Mr. Hutchinson,in pursuance of his notice, rose, and addressed the House to the following effect:—Sir; the wish for a secure and honourable peace must be general; but no one, at this moment, believes in the possibility of its attainment; nay, all agree in the necessity of continuing the war. Those who, till lately, shared in the universal panic which the unrivalled success, for many years, of the French arms on the continent had produced, are; now considerably shaken in their first impressions, and inclined to hope where they had once despaired. Those who, with myself, never swerved from the opinion, that this nation possessed great military power, though they have lamented, and still continue to lament, the too frequent misapplication of that power, and the inadequacy of our exertions, cannot but most heartily rejoice in any event which demonstrates the gallantry and efficiency of our troops, however they may consider such events as indecisive of ultimate success, and only as positive proofs of the capability of the empire—proofs, however, not requisite to establish, though they afford a noble confirmation of our long-acknowledged character for national intrepidity.
Yet, Sir, while ministers hold this language themselves, and cheer these sentiments in others, they declare that we are contending for our very existence as a state—that the great cause which we maintain in the Peninsula, is not so much that of the allies, as our own—that it is better to decide our fate there with the enemy, than to have to contend with him on these shores. We have been triumphantly congratulated on having escaped the fate of all the other powers of Europe, on our having arrested the progress of the enemy, by our glorious achievements in the Peninsula, where we are told, that we have directed the "impending thunderbolt" harmless to the earth. We have indeed gained that, which in war is inestimable—fame! We have obtained that, which is in itself a tower of strength—confidence!—While to the taunts of an 533 enemy become insolent by success, we have replied by repeated victories.
But Sir, as I was not one of those who mistook hopes for certainties, or construed the retreat of an enemy into the consummation of a campaign, I am not now surprised that a contest, which was considered as having finally terminated, should have but just commenced. I cannot forget that we are but now recovering, in consequence of the enemy's cession, that country, of which he had but recently dispossessed us. Assuredly we have cause to rejoice, and to be sincerely thankful—but while victory, that victory which is to decide between the two countries, is still doubtful, we should prepare more than ever for war—not hang up our arms, nor devote merely to eulogies and congratulations, those precious moments, which should be employed in exerting every nerve to afford lord Wellington, (who has spent his life in the "tented field," and who, repeatedly victorious, has never yet been defeated), a fair opportunity of measuring swords with the enemy, when, with increased force and confidence, he shall "rally for the fight."
Sir; there is no man in this House, or in the country, less disposed to excite a spirit of interminable warfare than I am; but however most desirable a secure and honourable peace may be, as well for the interests of humanity, as to lighten the severe pressure on the public, I cannot discover in either government any pacific disposition; neither will, I fear, consent, without first obtaining an unfair advantage over the other. With the exception of the war in the Peninsula, Buonaparté's splendid and unequalled success has been the result of plans wisely conceived, and ably executed. His objects have been worthy a great conqueror. His exertions and means employed fully equal to the attainment. Look to him in 1799, when, for the first time, he was placed at the head of the government of France, collecting at Dijon an army of reserve (ridiculed, because its object was not understood), with which he secured his victory at Marengo in the following year (1800). See him at Boulogne with his army of England, equally ridiculed, preparing in 1803 for the defeat of Austria at Austerlitz in 1805. Behold him in his Confederation of the Rhine (early in 1806) anticipating by its agency the enthraldom of Germany, the subjugation of the Prussian monarchy, and the humbling of the great Autocrat of the 534 north. View him on the Vistula in 1806–7, (while we were ridiculing his exertions" anticipating his destruction, and paralyzed into a state of culpable inactivity) collecting troops from Italy, and the most western extremities of France, Flanders, and Holland, by the aid of which, he afterwards fought and conquered on the memorable day of Friedland, decisive of so much!—Witness similar exertions after the battle of Asperne (1809) when at Wagram, he repaired the disasters of that day, and established his real supremacy in Europe, by a masterly and rapid junction of scattered and distant corps. See him at this moment in the north-west of Europe, under the pretext of merely excluding British commerce from the Continent (one of his objects doubtless—one too originally ridiculed as visionary; but which, however, unhappily for us, has been but too successful), organizing a force, by which he has already nominated to the throne of Sweden, and is now enabled to make any distribution he pleases of those of Denmark and Prussia. See him at Dantzic, Custrine, and Stettin—behold, on the north-east of Germany, his long-delayed, but sure-working plans as to the reintegration of Poland, whence, as from a citadel, he will be enabled to hold in subjection the whole European Continent. View him in his Illyrian empire, already directing his footsteps, resolved to plant his eagles on the Byzantine throne of the Cæsars. And, finally, behold him calling out the conscripts for 1811, for the purpose of securing, if not resisted by counter-exertions on our part, the conquest of Spain and Portugal, however hitherto deferred—and (not unlikely) for ulterior objects too, the mere mention of which might subject one perhaps to the scorn and derision of this House, and to the reprobation of an easily deceived public; who, feeble when they think themselves invincible, are frequently most confident when they have least reason for being so—and who, possessing great resources wherewith to become strong, are often ignorant how to call forth such power, and still more how to employ it when arrayed.
