HC Deb 12 July 1815 vol 31 cc1171-89

Since the Debate upon this Motion, which will be found in Vol. 30, p. 704, was printed off, the Editor has been favoured with the following detailed Report of the Earl of Egremont's Speech upon that occasion.

The Earl of Egremont

rose and said: Your lordships may possibly be surprised, that a person unconnected as I am with either of the military professions, should have undertaken to bring this subject under your lordships consideration.—As far as general inability to do that justice to any subject that an address to your lordships requires, I admit it, to the fullest extent; but I cannot admit any particular disqualification for this subject, in myself or in any noble lord, on account of his not belonging to those professions: on the Contrary, if I could have chosen, I should have preferred to have seen it in the hands of one of the noble and learned lords;—accident has thrown it into mine; and I assure your lordships, that nothing but a strong conviction of the importance of the subject, and of the improbability of its being taken up by any other person, could have induced me to undertake it, attended as it is, to me, with many painful sensations, and with much difficulty, arising from the peculiar nature of the subject, and also from the misconception which I believe to prevail, in the minds of many persons, respecting my motives, and the object which I have in view. And if any noble lords should imagine, that I am actuated by any personal feelings, either of friendship or resentment, I trust that I shall succeed in convincing those noble lords, that they are totally mistaken: but upon such a subject,—involving as it does such various considerations, not merely of what is commonly called interest, but of interest of a far superior nature; of honour and character, and in such various stations of life, even up to the highest, and where most respect is due from all persons, and certainly from me, who have had, I trust I may say it without the imputation of vanity, much opportunity of knowing how truly that respect is due,—on such a subject, your lordships will feel how difficult it is to avoid the appearance of personalities, which I now disclaim, as totally foreign from my intentions in every place, and which would be highly improper in this House. I shall, therefore, endeavour to avoid all exaggeration of language, and to state the facts upon which I found my object, as shortly and as plainly as I can; and I cannot define my object better than by saying, that it is to rescue a set of men whose bravery has so often preserved the liberties of their country from a state of servitude, in a nation of freemen; for sir Edward Coke will inform us, that "it is one of the genuine marks of servitude, to have the law, which is our rule of action, either concealed or precarious. 'Misera est servitus ubi jus est vagum aut incognitum.'"

This language, as your lordships well know, is not mine: it is the language of Mr. Justice Blackstone, who also uses these words: "His Majesty may form, Articles of War, and constitute Courts- martial, with power to try any crimes by such Articles, and inflict such punishment as the Articles direct. A vast and most important trust: an unlimited power to create crimes, and annex to them any punishments not extending to life or limb;" and, speaking of the Mutiny Act, he says, "Perhaps in some future revision of the Act, it may be thought worthy the wisdom of Parliament, to ascertain the limits of military subjection, and to enact express Articles of War, for the government of the army, as is done for the government of the navy."

Now, my lords, this suggestion is not directly applicable to the navy; but upon this I shall say more at another time. And with respect to the Mutiny Act, perhaps it may not be quite applicable to your lordships House; but I am not deterred by this objection, for I can see no reason why the regulation of the judicial code of the army and navy should not form a separate and independent act of parliament; and I am persuaded that a subject of this nature will be more maturely and temperately considered in this, than in the other House of Parliament.

The scene of public affairs has very much changed since I first mentioned this subject; and, instead of the hope of durable peace, we have now the gloomy prospect, either of actual war, or perpetual preparation, of the necessity of becoming, for our own defence, a military and armed nation; and, surely, this change must add very much to the necessity of improving the condition of our defenders; of placing them upon a footing more anarlagous to the spirit of the constitution, and better calculated to secure to them, their honour and their safety, and to us their fidelity and obedience. I will detain your lordships no longer by any general observations, but will proceed first to the naval part of the subject, as it will take least time, the business being already done to my hands: but as I believe I cannot regularly refer to documents not before your lordships, I must beg to be understood as stating the facts hypothetically, but undertaking to prove them true, if your lordships should accede to the motion which I shall make, for the minutes.

