§ No. I.—Note from General Budberg to his excellency lord Granville Leveson Gower, dated June, 1807.
§ My Lord, Accept my best thanks for the promptitude with which you had the goodness to transmit to me the dispatches which I have received, together with your excellency's letter of the 11th (23rd) instant. The reports which your lordship mentions are well founded. On the 9th (21st) instant, an armistice was concluded, which was yesterday ratified by both parties. The two armies remain nearly in the same positions, and hostilities will not recommence until a month after the denunciation of the armistice. Sensible that is of the utmost importance to you to transmit this intelligence as speedily as possible to your court, I lose not an instant in re-dispatching the messenger whom your excellency has sent to me.—In respect, my lord, to the interview which you request of me, it would give me great pleasure to comply with your wishes if it were possible for me to foresee at what place the emperor will stay even for a few days; but as we are still upon our journey, I must wait for the first opportunity of taking his imperial majesty's commands, in order to invite you to rejoin me, where I may then be.—I have the honour to be, &c. A. DE BUDBERG.
§ No. II—Note from his excellency lard Granville Leveson Gower, to general Budberg, dated Memel, 16th (28th) June 1807.
§ General,—I have to acknowledge the receipt of the intelligence of the armistice which was signed on the 21st of this month, and although I implicitly confide in your excellency's assurances, I cannot pass over in silence the prospect of a solid and permanent peace, which, from the tenour of your publick letter to the governor of Riga, your excellency appears to believe will be the result of that measure.—The reciprocal engagements between the courts of London and St. Petersburgh, the known principles and the firmness of his imperial majesty, the verbal assurances of the emperor which I have just transmitted to the king my master, were so many pledges, that it is not now a question (according to public rumour) to negotiate for a separate peace, but for a general one; and whatever doubts I may have entertained on this subject, your excellency's letter to general Buxhovden has completely done away. The just and enlightened 111 manner in which your excellency views the situation of Europe, convinces me that you could not expect a peace would be either firm or lasting, which did not include every power at war, and which was not founded upon an equitable basis. My court will be ready to concur in negotiations so formed, since it made war for the sole purpose of obtaining a secure and permanent peace. But your excellency will nevertheless permit me to express all the regret I feel, at being still unable to make known to my government the basis, upon which it is proposed to ground negotiations. At the moment when negotiation is carrying on with the enemy, it is most essential that unlimited confidence should subsist between the allied powers. Upon this principle it is that the court of London has ever acted, and it would be superfluous to recall to your excellency the eagerness testified by the British ministry last year to communicate to the Russian ambassador the whole of the correspondence with the French government. I wait with impatience your excellency's summons to repair to his majesty. Nothing can afford me greater pleasure than to repeat in person the assurances of the esteem, and high consideration with which I have the honour to he, &c. G. L. GOWER.
§ No. III.—Note from general Budberg to his excellency lord Granville Leveson Gower, dated Tilsit, 13th (30th) June 1807.
