§ Horse Guards, 10th Nov. 1814.
§ "His royal highness the Commander-in-chief has been pleased to direct that the following copy of a letter, containing the opinion and sentence of a general Court-martial, recently held for the trial of Colonel George Quentin, of the 10th or Prince of Wales's own Royal Regiment of Light Dragoons, and the Prince Regent's pleasure thereon, shall be entered in the General Order books, and read at the head of every regiment in his Majesty's service.—By command of his royal highness the Commander-in-chief,
§ "HARRY CALVERT, Adjutant-general."
§ This is a letter to the troops in England; as severe a punishment as can be inflicted upon men of honour and feeling; but what was, in reality, the letter which these gentlemen so negligently call a letter to the troops on the Continent? That letter was sent to lord Edward Somerset, who commanded the brigade, as a private admonition and reprimand to the 10th Hussars, was so read to them, and never was, nor was intended to be communicated to any other corps or man in the army; and that letter, which ought to have been a strong corroborative of the proofs against the prisoner, is converted, by the strangest perversion of all reason and justice, into a pretence for screening him from all punishment; and the consequence of this is, that it takes the punishment from the man who had deserved and received the censure of the duke of Wellington and lord Combermere,—the only competent judges of their respective merits,—and throws it upon those who had deserved and received their praise.—shall now read that part of the letter which is applicable to this subject:
§ "I am commanded by my lord Wellington to take this occasion of mentioning, that the complaints are so general against the 10th Hussars, and so extremely discreditable to the regiment, and prejudicial to the interests of the army, that it is requisite you should immediately adopt measures to re-establish that discipline which is necessary to good order, but which has 1190 been allowed to relax in an unpardonable degree, under the command of lieutenant-colonel Quentin. Your lordship will be so good as to communicate to the lieutenant-colonel, the Field-marshal's displeasure at having to notice irregularities it was in his power to have prevented; and that a recurrence of such breach of regulation and good order, will convince His excellency, that colonel Quentin is unequal to control a regiment of the first pretensions."
§ I shall say no more, except, in the words of lord Clarendon, to express my surprise, "that a circumstance of high aggravation should be applied to the mitigation of a censure that ought to be the more severe, nay, even to constitute such, an innocence as is not worthy of censure."
§ I now come to that part of the sentence in which the Court say, that "there appears to have existed such a want of co-operation, among the officers of the regiment, as to render the duties of the commanding officer much more arduous than they otherwise would have been." I do not clearly understand the meaning of these words; but I suppose it to be a want of co-operation with colonel Quentin, since one of the complaints against the officers is, a too great co-operation among themselves: but whatever the intended meaning may be, I maintain that there never was an assertion more destitute of foundation, and less supported by any evidence or proof whatsoever. There is proof abundant that the officers were zealous to do their duty; that they urged colonel Quentin to support them in their duty; but there is not the shadow of proof that they ever disobeyed him, or neglected to co-operate with him in the execution of his duties, or in any branch of the service. I have heard this subject discussed in another place; and the only allegation in support of this accusation was, a neglect of reporting to colonel Quentin. Now, I will venture to assert that there are only two instances of this supposed neglect in the whole evidence, one is, colonel Palmer not reporting to him that the surgeon of the regiment, Mr. Morrison, (not officially, but in accidental conversation,) had told him, that in answer to a letter of inquiry from the head of the medical staff, be had written word, that the great sickness in the regiment arose from relaxed discipline, and consequent intemperance: a report which, I believe, colonel Palmer was not at all bound to make, and which, if he had made it unne- 1191 cessarily, would have borne the appearance of an intended insult to colonel Quentin. The other is to be found in the answer made by captain Harding: "I certainly felt it useless on many occasions to report, finding that I was not supported:" an answer which carries within itself an excuse for captain Harding, and a reproach upon colonel Quentin. But admitting, for the sake of argument, these two instances to the fullest extent of blame; did ever any man advance such a proposition, as that a crime proved upon only two men, should implicate three-arid-twenty others? And out of these, thirteen were subalterns, who could not report to the colonel; it would have been a breach of duty if they had done so; and one, a captain Synge, who had served during the war on the staff with general Pack, had seen ten times more service than colonel Quentin ever had; wounded, maimed for his life; and who is now implicated in a censure for want of cooperation in duties with which be had nothing to do!