From these examples, Sir, it is evident that Napoleon has left nothing to accident or chance, but than (with the exception already mentioned) he has invariably acted on plans suggested by the wisest policy, and carried into effect with the most consummate military talent, What have 535 been during the same period, our continental exertions? In 1800, we appeared off Genoa with a small corps, not exceeding 4,000 men, a few days subsequent to the battle of Marengo. The junction of a considerable military force, such as might easily have been furnished by this country, would in all probability, a few days prior to our arrival, have secured the victory to the Austrians, and possibly have prevented the forming of those fetters, which have since enchained the powers of Europe. The attempt at least would have been worthy of this nation, and so great a cause. Subsequent to this, in the same year, we made two unsuccessful attempts against Ferrol and Cadiz. In 1801, with about 14,000 effective men, we undertook the expulsion of 26,000 of the chosen troops of Fiance from Egypt—a glorious expedition, and the only one successful during that whole war. In 1805, with 8,000 men, we formed a junction in Italy with the Neapolitan and Russian armies, but we speedily abandoned the country, and landed in the December of that year, with 25,000 men, in the North of Germany, where we took up a Position on the Weser, but not until the battle of Austerlitz had been lost, and an armistice signed preparatory to the peace of Presburgh. In 1806, with less than 5,000 men against a greatly superior force, we gained the battle of Maida, which, though highly glorious to the troops and to the general (sir John Stuart) as every thing connected with his mililary life has been, had no beneficial result. In the same year, we made several piratical descents at Buenos Ayres, where, after having increased our force to 10,000 men, we were ultimately foiled and disgraced. In 1807, with a small corps, we made an unnecessary, unjust, and inglorious descent on the "coast of Egypt, from whence, in a few months, we hastily retired. And in the same year, (after permitting a favourable opportunity to escape us, and suffering our allies, the Russians, to waste themselves in a most unequal contest, which they maintained with the utmost heroism) we appeared, at the very eve of the peace of Tilsit, with a small corps of 7,000 men at Stralsund, whence we speedily retired, without performing any thing; and with increased numbers, amounting to 25,000, we shortly after succeeded in the unhallowed capture of Copenhagen, In 1808, the gallant and ever-to-be-lamented 536 sir John Moore, was dispatched (with what rational military object remains still to be explained) to Sweden, with a chosen corps of 10,000 men, which his good sense and firmness probably saved from destruction, and with which he shortly returned to the British coast, without having fired a shot. In the same year commenced our campaigns in Spain and Portugal, under the most propitious circumstances, the spirit of our people and that of the allies most enthusiastic—the slate of Europe favourable—the cause a great and just one! Yet sir John Moore, though at the head of a nominal corps of 40,000 men, was at no moment in a situation of offering battle to the enemy, with a force much exceeding 26,000 effective. I am aware that the Downing-street generals, assisted by their staff and official documents, proved to their own satisfaction at least, that he had 40,000; but sir John Moore, though in the field with them, never could discover more than 26,000; it is true, indeed, he had recourse but to the old exploded method of counting By the head. Yet in this same year it appears, that the whole French force collected behind the Ebro, did not exceed 45,000 men—and early in this year we might have had 70,000 in the peninsula. In 1809, after having received intelligence of the loss of the battle of Wagram, we committed an army of 40,000 men to the marshes of Walcheren. Our bravest sons, eager for the fight, there died the death of cowards and of common men! Sunk without wounds, and fell without renown! And this we did with such an admirable choice of time and place, that even had success ensued, we could not have struck an effectual blow against the power of Buonaparté.—Yet early in that year, by uniting only our Walcheren, Spanish, and Sicilian armies, we might have thrown on any part of the continent 93,000 men, a force greatly superior in number to that with which the archduke Charles joined the battle of Aspeme, and nearly equal to that with which the enemy obtained the decisive victory of Wagram.
