsmouth. The specific nature of the charge was, that more money had been applied by the Boards to those purposes than had been specifically voted by Parliament. He fully admitted that such had been the case, but, he contended that in doing so, the Boards had acted not only on custom, but on law; and there was no official man who had the slightest practical acquaintance with the business of the Navy, who could for a moment suppose, that the several sums voted on estimate for the charges of the Navy, could in practice be kept each under the exact head and to the exact amount at which it had been estimated; and, in proof of his position, he begged to read to the House an extract from Mr. Hatsell's Precedents. In the third volume of that work, page 209, he found the following words. After describing the usual course of proceeding in the Appropriation Act, it says— But, in the instance of supply granted to the Navy, the practice has been different. In this service all the different grants are in the Appropriation Bill—are added together—and the whole sum arising out of the separate grants is appropriated generally for the Naval Service. This distinction in the form of proceeding between the Navy and all other public monies, has arisen from necessity, and the impossibility that there appears to be, from the nature of the sea service, to confine the expenditure of the sums granted to those immediate services, and no other. The long absence of ships in the different quarters of the globe, the uncertainty of their return, with many other circumstances, render it almost impossible to observe, in this as in other services, that rule which ought to be most strictly adhered to—'That the sums granted and appropriated by the Commons for any special service should be applied by the Executive Power, only to defray the expense of that service.' And this difficulty has, therefore, induced the House of Commons not to appropriate the sums voted for the Navy separately, 'but generally;' so that, if it should be found expedient and necessary, the whole of the Navy Money may be, by law, applied to any one part of the service, subject, however, to a future inquiry and examination by the House of Commons into the expediency and propriety of such an application. In addition to this authority he would also quote the observations of Mr. Fox, who had observed, 'that there was nothing new 'in the Admiralty practice of applying to 'one service what was intended by Parliament for another; it was authorized to 'do so, not only by custom and necessity, 'but by the very words of the grant, as 'any one might see by consulting the Act.' Thus the House would see there was nothing new or wrong in the practice that the right hon. Baronet had so much condemned. He (Mr. Croker) was ready to admit that, as a general rule, it would be highly objectionable to apply sums to a service, or even a branch of a service, not previously sanctioned by this House; but he did say, that with respect to the Navy, it had been the practice, both an ancient and a modern practice, to apply to objects which had been voted, money which had also been voted, but in sums greater or smaller as the case might be than each individual vote specified; and he would go further and affirm, that were the practice otherwise, it would be attended with the most serious inconvenience—with difficulties, indeed, which it would be, in his opinion, impossible to overcome. The right hon. Baronet, it seems did not deny that such had been the ancient practice, but he alleged that by a new form given to the Appropriation Act in 1798 and which new form had been since continued, the practice had been rendered illegal. Now, of all the first Lords who had had the responsibility of these matters since 1798, and there had been nine or ten of them, the right hon. Baronet was the first who had made this notable discovery. It had escaped Lord Spencer in whose time the alleged change had been made—it had escaped Lord St. Vincent no very lenient investigator of naval irregularities—it had escaped Lord Grey when in full youth and activity—it had escaped the cautious and inquiring mind of Mr. Thomas Grenville who had paid particular attention to the subject of the Naval Estimates. He mentioned these statesmen because they belonged to the party now in power and their authority would, therefore, be more weighty with the present Ministers. But to afford a practical view of the fallacy of the right hon. Baronet's new theory, he would more particularly refer to the very period at which the Act of 1798 was passed and when the affairs of the Navy were under the administration of the father of the noble Chancellor of the Exchequer. He did not do so invidiously or in censure but as a most respectable authority. He would always speak of Earl Spencer's administration of the Navy as every Englishman spoke of it. Its measures were glorious in war, and had been since found prudent and economical in peace. Even if it did not suit his argument, he trusted that he had too much admired in his youth, and after he came into office, found too much reason to approve the administration of the noble Earl to withhold from it his humble praise; but it did most eactly suit his argument. It so happened that, after the passing of the Appropriation Act in 1798, the money voted for the service of the Navy was applied in the same manner in which it had always been applied before, and, he might add, in the same manner in which it had been applied ever since. He would refer to an instance which could not have escaped the notice of Earl Spencer, because it was one to which his attention was peculiarly and interestingly called. The noble Earl conceived the idea that ships could be built at Milford Haven at a smaller expense than at other places. By way of experiment, he sanctioned the building of two ships the Milford, and the Lauinia, at Milford Haven. He need not state how anxiously Earl Spencer watched the progress of these vessels, which he thought, from local cirumstances, might be built at a cheaper rate at Milford than at other yards, as indeed he believed, they were. However, he found that, in 1798,1799, 1800, and 1801, during Earl Spencer's administration of the Navy, and in 1802,1803, and 1804, under the administration of Lord St. Vincent, the sums voted for these ships in successive Estimates amounted cumulatively to 130,000l. more than they cost. The greater part of the money voted never was applied to the ships at Milford, but was expended on the general wear and tear of the fleet in repairing ships which came home disabled in battle; and in providing for such unexpected accidents and contingencies as were inseparable from the naval service, and, above all, in a time of extensive war. The money being thus applied to urgent current services, it was necessary to vote every year a fresh sum for the building of the ships. The public, however, lost nothing by the transaction. Not a farthing more or less was expended, and if the sums voted for the Milford and Lavinia had been expended upon them, so much the more must have been added to the votes for the wear and tear, or current expenses of the ships afloat. But was it in large sums alone that this practice prevailed at the very period, namely, the year 1798, in which the right hon. Baronet would persuade us that it was abolished? He would adduce one or two very striking instances of the contrary. In 1798 it was determined to make a reservoir at Plymouth dock yard. The sums annually voted for this work were applied to other purposes, as the exigencies of the service required; and fresh sums being voted in a dozen succeeding years for the reservoir, the whole cost of the work appeared, according to the Estimates, to be 21,000l., though not half that sum was expended. In 1798, 2,000l. was voted for the erection of a painter's shop; and a very sufficient sum it was for a painter's shop; but the House would hardly believe that a vote to the same amount was made annually, from 1798 to 1809, on account of this painter's shop, until it appears to have cost the country no less a sum than 24,800l.? The fact was, that, in this, as in the other cases, the money voted for the specific purpose had been otherwise applied, and, even to the present hour, the painter's shop was not yet built. He was not defending such absurdities, for he had done his best in the subordinate office which he had filled to put an end to them. But he now quoted them, because they occurred at the very period to which the right hon. Gentleman referred, as the best times of naval administration; and began in that very year in which he had stated that a new enactment had superseded the old practice. The reason why these indefensible charges were kept up for so long a time was, that the Estimates for the Navy were not printed and laid before the House. On his coming into office in 1809, he suggested to his noble friend at the head of the Admiralty, and to his right hon. friend Mr. Perceval, who was then at the head of the Government, the expediency of having the Navy Estimates printed. That suggestion being adopted, the consequence was, that the reservoir and the painter's shop and all similar deceptions were swept away; but that correction of a manifest and useless absurdity was never intended to prevent the application, in cases which could not be foreseen at the time of preparing the Estimates, of money which might be in the hands of the Treasurer of the Navy.

But the House would see, that all this was very much beside the real question raised by the right hon. Baronet: for the principle of expending Parliamentary grants for purposes other than those for which they were voted might be right or wrong, but it was with the Admiralty, and not with the Navy Board, that the responsibility of this appropriation lay. The right hon. Gentleman had adduced it as a charge against the Navy Board when it was with the Admiralty, and the Admiralty alone, that the blame, if any, rested, and ought to rest. Then, said the right hon. Baronet, "we found that, in the course of five years a sum of 560,000l. was applied in a way not specially voted by Parliament." This was perfectly true; but as a charge against the Navy Board the same answer was ready, that it was so applied on the authority of the Admiralty itself, and its application could not, therefore, be used as an argument for the dimissal of the Navy Board, and he was prepared to prove that not one item of the expenditure had been appropriated without the full knowledge and sanction of the Admiralty.

But the emphasis with which the right hon. Gentleman complained, that in so short a period as five years, a sum of 560,000l. had been spent for purposes not voted by Parliament, required a little more explanation. 560,000l. spent, not voted by Parliament, looked like a very fearful charge; yet when examined and explained, it really not only constituted no offence on the part of the naval administration, but was even some proof of merit and economy. In the first place, the right hon. Baronet expressed himself inaccurately, when he said "the sums were not voted;" they had been all voted, regularly voted; but it was true they had not always been applied to the exact items of service, for which they were voted; but such an application was specially warranted, as he had already shown, by the general law of Parliament, and by special statutes, which, considering the peculiarities of the naval service, provided that all sums voted for the Navy, under whatever heads the Estimates should have been made, should be considered as one general mass, applicable to the whole of the naval service, whether foreseen or unforeseen. The right hon. Baronet seemed to him not to have sufficiently distinguished between estimates and accounts; though certainly no two things could be more different. An estimate was in its nature uncertain—we estimated what we could not ascertain, and all the naval monies were voted on estimate—an account, on the contrary, which related to the actual expenditure, might be given with perfect accuracy, and accordingly we might have at the end of any year, an accurate and minute account of the actual expenditure of all those sums which were estimated at the commencement of the year. The estimate was to a certain degree, a vote of confidence; the account afforded the check, and the control, and the proof, that the confidence was not abused. Accounts must tally to a farthing; but estimates must have, as every gentleman in his private affairs knew, a latitude of allowance: an estimate included, not only all foreseen expenses, but it always provided a certain surplus for unforeseen contingencies. The portion of naval expenditure which could be reduced to a certainty was very small—the part which must be subject to the uncertainty of estimate was very large. Now the naval votes for the five years alluded to by the right hon. Baronet, amounted to about 6,000,000l. a year; and he would ask, was it to be expected, that on so large a sum, less than 110,000l., or 120,000l., that was about two per cent, should be allowed for contingencies, and to insure a surplus at the end of the year? He would venture to say, that estimates were seldom made in any private work, which allowed so little as two per cent for contingencies and surplus, and yet this very small per centage, very wisely and properly distributed over the estimates and voted by Parliament, was accumulated by the right, hon. Baronet for five years, and formed the ground of his charge, that 560,000l. had been spent without the votes of Parliament. The charge was absolutely unfounded—the money had been voted, and the service to which it was applied was also voted; although the exact amount to be spent on each head of service within a given time, was not and could not be estimated. But even the right hon. Baronet did not pretend that any improper application of the money had been made—that one farthing had been lost—that one farthing had been unaccounted for. It could not be argued for a moment that any improper application had been made of surplus money in the hands of the Navy Board; and it was to be recollected that if the surplus was expended in meeting contingencies, the Estimate of each year was diminished in the same proportion. The case, therefore, as respected the economical appropriation of the money was, to use a homely saying, "as broad as it was long."

But he would not content himself with resting this practice of having an annual surplus, and of applying it to current services on these general grounds; he would follow the right hon. Baronet into the particular cases he mentioned, and he would show that such applications of the surplus were not merely legal, and indeed unavoidable, but highly useful and economical. The right hon. Baronet had prominently alluded to the case of the works at Cremill Point. Now, he (Mr. Croker) was ready, not to occupy too much of the time of the House, to accept this case as a fair example of the general practice, and he thought he could show that this case peculiarly exemplified the expediency of having a surplus at the disposal of the Admiralty. The time which it was contemplated by the original estimate, sanctioned by Parliament, that this work would require, was fourteen or fifteen years; but, inconsequence of a surplus of 320,000l. having in the course of two or three years, accumulated in the naval Treasury, it was determined to apply it to this object, and the result was, that the work—a most useful and necessary work, and expressly voted by Parliament—was completed in six years, instead of sixteen. Here then was the explanation of the right hon. Baronet's most formidable case of misappropriation. The monies had been voted, the service had been voted, but the negligent and improvident Board of Admiralty had managed to do in six years, what might have required sixteen; and had put the public in possession, ten years sooner than had been contemplated, of a most admirable and effective victualling establishment. In another point of view also, the appropriation of money in this manner was beneficial to the public. A contract had been entered into for the performance of a certain limited quantity of work at the place in question. After a short time, the contractor represented, that having his men and materials collected on the spot, a considerable saving might be effected if he were allowed to proceed more rapidly than had been originally contemplated, offering as an inducement an abatement of two and a half per cent. on his original contract. The Admiralty, having a surplus in their hands, accepted this offer, and thereby were enabled to save the public that amount. He begged, in making these remarks on special cases, not to be misunderstood as to his general principles. He freely confessed he was not one of those who approved of expending the public money, unless when specifically granted; and he would venture to repeat, that in his humble sphere, he had done something to control that, practice, which he, however, thought could not and ought not to be wholly prohibited. For in cases of emergency, he thought it proper to confide to the responsible Ministers of the Crown a limited power to that effect. He did not contend that it would be right to apply money to works which had not been previously sanctioned by Parliament, except it was in cases of emergency, such as, for instance, the case which had been debated the year before last of the establishment of the hospital at Malta, at the period when we increased our force in the Mediterranean previous to the battle of Navarino. He was now speaking, to obviate any misconception, relative to the undertaking of new works without a previous vote of Parliament, which he limited to cases of unforeseen necessity; but neither the case of Cremill, nor indeed, any of the other cases complained of by the right hon. Baronet, were of the class of new works undertaken without the previous sanction of Parliament. They had been all voted, and the total sums for each approved, and in these cases, all that he had to contend for was, that the Admiralty was justified in applying the surplus votes to the more rapid completion of works thus authorised by Parliament.