Captain Browne of the Hermes was tried in April, 1814, upon seven charges, totally distinct and different, both as to the nature of the offences, and the degrees of criminality attaching to them. The substance of the charges is as I shall now read.

  1. 1. "For abusing and offering to fight (i. e. box) on the quarter-deck of the Hermes, the master of a merchant-vessel.
  2. 2. "For drawing bills on the Commissioners of the Navy for the sum of 300 dollars (when at Buenos Ayres) under a fictitious name, for pilotage up and down the river Plate.
  3. 3. "For publicly calling the prosecutor a coward on the quarter-deck.
  4. 4. "For disabling his Majesty's ship Hermes, by striking two of the foremost guns into the hold.
  5. 5. "For telling the prosecutor, in answer to a remonstrance by him, that it was a falsehood, and holding him in derision.
  6. 6. "For acknowledging a false muster.
  7. 7. "For incorrectly charging the prosecutor with disputing his (capt. Browne's) authority, and the Commander-in-chief's when at Rio Janeiro, and suspending him from duty, and confining him in consequence."
I must now say a few words upon the nature of these charges, and the manner in which they were treated by the Court. The 1st, an act of intemperate passion, certainly blameable, and derogating from his own rank and station, by condescending to put himself upon a level with the master of a merchant-ship, but not affecting his character, either as an officer or a man of honour. The 2nd, a charge of the basest fraud, and deserving the severest punishment:—but upon this charge, the Judge Advocate told the Court, that it was impossible for them to proceed, for a reason, stated in a letter from the Board of Admiralty; which reason was, that the bills for the pilotage, which were the foundation of this charge, were not arrived at the, Navy-office, and could not be produced; and of course there was no proof of the fact itself, which was the subject of the charge. Notwithstanding this objection, the Court did proceed upon the charge; and very fortunate it was for capt. Browne that they did so, and that his defence from this accusation did not rest upon a technical objection, for he was most completely acquitted by the evidence: and I am confident, that there does not remain in the mind of any man, either of those officers who composed the Court, or of persons who have read the proceedings, the slightest suspicion of any guilt attaching to capt. Browne upon this charge. The 7th and last charge, was abandoned by the prosecutor; and the fact is, that there is not the slightest imputation of blame upon capt. Browne upon any of these charges, except the first, an act of intemperate passion towards this merchant captain—not arising from any personal ill-will, but from capt. Browne's eager solicitude for the safety of his own ship, which had been endangered by the obstinacy of the man in running on board the Hermes, notwithstanding the warnings of capt. Browne, which warnings were answered by the most contemptuous insult and abuse.

Now, upon these seven distinct charges, your lordships will certainly expect seven, or at least six (as the seventh charge was abandoned) distinct issues; but this is the sentence of the Court:—"The Court, having most maturely and deliberately weighed and considered the evidence in support of the charges, and what the prisoner had offered in his behalf, are of opinion, that the charges have been in part proved; and the Court does, in consequence, adjudge the said capt. Philip Browne to be dismissed from his Majesty's service."

Now, I really think that this fact requires no comment; but, at any rate, I feel that it would be very improper for me to detain your lordships with any observations or mine, when you have authority so infinitely superior within your reach—the opinion of the law officers of the Crown, sir William Garrow, and sir Samuel Shepherd. It is impossible for me to know precisely what their opinion has been; but I know the case—I know the ground I stand upon; and I know those honourable and learned gentlemen; and I shall rest with submission, but with confidence, upon their decision. I shall, however, take the liberty of reading, as part of my speech, a document which will take up but very little time.