§ Sir, and Ambassador, I have received the letter which your excellency did me the honour of addressing to me yesterday; and, having laid it before the emperor, my august master, I hasten to transmit to you the answer which his imperial majesty has commanded me to return to it.—The firmness and perseverance with which his majesty during eight months maintained and defended a cause which he had reason to suppose common to all sovereigns, are the most certain pledges of the intentions which animated him, as well as of the loyalty and purity of his principles.— Never would his imperial majesty have thought of deviating from that system which he has hitherto pursued, if he had been supported by a real assistance on the part of his allies.—But having, from the separation of Austria and of England, found himself reduced to his own forces, having to combat with the forces of France united to the immense means of which she has the disposal, and in the critical position at which affairs had arrived, his majesty 112 was authorized in believing, that by continuing to sacrifice himself for others, he would ultimately incur a risk of compromising the safety of his own empire, without being enabled to hope that he might ever fulfil the original object of this war.—The conduct which your government has held during these latter times is moreover of a nature completely to justify the determination which the emperor has now taken. The diversion on the continent which England has so long since promised has not to this day taken place; and if even, according to the latest advices from London, it would appear that the British ministry has at length decided on ordering the departure of 10,000 men to Pomerania, that succour is in no wise proportioned, either to the hopes which we were authorised in entertaining, or to the importance of the object to which these troops were intended to be destined.—The pecuniary succours which England constantly afforded to the powers of the continent at war with France, might in some degree have supplied the want of English troops. Not only did the British government decline facilitating the loan which the imperial court had intended to negotiate at London; but when it at length decided on offering some subsidy to the continental powers, it appeared that the sum destined for this purpose, so far from meeting the exigencies of the allies, would not even have covered the indispensable expences of Prussia.—In fine, the use which has been made of the British forces in the Mediterranean has not been more conformable than the rest to the unity and the connection with which it was indispensable to act in the operations of Russia and England. In lieu of attempting an expedition on the continent of Italy, with a view of reconquering the kingdom of Naples, or else in lieu of uniting these forces to those of Russia which were designed to compel the Porte to a reasonable peace, one part of the English troops stationed in Sicily directed their course towards an entirely different destination, which the British government had not even judged proper to communicate to the court of Russia. It is a point not to be contested, that, by following one or the other of the courses which I have just cited, the English troops in the Mediterranean would have been of an infinitely greater utility to the common cause, by compelling the enemy to divide his forces, which would have enabled Russia to have sent to her main army those reinforcements, which she 113 was under the necessity of employing on the Danube, to support her army destined to make head against the Turkish forces which might be collected in that quarter.—From this statement, I am willing to believe that your excellency will be persuaded, that in such a conjuncture, it only remained for the emperor my master to look to the glory and to the security of his empire, and that if the present crisis does not produce every result which might be expected, if the powers equally interested had displayed vigour in the same proportion as they have exhibited tardiness and irresolution in all their operations, no blame can on this account be attached to Russia.—But, at the same time, the emperor my master offers his mediation to his Britannick majesty to make his peace with France, having the certainty that it will be accepted by the latter power. I have the honour to be; &c. A. DE BUDBERG
§ No. IV.—Note from M. Alopeus to Mr. Secretary Canning, dated London, 20th July (1st August) 1807.
§ The undersigned, minister plenipotentiary from his majesty the emperor of all the Russias to his Britannick majesty, has received the orders of his court to notify to the British ministry, that a treaty of peace was concluded at Tilsit on the 25th June (7th July) between Russia and France.—His imperial majesty of all the Russias, having on this occasion, proposed his mediation, for the purpose of negotiating and concluding likewise a treaty of peace between England and France, and the emperor Napoleon having, by the 13th article of the afore-mentioned treaty of peace, accepted that mediation, the object of the present note is to offer it in like manner to his majesty the king of Great Britain.—Long since acquainted with the pacifick sentiments of his Britannick majesty, the emperor of all the Russias flatters himself the more, that he will embrace this opportunity of restoring peace to all nations, and of insuring repose to the present generation; since that, in many conversations winch his imperial majesty has held with the emperor of the French, he has had reason to be convinced, that he is sincerely desirous of the re-establishment of a maritime peace, upon equitable and honourable principles.—The emperor of all the Russias not only offers his interposition for the attainment of so desirable a result; but he would even be ready to promise the support of all the forces of his empire, for insuring the performance of 114 all time stipulations of peace, when once it shall have taken place between England and France. By this guarantee, his Britannick majesty will obtain that which he has ever appeared to desire, and may without distrust follow the bent of his humane and pacifick sentiments.—The undersigned, in requesting Mr. Canning, principal secretary of state of foreign affairs, to apprize him as soon as possible of the determination which the cabinet of St. James's may judge expedient to take in consequence of this offer of mediation on the part of his august master, avails himself of the opportunity of renewing to his excellency the assurances of his highest consideration. M. ALOPEUS.