The right hon. Baronet, among other charges, had stated that during the last four years a sum of 1,000,000l. of money had accumulated in the hands of the Treasurer of the Navy, being a surplus of the sums voted by Parliament for various naval, services. This was, certainly, on the part of the right hon. Baronet, the most ungrateful, as well as the most unfounded complaint he had ever heard. The Navy Estimates were made up on the 1st of January in each year, though the money was seldom or ever voted till three months after; the real year of expenditure therefore, ended and commenced about the first of April, and the right hon. Baronet chose to call the sum that remained in the Treasurer's hands on the 1st of January, and which was appropriated to carrying on the service till April, an unappropriated surplus, for the accumulation of which he arraigned the late Administration; though it was obviously neither surplus nor accumulation, but simply the expenditure of the current quarter of the whole annual vote. It was this sum which enabled the right hon. Baronet since his coming into office to meet the various naval services, without calling on Parliament for any grant of money; and it had also enabled the Ministers to adopt their new plan of commencing their financial year in April instead of, as hitherto, on the 1st day of January. That was to say, to date the Estimates on the 1st of April, about the period that they were to be voted, instead of dating them three months sooner; so that in the present year, the right hon. Baronet would have to vote only three quarters of the annual expense, the first quarter having been already defrayed out of what the right hon. Baronet had not quite fairly represented as an "unappropriated surplus." He (Mr. Croker) approved of the plan of voting the supplies prior to the date of the Estimate; and such had been the old practice. When Parliament assembled in October or November, the money was voted on Estimates which commenced on the 1st of January following; but it had been the late general practice to assemble Parliament after Christmas, and if that were to be the invariable course for the future, the plan of dating the Estimates from the 1st of April would be very proper; but if it should happen (as he thought very probable) that the old mode of voting the naval supplies before Christmas should be again adopted, then, in order to execute his own purpose, the right hon. Baronet ought to date the Estimates on the 1st of January, as heretofore; but all this the House would see was neither a question of amount of money or control over expenditure, but a mere question of date—whether the year commenced on the 1st of January or the 1st of April, the annual expenditure would be the same. He had entered into this detail to show, that the right hon. Baronet did not really understand the course of business, and that his complaint about an unappropriated surplus, arose entirely from his mistaking three quarters of a year for the whole year, and from assuming that the last quarter of the current year, was, in fact, the first quarter of the future year, which was true in mere chronological date, but quite false in regard to the naval financial year.

For this mistake on the part of the right hon. Baronet there might be some excuse, but his next charge was one founded on error and inattention, of a less excusable kind. The right hon. Baronet had com- plained that, in the year 1830, a grant of 195,000l. had been obtained for timber which remained unappropriated to that purpose. Now, he really was surprised to hear the right hon. Baronet complain of this, more particularly when he recollected that the right hon. Baronet, on coming in to office, had drawn up a balance-sheet of the items of naval expenditure for that very year; and, if he had looked into his own balancesheet, he would soon have seen an explanation of the alleged neglect on the part of the late Administration to appropriate this sum of 195,000l. to the purchase of timber. It was to be recollected that the first and most important call on the funds of the Navy was the punctual payment of the wages of seamen. The law expressly directed that these wages should be defrayed out of any money in hand, and virtually prohibited the outlay of any sums whatsoever until the seamen's claims were fully satisfied. This precaution was taken from a fear of dissatisfaction, the consequences of which might be most serious to the interests of the country. Now, he repeated, had the right hon. Baronet looked to his own balance-sheet of 1830, he would have found that the Admiralty had been obliged in that year to pay 165,000l. more wages than had been voted by Parliament. The unexpected reduction of our foreign force, and the consequent paying off of many ships, had occasioned that unforeseen call for wages, and the express words of the law, as well as justice and common sense, required that out of any monies which should remain in the Treasury, the wages of the seamen must be paid. There was, consequently, no reason to charge the Members of the late Administration with any impropriety in the non-application of the vote, to the purchase of timber which the law obliged them to appropriate to the payment of wages. He had now examined, and, he trusted, refuted, all the right hon. Gentleman's general charges: which, however, had they been all true (which not one of them was) would have had no bearing on the present question, nor advanced one jot the right hon. Baronet's argument against the subordinate Boards; for all these charges applied, not to the Navy or the Victualling Boards, but to the Admiralty Board, which was alone responsible for every one of the transactions which had been referred to. So that these charges were made the ground-work for abolishing Boards which had no concern with them, and for increasing the power of that other Board which was guilty of the offence, if offence there was.

The right hon. Baronet seemed to have been aware of this, and therefore he proceeded next to allege certain instances of misconduct, against these subordinate Boards. He would follow the right hon. Baronet into all these cases, and he should he trusted be able to show, that he was as much mistaken in these individual charges, as he had been in all the rest. Among the grave and weighty charges preferred against the subordinate boards, he would begin with the charge against the Navy Board of not keeping a certain ledger. Would the House believe so strange a fact as that the Navy Board, which had existed since the days of Henry 8th.—that this board, with all the offices connected with it, was to be abolished for not keeping a ledger? This ledger, be it observed, was a mere modern experiment; a few months old, having been ordered so lately as the year 1830; at the close of that year the late Administration went out; and because the right hon. Baronet found on his accession to office that the Navy Board did not keep the ledger, so recently ordered, it was, forsooth, to be swept utterly away, and its functions were to be handed over to the Admiralty, which had never kept a ledger at all, and was no more fit to keep books of account than the Navy Board would have been to direct the public policy of the country. But, suppose that he should be able to show, that the fault of not keeping the ledger (if fault it were, which he did not call it) was attributable to the Admiralty itself? He would enter for a moment into the history of this ledger—a matter so trivial and of so little real value, that he should not have ventured to trouble the House with an explanation of it, if the right hon. Baronet had not swelled it into such absurd importance. It had been the duty and desire of his noble friend, lately First Lord of the Admiralty and his colleagues at that Board, and particularly of his hon. and gallant friend (Sir George Cockburn) who sat near him, to make every practicable reduction in the naval department. In this reduction his noble and gallant friends, had, perhaps, in some cases, gone too far—certainly they had gone as far as they could. With this view the clerk of the check in the dock yards had been reduced, as it was consi- dered that the benefit of his peculiar services might be attained by keeping a ledger at the office of the Navy Board, similar to one, heretofore kept by him, at the yards, and orders to that effect were given; but the Navy Board very naturally and truly represented, that if they were to execute these additional duties, which had occupied heretofore the clerks of the Check, and several inferior clerks at each of the yards, the Navy Office, in town, would require a proportion of additional clerks to discharge this duty. To meet this objection, the Admiralty made a new arrangement. The materials for the proposed ledger consisted, first, of all the original vouchers for every receipt and issue; and secondly, of an abstract of all these vouchers. The chief clerical labour, it was clear, was in forming this abstract from the original vouchers; when this was done, there only would remain to copy the abstract into the ledger, a business of comparatively little trouble. The Admiralty, therefore (still persisting in its desire to diminish the number of clerks), directed that the abstracts should be made at the several dock-yards and transmitted to the Navy Office, where it could be easily posted into the ledger. This, of course, lightened the labour in town, but the officers at the several dock-yards remonstrated that the vouchers and check notes amounted to 500 a day, and that it would be impossible for them, without further assistance, to make out the abstract required; upon this Representation, the Admiralty rescinded its late order and decided that the Navy Board, without getting additional assistance, should be required, not only to keep the ledger, but to make out the abstract from the original vouchers, which amounted in number, as had been already stated, to about 500 a-day. The Navy Board certainly remonstrated against this order, but did not disobey it. That there was some delay in keeping the book was not to be denied; but that delay was not surprising, when the quantity of increased duty imposed upon the Board was considered. And, as if to complete the justification of the Navy Board, the right hon. Baronet was himself so satisfied with the reasons given by them for the arrear, that, when he came into office, the Admiralty, for the third time, altered its orders, and relieved the Navy Board of the duty of making the abstract. The hands of that Board being thus set free, they fell to work upon the ledger with such assiduity, that he understood from his hon. friend (Sir Byam Martin), the late Comptroller of the Navy, that it was in a great state of forwardness at the very time the right hon. Baronet was saying that such was the state of arrears in which the book was, that it had been abandoned, as utterly and absolutely hopeless. No doubt it was in arrear, when 150,000 or 160,000 documents had to be entered in it per annum, without the assistance of the abstracts, and without the help of a single additional clerk; but as soon as the abstracts were again supplied from the yards, the work was easily got through. It appeared from this, that the instant the Navy Board received orders to keep a ledger, they did their best to comply with those orders, and continued doing so until another order came, which suspended these proceedings; but, upon the arrival of a third order, which removed this suspension, they again kept their ledger; and that, at the moment that the right hon. Baronet, no doubt from misinformation, was stating boldly in that House that the ledger was in a state of hopeless arrear, the ledger was, on the contrary, in a most advanced state and with much less arrear, than considering the orders and the counter-orders, with which the Admiralty had perplexed the business could have been reasonably expected. Such were the unfounded and ridiculous charges of disobedience and delay in respect to the ledger, under which the ancient constitution of the Navy was to be destroyed, and its duties transferred to the very department which had first caused the delay, and had finally admitted the necessity of the disobedience.