"The proceedings of Naval Courts-Martial, as they are at present constituted, cannot reasonably be expected to adhere strictly to legal forms, or technical accuracy; all that can be looked for is, that the charges should be specific; and the proofs of each charge should be separately, as well as satisfactorily, made out. I say separately, because the Courts are bound to come to a decision on each; each being a distinct issue, on which they must decide. It is therefore essential to justice, that this should be observed in naval courts, because they have not the same advantage which attends a military court-martial where if any inaccu- racy occurs (as the court is not dissolved), the sentence may be sent back for revisal, before the result is made public: but, where the sentence is divulged on the decision taking place, as in a naval court-martial, the prisoner is precluded from all redress, if it is irregular, except by the interference of authority, as far as goes to the restoration of those deprivations which such a sentence was calculated to inflict. Now, in the present case, it appears to me, that the prisoner has much to complain of; for he is accused of various offences of different descriptions. Some (as of false musters) are so criminal, that, if he had been adjudged intentionally guilty of them, on proper and undoubted proof, he would have been precluded from all hope of future employment; whilst others are of so inferior a nature, that, if guilty, a censure was the utmost to be deprecated: whilst this judgment is couched in terms so vague and uncertain, that it is impossible to collect whether he was found guilty of a part of every charge, or of some one, or more than one of whole charges, of which one is a part. If it means the former, it is in direct contradiction to the minutes, which state that the last charge was abandoned, and for reasons which must have acquitted the defendant;—again, if it means the latter, it is ambiguous and uncertain to which of the charges it is to apply, for it is as applicable in terms to that which was not tried, or to any of which they thought him not guilty, as to any others; and it would only prove, that they perfectly acquitted him of some, by only finding him guilty of a part. The judgment, therefore, is so vague and uncertain, on a subject which imperatively calls for the utmost certainty, that I do not feel how the sentence founded on it can be consistently enforced. Having thus stated my impression on the case, I do not feel it necessary, nor would it become me, to analyze the evidence, in order to guess on what part of it the Court formed their decision; for, after all, it would be but guessing. I shall therefore content myself with stating my opinion, after attending with all the care I am capable of bestowing on the evidence, as applicable to the charges as well as to the sentence, as founded on that application, that it is informal, irregular, and illegal; notwithstanding which I cannot, from the nature of the subject, point out any mode in which capt. Browne can procure redress. The only amends he can look to, must be found in the justice and honourable feelings of the Board of Admiralty, in whose power it lies to restore the situation he has been deprived of; and to the prevention of which, I can perceive nothing on the face of the proceedings: to that tribunal he will have a right also to submit any of those facts, which, although capable of proof, did not occur to his recollection at the time of the trial."

This is the opinion of an eminent Barrister.

I will not detain your lordships with any observations upon the trial of Mr. Lazarus Roberts; or the order issued by the Board of Admiralty, in consequence of that trial; but I hope it is unnecessary for me to assure the noble lord at the head of the Admiralty that nothing can be further from my intention than any thing like hostility to him; on the contrary, if the object of that order is, as I believe it to be, to put a stop to the irregularities which have taken place in both these trials; and if the order is founded upon a reference to the opinion of the Crown lawyers on capt. Browne's case, the conduct of the Board of Admiralty has—what is certainly of little value—but it has my warmest approbation. I have taken up this subject solely upon public grounds, and without any reference to the interests or character of any individual; but it has been suggested to me (what certainly would have given me great pain, if I could have believed it to be true), that I am injuring a gallant officer, capt. Browne, and placing a perpetual bar to his restoration to his rank in the service, by this interference in Parliament: but I could not, consistently with my opinion of the duties and dignity of this House—I could not, consistently with my opinion of the justice and honour of the noble lord, allow myself to hesitate for a moment upon such a suggestion. I should very ill support the high respect which I profess for the character of the noble lord, if I could admit, that any imprudence of mine (if imprudence it should turn out to be), could obstruct the course of that noble lord's justice to a gallant officer, who deserves his restoration as much as several officers now high in the service (I will not recall their names upon so invidious an occasion, but the noble lord will understand me, and I assure him that I very much approve of their restoration), who have been broke for similar acts of rashness, and invariably, and very properly, pardoned and re- stored.*—'These officers are men of high rank and connexions, and in one or two instances were recommended for mercy by the Court; but the first of these circumstances will, of course, have no weight with the noble lord, and I cannot consider the recommendation of one of these Courts at all equivalent to the opinion of the law officers of the Crown. I must observe, that in the circumstances of these trials, the mind of man cannot suggest the possibility of any undue motive or bias in the members; and in addition to this, I have the surest pledge of their integrity in the high character and known honour of a particular friend of my own, admiral Otway, the president on captain Browne's Court-martial—an officer who has fought in five-and-twenty battles, honoured in his profession, and beloved in society; and of whom it is impossible for me, or any man who knows him, to speak but in the highest terms of esteem, affection, and respect.

