NEW REGULATIONS IN THE MILITIA. (Hansard, 23 November 1813)

Lord Castlereagh

was conscious that only one feeling pervaded the House and the country, on the necessity of exertion at so propitious and so decisive a period, and on the propriety of arming government with extraordinary means.—Any thing, which might have a tendency to increase the disposable force of the country, would, therefore, he was certain, meet with general approbation. He would call the attention of the House to some further regulations, which, he thought, should be adopted in the militia, without altering the principle on which that establishment was founded. He had no doubt, but the ends and wishes of government would be fulfilled by the additional amount of force lately granted by parliament. But it would become a question for them to decide, whether the existing arrangements would be sufficient for the service of the interior, or whether other more advantageous dispositions could not be made to meet any exigency which might possibly arise. As far as he was able to judge, the regular and local militias were, on their present footing, framed and organized in a most excellent manner: but occasions might occur, in which the necessity of those bodies being disposable might urgently be felt. He did not intend to propose any alteration in their constitution and establishment, and would not require from them any other service than that which he felt confident would be found consistent with their own spirit and good will, without any departure from the militia principle. The regulations which he should suggest embraced two heads, the local and the regular militia. They were not, if adopted, to be acted upon immediately; but he only wished government to have the power of accepting extended services from those bodies, should any necessity arise. With respect to the local militia, it was liable to be called into action on two services: in case of rebellion or of invasion. These were not likely now to happen; and notwithstanding the grant of force made by parliament for foreign service, and the magnitude of the 189 armies which we maintained abroad, yet the internal strength of the country was placed on the most satisfactory and encouraging footing. As long as England possessed her local militia and yeomanry, and Ireland her yeomanry, it might be said that an army was left sufficient for the defence of the empire. When it was seen what had been achieved by the Silesian battalions newly raised, and scarcely disciplined (at least in no degree to be compared in that respect with our militia and yeomanry), who would not feel confident in our own internal strength, and, with that description of force alone, secure against all the attempts of an external enemy? It was to be considered, however, that our country contained a large mass of French prisoners, who could not now be properly guarded without some new disposition of our force. It was indeed the peculiar and strange situation of the enemy, that he had left in the hands of his opponents, in those of Prussia, Russia, besides England, and shut up in fortresses, such a number of prisoners as would form, if collected, a larger army than any power in Europe at present possessed. But, however it might become necessary to alter the nature of the services of the local militia, it would be done, he repeated, with as small a departure as possible from the principle of the institution. When every voice in the country and in parliament agreed with his Majesty's ministers in the propriety of increasing and exerting our force, when they were invested with the power which that unanimous consent created, and honoured with the confidence which it displayed, it became their duty more than ever to restrict their measures within due limits, and on no occasion whatever to abuse that authority with which they had been armed, by exceeding the necessities of the case. When he proposed to extend the services of the local militia, he wished at the same time to limit them in point of time. Instead of performing 28 days service in their own county, he would enable them to do it in another, as the exigency might require; and for that purpose would so extend the period of their service, as would allow them to move from one county to another. He thought, the time for going and returning included, the whole need not exceed six weeks. If compared with the points to which it might be necessary to call them, without carrying them to such a distance as would 190 be injurious to their concerns and families, he thought that period would be found sufficient. This was all that he would require from the local militia. As to the regular militia, he only wished the crown to be empowered to accept their services, without the limitations which the law imposes. Instead of the present regulation, by which an interval of four years for the English, and of six for the Irish militia, must intervene between the march of a regiment to either country and its return, he would propose that interval to be reduced to one year, so as to render that force still more disposable than it now was. It would not be necessary to employ all the militia at once; but as exigencies unfolded themselves, the crown would call on certain regiments, to ask whether they were disposed to extend their services to such parts where they might be needed? There were two other points on which he would ask leave to bring in Bills, and which, without departing from the principle of the former measure, he conceived, would give considerable encouragement to the transfer of service from the militia to the line. The first was, that the previous years of service in the militia should not be entirely lost by any man volunteering into the line. Service in the West Indies counted in an increased proportion; he would propose that in the militia to be under an equality with that in the line, but such as to approximate the individual to the advantages which are obtained by length of service in the latter. The other related to the non-commissioned officers in the militia, for whom he thought parliament ought long ago to have legislated. Their situation was truly unfortunate. After 25 years service, a serjeant was either kept in the regiment when unfit for duty, by the charity of his colonel; or if he retired, had no other provision than 5d. a day. He would now propose, that any militia serjeant volunteering into the line, should, after a certain period of service, be entitled to a certain amount of pension. The details as to the rate of value of previous militia service in the first case, or the amount of the pensions in the second, he should leave to the wisdom of parliament to settle. There was another class whose situation he could not contemplate, as it was so subordinate and inferior to the corresponding class in the line, without astonishment that men of any abilities should be found to enter it. He meant 191 the surgeons in the militia, in whose favour he would also call on parliament to interfere, to approximate their situation to that of surgeons in the line. The last measure he had now to propose would be, to empower his Majesty to augment the 60th regiment, principally composed of foreigners, from seven, to any number not exceeding ten battalions. This, he stated, would be cheaper than forming two regiment of the same description. His lordship concluded by moving for leave to bring in a Bill to enable his Majesty to accept the services of the local militia out of their county, under certain restrictive regulations.

