CIVIL OFFICES CONTINUANCE BILL. (Hansard, 15 May 1817)

§ Lord Lascelles
observed, it had been suggested, that it might be proper to introduce into this bill a clause providing for the continuance of the parliament for a certain period, in case of the demise of the Crown. This suggestion he thought deserving of attention.

Mr. Ponsonby
declared, that he had never contemplated any such object as that alluded to by the noble lord. His bill was 597 intended solely to relieve persons at present holding offices in the army and navy, individuals filling the situations of justices of the peace, deputy lieutenants, and so forth, from the necessity of taking out new appointments, and, in consequence, paying very heavy fees, on the demise of the Crown. If the noble lord had any other proposition to make, it was in his power to introduce it.

§ Lord Lascelles
said, the suggestion did not originate with him; it was thrown out on a former debate, he did not know by whom.

Lord Castlereagh
said, the suggestion was thrown out by a learned gentleman (Mr. Brougham, on the other side of the House, and, under existing circumstances, it appeared to him to be worthy of serious attention.

§ Mr. Tierney
did not understand what relation there was between the bill then before the committee, and the non-dissolution of parliament. Undoubtedly it would be a very pleasant thing for ministers, if, on the demise of the Crown, parliament were not to be dissolved. The noble lord seemed to feel that; and, therefore, an observation from a gentleman on his (Mr. T's.) side of the House was made the peg to hang this suggestion on. He could not conceive a more dangerous suggestion, come from whom it would. When the people, in all parts of the country, were seeking to shorten the duration of parliament, ministers, it seemed, wanted to do away one of the few opportunities that occurred of exercising their elective franchise. He differed from his right hon. friend in the provisions of his bill. He did not approve of the idea of remitting, altogether, the fees payable by certain officers to the Crown. His way of looking at the subject was this—not to suffer those fees to swell the pockets of individuals, but to appropriate them to the service of the country. He would not let many thousands be added, on the demise of the Crown, to the funds of those, who, in the ordinary course of things, would receive them, but he would hare those fees carried to the consolidated fund. When he said this, he did not allude to the fees payable by officers of the army and navy, but to those which were exacted from persons holding high patent offices—which they entered, well knowing, that, on the demise of the Crown, they would be subject to this increase of expense. He was well convinced that ministers would be very 598 glad, in the present state of the country—under the favourable circumstance of the suspension of the Habeas Corpus act—to have parliament continued; but, he trusted, the House would oppose a principle which might give the people cause to say, that in a committee on a bill for the abolition of fees, they had entertained a plan for the perpetuation of parliament. If such a measure were intended, he hoped due notice would be given to the country, that they might express their sentiments on it.

Mr. Ponsonby
said, he had never had it in contemplation to render his measure a source of public supply. Its object was entirely limited to the relief of individuals, who, as the law stood, might be called upon to pay fees for which he saw no reason. He certainly had wished to make the bill a permanent one, but he must declare he saw no relation between its principle and that of a measure to prevent a dissolution of parliament taking place in the same event. He considered this pretended analogy, therefore, as a mere pretence; and would rather disappoint those who were looking to the bill with hope, although his majesty might yet outlive the gayest and most ambitious amongst them, than see it made the instrument of so extraordinary a design.

§ Lord Lascelles
never intended to introduce any such measure in or out of the committee; although he had certainly held for a long time the opinion he had expressed. He argued, that there was an analogy between the objects contemplated by the bill, and the continuance of parliament (the government being now in the hands of the Prince Regent) on the demise of the Crown.

§ Sir James Mackintosh
said, there certainly would be some analogy between the objects of the bill, and that which the noble lord adverted to, if members of parliament were appointed by the Crown and not by the people. But otherwise there was none whatever. The subject of a non-dissolution of parliament, on the demise of the Crown, ought not to be taken up lightly. If proposed at all, it ought to be proposed after sufficient notice had been given for its full consideration. The principle that, on the demise of the Crown, parliament should be dissolved was connected with one practical benefit of great importance. On every other termination of parliament, the ministers of the down had an advantage over their opponents; because they 599 could choose that time for sending them to their constituents, when, perhaps, ministers had acquired a momentary popularity, and when their adversaries were, in consequence, less favoured by the country. The termination, on the demise of the Crown, was, therefore, the only termination of parliament, that was impartial and equal between both parties—as advantageous to the one as to the other. It was to destroy this advantage that the present suggestion was proposed; it was to give ministers a perpetual advantage, in choosing the time of election; and, therefore, not only now, but on every occasion, he should raise his voice against it.

§ Lord Lascelles
said, the learned gentleman seamed to think him a greater enemy to the constitution than he felt himself to be. He meant not to give a perpetual advantage to ministers—the suggestion, which did not originate with him, went only to the present king and the present situation of the country, which, through the indisposition of his majesty, was governed by the Prince Regent.

§ Mr. Bathurst
said, that the suggestion alluded to was thrown out by an hon. and learned gentleman (Mr. Brougham), whose voice was not a little attended to in that House, and his noble friend (lord Lascelles) had merely introduced it, on this occasion, for the consideration of the House. The right hon. gentleman then shortly argued that there was a strong analogy between the situation of those persons whom the bill contemplated, and parliament; and that, perhaps, it would he wise to extend the same measure to both.

§ Sir James Mackintosh
did not mean to impugn the constitutional principle of the noble lord. All he had said was, that the tendency of the suggestion was adverse to the constitution; and nothing he had since heard could cause him to recede from that opinion. For the sentiments of Ins learned friend he had the highest respect, and he would listen to them with attention; but, he conceived, that it would demand his utmost powers of ingenuity to shake the conviction, so deeply rooted in his mind, that the measure alluded to was fundamentally opposite to the principles of the British constitution.

Mr. Ponsonby
did not expect that the measure would have given rise to the views which some seemed to have taken of it. The tendency of the argument used by the right hon. gentleman that because the Prince Regent performed the duties of the 600 Crown, the appointments made by him ought not to cease on the demise of the king, would lead to this conclusion—that these appointments ought only to fall on the demise of the Regent; but this he was sure was not meant by the gentlemen on the other side. If, however, it was to be held, that the bill went on the principle of the Prince Regent having made certain appointments, he would limit its operation solely to these appointments. When he came to reflect on what had been thrown out by the noble lord, he must confess that he was so much startled; because it went much farther than he intended when he introduced the measure, and involved questions which he had no idea of agitating.

Lord Cochrane
did not apprehend that it would make any material difference in elections, whether the idea which had been thrown out should be adopted or not. It was well-known that the great majority of the returns to that House were carried by money; and whatever might be the circumstances under which a dissolution might take place, the same influence would prevail. He held in his hand accounts, containing charges against him which amounted to more than 5,700l., for one of his elections, These accounts would throw great light on the nature of elections; and it was his intention to move on Monday for a committee to examine them. He should always be against any thing which tended to abridge the rights of the people; but as parliament was now constituted, he was perfectly certain, that, in nine places out of ten, the candidate who had most money in his pocket, if he chose to spend it, would be sure to succeed.