REPORT ON THE ARMY ESTIMATES

HC Deb 12 December 1803 vol 1 cc261-303

On the motion for bringing up the report on the army estimates,

Colonel Crawford

rose and spoke as follows:—Sir; in he debate which took place on Friday last, the Committee was so long occupied in attending to the speeches of gentlemen either the most distinguished for their talents or of the greatest weight from their official situations, that I thought it better to defer offering my opinions on the subject until the report should be brought up.—Amongst the various topics which have been, or naturally may be introduced into this discussion, there is to one which more prominently presents itself to my mind, than that which in the last session formed the ground of a specifick motion in this Mouse. I mean, the establishment of a military council.—At a time when (in addition to the immense sums that the public is called upon in other ways to contribute for military purposes) Parliament deems it necessary to vote establishments so large and expensive as those contained in the estimates now before us: at a time, Sir, when we are engaged in a war the met arduous and critical in which this country was ever involved, it undoubtedly is the first duty of every member of this House, to suggest all those means which in his judgment would conduce to the bringing our military system to the highest pitch of perfection, and to the placing die national defence and security upon a great, solid, and permanent basis; and the accomplishment of these most important objects would, in my opinion, be greatly promoted by the establishment of a military council, properly composed.—When this subject was mentioned on Friday, last by an hon. gent, not now present (Mr. Fox), the Chancellor of the Exchequer told us, that he had reason to believe that many of those who formerly had wished for such a council, were now, upon further consideration of it, convinced that it would be productive of no advantage, and of many inconveniencies to the public service.—I cannot pretend to say what change may have taken place in the opinions of others, but I think it right to declare, that mine remains unaltered, that the vote which I formerly gave, when the question was agitated in this House, was not lightly given, and that having fully considered tie subject since, I am confirmed in my conviction of the propriety of that vote.—But, before I proceed to state my reasons for adhering to this opinion, I cannot help expressingmy surprize, that whenever the measure has been recommended on the one side, and resisted by his Majesty's ministers on the other, it has been resisted chiefly on the ground that it would imp'ya want of confidence in the abilities of die commander in chief.—For my own part, Sir, I am very sure that I never made any proposal, never stated any opinion or uttered a single expression in this House, which, if liberally or fairly construed, could possibly be considered as conveying any thing, disrespectful or disparaging of that illustrious personage; although I well recollect that such insinuations were thrown cut against me both in and out of this House.—I am, however, totally regardless of what may be the effect of these or similar misrepresentations they shall never deter me from freely and openly delivering my opinions: and, therefore, I have no hesitation in declaring that, in the present situation of affairs, I do not believe his Royal Highness to be capable, without further assistance, of doing ample justice to the country in the administration of the various branches of the military department of the public service. When I say this, it is not that I do not think as highly as any man of his Royal highness's abilities and exertion; but I do not hold bim to be equal to such a task, because I believe that no one man can perform it.—I am fully sensible, Sir, of the great advantages which the country has derived from his being placed at the head of the army; and I know that he devotes himself to the discharge of his public duties with a degree of laborious assiduity, rarefy to be met with in any man. and still more rarely, per- haps, in a man of his high birth. But, completely occupied as he is, in dispatching the urgent and pressing business that daily occurs in the command of such a force as we now have on foot, it is not possible that he should have sufficient time and leisure left for reflecting, as deeply and maturely as the subject requires, on all the possible means of improving the national defence, and establishing it upon one great combined and permanent system,—But, it has been said, has he not already a council of able officers to assist him? Are not the staff this council?—Undoubtedly, Sir, his Royal Highness's staff is composed of very able and respectable officers; but they, too, are fully engaged with the details of their respective departments.—It has also been urged, that ail the general officers who are employed, are, in fact, his council, as he has constant opportunities of having recourse to their advice; but here, again, I must object, not only that these general officers are greatly occupied with the particular business of their respective commands, but also that their being necessarily dispersed, at a great distance from the commander in chief, and from each other, is an obstacle to their rendering at service, which might be expected from such a council as I have in view.—But let it not be supposed that I am proposing a council, for the purpose of controlling the commander in chief, in the direction of the active operations of the army in the field. What I mean to recommend is a council, comprising within it some officers of great experience and acknowledged abilities, who would devote the whole of their time to the nature investigation of every means, that might be proposed by others, or should occur to themselves, for increasing our military strength, digesting and combining the whole in to one great and comprehensive system.—The establishment of such a council, of which the commander in chief would be president, and the master and lieutenant general of the ordnance (amongst others) would be members, would have the advantage of uniting and bringing, under one view, those different branches of the military service which are now independent of each other; as every thing relating to the military branch of the ordnance department would come under its cognizance,—I say the military, as contradistinguished from the naval branch.—I also think, that, without being accused of speaking slightingly either of his Royal Highness the commander in chief, or of the noble lord at the head of the ordnance, I maybe allowed to say, that any proposal for the defence of the country, coming from such a council, would carry with it greater weight than if proceeding either from the commander in chief or from the master general and that ministers would feel, that in neglecting to attend to such a recommendation, they would take upon themselves a serious responsibility.—Ministers, indeed, and those who approve of their conduct, contend, that nothing necessary for the defence of the empire has been neglected; from whence they infer, that we have not felt the want of such a council; but, as I deny the premises, I cannot grant the conclusion. I contend, that there has been much neglect and mismanagement; and, to prove this assertion, I must shortly revert to a period which was referred to in the former debate, I mean that immediately subsequent to the treaty of Amiens.