Mr. Secretary Foxmoved the order of the day, for taking into consideration his majesty's message, relative to Prussia, 887 which being read from the chair, the right hon. secretary rose, and spoke as follows: I am sure, sir, that it is impossible that the message we have now heard read, can fail to excite the strongest sensation in every temper and disposition of mind which can exist in this house. In the first place, when we hear it stated that his majesty has abstained from appealing to his British subjects, on account of the violence and injustice which had been done to him in the seizure of his electoral dominions, it is impossible not to feel grateful for that kindness and mildness which his majesty has always shewn to the subjects of this realm. It was with the most extreme reluctance that he could consent to involve them in war upon any ground that was not immediately and directly connected with British interests. After the sentiment of gratitude to his majesty for this tender consideration of his subjects of this kingdom, the next feeling which must be strongly excited by the message, is a feeling of just indignation at the conduct of the court of Prussia. I hope that every member, while he feels this just indignation, will, at the same time perceive the propriety of uniting the most vigorous measures, with a language temperate and moderate, and which does not violate that respect which has been always considered as due to crowned heads, and ought not in the present times to be departed from. Indeed, to describe justly the measures which have been adopted by the court of Prussia against this country, they cannot be called the measures of the king of Prussia; for that sovereign is known to be of a mild and pacific disposition. The measures must be considered such as his Prussian majesty has been induced to adopt from the pernicious councils of the enemies of this country. Had it been my object to condemn, in the strongest terms, the decision of the Prussian cabinet, I might have though it necessary to lay some additional papers on the table, but that not being my object, I have moved but for few. More would have been unnecessary, as it was not my wish to give the strongest possible colouring to the accusation that the message contains. In order to understand those proceedings which have terminated in an outrage, unprecedented in the history of the worst proceedings of the worst times of Europe, it will be necessary to view the transaction a little earlier. The origin of this proceeding is to be traced to the convention concluded, at Vienna, on the, 15th of Dec., between Count Haugwitz and the French emperor; 888 but when it is considered what was the situation of Prussia, at the time that its sovereign concluded that treaty with France, it must be recollected, that its means of negotiation were still greater than, what it derived from its own sources, or its own armies. The armies of Prussia were undoubtedly numerous and respectable; but was it on them alone that the king of Prussia relied, when he was negotiating with France? Certainly it was not. He had a strong additional support, which gave weight to his negotiations. The emperor of Russia, after he had left Austerlitz, gave the whole direction of the Russian troops, that remained in Germany, to the command of the king of Prussia. This country, too, had promised him a powerful assistance by pecuniary supplies, if he should be driven to a war with France. These were the means he possessed of giving weight to his negotiations! And how did he apply those means? Why, to seize a part of the territories of one of those powers which had been supporting him in that rank and situation which enabled him to conclude his treaty. After this treaty was signed, a considerable difficulty remained in the execution of it; this difficulty proceeded, in a great measure, from the just scruples of the king of Prussia, who perceived that it would be very hard to prevail upon his Britannic Majesty to ratify such a treaty, and who, therefore, felt that his title would be so bad as to make the acquisition of Hanover, under these circumstances, a poor equivalent for those provinces that he was obliged to give up to France. He felt, besides, that, upon no principles of justice, could he pretend to take it on other terms than those which France herself had held it on, and therefore, at first, he did not pretend to take Hanover absolutely, but with the power of restoring it. France, in the mean time, pressed for the cession of Anspach and Bayreuth. What then did the king of Prussia do? Certainly he did not expect that the French government would be able to negotiate between him and his Britannic Majesty, that he should be allowed o retain Hanover; and therefore he finally resolved to seize it without the consent of his majesty, and under the pretence of an equivalent for Anspach, Bayreuth, and those provinces which were ceded to France. It cannot then be said, that this treaty, and the proceedings which followed it, were altogether the effect of fear: for what was the necessity under which his 889 Prussian majesty was placed? Was it merely the necessity of ceding Anspach and Bayreuth? This might have been a considerable misfortune, yet it was one which might be justified by necessity. But the sort of necessity claimed by the king of Prussia, is different; he says, "Because I have lost Anspach and Bayreuth, I therefore feel myself under the necessity of seizing the dominions of some third power; not only of a third power, but of one that, from all times, and by every circumstance, I am bound to respect." This is the sort of necessity claimed by the Prussian court, and it is this which makes the case of Prussia much worse than that of any other nation in Europe. As for Spain (1 do not wish to revive the differences of opinion with respect to the Spanish war) but Spain, I say, would comply no farther with the wishes of our enemies, than by giving a sum of money. Holland, and other powers, have been, from terror, obliged to make cessions of territory to France; but no other power has been compelled, by terror, to commit robberies or spoliations on its neighbours. It is in this that the case of Prussia stands distinguished from that of all other nations. We cannot help looking with some degree of pity and contempt, on a power that can allege that it is reduced to such a necessity. It would be, in itself, a considerable humiliation or degradation to Prussia, to be obliged to give up those provinces to which it was so much attached, and which had been called, "The cradle of the house of Brandenburgh." The degradation of this cession was still much increased by the conduct of the people of Anspach, who entreated their sovereign not to abandon them. Instead of lessening the ignominy of the cession, it was a great increase of dishonour, to sell a brave and loyal people for what was called an equivalent: it was an union of every thing that was contemptible in servility, with every thing that was odious in rapacity.