What, Sir, would Buonaparté have done with our means? How would he have availed himself of such opportunities? On several different occasions, the French armies were in Austria, at the most distant points of Prussia, nay at the eastern extremity of Poland. France, stripped of troops, exposed at all points, a population 537 of eleven millions in the Peninsula, animated as one man against her, a hostile disposition towards her in various parts of the continent, these islands, peopled with a hardy gallant peasantry, trained in a great degree to arms, an embodied militia from 65 to 86,000 men, a regular army from 135 to 235,000, a local militia to any amount, the undisputed empire of the seas, tonnage equal to convoy any number of men, the enemy's shores within a few hours sail, all Europe open to us.—What, I ask, with these opportunities, and such means, would not Buonaparté have attempted? What would he not have effected?
It has been said, that had we to select a spot in Europe, most favourable to ourselves, and most disadvantageous to the enemy, we should have chosen that on which we now act in the Peninsula. We have been reminded of the great and appalling difficulties under which the enemy has brought up his troops and supplies from the most distant points, and of the great comparative facility with which we have effected the same objects, in consequence of our maritime advantages and locality. How have we availed ourselves of these advantages of which ministers boast so much? The strength of lord Wellington's army, originally 25,000 men, has not in the course of two years been increased to more than 35,000 effective British; that strength now much diminished, in consequence of our severe recent losses. Yet we appear to be possessed of a force amounting to 235,000 men, from which, deducting the armies and garrisons of the Peninsula, Sicily, Gibraltar, America, the Cape, the two Indias, and Ireland, amounting to about 134,000, there remains a force unaccounted for (at least, not employed on actual service) of upwards of 100,000, allowing too in the above statement (of 135,000) 50,000 to be actually employed in the Peninsula, 20,000 for the East Indies, and as many for Ireland, both of which are greatly overstated at this amount. Do these 100,000 men really exist? If they do not, why is the country burdened with the enormous expense necessary for the support of such an establishment? If they are forth coming, why are they not, or a part of them, employed in the Peninsula?
I shall not be told that it is necessary to: keep upon our own shores, a disposable force of 121,000 men, after what we have 538 heard of the perfect internal security afforded by the Local Militia and other corps—this security should be something more than nominal, when it appears that the expence to the country of the embodied and Local Militia, and the Volunteer Corps, exceeds anually three millions sterling, while their vast numbers render any other species of troops altogether superfluous for home defence. Does lord Wellington not require reinforcements? Supposing the French armies now hovering on the frontiers of Portugal defeated—nay, according to the sanguine calculation of some gentlemen, destroyed—could this be effected without severe loss on our side?—Can we expect, when we consider the enemy we have to deal with, that lord Wellington with his present British force, aided but by the inexperienced, however patriotic and gallant levies of Portugal and Spain, can continue this contest with any prospect of ultimate success, so long as we only afford scanty and inadequate supplies. In the hour of our success, we calumniate the enemy. Are we ignorant how highly the officers who led the van of the British army applaud the skill and valour of Marshal Ney, and those troops who covered the retreat of Massena? Do we already forget our own severe losses on the Doas Casas, and that still more sanguinary, though glorious conflict of Albuera? In what state have the exertions of the enemy left our armies at this moment for active operations in the Peninsula? Would not a small reinforcement to him at this critical instant compel us hastily to retire to our lines?