—Without at all entering into the merits of that treaty, I shall merely say, that, even if after the conclusion of it, the conduct of the French government had been apparently pacific; yet, when we consider that by that treaty we recognized them as legitimate sovereigns of the Netherlands, and that the possession of that country, which at any time would have given France a predominant influence in Holland, does in the present state of Europe give them the absolute command of it; it undoubtedly behoved us to adopt a new and more enlarged military system than had ever before been deemed necessary, and to employ ourselves during the peace in strengthening our means of defence in proportion to the increased means of offence which France would possess in case of a renewal of war.—This, I say, was obviously necessary, even supposing the conduct of the French government had been apparently pacific. But, what was their conduct? What it really was. Sir, it is unnecessary for me to examine; it is sufficient for my argument to consider in what light his Majesty's ministers themselves viewed it, which they have fully explained to us in their declaration on the renewal of hostilities.—They there tell us, that "It may with truth be asserted, that the period which has elapsed since the conclusion of the definitive treaty, has been marked with one continued series of aggression, violence, and insult on the part of the French government. "That it is impossible to reflect on the different proceedings, and the course which the French government have thought proper to adopt respecting them, without the thorough conviction that they are not the effect of accident, but that they form a part of a system which has been adopted, for the purpose of degrading, vilifying, and insulting his Majesty and his government." Now, Sir, I ask, is it possible that his Majesty's ministers, viewing the conduct of France in this light, should really have thought that the peace would be of Jong duration? Is it possible that any set of men, composing the government of this brave and powerful nation, of a people jealous of their honour, and at all times ready to resent an insult offered to themselves or their Sovereign? Is it, I say, possible, that the ministers of such a country should have been capable of believing, that we could long remain at peace with a government which, as they themselves tell us, had, since the conclusion of the definitive treaty, acted upon a system of degrading, vilifying, and insulting his Majesty and his government? Under such circumstances, I cannot help supposing that they must at least have considered the duration of the peace to be very precarious: and if it was easy for them to foresee the probability of war, it was no less easy to foresee what would be the nature of it. Has a single circumstance occurred which was not expected? Did they reckon upon the co-operation of allies, who have since deserted them? No; they could have no such expectation. Is Buonaparte's project of invading this country any thing new and unexpected? Certainly not. When they made the peace of Amiens, they knew he had it in contemplation, if the war had continued; and, therefore, might be sure that if it should be renewed under such circumstances, he would again prepare to invade us? Since then, they must have foreseen both the probability of a rupture, and the precise nature of the war that would ensue. Did it not once occur to them to consider a little what measures were or might eventually become necessary to meet such an attack? Did they not consider that a rapid increase of the army would become necessary, and that, therefore, it was their duty to prepare beforehand the means of effecting it? Could they not foresee, that in a war of such a nature, they would be obliged to call upon a great part of the population of the country to assist the army in its defence? And did it never occur to them, that, in order to enable the people to fight, it would be necessary to give them arms? I am perfectly ready to admit, that the statement made by a noble lord (Castlereagh) on Friday last, respecting the number of arms that have been issued, is more satisfactory than circumstances had led me to expect; and I have no hesitation in declaring, that, in my mind, it fully acquits the board of ordnance of any imputation of neglect or want of exertion since the breaking out of the war. But, I am not the less of opinion, that the ministers were, in the highest degree culpable, for not having long ago enabled that department to fill the arsenals; and, it is a notorious fact, that much less than two months ago, nay, at the very period (I mean Michaelmas) when, by the general Training Bill, as first brought into the House by his Majesty's ministers, all exercising and drilling was to have been suspended till Lady Day next, not one half of the volunteers; were armed. Another precaution, which, the situation of this country, after the peace of Amiens, naturally suggested the propriety of adopting, but which appears, during that period, to have been wholly overlooked, is; that of defensive works: and no man, I think, will deny, that if these had been commenced, as they ought to have been, during the peace, our coasts would now have been in a state of much greater security, than any which they can derive from such imperfect works as have since been hastily thrown up. No man, for instance, can doubt that the towers mentioned on Friday by my right hon. friend (Mr. Windham) or other works possessing the properties of these towers, I mean security against assault, would afford much more effectual opposition to disembatkation, than can be expected from low I and weak batteries, which may be easily taken possession of by the enemy's infantry. These, Sir, and other such measures of defence and precaution, would probably not have been neglected by his Majesty's ministers, if they had been recommended, as no doubt they would have been, by such a council as I have proposed; because, as I have before observed, the neglecting to attend to the advice of such a council (recorded as it would be on their minutes) would have thrown upon ministers a greater degree of responsibility than attaches to the not adopting the advice of any one man, however elevated his rank.—It will be said, I suppose, that all these measures would have been expensive, and that it was, therefore, advisable to practise economy, to keep up the funds, &c. a mode of reasoning which, does not deserve an answer. But, what will be the excuse for having neglected those precautions which were not attended with any expense? If it was foreseen, as it certainly must have been, that a rapid increase of the regular forces, and a great armament of the people would be necessary, why, at least, were not those laws prepared at leisure, which, when a rupture took place, it would become the duty of government to propose to Parliament for the carrying these measures into effect? As an excuse to the imperfect state in which the different bills were brought forward, it is said, that they were framed under the pressure of critical circumstances, and that such a system could not be expected to be made perfect at once. Now this, which they allege as an excuse, is, in fact, the very ground of my charge against them. Their dafence, in this case, like their justification of the Irish government, only makes the matter worse; for, I ask, why were these; measures hastily framed tinder the pressure of critical circumstances? Why were they not maturely considered and digested before the renewal of a war which must have been foreseen?