INDEPENDENCE OF PARLIAMENT.

HC Deb 31 May 1821 vol 5 cc1053-66

Mr. Bennet

rose, in pursuance of notice, to bring in a bill for better securing the independence of parliament; and, in submitting his proposition to the House, it gave him great satisfaction to reflect that he was introducing no novelty to its consideration. In the plan which he should propose for their adoption, he had followed closely the path of their ancestors, and had put his foot, wherever it was possible, in the very track in which they had trodden. In looking into the subject, the first question that suggested itself was, what, in the language and spirit of the constitution, was meant by the term "House of Commons." He found, by looking at the best authorities, that it ought to be the living image of the people of England—a body whose object it was to represent the opinions, express the feelings, and guard the interests of the nation at large. Such being the purposes for which this body existed, it became necessary to consider next the manner in which it was constituted. It would be difficult to conceive a plan more prejudicial to the integrity of parliament, than that which would attach a large body of members to the Crown, by the ties of office. He was not so wild as to say that the leading members of government ought not to fill seats in that House; but this he would say, that the best mode which could be adopted for the destruc- tion of the independence of parliament would be to keep the gentlemen of, the country attached to the administration of the day by beneficial places, thus securing a certain majority for every one of its measures, no matter how derogatory to the honour or how hostile to the liberties, of the nation. Their ancestors, from the earliest period, had clearly laid down the method in which members were to qualify themselves for entering the House of Commons; but it was not until the struggle had commenced between that House and the Crown, that the House exhibited any jealousy of the power of the Crown, or took any measures in order to control it. The first instance of that jealousy which he could find in their Journals was in the reign of James 1st; and it was very curious to remark, that in the very first year of his reign a letter was sent by his command from the lord chancellor to the Speaker, informing him that certain members of that House had been appointed to certain offices, and asking him whether they would be allowed to retain their seats. Some of them had been appointed to commands in Ireland; others had been sent I abroad as ambassadors; and one of them had been made attorney-general. The House connived at the attorney-general's retaining his seat in that parliament; but in the next they declared him incapable of holding it, on the ground, as he understood, that it was a new office. All persons who held livery under the Crown were precluded from sitting in parliament. It was not until the year 1680, that the House came to a unanimous vote, that no member should hold an office under the Crown without express leave of the House. In 1692, the first place-bill, of which the vote of 1680 was the foundation, was introduced into parliament; and though it was carried through the Commons, it was lost in the Lords. In the next year it passed through both Houses, but did not become law, in consequence of the king refusing his assent to it. The House of Commons, when that refusal was announced to it, came to a resolution, that whoever had advised the king not to give the royal assent to the act touching free and impartial proceedings in parliament, which was to redress a grievance and take off a scandal upon the proceedings of the Commons in parliament, was an enemy to their majesties and the kingdom. In 1700, the act of William and Mary was passed, which disqualified the holders of certain offices from sitting in parliament, and enacted that all members who accepted offices under the Crown should by that act vacate their seats. The next place bill was the 6th of queen Anne, which declared any person having a pension under the Crown during pleasure, or for a term of years, to be incapable either of being elected or of sitting in parliament. In the 1st of George 1st, another place-bill was passed; and from that period repeated efforts had been made to diminish the power of the Crown over parliament, and to exclude from it the equipage and underlings of office. Those efforts had been frustrated; some in one way, others in a different. Sir R. Walpole adopted the plan of letting a place-bill pass through the Commons almost without a discussion, and of defeating it afterwards by his influence in the House of Lords. In 1742, however, under the auspices of Mr. Pelham, the act was passed, which excluded a great variety of persons, and adopted the principle of clearing the House of Commons from the underlings of office, and of retaining in it only such members as were necessary to the administration of public business. He did not know that any other plan for securing the independence or parliament had been submitted to it until the close of the American war. A vote of parliament then declared, that the influence of the Crown had increased, was increasing, and ought to be diminished; and upon that vote, seconded as it was by the voice of the people, Mr. Burke brought in a bill, which, if it had passed in the state in which he first laid it on the table, would have been most useful; but which was rendered less valuable by the arrangements, negotiations, compromises, and sacrifices of principle, which were made in passing it through the two Houses of Parliament. From that period to the present, parliament had been carefully purifying itself from without, but had studiously avoided purifying itself within. It had allowed ministers to keep within the close battalion of their retainers, all those who were in anywise engaged in carrying on the king's business; and if any man would contrast the recent majorities and minorities, he would find that all public questions in which the power of the Crown had been opposed to the voice and the feelings of the people, had been carried against the people by the dead votes of those mem- bers, who, being the hacks of office, were consequently at the beck and call of ministers. He wished to keep clear of all subjects of immediate discussion, from a fear of exciting that angry feeling which generally attended questions that had recently been before the House; but still he could not help saying, that if hon. members would only recollect what had occurred since the year 1812, they must make up their minds to this truth—that government had only been supported in that House by a majority of its own creatures. He did not mean to say that on questions of great national importance, the sense of the House was overruled by the voice of placemen and pensioners: he referred principally to matters of economical reform, and subjects of that kind, where the preventive vote was given by some useless lord of the Admiralty or bedchamber. At the period to which he had particularly referred—when great reforms were made in the construction of the House—the power and patronage of the government, its domestic and colonial influence, were at a minimum compared with the present moment. The whole revenue of the country was then less than the mere charge for its collection now. In the last year it had cost 4,100,000l., which was a larger revenue than Geo. 2nd possessed at the passing of the act of 1742, or than Geo. 3rd enjoyed when he ascended the throne.