I deny, generally, the humble degraded state of the enemy and his loss of military fame, and I do so, not with a view of offending or irritating those who differ from me, but to remove an impression, which if suffered to remain, may be greatly injurious, at a moment when our exertions, instead of being relaxed, should be more vigorous than ever. Between October and the first week in March, lord Wellington did not receive more than 0,000 additional men, though it is evident he felt himself not sufficiently strong in his lines, for in October he recalled from Estremadura, marquis Romana and his corps, who at that moment threatened Seville, having recommenced offensive operations. The absence of this corps from this point enabled Soult and Mortier to combine their operations against Badajo, and may be 539 fairly considered as having greatly accelerated the fall of that place. His lordship has proved to ministers the great value of a reinforcement, even of 5,000 men, for on the arrival of a force to that amount, in March last, he was enabled to undertake the double operations to the Agueda and the Guadiana: he has also avowed, that had he received these men earlier, he would have attempted the relief of Badajos. Ministers may now indeed chaunt the praises of lord Wellington, but it is evident they did not afford him effectual support, at a most important moment, and they may be accused of having even marred his plan. We are told, that we have secured for the allies an additional year. Let us not be too sure of this: but granting it, are we to rest satisfied? Is this the utmost of our expectations? An additional year! Is this the nature of the warfare which we wage r Is it for this additional year only, that, in all the "waste of blind extravagance," we are squandering our treasures, and shedding the best blood of the empire? It has been rumoured, that the Spanish Government at Cadiz does not enter cordially into lord Welington's views. I know not how true this may be; but of this I am confident, that, however the short-sighted politicians of Britain may consider a mere protracted contest beneficial to these islands, the Spaniards and Portuguese cannot but feel that war, with such an object, must end in their general desolation—and could it but reach them, that even the minister had, in argument, seemed to limit his views only to this—there is surely no inhabitant of the Peninsula who ought not, most anxiously, to desire the speedy removal of the British army.
But the folly of limiting our exertions to mere self defence must be evident. Let us recollect that we are not now at war to restore or protect any particular dynasty—to dictate a constitution to another people—nor to prevent their procuring for themselves that liberty, and those privileges, which we never should have forgotten our ancestors obtained by the sword. Of this we might have been accused in 1793. We have since lived to see Europe in chains, and our own subjugation threatened. It is for this we arm! The moment is then one, not suited to dilatoriness or irresolution. We must have no half measures. Let us then not lose so great an opportunity—let us rally under the impression, so eloquently and forcibly 540 expressed by the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that "this enthraldom of Europe is not intended to last for ever—that possibly, in so just and great a cause, we may be pointed out, and intended by Providence, as the humble instruments of deliverance!" But to render, ourselves worthy of this high exaltation, we must not slumber on our posts! Why have all our victories hitherto been so unavailing? Because the nation has never put forth its strength. What was the result of the victories of Role and Vimiera? The Convention of Cintra. Why? The strength of the enemy. What of the victory of Corunna? Embarkation. What of the victory of Talavera? Retreat, and from apprehension as to the like, strength. What of Barrosa? Retreat, also! without accomplising the object of the expedition, the British not being it" sufficient force. And even now, when we think ourselves so successful, will lord Wellington suffer Massena to continue in Salamanca and Leon, or the other French armies in Andalusia? Supposing them to retire, and unite, has he strength prudently to venture into the heart of Spain, and to clear that country of an enemy, whom we scoff at, as discomfited and disgraced? Are all our rejoicings to end in this, that Massena having attempted that for which he appears not to have had sufficient force, has retired from a bad position in Portugal, to his resources in Spain, until it shall be his convenience, with increased numbers, and at a more favourable season, to return? Our past and present circumstances have been compared; that is, our situation now in the Peninsula, to what it was in 1808 Where are the Spanish armies of that year? Are they not defeated and dispersed? In whose hands are the fortresses then occupied by the Spaniards? Are they not principally in the hands of the enemy? We have reason now to exult, but at what? That the enemy has not hitherto succeeded in expelling us from Portugal! Our success "has this extent, no more!" But from our present rejoicings, one might be disposed to infer, that we bad expected annihilation. Why, in 1809, did Buonaparté withdraw himself and his guards from Spain? Was it not to defeat Austria? And did he not gloriously accomplish the object. Why has the war so long, lingered in the Peninsula.' Because he has had other views. Is he not now prepared to enter into another continental war, and in another quarter' of Europe, should circumstances 541 render it necessary? I am sorry to perceive an anxiety in this country for such a war. We seem alike ignorant of the strength and situation of the enemy, and indifferent to the fate of other nations, eager for revenge we cry for blood, reckless of the consequences! It has often been our policy to excite the continent to war; and when the misfortunes of our allies, possibly our neglect, had separated us, we have immediately had recourse to an envenomed illiberal abuse,—proving ourselves no less powerful in enmity, than unserviceable in friendship. How cruelly have not the Russians been aspersed, against whom the pen even of the learned and the wise, has, with little justice and Jess charity, been directed; whose very virtues, with a shameless ingratitude, have been represented as vices? Having ourselves, in 1807, been mere spectators of the scene, we have since dared to question that merit, which even our common enemy has acknowledged; I say our common enemy, for France is still in heart the enemy of Russia, Should the emperor Alexander be so ill advised as to break with France at this moment, what are likely to be our occupations? If we do not materially change our system, we shall perhaps advance a little further into the Peninsula, still with an inadequate force. We shall subsidize Russia, if she will deign to accept; and provided no hitherto undiscovered rock, or petty island, attracts our notice, we may send to some point of the continent, far distant from the scene of action, and late in the war, a corps unequal to effectual impression, but just sufficient to encourage the deluded people, (naturally discontented with the tyranny under which they exist), to rise in arms; and, having elated them by our presence, abandon them to their fate, after having exhausted their country, and exposed them to the chastisement of an irritated master.