§ No. V.—Note from Mr. Secretary Canning to M. Alopeus, dated 5th August 1807.
§ The undersigned, his Britannick majesty's secretary of state for foreign affairs, has lost no time in laying before the king his master the official note presented to him by M. Alopeus, minister plenipotentiary of his majesty the emperor of all the Russias; in which M. Alopeus, by order of his court, notifies to the British government the conclusion at Tilsit, on the 25th June (7th July) of a treaty of peace between Russia and France, and announces at the same time, the offer of the mediation of his imperial majesty, for the conclusion of a treaty of peace between Great Britain and France, and the acceptance of that offer by the French government.—The undersigned has it in command from the king his master to declare, that the emperor of Russia does justice to the sentiments of the king, when his imperial majesty expresses his reliance on the king's disposition to contribute to the restoration of a general peace, such as may ensure the repose of Europe. Ample proofs of that disposition have recently been afforded by his majesty, as well in the answer returned, in his majesty's name, to the offer of the mediation of the emperor of Austria, as in the willingness expressed by his majesty to accede to the convention concluded at Barteniein, on the 23d of April, between the emperor of Russia and the king of Prussia, and in the instructions which the undersigned transmitted by his majesty's command, upon the first intelligence of the late disastrous events in Poland, to his majesty's ambassador at the court of St. Petersburgh, by which instructions that ambassador was directed to signify to the ministers of the emperor of Russia, his majesty's perfect readiness to 115 enter in concert with his august ally, into any negotiation which the emperor of Russia might think it expedient to open for the restoration of a general peace.—These sentiments and this disposition his majesty continues invariably to maintain.—The undersigned is, therefore, commanded by his majesty, to assure M. Alopeus, that his majesty waits with the utmost solicitude for the communication or the articles of the treaty concluded at Tilsit, and for the statement of those equitable and honourable principles, upon which his imperial majesty expresses his belief that France is desirous of concluding a peace with Great Britain.—His majesty trusts that the character of the stipulations of the treaty of Tilsit, and of the principles upon which France is represented as being ready to negotiate, may be found to be such as to afford to his majesty a just hope of the attainment of a secure and honourable peace. In that case his majesty will readily avail himself of the offer of the emperor of Russia's mediation.—But until his majesty shall have received these important and necessary communications, it is obviously impossible that the undersigned should be authorized to return a more specific answer to the note presented by M. Alopeus.—The undersigned, &c. GEORGE CANNING.
§ DECLARATION OF THE KING OF GREAT BRITAIN, RELATIVE TO THE WAR WITH DENMARK, DATED SEPT. 25, 1807.
§ His majesty owes to himself and to Europe a frank exposition of the motives which have dictated his late measures in the Baltick. His majesty has delayed this exposition only in the hope of that more amicable arrangement with the court of Denmark, which it was his majesty's first wish and endeavour to obtain; for which he was ready to make great efforts and great sacrifices; and of which he never lost sight even in the moment of the most decisive hostility. Deeply as the disappointment of this hope has been felt by his majesty, he has the consolation of reflecting that no exertion was left untried on his part to produce a different result. And while he laments the cruel necessity which has obliged him to have recourśe to acts of hostility against a nation, with which it was his majesty's most earnest desire to have established the relations of common interest and alliance; his majesty feels confident that, in the eyes of Europe and of the world, the justification of his conduct will 116 be found in the commanding and indispensable duty, paramount to all others amongst the obligations of a sovereign, of providing, while there was yet time, for the immediate security of his people—His majesty had received the most positive information of the determination of the present ruler of France to occupy, with a military force, the territory of Holstein:—for the purpose of excluding Great Britain from all her accustomed channels of communication with the continent; of inducing or compelling the court of Denmark to close the passage of the Sound against the British commerce and navigation; and of availing himself of the aid of the Danish marine for the invasion of Great Britain and of Ireland.