THE LORDS COMMISSIONERS' SPEECH.

HC Deb 19 November 1806 vol 8 cc36-81

The Speaker reported, that the house had been at the House of Peers, at the desire of the Lords Commissioners appointed under the great seal, for opening and holding this present parliament; and that the lord high chancellor, being one of the said commissioners, made a speech to both houses of parliament, of which, to prevent mistakes, he had obtained a copy. He then proceeded to read the speech from the chair, for which we refer to our report of the proceedings of the house of lords (see p. 15). After the speaker had finished reading the speech,

The Hon. William Lamb (son of lord viscount Melbourne)

rose. He said, that unfortunately the gloom cast over the meeting of parliament by the continuation of the disturbance of that system, under which Europe had enjoyed the highest tranquillity and happiness, was by no means either novel or extraordinary: a disturbance, which sufficient experience had ascertained, went to the complete destruction of ancient and venerable estates, at least to a degradation of them so humiliating as to leave little choice between that and their complete destruction. But, although every successive disaster prepared the mind in some measure for the present state of affairs; yet it was not without the utmost awe and inquietude that we could behold the period, so long menaced, at length arrived: a period when the power of the enemy was predominant and unlimited over the greater part of Europe, and when Great Britain, with the exception of two powerful allies, was left unsupported and compelled to rely for its security on those resources, on which, he was confident, we might rely implicitly—the natural courage and the unparalleled spirit of the people. It was impossible, therefore, not to consider the meeting of a new British Parliament, under such trying and arduous circumstances, as a most important event. Their deliberations would be looked to by their country, by their enemy, and by their allies, with the utmost anxiety. By their country, with the expectation that their proceedings would be distinguished by consistency and resolution; by their enemy, with the hope—disappointed as he trusted it would prove —that in their councils might be detected an auspicious prognostic of alarm, wavering, and disunion; by their allies, with the anticipation of increasing confidence and co-operation.—In his majesty's most gracious speech, which had just been read from the chair, their attention was principally drawn to two topics. The first was the fruitless Negociation with France. Nothing could be further from his intention than to touch on any subject which in the remotest degree might tend to revive political differences, now almost lost in the disastrous events in which we were so nearly interested; but he thought, without any hazard of such a revival, he might say, whether the pacific system so strongly recommended during the last war was practicable or not, that when the advocates for that system came into power, it was at a time when their hopes of carrying that system into effect must have been considerably diminished. In the event of peace with France, and of the mediation of other powers, to produce that event, it was necessary, indispensably necessary, that we should be strong ourselves, and backed by strong and formidable allies and mediators, to whom we might make an effectual appeal, and from whom we might expect effectual assistance. To go to war might be merely the effort of despair, but to become a mediator and an abritrator among nations, required strength to support the award. It followed, therefore, that although at an earlier period France might have been successfully resisted by the pursuance of a pacific system, yet it became a far different case when so many rivals lay at her mercy; when their resources were exhausted; when their territories were dismembered; when their armies were overcome; and when their spirits were abashed and dismayed before the overwhelming superiority of France.—Under these inauspicious circumstances, so little calculated to produce a pacific disposition on the part of France, or to induce a corresponding inclination on the part of other powers; under these inauspicious circumstances, the negociation was begun. It was begun because ministers advised his majesty to take advantage of the opening presented by the enemy; because it was deemed advisable to endeavour to put a stop to those encroachments of which experience had too fatally shewn that a state of hostility was the increaser; and because it was so desirable an object to collect what might be termed the relics of the continent, and by peace give to various powers the opportunity of recruiting their strength, with a view to future exertions for self-liberation from the oppression under which they groaned. But it was soon discovered that if any peace consistent with the honour of this country could be made, France would soon find it her interest to break it, or at least to indulge in facther aggrandizements, which must eventually lead to its rupture. His majesty's ministers, therefore, having, in the first place, so far relied on the good sense of the people of this country, that they would not allow themselves to be buoyed up by false hopes, made the attempt at pacification; but finding that those terms alone on which a peace ought to be concluded, could not be obtained, they preferred war, with all its calamities and burthens, to a peace which, by the abandonment of our allies, must eventually prove more destructive to the country than successive years of active warfare. This attempt, however, sufficiently shewed the pacific disposition of Great Britain, and the restlessness and inquietude of France. His majesty had been graciously pleased to order the papers relative to the negociation to be laid on the table of the house. It would therefore be premature to enter into any minute discussion of the subject, but assuredly, enough had appeared in the partial statement of the enemy to prove the equivocation, the insincerity, and the subtlety to which they had the meanness to resort, and the true wisdom, the ability, and the plain manly good sense, by which that equivocation, that insincerity, and that subtlety were combated. Enough had been discovered to make the house confident, that when the whole of the transaction was fairly on the table, it would indubitably appear that the best means had been taken for security against the further aggrandisement of the enemy; that nothing had been abandoned which ought to have been retained; that the interests, neither of the continent, nor of our own country, had been endangered; and that not a particle of honour had been compromised. On this high ground, having made every reasonable concession for peace, yet at the same time, maintaining the dignity of Great Britain unimpaired, ministers had a right to claim their most honourable reward, the support of that house and the approbation of their country. The failure of the negociation had, it was too well known, produced a series of most disastrous events, succeeding each other with unexampled rapidity. In the present state of circumstances, it was unnecessary, perhaps it might be ungenerous, to comment on the conduct of Prussia, which had led to that state; but at least, it was some Satisfaction to know, that however desirous the British government might be to afford every assistance to the king of Prussia, they were in no degree responsible for the proceedings at the commencement of the Prussian war, or for the manner in which that war was carried on. If our eyes were directed to another quarter, it would reasonably be permitted us to hope, that although Russia might not be able to reconquer kingdoms, and re-establish thrones; she might yet have the power of setting a boundary to that inordinate ambition which had swallowed up every government within its reach. From the contemplation of foreign affairs, which he allowed was comparatively painful, he would turn to that which ever had afforded, which did afford, and which he trusted, ever would afford, a most pleasing picture; a picture, which the contrast rendered more pleasing: he meant the internal state of Great Britain. On the blessings which we enjoyed, it was unnecessary to expatiate; they were justly understood, they were fully appreciated, they were warmly and enthusiastically beloved, not by that house alone, or by the superior classes of society, but by a great majority of the meanest and most illiterate of the people. Dearer did the menaces of the enemy render these blessings; notwithstanding that the acknowledged superiority of our navy, the bravery of our army, and the high and united spirit of our population, warranted us in setting those menaces at defiance. As to the enemy's attempts to destroy or injure the commerce of Great Britain, he flattered himself, that those hopes would be completely disappointed; and that, secure in our capital and our credit, we might deride the vain efforts of an implacable foe. Adverting to that part of his majesty's speech, in which the necessity of enduring great burthens was lamented, he observed that, deeply as the weight of those burthens must be felt, he was convinced that with that feeling would be mingled throughout the country a firm conviction of the necessity which existed of imposing them, of bearing them with good humour, and of making those sacrifices which, under the present circumstances, a great nation was called upon to make. With these advantages, he could not believe that the house would, for a moment, hesitate in adopting the only line of conduct which, as it appeared to him, they could with propriety pursue, namely, to pledge themselves to meet the exigencies of this great crisis with firmness, and to make provision for calling the strength of the country into energetic exertion. We might then oppose the enemy with a confidence not vague or baseless, but founded on the solid grounds of a real and extensive force, directed by experience and wisdom, and determined to fight to the last extremity for the happiness and honour which Great Britain had to preserve, and against the misery and disgrace which she had to avert.—The hon. gent. Concluded with moving, "That an humble address be presented to his majesty, to return his majesty the thanks of this house, for the most gracious speech which the lords commissioners have read to us by his majesty's command; to assure his majesty, that his faithful com- mons embrace, with the utmost satisfaction, the first opportunity of humbly testifying to his majesty those sentiments of duty and attachment to his majesty's person and government, and of zeal for the honour of his crown, and the interests of his dominions, which will uniformly direct all their proceedings:—To offer to his majesty our humble thanks for having directed to be laid before us copies of the papers which have been exchanged in the course of the late negociation with France, which we will not fail to take into our most serious consideration: to express to his majesty our firm conviction, that a general and permanent tranquillity can only be established on terms consistent with the honour of his majesty's crown, with the interests of his loyal people, and with that inviolable good faith to wards his majesty's allies, by which the conduct of this country has always been distinguished:—That we deeply and sincerely regret, that his majesty's benevolent endeavours to obtain this desirable end should have been disappointed, and that, in the same moment, a fresh war should have been kindled in Europe, the progress of which has been attended with the most calamitous events:—That we learn, with regret, that no adequate satisfaction had been offered to his majesty by Prussia for those aggressions which had placed the two countries in a state of mutual hostility; but that we sincerely applaud his majesty's generous resolution to adopt such measures as might be best calculated to unite the councils and interests of the two powers against the common enemy:—That we observe, with sincere pleasure, that, in the midst of the disastrous events which have followed, and under the most trying circumstances, the good faith of his majesty's allies has remained unshaken; that the conduct of the king of Sweden has been distinguished by the most honourable firmness; and that the happiest union continues to subsist between his majesty and the emperor of Russia:—That we trust these reciprocal proofs of good faith will have the happy effect of strengthening and confirming an alliance which affords the best remaining hope of safety for the continent of Europe:—That, whilst we acknowledge, with gratitude, the gracious expressions of concern with which his majesty observes the necessity of adding to the public burthens, and sincerely partake in the same sentiment, we humbly beg leave to assure his majesty, that we will, upon all occasions, carefully keep in view the Wishes which his majesty's paternal goodness has induced his majesty to express, of combining all practicable economy with those efforts which it is necessary to make against the formidable and increasing power of the enemy:—That we are impressed with the deepest sorrow at the long series of misfortune which has afflicted the continent of Europe, and which could not fail to affect in some degree, many important interests of this country; but that we observe, with the truest pleasure, that the great sources of our national prosperity have remained unimpaired:—That we feel the utmost confidence, that, under every difficulty, his majesty will still have the satisfaction of witnessing an increasing energy and firmness on the part of his people; and that the valour and discipline of his majesty's fleets and armies will continue to be displayed with the same Undiminished lustre which has distinguished them during the whole of the present contest:—That, with these advantages, and with an humble but firm reliance on the protection and support of Divine Providence, we are prepared to meet all the exigencies of the present crisis, and to second, to the utmost of our power, the paternal efforts of his majesty, to secure the honour and independence of the British crown, and the prosperity and freedom of his brave and affectionate people."