—A most serious evil resulting entirely from the mistakes committed in drawing up these bills is, that we now have nearly 400,000 men exempted from the army of reserve and militia ballot. I have, indeed, heard the right hon. Sec. of State maintain, that the granting these exemptions was not, as I contend, the effect of a mistake; but that it was in the contemplation of Parliament, at the time, to give to the act, under which the volunteers claim the exemption, the full effect, which it has since been discovered to have produced. Now, I am perfectly convinced, that the great majority at least of this House had no such intention; and I have good reason to suppose, that his Majesty's ministers themselves had it not; for it appears, that sometime after the close, of the session, the Sec. of State wrote a letter to the Attorney and Solicitor General, desiring to know, whether, in their opinion, the volunteers were really entitled to these exemptions? It is, indeed, curious to observe, how this clause, granting exemptions, got into the system.—In passing the act for raising the army of reserve, the greatest anxiety was shewn by the Committee, to confine the exemptions within as narrow limits as possible; and the act provides, that only such volunteers should be exempted as had been accepted before the 22d day of June, 1803.—In the general Training Bill, which followed the above, it is expressly enacted, that this act is not to exempt persons from being balloted for the militia or army of reserve.—In the 120th ch. Geo III. being an act for amending the last mentioned, no notice is taken of exemption from ballot. But there comes a Kill, of which, from its title, it was impossible for any member to suppose, that any thing contained in it would repeal one of the most important provisions of the preceding acts, but which has since been discovered to have produced this effect.—It is the 121st chap. Geo. III. and is entitled, "An Act for billetting Volunteers when assembled, for subjecting to military discipline Serjeants, Trumpeters, Drummers, and Buglemen, who receive constant pay and for the further re- gulating such Yeomanry and Volunteer Corps." And this is the Act, which, in the opinion of the Attorney and Solicitor General, given in answer to a query from the Secretary of State, is declared to have repealed that clause of the Army of Reserve Bill, which denied the exemption from ballot to any volunteers, excepting those who had been accepted before the 22d of June. I, therefore, cannot believe that this was intentionally done by his Majesty's ministers; and I am very sure it was without the knowledge of by fir the greater part, if not the whole, of the other members of this House. Now, this general exemption, which I consider as the effect of a mistake in the framers of the last Bill, is, in my opinion, by far the greatest defect in the whole of the volunteer system. It greatly interferes with the recruiting the army of reserve and militia; it gives to certain persons in the volunteer corps a very improper power of deciding, who shall or shall not be subject to the ballots, accordingly as they please to accept or reject the offers of those who wish to enter their corps and it gives a dubious character to the whole volunteer institution, inasmuch as it is now impossible to distinguish those who come forward from pure zeal and patriotism, from such as are actuated only by a desire of escaping the operation of the other Bills.—Sir, before I conclude, I must take the opportunity of again reverting to the subject of fortifications; and, without entering into any detailed reasoning, I will assert, that, without fortifications, every defensive system must be extremely imperfect. To execute them on a great scale is, undoubtedly, a work of time; but, I ask, has any such system been commenced?—In Ireland, for instance, where the necessity of fortresses has been recognised and pointed out, I believe, by every officer who ever gave an opinion on the subject, I do not understand that government has gone the length of even marking out a single spot of ground for the purpose. With respect to the extent to which it would be advisable to carry the system of fortifications in England, there may be some variety of Opinion; but there is one subject upon which, if we are really exposed to invasion, no difference of opinion can possibly exist. I mean the propriety of fortifying a great military depot and place of arms; that is to say, of fortifying it at least to such a degree that it cannot be taken without a siege: for, although I go, perhaps, as far as any man, in believing that the enemy may effect the disembarkation of a great force in this country, yet, I am aware, that he will have very great difficulty in landing all the ammunition and military stores that are necessary for a long operation. If, therefore, our military d épóts were secure against a coup de main, the enemy, unable to possess himself of them, would find the difficulties of an invasion infinitely increased, as he would be under the necessity of attempting to form a magazine of his own, and of preserving a communication with it. I must repeat, that if such a council as I have proposed had existed, I do not believe that all these precautions would have been so completely neglected, as they appear to have been.—With respect to the estimates themselves, they appear to be little different from the establishment voted during the last session, and I have, therefore, little to remark, upon them; but as it is, undoubtedly, of the utmost importance that the regular army should be increased as much as possible, I must again repeat my regret, that the measure which was successfully adopted last war, has not again been resorted to; I mean that of recruiting from the militia; for without disparagement to the latter, I may be allowed to say, that the former is a more efficient force. I also regret that the militia of Great Britain and Ireland has not been made interchangeable: a measure which always appeared to me, to be one of the advantages that would naturally result from the union.—There is another species of military arrangement highly deserving of attention (I know not how far it has been carried); I mean an extensive organization of the unarmed peasantry into corps of pioneers. It is impossible to estimate too highly the benefit which we should derive from their assistance, particularly when we consider, that the face of tins country, covered as it is with enclosures, is of a nature that greatly impedes the action of those two descriptions of force in which we shall be so decidedly superior to an invading enemy, that is to say, cavalry and artillery. The advantage of this superiority we shall be in a great measure deprived of, without the aid of numerous bodies of pioneers to facilitate the operation of these two arms. I should, therefore, be desirous of seeing a great proportion of the peasantry immediately enrolled into corps for this purpose and I should recommend that they should, at the same time, be armed with pikes, the manufacture of which requires very little time or expense, and which they can make use of without any previous instruction. With this arm I am convinced, that, in opposing a disembarkation, and on many other occasions, they would add very powerfully to the effect of an attack, if they were judiciously managed, and not exposed to the enemy's fire until the moment presented itself for charging him.