—Confident as his majesty was of the authenticity of the sources from which this intelligence was derived, and confirmed in the credit, which he gave to it, as well by the notorious and repeated declarations of the enemy, and by his recent occupation of the towns and territories of other neutral states, as by the preparations actually made for collecting a hostile force upon the frontiers of his Danish majesty's continental dominions, his majesty would yet willingly have forborne to act upon his intelligence, until the complete and practical disclosure of the plan had made manifest to all the world the absolute necessity of resisting it. His majesty did forbear, as long as there could be a doubt of the urgency of the danger, or a hope of an effectual counteraction to it, in the means or in the dispositions of Denmark.—But his majesty could not but recollect that when, at the close of the former war, the court of Denmark engaged in a hostile confederacy against Great Britain, the apology offered by that court for so unjustifiable an abandonment of a neutrality which his majesty had never ceased to respect, was founded on its avowed inability to resist the operation of external influence, and the threats of a formidable neighbouring power. His majesty could not but compare the degree of influence, which at that time determined the decision of the court of Denmark, in violation of positive engagements, solemnly contracted but six months before; with the increased operation which France had now the means of giving to the same principle of intimidation, with kingdoms prostrate at her feet, and with the population of nations under her banners.—Nor was the danger less imminent than certain.—Already the army destined for the invasion of Holstein was 117 assembling on the violated territory of neutral Hamburgh. And, Holstein once occupied, the island of Zealand was at the mercy of France, and the navy of Denmark at her disposal.—It is true, a British force might have found its way into the Baltick, and checked for a time the movements of the Danish marine. But the season was approaching when that precaution would no longer have availed; and when his majesty's fleet must have retired from that sea, and permitted France, in undisturbed security, to accumulate the means of offence against his majesty's dominions.—Yet, even under these circumstances, in calling upon Denmark for the satisfaction and security which his majesty was compelled to require, and in demanding the only pledge by which that security could be rendered effectual—the temporary possession of that fleet, which was the chief inducement to France for forcing Denmark into hostilities with Great Britain;—His majesty accompanied this demand with the offer of every condition which could tend to reconcile it to the interests and to the feelings of the court of Denmark.—It was for Denmark herself to state the terms and stipulations which she might require.—If Denmark was apprehensive that the surrender of her fleet would be resented by France as an act of connivance; his majesty had prepared a force of such formidable magnitude, as must have made concession justifiable even in the estimation of France, by rendering resistance altogether unavailing.—If Denmark was really prepared to resist the demands of France, and to maintain her independence; his majesty proffered his co-operation for her defence-naval, military and pecuniary aid; the guarantee of her European territories, and the security and extension of her colonial possessions.—That the sword has been drawn in the execution of a service indispensable to the safety of his majesty his majesty's dominions, is matter of sincere and painful regret to his majesty. That the state and circumstances of the world are such as to have required and justified the measures of self-preservation, to which his majesty has found himself under the necessity of resorting, is a truth which his majesty deeply deplores, but for which he is in no degree responsible.—His majesty has long carried on a most unequal contest of scrupulous forbearance against unrelenting violence and oppression. But that forbearance has its bounds. When the design was openly avowed, and already but 118 too far advanced towards its accomplishment, of subjecting the powers of Europe to one universal usurpation, and of combining them by terror or by force in a confederacy against the maritime rights and political existence of this Kingdom, it became necessary for his majesty to anticipate the success of a system, not more fatal to his interests than to those of the powers who were destined to be the instruments of its execution.—It was time that the effects of that dread which France has inspired into the nations of the world, should be counteracted by an exertion of the power of Great Britain, called for by the exigency of the crisis, and Proportioned to the magnitude of the danger.—Notwithstanding the declaration of war on the part of the Danish Government, it still remains for Denmark to determine, whether war shall continue between the two nations. His majesty still proffers an amicable arrangement. He is anxious to sheathe the sword which he has been most reluctantly compelled to draw. And he is ready to demonstrate to Denmark and to the world, that having acted solely upon the sense of what was due to the security of his own dominions, he is not desirous, from any other motive, or for any object of advantage or aggrandisement, to carry measures of hostility beyond the limits of the necessity which has produced them.