But, if such men, with the best intentions, good understandings, and considerable information upon other subjects, are upon this subject liable to errors of such fatal consequence to their brother officers, and which will recoil upon themselves, if the accidents of life, beyond the reach of human prudence, should render, them amenable to such a court: and if these errors arise from the defects and obscurity of the law; bow forcibly does it call upon your lordships, to correct those errors, and that obscurity, and to protect these brave men from the heavy but unavoidable misfortune of committing injustice, as members of the court, and of enduring it as prisoners, if accident should bring them into that situation?

With respect to the military part of the subject, your lordships may, perhaps, suppose, that it was first suggested to me by the peculiar circumstances of colonel Quentin's trial; but the fact is otherwise; my attention was drawn to it some years ago, by no less than two law-suits, which, as commanding officer of a militia Regiment, I felt it to be my duty to undertake, at my own sole expense and trouble, and by which I had the good fortune to counteract the effects of the sentence of a Regimental Court-martial, certainly given with the best intentions, but erroneous, and subversive of the first principles of mili- * Captain Browne has been reinstated in his former rank in the service. tary discipline. Upon subsequent inquiry among military men, I have reason to believe that there is no part of military duty so much neglected, and so ill executed as this of the Regimental Court-martial; arising, I believe, from the neglect of impressing upon the minds of officers, the importance of the duty, and the want of some rules of evidence, and of forms by which that duty is to be properly executed; and I believe that this inconvenience alone, though much the least important part of the subject, is of an extent sufficient to deserve your lordships attention.

I will now proceed to the Court-martial upon colonel Quentin; and, my lords, having been upon the spot at Brighton, at the beginning, and during the progress of this unfortunate business, intimately acquainted with many officers of the 10th Hussars, and privy to their most secret thought in that transaction, I trust your lordships will give me credit when I assure you, that there never were men animated with a purer sense of honour, with more zeal for their duties, or with more gratitude and attachment to their Royal Colonel; and if they have erred, it has not been from malice, or from party, but from a too eager desire to shake off reproach from their corps, and to preserve themselves worthy of the high distinction with which he had honoured them. But if, with this connexion with that regiment, it should be thought that I have felt any particular regret at the result of that Court-martial, I can assure your lordships that it is far otherwise; and, although I could not have wished for any young officer a more brilliant destination than to have served with those honourable men in that glorious campaign, which began in Portugal and ended at Thoulouse, I have felt for many years, and I have felt it in common with many other persons, that the honour with which that regiment is distinguished, is dearly purchased; and particularly in peace. I do not mean dearly, in the usual sense, or to allude to the inconvenient and expensive frippery with which the Hussar regiments are disfigured and encumbered, but dearly purchased by various circumstances, arising out of that honourable distinction which I will not detail; but will only say that, but for that honourable distinction, I should never have had to trouble your lordships about any Court-martial upon colonel Quentin.