Mr. John Smith,

in rising to second the address, observed that, in the present crisis, and at a period so big with new and extraordinary events, the satisfaction which his majesty was pleased to express at meeting his parliament, must be equally felt by every member of that house; for there never was a moment when the collective wisdom of parliament was more imperiously called for, than in the present unexampled state of public affairs: and he was persuaded that the deliberations of that house would be so conducted as to merit the confidence which his majesty had been graciously pleased to repose in them. The house must see with concern that his majesty's recent endeavours to restore peace to his subjects, had been disappointed by the failure of the late negociation; and they must recognize in this proceeding of his majesty, the same benevolent disposition which had so often led his majesty in circumstances equally discouraging, to leave no means untried to put an end to the calamities of war.—His majesty having ordered the papers relative to the late negociation to be laid before the house, it would be premature to enter into the discussion of the subject. They would, in course, have an early opportunity of doing so. But from the state of that transaction, published by the enemy, false and mutilated as it had been, he thought he might venture to pronounce, that the good faith, sincerity, and plain dealing of those noble persons to whom his majesty entrusted the conduct of the negociation, were no less conspicuous than the insincerity, double dealing, and duplicity, almost approaching to chicanery, of the French negociators. In the one, was plainly manifested British rectitude and British character; in the other, that evasive and varying policy which had been the never-failing characteristic of French negociation, in all times and under all circumstances. Indeed there could be no great expectation of a favourable result, when, at the very moment that the French government were making the most pacific professions, they were taking those very measures, which, as his majesty has been pleased to inform us, compelled the king of Prussia to engage in that calamitous struggle, the consequence of which we must all deplore. This resistance, which at first sight seemed ill advised, and ill timed, appeared now to have been the result of imperious circumstances. France demanded of Prussia, not only the sacrifice of her trade and commerce, and the dissolution of her best and wisest alliances, but cessions of territory were insisted upon, evidently calculated to weaken her barriers, and in the final result to render resistance impossible, and to compel that unhappy country to submit without the power of striking a blow. Her fate, if it could now operate as a warning to Europe, ought to be felt as an encouragement to Great Britain, whose conduct had been the complete reverse, and whose magnanimity had hitherto preserved her power undiminished. We had seen Prussia, almost from the commencement of the French revolution, crouch to every one of those despots, under whom the country had by turns fallen, and this, too, at times when the exertion of her arms in the common cause might have turned the scale, and insured the deliverance of Europe. And, what had been the effect of her base and abject submissions? Driven to contend, single-handed, with the whole force of the enemy, and overwhelmed, he feared, for ever, with a ra- pidity unequalled even in modern times; and at last to fill the cup of her misery, in the answer of the French government to the manifesto of the king of Prussia, who to a generous foe would now be an object of compassion, that unhappy monarch is cruelly and insolently taunted with the degrading submissions and temporizing policy, which his unfeeling tyrants had so long exacted from him. In the midst of these disasters, it was truly consolotary to find that the king of Sweden and the emperor of Russia were animated with such just views of their duty and their interests. And the house would doubtless attend to the recommendation of his majesty, to cultivate and support a close connexion with those powers. With regard to our own particular situation, it was evident that in a contest so important, and for the preservation of every thing that was dear to us, we must necessarily be called upon to support additional burthens. But it was with extreme satisfaction, indeed, that he heard that part of his majesty's speech which pointed out the necessity of the most economical use of our resources. The attack of the enemy was now openly aimed at the vitals of the country. In defence of these the country was ready, nay, desirous to make whatever sacrifices were necessary; but, with a view to the continuance of the war, of the speedy termination of which no one could now indulge a hope, the careful application of our resources and means of defence, was more than ever become an indispensable duty, and he was happy to believe, one of the favourite objects of the noble lord (H. Petty) now below him. The flourishing state of the revenue and of public credit, must be a source of exultation, in the present state of Europe. He thought he might venture, without fear of contradiction, to attribute it to the wise and vigorous system of finance, established by that immortal statesman (Mr. Pitt), whose loss was so deeply deplored, whose virtues were indelibly engraven on the hearts of his countrymen, and whose splendid talents would be the admiration of posterity. But he was far from wishing to withhold his tribute of applause from those who had sueceeded him, and who had manfully and vigorously upheld and supported his system of finance. With regard to the state of our commerce, it must be expected that partial inconveniencies would be suffered, at a moment when the whole power and force of the enemy were directed against it: but we had his majesty's assurance that the main sources of our prosperity were unimpaired, and he might venture to say, would long continue so, notwithstanding the present blockade of the British isles. A blockade by a country who had hardly dared to trust a ship out of the protection of their batteries, against a country which commanded the seas, and could, if it thought fit, intercept the commerce of the whole world. The arrogance of this threat of blockade could only be equalled by its absurdity. The consequence of the declaration only had been well described, by a person, whom it might hardly be decorous to name in that house, by the vassal king of Holland. He, in his address to his unfortunate subjects, himself told them that the prohibition of the trade of neutrals would give a death-blow to the already-expiring commerce of Holland.—With regard to the general situation of the country, there could be no doubt but that the spirit and vigour of the people were fully equal to any situation in which they could be placed; and he had observed with admiration, the firmness and fortitude with which they had supported all the expences of the war, and all the pressures of the times; and that ardour and promptitude which they had uniformly manifested in defence of their country and constitution.