The next point of accusation to which he would advert was much more serious, not as regarded the Navy, but as regarded the right hon. Baronet opposite—he meant the non-reduction of labourers in the dockyards. The right hon. Baronet had stated—'This, however, is not the only instance in which the orders of the late Board of Admiralty have not been carried into effect. An order was made, framed, as I think, on the most judicious principles 'with regard to the reduction of the number of labourers in the dock-yards. The regulation was signed by Lord Melville, and it contains a positive direction that the number of labourers shall be reduced 'on the following principle. In addition 'to the reduction already made, no com- 'missioner was to enter any man into the 'yard except in lieu of those who might 'die or be discharged. They were to be 'reduced to 6,000, including apprentices, 'and no new apprentices were to be taken, 'unless in cases of death. This was the 'number which it was considered fit and 'proper to keep up in time of peace.' And, further on,—'Now, when I accepted office, 'I think this order had been one year in 'operation, and the number of workmen 'was 7,716: the number employed on the '31st of January last, was 7,473; so that 'there was only a reduction of about 250 'men. I have stated so much in order to 'shew the inefficient control on the part of 'the Admiralty, and the imperfect obedi-'ence on the part of the Navy Board.' Now, in direct and positive contradiction of every syllable of this charge, he (Mr. Croker) would take upon himself unequivocally to assert, in the face of the right hon. Baronet, that there was no disobedience on the part of the Navy Board, and that the right hon. Baronet was, he must presume, misinformed upon, and therefore had mis-stated every one of the facts. The right hon. Baronet said, that a positive order was given, but that was not the case. The order was contingent and to this effect: That it being necessary to reduce the public expenditure as much as possible, with as little inconvenience to the public service as could be, and their Lordships having determined to reduce the number of workmen in the yards - not as stated by the right hon. Baronet to 6,000—but to a number which should be named at a future time, the Commissioners of the yards were not to enter any more men in lieu of those who should happen to be from accidental circumstances, discharged, nor to enter any apprentices, except in the case of death. So that these "positive" directions of the Admiralty to the Navy Board amounted to nothing more than this, "We intend to reduce the number of workmen, but to what extent we have not yet determined." The reduction was not to be immediate, nor by discharge, nor by any other means within the control of the Navy Board, but was to take place by the hand of God, and the course of time. Now, what did this contumacious Navy Board do upon this? What was the proof of imperfect control on the part of the Admiralty, and of the disregard of the Navy Board to its positive directions? The order was issued from the Admiralty in January, 1830, and the very next day the Navy Board carried it into effect; and as if, anticipating that it might be charged some day with pertinaciously disobeying the orders of the Admiralty—although, of course, his gallant friend (Sir Byam Martin) could have had no idea that his Board would have been suspected and traduced as it had been—yet, as if anticipating such a charge, the Navy Board had not even taken advantage of giving the turn of a phrase to the order—of interposing twenty-four hours delay—of throwing any impediments in its way—they did not send it to the dock-yards, as if it had been a measure of their own, which, upon remonstrance to the Admiralty, might be arrested—they did not take an opportunity of throwing any doubt or difficulty in the way, as they might have done, if they had intended to thwart the Admiralty—no, they had acted with a degree of activity and zeal which was quite exemplary, and the very next day the letter of the Admiralty was literally copied, and sent down to the different ports with positive orders that it should be immediately carried into effect. And yet the right hon. Baronet had not hesitated to state, that the Navy Board on this point, had "pertinaciously disobeyed the orders of the Admiralty." About three months after this—that was, in the month of March—the Admiralty having made up its mind as to the amount of the reduction of men, told the Navy Board, the number to be ultimately retained was to be limited to 6,000. But the Admiralty—so far from expecting that such a reduction was to be effected, all at once—so far from hoping that there was to be such a cholera morbus in the yards—such a pestilence, as, in the course of a few weeks, would cut down the existing number of workmen to 6,000—still contemplated the reduction being gradual, and considered its operation as likely to be so slow, that they directed, that when the number of men was reduced to 7,000, they were to work the whole of Wednesday; (for, at present, rather than discharge shipwrights, they had been curtailed of their Wednesday's work so that a greater number might be kept at comparatively a small expense.) The Admiralty further directed, that when the number was reduced to 6,500, the men should work the whole of the six days in the week. It was clear, from all this, that the Admiralty did not expect the enormous reduction they ultimately contemplated in the yards to take place between the months of March and November; and yet, because it had not so taken place, the right hon. Baronet complained that when he came into office, the Navy Board had disobeyed the "positive" orders of the Admiralty. He had now stated exactly how the casestood. What, then, became of the statement of the right hon. Baronet, that the Navy Board, in defiance of the "positive orders" of the Admiralty, kept up the number of shipwrights? The right hon. Baronet had triumphantly asked the other night, why the Navy Board did not obey this order of the Admiralty? And was very much surprised, when told, in answer, that no such order as he spoke of had been given; and it was now an admitted fact, that the right hon. Baronet had been so strangely misinformed and mistaken, as to have asserted, that an order was given which, it appeared, had really never been issued. Was it upon such evidence so misapprehended, so mis-stated, so misapplied by the right hon. Baronet, that the ancient constitution of the Navy was to be overthrown and the whole duties of the Navy Board transferred to the special responsibility of the right hon. Baronet, who had shown himself to be so entirely unacquainted, not merely with the course of business, but with the clearest facts of the cases which he had attempted to state?

But there was another complaint against the Navy Board, and that was, that it kept a book of prices, and that this book of prices was so negligently kept as to be erroneous, not to say fraudulent, in some of its most important details; and as examples of those crying errors, the right hon. Baronet, with laudable minuteness stated, that the public, under this book of prices, was paying 1l. 1s. for lead, and 15l. for iron, when the market prices were respectively 14s. 6d. and 10l.? No such thing. The fact was, that nothing was bought or sold by the book of prices. It was a mere scale for bringing the materials employed at the several yards into calculation at a common rate—something like what in commerce was called the official value of goods, which was only used for the purposes of comparison. Suppose it was required to know the value of any two ships; each would, of course, be composed of timber, of iron, of lead, of copper, of hemp, bought in different years at various prices. If one had happened to be built of materials which had been purchased at high prices, and the other of materials bought at low prices, the cost of the two ships might be in very different proportions, though the value of the ships would not; in computing their value, then, it was necessary to bring the materials to one common average valuation. How, indeed, even if it were desirable to make the calculation in any other way, would it be possible? for what number of clerks and accountants would enable the Navy Board to compute the value of a ship from the actual cost of every separate piece of timber, every distinct bar of iron, every individual pig of lead; the thing would be impossible, and if possible, useless. At Milford, timber was generally cheaper than at the other yards, at least that was one of Lord Spencer's reasons for building at that yard: while from their contiguity to the great London market small stores and the produce of the Baltic were cheaper in the rivers Thames and Medway, while, again, at Portsmouth copper was, from the contiguity of the copper mills, a shade cheaper there than at the eastern and western yards, how absurd would our calculations be, if in fixing a general value, a general average were not to be adopted. Then in the money debits made against storekeepers, warrant officers, and other persons having custody of stores, and pecuniarily responsible for them, it was necessary to have some general measure of value, so that one officer should not be charged at a different rate for the same article, from another who had happened to fit out at a different yard, or to be furnished with an article which had been bought at a cheaper rate. It was evident therefore, that it was not a fluctuating market price, but a general average value that was required in such a document. If it were said, that the price-book ought to have been amended, he replied that he thought the Board was right in not altering it too frequently; for it must be recollected, that it cost much time, trouble, and expense, taking the officers from their work for many weeks, and really for no good purpose, for, after all, the book of prices was merely a means of comparative charge, and did not affect the real cost of any of the articles. But let what would have been done, however frequently the book might be corrected, it would have been impossible to meet the views of everybody. Some thought the articles ought to be put down at the cost price, whilst the right hon. Baronet thought the market- price ought to be charged; and his hon. friend, the member for Thetford, (Mr. A. Baring) with whom he had had some communication upon the subject, and whose opinion on such a subject was of the greatest weight, said, that he did not know what ought to be done, but he was rather inclined to think, in opposition to the right hon. Baronet, that the cost price ought to be charged. When the prices in the book were fixed, the price of lead was 21s. and 22s., but the discovery of a rich Spanish mine made the lead of this country a drug, reducing its selling value to 8s. and 10s., and at that price it was of course now bought by the Navy Board. Did anybody, except the right hon. Baronet, complain of the Navy Board, that because lead had fallen from 22s. per ton to a much lower price, on account of the discovery of a Spanish mine, they had charged it at the price it had cost, for observe what would be the result in the right hon. Baronet's own example, of following his own rule, the Navy Board would have been bound to price at 8s. or 10s., what had actually cost the public 22s. Again, suppose the right hon. Baronet's plan of making the price-book agree minutely, and to every fraction, with the market price, what would follow? That there should be a new price-book every week according to the variations of the market, and that no two ships in the navy would be estimated—no two officers charged—at the same rate. But although the price-book was more a matter of comparison than anything else, it was still desirable that it should approximate to current values, and, therefore, he thought it should be revised every ten or a dozen years, but, that he ventured to say, would be quite often enough for any useful purpose. He had gone into more detail on this point, also, than he thought it deserved, but the fictitious importance given to it by the right hon. Baronet, made it necessary to show how futile the allegation was, as instituting a charge of culpable negligence or waste on the part of the Navy Board.

The next charge was, that the Navy Board had neglected to make sufficient surveys of the stores in the custody of the several storekeepers of the yards; the consequence of which was, as the right hon. Baronet had been pleased to say, that five and a half tons of copper were stolen from Chatham dock-yard, and the robbery was discovered, not by any vigilance of the officers, but by accident, at Birmingham. Now he must tell the right hon. Baronet, that no surveys of the stores in the dockyards could have prevented or detected that robbery. It was proved at the trial, that this copper was not in the possession of the store-keeper at the time it was stolen; so that the yard might have been put to an expense of 5,000l., and four months might have been employed in turning over the stores in his care, without the possibility of missing the articles stolen. He would tell the right hon. Baronet, from what had transpired at the trial, how he thought it probable this copper was taken. A small portion of it was issued by the store-keeper for use to an inferior officer, called the cabin-keeper, who stole it, and who was afterwards transported for the offence. It was clear that no survey of what was in the hands of the store-keeper could have detected the loss of this copper, which had been already discharged from his custody. The greater portion of the copper was, however, taken from old ships, which were being broken up. The men employed in breaking up the ships, might have thrown the copper over the dock-yard wall, or secreted it in their clothes; but at all events it never came into the storekeeper's hands, and of course could not be missed on any survey of his stores. Five tons and a-half of copper sounded like a great deal, to be stolen without being missed; but when he told the House that the quantity of copper procured on breaking up a seventy-four gun ship was not less than forty tons, it would not be surprised at five tons and a-half being stolen from Chatham dock-yard, where so many ships were broken up. No blame, therefore, could attach to the Navy Board for not having prevented or discovered this robbery by a survey, when no survey could have effected either of these objects; and it showed a very inaccurate knowledge in the right hon. Baronet of the subject he was discussing, when he alleged that any survey of the storekeeper's remains could have prevented or detected the plunder of an article which never was in his custody. But, then, the right hon. Baronet remarked, must there not be a very bad look out kept, when such a robbery could have been committed? But this was one of the consequences of the economy which the will of the House and the necessities of the country induced the late Government to pursue. The right hon. Baronet stated the other night, that no nation paid so much for checks as we did. The late Administration endeavoured to lessen that expense by reducing the number of watchmen, warders, and others, called idlers, because they had nothing to do but to prevent others from committing depredations. The country, however, if it did not wish to be plundered, must submit to some expense in the way of checks. He was afraid that human nature required these checks; but to adduce this robbery as a reason for the abolition of the Navy Board, was one of the most extraordinary parts of this whole transaction; because these checks had been diminished by the Admiralty contrary to the advice and remonstrance of the Navy Board. The case of that Board was, indeed, a hard one in the hands of the hon. Baronet. When they remonstrated against the reduction Of watchmen, they were accused of "thwarting" the economical proposals of the Admiralty; and when, in consequence of these Watchmen being reduced, plunder had occurred, they were made responsible for the robbery.

He had now noticed every one of the causes for the abolition of this Board, mentioned by the right hon. Baronet. He might have been tedious upon some of the points to which he had referred, but at least he had not Omitted a single accusation, and what did they all amount to? Nothing—absolutely nothing. Those who had made these charges, knew that they amounted to nothing, and he thought that he might take on himself to say, that there was not one scintilla of evidence of sufficient weight to justify the alteration that the present Government was preparing with respect to the affairs of the Navy. The right hon. Baronet had taken occasion to refer the House to the authority of Mr. Pepys, for facts and opinions which Mr. Pepys had never stated; he (Mr. Croker) would refer to the same authority, but would produce the very words of Mr. Pepys; and he begged leave to call the attention of the House to the following passage in that gentleman's diary, which described the value of an attempt that was then proposed for altering the system of the naval affairs of England:—"And the Duke of York, Wren, and I, it being now candle-light, went into the Duke of York's closet, in Whitehall; there read over this paper of my Lord Keeper's, wherein are laid down the faults of the Navy so silly, and the remedies so ridiculous, or else the same that are how already provided, that we thought it not to need any answer, the Duke of York being able himself to do it; that so it makes us admire the confidence of these men to offer things so silly in a business of such moment." Upon which Mr. Pepys exclaimed, "But it is a most perfect instance of the complexion of the times!" And so he (Mr. Croker) would exclaim, that this description of what was proposed in 1668, was another example of what "silly things men would offer in a business of such moment."

But it was not on a consideration of details only that he rested his opposition to this plan. It had, to him, the higher and more constitutional objection of giving by fat too much power to the Admiralty. The whole gist of the plan appeared to him to be, to dismiss the independent Boards, and to substitute individuals in their place, who would find it prudent to submit, without opposition, to whatever the Lords of the Admiralty should direct; the result of which would be, that the whole despotic influence would be thrown into the hands of the Board of Admiralty. He would take on himself to say, that the power of that Board, under this Bill, would be greater than that of the Monarch—greater than that of Charles 2nd, or James 2nd, when they declared themselves Lord High Admirals.