How have you been hitherto waging war against Buonaparté? By exhausting your treasury and discouraging even your own people, by repeated continental failures, you flatter yourselves you are making a great exertion, because incurring an enormous debt, but while, doubtless, you are succeeding in this, do you thereby advance one inch toward limiting the power of France, which, if suffered to acquire strength in the rapid manner it has done, will shake your empire to its Very foundation?
542 But you imagine that you are safe at home—Are you so? You have indeed challenged Buonaparté to your coasts, and with little justice and less modesty, have pronounced him afraid to meet you! You doubt his intentions to invade. Look to his levies of seamen, and his other naval preparations. Hear his threats—But you believe the thing to be impracticable Examine his means, and recollect your own history! Have you not heard from the first lord of the Admiralty, that the labours of the enemy to complete his navy are incessant, that he has nearly ready for sea sixty-four sail of the line—that commanding, all the naval resources and most of the ports of Europe, it would be "idle to question his capability of rendering himself formidable as a naval power." You have frequently experienced the gallantry of the seamen of Holland, France, and Spain, to whom those of Sweden and Denmark do not yield—those of Genoa and Venice have also had their day; why not again? Greece and her islands have hitherto furnished abundance of seamen to the fleets of Turkey and Russia. Ali, or the greater part of these countries, are under the absolute control of Buonaparté.
We have been lately more successful than usual on the continent, because we have applied more of our physical strength. The enemy has been less so, from not having been able to direct all his energies to one point, as in his former wars. Our success, then, and the enemy's retreat, prove the truth of my position, which is, not that numbers will, and always have been victorious, but that without a certain strength it is impossible to succeed. Such troops as gained the battles of Talavera, Barrosa, and those of Portugal, can not be too confidently relied upon, but they should not be devoted in small numbers, where their heroism only can be proved. Buonaparté has hitherto waged successful wars against the corrupt and feeble governments of Europe, who mouldered at his very touch, but he never before was engaged in a contest with a whole people, who have no government to sell or betray them. One district may be held in subjection by the presence of an army, meanwhile the neighbouring pro vince rises. This species of warfare in other times would have exhausted any invading nation. Such a contest, well managed, may yet prove too mach even for Buonaparté.
543 There never was a period in the history of this country when the union of political and military knowledge were so necessary, or might be so advantageously exerted in the councils of the nation, as at the present hour, "this important hour," perhaps "the very crisis of our fate." We have reason to feel somewhat of confidence, which we have not had for some time, not so much owing to what we have ourselves achieved, as inconsequence of the serious difficulties in which the enemy has involved himself, but we must not believe those who say he will abandon his views in Spain. Such, under his difficulties, might be the conduct of a Bourbon—a legitimate prince, who might, without risk, retire within his hereditary dominions; but he who has, by his sword, possessed himself of the Empire of the West, and is encircled by those he has despoiled, cannot venture to retrograde—he must prove himself invincible, or relinquish every thing.
We are checked in all our sanguine expectations; by the apprehensions of the cautious, and the financial calculations of the economical, and every suggestion for opposing an effectual resistance to the power of France, is met by a reference to the already-protracted length, the frequent failures, and burthensome nature of the contest. I am aware of this; but I am convinced, that, however unwisely we have hitherto conducted the war, we possess the means to act otherwise—and if it be admitted that we cannot make peace with safety, the war should be carried on with energy, unless we would have the power of Britain crouch to that of France.