§ I must add a few words of comparison between the different testimonies upon which the Court have founded their opinion. All those who were upon the spot, whether as generals commanding, or as spectators, and witnesses of the conduct of the regiment; the noble lord who commanded the cavalry; lord Edward Somerset, who commanded the brigade; colonel Gardiner; major Jones; all speak in the highest terms of praise of the officers and very differently of colonel Quentin. I will read two or three very short extracts, but will first call your attention to those words of the sentence, where, in speaking of the relaxation of discipline, the Court says, that they think themselves bound to find colonel Quentin guilty, to the extent of allowing it to exist; as if there were some crime beyond that of allowing it, which a commanding officer could be guilty of, as if he could act the indiscipline of a regiment himself, in his own person. Lord E. Somerset said: "I had every reason to approve of the general conduct of the officers; they appeared to be zealous and attentive to their duty:" and again, "the officers of the 10th Hussars seemed generally attentive to their duty; but of course, where the system of discipline is relaxed, it will extend to all ranks more or less:" and then being asked to what he attributed this relaxation of discipline, his answer is, "I certainly attribute it to the want of a proper system being 1192 maintained by the commanding officer, and the want of proper activity on his part." I will now read the evidence of lord Combermere: "I think I told him," (lord E. Somerset) "that as there was no amendment," or likely to be in the 10th, that I should write home on the subject, stating that colonel Quentin, from a bad state of health, or some cause, appeared unfit to command a regiment of light cavalry on active service; but the war being over a few days afterwards, I did not think it necessary to take any further notice. I cannot recollect the whole of the conversation; I said a great deal more to him." And here I must observe, that this passage affords a complete answer to that reproach which has been thrown upon the officers, that their accusation of colonel Quentin was the deliberate issue of a long and extraordinary delay, for which no sufficient reasons or explanation have been given; for here it appears, that the officers had reason to expect that the accusation would have been brought forward in the proper and regular mode by the General commanding the Cavalry, and that nothing but the unforeseen circumstance of the sudden cessation of hostilities prevented that general from doing so; but although the cessation of hostilities was a sufficient reason for the noble lord's forbearance, your lordships may easily conceive that the feelings of officers, labouring under reproach which they did not deserve, for offences of which they were innocent, which they knew and deplored, but could not prevent, were not to be so easily satisfied, and could not be endured in silent acquiescence. He again says: "I thought colonel Quentin was in a bad state of health, that probably it was owing to that, but that he did not appear fit to command a regiment of light cavalry on active service. I had an opportunity of seeing a great deal of the officers of the 10th in quarters and in the field, and I must say, I never met with a finer corps of officers, and I do hot think there were ever officers better disposed or more zealous, or officers I should like better to command than the officers of the 10th Hussars: that is my reason for thinking still, that it was not their fault, but the fault of the commanding officer, that the regiment was not in the high state of discipline which it ought to be latterly."
§ This testimony coming from such a source, no less than that highly distinguished officer who commanded the ca- 1193 valry under the duke of Wellington, is a compensation for the injuries which have been inflicted on them; a protection from the disgrace which was intended for them; the safeguard of their character; the consolation of their misfortune: it will stand for ever a monument of honour to them, and of reproach to the Court, whose total disregard of such testimony must present to your lordships a strong argument for revising the construction and the proceedings of these tribunals.