§ DECLARATION OF THE KING OF GREAT BRITAIN AGAINST RUSSIA, DATED DECEMBER 18, 1807.
§ The declaration issued at St.Petersburgh by his majesty the emperor of all the Russias, has excited in his majesty's mind the strongest sensations of astonishment and regret.—His majesty was not unaware of the nature of those secret engagements which had been imposed upon Russia in the conferences of Tilsit. But his majesty had entertained the hope, that a review of the transactions of that unfortunate negotiation, and a just estimate of its effects upon the glory of the Russian name, and upon the interests of the Russian empire, would have induced his imperial majesty to extricate himself from the embarrassment of those new counsels and connections which he had adopted in a moment of despondency and alarm; and to return to a policy more congenial to the principles, which he has so invariably professed, and more conducive to the honour of his crown, and to the prosperity of his dominions.— 119 This hope has dictated to his majesty the utmost forbearance and moderation in all his diplomatic intercourse with the court of St. Petersburgh since the peace of Tilsit. His majesty had much cause for suspicion, and just ground of complaint. But he abstained from the language of reproach. His majesty deemed it necessary to require specifick explanation with respect to those arrangements with France, the concealment of which from his majesty could not but confirm the impression already received of their character and tendency. But his majesty, nevertheless, directed the demand of that explanation to be made, not only without asperity or the indication of any hostile disposition, but with that considerate regard to the feelings and situation of the emperor of Russia, which resulted from the recollection of former friendship, and from confidence interrupted but not destroyed.—The declaration of the emperor of Russia proves that the object of his majesty's forbearance and moderation has not been attained. It proves, unhappily, that the influence of that power, which is equally and essentially the enemy both of Great Britain and of Russia, has acquired a decided ascendency in the counsels of the cabinet of St. Petersburgh; and has been able to excite a causeless enmity between two nations, whose long-established connection, and whose mutual interests prescribed the most intimate union and co-operation.—His majesty deeply laments the extension of the calamities of war. But called upon, as he is, to defend himself against an act of unprovoked hostility, his majesty is anxious to refute, in the face of the world, the pretexts by which that act is attempted to be justified.—The declaration asserts that his majesty the emperor of Russia has twice taken up arms in a cause, in which the interest of Great Britain was more direct than his own; and founds upon this assertion the charge against Great Britain of having neglected to second and support the military operations of Russia.—His majesty willingly does justice to the motives which originally engaged Russia in the great struggle against France. His majesty avows with equal readiness the interest which Great Britain has uniformly taken in the fates and fortunes of the powers of the continent. But it would surely be difficult to prove that Great Britain, who was herself in a state of hostility with Prussia, when the war broke out between Prussia and France, had an interest and a duty 120 more direct in espousing the Prussian quarrel, than the emperor of Russia; the ally of his Prussian majesty, the protector of the north of Europe, and the guarantee of the Germanick constitution. It is not in a publick declaration that his majesty can discuss the policy of having, at any particular period of the war, effected, or omitted to effect, disembarkations of troops on the coasts of Naples. But the instance of the war with the Porte, is still more singularly chosen to illustrate the charge against Great Britain of indifference to the interests of her ally: a war undertaken by Great Britain at the instigation of Russia, and solely for the purpose of maintaining Russian interests against the influence of France.—If, however, the peace of Tilsit is, indeed, to be considered as the consequence and the punishment of the imputed inactivity of Great Britain, his majesty cannot but regret that the emperor of Russia should have resorted to so precipitate and fatal a measure, at the moment, when he had received distinct assurances that his majesty was making the most strenuous exertions to fulfil the wishes and expectations of his ally (assurances which his imperial majesty received and acknowledged with apparent confidence and satisfaction); and when his majesty was, in fact, prepared to employ for the advancement of the common objects of the war, those forces which, after the peace of Tilsit, he was under the necessity of employing to disconcert a combination directed against his own immediate interests and security.