It is, then, incumbent on us at length to put forth our strength—if we do not, then indeed will all our former exertions have been rendered wholly unprofitable. I admit our expenditure hitherto to have been immense—in many instances, profligate and useless! What sums have there not been expended since 1793, on coast and insular expeditions, and on some, most wild continental ones, many of which have not been enumerated! How many millions in subsidies, some of them most objectionable—in foreign levies—home fortifications, quite unnecessary—barracks, and other whims!—A small part of these sums would have enabled us to have acted as principals, most formidable, too, on the continent. We have been reminded of the war system of our ancestors—that we should adhere to that, 544 and depend on our navy. It is idle to, look for precedents in times quite dissimilar to those in which we live. Our ancestors knew no such dangers as those to which we are exposed. I have lamented the division and misapplication of oar force, and have expressed a wish for concentrated, formidable attacks—for war with energy, not as we have waged it—war with no partial views, but comprehending the interests of the civilized world—war, as the soldiers of a great empire, not as the pirates of a petty state!
It is evident from a retrospect of our proceedings, since the commencement of the war, that we have never been in sufficient force on the continent, and on reference to the Army Estimates of each year, it appears, that we have not employed in our continental expeditions, any thing like the quantum of force, which the military establishments of the country enabled us to employ—that we have never been at the moment, nor at any point, where supposing success to have attended our arms, we, or our allies, could have essentially benefited; that we have never anticipated, but have always awaited in stupid gaze the coming of events; that we have therefore never prepared before hand; that we have seldom had a fixed plan of our own, but have usually looked to the enemy for our motions; that of such plans as we had devised, and attempted the execution, most of them were conceived in utter ignorance; some accomplished, and others sought to be accomplished, in violation of solemn treaties, and the most sacred principles of the laws of nations! We have lost the finest opportunities! We have exhausted ourselves in a vast variety of insular, and some purely buccanneering expeditions, which have thrown a deceitful colouring of glory on our arms, and which appear to have enriched, while, in fact, they have impoverished the state, and deceived the people with, an appearance of security, strength, and prosperity, entirely fictitious. But this is not the moment for complaint, the past is irretrievable—the future is yet our own! I cannot conceal from the House my conviction, that this contest, sustained in the manner in which we are now carrying it on, cannot fail to terminate fatally. At this moment the efficient force under lord Wellington is over-rated at 25,000 men. It is also divided, and opposed by superior French armies—these armies, certain soon to obtain considerable reinforcements. 545 What are our views? For the moment we are taking up strong positions on the frontiers, where, at immense loss, we have repulsed the enemy, but the intention, the avowed plan, is to fall back to our position, when the enemy shall have strength to advance in force, and to re-occupy our lines in the neighbourhood of Lisbon, which require 70,000 men to defend. But should our losses continue in the proportion that they have been since the opening of this campaign, and our supplies be as slowly and sparingly furnished as they have been since the commencement of the peninsular war, the result cannot be problematical, but failure the most complete inevitable. One cannot hear with patience, after all our boasted facilities and maritime advantages, and the great difficulties under which the enemy carries on his operations in the peninsula, that at this moment, while we possess a numerous useless cavalry, at home, which we could (as it were in a moment) transport to the opposite shores, we are greatly out-numbered even in that arm. One cannot silently hear the merit of such an enemy decried, after his having overcome all these obstacles, and recently performed some of the most difficult and gallant military achievements, such as the retreat from Santarem, the evacuation of Almeida, with the destruction of that fortress and the preservation of its garrison: and the undaunted heroism displayed in the late sanguinary battle, where on the heights of Albuera, the troops of the two most warlike nations of the earth never more distinguished themselves, though victory declared in favour of Britain. The hon. gentleman concluded with moving the following Resolution:
"That an humble Address be presented to his royal highness the Prince Regent, to assure his royal highness of the unfeigned attachment of this House to his person and government, and their undiminished confidence in his wisdom, vigour and perseverance; the display and exercise of which qualities in the administration of the affairs of this empire can alone, under the blessing of Providence, bring the arduous contest in which they are engaged, to an happy and glorious termination.
"That, called upon as this House has been, to impose many and grievous burdens on a loyal, patient, and affectionate people, they should, nevertheless, fail in their duty towards themselves, his royal 546 highness, and their country, if they did not declare their firm conviction, that it is by additional sacrifices alone, and superadded vigour, they can ever hope to bring this war to a safe and honourable conclusion, a war, unexampled in its extent and duration, in which they contend not for glory, empire, and dominion, but for existence.