Mr. Canning

declared that he never rose with more lively sensations of anxiety than on the present occasion, both because he felt the unparalleled importance of the crisis, and the duty which bound him, in common with every member of the house, and every subject of the realm, to state his real opinion of the situation of our affairs, and of the best means which remained for their extrication from the peril in which they were involved. But in doing this, the greatest difficulty was to avoid that which, above all other things, he was most solicitous to avoid; namely, to appear to damp the spirits of the country at a period when it was so necessary that firmness and confidence should prevail. He begged, therefore, that the house would be candid enough to believe him, when he declared, that he entertained a perfect and sincere confidence—a confidence founded not on rashness, but on the most mature reflection—a confidence founded on the experience of the past, on the review of the present, and on the anticipation of the future—that there existed in this country resources amply sufficient to meet and brave all the difficult struggles, and to avert all the impending dangers with which we could possibly be threatened. He trusted, that all which it might be necessary for him to say in the course of the observations which he should take the liberty of submitting to the house, might be considered with a reference to this declaration. But, with whatever confidence he felt himself justified in looking to the resources of the country, he also felt how incumbent it was on him and on the house to look seriously to the situation of the country, to examine, to deliberate, and to determine, whether all that had passed in the conduct of the state had been without error, or whether some reflections on what had been done, might not have a favourable influence on what was still to do. Assuredly it was in the power of any man, who had turned his attention more particularly to public affairs, even of such an humble individual as himself, to throw out suggestions to government without the slightest intention of thwarting it, or without the most remote feeling to the members of which it was composed. For many of those members he professed to entertain the highest consideration. Were it possible that it should enter into the imagination of any man, at such a crisis as the present, to set himself to a perverse opposition to government, he must be thought not only insensible to public affairs as they then stood, but to all that had passed under a late administration; the history of the 15 last years of which, sufficiently shewed that was not the course of opposition that ought to be pursued, or that was likely to produce beneficial effects; he alluded to the conduct during the last war, of the gentlemen who then sat on the bench which he and his friends now occupied. Both the hon. proposer and the hon. seconder of the address (and here he begged leave to remark the distinguished performance at the present time, and the flattering promise for the future, which their speeches afforded) dwelt on the necessity of unanimity. Unquestionably the situation of the country was calculated to produce unanimity. But of unanimity there were different degrees. There was a description of unanimity which blinded every man's judgment to every thing that was wrong, and thus made him the passive instrument of any ministry. But there was another and a superior species, the professor of which, while he insisted on his right to investigate measures, and consider results, would yet give his cordial support to the government, in spite of the errors to which he would not allow himself to be wilfully blind. If at any time this latter course of proceeding was justifiable, when the judgment of every man who possessed any judgment ought to be exercised, it was the present. The situation of the country divided itself into two considerations, our relative situation to the world, and our internal situation. With regard to the former it was impossible that any thing more just or more eloquent could be said upon it, than what had been said by the hon. mover of the address. With regard to the latter, it afforded matter for deep meditation. A new parliament had been assembled, and they were now for the first time about to review the transactions of an administration, composed of men of great talents, who entered upon office not ten months ago, with this particular and distinct declaration, that all those who had preceded them had been in the wrong; that they had "clubbed the battalion;" that every thing required correction and amendment; that nothing was in its place; that our resources were exhausted, our credit destroyed, our faith violated, and that we were unable to maintain our own rank among the nations of Europe, much less to assist others in regaining that which belonged to them. What followed? At the end of ten months, these very gentlemen say that the resources of the country remain unimpaired. Those who but ten months ago, exclaimed that they were in a state of the utmost dilapidation, now tell us—not that they have been retrieved, not that they have been re-established,—but that they remain unimpaired. That is, that they never have been impaired. It was certainly very satisfactory to every man that there should be even this stale tribute paid to those who had been formerly loaded with censure. But surely it would be too much to expect that any man who had ever regulated his conduct by, who had followed the footsteps of, or who had considered the name of Pitt as connected with the glory and happiness of England, could pass this part of his majesty's speech unnoticed. Amidst the accusations that had been vented against the late administration, those against their foreign connections were not the least virulent. It had been said, that the continent had been lost by the confederacies which England had so ill put together. But what was the nature of the system that had been substituted? It seemed as if those who had happened to hear that a confederacy was a bad thing, had determined to repel every ally that might, by opposite conduct, have been attracted to us. But of this new system it would be worth while to trace the operation as well as the cause. On the first day of the first session of a new parliament, during whose existence the fate of the world might probably be decided, in whose time a struggle would, in all likelihood, take place, that would terminate either in total destruction, or complete safety, such a discussion was assuredly most important and most proper. The speech and address, which, at such a period as the present, were any thing but mere matters of form, might be considered in two distinct views. The first was as a mutual pledge between the sovereign and his people. Had it been possible to confine the speech and address to a description of the dangers of the country, and an enumeration of the best means of deliverance from those dangers, he would have been well content that the address should have gone up without a whisper of remark. But there was another view of the subject. The present was the constitutional opportunity afforded for both houses of parliament to express their opinion not only of the relations of government with foreign states, but of the relations of government with the country. Of this he begged to be understood that he was fully satisfied, whether when the official documents should be laid on the table it might or might not appear that there had been any remissness, or want of dexterity, or blameable attention to delusive promises, that the cause of this country against France would not admit of the smallest question. The only matter in dispute was not whether or not the cause was sufficiently strong, but whether or not the cause had been prosecuted in the best manner, and at the most proper time. If it could be proved (which he did not in the least degree mean to insinuate), that the negociation had wilfully failed, he should be sorry that that circumstance should lead to the slightest hesitation in giving the most unqualified support to the war. In prosecuting his consideration of the subject, he could not acquit the late house of commons of an act of inconsiderate confidence. And here he must observe, that with every man in the house, he sincerely lamented the absence and loss of that great man, with whom, in politics, he had so frequently differed; but the memory of which differences ought no longer to exist. Those who were in habits of private friendship with that great man might deplore him more feelingly, but it was impossible that they could admire more than himself his transcendant talents—talents, the strength of which was sufficiently evinced by the awe and fear which his presence inspired in the breasts of his political opponents. Having stated thus much, he trusted he should be acquitted of any disrespectful imputation in what he was about to say. In order to judge correctly of the situation in which the country now found, itself, it was necessary to revert to the last confederacy. After the dissolution of that confederacy, and considering the state in which Prussia and Russia stood, what was the clear and obvious policy of France, and what was the clear and obvious policy of England? He would state it fairly. No man could hesitate in saying, that unfortunate as that confederacy was, broken and disjointed as it might be, yet were its scattered limbs not without life and vigour. It was the clear and obvious policy of England to unite those divided parts, and to endeavour to produce and energetic whole. On the other hand, it was the clear and obvious policy of France to effect a complete dismemberment of the confederation, and if that could not be completely accomplished in reality, at least to accomplish it in appearance. Now, what had been the conduct of the two powers? Prussia signed a treaty of access to the confederacy just previous to its dissolution; an unequivocal proof of the disposition of the court of Berlin, manifested still more strongly by the declaration since published. Subsequently, however, Prussia was forced into measures, which brought upon her the prompt resentment of this country. But at the time that the house of commons approved of that resentment, did they know that a negociation was carrying on with France, for the restoration of that which Prussia had seized? There were two distinct questions. If it were simply asked, would you go to war for the recovery of that unjustly wrested from you? the answer would be, yes; but if a negociation were carrying on to obtain the same object in another quarter, then the war would be superfluous. Even were this principle doubtful, yet, coupled with the certainty that it was the interest of this country to preserve Prussia, to retain her as an enemy to France, and to put up with, or overlook any conduct that might involve Great Britain in a contest with her, it became established and irresistible. The house would see what were the dreadful consequences of an original error in this respect; consequences which were now felt too late. While we were in the incongruous situation to which it gave rise, a war commenced between Prussia and France, undeniably instigated by the demands made by this country, through her negociator at Paris. It was true, Hanover was not the sole cause of this rupture, but it was the main one, as the subsequent declaration of Prussia proved. The conduct of Great Britain to Prussia was therefore thus: Prussia, unable to resist the power of France, encroached upon us; we had however the option to pass over the just cause of complaint which we possessed in consequence, and leave untouched the only power in Europe which appeared capable of being the germ of an alliance hostile to the ambitious views of France. But the conduct of his majesty's ministers had been the converse of their policy. By that conduct, Prussia had been compelled to act without our advice and assistance, and to plunge into a war, of which, if our advice could not have prevented it, our assistance might at least have meliorated the termination. He did not mean to cast the slightest imputation on the diplomatic character of the noble lord employed by government on this occasion (lord Morpeth); no man was better fitted for the office, both from the qualities of his head and heart, and because no man had been a more constant advocate for the justice of the cause of this country: but would any man of common reflection say, that if the restoration of Hanover were the sole object, it was worth while to make war against Prussia? The British government had continued at war with Prussia as long as the Prussian resources were unimpaired, and her strength unexhausted; but as soon as there seemed the prospect of a war between France and Prussia, an ambassador was dispatched to Berlin, with instructions adapted to all possibilities, except that which was most probable, namely, that war had actually commenced; for that no provision had been made, an event of which the most common information might have shewn the likelihood. As soon, however, as lord Morpeth returned, our go- vernment began to perceive their error, and to think that there was really something like war between France and Prussia,—from the trifling circumstance that the Prussian army was annihilated! They then sent a few military men to their aid, and when the Prussian monarchy shall be destroyed, they will perhaps send an army! When the gentlemen opposite to him came into power, they exclaimed, that nothing was more shabby than the foreign diplomacy of Great Britain. It was even said, that there was not a man at a foreign court capable of writing a letter. As it was an undoubted right possessed by the good people of this country to canvass the conduct of their statesmen; he remembered to have heard it asserted in one of these political assemblages, that all our ambassadors in future were to be Ajaxes, Ulysses, and Phœnixes. Now it so happened, that there had been only one remove. Mr. Adair had succeeded sir A. Paget at Vienna. Of course as he was single, he must be the phœnix! But, in our diplomatic intercourse with foreign courts, we were taught to look for perfect frankness, sincerity, and openness; freedom from trick and intrigue, and a sort of pellucid simplicity. Now, what was the first tangible proof of this simplicity? Why, a minister at Paris negociating for peace, and another at Berlin instigating war for the same object! Such conduct might be dextrous, it might be able—it might be any thing but frank, open, and undisguised.