The right hon. Baronet proposed to make the Admiralty an account office, the right hon. Baronet being apparently ignorant that the Admiralty was not calculated for duties of this description, and was by the Constitution wisely prohibited from exercising any such authority. The Admiralty never was at any period a money-account office. The right hon. Baronet seemed to forget that, by the constitution of the Admiralty, they were not authorised to direct the payment of a single shilling of money, unless with the previous sanction of the King in Council. He did not mean to deny that, of late years, there had been occasional deviations front that principle, against which, however, he always protested while he had the honour of holding place under the late Government. Such a protest now-a-days would be a sufficient cause for his dismissal; ad- vice or remonstrance from a subordinate officer against what he might in his conscience think wrong, was now called, "thwarting one's superior;" and was visited by instant annihilation; but he had then more indulgent masters than it seemed the new Admiralty would be. They, on all occasions, received kindly his humble advice, and generally acted on it; and never, for a moment, seemed to think that the exercise of a conscientious duty was liable to be considered as "disobedience" or "thwarting." Constitutionally speaking, he would say, that the King, surrounded by his Cabinet Ministers in Council, ought alone to exercise the great powers which it was now proposed to vest in the Admiralty Board. According to the plan proposed, so far as he could see they would be under no check from the King in Council. But, said the right hon. Baronet, there is to be an audit. Oh, what an audit! It would be an audit in which he, for one, could not place the slightest reliance. The order of the Admiralty was to be all sufficient, and no person, or body of men, would have a right to resist it. There was to be one Lord of the Admiralty, it seemed, at the head of each of the five great branches of the service. Was his control to be real and effective? If so, the subordinate officers of the department must obey, and they could be subject to no responsibility, for all the responsibility remained with this individual Lord of the Admiralty. But it seemed that, by the proposed plan, an order signed by two Lords of the Admiralty would be necessary to execute the directions of one. This appeared to him an unanswerable objection to the plan. One Lord was to be enough to decide all questions—to execute the whole practical service; but to do the formal part of the business, in which there was no discretion or responsibility whatsoever, two Lords were to be necessary. One Lord was to have authority to dispose of millions; but two were necessary to sign the most ordinary papers, of which, by the new constitution of the Board, one of them could know nothing; so, when the objects of the Lord who presided over the stores were to be carried into effect, he must say to the medical Lord, or any other Lord who might be at hand, and who would know nothing about stores or accounts, or any department but his own, "Hollo! come, put your name to this order." The Gen- tlemen composing the Board of Admiralty ought to be persons of the highest eminence in their profession, distinguished for their naval experience and abilities; but from their habit of life it was not to be expected that, generally speaking, their acquaintance with civil affairs, could be such as fitted them to preside over such departments as it was now proposed to establish. Were they to be at the same time ship-builders, store-keepers, pursers, accountants, and medical men? Let it not be supposed that he was fancying a case, for all this was actually intended and proposed by the Bill of the right hon. Baronet. Let him, for instance, suppose a naval officer placed at the head of the medical department. When he came to be seated face to face to the physician, he would have to dispute with him about prognosis, diagnosis, diaphoretics, and astringents, and such technicalities of the art. And, supposing it seemed good to the naval officer to differ from the medical man in these respects, a pretty situation they would be placed in. Perhaps the naval officer might be of opinion that too much bark had been used. "Who," the satiric poet asked, "shall decide when doctors disagree?"—but who, he would ask, in the name of Heaven, was to decide, when the seaman differed from the doctor? Was this as it ought to be? Could there be any responsibility, when the chief medical man of the Navy was to have his opinion overruled by a young captain? To him it seemed just as preposterous as if the doctor were to presume to instruct the captain in navigating or fighting the ship. But the most important of the whole, was the accountant branch. For his own part, he had not been lucky enough to meet with many naval officers who would condescend to turn their attention to a thing so much beneath them, or at least so remote from their habits and their usual duties, as the mysteries of bookkeeping; and, at all events, he might safely assert, that there were very few men of any but the mercantile profession, who were capable of keeping accounts with that accuracy and technicality which would be necessary for such an important office. He (Mr. Croker) had had a pretty long experience of Admiralty business; and, without pretending to any great sagacity, Would say, that he was as likely to understand something of the civil affairs of the Navy, as most of those who might be called for the first time to the Admiralty: yet, if he had still continued in office, and that the first Lord of the Admiralty were now offering him the superintendence of the accountant department, he should feel it to be his duty, most unquestionably, to decline it, from the feeling that he was not fit to undertake such an office. [Here Mr. Poulett Thomson made some observation.] He (Mr. Croker) knew very well that the right hon. "fructifier" opposite (the Vice President of the Board of Trade) was a most valuable accountant; and he understood the right hon. Gentleman to intimate, that he would not trust him (Mr. Croker) with accounts.

Mr. Poulett Thomson

"I meant no such thing."

Mr. Croker

at all events,the right hon. Gentleman seemed to cheer an expression to that effect, which he had just used with respect to himself. All he could say was, that the right hon. Treasurer could not value lower than he himself did, his (Mr. Croker's fitness for any such office; but if he (Mr. Croker) were, after twenty-two years' experience, so unfit, what was to be said of confiding the duties to Gentlemen who not only had no experience in the civil service at all, but whose education and habits were totally incompatible with such inglorious, but not unimportant duties. But let that be as it might, he would still ask whether any naval officer would like to put himself in such a situation of risk and responsibility, when he must feel that his previous habits were not at all calculated for such an office. If such a system was attempted, he knew very well what must happen. The subordinate man would do all the business. It could not be otherwise. And then, if he was correct in this position, might he not ask, whether it would not be better to give the subordinate the responsibility, as well as the business?

This consideration led him to offer a suggestion to the right hon. Baronet, namely, that he should form these five subordinates into a distinct Board. If he did that, he would get rid of a large portion of his (Mr. Croker's) objections to this plan. If the right hon. Baronet would constitute these inferior officers a Board of five, the whole would equally come under the general superintendence and control of the Board of Admiralty. This proposition would make no alteration in the right hon. Baronet's plan, except the placing the responsibility where it really should lie. The subordinate details of the naval ser- vice afforded, as experience had unfortunately shown great temptations to peculation—false accounts and other pecuniary irregularities; to check, to detect these would be easier, safer, and more effectual in a Board than in any individual. It would always happen, among any set of men, that some one might behave dishonestly; but the greatest check that could be put on them was, to congregate them together; for it was a principle inherent in human nature, that, though an individual might be disposed to behave dishonestly, he had a strong inward objection to seek the confidence of others—to form a partnership of iniquity. He was, therefore, reluctant to place the money and store accounts of this immense service in the hands of any individual whatsoever—the persons intended to be placed in these situations were, he doubted not, most respectable men, but so individually he would say of all those whose accounts they were to examine and check—but, nevertheless, these unpalatable persons were to be checked by the new officers, and speaking not of the individuals but of human nature, he wished those new officers to be themselves under some effective control. And so far from his plan offering any diminution to the superior control of the Board of Admiralty, it would, in his opinion, increase it; for, instead of having five Lords of the Admiralty, worn down by the fatigue of details, so as to be unable to look after the higher duties of their station, all those details would fall to the share of the subordinate Board, and the Board of Admiralty would constitute a complete and effective check upon their actions, instead of being, as by the proposed plan they would be, puzzled and embarrassed between absolute authority, semi-responsibility, and complete ignorance.

When he looked at the manner in which the right hon. Baronet had argued the propriety of making this change, it appeared to him as if he had entirely overlooked what was the great object of the country for which the Board of Admiralty had been constituted. What, according to this plan, was to become of all the military transactions connected with the naval service? What was to become of the natural occupations of these naval officers? They would be wearied with the details of duties they could not understand, and incapacitated by fatigue and confusion, for those which they did. For his part, he did not think it possible that they could adequately perform those various duties, even on their recent introduction to office, when the proverb would be on their side, that "new brooms sweep clean;" and, he would ask the hon. Baronet himself, whether he and his colleagues had, since they had been in office, found the labour so light, or that they had so little to do, as to justify the surcharging them with additional duties? For his own part, he did not think it possible that more duties could be adequately executed, though he saw, without admiring, the boldness with which more were undertaken: and he said, that, even in the time of peace, we ought to take care how we overloaded the public servants, lest, when the real time of difficulty arrived, it should be found that they broke down under the weight imposed upon them, and at that very moment when it would prove most pernicious to the interests of the country. In the time of peace we should prepare for war. In the time of peace we should arrange the Departments in such a way that, when the day of exertion came, we might, by the addition of inferior hands, enable the heads of the different Departments to carry on the increased service. That, according to his opinion, was the true principle of economy: reduce the numbers as low as you please, but on no account alter the principle; by which means, you will always have a system of vitality and vigour on which to engraft still further power. But, on the contrary, if they made this alteration, he would tell them that, on the first rumour of war, the whole would break down, and the country would be exposed to imminent danger.

He further contended, that not one farthing would be saved to the country by this new plan of the right hon. Baronet. On the contrary, much would be lost. Let him give the same salaries as he now proposed. Let him constitute his officers how he pleased—whether by patent or by warrant, he would not quarrel with him about such formal matters as those; he would not balk the right hon. Baronet's idle fancies, or pull down the pretty gewgaws with which he was seeking to dazzle his own eyes. All that he wanted was, to have the safety of the country insured—the safety of the Navy and the country;—and for the rest he cared not. Under this view, would the House allow him to ask what, with a single officer to each department, would become of the country's service in case of that officer's sickness or other occasional absence? What would happen if the Accountant, or Victualling Lord of the Admiralty were sick or absent? Why, a colleague must be called from the management of the stores, or the medical department, or the dock-yards, to act in his stead. Unless, perhaps, the First Lord of the Admiralty himself should abandon the great political and administrative duties specially confided to him, and devote himself to summing up the items of necessary money, or weighing the proportions of dholl and calavances. What a farce would this be! Whereas, by the appointment of a Board, the consequences of the absence of an individual member would be obviated by the general knowledge and co-operation of his associates.

He would put the question, however, upon still higher grounds. It was possible that the business might go on more smoothly and easily under this new system; but did human prudence sanction the House in supposing that business went on more efficiently, more economically, because it went on with ease and smoothness? It was well known that nobody commanded an army so effectually as a despot. He said, "come, and they come: go, and they go." There was no remonstrance to his orders. Every thing that he commanded must be attempted, if not executed; but when all that was done, there was an exercise of tyranny against which every heart naturally and necessarily revolted. If the First Lord of the Admiralty were to be armed with despotic power, no doubt he would think that all went on smoothly and well. He would have no "thwartings" or "disobedience" of subordinates; but was that a state in which any department in this country could long exist. Could the country itself exist with such a tyranny in the bosom of its most important service? Though he was prepared to say, that great immediate danger would result from the inordinate power intrusted to the Board of Admiralty, yet, judging from the speech of the right hon. Baronet, and the doctrines laid down, he saw in this measure the principle of an inordinate power, which ought to be resisted in the outset.

The right hon. Baronet had alluded to the many years the Navy had been governed under the old system, and the many glories it had achieved; but the right hon. Baronet was about to destroy that ancient edifice, in order to erect this new-fangled building of his own. And at what period was he doing this? At the very period when other nations, not so happy as this, were, in imitation of the acknowledged merits of our ancient system, establishing Boards like those the right hon. Baronet would destroy. The right hon. Baronet had stated, that he had taken a lesson from the French as to their mode of keeping their public accounts: he was ready enough to praise the French when it suited his purpose, but he was blind and deaf to their evidence on other points, to which however he might have given some consideration; for instance—It was but a few years ago, that the French established a Board similar to our Navy Board, which was called the Council of Admiralty. It had, he believed, some of the duties, of our Admiralty Board to perform; but it had all the duties of our Navy Board. He felt ashamed to quote—he felt ashamed that he should have lived to invoke the example of France, as worthy of our imitation, in naval matters; but the invocation was not his—it was that of the right hon. Baronet; and he (Mr. Croker) had only applied it. Let the House look, too, at America. America had also within a few years established a Navy Board. He had that day looked at the Act of Congress, establishing that Board, and it was in substance very much the same as the patent establishing our Navy Board; and he believed that some of the instructions for our Board were embodied into that Act ef Congress. Yet, when that was the case—when our nearest neighbour and most frequent enemy, and our younger and greatest naval rival, were both establishing Navy Boards; we, rejecting their experience, and our own, took the first opportunity of pulling down that most ancient and admirable establishment, which those Other nations were endeavouring to imitate.