"If their efforts have been great, they must be still greater; if their sacrifices have been many, they must be still more numerous. They cannot but recoliect, that they arm for the independence of man against embattled Europe, awed by the assumed authority, and subdued by the power of one relentless mind, whose policy, whose? ambition, whose hope, is the destruction of this country, and all it" proud establishments.
"That, anxious as they are to obtain a durable, a safe, and honourable peace, they can see no means of obtaining this inestimable good, but in the vigorous prosecution of the war, in a strict economy of all the remaining resources, in an indissoluble union, by one common interest, of every class of his Majesty's subjects, and in military efforts proportionate to the danger, and limited alone by the extent and powers of exertion, which are to be found in this empire.
"That, in common with all his Majesty's faithful subjects, they have to lament former failures, and to rejoice at present successes.
"That, in this protracted warfare, much has occurred to instruct ignorance, and chastise presumption, and a great deal to inspire hope, and future confidence. That if something has been done, much remains to be performed, which can never be accomplished without the most stedfast regard and attention to those fixed and immutable military principles, without which exertion must be useless, and courage itself unavailing."
The Chancellor of the Exchequersaid, it was not his intention to take up much of the time of the House. He assured the hon. gent. that in what he bad formerly stated respecting the views entertained by his Majesty's government, he had never designed to undervalue the force and the power of the enemy. It had never been in his contemplation to represent the French army as degraded, but upon comparing it in the state to which it was reduced by recent events, with that degree of estimation in which was before 547 held by its successes, over the powers of Europe, be had meant to say, that its glory and its terrors were diminished. It was lowered in character from that unnatural height which it had previously attained, and was clearly proved to have no claim to the title of invincible. With respect to a system of protracted warfare, he certainly did consider that the maintainance of the contest on the Peninsula, even for another year, would afford a chance which it would be consonant to every sound view of practical policy to adopt. He had never, however, confined himself to the belief that another year was the necessary limit to our exertions in that quarter, and had never intended to urge more than that, if there was any where a peculiar opportunity, and a more favourable prospect than another of resisting the enemy, it was to be found in Spain and Portugal. It was there he conceived it to be the paramount interest of the country to maintain the straggle. With respect to what had been said of the want of feeling displayed by fermenting and keeping alive the war in the Peninsula, in his opinion, no calamity that might be inflicted on that part of the Continent by a protracted warfare, could be equal to the evil of French dominion. Thus much he deemed it necessary to say in explanation of his sentiments formerly expressed. In answer to that part of the hon. gentleman's speech in which he talked of lord Wellington's not having been sufficiently reinforced, and of his exertions having been starved, he had it in his power to say, that lord Wellington himself held no such opinion. He would, however, rather see this sentiment prevail in the public mind than the contrary one, that the blood and treasure of the country had been wantonly and extravagantly squandered. The reinforcements sent to lord Wellington arrived sufficiently early to enable him to prosecute all his designs. As to the general and speculative views taken by the hon. gent., it was easy in the closet to project schemes for the sending 50 or 100,000 men abroad, but the moving and the maintenance of such a body were difficulties not easy to be surmounted in practice; neither was the real military strength of a state to be fairly judged by its numerical amount. What had been already done by ministers was, an his judgment, enough to procure them credit for a disposition to make every practicable exertion consistent with the object of preventing the country from exhausting 548 itself so as to leave it incapable of maintaining for any length of time the contest on which its best interests depended. However he might concur in the spirit with which the hon. gent. had regarded the general objects of our foreign policy, he did not think the House would be well advised if they were to adopt the Address of the hon. gent., or endeavour to stimulate government beyond that temperate and cautious, but firm and energetic system of exertion on which they had hitherto acted, for which reason he must oppose the motion.
Mr. Hutchinsonin reply stated, that he did not propose this motion for the purpose of calling forth any explanation from ministers of their plan of proceeding, but merely to point out, that they were pursuing a plan in the Peninsula, that would tend to the ruin of this country. He felt it therefore his duty to protest against the manner they were carrying on that contest, without comparing the present ministers to former ministers, or giving any offence to the right hon. gent. and his colleagues. Ha was still convinced that our victories would lead to nothing, however much he united in sentiments that had been slated that night in favour of lord Wellington, who, whether he had been so successful or not, was fully entitled to the confidence of the country. If they suffered the French to collect a force, and not speedily meet them now, all the talent" of lord Wellington, and the bravery of British troops, might be in vain called forth to prevent us being driven out of the Peninsula.
§ The motion was then put and negatived without a division.