—On the 26th of Jan., an official letter was written from baron Hardenberg to Mr. Jackson, expressly stating it to be the intention of his Prussian majesty to take possession of Hanover only until the conclusion of peace between England and France. In the answer to that letter, his majesty expresses his firm reliance on the declaration of his Prussian majesty, but wishes the terms to be more explicit. The language that Prussia held at that time to our court, was the same she then 890 held to Russia, and to every other court with which she was connected by the relations of friendship. Soon after this, the convention with France appeared, and then the court of Prussia wished to represent the measures taken with regard to Hanover, as in a manner dictated by France; they would have it supposed, that it was rather an object of French than of Prussian ambition, that they should be possessed of Hanover. At first, they endeavoured to represent to the government of this country, that it was more for our interest that Hanover should be occupied by Prussian than by French troops; and their argument was this: ?If we have it, the ports may be still open to your commerce, or at leas your manufactures may have a passage through our territory.? This hope was, however, now entirely cut off, and M. de Schulenburgh, in his manifesto, professes to take the country as a present from France, which she had won and held by the right of conquest. No example could be found in all the histories of war, and no mention had ever been made by the writers on ht law of nations, of any power having a right to receive as a present, a country occupied during a war by one of the belligerent powers, but not ceded by the other.—The house must therefore see to what extremity we are now reduced. It would be idle to say that a war with Prussia would not be a calamity. It is impossible but that it must be a calamity to this country, to have the number of its enemies increased. It is also a painful consideration to think that there is no mode of returning this calamity on the aggressors which will not, in some degree, fall also on neutral and friendly nations, and even on ourselves. The house will, however, feel that there are occasions in which a manifestation of our principles and of our resentment become necessary, although attended with the calamities inseparable from war. If such an outrage as this were passed over, might not every other nation in Europe, and particularly those who have less power to resist than Prussia, say to us, "we wish as much as you that the power of France could be restrained, but you see our situation, and the great power of France, to which we are exposed? What are we to do?" If this question were put to me, I should answer, that powers in that situation must save themselves as well as they can, and even make cessions if they are insisted upon. If Prussia should 891 allege, that she was in that state of comparative weakness that she was obliged to cede Anspach and Bayreuth; however his majesty might lament the necessity, or the accession of strength his enemies derived from the acquisition, still he would not have attempted to oppose it, or make the slightest remonstrance on the occasion. But when that power shall say, "I am not only obliged to make cessions, but I am also obliged to make war with you," then the question becomes very different, and his majesty is under the necessity of considering it in a very different light. Although I, for one, am not inclined to look very favorably on the present situation of this country, nor to feel so sanguinely as some other gentlemen, yet I think that, upon the present occasion, we should make a signal example of the court of Prussia; and whatever principles theorists may lay down about restoring the balance Europe, I think we shall do more to restore the sound and true principle that ought to prevail in Europe by sheaving the world, in this instance, that this country will not abandon them herself, nor consent that they shall be departed front by other nations in their transactions with her. I consider that the power of the country consists, in a great measure, in the known justice of its principles, in its moderation and forbearance; but if the court of Berlin chooses to depart from the principles of justice, and to act hostility to this country, it must take the consequence. I believe it has, as yet, gained nothing by its injustice. Hanover, desolated as it was first by French armies, and afterwards, in a still greater degree, bY Prussian armies, can add little or nothing to the revenues of Prussia, neither can it, in its present situation, increase her military strength. The king of Prussia has been given a mere nominal possession of that country; but so far from being strengthened by this present from France, he is only the more completely vanquished and subdued. Austria was forced, by the fortune of the war, to cede many of her provinces; other nations have been obliged to make similar cessions; but none of them had, like Prussia, been reduced to that lowest state of degradation, to consent to become the ministers of the injustice and rapacity of a master. By the command of France, Prussia was obliged to shut the ports of Hanover against our ships, and what was the possession which France allowed her to keep of Hanover? 