And here I cannot refrain from sub- mitting to your lordships—and I wish it had been done, and successfully done, twenty years ago, for the comfort and happiness of an illustrious personage to whom no man is more attached than myself, or more solicitous for his happiness and comfort—whether it is consistent with the impartiality due to the army, that any one regiment should be distinguished by having the Sovereign for their colonel; whether it is consistent with the dignity of the Sovereign, that he should be liable to be intermixed in the details, and possibly the disputes of a regiment; whether it is consistent, either with dignity or propriety, that he should have the possibility, and therefore be liable to the suspicion of knowing confidentially, as the colonel, what he will have ultimately to decide upon, as the Sovereign? I stated to your lordships, that the mind of man could not suggest any motive for an undue bias in the members of the Naval Court-martial: I regret that I cannot say the same in this upon colonel Quentin; but it is very unfortunate, that the errors of those honourable men who composed that Court, have coincided with the known inclinations of the Sovereign—the fountain of all military favour and reward; but I am sure that the candour of your lordships minds will agree with mine in repelling any such suggestion. I know nothing of motives; I impute none; and, if from the want of that correctness of language, which nothing but the habit of public speaking can give, any word should escape me, capable of such a construction, I now declare that it is not mine; and I shall be much obliged to any noble lord who will call me to order, that I may immediately retract it: and here I beg to be understood, that, by the known inclination of the Sovereign—for known it is, and it would be folly to attempt to doubt, or deny it—I was far from meaning any improper inclination, or a wish to bias the Court, but that regard which is due from a prince to an old and faithful servant, a very worthy man, and a very good officer, I believe, as far as his experience and ability could go, and very useful to his health and his amusement; but this regard, as well as feelings of an opposite nature, are known in all periods of history to have been very much misinterpreted, not by such honourable men as composed this Court, but by interested and unprincipled sycophants, greedy of the emoluments which power can bestow. But when I have heard colonel Quentin described as an old officer, worn out in the service, I look to facts, certain and undeniable; and there is not a subaltern who marched with the regiment from Portugal to Thoulouse, who has not seen more service before the enemy, than colonel Quentin; more in point of time, as much as the march to the 26th of July, when colonel Quentin joined, exceeded the short campaign of ten weeks under sir John Moore, and more in importance of events, as much as the affair of Morales, and the decisive battle of Vittoria, exceed the engagements at Benevente and Majorca; for these are the only instances in which colonel Quentin was ever engaged, before the last campaign, notwithstanding the accidental inaccuracy of some of the witnesses, from which a contrary inference might be drawn. But without calling upon your lordships candour, I desire, for the sake of my argument, that none but the purest motives may be imputed; for it is not against perjury and self-interest, and those base motives which degrade human nature, and baffle the means of justice, however wisely constructed, that I wish your lordships to legislate, but against ignorance and error; and if the most honourable, the best-intentioned men, and well informed upon other subjects, are not exempt from these defects, under the present system of military law, how much will it strengthen my argument to induce your lordships to revise that law?

My lords; the 1st Charge is, "That on the 10th day of January, 1814, the regiment being on that day on duty, foraging in the valley of Macoy in France, colonel Quentin, having the command of the regiment, did not make the proper and timely arrangements, to ensure the success of the regiment, in its operations of foraging, although directed so to do by the brigade orders of the 9th January, 1814, but neglected and abandoned his duty as commanding officer, leaving some of the divisions without orders or support, when attacked by the enemy, whereby some men and horses of the regiment were taken prisoners, and the safely of such divisions hazarded: such conduct on the part of the said colonel Quentin, evincing great professional incapacity; tending to lessen the confidence of the soldiers of the regiment in the skill and courage of their officers; being unbecoming and disgraceful to his character as an officer, prejudicial to good order and military discipline, and contrary to the articles of war."