He begged pardon for troubling the House at such length, but he had been in that service for twenty-two years—he filled a high and confidential situation in it, and he should have deserted his duty to the House and the country, if he had not given his opinion on the right hon. Baronet's plan. He would say one word more. What was to become, under the new plan, of the Secretary to the Admiralty? It would be impossible for any individual to do the duties which would, or, at least, ought to devolve upon him. For twenty-two years that he had filled that office, he had been only twice absent for three weeks, at any one time, and generally he had heen unable to absent himself, at any one time, for more than a few days. During the whole of those twenty-two years he had never left the office for one hour, or even for one half hour, without leaving word where he was to be found. This close and constant attendance was necessary for the due satisfaction of his conscience in the discharge of the duties of the office, such as they then existed. What would then be the situation of the Secretary of the Admiralty, who was to be also the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Victualling, and the Secretary of the Transport, and the Secretary of the Medical Departments? He would say—and the strong assertion had all his experience for its justification—that, if the principle laid down by the right hon. Baronet were carried into execution, he would say, that two or three, or four Secretaries of the Admiralty would be scarcely sufficient; nor two, nor three, nor four Secretaries to the separate Commissioners. They might get inferior people, undoubtedly, at a lower salary, as Secretaries to the Commissioners; but, whatever assistance they might get, it would be impossible to carry on the business of Secretary of the Admiralty, as that important and responsible office ought to be conducted, on the plan of the right hon. Baronet. He might be, perhaps, partial to an office which he had so long filled, inadequately he acknowledged, but faithfully and zealously; but he would say that, in his opinion, the due execution of the duties of that office were most important to the best interests of the country—and that, if the person who held it were to be called away from his higher duties to all the inferior details with which the Admiralty Board was encumbering itself, the evil would be greater than would be compensated by saving the salaries of the subordinate secretaries.

He attached, however, no great importance to these personal and secondary considerations. His great objections were, to the rash haste, the sweeping extent, the complication and unconstitutionality of the general scheme. Individual injustice and technical difficulties there were in abundance; but all such considerations vanished before the danger to the country, which this measure might involve. He wished he could hope to persuade the right hon. Baronet to pause in his course—to proceed a little more cautiously—to try his scheme by degrees, instead of blindly and rashly, taking a step which it would be difficult to retrace—a step perilous in itself—and, if it should happen to be a false one, a step which might be ruinous to the country.

Sir James Graham

said, that before he replied to the objections of the right hon. Gentleman who had just sat down, he had been most anxious to hear the observations with which other hon. Gentlemen might be inclined to support them; but finding that no other hon. Members were inclined to follow the right hon. Gentleman on that side of the question, he had now risen to address the House, thinking that it would not be respectful to it to let the matter go to a division, without making some remarks upon it. He thought that he had good reason to congratulate himself that, throughout the whole of his long premeditated speech, the right hon. Secretary had busied himself with replying, not to the speech with which he (Sir James Graham) had introduced this measure to the House, but to the speeches which he had made on naval affairs, not only in the present, but also in former Sessions of Parliament. He would endeavour to follow the right hon. Gentleman regularly through all the topics of his very discursive speech—a speech in which he had endeavoured to refute speeches which he could not refute at the time when they were made, and in which he had omitted all consideration of the arguments by which he (Sir James Graham) had, on a former evening, endeavoured to recommend this measure to the favourable notice of the House. And here he would remark, that he could not help being surprised, that there should be so strong a lurking suspicion in the mind of the right hon. Gentleman, that he (Sir James Graham) had misquoted the authorities which he had produced on a former occasion, in support of the provisions of this Bill. He would not enter into any investigation of the reasons which induced the right hon. Gentleman to entertain such a suspicion—he would only say, that he believed he was not more likely to make a misquotation to gain a temporary advantage in debate than the right hon. Gentleman himself was, and, therefore, he was surprised to hear the right hon. Gentleman accusing him of falsifying, though not intentionally, the authority of Mr. Pepys. He begged the House to attend to the course which the right hon. Gentleman had pursued upon this occasion. In the first instance he had endeavoured to make the House believe, that he (Sir James Graham) had addressed it without any authority; but then seeing that he (Sir James Graham) held in his hand his authority, namely, the first report of the Commissioners of inquiry into the civil affairs of the Navy, which the right hon. Gentleman said he knew by heart, he boldly stated, that he (Sir James Graham) had not read it correctly to the House. He would, therefore, apply himself, without delay, to the refutation of that charge; and, as the best mode of doing it would be by producing the authority itself, he would read that of Mr. Pepys, as stated in that first report. In that report, the history of our Navy was traced, with great minuteness, from the earliest times down to the present. It was divided into distinct periods, and the third period commenced with the restoration of the Monarchy under Charles 2nd. The report stated that, on the Restoration, the Duke of York was appointed Lord High Admiral, that the Navy Board was dismissed, and that a plan was devised for the restoration of the Navy. He thought that the House would recollect, that the right hon. Gentleman had said, that this report must be inaccurate, as the small memoir of Mr. Pepys on the state of the Navy was the only document of his that was then known to be in existence. But the Commissioners who drew up that report, were as accurate in their statements as the right hon. Gentleman, and perhaps a little more so. For they proceeded as follows: "All the proceedings of the Duke of York in the management of the Navy, either when he was Lord High Admiral, or after he came to the Throne, are minutely detailed in a great number of manuscript volumes in the Pepysian library at Cambridge, of which, thirteen volumes have, at our desire, been sent for our perusal." They then proceeded to state the contents of those volumes. The House would recollect that the right hon. Gentleman had asserted that the Duke of York did not revoke or abolish the powers of the Navy Board. Well, upon that point too, be would join issue with the right hon. Gentleman. The report proceeded—"The powers which had been granted to the Commissioners of the Admiralty and Navy Board were recalled, and the entire management was put into the hands of the Duke as Lord High Admiral, to whom three new Commissioners were appointed, to act with the Treasurer of the Navy, the Comptroller, the Surveyor, and the Clerk of the Acts, as principal Officers and Commissioners of the Navy." He (Sir James Graham) said, that this was a new Board of Admiralty, constructed by the Lord High Admiral; and he now begged leave to state what the effects of this new management were. They were most satisfactory. "Great progress," said the Report, "was made in the preparation of the fleet, owing to the skilful management of the Duke of York and Mr. Pepys." The Duke then went to take the command of the British fleet during the Dutch war. He controlled the Navy Board; but the same careful management which prevailed while he was present to superintend it, did not prevail during his absence. A sudden change took place for the worse, which, on his resuming his management at home, was instantly checked. The Duke then went abroad again for five years; in his absence, new men were appointed to the Navy Board, without either experience or industry. What was the effect? That all was again supineness at head-quarters, that waste prevailed, and that the Navy became inefficient. At the end of five years, the Duke returned; and, on finding the mismanagement which had taken place in the interval, suspended all the members of the Navy Board, and confined their duties merely to the accounts. He then exercised similar authority to that which he had exercised previously to his leaving England. He appointed new Commissioners, but, in the measures of reform which he recommended the members of the Navy Board were not displaced, they were only directed to confine their attention to matters of account. The report then proceeded to show the effect produced by this concentration of power. "In ten years and a half after the Commissioners were appointed, the King visited the dockyards, and, finding every thing accomplished to his satisfaction, he dissolved the Commission." He contended, that this resolution on the part of the King amounted to a dissolution of the Navy Board. But, to proceed—"He dissolved the Commission with marks of his high approbation, and then restored the management to the regular Boards." That was conclusive proof to his mind, that at that time, the concentration of power was in the single Board over which the Lord High Admiral presided. He thought that he had now exculpated himself from the charge of having misquoted the authority of Mr. Pepys, and of having misrepresented the facts which he had endeavoured to bring under the notice of the House as justificatory of the measure which he now proposed. The right hon. Gentleman had then proceeded to impugn his statement as to the disobedience of the orders of the Board of Admiralty by these subordinate Boards. For proof of that statement, he had relied upon a speech made in that House, on a former evening, by an hon. and gallant Officer whom he saw opposite (Sir Byam Martin), and upon the evidence which he had given before the Finance Committee. He had likewise relied upon the opinions avowed by a gallant Admiral (Sir George Cockburn), opposite who had given testimony before the Finance Committee, which was much less qualified even than those opinions. The gallant Admiral seemed to insinuate, that, he (Sir James Graham), had no right to advert to that testimony. Now he maintained, that he was fully justified in alluding to it, for, though that evidence was not printed, it was yet preserved in a form which made it cognizable to every Member of Parliament, and in a place to which every Gentleman who then heard him, could resort at pleasure. The gallant Admiral had said, that one use of these Boards was, to prevent the Board of Admiralty from going too fast; and, in the discussion which took place the last time that this Bill was before the House, he had said, that they were the drag-chain of the Board of Admiralty. That expression was most appropriate, and he thanked the gallant Officer for having used it, though he must observe, that a drag-chain so useless and so expensive, was never before invented. What was the evidence of another hon. Gentleman, who had also occupied a seat at the Board of Admiralty? He had quoted his evidence upon a former occasion, and he would now repeat it. He was asked this question: "Do you conceive, that the Admiralty require to be reinforced by any such authority, or that, there does not reside in the council of the Lord High Admiral sufficient authority?" His reply was: "I conceive, in subordinate departments, where parties are very much interested in maintaining an over-establishment, they are always inclined to make resistance against any alterations which are to take away the emoluments of the department. Retrenchment is always ungracious; and it is constantly seen, when there is any great class of reduction effected in any department, that the views advocated by the parties interested against the reduction are very well backed by Members of Parliament and others connected with them. If this Committee think that, the Admiralty are right in the general views which they entertain, I have no doubt that their sanction and authority, or their recommendation in favour of the views of the Admiralty, will be extremely useful." On what ground, he would ask, was it that the hon. member for Dumfriesshire thought that the limited intervention of this House would be necessary? He was sure that that hon. Member, from contemplating the resistance of the subordinate orders, knew that it existed, and that it had too often proved successful. No one could concur more strongly than he concurred in the high eulogium which had been passed upon the character of the gallant Officer on the other side of the House (Sir Byam Martin.) He frankly admitted that, in his professional career, that gallant Officer was one of the most able and distinguished characters of which the service could boast, and that in his civil capacity, no man had ever displayed greater industry, greater assiduity, and great integrity. But the gallant Officer had argued as if he (Sir James Graham), in introducing this measure, was not backed by any professional authority. Now, he appealed to the gallant Officer whether there were not in the present Board of Admiralty officers who stood as high in their profession as men could do. He stated unequivocally to the House, that he introduced this measure with the unanimous consent of all his colleagues in the Admiralty, given after they had had fifteen months experience in the toils of office. They were all of opinion that, by the direct control which the proposed plan would give the Admiralty over the Subordinate Departments, its labours would not be increased, but diminished. But, said the right hon. Gentleman, "all this proceeds from the thirst of uncontrolled power, which at present possesses the Board of Admiralty." Here it appeared to him that the right hon. Gentleman, with all his ability, was guilty of some inconsistency; for first he said that the Board of Admiralty was hunting after new powers which it did not at present possess; and then he read the patent by which the different Boards were constituted, clearly and incontestably proving that, in every case where the Board of Admiralty interfered, the sole duty of the other Boards was to obey its orders. What, then, was his objection to the present system? That the Board of Admiralty was not at present always cognizant, of the steps taken by the Subordinate Boards, and that it had, therefore, no control over them within such a period as made it a real and efficient control. The right hon. Gentleman had also paid him a compliment, in replying, not to his speech of the other night, but to a speech which he had made in the course of last Session, on what he must still call the misappropriation of the public money. The right hon. Gentleman had adverted to what he had said respecting the opinion of Mr. Hatsell and of Mr. Fox on that point, and had endeavoured to show, that he (Sir J. Graham) must be in error, because, at the time when Mr. Hatsell wrote, the Appropriation Act did not apply to the estimates for the naval force. But the right hon. Gentleman ought not to have forgotten that in the year 1798, the Appropriation Act was extended to those estimates also. He admitted that, in the time of Mr. Hatsell and Mr. Fox, it was neither the law nor the practice to have those estimates strictly appropriated. But since their time the law had been altered, though not the practice. The right hon. Gentleman asserted that the practice never accorded with the law. Why, that was the very charge which he brought against the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues. He said, that the practice which they had followed was a vicious practice, for which nothing like a satisfactory defence could be offered, "But," continued the right hon. Gentleman, "no loss was ever sustained by this practice." No, but loss might have been sustained by it; and if it had been suffered to continue, loss would have been sustained by it. He must also add, that this practice was gradually increasing. The right hon. Gentleman had declared that this practice had been sanctioned by the Administration of Earl Spencer, but during the last four years that the colleagues of the right hon. Gentleman were in power, this practice had been carried to a more dangerous extent than it ever had been carried at any previous period. He challenged the right hon. Gentleman to adduce, if he could, any instance in the time of Earl Spencer's naval Administration, in which the estimates sent in by the Subordinate Boards to the Board of Admiralty were greater than the votes submitted by the Board of Admiralty to Parliament. On a former occasion he had stated that there were two cases—the one, a mill at Deptford, and the other a certain tide wall at Woolwich—in which the estimates sent in to the late Board of Admiralty by the Subordinate Boards were each 10,000l. less than the estimates subsequently submitted to Parliament by that Very same Board of Admiralty. "Then," said the right hon. Gentleman, "whatever be the blame of this misappropriation, it must rest with the Board of Admiralty, which failed to control it, and not with the Subordinate Boards, which perpetrated it." But, in answer to that remark, he (Sir James Graham) must beg leave to state, that it was very difficult to ascertain where the blame ought to rest, for the communications between these Boards were carried on by word of mouth only, and there was very often no trace to be discovered of the authority upon which the Subordinate Boards acted. The evil consequences of this system were so well put by Earl St. Vincent, that he would take the liberty of laying before the House the sentiments which he had expressed upon it in his place in the House of Lords, in the year 1805. Earl St. Vincent said—"With respect to the Ministerial communications between the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Comptroller, it is one of the great vices of the Navy Board, and serves no other purpose but to screen them from all responsibility; for, when called on to account for disobedience to the most positive orders from the Superior Board, the constant reply is, that the Comptroller explained the reason in a Ministerial communication with the late First Lord;"* and he (Sir James Graham) rather suspected that, after the examination of some ^* Hansard's Parl. Debates, vol. v. p. 98. cases which were then pending was made public, the country would hear a little more than at present of these Ministerial communications with the late First Lord of the Admiralty. The right hon. Gentleman, in speaking of the misappropriation of the public money, had admitted it to be most unconstitutional, to commence any public work without previously submitting the estimate to Parliament. He had previously, however, stated five cases in which this had been done, and, curiously enough, it happened, that four out of the five cases in which the expenditure had commenced before any vote of Parliament was obtained to sanction it, were cases which had occurred in the time of the late Administration. The right hon. Gentleman had also stated, that the surplus of the different grants voted was regularly carried to the general service of the year. He admitted that such was the fact; and it was owing to his having found a very large surplus under the head of "Timber" on coming into office, that he had been enabled to carry on the naval service so long without applying to Parliament for fresh funds. But what was the explanation which the right hon. Gentleman had given respecting the existence of this surplus? Most jejune and unsatisfactory. The right hon. Gentleman said, "Under the head of wages, you will find that a deficiency of money was voted;" but, in reply to this, he was prepared to contend that nothing could be more unconstitutional than the keeping up a larger number of men than that which was voted by Parliament, and paying their wages out of the surplus belonging to other grants. He assured the House that during the last year there had not in any part of the world been one boy borne on the books of the navy more than the maximum for which he had asked wages during the last year. When he came into office, however, he found 1,500 men more employed in the navy than had been voted by Parliament. The right hon. Gentleman had alluded to what he (Sir James Graham) had stated the other night about the store-ledger not having been kept; and he had attempted to explain the matter, by stating that there had been a cessation of keeping abstracts in the out-ports: but it seemed to him that this was no answer at all, for the regulation with respect to the ledger was for the very purpose of superseding that practice; and, therefore, it was surely a very strange apology for the neglect of the ledger, to say, that both had been allowed to lapse into non-performance. The right hon. Gentleman, however, said, that great progress had taken place in making up the arrear, and that they might shortly expect to hear that the book was completed. He listened with much pleasure to the right hon. Gentleman's intelligence; but he must be allowed to observe that, if such was the case, this extraordinary diligence had only been exercised since he had come into office; and one inference, at all events, was obvious—if it was within the power of the Board to bring up all these arrears without any additional hands, it was quite clear that to suffer the accounts to go into arrear, was neither more nor less than sheer neglect. The right hon. Gentleman had somewhat harshly asserted, that he had misrepresented the orders of the Admiralty, with respect to the diminution of the men in the dock-yards. It appeared, however, by the right hon. Gentleman's statement, that there were two orders issued by the Admiralty—the one in January, and the other in March. He had quoted from the one issued in March, and though he did not happen to have that order with him, as he did not expect that all the details of his former speech would be gone through by the right hon. Gentleman, yet he certainly very well recollected that that order was explicit for the reduction of the number of men to 6,000, on the principle therein laid down; and if he remembered right, the order contained a marginal note, directing that a copy of a certain portion of it should be sent to the out-ports; though the right hon. Gentleman told them, that the whole of it was sent thither by the Navy Board, verbatim et literatim. It was not necessary for him to reply any further to the observations which the right hon. Gentleman had made, not only upon the speech which he had made in introducing this measure, but also upon every speech which he had uttered during the last Session upon naval affairs. Passing on, therefore, from these minor topics, he would now proceed to his observations upon the measure itself. He would first remind the House that the most important provision of this Bill was that which vested a complete control in the Board of Admiralty over the Subordinate Officers, and a complete responsibility which did not exist at present, and which he deemed highly ne- cessary. The right hon. Gentleman considered that the total amount of Estimates voted for the naval service of the year was applicable to any particular estimate, and that the money granted was not restricted to the professed purpose for which it was granted. That was a doctrine conformable certainly to the practice, but he looked upon the practice as the primary cause of all the evils which pervaded these departments. In the next place, he would remind the House that this Bill, if the House should sanction it, would convert a nominal into a real and efficient control. He understood that one of the objections taken by the right hon. Gentleman, referred to the power of the Board of Admiralty auditing their own accounts. But, this very principle had been recognized by the right hon. Gentleman, and his colleagues, for when they brought forward their Bill to consolidate the office of Treasurer of the Navy, they introduced a clause therein to this very effect. But he did not intend to leave this part of the question in the way, in which the right hon. Gentleman had assumed. It was his intention to propose to re-enact the audit, which was sanctioned by the Act of the 2nd of William 3rd. As the audit at the end of the year could not be either a perfect or a final audit until all the accounts were furnished, he proposed to keep the account open until all the other accounts were received, even from the most distant parts of the world. He would keep the audit also open until two months after all the accounts were closed with their vouchers; and then the expenditure on each head, whether it be a surplus or a deficiency, was to be fairly stated to Parliament. That was the best answer which could be offered to the objection which the right hon. Gentleman had urged against the measure which he had introduced, for it proved the utter absurdity of his having introduced it with a view of getting irresponsible power to that department over which he presided. The right hon. Gentleman expressed some fear that the Bill would degrade the Admiralty Board to an Accountant Board. But the fact was, that the Navy Board was not at present an Accountant Board, nor was the Accountant General of the Navy a money Accountant. The only money Accountant was the Treasurer of the Navy, whose office and duties would still remain. Not one of the least recommendations in his estimation of the measure itself was, the arrangement by which the officers to constitute the Board would hold their appointments, not by patent but by warrant, and greater facilities would be thus afforded for their removal. While so far as the discharge of their duties authorized it, the same persons would continue in employment. But then, the right hon. Gentleman contended, that the Admiralty had already sufficient employment; he allowed this, but then, a large part of their present occupation arose from the confusion produced by the erratic motions of the Navy and Victualling Boards, and he accordingly expected that when this source of employment was cut off (for the present arrangement seemed to provide, that the various Boards should make work for each other), that the Admiralty would have sufficient time to attend to the increase of duty that would be thrown on them by this plan. But, the right hon. Gentleman had admitted that the proposed arrangement was not objectionable except that he wished the five officers who were to preside over the various departments should be in themselves a Board. But, such a plan would retain a considerable portion of the vice of the present system, and would open the door for an insufficiency of control on the part of the Admiralty. It would be the shadow of the plan he advocated, but, the substance would partake too much of the old arrangements. The right hon. Gentleman, with great pathos, had asked, what was to become of the Secretary to the Admiralty? He begged to assure the right hon. Gentleman, that he had submitted his plan to Mr. Barrow, one of the present Secretaries, whose experience was at least as great as that of the right hon. Gentleman, and from him he (Sir J. Graham) had received every assistance, though he differed from him in politics, for the promotion of the welfare and interests of the service over which he had the honour to hold the guardianship, that gentleman had, with perfect consistency, maintained his political sentiments, and had given him (Sir J. Graham) that assistance which he felt proud to avow, and should ever remember with the most grateful feelings; Mr. Barrow not only thought this measure practical, but salutary, and that it would have the effect of correcting many of those grievances, which he well knew had existed. By the opinion of Mr. Barrow, he felt fortified in the strong sentiment he entertained in favour of this measure, and in that sentiment he was also supported by the present Board of Admiralty, which, he trusted he might say, contained as much naval knowledge as any previous Board. He had no personal interest in the change, he gained no advantage or patronage by the measure; indeed, he sought none; but he implored the House, for the sake of the service over which he had the honour to preside—he entreated the House, for the sake of that service, to allow the Bill to be read a second time.