—As to that passage in the speech and the address, which congratulated the country, that in those councils which preceded the war between Prussia and France, his majesty had no share, he was astonished that such a topic of consolation could have entered the head of any minister. Instead of shewing that they had attempted to prevent evils, ministers called for approbation, on the ground of having abstained from any interference! But he believed neither Berlin nor Vienna, nor even London could be thus consoled. It ought to have been our care that the difference between France and Prussia should not have been too suddenly blown into a flame, lest it should have been too suddenly extinguished. In this part of the address it was therefore impossible for him to concur: he by no means meant to imply doubt of the justice of his majesty's quarrel with Prussia; but if France, by a nominal and illusive transfer of Hanover to Prussia, could plant a cause of dissention between Prussia and Great Britain, was not this a contrivance of the enemy which nothing but the plain and simple diplomacy adopted by our government could be blind to? France found Great Britain and Prussia in amity; with a tendency to coalesce. What was her object? To divide them; and by a pretended transfer to Prussia of the hereditary dominions of the king of Great Britain, to create a war between the two countries.—With respect to the negociation with France, this was not a time to discuss it, although some observations made by the hon. mover of the address might justify some strong comments upon that negociation. But it would be better to reserve these until the papers relative to the subject should be in possession of the house. He thought, however, that it would be but fair to state to his majesty's ministers what, as far as the documents had transpired, appeared to him to be the defective parts of their case. The British declaration contained three unproved allegations. The first was, that the overture for peace had come from France; and as this was also insisted on in the speech, he had no doubt that ministers had something to produce, which would give an entirely new colour to this part of the transaction. He denied, however, entertaining any opinion that had the offer of peace proceeded from England, ministers would have been culpable. Had peace been a desirable thing, it mattered little in what quarter the proposal for it originated.—Adverting to Mr. Fox's first letter to M. Talleyrand, he observed, that there were fifty other and better ways in which the intelligence which it contained might have been communicated, and he condemned most strongly the reception which the answer to that letter experienced, The assertion that the British government were beginning a new course, as illustrated by the transaction alluded to, was false. Never had the British government been the stimulators of assassination. Had he held the situation which the late right hon. gent. occupied, he should have thought it his duty to repel the accusation with contempt and indignation. The second unproved allegation, contained in the British declaration, related to the basis of the negociation, which was asserted to be the uti possidetis; now throughout the negociation the basis referred to was that stated in Mr. Fox's letter, the mutual honour of the countries; a basis no more like the uti possidetis, than it was like the propria quœ maribus. The third unproved allegation, which he had no doubt that the French government had completely misrepresented, was, that we had refused to treat except in conjunction with our allies. Now, from the partial documents that had been published, it appeared that that had been the case in the first instance, but that afterwards the British government had treated alone. He had no doubt that this would be satisfactorily cleared up, as the address stated in high terms of panegyric, the great care of his majesty for his allies. The particular mention of Russia and Sweden, was proof that some misrepresentation existed.—Having thus stated the points which it was necessary for his majesty's ministers to elucidate, and having considered the state of this country with respect to foreign relations, he proceeded to examine our domestic situation. It was impossible but that he must look at our means of internal strength with the utmost seriousness. We must examine the physical force, and the spirit by which it was actuated. Our internal policy was intimately connected with this contemplation. And first, with regard to the dissolution of the last parliament; there was a great difference between questioning the exercise of an independent prerogative, and questioning the propriety of exercising it at such a period. If the dissolution were prompted by party views, with the hope of giving a triumph to ministers, and if, for these purposes, they created and revived party differences, at a time when they loudly called for unanimity, their conduct was highly culpable. But he had no doubt that ministers had some great public advantage to gain; for he could not suppose that they merely wished to obtain a few supporters in parliament, at least this he was sure they would not avow.—Another class of observations would apply to the practical means of defence and attack which the country possessed, and the mode in which those means had been managed and applied, Now; it was most extraordinary that in reading the speech, and the history of the last year, no one could suspect that the country was at war. There was not a feature of war in the speech, nor an act of war during the last year, in which government could assume any credit. There had not been even a single warlike plan, much less any warlike achievement. As for the internal defence of the country, a most laboured scheme had been brought forward last session, and when the right hon. gent. (Mr. Windham) by whom it had been produced, had been repeatedly questioned whether or not it was intended to put it in execution, the answer was uniformly in the affirmative. In no single parish, however, had the slightest step been taken towards this end; and yet it was a reliance on this scheme that had been held out to induce parliament to allow the volunteers to crumble away, the militia to be diminished, and the regular army to be sent experimenting. And what kind of experimenting? We had heard of a great statesman, who stripped the country of troops, which he employed on various active services, and then boasted that he defended it at a distance. Could the gentlemen opposite make a similar boast? After orders, and counterorders, and confirmations of orders, and revocations of confirmations, and countermands, &c. &c. &c. an expedition actually did sail from the Downs, and arrived—where? at Plymouth! Certainly a place not very well provided with means of defence; and had this same expedition proceeded to some possession of the enemy not superior in strength to Plymouth, they very possibly might have succeeded in taking it. But perhaps this was meant as an experiment. It might have been said, "We'll sail from the Downs, land at Plymouth, and surprize the dockers." It is prudent to try to swim upon a table, before committing oneself to the waves. The right hon. gent. was not accustomed to salt water, and he wished to begin with fresh. But could the country forget the loudness of his accusations against his predecessors for what he termed their supineness and neglect? Yet what had he himself done? When war was raging in Prussia, our peace minister was on his return! The whole amount of the right hon. gent.'s campaign was a fire-work before Boulogne, and—(yet that wanted confirmation)—an embarkation on the Paddington canal. But for the uncommon openness of the weather, it is probable that his army would have been frozen up at Uxbridge—(a laugh). But these were not the heaviest charges against the right hon. gent. That right hon. gent. had declared it as his opinion, that in all military establishments, it was not the form, but the soul, the spirit, the nice sense of honour, that were to be cultivated and encouraged. Now, was not that right hon. gent. aware, that by partial measures, he had disgusted and dispirited the army more than he had improved their character by the monopoly of shoulder-knots and cockades? The report of their discontent must have reached him. If not, it was time that he should be told of it. Let him recollect the recall of officers who had nobly fought and conquered for their country. Was sir John Stuart's being superseded by the brother of a secretary of state (Gen. Fox), calculated to give animation and enthusiasm to the army? And when an expedition was ready for embarkation, were not the hopes of many gallant officers who already anticipated victory at the head of their brigades, disappointed, because the rank of a favourite of that right hon. gent. (colonel Craufurd) to whom he meant no disrespect, was not entitled to command them?—He had before observed, that in the speech, all notice of war seemed studiously to have been passed over, and yet some debts of gratitude remained to be paid; some acts of heroism had been displayed, which, had it been for no other purpose than to shew that the British army already possessed the character which the right hon. gent. only wished it did possess, might surely have been mentioned. To the records of parliament, the historian looked for his materials. It was cruel to deprive the hero of the honourable reward of his military achievements, and it was disgraceful that government should dislike to sprinkle over the gloom of despondency with some of those achievements. It was true, they might say, that these achievements were not of their planning; but this was a period when party feelings should not withhold every glorious incitement to great actions. On these grounds, on the deficiency of that which ought to have been recorded in the speech, it was impossible for him to satisfy his feelings with the continuation of that omission in the address. The usual form in similar instances, had been to endeavour to render the answer to the speech a vehicle for such sentiments as it might be wished to add; but the present speech was so contrived, that there was not a niche in which the additional sentiments of parliament could be properly placed, although many important points had been disregarded. There were many topics on which amendment to the address might be introduced, so many that he preferred substituting a new address altogether, leaving it to the option of the house which to adopt. He therefore proposed, by way of amendment, to omit the whole of the address subsequent to the words "his majesty's commons," and to introduce the following:—"To assure his majesty that it is with increased affection, attachment, and loyalty, that his majesty's faithful commons meet his majesty in this ninth parliament of his majesty's assembling. And that amidst all those evils and pressures of war, and those tremendous and unparalleled successes of a formidable and unrelenting enemy, which render the present crisis peculiarly awful and alarming, the first and most fervent prayer of his majesty's faithful commons is, that it may please Divine Providence to grant to this favoured country the prolongation of a life and of a reign, the value and the blessings of which, each succeeding year teaches us more highly to appreciate.—And to express to his majesty our unshaken determination to stand by his majesty throughout all the difficulties and dangers of the times; in defence of the laws and liberties of this realm; in defence of his majesty's sacred person and government; and of a throne endeared to all classes of his majesty's subjects by the virtues of the sovereign who adorns it.—To offer to his majesty our humble and affectionate condolence on that share of the public calamities of Europe which has come home to the personal and domestic feelings of his majesty and his royal family, by the death of that gallant and illustrious prince the late duke of Brunswick, a prince connected by such near alliances with his majesty's royal house, and with the throne of these kingdoms.—That while we most sensibly participate in the deep and poignant grief with which his majesty contemplates the issue of the late campaign on the continent, we studiously abstain from suggesting to his majesty, as a topic of consolation, what we well know his majesty's intelligence and magnanimity would disdain to receive as such—the interruption of his majesty's intercourse with the court of Berlin during the last eight months, which precluded his majesty from any knowledge of those counsels by which the war between Prussia and France was so unfortunately precipitated.