With regard to the proposition he had to offer, he had scrupulously attended to the great principles that had guided our ancestors, his chief object being to exclude clerks and underlings from the House, leaving the great officers of government still in possession of their seats. He had first directed his attention to the Treasury, which consisted of a chancellor of the exchequer, and five lords. He was willing that the chancellor of the exchequer should remain, and that one of the lords for England and another for Ireland should also remain; but he thought the other three lords would be much better employed in doing the business of the board than in doing the business of the House. They ought, in fact, if they existed at all to be efficient public servants, not chosen from motives of favour and influence—because this peer, the relative of the lord of the Treasury, had five, this six, and that seven votes in the House—but because they were men of knowledge and industry, and whose talents were calcu- Iated to promote the public benefit. He did not mean to complain of the presence of the two secretaries of the Treasury; they were useful and intelligent persons, though he could not help here remarking upon the mode in which the spirit of the act of queen Anne had been violated. The spirit of it required that persons should vacate their seats when they accepted offices under government; but as the words were "under the Crown," these two secretaries never vacated their seats, because they were nominated by the commissioners of the Treasury. The next offices to which he came were those of the secretaries of state. The foreign secretaryship was very ably filled by the noble marquis; and there was no question that he should be allowed a seat of a commoner, or if a peer, that he should be represented by his secretary in the House of Commons. The same might be said of the other secretaries of state: being peers, they had their representatives here; and it was fit that they should continue. There was also no question that the secretary for Ireland should have a seat; but he did not see why the House need be favoured with the company of the vice-treasurer of Ireland. This was quite a new office, and directly in the teeth of the act of Anne. The late Mr. Ponsonby had proposed that the salary of the vice-treasurer should be reduced to 2,000l. a year; but the government resolved that he should receive annually more than 3,000l. Mr. Ponsonby had objected to the office altogether; and the House very nearly coincided with him; since the numbers were, 100 for the larger salary, and 98 for its diminution. Among the majority on that occasion were from 30 to 40 placemen—a striking proof of the services they rendered in that House!—He then came to the India Board, consisting of the president, a noble lord, aright lion, gentleman, and the secretary. His wish was to allow the president a seat, but to remove all the others from parliament—to leave one, and to turn out three: and he would state why—because they were of no use here, and he firmly believed of no use elsewhere. The name of India was now not even mentioned in parliament: the House had as little to do with it as with the planet Jupiter: it had not been mentioned since 1813: no budget had been brought forward, and no account given of the state of the colony: it had never of late been heard of but on a motion of an hon. friend of his (Mr. Hume), and on the vote of thanks to the marquis of Hastings. In 1784, Mr. Pitt, having defeated one India hill, introduced another of his own, with his usual flourish, stating that the country was to be put to no expense; that gentlemen of talent and character would serve for nothing, and that their public spirit was to be its own reward. But what followed? In 1794, lord Melville came down to propose the present construction of the India board, viz. that the president was to have 2,000l. a year; two other members, 1,600l. each, and the secretary 1,200l. All four were likewise to hold seats in the House, to swell majorities, but to do literally nothing for India. They were to vote for the minister at his beck and command, and in violation of the statute, and that was to be the full extent of their arduous duties.