Mr. Rose

said, it was by no means his intention to oppose any of the resolutions, but he wished to make a few observations connected with the general subject before the House, The principle point on which he meant to trouble the House, related to the measures necessary to be adopted in the event of marchingivotunteers to the coast. It appeared to him that the sum, proposed to be voted for volunteers, was too small, because, upon the best calculation he could make, it would require very little less than one million. If they were to be employed at all in that way, he thought that some provision ought to be made for their families. Upon this subject he had lately had some correspondence with one of his Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, and he begged to acknowledge the great readiness which that right hon. gent, bad shewn to attend to his representations. There was in one of the acts a provision upon this subject, in case the volunteers were called out upon actual service. Some doubt had arisen respecting the word "called" out on actual service; but, in his opinion, if they were out, some provision ought to be made, for their families, Some or the corps in his neighbourhood were now upon actual duty, and when they offered their services fos that purpose, they made no stipulations upon the subject. When he learnt from the Lord Lieut. that it was wished that some of the volunteers should march to the coast, he assembled the corps nearest to him, and when the proposal was made to them, they cheerfully offered their services: of 296 there was but one man that made the smallest objection to it. Afterwards, some of them came to him, and represented the impossibility of their maintaining their families. The corps, to which he alluded, was in general composed of labouring men, who earned, upon an average, about nine shillings a week; with this they were enabled 10 maintain their families. If they were marched from home, they would receive a shilling a day, out of which it was obvious they could not maintain both themselves and their families, it would, therefore, be absolutely necessary that some provision should be made for their families, otherwise it would be impossible for them to continue, in the service. The corps to which he alluded, were animated with the most ardent desire to devote their services to the public, and to go wherever their services could be useful. When he was speaking to them about marching, and explaining to them their district, they said, "Don't, tell us, Sir, about districts, we will follow our officers any where." Out of 296 men, of which the corps was composed, 294 marched from home, and were now actually on duty. He had heard regularly from the commanding officer, ever since they marched, and every letter was full of applauses of the conduct of the men. This spirit was not confined to the spot to which he alluded, it was, he was sure, general all over the country, and he should be sorry indeed to see such a spirit damped. It at first occurred to him, that the allowance to their families ought to be paid by the county; but, upon consideration, he thought otherwise, because the burthen would then fall peculiarly heavy on the maritime counties, where the volunteers would be most frequently required to march to the coast, and therefore he thought they ought to be paid out of the general fund. This was a subject on which he really felt much anxiety, and therefore the House, he hoped, would excuse him for occupying their time. With regard to the state of defence of that part of the coast with which he was acquainted, it was not his wish to make any observations which could convey any information to the enemy. Indeed it was not in his power, because he was sure they were as well acquainted with the state of the coast as we were. They knew lh3t many parts of it were unprotected. It was not a great many weeks ago (and the circumstance was known to one of his Majesty's ministers, who was not far from the place at the time), that, a spy actually took a boat and went over to France, with two recruits for the enemy. He was happy to say, however, that measures had since been taken to prevent this. With regard to the volunteer force in general, he was perfectly convinced, that it would turn out completely efficient,—Upon this subject, he totally differed from a right hon. gentleman (Mr. Windham). He did not speak upon his own judgment, because he would never give an opinion upon a subject upon which he was incompetent to form one correctly, but he spoke from what he had heard from every officer with whom he had conversed, particularly the reviewing generals—From them he had never heard but one opinion, and that was, that they would do their duty as well as any regular troops.— Nothing certainly could be more desirable than to take every opportunity of bringing small volunteer corps together, so as to act in batallion, and this he was convinced would not be so difficult as many gentlemen imagined—He saw very lately 1,400 men assembled, many of whom had marched 13 or 14 miles; they went through their evolutions, and marched back again without a single murmur, though the weather was uncommonly severe—He therefore hoped that every means would be used to bring them as often as possible into batallion. He was perfectly convinced that they would not give way even in line before any troops to which they might be opposed. The only apprehension he entertained was that if they were brought into action, they would be impetuous. If history was looked into, innumerable instances would be found where troops not so well disciplined or instructed had stood firm and defeated veteran troops. But even if they could not stand in line they would be of most important use as light troops and as rifle men. A friend of his who had seen a great deal of service, particularly in Holland and Egypt, declared, that during these campaigns he had not seen the French above twice in line. It was known that a great part of their troops consisted of tirailleurs, who were not used in line but as light troops. The hon. officer who spoke last had alluded to the possibility of the enemy effecting a landing. He by no means agreed with those who thought it was impossible for the French to escape our blockading squadrons. He believed it was impossible for any officer, however vigilant or skilful, so completely to block up any port, as that it should be absolutely impracticable for the enemy by any. accident to effect their escape. But if the enemy should escape, he begged the House to consider what a line of defence we had upon our own coasts. He had heard with great satisfaction that we bad no less than 800 armed vessels employed for the defence of the coast. He could state, from his own knowledge, that on that part of the coast with which he was acquainted, there were eighty of these vessels armed with carronades, ready to start from every creek to annoy the ennemy on their approach; they were manned with men who perfectly understood the management of these vessels, and were thoroughly acquainted with every inch of the coast, and he had no doubt, but they would very nearly destroy any flotilla the enemy could send, before they could make any impression upon our coast. It, therefore, the volunteers were encouraged he had no doubt but that, with the assist- ance of that force to which he had just alluded, the country would be completely safe. He was only anxious that the volunteers should meet with that encouragement and protection which they deserved.