—Satisfied as we are of the justice of the original grounds of his majesty's complaints against Prussia, we are yet unable to refrain from deeply deploring their consequences.—We are not furnished with any means of judging how far those complaints were capable of being adjusted, without recourse being had to actual hostilities; or how far any discussions which may have taken place subsequently to his majesty's gracious message of the 21st of April, were directed to that object.—But we cannot but lament that the obvious artifice of the common enemy, in making a fraudulent and nominal transfer of his majesty's electoral dominions to the king of Prussia, should have been so far crowned with success as to have involved his majesty in war with the only state in Europe whose resources were yet unimpaired; and whose arms might, at some happier hour, have been employed with effect in a new confederacy against France; and that the too successful policy of the enemy in amusing this country with an insincere and protracted negociation, should have obtained for France the opportunity of goading Prussia (by unmeasured and accumulated injuries) to that premature, unconcerted, and unassisted effort; which has terminated in the overthrow of that powerful monarchy, and in the complete subjugation of its dominions.—We cannot but express our regret that the policy which appears to have been ultimately adopted towards Prussia should not have been recognized and acted upon until the occasion was gone by; and that his majesty's plenipotentiary should have arrived only in time to be an helpless witness of that prodigious ruin and destruction which a more timely interposition of his majesty's advice and assistance might possibly have averted or alleviated.—To acknowledge his majesty's goodness in having directed to be laid before us the details of the negociation so long carried on at Paris.—We entertain the fullest conviction that the just and moderate sentiments by which his majesty has proved himself to have been animated in the several preceding negociations for peace with France, have alike actuated his majesty on the late occasion: and while we look with anxious interest for the developement of those circumstances which can have deferred for so long a period that termination of the negociation which it is evident, as well from notorious facts as from the language of his majesty's declaration, the artifices and pretensions of the enemy rendered from the beginning almost certain and unavoidable; we doubt not but we shall see, in the whole course and tenour of the proceedings on the part of his majesty, fresh instances of that desire for peace, and of that sincerity and good faith in the pursuit of it, which have so often been frus- trated by the ambition of the French government; as well as fresh proofs of the expediency of adhering to the policy of treating for general peace, and only in conjunction with our allies.—That we receive with the utmost satisfaction the assurance of his majesty's uninterrupted concert and good understanding with the emperor of Russia; trusting that neither in war nor in negociation, his majesty's councils will be separated from those of our ally, distinguished alike by perseverance and good faith.—The continued prosecution of the war being necessarily imposed upon his majesty, we rejoice in the assurance that it is intended to prosecute it with vigour: earnestly imploring his majesty that no apprehension of embarrassing the conduct of a negociation by acquisitions made during its progress, may ever again be suffered to relax for a moment the military and naval operations of this country.—That if we have not the triumph and satisfaction, as in former years of war, of offering to his majesty our congratulations on any signal and decisive victory by sea, we nevertheless reflect, with just pride and acknowledgement, on the several distinguished instances in which the skill, valour, and intrepidity of British officers and seamen have been displayed in their usual lustre, and with their accustomed success, over equal or superior squadrons of the enemy. But we cannot help lamenting, in justice to the naval service, as well as to the interests of the country, that supineness or mismanagement, by which the predatory squadrons of the enemy have been permitted to range, unchecked, among our West-India colonies, and to escape with impunity, and by which our commerce has been exposed, to a degree of annoyance highly injurious to the interests and discreditable to the maritime superiority, of Great Britain.—With equal sorrow, and with no less astonishment, we have observed those delays and uncertainties, and that apparent perplexity and fluctuation of councils, which have marked the conduct of the war department of the state, which have hitherto prevented the execution of those measures which ministers persuaded the late parliament to enact, and upon which they themselves professed so greatly to rely for the internal defence of the empire; and delays which have so long confined our expeditions within our own ports, and have rendered the military preparations of this government at once in- effectual to the annoyance of the enemy, and a just ground of dissatisfaction and disappointment to the nation at large.—We rejoice in the opportunity of congratulating his majesty on the capture of that valuable and important settlement, the Cape of Good Hope, by those distinguished officers, sir D. Baird and sir H. Popham. We have however, the consolation and gratification of being able to recall his majesty's attention to acquisitions and achievements in the course of the present year, by which, notwithstanding the apparent inactivity of his majesty's present servants, the credit of his majesty's arms, by sea and land, has been sustained in the different quarters of the globe. We congratulate his majesty on the signal advantages obtained by his majesty's arms in the expedition under sir H. Popham, and general Beresford, against the Spanish settlement of Buenos Ayres; advantages which, if seasonably supported and diligently improved, must be in the highest degree valuable to this country, opening fresh channels of commercial enterprise, and affording new and increasing encouragement to British manufactures and navigation; advantages doubly important at a moment when the other markets of the world are attempted to be closed against us.—We enter, with heartfelt exultation, into the sentiments so justly expressed by his majesty, on the brilliant victory obtained on the plains of Maida, by his majesty's land forces, under the gallant and able conduct of sir J. Stuart, over a French army, superior in numbers. We feel with his majesty, the full value of the seasonable check given, by this splendid achievement to the overweening confidence of the enemy; and of the proof which it affords that the character and constitution of the British army were not inadequate, upon their ancient footing, to maintain, unimpaired, the lustre of the British name, and the military glory of our ancestors.—That we shall nevertheless examine, with due attention and solicitude, into the effect of that new system which the late parliament were induced to adopt, for improving the character, as well as augmenting the amount of his majesty's regular forces; willing to hope that we shall have the satisfaction of discovering an improvement so striking, and an augmentation so rapid and abundant, as at once to have supplied all the deficiencies arising from the disuse of such measures as have been either abolished or suspended, and to compensate for the certain, permanent, and large addition which they have necessarily occasioned to the military expenditure of the state.—We shall investigate with equal care, the state of our other military establishments, and particularly that of the volunteers, the cheap, efficient, and patriotic defence of the united kingdom; we trust and believe that we shall find them, in spite of all discouragement and discountenance, neither abated in zeal, nor, as yet, materially reduced in numbers, at a period when it appears but too probable that their services may be more than ever essential to their country.—That we are fully sensible of his majesty's paternal affection for his subjects, manifested in the regret which he expresses at being compelled to call upon them for sacrifices of so great an extent as may be necessary in the present crisis of affairs. That however painful the duty of imposing fresh burthens upon the people, we shall, however, not shrink from discharging it; satisfied as we are of the prevailing determination of all ranks of the community to submit with cheerfulness to the indispensable necessity of providing means for the continuance of a contest, in the issue of which public safety and private happiness are alike inseparably involved.—That it is a consolation to us as to his majesty under the pressure of this inevitable necessity, to learn the flourishing state of public credit, and the productiveness of the several branches of the revenue: and that we agree entirely with his majesty in attributing these salutary effects in a great measure to the system so wisely begun, and so properly persevered in, of raising a considerable proportion of the supplies within the year, a system which has happily disappointed the predictions of the external and internal enemies of his majesty and his government.—That we earnestly wish it were in our power to close our address here. But we feel that we should be wanting as well in duty to his majesty as in fidelity to that people, in whose name and on whose behalf we are proffering sacrifices unexampled in magnitude and indefinite in duration, if we were to disguise from his majesty the deep and general sentiment which prevails respecting the measures which preceded and accompanied the late general election.—Far be it from us to question his majesty's undoubted prerogative. But we cannot reflect without concern and disapprobation upon the circumstances of surprise and de- ception which attended the sudden exercise of that prerogative in the dissolution of the late parliament; and particularly of his servants to mislead upon the irreverent use of his majesty's royal name in a proclamation summoning the late parliament to meet on a fixed and no distant day, issued at a period, when the measure of dissolving that parliament must already have been in contemplation.—Connected also with this subject, we cannot forbear to notice rumours which strongly prevail throughout the country, of the most improper and unconstitutional interference of his majesty's ministers in the course of the late Elections: rumours at once highly discreditable and injurious to his majesty's government, and to the independent character of parliament.—We hope that upon enquiry and examination they may be proved to be utterly unfounded.—But, convinced as we are, that the tendency (though we trust not the effect) of such interference, as is alledged, must have been to revolt and disgust the well-affected part of the community, and to sow distraction and discontent in place of that unanimity which is so loudly called for, at a moment when the prosperity of the British empire depends upon the consenting and cordial co-operation of all orders and descriptions of the people; convinced also, that it is our peculiar duty, as it is the common interest of all those who prize, as it deserves, the inestimable blessing of a free form of government, to mark with our strongest reprehension a perversion of power which would be too well calculated to favour those delusive and dangerous theories which stigmatize the house of commons as an inadequate representative of the people.—But while we feel this most unpleasant duty forced upon us, in vindication of our own independence, and of the rights of those whom we represent, we humbly and earnestly intreat his majesty to be persuaded, that neither this, nor any other misconduct of his majesty's ministers, can essentially affect the firm and settled purpose of this house and of the great body of the nation, to unite in that general cause, and against that common danger—in comparison to which all other considerations, however important in themselves, are at the present moment, unfortunately, inferior and subordinate.—And we venture confidently to assure his majesty, that great and unexampled as are the difficulties and dangers which surround us, his majesty possesses in the wealth and prosperity of his dominions, in the loyalty and firmness of his parliament, in the bravery of his fleets and armies, and in the affection, zeal, and courage of his people—resources, which, if wisely called forth, and diligently and judiciously applied, are yet amply sufficient to ensure the safety and honour of the British empire; and to maintain the only remaining hope, under Divine Providence, for the restoration of the liberties and happiness of mankind."—Mr. Canning added, that those gentlemen who thought that in the address to his majesty the house ought to overlook all our naval and military achievements, would, doubtless, prefer the original address; but those who thought with him, that what was cheering and consolatory should not be sunk into the shade, would, he trusted, approve of the amendment which he had just read. Apprehending, however, that the tendency of pressing his amendment would be to cause a division of the votes between the two addresses, and anxious that nothing should be occasioned, on his part, which might have a tendency to throw a damp on the spirit of the country, it was not his intention to press his amendment to a division. The speaker then put the question, "That the words proposed to be left out, stand part of this question." Upon which,