—The board of Admiralty next presented itself, and five of the lords were found sitting in the House of Commons, each receiving 1,000l. a year, and with the secretary and comptroller, mustering seven votes. He should be glad to know why they were here. The noble secretary at war presented a wholesome example of a man standing alone in parliament, but equal to the duties of it; for he had, within these few weeks, sustained a most arduous struggle on some of the most extensive estimates ever produced to the House. If he, single-handed, were competent for the army, why did the navy need these seven champions? They were, in truth, only to rally round the government, and to form that regular band of allies upon whom ministers could always confidently depend. How needless they were for any other purpose was obvious from the fact, that three-fourths of them had taken no part in the late discussions of the estimates. True, they had always been present with a most praiseworthy assiduity, but were only roused from their lethargy by the cry of "question," or the necessity of giving a welcome cheer to some friend who needed their countenance in the distress of a hopeless argument. He did not deny that they were excellent adherents of government; but they were at the same time bad members of parliament: they held livery of the king, which alone ought to incapacitate them. He thought one lord would be quite sufficient; but as he did not wish to cut his cloth too close, he was ready to consent that two lords of the Admiralty should have seats. In the Ordnance department, there was the surveyor-general, his clerk, I the clerk of the deliveries, and the treasurer, all sitting in the House at present; and he had seen there the secretary of the master-general, and the store-keeper. Six might at present hold seats; but he was of opinion that two only ought to be permitted to do so. The secretary at war, of course, must remain. To the judge advocate and the paymaster of the army, he had no objection. The chancellor of the duchy of Lancaster ought also to have a seat, as well as the vice-president of the board of trade. He could not, however, discover any reason why the master of the Mint should be in the House. In the office of Woods and Forests there were two individuals having seats in the House, and one seemed quite enough. With regard to the king's household, he was at a loss to conceive why any member of it, with the exception of a gentleman from the lord stewards, to bear communications between the king and the Commons, should have seats among the representatives of the people. If two lords of the bedchamber were admitted, as at present, there seemed no reason for excluding the other twelve. They held most directly livery of the king; and precisely the same might be said of the comptroller of the household, the groom of the bedchamber, the three equerries, the lord warden of the stannaries, all of whom were worse than useless to the public, forming the dead weight hung underneath the scale of truth and justice in that House. The attorney and solicitor-general, the judges of the Arches and of the Admiralty, together with the lord advocate of Scotland, he was ready to retain; but he most seriously objected to the chief justice of Chester being allowed to sit in that House. He remembered to have heard an unanswerable speech from the late sir S. Romilly upon the subject, showing that that personage, like the other judges of the land, ought never to be placed in a situation where his mind was likely to be influenced by political squabbles. He saw many objections to retaining masters in Chancery, both English and Irish; and he was happy to say that, with respect to the latter, the evil had been remedied for the future. The English masters in Chancery were, in fact, the servants of the House of Lords, and could not do business in two places at the same time. A great change had of late taken place with respect to these offices; they were now merely political, and those who filled them were chosen for their political merits. In 1806, a retirement of 1,500l. a year was allowed, and an addition of 400l. a year made to their salaries. Had he been at that date in parliament, he should have given the bill his most strenuous resistance. He should wish to exempt the holders of some other offices, but at present it appeared that there were 51 members of the House who filled places at pleasure, and of those he should propose to exclude 29, who would vote for any minister or for any measure, and who were in truth retained only upon that condition. In the recent case of lord Fife, it had been shown that a removal would be the consequence of any vote hostile to the wishes of the minister, however consonant it might be with the earnest desires of the people.