892 She has sent general Barbou to reside in that country, as a military superintendant, to see that every thing be done there according to the pleasure of France. There are many other instances of the manner in which Prussia is now treated by France; in several transactions, respecting the possession of Essen and Werden, and several little villages almost too inconsiderable to name, Prussia is treated with *little respect as she deserves. The French appear constantly to treat Prussia as a country that it is impossible to make a treaty or agreement with; and, in this respect, it is very likely that they are in the right. In our conduct upon this occasion, we shall have avoided a great evil, and done some good; we shall avoid the giving the sanction of this country to the spoliations which have been committed on the Continent; we shall avoid the imputation of being indifferent to the fate of his majesty's foreign possession, which would be a heavy imputation, even if it were supposed that their security was not immediately connected with the interests of this country; but, above all, we shall avoid the giving our sanction to that principle which has been lately adopted, of transferring the subjects of one prince to another, in the way of equivalents, and under the pretext of convenience and mutual accommodation. The wildest Schemes that ever were before broached would not go so far to shake the foundations of all established governments as this new practice. If we are to make exchanges, let us exchange those things which are the proper objects of exchange; let us give a field for a field, or let us exchange its stock, its oxen, and its sheep; but let us not consider the people of a country, or the subjects of a state, as matter for exchange or barter. There must be, in every nation, a certain attachment of the people to its form of government, without which no nation can subsist. This principle, then, of transferring the subjects of one prince to another, strike it the foundation of every government, and the existence of every nation. I had, therefore, great pleasure in presenting the note, delivered by me to M. Jacobi, which expressed, that no consideration of convenience or mutual accommodation, much less an equivalent, should ever induce his majesty to forget the exemplary fidelity and attachment of his Hanoverian subjects, or consent to the alienation of the electorate. I do not know that it is neces- 893 sary to make any further observations; but before I sit down, I must stat, that there can be no doubt but that the shutting the ports of Prussia to British vessels is alone most clearly and unquestionably an act of hostility against this country.—Mr. Fox then concluded, by moving an address of thanks to his majesty, which, as usual, was an echo of the message.
Lord Castlereaghrose to express his entire and unqualified concurrence in the address moved by the right hon. gent., and his cordial approbation of the sentiments with which it was introduced. From the manly manner in which the government had acted upon this occasion, it was impossible that any candid man could refuse them his praise. They had conducted themselves with a firmness so judicially tempered with conciliation, as to maintain the dignity and resolution which pressingly became them in such a case; and, at the same time, not to shut the door against an opportunity of an amicable adjustment, if the Prussian cabinet were so disposed. The right hon. gent. who opened the motion, had put the argument in favour of this country upon such broad grounds, and sustained the proceeding of his majesty's ministers by reasoning so irresistible, that he felt it unnecessary to add much to what the house had already heard. Indeed, under all the circumstances, he could not see how it was possible for government to have taken a different course. Prussia, in becoming the instrument of France to take hostile measures against this country, to adopt the course of annoying us that France had previously pursued, left to us no other alternative than that which had been taken. The noble lord vindicated the resolution to resent invasion of Hanover, and expressed his confidence that ministers, in evincing such a solicitude for his majesty's Hanoverian territories, but acted in unison with the feelings of the British people, who must ever participate in the feelings and wish of their sovereign. As to the arguments used by Prussia, after taking possession of Hanover as a permanent dominion, they appeared to him to be obviously untenable upon any principle of justice. Prussia stated, that France held Hanover by right of conquest, and under that right assumed to dispose of it. But, without any reference to the forcible and outrageous manner in which France originally took possession of Hanover, it was clear that, at the time they un- 894 dertook to transfer it to Prussia, they did not hold it at all, for they were not in possession of that country, having evacuated the whole of it, with the exception of a single point. And unless the retention of that point (the fortress of Hameln) could be argued to imply a possession of the whole country, it would be absurd to attempt the maintaining, upon any principle of public justice, that the French held Hanover as a conquest at the time of the transfer so justly complained of. Therefore, the main ground of justification upon which Prussia seemed to rely for the validity of this transfer, must fall to the ground. Indeed the declaration of Prussia herself, in January, when she occupied Hanover, professedly, until the conclusion of pace, distinctly supported this argument, and recognized the principle she had asserted. And, upon no pretence whatever, could the unqualified way in which she afterwards acted towards that ill-fated country, be warranted. As to the probable result to Prussia herself of these events, and of the line of policy which she had so long thought proper to pursue, he firmly believed she would very soon find that she was miserably mistaken, that she would much better have consulted her own political security; and sure he was, that she would have better maintained her importance and character, had she acted quite differently—had she given her aid, when that aid might have been effectual, towards restoring the safety of Europe. Still, however, if by any course of conduct Prussia could be released from her present situation, if she could be excited justly to appreciate her own interest, and to feel for her own safety, and if any alliance could be contrived which should induce her to act upon that feeling, it was important that this country should manifest a disposition to afford every possible assistance. Such was the policy which, he trusted, would be pursued; for such, he was convinced, would be for the common interest. In every view of the subject, he was persuaded that the war, to which the address referred, was one of complete justice and absolute necessity; and on these grounds he felt great satisfaction in supporting the motion.—The address was then carried nem. con. and was ordered to be presented to his majesty by such members of that house as were of his majesty's privy council.