And the sentence of the Court is—"That Colonel Quentin is guilty of so much of the first charge as imputes to him having neglected his duty as commanding officer, by leaving some of the divisions without orders when attacked by the enemy, but acquit him of the remainder of the charge," and then, they do only adjudge, with reference to the first charge, 'that Colonel Quentin be reprimanded, 'in such a manner as the Commander-in-chief shall be pleased to direct:' a very light punishment—and by their words, 'do only adjudge,' it was evidently their intention, that it should be light. To my mind, the evidence clearly establishes another part of this charge, the want of proper and timely precautions to ensure success. But this is of little importance, compared with that part of which the Court have found him guilty. The facts which are proved, and I will state them shortly, and without aggravation, are these:—That Colonel Quentin commanded the regiment upon a foraging party; that a part of the regiment, while foraging, was attacked by the enemy; that, soon after the firing began, Colonel Quentin marched off, with a little more than one-half of the regiment, leaving a little less than the other half exposed to the fire of the enemy, still under the order for foraging, and ignorant of his departure; that he went away, without giving or sending any orders, or any notice to the troops under fire, leaving them to chance, and their own discretion: and it is remarkable, that the officers thus left were some of the youngest in the regiment; to whom it has since been objected, and against whom it has operated as an aggravation of their offence, and of their punishment, that they were too young and inexperienced to judge for themselves—that he was not ignorant of the danger to which he left them exposed, which is proved from his own mouth, in various instances, in which, after a retreat of two miles, beyond the reach of danger to himself, or of assistance to them, he expressed his anxiety for their safety; that he himself led the column to the rear. And I am not afraid to put myself at issue with the best cavalry officers, when I say, that this was a situation unfit, or at least very unusual, for the commanding officer, upon a principle established by all the regulations for the movements of cavalry, founded upon sound reason, and with a reference to actual service, and of such obvious use that no man can mis- understand it, that the place of the commanding officer is, upon advancing, in the front, and upon retreating, in the rear; i.e. in the place nearest to the enemy, where alone he can judge of the means and opportunities of safety to his own troops, and of annoyance to the enemy:—and, although circumstances may frequently arise, which may require a deviation from this rule, still it is a deviation, and exception, from a general rule, and there must he circumstances to justify it; and circumstances capable of explanation; but no such explanation has been given. These facts are admitted by the language of the sentence; and I can only account for the mitigation of the punishment, by supposing it to arise from a misconception, which I know to prevail in the opinion of many officers, and I believe did in the opinions of some of the members of this Court—and this is, that they ought not to affix any high degree of punishment, unless they can convince their minds that the misbehaviour has arisen from one particular motive, and this motive is cowardice. Facts may be proved; but it is almost impossible to be certain of motives; and, in my humble opinion, the crime (I speak in the abstract) is that misbehaviour which is detrimental to the public service, by obstructing the success of the operation, whatever it may be, or by endangering the safety or injuring the character and reputation of the army, from whatever motive it may have arisen: but the word 'cowardice' is not to be found in the charges; it is not even to be found in the Articles of War; and I shall now desire your lordships attention to the different manner in which this subject is considered by the naval and the military law. The expression in the military article is simply, 'misbehaviour before 'the enemy,' without mention of motive, or of any circumstance whatsoever; the naval expression is, 'cowardice, negligence, or disaffection in action.' If the naval definition of motives is preferred, there can be no doubt that all possible motives ought to be included, and there is one, of known effect in all periods of history, as far as motives can be known—private ill-will and malice against individuals, generally against the commanding officer;—to these may, perhaps, be added an expression lately introduced into military law—'error in judgment:' but that expression appears to me to be too vague and indefinite, as its value must depend upon the combined result of the importance of the object which has failed by that error, and of the difficulty of the case upon which the judgment is to be formed. Error in judgment may be a fair excuse for inferior officers, sent upon services which they have not sought, and may perhaps dislike; but I cannot help saying, that, where commands are given to Generals, as favours solicited by them, they are bound to find a sufficient stock of judgment for the occasions which they have solicited and sought. There can be no doubt that cowardice is a complete disqualification for the military profession; but it would only be to waste your lordships time and my own, if I were to use any arguments to show, that disaffection to the state, treason, or envious malice—crimes of the blackest dye, and which the mind has the power to resist—deserve a much higher degree of punishment than cowardice, an involuntary weakness of nature, irresistible, and approaching nearer to that general excuse for all crimes—mental derangement—and therefore rather deserving of compassion than of punishment. In the word 'negligence' there are very different degrees of blame: the negligence of brave, but rash men, by which they expose themselves, and the troops under their command, to unnecessary and useless danger, is certainly very blameable, and very injurious to the service; but, when the negligence of the safety of others, is coupled with perfect security to their own persons, it assumes a very different character, and such as I will not describe, because I cannot do so without epithets which I do not wish to use. I do not pretend to say which of the definitions is the best, the naval or the military; but as they are essentially different, though describing precisely the same thing, it is not probable that there should not be a preference between them; and it must be very desirable that they should be the same in both professions, and that officers should be made to understand, that the misbehaviour is the crime to which the punishment is due, whether arising from cowardice, or from any of the malignant motives, among which I class wilful negligence, such as I have before described to your lordships.