The hon. gentleman having gone through his details, proceeded to recommend the House to pay due regard to the progress of public opinion, and to follow the system of our ancestors, that as soon as an abuse arose, a remedy should be provided; it was thus that new blood and life were at intervals poured into the decayed constitution, by a revivifying and refreshing principle. For the last half century, the influence of the Crown had rapidly gained ground on the rights of the people: that influence was immortal, he might almost say, eternal; death had no power over it; and if in 1780, it was voted that the power of the Crown had increased, was increasing, and ought to be diminished, how much more necessary was it now to check and to control it. On this subject he could not do better than read the words of a Protest entered on the Journals of the Lords by certain peers, among whom was lord Bathurst, in 1730, on the rejection of the Pension bill. It stated that they objected to the rejection of the bill. "Because, strictly speaking, all influence in either House of parliament, except that which arises from a sense of those duties which we owe to our king and country, are improper, and the particular influences, which this bill was intended to prevent, are not only improper, but may, and naturally must in course of time, become extremely pernicious both to the Crown and the people; for first, although this influence appears to be that of the Crown, it may become entirely that of the minister, and be applied to deceive the prince, as well as to oppress the people. If ever a corrupt minister should have the disposition of places and the distribution of pensions, gratuities and rewards, he may create such an influence as shall effectually deprive the prince of the great advantage of knowing the true sense of his people; and a House of parliament being prevailed upon to oppose such measures as the whole nation dislikes, he may be so confirmed in the pursuit of them, as for the sake of an unworthy servant to lose the affections of his people whilst he imagines that he both deserves and possesses them. In the next place, if ever this improper influence should obtain a certain degree of strength, these terrible consequences must inevitably flow from it, that the worst proposals for the public Will be the most likely to succeed, and that the weakest ministers will be the best supported; the reason whereof we take to be extremely plain, since this improper influence may e directed to any purpose whatsoever, and will always be most exerted when it is most wanted; that is, in the support of ill measures and weak ministers."^* Whether this was or was not a prophesy of the present state of things, he would leave others to determine; but if the House did not reform itself by turning out all useless placemen and pensioners—if it did not remove now what was thought a scandal in the reign of king William—it could not possess the confidence, affection, or respect of the people. He would now move, "That leave be given to bring in a Bill for the better securing the Independence of Parliament."