Mr. Keith Douglas

rose for the purpose of pointing out to the House the extreme inconvenience which would result to the public service, in case the changes contemplated by the present Bill were to be carried into effect; the duties of the three Boards were totally incompatible with each other, and it was alogether impossible for them to be executed by one Board. The Bill proposed to vest in the members of the Board of Admiralty the powers now intrusted to the Navy and Victualling Boards, comprising many duties of detail: they were to have the superintendence of all the dock-yards of the building, repairing, furnishing and victualling of ships. For the future, all contracts for the supply of the Navy were 'to be effected by the Admiralty Board; but when the extent of those contracts was reflected on, and how complicated and how multifarious they were, he must confess that he looked at any such proposition as that of confiding them to the Board of Admiralty to be totally impracticable, and likely to produce the worst results. In addition to these duties, those of the Treasurer of the Navy were to be vested in the Board of Admiralty, as well as the examination of all vouchers and accounts, with the control of Greenwich Hospital, and of the multiplicity of prize accounts connected with that establishment. Such commercial duties were incompatible with the proper functions of the Admiralty Board. The principal object contemplated in instituting that Board was, to have an efficient controlling power connected with the Ministry over the whole of the naval service, so as to render it effective in all its branches, and easily applicable to any service, the political situation of the country might require. With these duties to perform, and, in addition, being burthened with those of the Secretary, and of the subordinate de- partment of the Secretary's office, he was of opinion that the Board of Admiralty would speedily find itself overwhelmed with a mass of business, altogether out of its power to get through. Although there might result to the country, by the right hon. Baronet's plan, a saving of from 2,000l. to 3,000l. a-year in these reductions, yet there would also be this result, that the duties which were now most efficiently performed would be altogether neglected, to the great detriment of the public service, and to the injury of the community at large.