The second and third Charges are as follows:

"2nd. That the said Colonel Quentin, having the command of the regiment, after the battle of Orthes, viz. on the 28th of February 1814, on the high road leading to St. Sever, in front of the village of Hagelman, department de Landes in France, and the regiment being on that day engaged with the enemy, he, the said Colonel Quentin, did not, previously to, or during the period the regiment was so engaged, make such effectual attempts as he ought to have done, by his presence, and his own personal exertions and example, to co-operate with, or support the advanced divisions of the 10th Hussars under his command, but neglected and abandoned his duty as commanding officer, and thereby hazarded the safety of those divisions, and the character and reputation of the regiment; such conduct, on the part of the said Colonel Quentin, tending to lessen the confidence of the soldiers in the skill and courage of their officers, being unbecoming his character as an officer, prejudicial to good order and military discipline, and contrary to the Articles of War."

"3d. That on the 10th day of April 1814, during the battle of Thoulouse, in France, the said Colonel Quentin, having the command of the regiment, and the regiment being on that day in the presence of, and attacked by the Enemy, he the said Colonel Quentin did not, during such attack, make such effectual attempts as he ought to have done, by his presence and his own personal exertions, to co-operate with or support the advanced divisions of the regiment under his command, but neglected and abandoned his duty as commanding officer, leaving some of the divisions, when under fire from the enemy, without orders, and thereby unnecessarily hazarding the safety and reputation of those divisions; such conduct, on the part of the said Colonel Quentin, tending to lessen the confidence of the soldiers of the regiment in the skill and courage of their officers, being unbecoming and disgraceful to his character as an officer, prejudicial to good order and military discipline, and contrary to the Articles of War."

Upon these charges the evidence does not convey to me the same result that it appears to have done to the Court. I say appears, because I cannot bring my mind to any certainty as to their real opinion upon these charges, as I shall explain to your lordships presently. Upon the second charge, I shall only observe, that if it did not occur to these officers to attribute the backward situation in the attack of colonel Quentin,—one of the best riders in the world, with excellent horses, and in excellent condition,—to the defect of his horsemanship, or his horse, it appears to me to have been a very natural and a venial error; and if they have erred respecting the propriety of that backward situation, that error is certainly a venial one, for they were led into it by the Prince Regent himself, who had but a few weeks before most properly rewarded their own major (major Robarts) with the rank of lieutenant-colonel, for his conduct at Morales; for a conduct directly opposite, in circumstances nearly similar: for encouraging the men, not with his voice, but by his example; for heading the charge, himself the leading man of the leading squadron. And upon the third charge (in the battle of Thoulouse), if those officers who saw colonel Quentin in front just before the firing began, and who did not see him when it did begin, (although the front was not longer than the width of this House), and who heard major Howard send lieutenant Wyndham to the general for instructions, (left as he was, without notice or orders, in the most difficult situation for cavalry, standing still under a heavy fire,) should think such an abrupt disappearance ill-timed and improper, it may be an error; but I cannot think it an error deserving the severe reproof that has been thrown upon them. But with respect to these charges, my objection is to the language of the verdict. Till this unfortunate trial, it has been invariably the custom that the sentence of acquittal should end with these words, 'that the prisoner is not guilty of the charge, and is acquitted, or is 'honourably-acquitted;' and unless the word 'honourably' was added, it was not understood to be that sort of acquittal which completely restored the prisoner to his former reputation and character, and it therefore justified the prosecution. I know that this example has been followed in a subsequent Court-martial; but to this I feel no objection, and I am doubtful whether it is desirable to leave that discretionary sentence to the option of the Court: but I am convinced that it is essential to the ends of justice, that there should be a fixed form of words for the sentences, and that the Court should not have the power to evade and to sink a part of them, as has been done for the first time upon this occasion. Upon these two charges, the sentences are only—that colonel Quentin is not guilty: the prisoner was not ho- nourably acquitted upon these charges; and it is now impossible to know whether that omission was intentional or accidental; but if your lordships would relieve the members from their oaths, I have great doubts whether the majority of them, or perhaps any of them, would subscribe their names to the words 'honourably acquitted.'