—The vexation of Russian commerce by Great Britain is, in truth, little more than an imaginary grievance. Upon a diligent examination, made by his majesty's command, of the records of the British court of admiralty, there has been discovered only a solitary instance in the course of the present war, of the condemnation of a vessel really Russian: a vessel which had carried naval stores to a port of the common enemy. There are but few instances of Russian vessels detained: and none in which justice has been refused to a party regularly complaining of such detention. It is therefore matter of surprize as well as of concern to his majesty that the emperor of Russia should have condescended to bring forward a complaint which, as it cannot be seriously felt by those in whose behalf it is urged, might appear to be intended to countenance those exaggerated declamations, by which France perseveringly en- 121 deavours to inflame the jealousy of other countries, and to justify her own inveterate animosity, against Great Britain.—The peace of Tilsit was followed by an offer of mediation on the part of the emperor of Russia, for the conclusion of a peace between Great Britain and France; which it is asserted that his majesty refused.—His majesty did not refuse the mediation of the emperor of Russia: although the offer of it was accompanied by circumstances of concealment which might well have justified his refusal. The articles of the treaty of Tilsit were not communicated to his majesty: and specifically that article of the treaty, in virtue of which the mediation was proposed, and which prescribed a limited time for the return of his majesty's answer to that proposal. And his majesty was thus led into an apparent compliance with a limitation so offensive to the dignity of an independent sovereign. But the answer so returned by his majesty was not a refusal. It was a conditional acceptance. The conditions required by his majesty were,—a statement of the basis upon which the enemy was disposed to treat; and a communication of the articles of the peace of Tilsit. The first of these conditions was precisely the same which the emperor of Russia had himself annexed not four months before to his own acceptance of the proffered mediation of the emperor of Austria. The second was one which his majesty would have had a right to require even as the ally of his imperial majesty; but which it would have been highly improvident to omit, when he was invited to confide to his imperial majesty the care of his honour and of his interests.—But even if these conditions (neither of which has been fulfilled, although the fulfilment of them has been repeatedly required by his majesty's ambassador at St. Petersburgh) had not been in themselves perfectly natural and necessary; there were not wanting considerations which might have warranted his majesty in endeavouring, with more than ordinary anxiety, to ascertain the views and intentions of the emperor of Russia, and the precise nature and effect of the new relations which his imperial majesty had contracted.—The complete abandonment of the interests of the king of Prussia, (who had twice rejected proposals of separate peace, front a strict adherence to his engagements with his imperial ally,) and the character of those provisions which the emperor of Russia was contented to make 122 for his own interests in the negotiations of Tilsit, presented no encouraging prospect of the result of any exertions which his imperial majesty might be disposed to employ in favour of Great Britain.—It is not, while a French army still occupies and lays waste the remaining dominions of the king of Prussia, in spite of the stipulations of the Prussian treaty of Tilsit; while contributions are arbitrarily exacted by France from that remnant of the Prussian monarchy, such as, in its entire and most flourishing state, the Prussian monarchy would have been unable to discharge; while the surrender is demanded, in time of peace, of Prussian fortresses, which had not been reduced during the war; and while the power of France is exercised over Prussia with such shameless tyranny, as to designate and demand for instant death, individuals, subjects of his Prussian majesty, and resident in his dominions, upon a charge of disrespect towards the French government;—it is not while all these things are done and suffered, under the eyes of the emperor of Russia, and without his interference on behalf of his ally, that his majesty can feel himself called upon to account to Europe, for having hesitated to repose an unconditional confidence in the efficacy of his imperial majesty's mediation.—Nor, even if that mediation had taken full effect, if a peace had been concluded under it, and that peace guaranteed by his imperial majesty, could his majesty have placed implicit reliance on the stability of any such arrangement, after having seen the emperor of Russia openly transfer to France the sovereignty of the Ionian republic, the independence of which his imperial majesty had recently and solemnly guaranteed.