Mr. Secretary Yorke

entirely concurred in the opinion if the right hon. gent, who had just sat dow; but thought the subject might be more properly dicussed on the particular resolution than on the report. The volunteers, in his own opinion, were not entitled to such allowances, either by the 42d or 43d o!" his Majesty, though the Board of Treasury had issued orders to the receivers general to make them, in case of volunteers called out on actual service. But if any doubt existed in the minds of other gentlemen on the subject, a clause to remove it might be introduced into the Bill, now before the House, for amending the Volunteer Acts, which he proposed to have read a second time this dry, in order that it should be committed tomorrow. Government had not called on the services of the volunteer corps to the extent that might have been thought desirable, from the difficulty of procuring accurate returns. The number now on duty voluntarily was about 14,000 He was not aware of any thing more he had to say: when the resolution should be under the consideration of the House, he should take that opportunity of stating his opinion as to any observations it may give rise to.

Mr. Pitt

did not mean to object to the Report, because he fully concurred in the resolutions contained in it, to the utmost of their extent. He rose only to correct some mistatements from misconception, which had been made of his sentiments on a former day. With respect to a proposition which he had thought it his duty to submit to the House, on that occasion, for the formation of volunteer corps into battalions, and the appointment of field officers to each battalion, one misconception had possibly arisen from his wish to save the time of the House, in not going at length into the explanation of his proposal. So far from having for its object the appointment of held officers, who were to have a control over the colonels commandants of the corps, nothing could be more repugnant to his feelings or sentiments. He had, he thought, distinctly stated, that his sole and great object was, to afford the commandants of corps the benefit of the assistance and advice of officers not their superiors; but, from experience, competent to aid them effectually by their instruction; and the more he reflected, the more he was convinced of the advantages that would result from the adoption of his proposal. No commandant could look with confidence to the period of leading his men to actual service, if refused the advice of professional men, capable, by their skill arid experience, of promoting the discipline of their corps; and he took this opportunity, both on his own account, and on the behalf of others, who entertained the same sentiments with himself on the subject, to apply for such assistance. How far others may be disposed to accept such assistance, he could not take: upon himself to say but he should sincerely rejoice that other commandants of volunteer corps could go with confidence into action without such an advantage. He hoped, however, that if many should be found `desirous of the benefit arising from the advice and assistance of experienced officers, they should not be deprived of it in consequence: of an opposite opinion on the part of others. Another misconception was, that his wish was to make the regulation general, but he had never proposed extending the appointment of regular officers to any battalions, but those which should apply for them, and; he sincerely hoped that all would do so. He had discharged his duty in submitting his proposition to the House, which he did not mean to press in the present instance; but, unless he should hear more weighty arguments against it than mere considerations of economy, or of its being likely to be unpopular, he should consider it his duty to persist in his object, which he looked upon us material to the most important interests of; the country. How far the principle should be carried, he could not take upon himself to say, neither should he enter in to a detailed consideration of the mode of applying it in every circumstance, because he was no friend to any general rule, any unbending maxim, where the variety of circumstances might, in many cases, render a departure from it necessary. He was sure, however, that too much attention could not be bestowed on the instruction and improvement of the volunteer force of the country in military discipline and evolutions; and he was persuaded, notwithstanding the opinion entertained by a right hon. friend opposite (Mr. Windham), that there were many regiments of volunteer corps already in a state of discipline to fit them for actual service, and whenever it should be necessary for them to act in line, that the volunteer corps would not be found the weakest part of the line. He should not consent to invert all the ordinary maxims of prudence, he should not let it be said, that they were making Acts of Parliament, putting the country to vast expense; and that, after all, what they had done was good for nothing, and absolutely inadequate to the purposes for which it was intended. He looked upon the volunteers as completely capable, with proper attention, of rendering the country impregnable, but he must think, however, that the service, as light troops, which seemed to be most approved by gentlemen, for volunteers, in place of requiring less discipline, was that which required the highest degree of discipline. It was a simple operation to make them act in Hue, but it required a much higher state of discipline to enable troops, after suffering a temporary disorder to re-assemble with regularity and return to the attack. It was like a slow and regular machinery at first, which, by progressive improvement, might be afterwards advanced to the highest pitch of nicety and precision. He did not mean to enter further into the discussion, but, as an humble individual, he could not neglect this opportunity of putting in his claim on the part of those who are prepared to devote their lives in the cause of their country, that assistance should not be denied them in any instance of their applying for it. Let it not be said, that because we have three or four hundred thousand men, ready to act as armed peasants, that we are therefore satisfied. Neither should it be said, that because they had made considerable progress in military discipline, they had reached the perfection of military science. Much had been done, but much remained to be done, and it was only by constant, renewed, and active attention, that the common object of all was to be accomplished. By persevering in a wise system of instruction and discipline for the volunteers, every year would afford an additional improvement, which, in the end, would defeat every attempt of an inveterate enemy, would enable us to continue with spirit and confidence the contest in which we were engaged, tedious is it was likely to prove, and conduct us to a long series of years of secure an.; honorable peace. Thus much he had thought it necessary to say: he should only add, his conviction, though much more had been done, than some gentlemen were disposed to admit, much less had been effected than sanguine persons were too apt to suppose.