Mr. Robinson

said, he was aware that it was an unpopular course to resist any plausible proposition for reducing the influence of the Crown, but it would be a most unworthy feeling if he suffered himself to be deterred, by any such considerations, from speaking his sentiments plainly and explicitly on the present occasion. From the way in which his hon. friend had argued the question, he was relieved from the necessity of answering him at any great length, for his hon. friend had admitted that it would not be desirable totally to remove placemen from the House of Commons. His hon. friend, therefore, had, in fact, reduced the question to a question of degree. It was not necessary for him to argue in general, that in all governments there must be a rea- ^*New Parl. Hist. Vol. 8. p 796. sonable degree of influence, for it was impossible that any government could be conducted upon mere abstract principles of right and wrong. The question was, whether the state of the House, in respect to those members of it who held places, was such as to require the interference of parliament? His hon. friend had stated, that it had been the practice of our ancestors by various salutary laws to check the influence of the Crown in that House. No man regarded those laws with more veneration than himself. They were founded upon principles which were sound in themselves, and which were applied with sound judgment and discretion, He would go still farther; for he was ready to admit, that many of the early acts which imposed some restrictions upon the influence of the Crown, did not impose any thing like sufficient restrictions. Hence, the acts which were subsequently passed were rendered necessary by the inadequacy of the earlier provisions against the influence of the Crown. For instance, in the time of sir R. Walpole there were no less than 200 persons who held places and pensions in that House; a proportion which was quite preposterous, and under which, he believed his hon. friend would admit, with all the veneration which he entertained for the Whig ministers of that day, that it was utterly impossible that the government could be beneficially conducted, or the liberties of the country and the independence of parliament preserved. He believed, that from the time that placemen were first admitted into that House, there never was a period at which there were fewer than at the present moment. In the administration of lord North, before the year 1780, there were 118 placemen in that House. The question for the House, therefore, was, whether, looking to all the circumstances, they thought the influence of the Crown, through the means of placemen and pensioners in that House, was such as to require an act of parliament to diminish it? His hon. friend referred to particular votes which had been given in the present session, as a ground from which he was entitled to infer the necessity of further limitation. His hon. friend had, in fact, begged the whole question with regard to those votes: he was perfectly satisfied with the votes which had been given against the government—these votes his hon. friend considered quite unexcep- tionable. But surely it was a most unfair mode of reasoning to contend, because the majority passed votes which the minority did not approve, that this was in itself a reason for diminishing the number of placemen in the House of Commons. The argument which his hon. friend founded upon an analysis of particular votes passed in the present session would drive him, by parity of reasoning, to the total exclusion of all placemen. If his hon. friend's proposition were pushed to the extent to which he seemed desirous of carrying it, it would go far to destroy that union and community of feeling among the members of a government, without which no government could be effectively conducted—it would destroy, in short, the power of carrying on the government as a party. He confessed, he was one of those who thought it impossible to carry on a government upon any effective and consistent principle, except through the medium of parties, combined together, not for the mere miserable object of promoting their personal interests, but upon sounder principles, and with more honourable generous, and patriotic feelings. In spite of the ridicule and invective with which party men were perpetually assailed, he believed they were generally actuated by honourable and disinterested motives He believed that the proposition of his hon. friend pushed to the extent for which he contended, would materially alter the character of the government in this country, and compel them to have recourse to other and more prejudicial means of obtaining support. He feared that a House of Commons, in which there were too few persons connected by the ties of office, would very soon lose its power over the existence of an administration; and that, on the other hand, such an administration, feeling that its existence did not so essentially and vitally depend upon the House of Commons as upon every sound constitutional principle it ought to do, would be less controlled in its operations by a regard to the opinions of that House. His hon. friend was of opinion, that the House of Commons, as it was now constituted, merited the disapprobation of the whole country, and he claimed for himself the credit of acting in that House more in unison with the feelings of the country, than those whose measures he opposed. He claimed for himself—and he (Mr. R.) was ready to admit the justice of his claim—the merit of supporting the interests of the country upon all occasions, and of resisting, upon conscientious views, the measures of administration. But, while he gave him full credit for his motives, he trusted that his hon. friend would also believe that he (Mr. R.), and those with whom he acted, were influenced by motives equally honourable and equally disinterested. It was not fair, because the conduct of ministers was the subject of pretty general attack in that House, and of much misrepresentation elsewhere—because the people felt eagerly and keenly on particular subjects, and ministers conceived it their duty not to fall in with that keen and eager feeling—it was not fair, upon such grounds, to stigmatise ministers as men regardless of the wishes, and insensible to the feelings of the people. His hon. friend thought that the influence of the Crown was too great in that House, and that public opinion was wholly disregarded. Now, he would venture to say, that while, on the one hand, there never was a period when the direct influence of the Crown in that House was so small—so, on the other hand, there never was a time when the direct influence of public opinion was so all-powerful as at the present moment. He did not complain of this change; he respected the wishes—he respected the feelings of the people, and he trusted he should always endeavour to consult their interests. He did say, however, that it was the duty of the government, in whosoever hands it might be placed, not to consider every particular expression of public opinion as a necessary law by which they were to be guided. If they had not the firmness to look to the right and wrong side of a question—if they were to be swayed by every wind that turned the tide of popular opinion—it was impossible that the government could be conducted efficiently or beneficially, with a view to the interests of the people themselves. When he said this, he did not wish it to be supposed that he thought lightly of public opinion. On the contrary, no man respected it more; and he believed that in this country, above all others, when public opinion was once fixed and deliberately entertained, there did not exist a power, either in the Crown or the parliament to resist its operation. He had endeavoured very shortly to state the general grounds on which he conceived that, however well-founded the principle of controlling the influence of the Crown might be, his hon. friend had not succeeded in making out a case, as arising out of the present constitution of the House of Commons to justify his proposition. He was aware that much odium would probably be cast upon the House if they rejected this measure: it would be urged that nothing could induce them to purify themselves. He trusted, however, that the House would never be driven by unjust calumnies, into the adoption of a measure, which, looking to larger views than the mere discussions of the day, was calculated to destroy in the House of Commons that just, reasonable, and natural influence, of which all statesmen and philosophers had admitted the necessity, in support of the supreme power of the state.