Lord Howick rose .

He was certainly not surprized that the very extraordinary motion of the right hon. gent. should be thought of such a nature as not to require that it should be read from the chair; but he certainly was surprized that the right hon. gent. should have thought proper to submit to the house not only in this motion, but in many parts of the speech with which he prefaced it, assertions of facts unfounded in truth, and that he should have built on those facts, unwarranted conclusions, without investigation or enquiry, without having recourse to the authority of any document whatsoever. On such grounds, the hon. gent. had brought forward an amendment, charging his majesty's ministers with the most grave and momentous derelictions and deficiencies in the management of the army, of the navy, and of the foreign relations. The hon. gent. accused them of having excited universal discontent and disturbance in the army by an improper distribution of patronage; he accused them of prostituting the sacred name of his majesty, by dissolving parliament at a time when it was actually summoned to meet for the dispatch of business. The amendment proposed by the hon. gent. contained matters which, if founded in fact, ought to be referred to a committee to ground upon them articles of impeachment against his majesty's ministers. The hon. gent. thought it necessary to offer an apology for himself for being in opposition. The hon. gent. wished for unanimity, but when that unanimity would amount to an acquiescence in faults destructive to the country, it would be a dereliction of his duty to make it an invariable rule. The hon. gent. therefore contented himself with that qualified concord which, while it marked whatever was wrong, gave a general support to government. How far the hon. gent.'s speech agreed with the principles he had thus laid down, it was for the house to judge. As to the principles and character of the opposition that he himself had joined in, the popularity which that opposition had enjoyed for 15 years was the most satisfactory proof of their justice and propriety. It was an opposition of principle, and never could allow itself to give way to the low hostility of vexing and harassing by a warfare of details. The hon. gent. needed not to have gone back to the length of these 15 years to illustrate, by contrast, the nature of the opposition which he had resolved to enforce, after that painful struggle, in which he was so desirous to support the government, if duty did not sometimes compel him to oppose. The experience of the late general election might have told him, how far this opposition was popular, the public sentiment having been so strongly manifested with respect to it, and that when it stood forward proposing to vindicate the injured rights and wounded independence of the people. The hon. gent. accused ministers for their conduct in the recent negociations, and brought forward against them the promise they had made to substitute a direct and manly system of diplomacy, for former artifice and cunning, and the result of that promise. The hon gent. also taunted ministers with those pretensions of great talents, which, however they may have been put abroad by others, were never once urged by ministers themselves. Yet, disclaiming all pretensions for himself, he for one was ready to say, that before the fatal stroke which had laid Mr. Fox by the side of his late illustrious rival, and he trusted united both in the mercy of God, the administration of which Mr. Fox and lord Grenville were the chief members, was the one which possessed the greatest share of knowledge, information, experience, and ability. Much of these great qualities was now in the grave; but, with the exception of the individual who was now addressing the house, without any disparagement to the hon. gent. who as well as many of those about him would, he allowed, be a valuable acquisition to any administration, he might challenge any one to look round, and state from what men an administration could be formed with better claims to the confidence of the country. The present ministers were told they were on a "bed of roses," they were told so by a noble lord (Castlereagh) who acknowledged that the continent was in a very "unsatisfactory" situation; they were told so after the battle of Austerlitz. Was it possible for the present ministers to remove all the distresses that had come upon the country in 15 years pregnant with calamities, during the time of the late administration, though perhaps without any blame to that administration? All that could be done was, to offer the best advice and aid in their power. That had been done. When the hon. gent. spoke in glowing colours of the calamities of Prussia, and of the evils extended to the world, in consequence of the destruction of that power, he had only to say, that no part of those misfortunes was caused by Ins majesty's ministers. The misfortunes of this case required none of those exaggerations the hon. gent. was so prone to. History recorded many instances of armies destroyed and empires ruined; but the destruction of the Prussian empire was sudden and complete beyond parallel. A mighty monarch, possessing a vast army, distinguished for military reputation, was in one day reduced to seek safety in a precipitate flight, accompanied but by a few faithful followers of his broken fortunes. The hon. gent. had introduced into his speech the melancholy fate of the duke of Brunswick. That gallant prince, after receiving his death wound, was carried into his palace, in a litter; but when all means of ease and safety were denied him there, he was carried beyond the frontier;—he could go no further, and his brave heart burst. But persecution did not stop here. Cæsar was merciful when the battle was over, and those who had fallen, opposing his ambition, were sure at least of honourable burial. But the son of this brave prince was refused permission to deposit his venerable father's remains in the vault of his ancestors. This melancholy event had been omitted, only because there was no precedent for mentioning it in the king's speech. It was not want of feeling; for who that read in remote history of things like this, was able to withhold the tribute of a tear? And how much more naturally did that tribute flow for distresses which happened in our own time, and which we almost saw with our own eyes! When, to use the words of the poet, we see "Darius great and good, fallen from his high estate and weltering in his blood;" what heart could be so callous as not to melt with sympathetic grief! When the calamities were real, and happened in our own time, their affliction must fall upon us with a double weight. And was it to be supposed that those who were charged with the weight of government should be peculiarly insensible, when deprived of the stays and supports which they should otherwise reckon upon, when their best hopes were lost? Their affliction was, indeed, most poignant; but it was some consolation to them to be exempt from the bitter reflection that it was brought about by an interposition of theirs, or by any delay of their timely aid.—With regard, continued the noble lord, to the hon. gent.'s allusions to Hanover as the sole cause of the declaration of war by this country against Prussia, I am astonished that the hon. gent. could hazard such an unfounded statement. Indeed, if the hon. gent. had taken the trouble of looking at the terms of the declaration itself, he would have there seen, that, so far from Hanover being the only cause, the shutting of the rivers in the north of Germany against our commerce was the principal alleged ground of hostility, and upon that ground the house voted the address to his majesty, which approved the course pursued by government upon that occasion. But even supposing that the ports in the north of Germany were not closed against our shipping, was not the detention of Hanover by Prussia, upon such grounds as that power alleged, of such a nature as this government could not subscribe to? Was it not such a claim, indeed, as our government could not allow any power to insist upon in a negociation, or to maintain without interruption? Would the hon. gent. say that it was? But, combining the detention of Hanover with the shutting up the ports I have already stated, would the hon. gent. as member of a cabinet, hesitate to advise his majesty to declare war against the power which should be guilty of such aggressions; or would he advise his majesty to conclude peace with a power which, under such circumstances, should insist upon withholding Hanover? Then, if the hon. gent. would not do so, what becomes of all the empty, and, I must say, trifling declamation which the house has heard from him? The hon. gent. has thought proper to condemn the time at which our government declared hostility against Prussia, triumphantly asking, whether it was wise and becoming in his majesty's ministers to make war upon Prussia for those measures which she had taken in compliance with the wishes or directions of France, at the time when we were engaged in a negociation with the latter power, one of the objects of which was to do away those measures, and the consequences resulting from them? But on this I shall only observe, that the question itself demonstrates that the hon. gent. has not taken much pains to consider the question. For upon reviewing even the selection of letters published by the French government upon the subject of the negociation, he must have seen that there was no negociation pending with France at the time his majesty's declaration appeared against Prussia; that selection alone furnishes enough to shew that the assertion of the hon. gent. was unfounded. The second letter of Mr. Fox to the French minister, which communicated the resolution of this country not to enter into the negociation but jointly with Russia, was dated the 26th of March, and to this letter no answer whatever was received until June. In the interim, that is, on the 23d of April, his majesty's message, relative to the Prussian war, was laid before this house. I would ask, then, whether, as no answer was returned to this letter for so long a period, it was not very natural to conclude that the propositions of his majesty's government would not be complied with, and that the negociation was wholly at an end? Such being the case then, how can any candid man, will even the hon. gent. himself, maintain, that the causes urged in his majesty's message did not form a justifiable ground of war? Why, how did the case stand? France refused to negociate with us upon such conditions as, consistently with our character, interests, and security, we thought it our bounden duty to demand, and Prussia, upon a most preposterous plea, affixes to her dominions the territory of Hanover, which was unjustly seized upon by France; and, in addition to this, Prussia orders our shipping to be excluded from the north of Germany. In the address which the hon. gent. has read to the house, I perceive that there are very many professions of personal attachment to our sovereign, and of anxious wishes for his interests. I would wish to know, then, from the right hon. author, or advocate of all these professions, whether he, as a minister, would conduct a negociation, and conclude a war which should alienate from that sovereign an hereditary possession, wrested from him originally on account merely of a war between this country and a foreign enemy—and in which war that hereditary possession had no concerns? Of the separate interest of this country and Hanover, I have read and heard much. Into the discussion, however, I do not now mean to enter; but, thinking as I do, that honour is the most valuable possession of any state, I have no hesitation in stating, that it would be highly injurious to the interests of England, because inconsistent with its honour, to leave Hanover to France or her allies, under such circumstances as I have already described. When Hanover was taken possession of by Prussia, it will be recollected that it was transferred to her by France, with whom she was in the closest alliance, and when this was connected with the original cause of the invasion of that electorate, I would appeal to this house and to the world, whether it could be reconciled with any sentiment of magnanimity, honour, or justice, to allow its lawful sovereign to be deprived of Hanover in consequence of a war between Great Britain and France. I think I have fully answered the hon. gent.'s observations upon this head. But there is another charge of the hon. gent.'s which he has dwelt upon as the most serious, and to which I shall take leave to apply a few remarks. The hon. gent. makes this heavy accusation, that we did not send timely assistance to Prussia. But how soon had we reason to suppose that Prussia was at all disposed to enter into hostilities with France? At the time we declared war against her, she was in close connection with the French government. But notwithstanding our declaration, she had opportunities enough of communicating to our government any intention she entertained with regard to France. For, although war against Prussia was declared in April, baron Jacobi did not leave this country until the 15th of August. Of course ample means of communication with our government was open to Prussia. But still nothing transpired to indicate to us the disposition of that power to break her connections with France, and to commence actual war. No sign of the separation appeared. But as soon as it became evident to us that Prussia determined on war, I venture to say, that not a moment was lost to afford that power every aid the nature of the case admitted, notwithstanding the relation in which we stood to her; and until the sincerity of Prussia in her opposition to the views of France became very manifest, I am sure that no rational statesman would have advised us to act, certainly not to send British troops to the continent: least of all could such advice be consistently given by those gentlemen who had last year sent forth a publication not at all calculated to encourage confidence in the character of the Prussian court. No man can feel more disinclined than I do to speak of that court, in its present situation, in terms at all approaching to harshness. But, I must observe that, under the impression generally prevalent as to the character and policy of the Prussian cabinet, and under the total ignorance in which this country was placed, as to its views respecting France, until almost immediately before the war commenced, his majesty's ministers were not fairly liable to the slightest degree of censure. For what was the fact that served to warrant any suspicion of hostility between Prussia and France? In the month of September, M. Lucchesini, the Prussian ambassador, was recalled from the French court, in consequence of his becoming disagreeable to Bonaparte, and baron Knoblesdorff was appointed in his room, upon the express recommendation of Bonaparte himself. When that ambassador arrived at Paris, did his arrival serve to betray, or did he himself intimate to lord Lauderdale, who was then there, any change of disposition, on the part of Prussia, towards France? No, nothing whatever. And, in point of fact, the first communication which his majesty's ministers had as to the intentions of Prussia, was in a letter received from Mr. Thornton, our resident at Hamburgh, inclosing a letter from baron Jacobi, expressive of his (that nobleman's) wish to come to this country in something of an undescribed character (sous un caractère queloonque) in order to treat with us upon the subsisting differences between the two courts, and upon other matters of importance. Immediate measures were taken to facilitate the journey of baron Jacobi. That no intimation of the views of Prussia had been sooner received by our ambassador at Paris, was not at all attributable to any want of diligence, ability, and activity displayed on the part of the noble lord who conducted that mission in a manner so eminently worthy of his character, and so well calculated, had an appropriate disposition existed on the part of the enemy, to bring it to an amicable conclusion. But no opportunity offered to that noble lord to ascertain the altered views of Prussia. When, however, the intelligence of the alteration reached this country, ministers were not slow to act upon it. Baron Jacobi, whose proposals to this country turned out, after all, to be quite unsatisfactory, did not reach Hamburgh until the 1st of October, nor arrive in London until the 10th; nor communicate his propositions to his majesty's ministers until the 11th; and the battle of Auerstadt, it will be recollected, was fought on the 14th of that month.—From this statement, the house and the country will be enabled to appreciate the hon. gent.'s censure upon the conduct of his majesty's ministers in this transaction. That the conduct of Prussia towards the British government was not such as allowed the latter the least opportunity of affording her any timely or effectual assistance, must be obvious. But still more unaccountable was the course pursued by that court with regard to Russia her ally, who was pledged by treaty to assist her. The resolution of Prussia actually to commence hostilities was first communicated to the Russian government, by count Krusemark, who was dispatched with that intelligence to St. Petersburgh, which he did not reach until the 30th of September. The moment the tidings were conveyed to the magnanimous sovereign of Russia, orders were issued to set the troops in motion, and on the 5th of October an army was marched off under general Benigsen. Such was the procrastination of Prussia, even towards a court with whom she had no differences to adjust, from whom she had a right to call for immediate aid, and such was the course that rendered not only this country, but Russia, unable to afford her any effectual assistance! Upon all the points referred to relative to Prussia, I believe I have satisfac- torily replied to the hon. gent. I will add, that it was the inclination and purpose of ministers to afford every assistance and advice in their power to aid the cause and to restore the interests of Prussia. The hon. gent. has said, that we have sent a minister to that court when the war was over. But I beg it to be remembered, that we could scarcely have expected that the battle of Auerstadt would have produced such direful consequences as have since arisen. I also beg to state, that the delay which took place in the departure of a noble lord (Hutchinson) was owing to two causes, first, that the noble lord was not in England when it was deemed adviseable to send him to the continent; and secondly, that he did not clearly understand my first message to him. But when the mistake was removed, no time was lost in his lordship's departure, and I feel confident that the selection of this nobleman for such a mission, is a measure not likely to be found fault with by any man.