Before I begin the fourth Charge, I must say a few words upon a principle which indeed belongs to them all, and which throws a heavy responsibility upon the members of these Courts, if they do not pay the most minute attention to every particle of evidence, and to every syllable of applause or censure which they may apply to any of the parties before them, whether prisoner, prosecutor, or witness; a principle so opposite to the benignant spirit of justice in our other Courts, which rejoices when she can abstain from punishment; but here the sword of justice, like the enchanted sword of Angantir, is never drawn but it slays a man, and if the enemy escapes, destroys a friend; if it cannot reach the prisoner, exterminates the prosecutor and the witnesses; but with this advantage to the prisoner, that he has the means of defence, whereas the other parties are condemned, undefended, and unheard; they are like buckets in a well, in the proportion as one sinks the other rises—not by any properties of his own, but by the simple operation of the gravity of the body opposed to him; and I cannot conceive any thing more likely to destroy all truth and fairness, and to confound the means of justice, than the sort of bellum internecinum which this principle establishes among all the parties—prisoner, prosecutor and witnesses.

The fourth Charge is, "for general neglect of duty, by allowing a relaxed discipline to exist in the regiment under, his command when on foreign service, by which the reputation of the regiment suffered in the opinion of the Commander of the forces, and of the Lieutenant-general commanding the Cavalry; their displeasure having been expressed or implied in a letter from the Adjutant-general of the forces, addressed to major-general lord E. Somerset, commanding the Hussar brigade, dated on or about the 29th of March, 1814, and in the orders of the Lieutenant-general commanding the Cavalry, dated the 26th February, 1814; such conduct, on the part of the said Colonel Quentin, being unbecoming his character as an officer, prejudicial to his Majesty's service, and contrary to the Articles of War."

Upon which this is the sentence of the Court:—"With respect to the fourth Charge, the Court are of opinion, that a relaxed discipline, as set forth in that charge, did exist in the regiment under Colonel Quentin's command, whilst on foreign service, during the period alluded to in the letter and orders referred to in the charge; and as they cannot but consider the commanding officer of a regiment to be responsible for such relaxation of discipline, they therefore think themselves bound to find Colonel Quentin guilty, to the extent of allowing it to exist; but as they consider the letter from the Adjutant-general to the troops on the Continent, of March 30, 1814, expressing the displeasure of the Commander of the forces, as a reprimand to Colonel Quentin, adequate to the degree of blame which attached to him, the Court do not feel themselves called upon to give any sentence upon this charge in the way of further punishment; and they consider that arty thing unusual in this determination will be explained, by the singularity of the circumstances attending this charge, by which an officer is put upon his trial for conduct which had before been the subject of animadversion, by those under whose command he was then serving, but which, at the time, was not considered deserving of a more serious proceeding by the Commander of the forces; nor does it appear to have been made the subject of any remonstrance, or request for a more serious investigation, on the part of the officers of the regiment."

I must first observe, that out of four Charges, two have been proved; and upon the other two, the prisoner has not been honourably acquitted. I shall now call your attention to the statement of the Court respecting the letter of the Adjutant-general, which they allege to be a sufficient punishment already undergone, and therefore their ground for not inflicting any further punishment upon the prisoner; Which remission of punishment by the Court affords, according to the present practice of military law, a pretence for punishment to the other parties; and for this purpose it is necessary that what they consider to be the punishment already undergone, should be represented to have been as severe as possible; and I beg your lordships to observe the great inaccuracy of their language, in calling this letter, a letter to the troops on the Continent, winch certainly means a letter in General Orders to the duke of Wellington's army, then consisting of from 80 to 100,000 men. I will now show your lordships what such a letter really is.