§ On the other hand, what is the evidence for col. Quentin? Campaigns at Hounslow, and at Ipswich; generals who never heard a shotted gun; a captain who remembers col. Quentin, but forgets col. Leigh at Majorca; but not one officer who had been present at the events which are the subject of this Court-martial. But from this nonsense, only fit for the Mayor of Garrat, there is one brilliant exception—the noble lord who commanded the cavalry under sir John Moore in 1808, and whom I shall ever respect for that gallant spirit which at the first call of his country's danger tore him from the charms of a society, where every thing conspired with his own personal qualities, to allure him from the paths of glory to those of pleasure, and who, as well as another noble friend of mine, in circumstances somewhat similar, whom your lordships must be proud to see among you, by the native energy of their own characters, have attained the highest celebrity in a profession to which they had not been destined. But to what indignity was that noble lord exposed, by the blunders of this Court! no less than to have the testimony which he gave on one day, expunged from their minutes on the next; a testimony not voluntarily given, but extorted from him,—and by whom? no less than the President himself, and in these words, "Will your lordship relate the particular circumstances of the conduct of col. Quentin in the affair of Benevente? They have been related to me as particularly meritorious,"—and, as if every sort of absurdity was to attach to the proceedings of this Court, it so happens that this affair at Benevente was the only thing which it was unnecessary, and therefore improper, for the noble lord to describe at all, not only upon the new and unintelligible principle, respecting the cross-examination of witnesses to character, broached for the first time upon this trial, but upon the soundest principles of evidence in our courts of law—for there 1194 is now extant the official document, the letter of that noble lord, as commander of the cavalry, detailing all the circumstances of that engagement; published in the Gazette, accessible to a your lordships, and open to the prisoner; who might have produced it in his defence if he had thought proper; and the authority of such a letter, written at the time, and upon the spot, must be infinitely beyond that of the best recollection after the lapse of six or seven years. I should not have mentioned' what I am now going to say, if the Court had confined themselves to the bare sentence, whatever it might have been; but as they have added mitigations, founded upon a variety of circumstances, I cannot but think that they ought to have given line weight to all the circumstances connected with the transaction; and is it a circumstance of no consequence, that col. Quentin subpœna'd for his own witnesses, officers of the regiment who were present at these transactions—major Howard and col. Wyndham;—both friends of his own, but men of honour, and who would have spoken the truth, but whose mouths, though present and in attendance, he did not think proper to unseal, but trusted the defence of his honour to the varying and contradictory testimony of non-commissioned officers and private soldiers. Major Howard had been present, and close to him upon most of the occasions which are the subjects of the charges; and col. Wyndham had served with the regiment under col. Robarts, and for six weeks afterwards, under col. Quentin, and must have known if any change had taken place in the discipline. Is it of no consequence that he refused the production of the Due de Guiche's letter of explanation, in answer to a letter of his own?—the Duc de Guiche, whose absence (compelled by the orders of his Government) is much to be regretted, for considerations of infinitely more importance than the value of his testimony, great as that would have been. Is it of no consequence that, after having told the Court himself, that col. Palmer permitted him to remain in perfect ignorance of a medical report, stating drunkenness, want of necessaries, and inattention to personal cleanliness, as causes of an increase of sickness in the men of the 10th, which might have seriously affected the character of the regiment, and of himself as commanding it, if not inquired into and answered—he then, when col. Palmer proposes to him to call the author of that 1195 medical report, Mr. Morrison, into Court, to give an explanation upon this subject, which be (col. Quentin) had introduced himself to the Court, refuses the evidence of Mr. Morrison, upon a technical objection, that his name was not upon the list of witnesses.