Colonel Davies

said, that so far from the influence of the Crown being less now than it was formerly, he thought no man could lay his hand on his heart and deny that it was greater than at any former period. If those who sat in that House really represented the people, then the motion would be unnecessary; for then, if members acted improperly, they would speedily be removed by those whose suffrages had sent them there. He was not one of those who contended that the Crown ought to possess no influence in that House, or that the House ought to be swayed by every breath of popular opinion. Still, he was decidedly opposed to its possessing such means of influencing its decisions as were now given to it. But it was said that fewer placemen, were at present in the House than had sat there at any former period in modern times. He denied the fact. He would assert that there were more members in the House now who were connected with the Crown than sat there in 1808: as he calculated that at present there were not fewer than 80 or 90 who were directly or indirectly under the influence of the Crown. The right hon. gentleman had stated, that in 1740, there were not fewer than 200 members in that House, who were connected in some way or other with the government. But in that number the naval and military officers who had seats were included, to whom he did not object. He animadverted on the extensive patronage at present enjoyed by the Crown, and insisted that it was the duty of the House to do every thing in their power to curtail the enormous influence now exercised. It had been said, that the government ought to be dependent on the House of Commons. He denied the correctness of this position and maintained that every government ought to depend not upon a House, of Commons, but on public opinion.

The House divided: Ayes, 52; Noes, 76; Majority, 24.

Lift of the Minority.
Benett, John	James, W.
Bernal, R.	Johnson, colonel
Boughey, sir J.	Liushington, Dr.
Boughton, sir W. E. R.	Martin, John
	Milton, visct.
Bright, H.	Monk, J. B.
Byng, G.	Newman, R. W.
Burdett, sir F.	Ossulston, lord
Chaloner, Robt.	Palmer, col.
Chetwynd, G.	Palmer, C. F.
Creevey, Thos.	Phillips, G.
Denman, T.	Rickford, Wm.
Ebrington, lord	Rice, T. S.
Evans, Wm.	Ricardo, D.
Folkestone, lord	Robinson, sir G.
Gaskell, B.	Russell, lord J.
Gordon, R.	Scudamore, R. P.
Grant, J. P.	Smith, R.
Grattan, J.	Smith, W.
Graham, S.	Tavistock, marq.
Griffiths, J. W;	Tennyson, C.
Guise, sir W.	Tynte, C. K.
Harbord, hon. E.	Warre, J. A.
Hamilton, lord A.	Webb, E.
Heron, sir R.	Western, C. C.
Hornby, hon. E.	TELLERS.
Hobhouse, J. C.	Bennet, hon. H. G.
Hutchinson, hon. C. H.	Davies, colonel.