—But while the alledged rejection of the emperor of Russia's mediation, between Great Britain and France, is stated as a just ground of his imperial majesty's resentment; his majesty's request of that mediation, for the re-establishment of peace between Great Britain and Denmark, is represented as an insult which it was beyond the bounds of his imperial majesty's moderation to endure.—His majesty feels himself under no obligation to offer any atonement or apology to the emperor of Russia for the expedition against Copenhagen. It is not for those who were parties to the secret arrangements of Tilsit, to demand satisfaction for a measure to which those arrangements gave rise, and by which one of the objects of them has been hap- 123 pily defeated.—His majesty's justification of the expedition against Copenhagen is before the world. The Declaration of the emperor of Russia would supply whatever was wanting in it; if any thing could be wanting to convince the most incredulous of the urgency of that necessity under which his majesty acted.—But until the Russian declaration was published, his majesty had no reason to suspect that any opinions which the emperor of Russia might entertain of the transactions at Copenhagen could be such as to preclude his imperial majesty from undertaking, at the request of Great Britain, that same office of mediator, which he had assumed with so much alacrity on the behalf of France, nor can his majesty forget that the first symptoms of reviving confidence, since the peace of Tilsit, the only prospect of success in the endeavours of his majesty's ambassador to restore the ancient good understanding between Great Britain and Russia, appeared when the intelligence of the siege of Copenhagen had been recently received at St. Petersburgh.—The inviolability of the Baltick sea, and the reciprocal guaranties of the powers that border upon it, guaranties said to have been contracted with the knowledge of the British government, are stated as aggravations of his majesty's proceedings in the Baltick. It cannot be intended to represent his majesty as having at any time acquiesced in the principles upon which the inviolability of the Baltick is maintained; however his majesty may at particular periods have forborne, for special reasons influencing his conduct at the time, to act in contradiction to them. Such forbearance never could have applied but to a state of peace and real neutrality in the north; and his majesty most assuredly could not be expected to recur to it, after France has been suffered to establish herself in undisputed sovereignty along the whole coast of the Baltick sea from Dantzig to Lubeck.—But the higher the value which the emperor of Russia places on the engagements respecting the tranquillity of the Baltick, which he describes himself as inheriting from his immediate predecessors, the empress Catherine and the emperor Paul, the less justly can his imperial majesty resent the appeal made to him by his majesty as the guarantee of the peace to be concluded between Great Britain and Denmark. In making that appeal, with the utmost confidence and sincerity, his majesty neither intended, nor can he imagine that he of- 124 fered, any insult to the emperor of Russia. Nor can his majesty conceive that, in proposing to the Prince Royal terms of peace, such as the most successful war on the part of Denmark could hardly have been expected to extort from Great Britain, his maj. rendered himself liable to the imputation, either of exasperating the resentment, or of outraging the dignity, of Denmark.—His majesty has thus replied to all the different accusations by which the Russian government labours to justify the rupture of a connection which has subsisted for ages, with reciprocal advantage to Great Britain and Russia; and attempts to disguise the operation of that external influence by which Russia is driven into unjust hostilities for interests not her own.—The Russian declaration proceeds to announce the several conditions on which alone these hostilities can be terminated, and the intercourse of the two countries renewed.—His majesty has already had occasion to assert that justice has in no instance been denied to the claims of his imperial majesty's subjects.—The termination of the war with Denmark has been so anxiously sought by his majesty, that it cannot be necessary for, his majesty to renew any professions upon that subject: But his majesty is at a loss to reconcile the emperor of Russia's present anxiety for the completion of such an arrangement, with his imperial majesty's recent refusal to contribute his good offices for effecting it.