Mr. Secretary Yorke

agreed with his right hon. friend(Mr. Pitt) in the opinion he entertained respecting the efficiency of the volunteer corps. He was also ready to admit, that every possible effort should be made to render them as perfect as possible in discipline. He, however, doubted much whether he proposition of his right hon. friend could be carried into effect to be extent he wished. Adjutants and serjeant-majors, he did not deny, ought to be appointed in every case where the members of the corps required them, provided care were taken that none but proper and competent persons should be appointed, and that the places should be filled rather with a view to the public interest, than, as on former occasions, from favour. He feared it was impracticable to procure field officers from the line, if his hon. friend's plan were to be pursued, in sufficient numbers. There were 604 troops of cavalry, 102 companies of artillery, and 3,947 companies of volunteer infantry. The cavalry alone would require sixty field officers, and the others in proportion. The officer on the half-pay list had been provided for in the reserve, and many could not be procured from amongst those who had retired, many having been appointed inspecting officers of the volunteers. He was aware the right hon. gentleman would say that field officers would not be required for all the battalions; but as these should be taken from the regiments of the line, either field officers or the oldest captains, he thought it impracticable. Besides, he should be both to interfere with officers of that descreption, who may be dissatisfied at their removal. In the next place, he was as little disposed to be deterred from the pursuit of a measure of national importance by the apprehension of its unpopularity as any hon. gentleman, yet he could not think it would be acting altogether fairly with the captains of volunteer corps, over whose heads field officers would necessarily be put, though they may not be superior to the colonels. Here the right hon. Secretary begged to remind the House of the conduct of Parliament last session with respect to the introduction of regular officers into the militia. They had authorized the admission of subalterns and captains; but they stopped short at field officers, and this appeared to him a kind of parliamentary barrier. He had himself, as a militia officer, and from having turned his thoughts particularly to the subject, entertained an opinion, that the introduction of regular officers, even field officers into the militia, would hive promoted the efficiency of the regiments, and he had doubts of the policy of limiting the admission to captains and subalterns. He did not mean any disrespect to the militia in saying this. There was another objection, which, though not very material, ought not to be lost sight of, he meant the expense. Three hundred or three hundred and fifty would at least be necessary, and these would be placed on half-pay to the end of the war, whereby they would lose their prospects of promotion in their profession.

Mr. Pitt

said, he would take an opportunity of bringing forward his proposition on the resolution respecting the volunteers.

Mr. Curwen,

as one who had mistaken the right hon. gent. (Mr. Pitt), declared himself satisfied with his explanation. He thought the appointment of field officers would be too expensive, but was of opinion, that adjutants and Serjeant majors should be appointed to battalions, and that the adjutants should have the rank of captain by brevet.—The Report was then received. On the first resolution, that a force of 129,039 men be granted for guards and garrisons, being read,

Mr. Pitt

expressed his satisfaction at so large a vote, but desired to be informed what the actual effective force of the country was at present, what its deficiency from the number in the vote, and what mode was proposed for supplying the deficiency?

Lord Castlereagh

supposed the right hon. gentleman alluded to a statement of his on Friday; he had then stated the effective force of the United Kingdom to be 176,000 men, 80,000 of whom were militia, and of course 96,000 regulars, of whom 26,000 were only for limited service, so that the force for general service was 69,000 rank and file. The most material deficiency, therefore, was in the regulars. There were of the 50,000 of which the army of reserve was to be composed, 14 or 15,000 not yet raised, which arose from the time of the year at which the act passed, in harvest. In Ireland, too, it was later, but the execution of it was proceeding favourably at present, and if the country were to continue its efforts, that deficiency would soon be made up. The crown would have a discretion in promoting the recruiting of the regular army from the army of reserve, by allowing a bounty.

Mr. Pitt

wished to be informed by what mode the deficiency, below the number voted, which, in his view amounted to about 23,000, was proposed to be raised in a short time. He considered the reserve as regulars, though engaged only for limited service. As drummers and non-commissioned officers were not included, they, he supposed, might be considered equal to 9 or 10,000.

Lord Castlereagh

replied, that the deficiency, making allowance for drummers, &c. did not exceed 20,000, which was to be made up by the 15,000 of the army of reserve, not yet raised, and by such modes as should be deemed most likely to promote the general service of recruiting. If the country would put its shoulders to the busi- ness, there would be no reason, on the meeting of Parliament, to regret any deficiency. With this supply from the reserve were would only be 5,000 deficient, and on the gross militia of the United ampire, there was only a deficiency of 8,000.