§ I now come to the subject of the letter, upon which I shall state nothing but what I saw and know; and I say that this letter ought never to have risen in evidence against the officers; that it ought never to have seen the light; that it was suppressed almost as soon as written, and that it is to the indiscretion of col. Palmer alone, that its disclosure is to be attributed. I say that col. Palmer owes it to the officers—that he owes it to his own honour, to state distinctly to the country, the manner in which that letter has risen from obscurity to the ruin of twenty-five of his friends, gallant officers, and honourable men. I say nothing of the letter itself; I do not defend it; I do not blame it; I do not blame the consequences that have resulted from it; but I did wish, and I wish still, and I believe it is not now too late, that these officers may be brought to a Court-martial for that letter, and broke, if-they shall appear to have been as guilty as they have been represented: as it now elands, they have been condemned without the means or opportunity of defence; and when I have read to your lordships this letter, signed ten years ago by fifteen officers of the Blues—
§ ["The printed paper which has been exhibited in the most public manner, with the name of Mr. Goulburn affixed to it, reflecting the worst possible abuse upon an officer now in the Blues, cannot but give us much concern, as affecting the honour of one of our corps. We declare, in duty and justice to the regiment, to which we belong, that we cannot tacitly consent to partake of the blame or the disrepute, which from this circumstance may, in the opinion of the public, appear to attach to us as a military body, owing to the private conduct of one of its members. As the name of the regiment has been made use of, we think it our duty to come forward with this declaration, and most respectfully to assure our colonel, how, sensibly we feel for the honour and character of his regiment, whenever its name is brought into public notice, also pf our firm reliance upon his, support, and of our constant endeavours to deserve it."]—and when I tell jour lordships, that 1196 this letter was approved by the King, who then took much pleasure in that regiment, and that captain Horsley was in consequence obliged to leave the regiment, your lordships will feel that there is at least that similarity—I think the similarity is perfect—but at least that similarity between the outset of the transactions, and such a total difference in the results, as to afford some excuse for men who followed this precedent so far as to write a letter, and then to burn it; for their intention, and consequently their real offence amounted to no more: and I think your lordships must also feel that, when, coupled with the ruin of twenty-five gallant officers, misled by precedent, and unconscious of crime, it affords to me strong ground for intreating your lordships to rescue the army from that state of law, worse even than bad laws, the Jus vagum et incognitum. And I much wish that the circumstances of the letter of the 10th Hussars had been subjected to a strict investigation, because it would have prevented a great deal of very unpleasant suspicion and discussion; and I believe the result would have been to show, that, neither colonel Palmer, nor any of the parties were intentionally to blame, and that the disclosure of the letter was occasioned by misunderstandings in verbal conversation, by which all these parties were misled, except the officers, who intended nothing, and expected nothing, except that the letter was to be burnt, and was burnt. With respect to col. Palmer, I do not believe, that there ever existed a braver officer, or a more honourable and better man; and in this I have the good fortune to agree with the Court; and if any thing could add to my conviction of the necessity of giving some better mode of reference for the Military Courts to the law officers of the Crown, it would be the anomaly in this trial, by which causes directly opposite have produced precisely the same effect: the signing the letter, and the not signing it, are made equal crimes, and the moderate but unjust censure of the officers by the Court, and their high and just commendation of colonel Palmer, both as to his conduct in the regiment, and upon the trial, are productive of the same bad effects to both, the same destruction to the parties unjustly censured, and to the party justly praised.
§ There is not one of the articles that requires revision more than that which, relates to the subject of this letter of the 1197 Blues,—duels;—if the prerogative of the Crown is not already sufficient to prevent it,—and I very much wished it to be exercised upon a late duel, not only on account of the impropriety of that duel and its absurdity, (for there is not such a fool in the army, who could suppose that it could be useful to any purpose, except the chance of destroying colonel Palmer,) but much more to put an end to suspicions which naturally arose from the circumstances, very imprudent, both as to the persons, the time, and the place, from which that duel is supposed to have originated: and even now since col. Quentin's trial, a young and gallant officer (lieutenant Cowell) has been broke for not prosecuting a quarrel in a way that could lead to nothing but a duel, and in a letter produced in evidence from the officer commanding the regiment, which letter was the Foundation of the whole proceeding, the Court expunge this sentence, "You must beware that fighting a duel is contrary to the Articles of War," leaving the remainder in evidence, and then they break him for not proceeding in such a manner as could have ended in nothing but a duel. The prisoner put this question to the Court,—"Was I to understand by this letter, that if I had fought a duel, the Articles of War would have been resorted to, and that not having done so, my commission must have been the forfeit?" Certainly a very unpleasant question; as it made nonsense of their whole proceedings: and how did they get rid of it? They cut the gordian knot; and at once expunged, both question and answer from their minutes. But there is no end to the absurdity of these Courts.