Sir Byam Martin

had listened with great attention and with the highest satisfaction to the clear, able, and unanswerable speech of his right hon. friend, the late Secretary to the Admiralty. That it was unanswerable was proved by the laboured and unsuccessful effort of the right hon. Baronet opposite. As his right hon. friend had so completely vindicated the Navy Board from the charges of the First Lord of the Admiralty, it would not be necessary for him, though he had had the honour of presiding over the Board, and was, perhaps, the person most implicated by the right hon. Baronet's remarks, to add one word in its defence. On a previous evening he had ventured to state, that there was not one word of the right hon. Baronet's representations which was not founded in error. That he had sufficient grounds for making that assertion he would establish by papers, for which he had intended to move on that evening; but not having had an opportunity of speaking to the right hon. Baronet until too late for their production so as to be made use of that evening, he postponed his Motion to some future occasion. Those papers would show, that from beginning to end the statements of the right hon. Baronet were founded in error. As his right hon. friend (Mr. Croker) had sufficiently vindicated the Boards from the aspersions which had been cast upon them, he would not now detain the House by adverting to those aspersions, but would go at once to the provisions of the Bill; and, first of all, to the persons who were in future to do the duty of those Boards. The office of Surveyor of the Navy, hitherto so efficiently filled by Sir Robert Seppings, was to be given to an unprofessional man, who knew nothing about the business. He (Sir B. Martin) had a high opinion of Captain Symonds as an able seaman, and as good an officer as ever walked the quarterdeck of a British ship; but although that gentleman was capable of producing the form of a vessel admirably calculated for fast sailing, as had been done by several other persons, for he himself had commanded a very fine frigate, the outlines of whose form had been drawn by a watchmaker, yet he had no doubt, that Captain Symonds would himself allow that he new nothing of the business of a practical shipwright. That officer, therefore, was by no means a proper person to supply the place of his distinguished predecessor, and most likely, on being appointed, would, in the frankness of his disposition, declare, he knew nothing about the duties of his office. If he were told that this gentleman might, under such circumstances, refer to the Admiralty for instructions, he would just ask the House to consider the time which would be lost in such communications, independent of there being no person qualified to instruct him at the Admiralty. It was quite impossible, he apprehended, that the right hon. Baronet could be serious in proposing to make such an appointment. The right hon. Baronet had said, that five persons were to do the business which was now transacted by the Accountant General, the Surveyor of the Navy, and the Navy, Victualling and Transport Boards. He was sure the House would remember that it was a very different thing when individuals acted for themselves, and when they were enabled to have recourse to a Board for advice and assistance. In the absence of a Board, the responsibility must be left to the Clerks in the office, for the existing responsibility would be entirely removed. If the right hon. Baronet's plan was carried into execution, the first step must be, to bring all the departments of the Navy under the same roof. If this was not done, it would be utterly impossible to conduct the public business. His right hon. friend stated, very truly, that, in order to keep up the ledger which the right hon. Baronet said ought to have been kept up, for the purpose of correcting fraud, though he believed it would never answer such a purpose, no less than 158,000 documents must be entered in the course of a year; and, in war time, according to his calculation, there would be no less than 3,000,000 of documents sent to the office for this one purpose, and on this one subject. The right hon. Baronet then went on to say, that, in the new ar- rangement it should be enacted, that all applications and notices for all prizes and other receipts and accounts, and all books, documents, and papers which were, by any previous Act of Parliament, required to be made, given, and transmitted to the Commissioners of the Navy, shall be made, given, and transmitted to the Secretary of the Admiralty. If, to the 158,000 documents he had already mentioned were added all these accounts, receipts, books, and, documents, they would amount to such a number, that a van would be required to travel between the Navy Board and the Admiralty, for the purpose of transmitting them from one office to another. The Admiralty were to have all these documents first transmitted to them, but it was utterly impossible, however, that they could use them—they must send them to the Navy office before they did. To give an idea of the magnitude of the correspondence, he would merely state to the House that the postage had amounted to no less a sum than 460l. in one day. It was so obviously impracticable that the plan of the right hon. Baronet could be carried into effect, unless he would consent to transplant himself to Somerset place, that he was perfectly sure the public business could not possibly be carried on under the proposed arrangement. With regard to the office of Surveyor of the Navy, if the right hon. Baronet appointed Captain Symonds to the situation, he would commit an act of the most gross injustice against some of the most intelligent, able, and respectable master-shipwrights that this kingdom ever produced. Being now, at the head of their business in the dock yards, they had an absolute right to look for promotion to that office, and they were now to be superseded by the appointment of a person who had not been at the expense and labour of preparing himself as they had prepared themselves, for the arduous duties, which required, not only the highest scientific attainments, but also practical knowledge, which could only be attained by constant practice in the laborious and difficult art to which they had devoted themselves. This was not all, however; for if the proposed arrangement was carried into effect, the right hon. Baronet would make his Majesty depart from his Order in Council, and break his faith with the students, who, under that order, were invited to enter into the service upon a positive pledge that they alone should be advanced to the superior stations; and the office of the Surveyor of the Navy was particularly held up as an object to stimulate their ambition. It was a most extraordinary proceeding to set aside persons who had been educated expressly for the purpose by the public, and selected for their abilities, and who to theoretical knowledge added practical experience, for the purpose of promoting a man who was a stranger to these duties. He had received letters from those gentlemen, saying it was impossible they could remain in the public service under such circumstances, if by any other means they could get a living. To return to the plan of the right hon. Baronet, in addition to the multiplicity of documents he had already stated, many others would be found in numbers quite inconceivable; and how the business was to be carried on with "unity and simplicity" which the hon. Baronet held to be the very essence of business, when the documents necessary for one department were only to be found at another part Of the town, he could not imagine, for he declared he could conceive nothing more completely at variance with every known principle of unity and simplicity than this Bill. He had no doubt, however, that the hon. member for Middlesex would support the measure on the ground of economy, without considering what was likely to be its ultimate results. With respect to the reductions at the Navy Office, he begged to assure the House, that he had no feeling of prejudice or partiality whatever in favour of that establishment; indeed, he wished to see some alterations made in that department; but he thought that if the right hon. Baronet would agree to the suggestion of his right hon. and gallant friend—to unite the Navy and Victualling Boards—he would accomplish an equal saving, without embarrassing the service by the introduction of machinery which would stop in time of war. As to the dock-yards, that part of the subject was of great interest and importance. The right hon. Baronet made it a boast, that if he were allowed to carry his new Bill into execution, he would make reductions in a great variety of establishments, to the amount of about 49,000l, a-year, and that he would, in time, bring the number of men employed down to about 6,000. He, therefore, concluded that he proposed to discharge about 1,100 or 1,200 men, and he must be permitted to say, that a reduction of some 49,000l. would be very dearly purchased, by exposing to want and starvation a large number of industrious men. He would venture to say, that he could show to the House how as great a saving could be effected, without the discharge of a single man—retaining in the service men who would be ready in case of war to assist in the equipping a fleet with that energy and despatch to which they had been accustomed; but if these reductions in the docky-ards were carried into effect, the whole machinery of the civil service would be so grossly deficient, that he would venture to say, no man would be able to conduct the service in war time. The right hon. Baronet proposed to discharge a number of shipwrights: they were a most valuable body of men, and he regretted to say their number was very considerably decreasing throughout the kingdom. He knew it was a very common thing for some gentlemen to say, "You have ships enough, what do you want with more." He had said in this House, on a former occasion, and he now repeated, that at no period of the naval history of this country had we ever so fine a fleet as at this moment. His advice to the right hon. Baronet was, take care and keep it so. Although our vessels were in an admirable condition, yet many of them were old; and unless they went on with a succession of repairs and buildings, the fleet would go to decay, and, in the event of a war our means of defence would not be proportionate to our wants.