—Now, as to the hon. gent.'s remarks upon the negociation, he has declined to enter fully into the subject, but yet in stating, professedly with a view to inform ministers of the points upon which he should feel it necessary to require further explanation, he has not declined to indulge in a strain of animadversion very well calculated to produce an undue opinion of the case. Without waiting for the further explanations which he professed to think necessary, he has thought proper to assert, that the statement in his majesty's declaration relative to the first overture for a negociation coming from the French government, appeared to be unfounded. Does the hon. gent. mean to argue that the first letter of my late right hon. friend which related merely to the assassin, and which did equal honour to the head and heart of that illustrious person, had any reference whatever to a negociation for peace? No, not a word about it. The right hon. gent. has also animadverted with some severity on Mr. Fox for not having disclaimed the compliment paid exclusively to himself on the subject of this assassin. Every one who knew him was sensible, that exalted man was ever anxious and eager to defend the character of friend or foe when assailed by base aspersions. He had done so at the court of France during the interval of peace, and when Buonaparte intimated to him, that my right hon. friend near me (Mr. Windham) was the abettor of a conspiracy against his life, he Openly declared to him, in the presence of his whole court, that it was a false accusation; that he was sensible and confident it must be so, for that Mr. Windham was, to his knowledge, a gentleman possessing the highest sense of honour, and altogether incapable of so base a design. Then why should the letter of my distinguished predecessor, be subject to the interpretation attached to it? But as to the circumstance of making the first overture for peace, I perfectly concur with the hon. gent., that there is nothing dishonourable in the thing itself, provided circumstances call for it. So far, indeed, am I from entertaining any such opinion, that were a promising opportunity to offer, and any change to appear in the pretensions of the enemy, I should not be slow to make an overture for negociation, from any fear of the reprehension that it might incur, particularly on the score of false pride. But with respect to the late negociation, I am warranted in asserting, that when the person at the head of the French government told one of his assemblies that the first overture was made by this country, he stated that which was untrue. The correspondence published by the French government is imperfect in a material point as to this part of the case. Only one letter in answer to the first letter of Mr. Fox appears in this publication, and a second letter, by which it was accompanied, is altogether omitted. In this second letter, which is by much the more material, Talleyrand writes somewhat in these terms, "Probably you would desire to receive news from this country. I send you the emperor's speech to the legislative body, in which you will perceive how pacific his sentiments are. I do not ask what is the prevailing inclination with you: but if the advantages of peace are duly appreciated, you know upon what basis it may be discussed." Now, this letter being suppressed, the hon. gent. and others, who think with him, are of course incompetent to judge upon this point, with regard to which they seem disposed to form such a positive opinion. But this letter will be laid before the house, accompanied with some private communications upon the same point, which we received through lord Yarmouth, and which neither this house nor the public have yet seen. From these communications this country and Europe will be able to judge upon what conditions we proposed to treat; also what points the French minister acceded to, and what points he afterwards retracted.—As to the proposition of the uti possidetis,that will be fully explained by the correspondence which we have to lay before the house. In the French publication of the papers, you will observe an immense chasm from the month of June till the arrival of lord Lauderdale: during that interval, lord Yarmouth was at Paris, not, to be sure, as an accredited minister, and therefore no formal notes were interchanged; but we have his dispatches regularly transmitted to us, and which elucidate the nature of his communications with the French minister, particularly relative to our demand of negociating in conjunction with Russia. This is a demand from which we never swerved, until the treaty of M. D'Oubril rendered it unnecessary for us to persist in that condition. But, even then, we consented only in order to prevent farther delay, to enter into a provisional negociation, until the opinion of the Russian court should be ascertained. That the fidelity of that government could not be shaken, was soon made evident. Our disposition to make an adequate return for such fidelity, cannot in any part of this transaction, be for one moment questioned. When the object of the negociation, and the peace to which it was once expected to lead, was to cement our alliance with this great and honourable government, to check the farther aggrandisement of French power, and to restore and secure what remained of independence in Europe, among others of course, the states of Prussia, I am astonished that the right hon. gent. should manifest such a decided temper of hostility to that negociation, and to an address which proposes to thank his majesty for commencing and pursuing it with such benevolent, wise, and exalted views. But, the whole history of this negociation will form the most complete answer to the hon. gent.'s objections, and the best antidote to the unbecoming sarcasms which the hon. gent. has thought proper to deal out, particularly against the conduct of my illustrious predecessor, who is most unaccountably censured for a want of that simplicity and manliness of character which are most strikingly obvious in his letters. That my right hon. friend made no concealment of a negociation with France at the time he brought down the message relative to Prussia, because in fact no negociation was then on the tapis, and that his conduct was in this, as in every instance of his life, plain, open, and manly, a simple statement of the fact may fully demonstrate. The hon. gent.'s attack, therefore, is powerless with regard to my deceased friend. But the attacks of the hon. gent. are general. Among the rest, he has thought proper to level his shafts at me; not, however, in his speech. He reserved me for his address, where he complains of predatory squadrons being allowed to maraud without interruption, among our West-India colonies. He has not, however, stated the amount of these squadrons, the amount of the mischief they have done, nay more, the means by which they were able to get out of port. Now, the fact is, that the squadrons alluded to by the hon. gent., were at sea before I was appointed to the admiralty. One squadron sailed in Oct. 1805, and the other on the 11th of Dec. following: and when I came to the admiralty there was not a scrap of paper to be found that could inform us as to the destination of those squadrons. We had nothing whatever to guide our judgment, we were left to our own enquiry, and we could only send out squadrons in pursuit of them in every direction where they were likely to have steered, or where any mischief could be done. Things remained thus till I got intelligence of the fleet, after which sir John Duckworth went in search, and the event of his 8 months gallant cruize in search of them is well known. Those fleets of the enemy did certainly reach the West Indies, and very much interrupted and injured our commere there and on the coast of Africa; but this is in no degree imputable as any blame to the present administration. Since they came into power, not a single squadron has escaped from their own ports except one, and out of that, 4 or 5 of the frigates which composed it have been taken; our fleets at present block them up in every port along the whole extent of the coast. The fleets which formerly escaped from these ports, have been mostly scattered and dispersed in different quarters of the globe; some of them have been so fortunate as to reach home again, by separating, and by single ships stealing into their own ports in the night, in the same clandestine way in which they had stolen out. Some of them are now blockaded to the American ports, where our ships are waiting to watch their coming out, and if they shall dare to do so, I have no doubt we shall have a good account of them. The last we heard of, had, to avoid our ships, sailed into a port, where a ship of her size had never been known to enter before; and there is every reason to hope and believe, that the winds and sea will beat her to pieces before the winter is over.—I next come to the embarkation that the hon. gent. seems to think we ought to have prepared on our first coming into office. The expeditions that he doubtless means to suggest that we ought to have sent out, would be for the West Indies. But has he considered, that if, as soon as we had been in office, we had prepared such an expedition, it would not have arrived at the West Indies until the latter end of May, or the beginning of June? and that, surely, is not a time for beginning military operations in the West Indies: [lord Castlereagh said across the house, not to the West Indies.] O, then, I suppose it is meant that we should have sent an expedition to some part of South America. They should however, suppose that the novelty of such an expedition, and the extent of the operations on that continent, would be of a nature to require at least some time to consider and prepare. Whatever success we have obtained in South America, his majesty's ministers do not pretend to give themselves any credit for. On the 21st of Sept. they gave an order that the transports should return from the Cape empty. The first notice that the present government ever received of such an expedition, was by dispatches that they received on the 24th of June, dated from St. Helena in the month of April. At that time it was a matter of serious difficulty to know what to resolve upon. If they had sent out a strong fleet, and that fleet should find that sir Home Popham's expedition had sailed, they would not have known what part to go to. His majesty's ministers were not, however, negligent. They sent the Sampson man of war, and a convoy which sailed under her protection, as soon as the wind would permit. If a more considerable reinforcement was not sent, the hon. gent. must acknowledge, that there might be other services which appeared more pressing. and that in the situation the continent then was, it was extremely desireable to keep a considerable disposable force at home, to take the advantage of any favourable opportunity on the continent. Sir Sa- muel Achmuty's squadron sailed for Buenos Ayres on the 9th of Oct. which was only a month after it was known the place was in our possession, and if it did not sail sooner, it was merely because it was detained by unfavourable winds. As to the discontent that the hon. gent. states to have been produced by general Craufurd's appointment, I must only observe that he certainly knows nothing of the nature or the object of the expedition which has been confided to gen. Craufurd. His majesty's ministers have certainly a right to select those officers whom they may think most proper to execute those particular things that are entrusted to them. But why are we to suppose that this selection of gen. Craufurd has given great offence? We have never heard, neither does the hon. gent. now allege, that the selection of sir Home Popham ever gave any offence, and yet sir Home Popham has at least as many superiors in the navy, as gen. Craufurd has in the army. He is only the 160th upon the list of captains; and yet who ever heard that the navy were discontented, because sir Home Popham was employed, while many of his seniors were unemployed? We are charged with having superseded sir John Stuart, sir Home Popham, and sir David Baird. As to sir John Stuart, it certainly is not fair to say that he was superseded. At first, 7000 men were placed under his command for the defence of Sicily; afterwards, that number had been increased to an army of 16,000 men, who were commanded by gen. Fox. This was not superseding sir John Stuart, but making his division a part of a much larger army. It cannot be said, that we think lightly, or wish to speak lightly of the services performed by sir John Stuart. Nobody holds them in a higher light than I do, nor feels more proudly, as an Englishman, at the glorious event of the battle of Maida; but if the hon. gent. had had but the patience to wait for a few hours longer, he would probably have heard from my right hon. friend (Mr. Windham) a notice of a motion for the purpose of returning thanks to sir John Stuart, and those officers who distinguished themselves in that action. I believe, if he considers a little, he will not suppose that it was merely for the purpose of giving gen. Fox a high command, that the additional army was sent to Sicily. As to sir Home Popham and sir David Baird, I freely confess that I was one of those who advised their recall, and upon the ground that they did without orders, and upon their own judgement and responsibility, undertake the expedition to South America. In prosecution of their scheme, they did not even leave a single ship of the line to protect the Cape of Good Hope. They even obliged a frigate that was sent out to India with money for the payment of the troops there, to desert the destination that it was intended for and go upon this South American expedition. Such conduct as this I consider highly reprehensible, and were it to be overlooked, there would be an end to all discipline and subordination. I do not wish to dwell upon the misconduct of men in their absence: but there is one act of sir Home Popham's which I cannot hesitate to censure as particularly improper, and that is, his letter to the manufacturers. What his motives for such conduct were, I Cannot say. Perhaps he wished to court some favour and protection against the censure which he must be conscious of deserving from government. Perhaps this letter to seek mercantile gratitude, while offending against professional duty, was one of the fatal effects to be apprehended from that mischievous system of rewards administered by the committee at Lloyd's, called the Patriotic Fund, a committee which is held out to the navy as giving greater reward and encouragement than the government of the country. I do consider the conduct of sir Home Popham, as highly reprehensible in a British officer, and, therefore, although I should be sorry to pronounce strongly on the conduct of any man until he has had an opportunity of justifying himself, yet I will say, that there is nothing in the first appearance of this transaction, which a British parliament can approve of. If such conduct as this appears to be, could be not only justified but approved of, it would then follow, that all our military governors, in the West Indies, in Gibraltar, and in every other part of the world, might totally disregard the instructions they should receive from government, and turn their whole forces wherever their private opinion, or wherever their interest might point out. This is a doctrine, which I am sure the hon. gent. would not wish to hold out to our army and navy. As to the changes in our ambassadors, and that to which he principally alludes, of sending Mr. Adair in the place of sir A. Paget, I Must observe, that, after the very incautious publication of his correspondence by the late government, it is not extraordi- nary that we should think it proper that some other person should be sent out to succeed him.—As to the dissolution of parliament, it is by no means surprising, that, after the negociation had completely failed, his majesty's ministers should advise his majesty to recur to the sense of his people, as the means most likely to obtain that unanimity which is so desireable under the present circumstances. The dissolution was at a time when the public business was over, when the harvest was finished, and when it appeared that the election could be carried on without the least disadvantage to the industry and convenience of the nation. We are charged with abusing the name of the king on a former occasion; but to that charge I will simply answer, that his majesty's ministers had no idea of advising the dissolution of parliament until they heard of the complete failure of the negociation, and as soon as they were informed of that event they advised it. As to the charge of his majesty's ministers having used improper means to influence the election, I believe there have been complaints that government did not employ that influence which they fairly might have employed. I can take upon myself to say in the face of this house and of the public, that in no instance was a single shilling of the public money employed in any election throughout the country. For what reason the long amendment of the hon. gent. has been proposed, I know not; perhaps it was to answer the purpose of publication. Whatever may have been the motives, I think I have generally replied to it, and I shall be ready to meet the charges separately, and more in detail, whenever the subject is brought regularly before the house.