Mr. Pitt

observed here that chearmy of reserve was by the act intended to have been raised in proportion to the population of the several districts, and no substitute was to have been received who should not be of the same, or of an adjacent county. The provisions of the act were violated whenever crimps were employed to procure substitutes, and considerable inconvenience was felt in many places, by adhering to the dispositions of the act.—After a few words from the Secretary at War and Mr. Fuller, the resolution was agreed to.—The several other resolutions were then read and agreed to.—On the question being put on the last resolution relative to the volunteers,

Mr. Pitt

said, he was sorry to be obliged on this resolution, again to address the House, on the subject of his proposition. The objections of the Right Hon. Sec. seemed to him to be founded on two or three grounds; first, a doubt whether a sufficient number of field officers could be procured; 2dly, an apprehension of creating discontent amongst the officers of the volunteer corps; and 3dly, the injury that the officers thus employed would sustain by being placed on half-pay after the war. The two first appeared inconsistent with each other. The first proceeded on a supposition that 4 or 500 would be necessary, and the second 011 the supposition that the corps would be dissatisfied; but as his proposition extended only to such as should apply, if there should not be many applications the first objection. as to the number would be done away, and if many should apply as he hoped all would, then there, could be no discontent, and the second objection vanished. But he maintained, that a sufficient number could be supplied from the line. Each regiment consisted of 750, had two lieut. colonels, two majors, and ten captains, and the question therefore would be, whether it was more material to the public security that every old regiment should have its number of old captains complete, or every battalion of 1,000 volunteers, have an efficient field officer to prepare them, by discipline, to accomplish the common object of all, the effectual defence and security of their country? But, if the regiments of the line could not afford the numbers necessary, the half-pay officers might be employed, or those who had retired from the service, or from amongst those meritorious officers who bad been in the India Company's service.—As to the other circumstances of discontent, there would be reason to apprehend that there may be disappointment, it not discontent, should the application for such assistance be refused. As to the third objection, the auk-ward situation to which the appointment would reduce the officers, by exposing them to be placed on half-pay, and interfering with their promotion, he could not, in his view of the question, admit such a conclusion. He could not perceive why such officers might not be in as fair a situation to be promoted to vacancies as if employed in any other way.—There was another general subject on which the Right Hon. Sec. had touched, though he had applied it somewhat whimsically. He had stated as his opinion, that the admission of regular officers into militia regiments was a wise measure, and he was even disposed to go further than the legislature had done; it was fair then to turn his personal judgment against himself, and insist that with such an opinion he cannot consistently object to the proposition, for if regular officers were of great benefit to the militia, they must, of course, be equally so to the volunteers, and he had no hesitation in saying, that though he thought the decision of Parliament right, he now, with his eyes open, asserted it was erroneous. He therefore hoped that gentlemen would not object to the proposition; he would not, however, press it then; but unless he should understand it to be the intention of his Majesty's government to adopt some such regulation, he would bring it forward again hereafter.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer

considered the reasons advanced by his right hon. friend, against adopting the proposition to its lull extent satisfactory. He concurred in the principle, but he had doubts of its practicability. The number of volunteers in the united empire was 43,0,000, which, if formed into battalions of 500 each, and from local circumstances a greater number could not be assembled, would require 860 field officers. He admitted that the right hon. gent. (Mr. Pitt), had distinctly stated battalions, not corps, on a former occasion.—The half-pay could not supply any officers, the whole on that establishment having been appointed to the reserve. It would, therefore, be necessary to resort to the regulars. The whole amount of the regiments in the united kingdom was 70; there were 25 or 26 regiments of cavalry; but taking the whole at 700, to supply 860 each battalion should afford eight officers. Though the right hon. gent, had distinctly mentioned captains, not field officers, it would be admitted, that they should be men not only of military acquirements, but of temper, and address to manage with effect so vast a force. He had considerable doubt in his mind, concerning a measure that would go to take its very essence from the army. Besides the individuals themselves would quit reluctantly, nor, though employed in the same glorious cause, would they be satisfied with the same species of renown which they might acquire in acting with the volunteers, and therefore he did not think it right to take from the army, persons unwilling to commute their services. He had some doubt as to the application of the principle, because, from what had come to his knowledge within the last four days, he had reason to think, that the corps would not be satisfied that regular officers should being rafted on their original body; their original institution was to serve under officers with whom they were connected by every tie of intimacy and acquaintance, and, therefore, the proposition, with respect to them, involved an auk ward alternative. He knew, if it was put to them, they possibly might not object to it, though, at the same time, it might create a degree of discontent, which could never have been in the contemplation of the right hon. gent, who had brought forward the question. On these grounds be entertained doubts as to the principle, though he was prepared to admit that every effort ought to be made to give greater efficiency to the volunteer corps and to give some more confidence in going into action. He could not help thinking the House indebted to the right hon. gent, for his suggestion, as well as for that respecting adjutants, which had been adopted, and produced much good effect. Another suggestion of the right hon. gent. also for brigading small corps, under generals from the regular forces, was likely to be attended with much benefit. These generals, and their respective staffs, would be a drain from the line equal to what it could bear. The Chancellor of the Exchequer then adverted to the admission of regular officers into the militia, which was chiefly composed of substitutes. The same regulation did not apply to the volunteers, because the chief object was to preserve the genuine relations between the officers and privates, and, therefore, the introduction of regular officers amongst them was much more liable to objection than in the militia, where the prevalence of substitutes weakened that connection.—As he was up he should take the opportunity of adverting to the deficiency in the military, which, he was happy to say, was, in an unprecedented degree, smalls and the most effectual measures were to be taken to fill it up, so that when Parliament should next meet, gentlemen would have no reason to regret any deficiency In the artillery, which consisted of, there were not more than 460 deficient, and measures would be taken up the deficiency in the regular with all possible dispatch.