§ Mr. Whitbread

had no doubt but this measure of the noble lord's originated in the joyful event which had just taken place in Holland, and which made him desirous to employ a larger force out of this country, to assist that nation to be recover its independence. Never did a more favourable opportunity present itself to exert our whole strength, with more confidence of success; and the noble lord need not anticipate any opposition from him, to a measure calculated to facilitate the emancipation of a brave people. But for the presence of the French prisoners, who, he sincerely regretted, still remained in this country, he would say that there never was a moment when less force was required to conduct the police at home. Tranquillity was reigning within our island; and he trusted that the abundant harvest with which Providence had blessed us, the cheapness of provisions returning with returning employment, would maintain it; would dispel any apprehension of its again being disturbed; and would convince men, that the riots which had some time since alarmed the country, were only occasioned by the dearness of provisions, and, the had therefore ceased with them. There could be but one voice in favour of our assisting the Dutch. They had already so far succeeded because theirs was a contest of the people, and not of the government. Because it was a contest of the government and not the people, the single battle of Jena had crushed the Prussian monarchy. Because the people and not the government now waged it; the Prussian monarchy was restored. When Buonaparte marched his immense army to the centre of the Russian empire, the people fought, and he was destroyed. In Sweden, the people had rid themselves, 192 with a bloodless revolution, of an oppressive government, and elected in its stead that great captain, whom the noble lord had represented as the author of the plans of the present campaign. They had selected a chief out of the French armies, were he had learned to conquer him under whom he had served; and to conquer him under whom he had served; and to the exertions of the Swedish people we were therefore indebted for a portion of the great results now obtained. The energies of the people, at the beginning of the French revolution, had repelled the hositilities of invading nations; and it was not till, happily for Europe, the emperor of France stretched those energies too far, that his power, under the will of an all-wise Providence, crumbled in his hands. It was the people of England that assisted all nations, and he felt confident it would continue to do it with all its power, and with universal spirit and satisfaction. The time of the year was favourable to the collection of a large force, without injuring the interests of the country. The agricultural labours of the year were over and for a few months, those men who before would have been wanted to reap the harvest and cultivate the ground, might be spared to assist in restoring the independence of Europe. In the house and exultation of success, however, he wished us not to forget ourselves. He did not believe that any attack on the liberties or the country was intended, or that any effort to obtain an undue increase of influence for the crown was made. Yet it should be remembered, that the present events necessarily created a larger augmentation of influence than ever. He did not urge this in a spirit of hostility, but merely as an admonitory observation. Far from opposing it in the present circumstances, he consented to it; he gave it his feeble support, because he though it necessary; and however humble he might be as an individual, yet that support was valuable, because it was not given blindly, but with his eyes open to all the inconveniences, with which the measures, rendered necessary by events might be attended.