Lord Castlereagh

assured the house, that it was not his intention to trespass on the time of the house, by entering at length into the consideration of the present subject, particularly as all the papers and documents relating to it had not as yet been laid on the table. He agreed with the noble lord, who had displayed great eloquence and very considerable talents in the vindication of himself and the rest of his majesty's ministers, that the proper time for considering the important question of negociation with France was, when the whole of the correspondence should be laid before the house. Coinciding with him thus generally on the subject of the negociation as to the fitness of the time for dis- cussing it, he begged leave, however, to observe, that the course pursued by the noble lord and his colleagues in office was not founded in wisdom, nor the propositions of the noble lord borne out by sound argument. Before he undertook to shew the fallacy of the noble lord's reasoning on many of the general points contained in his speech, he should make a few preliminary remarks on the noble lord's reply and comments on his right hon. friend's amendment. Whence arose the noble lord's exultation and marked display of triumph at his right hon. friend's resolution not to press the question to a division? It would appear as if ministers thought themselves certain of the confidence of the house, and secure of a majority; but, leaving them to enjoy their own feelings on the occasion, he could not but applaud the view and object of his right hon. friend in not dividing the house under the present circumstances. In whatever light the amendment might be considered by ministers, he was sure that every impartial person who attended to it seriously, must acknowledge that it was founded on matter of fact, and not on opinions and assertions. His right hon. friend had not endeavoured to attack the government under a notice of a motion for an enquiry into their conduct; he did not thus impute blame to them, and suspend an implied charge over their heads. No! he exhibited his complaint in the first instance, supported by facts, boldly and unequivocally advanced, which gave ministers a fair opportunity of explaining themselves, and vindicating their measures. The noble lord had, in some parts of his speech, took credit to himself and his friends, for having uniformly acted in opposition from principle, and not from a spirit of teasing and harassing government unnecessarily. He could also assure the house that both himself and those who acted with him on the same side were influenced by no motive in their opposition but public principle. They felt it their duty to watch and revise the acts of ministers, in order to call them to an account. Such a thing might be deemed bad or reprehensible. On this ground therefore the opposition, of which the noble lord had formed a distinguished part, could not stand in competition, with respect to the discharge of public duty, with the present opposition; for his lordship must recollect, that he and his friends had turned their backs on parliament, and neglected all public concerns in the hour of distress and peril: when public duty required their attendance, they were not to be found at their posts; they had seceded and abandoned the cause of the country, and the trust reposed in them by their constituents. Having said thus much respecting the preliminary topics of the noble lord's speech, he should now proceed to call the attention of the house to some prominent points of the negociation, which was the main question; and first, he readily admitted, that the issue of the negociation was disgraceful to the enemy, and honourable, on the whole, to this country, even from the present blush of it; but, notwithstanding this admission, he felt much anxiety respecting many circumstances connected with, and arising out of it; but he trusted ministers would be able, when the papers were produced, to remove his present uneasiness. As he had already observed, there were many points of the negociation which required very satisfactory explanation. He was apprehensive, however, that in carrying on the discussions, ministers had deluded both themselves and Europe; it necessarily followed that the powers of the continent had their attention fixed on the progress of a negociation which lasted 8 months, and what naturally must have been the result, but that their disposition to co-operate against France had relaxed or produced indecision? It was to be shewn, therefore, what effect the negociation had on the rest of Europe; it remained for ministers to prove that their protracted pacific discussion had not exposed and endangered the interest and security of the continent. It might have induced Russia to enter into a negociation with the French government; it might have even led Prussia to make a premature demonstration of hostility against France, in order to assure both England and Russia that the cabinet of Berlin was determined to submit no longer to the humiliation and insults of the enemy. These circumstances, and many more which arose from the pendency of a negociation for 8 months, undoubtedly made the production of all the papers on the subject highly desirable and necessary. From the conduct of ministers during the negociation, it appeared as if they had been certain of peace; if they had not made sure of peace, was it possible, that during 8 months, while the discussions lasted, they should have laid up all their military plans, and the whole system of internal defence and security? Upon what other possible ground was the General Training act suspended in a great measure? Why was the instruction for regulating the army according to the new system postponed till the return of lord Lauderdale? On what ground could the neglect of all military resources be accounted for, but on the certainty of peace, under the severest terms of an armistice? It was impossible to conceive a more general torpor than that which pervaded every branch of the army during the whole of those anxious 8 months. After having paid the closest attention to the subject, he could only discern that 3 regiments of the line had been sent up the Mediterranean, and arrived just in time to see our gallant troops abandoning the brave and loyal Calabrians, to whom our commander had promised every assistance. He begged likewise to remind the house, that not a man had sailed for Buenos Ayres till the return of lord Lauderdale was known. Under the circumstances of the case they should either have recalled general Beresford, or sent out a reinforcement immediately. They had left that valuable capture 4 months without any reinforcement; and if the gallant officer commanding at the Cape had not detached some of his troops, it would be impossible to tell the consequence. This, however, was not the only proof of their indecision; there was another equally strong in their conduct towards general Miranda. He did not mean to discuss the policy of forwarding that officer's projects, that was a subject which required consideration: but why had not ministers decided one way or other on a question obviously interesting to the British empire? So far was government from making up their mind on it, that our commanders were obliged constantly to reply to the applications made to them for support, that they would write home for instructions; and at last we contributed our aid by sending a few light armed vessels to convoy the expedition.—As another proof that ministers had relied on the certainty of peace, the noble lord mentioned the situation of our troops at Plymouth, where they had remained 4 months in a most deplorable condition, at the expiration of which time the half of them sailed for Sicily, where they remained locked up at the very moment when they should be ready at home to second our allies on the continent. It was evident that ministers could not commit such gross mismanagement if they had not literally duped themselves with the sanguine expectation of peace with Buonaparte.—Here the noble lord contrasted the confederacy of last year with the one formed this year, and inferred from the comparison, that the former, though unsuccessful, had displayed combination, energy, and wisdom, while the latter, as far as ministers were concerned, exhibited the utmost imbecility. With respect to the appointment of brigadier-general Craufurd, to the command of so large and important an expedition as had lately sailed, he concurred with his right hon. friend in saying, that it was naturally a subject which had dissatisfied many; to that officer, personally, he could not have the smallest objection, he had an opportunity of seeing his talents displayed in Ireland to the greatest advantage, and had no doubt whatever of his possessing great military skill; but it should be remembered, that he was only the fourth or fifth colonel in the service, and consequently, that if any thing occurred on the voyage, or on the arrival of the expedition at its destination, to prevent him from attending his duty, the command in chief must necessarily devolve on a lieut. colonel under him. This would be an unprecedented situation for the troops to be placed in. He saw no necessity of giving an appointment which had excited such surprise and disgust throughout the army. Surely, it was easy for the right hon. Secretary (Mr. Windham) to have made a selection which would have given satisfaction, and have conducted the expedition with equal gallantry and success. The only merit his majesty's ministers could pretend to claim on account of the business in South America, was that of having given a considerable disposeable force to officers invested with a certain discretion. As to the dissolution of parliament, he highly disapproved of it. In lord Howick's letter to the lord mayor, dated the 8th of October, there was not a word of the dissolution of parliament, but upon the 10th, parliament was dissolved. This was a course of proceeding which was neither justified by precedent nor fair dealing. He considered it as an electioneering trick of government, and a measure not called for by necessity; and bestowed praises on the last parliament for the integrity of its proceedings. He contrasted the late dissolution with that in 1784, which he maintained to be a constitutional exercise of the royal prerogative; but here it was made use of from party motives; and for party purposes. He thought the amendment of his right hon. friend a perfectly manly mode of telling ministers wherein their conduct was to be objected to; but he was glad his right hon. friend did not press for a division. It was very different from the conduct of opposition for the last 15 years; for those gentlemen cared not to commit to writing their sentiments, but almost always dealt in general censure.—The original motion on the address was then put and carried, nem. con.

Lord Howick

then rose and said, that he hoped to be able on Monday next, to lay the papers relative to the negociation before the house, as every exertion was making to have them prepared as early as possible.

Mr. Secretary Windham

gave notice, that on Monday next he should move the thanks of the house to sir John Stuart, and the officers and men who had fought under him at the glorious battle of Maida.—Adjourned.