Sir George Clerk

trusted the House would bear with him for a short time. He was well aware how difficult it was to fix the attention of Gentlemen upon a subject which did not interest them particularly, but, before he proceeded any further, he would say, that he was perfectly satisfied that both the right hon. Gentlemen who had spoken to-night, had been actuated by the same feeling of zeal for the welfare of the naval service, and by a similar anxiety to place every department connected with it on an efficient footing. The right hon. Baronet complained that his right hon. friend made an answer to-night to his speech of a former night. The right hon. Baronet ought to have recollected that, in consequence of the extreme lateness of the hour when the right hon. Baronet had concluded his statement, his right hon. friend contented himself, on that occasion, with merely entering his protest against the right hon. Baronet's plan, reserving to himself another opportunity of proving its inaccuracy; and he might appeal to the Gentlemen now in the House, who had the good fortune to hear his right hon. friend, whether he had not fully redeemed the pledge he then gave. The right hon. Baronet complained that his right hon. friend had made remarks, not only on his speech of the other night, but on every speech he made last Session; but for this, he had himself alone to blame, as, in every speech he had made on naval questions, the largest part of his statement had been occupied by a detail of what he called the misappropriation of the public money, in applying the surplus of some grants to make good the deficiencies of others. The right hon. baronet, on a former night, gave the House some historical information with respect to the abolition of the subordinate Navy Boards by James Duke of York, which he quoted on the authority of the "Memoirs of Mr. Pepys." But when his right hon. friend inquired from what part of that authority such information was derived, the right hon. Baronet said, it "was not from the works of Mr. Pepys, but from the report of the Commissioners made in the year 1809, containing a statement of certain inquiries into the affairs of the Navy that took place between the years 1660 and 1670." He was perfectly sure the right hon. Baronet had no intention to mislead the House, but certainly he had entirely mistaken the meaning of the passages which he had referred to. If the right hon. Baronet had taken the pains to look into the authorities on the subject, he would have found that there was no ground whatever for the supposition, that, during a part of the reign of Charles 2nd, the Navy Board was abolished, and that, under an arrangement, made at the time the Duke of York was Lord High Admiral, the concerns of the Navy were conducted in a most efficient and proper manner, while the Subordinate Boards were abolished; that when they were re-appointed, abuses again arose; and that when they were once more abolished, the system again improved. Now, he must declare, that the whole of that statement was altogether founded in error. The Navy Board never was abolished subsequent to the restoration of Charles 2nd, and the appointment of the Duke of York as Lord High Admiral. It was true, that the grossest abuses prevailed in the naval departments; and that, in 1668, one of the Commissioners was impeached for gross misconduct. The Duke of York, however, did not abolish the Board; he merely appointed a number of Commissioners to inquire into the abuses which prevailed. Commissioners had been from time to time appointed to inquire into the whole of the civil affairs of the Navy; but was it ever before conceived that such appointments superseded and set aside the Navy Board. The House had some reason to complain, that the right hon. Baronet did not look into historical authorities, before he had on the strength of this misunderstanding, recommended his colleagues, and advised his Majesty to abolish the Navy and Victualling Boards; supposing they had been temporarily and successfully abolished in the time of Charles 2nd. To prove this was an erroneous statement, he would only quote a very short paragraph from the report of certain Commissioners, whose opinions, some short time since, would have had very great weight with hon. Gentlemen on the opposite side of the House. There was a Commission appointed in 1785, to inquire into the state of the Navy Office, and not being Antiquarians, they did not search into manuscripts at Cambridge, they merely looked into the records of the Navy Office itself, which presented a continuous statement from the year 1660 downwards. There was no regular record until after the Restoration. The Commissioners stated, "that, on the restoration of King Charles 2nd, his Majesty constituted a Navy Board under the Great Seal, consisting of a Treasurer, Surveyor, Comptroller, and Clerk of the Navy, who were styled the principal officers, to which number, on the 4th of July, 1660, three Commissioners were added. In January, 1661, the Duke of York, then Lord High Admiral, established certain instructions, which were now in use for the conduct of the four principal officers; the other three being Commissioners at large had no particular line of duty assigned to them until 1666, when they were directed to take upon themselves so much of the Comptroller's line of duty as related to the inspection of the Treasurer's accounts: and, in the year 1671, the examination of the Comptroller and Storekeeper's accounts were assigned to them, which, with the addition of one Commissioner at large, is the present arrangement of the Navy Board." It would appear, therefore, that the constitution of that Board, was not such as the right hon. Baronet stated; and if he would follow the detail of the alterations which took place in 1660, 1661, 1666, and 1671, he would see that the Navy Board continued during the whole of that time an independent Board, discharging not only the proper duties of the Navy Board, but also of the Victualling Board. In consequence of the increasing demands of the service, the Victualling Board was created in 1783, and it had continued up to the present moment. It appeared, therefore, that both the statements which the right hon. Baronet had adduced as the ground-work of the greatest change that had ever been attempted to be introduced into the naval administration of this country, since the days of James, Duke of York, entirely broke down. He was perfectly ready to admit that this would have been the strongest argument that could have been adduced in favour of the experiment which was now proposed, had it been founded in fact; but it was not, and, therefore, it only remained for the House to look to the other grounds on which the right hon. Baronet urged the necessity of this measure, to see if upon them he could make out a case. The next point, then, was, the misappropriation of some of the votes of that House. The right hon. Baronet stated, on a former occasion, that a change in the principle of the appropriation of naval monies was introduced by the Bill of 1798, and that it was the intention of those who brought that measure forward, that all the votes granted by that House should be strictly applied to the very purposes for which they were originally designed. But the House must bear in mind, that, up to the year 1821, the whole of the money granted on account of the naval service was voted in three large items. Since that period, the votes had been subdivided, and each head of service voted separately—a course of proceeding which, though it afforded great facility for the strict examination of the Estimates by the House, greatly increased the difficulty, and rendered it impracticable to keep the expenditure under every head within the sum voted. The only mode in which it could be accomplished was that to which the right hon. Baronet himself resorted in a former year, namely, calling on the Committee to vote a much larger sum under each head than was actually required, Under the present defici- ent revenue of the country, the noble Lord, the Chancellor of the Exchequer could hardly allow the right hon. Baronet to make such demands, and, therefore, it was his object to cut down the establishments as much as possible. The right hon. Baronet, had, accordingly endeavoured to diminish their extent, and, by such means, he (Sir G. Clerk) feared had impaired their efficiency, so much so, that he would even this year experience great difficulty in acting up to the rule he had laid down. The right hon. Baronet had confined his objections with respect to the excess of expenditure beyond the votes of Parliament, to within the last four years. He would beg to state to the House, that the peculiar political circumstances of the country during that period, rendered it extremely difficult to frame a Navy Estimate with that degree of accuracy which would have been possible under other circumstances, especially as regarded the number of men to be employed. The right hon. Baronet said, it was most unconstitutional that a greater number of seamen should be employed than was sanctioned by Parliament. In opposition to the right hon. Baronet, however, he must state, that there was nothing unconstitutional in increasing the naval force of the country, if, after the Estimates were passed, that was found necessary, provided there were funds to meet that increased expense, and the fact was stated to Parliament. The right hon. Baronet alluded to the Finance Committee: if he would refer to the evidence of his right hon. friend, the late Comptroller of the Navy, he would find he explained the necessity of keeping up a large navy, and he said that, when the number of men had necessarily exceeded the number voted, the heads of the different departments had been obliged to refrain from the purchase of stores, for the purpose of paying them. He had, in 1829, made a similar statement. In the year 1830, he stated, that it was intended to retain 29,000 men, but that, in fact, 32,000 were employed chiefly on foreign stations, but that orders had been sent out to recall them, and it was hoped, in the course of the year, to reduce the number to 29,000. Political occurrences in the east of Europe, however, prevented their being recalled, and, at the end of the year 1830, at the period of the accession of the right hon. Baronet to office, those vessels were only then on their voyage home. The right hon. Baronet had taken great credit to himself for having reduced the number of men employed below the amount sanctioned by Parliament. In the first place, in the month of February, he obtained a vote for 32,000 men—a number greater than was actually employed at that period; and, in the course of the next month a measure was resorted to, the policy of which he very much doubted, by which the calls on the naval service was considerably reduced—he alluded to the reduction of the whole of the Coast Blockade, consisting of 2,700 men. In the next argument of the right hon. Baronet, he quoted a very high authority in the opinion expressed by the late Lord St. Vincent, in the year 1805; he stated that Lord St. Vincent condemned the practice of verbal orders being given, as was the rule, by the First Lord of the Admiralty to the Comptroller of the Navy. He, (Sir George Clerk) on the other hand was of opinion, that this was a most useful proceeding. It would be in time of war impossible to carry on the service beneficially if all the communications between these two officers were to go through the hands of Secretaries and clerks, they being of the most confidential nature, and concealed at the moment, sometimes even from the colleagues of the First Lord of the Admiralty. Lord St. Vincent, also, it was said objected to the constitution of the Committees of the Navy Board as they then existed. He agreed with him in that opinion; but the proposed Bill was not calculated to remove the evil. He wished instead of that crude plan the right hon. Baronet had adopted the suggestion of his gallant friend (Sir George Cockburn), and consolidated the Navy and Victualling Boards into one, in lieu of attempting to incorporate them both with the Admiralty. He admitted, that when he was examined before the Finance Committee, he had stated objections to such a consolidation as these Boards were then constituted, but the abolition of the Committees, and the plan of assigning specific duties to each individual Commissioner had removed many of his objections; and he would candidly state to the right hon. Baronet, that, as he had in his opinion, in great measure, destroyed the efficiency of the Victualling Board as a separate establishment, by moving from it last year the only naval officer belonging to it, he now saw no difficulty or objection in unit- ing these two Boards, a plan which he should greatly prefer to their entire abolition. The right hon. Baronet complained of the disposition of the Navy Board to thwart the Admiralty, and he particularly instanced their supposed disposition with regard to the reduction of the number of men employed in the dock-yards, but it must be recollected, that the Navy Board had some discretion upon the subject: they were not told to proceed at once to reduce a certain number of men, because a Representation had been previously made, not from the Navy Board, but from persons connected with the dock-yards, with regard to the hardships which would be entailed upon individuals, if a sudden reduction were to take place at Portsmouth and Plymouth; and the consequence was, that the men were deprived of certain advantages, and it was arranged that the reduction should proceed gradually, as casualties might arise. He contended, therefore, that instead of disobeying the Navy Board acted in strict conformity with the spirit and letter of the instructions received from the Admiralty. But whether the Navy Board had, or had not, occasionally resisted the orders of the Admiralty, whether more money had or had not, been spent on particular heads of the service than was voted by Parliament, still they must come back to the plain question—would this Bill remedy those evils. He would put the question upon this simple footing—did any hon. Member in that House expect, that the Bill would remedy the inconveniencies which the right hon. Baronet had made a subject of complaint—no, nor any portion of them, worth the increased trouble which its provisions would introduce. In his opinion, not one of the real inconveniencies of the service would be removed. There could be no doubt, that the Admiralty would be thereby relieved of a certain degree of restraint, and invested with a certain degree of increased power; but he was by no means sure that that was a change likely to be attended with beneficial results. If experience had shown to them that the Board of Admiralty had at all times proved itself the most economical, and the Navy Board the most extravagant, then, perhaps, there might be something in the argument and plans of the right hon. Baronet. The contrary, however, was, in most instances, the more likely to be the result—because it was the general habit of the Navy Board to take upon itself the charge of checking the Admiralty Board, especially in those points which regarded the expenditure of Naval stores in the equipment and decoration of vessels—the officers being appointed to those ships by friends of theirs, at the Admiralty Board—who, of course, would be disposed to acquiesce in the Representations made of the necessity of such expenditure by those in whom they took an interest. It was his apprehension, therefore, that, when the Board of Admiralty came to be invested with increased power, they would deal more freely with the public money than if every one of their plans were to undergo the strict examination of the Navy Board. He felt much disappointed that the right hon. Baronet, in bringing forward his plan, did, not take the trouble of entering somewhat into detail; the right hon. Baronet had only, he might say, favoured them with one proof of the alleged superiority of the proposed new plan, and that was, that it would afford them the chance of an improved audit. He doubted whether such a result could be accomplished; and, even if it were, he feared that it would yield but small advantage, compared with the many inconveniencies incident to the Bill. One of the effects of the new system would be, that the House of Commons could not come to the discussion of the Navy Estimates with anything approaching the facility with which they had hitherto performed that duty; for this reason, amongst others—that whereas, in the present year, for example, they had the Estimates for 1832 before them, and they could compare those Estimates with the actual expenditure of the year 1831; but, under the new system they would enjoy no such advantage—four months at least must elapse before the accounts could he made up. In every new light in which he viewed the subject, he found nothing but objections to the plan. From the mode in which the new officers were to be appointed—namely, at the pleasure and at the will of the Admiralty, and not by patent, as was the Navy Board, it was clear that they would be liable to be displaced, with a new Administration; and so far the advantage, which it was said these appointments would have over those of a similar kind in the Ordnance department vanished and disappeared, for whatever might be the experience or the services of these officers, on a change of the Ministry they were liable to be displaced. What then became of all the arguments urged by the right hon. Baronet in favour of his plan founded upon assimilating his measure to that adopted in the several departments of the Ordnance, where the head of each was rendered responsible for the conduct of the officers under them? He put it strongly to the good sense of the House, whether they ought to decide merely upon the presumed economy of the plan of the right hon. Baronet in a case involving such vital and important interests and results as the conduct of the naval force of this country? The interests of this great branch of the public service were concerned, and it would behove the House to examine well whether the correspondence of these departments could, by possibility, be kept up by the mode proposed—namely, by one officer, and whether the public service would not be thereby materially impaired? He could not well see how the House could complain of the efficiency of a system which, under Mr. Canning's Administration, had furnished to that Minister's demand a fleet of twelve sail, perfectly manned and equipped (though in a time of peace), which was on its way down channel to theTagus within three days after the order for its equipment was issued by that Minister. He feared sufficient care had not been taken to make, under the Bill, a proper and judicious subdivision of labour in those offices, which was always of so much importance in cases where rapid, and particularly where secret, naval expeditions were necessary to be equipped; and he could not but think there was a strong probability that, in case of a war, the time might arrive when even the right hon. Baronet himself might have too solid reasons to regret, as well as the public, that a system so long safely and successfully acted upon, should have been suffered to be superseded by another so novel, so wild, and, in his opinion, so impracticable.

Sir George Cockburn

said, that he entertained strong objections to the Bill, first, because he foresaw that it would repose in the hands of the five subordinate officers of the several departments the total management and direction of the naval services, and the control of the public money voted for that service—and secondly, because he could not perceive that the Bill provided any efficient means of rendering these subordinate persons sub- ject to a proper responsibility. Nothing, he was satisfied, was so effectual in public offices in this way, as saddling the principal officers with the responsibility of the conduct of those particular departments over which they severally presided. This had been the peculiar and distinguishing feature of that Board—the Ordnance—to which the right hon. Baronet, affected an anxiety in his opening speech on this subject, to assimilate the Admiralty Boards. With reference to the responsibility of the five officers alluded to, not only was there no adequate provision in the Bill to secure that, but none of them was even named except the Accountant General. If there were any semblance of responsibility, it must be considered merely a nominal and not a real responsibility. Hence he inferred it was impossible this Bill, as at present constituted, could work well. He, however, should not oppose its being read a second time, because he hoped the right hon. Baronet would in the Committee listen to those suggestions which practical men would supply him with, in order to guard against the possibility, or rather great probability, of the officers, under this Bill, being obliged, in their attempts, to accomplish more than was fairly in men's power, to neglect their duty in their separate departments. He was persuaded that it would be impossible for the Lords of the Admiralty to give their efficient attention to details respecting contracts, stores, and transports, as well as attend to their own duty, and he, therefore, could not do otherwise than conclude that the right hon. Baronet would be completely disappointed in the expectations he had formed.

Mr. Hume

was convinced that much gratitude was due to the right hon. Baronet for the attempt which he had by this Bill made, to reduce the department of the navy to order and efficiency. The principal part of the debate for the last two hours and a-half, had consisted of the defence of the conduct of the late Naval Administration; and of it no one would be much enamoured, since it consisted, to say the best of it, only of admissions and details of abuses practised in these departments, and well and generally known by all parties. Now, these were precisely the reasons why he should support the Bill. The last hon. and gallant speaker had fairly met the question by putting it to the House, whether the late Boards had answered those purposes well for which they were instituted? He would answer "No." The Navy Board had been well described by one of its advocates as being a drag-chain on the Board of Admiralty. As to the first objection made to the Board of Admiralty under this Bill, he would reply at once, that he did not think, as it was the great and controlling Board, that it could have too much power over its subordinates. Then, as to responsibility, did not the Bill afford a better chance of rendering its higher officers responsible than the present system, which allowed the Navy Board to issue its orders for an immense expenditure, and afterwards to audit its own accounts? The Bill proceeded on much better and safer grounds, by providing that one set of officers should issue the orders, and another examine and control the accounts. If there were, on the head of responsibility, objections entertained as to the Bill before them, those objections applied in a tenfold degree to such a system as prevailed at the Navy Board at this day. He would not contend that the system proposed was perfect. He must be a bold man who would hazard any such assertion of an experiment; but he hoped that, with the assistance of practical men on both sides of the House, the Bill would effect a considerable improvement of our naval system; and he further trusted that, from the aspect of everything abroad, the period during which we might expect peace would be so long, that all the parts of these valuable improvements would have time to be matured, that the alteration would, as a whole, be hailed by the whole service and the nation as an important Reform in this branch of our national force.

Mr. Hunt

said, that, the right hon. Baronet had talked of a saving of 40,000l. or 50,000l., by this measure; he wished to know whether any part of this was taken up for the superannuations; because, if 1,000 shipwrights were to be discharged, and the officers to be pensioned off, there might be little or no saving. When he had heard the right hon. Baronet the other night, he thought he had poured a broadside into the late Administration; but the late Secretary to-night had returned the broadside, and he (Mr. Hunt) thought had wrecked the hon. Baronet. The late Secretary had completely answered the right hon. Baronet, and proved that the system had always been the same, and had continued till the last month.

Sir James Graham

, in explanation, observed, that he had said, or intended to say, that, independently of the measures which this Bill would carry into effect, he had, by other economical arrangements, effected a saving of 49,000l. With respect to superannuations, the persons removed were entitled by law to superannuation; but he should consider it his duty to bring under the consideration of the Committee the scale of remuneration.

Mr. Croker

thought it unnecessary to take the sense of the House on this occasion, but he should deem it his duty to do so on the third reading, unless there were material alterations made in the Bill in Committee.

Bill read a second time.