§ But it has been said, that because these officers are allowed to retain their rank in the army, the punishment is not a severe one, and the words of the letter imply that it is not adequate to their offence. Is it not a severe punishment to be scattered, not over England, not over Europe, but over the world, like a gang of mutineers that cannot be trusted near each other, and to have their disgrace proclaimed to the whole army, at the head of every regiment? Is it not a severe punishment to captain Lloyd, an officer of long standing, the first captain in the regiment, reduced to the last in another; his hopes of promotion in the service retarded, till a time of life when, perhaps he will be no longer able to serve wounded, ill treated by the enemy, be- 1198 cause he refused to surrender his sword, a sword highly valued by him, because a present from his colonel, received front the very hand which has since signed his ruin? Is it not a severe punishment to the second captain, captain Harding,—a name which it is difficult to pronounce without indignation, when I think bow he has been sacrificed, and to what he has been sacrificed,—a name never heard without distinction, and never mentioned without respect; of long service, repeatedly wounded, who, already a soldier, saw the safety of India fixed, under the auspices of a noble marquis, by the fall of Serin gapatam; who saw that star rising in the East, to whom the Western world now looks for safety and defence. I mention these circumstanced, because, among many other calumnies, it has been circulated that the officers were little more than boys. Is it no punishment to two brothers, of whose honourable principles, of whose zeal for their duties, of whose respect and gratitude to their benefactor, which no harshness can shake or diminish, I can speak with certainty, from personal knowledge, to be sent, perhaps to perish in India? Is it a slight punishment to all these officers to be placed upon half-pay, or as supernumeraries, without the hope of service or the chance of distinction—and now, when the trumpet has already sounded for preparation? I have heard It urged that this sentence is the triumph of justice to an unprotected foreigner, over personal friendship and favoritism. To my mind, there never was a greater misapplication of terms. I have understood the word 'favoritism' to apply to persons who owe their promotion to their private services to the Sovereign, and to his personal favour, but not at all to these officers; not to the son of a noble duke; not to the brother of a noble marquis; not to the nephew of a noble marquis, high in his Majesty's household; nor to many others of them; who, if they are as independent in their minds, as they are in their situations, are placed far above the caprices of power; and who, while they firmly support that key-stone of the constitution, the Crown, and while they respect and love the personal qualities of the Prince who now exercises its power, will spurn at the disgraceful and inapplicable term of 'favoritism.'
§ I will now state shortly the objects which I intend to recommend to your lordships, as founded on these minutes:— 1199 To define the crimes—To fix the highest punishment to each crime, leaving the mitigation only to the discretion of the Court—To fix the language of the sentences—To give to the Court the power of declaring the charges frivolous and vexatious, and of either ordering or recommending any of the parties to be brought to a Court-martial, if they shall appear to deserve it, but not to punish or censure without trial—To leave the prerogative of the Crown untouched, except by limiting it to a distinct and separate exercise, never mixed with the judicial proceedings—To define the modes of accusation, and of prosecution, so that officers may know what they can do with safety; what they may attempt at their peril; and what they must not do at all—To establish some mode of reference, common to both professions, perhaps a judge independent, and upon the footing of the judges of England—To take off the oath of secrecy, an oath highly injurious to the character of officers, who have not concurred in an unjust sentence—To give to these Courts that publicity which is essential to justice, which is the practice of alt our other Courts of Justice, and which forms a most important branch of the Constitution; and to compel the members, after deliberating in private, to give their votes in open Court, upon the principle of increasing the individual responsibility—a principle recognised in the 1200 other House of Parliament, in the Act for deciding contested elections;—to direct that clear, distinct, and intelligible rules of evidence be prepared for the guidance of these Courts, and to comprise all these in a few words—To introduce, I hope, under the auspices of the Commander-in-chief, that reform in the judicial part, which has been so successfully effected in every other part of the military system, by that illustrious personage to whom I, in common with the nation, must fee the deepest gratitude for the services which he has rendered to the country, and myself individually; for that kindness and condescension which adorn his private, as much as his ability, his diligence, and his upright intentions, exalt his public character.
§ My lords; I shall now conclude with moving, "That an humble Address be presented to his royal highness the Prince Regent, to order copies of the Minutes of the. Court-martial upon captain Philip Browne of the Hermes, and of the opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown upon that Court-martial, and copies of the Minutes of the Court-martial upon Mr. Lazarus Roberts, midshipman of the Hamadryad, and of the order issued by the Board of Admiralty in consequence of that Court-martial; and copies of the Minutes of the Court-martial upon colonel Quentin of the 10th Hussars; to be laid before this House."