—The requisition of his imperial majesty for the immediate conclusion, by his majesty, of a peace with France, is as extraordinary in the substance, as it is offensive in the manner. His majesty has at no time declined to treat with France, when France has professed a willingness to treat on an admissible basis. And the emperor of Russia cannot fail to remember that the last negociation between Great Britain and France was broken off, upon points immediately affecting, not his majesty's own interests, but those of his imperial ally. But his majesty neither understands nor will he admit the pretension of the emperor of Russia to dictate the time, or the mode, of his majesty's pacific negociations with other powers. It never will be endured by his majesty that any government shall indemnify itself for the humiliation of subserviency to France, by the adoption of an insulting and peremptory tone towards Great Britain.—His majesty proclaims anew those principles of maritime law, against which the armed neutrality, under 125 the auspices of the empress Catherine, was originally directed; and against which the present hostilities of Russia are denounced. Those principles have been recognized and acted upon in the best periods of the history of Europe: and acted upon by no power with more strictness and severity than by Russia herself in the reign of the empress Catherine,—Those principles it is the right and the duty of his majesty to maintain: and against every confederacy his majesty is determined, under the blessing of Divine Providence, to maintain them. They have at all times contributed essentially to the support of the maritime power of Great Britain; but they are become incalculably more valuable and important at a period when the maritime power of Great Britain constitutes the sole remaining bulwark against the overwhelming usurpations of France; the only refuge to which other nations may yet resort, in happier times, for assistance and protection.—When the opportunity for peace between Great Britain and Russia shall arrive, his majesty will embrace it with eagerness. The arrangements of such a negociation will not be difficult or complicated. His majesty, as he has nothing to concede, so he has nothing to require: satisfied, if Russia shall manifest a disposition to return to her ancient feelings of friendship towards Great Britain; to a just consideration of her own true interests; and to a sense of her own dignity as an independent nation.
§ Mr. Whitbreadinquired, whether it was the intention of his majesty's ministers to submit to the house any proposition, founded upon the above Papers?
§ Mr. Whitbreadthen gave notice, that after a sufficient time had elapsed to give the members an opportunity of duly investigating the contests of these Papers, he should move some proposition, which would bring the house directly to the point of the propriety, at the present time, of entering into a negotiation with France.
[RUSSIAN MEDIATION.] Mr. Ponsonbywished to know whether his majesty's ministers had any objections to the immediate production of the proposition made by this country, for the Mediation of Russia, between Great Britain and Denmark, and of the Answer made thereto.
Mr. Secretary Canningreplied, that unquestionably his majesty's ministers 126 could have no objection to furnish the house with whatever information actually existed on the subject alluded to by the right hon. gent. For this purpose he was desirous that the right hon. gent. should shape his motion in such a manner, that it might apply to papers actually in existence. If the right hon. gent. meant to move for any official instruction on the subject, he could inform him that no such existed; but if he confined his motion simply for the proposal that had been made to the court of Russia on the subject of mediation with Denmark, with the result of that proposal, to such a motion there could be no possible objection.
Mr. Ponsonbyexpressed his wish to shape his motion, so as to attain the object he desired. The right hon. gent. must certainly be better informed on the subject than he was; but he confessed he could not understand how any proposition could be made to the court of Petersburgh, without official instructions to our ambassador. The answer, too, must be official, and assuredly all these papers might be forth coming.—After some further conversation, it was agreed to draw up a motion in concert, which was done, as follows: "That an humble address be presented to his majesty, that he will be graciously pleased to give directions, that there be laid before this house, Copies or Extracts of such parts of the Correspondence between his majesty's secretary of state and his majesty's minister at the court of St. Petersburgh, as relate to the request, on the part of his majesty, of his imperial majesty's Mediation for the Restoration of Peace between his majesty and the crown of Denmark."
ORDERS IN COUNCIL RELATIVE TO NEUTRAL VESSELS, &c.] The Chancellor of the Exchequer presented to the house, by his majesty's command, the following Papers, viz.