Mr. Windbam

did not mean to trouble the House at any length, after what he had said on a Conner occasion; but, as many topics were then omitted, and some important suggestions had since been made, he thought it not wholly unnecessary to say a few words.—His right hon. friend under the garner (Mr. Pitt), had explained and enforced with his usual ability, the measure which he had wished to see adopted for the improvement of the volunteer system; observing, with too much truth, that his order respect, were diametrically opposite to the Mr. Windham. He lamented the fact, and not the less sincerely, because it must happen in consequence, that his ideas be diametrically opposite to those to his right hon. friend. It was always painful to him to differ from his right hon. friend, with whom he so generally agreed: and independent of that feeling, there was commonly the further cause of regret, that his opinion, so opposed, had less chance of being received. It was not on that account, however, less necessary, that he should state the grounds, on which his opinion was formed.—His objections certainly did not arise from any general feeling adverse to voluntary service. On the contrary, he had always strongly declared himself in favour of voluntary service, as opposed to that which was compulsory: but voluntary service did not necessarily mean service of volunteer corps, such as they were now constituted. Here and there, perhaps, the cases might concur. One of the corps which he should have looked to, though resembling in some degree those to which he was objecting, was the corps of which his right hon. friend was at the head: and which had contributed, probably not a little, to lead him to the ideas which he now entertained respecting volunteer corps in general. This was a corps, formed in peculiar circumstances, and with peculiar advantages both in respect of its leader, and of the men of whom it was composed, His right hon. friend was not to conclude that what could be done by himself, circumstanced too as he was, could be done by any other commander, and with respect to any ordinary corps. His right hon. friend had at once his own personal powers, his general authority in the country, and the authority of his high provincial office. He had a people to deal with tendered tractable by a more immediate exposure to the danger, and animated with something of a peculiar character, and peculiar duties. It was the experience of what might be done in these particular circumstances, which had misled, as he conceived, his right hon. friend in his ideas of this service in general. For his part, he must confess, that the notions which he entertained, and the conclusions which he was led to draw, were altogether different. He must object to the volunteer system; first, as being very ill-adapted to the principal and more immediate purpose, for which it was wanted; as increasing most materially the difficulties of recruiting the army; as being liable to have a most injurious influence on the character and conduct of the army; as in fringing the just claims, and violating the reasonable feelings, of military men, by confounding those distinctions which they had hitherto enjoyed exclusively, and effecting a general depreciation of military titles and honours; as confounding the ranks and gradations in civil life, while it disturbed and deranged the ordinary functions of society; and lastly, as liable to become a source of great future political danger, such as might be apprehended always, from great bodies of armed men subject to no military control, and whose constitution at this moment was, in innumerable instances, precisely that, which would be most likely to give birth to such danger, and to render it formidable, were it to take place. A proof of this he would give to the House, (since he perceived in some parts expressions of incredulity,) by producing the constitution of one of the principal corps in this city, which had been recently furnished to him, and which he had in his pocket. It would appear by this, that the corps was governed, not by officers approved and appointed by his Majesty, but by committees and sub-committees, so constructed, as that it might happen continually that questions the most important to the proceedings and well being of the corps, might be decided by a quorum, in which there should be six privates to one officer. Any thing more completely democratical, or better supplied with all the apparatus usually provided for such purposes, could not have been furnished by any of the dealers in constitutions to be found in the Corresponding Society. It was impossible, therefore, to look at these institutions, however lull of zeal and loyalty at present, and to reflect on what they might become hereafter, without a const durable degree of jealousy and uneasiness. One effect of their power was already apparent in the complete conquest which they I had obtained over his Majesty's ministers. It was plain, that the hon. gentleman (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) did not dare to stir a step respecting, them, without first asking their leave. It was whimsical to soc the embarrassment in which he was placed, between his fear of rejecting a proposition coming from the right hon. gent, behind him, (Mr. Pitt) and the greater dread of offending the volunteers. Both were objects of terror, and the combination of the two tears seemed likely to produce a kind of oblique course in the right hon. gent., that would satisfy neither one side nor the other. This was not the natural situation for a government to be placed in. A military measure, before it was adopted, might, with great propriety, be referred to those, who were likely to have a good judgment in military affairs; but the question referred would be, "what is good upon the whole for the interests of the state or of the army?" not, as in the present case, "what do the soldiers or officers like?" Such, however, was the ascendency which the volunteer body already had over the government! He wished they might be able to prevail as easily over the legions of Buonapartá. If they would, he should be inclined, for one, to overlook all other dangers that might be apprehended from them. He would shut his eyes to consequences, and jump the life to come,' if he could be satisfied that the system, as at present established, was calculated to answer its grand purpose, that of the defence of the country against a foreign enemy.—It seemed to be admitted, that it was not so at present; though it was hoped it might become so under the alterations proposed by his right hon. friend. He was fain to confess, that he despaired of the efficacy of these alterations. It was not that he did not see the advantage of having an intelligent regular officer attached to a volunteer corps; or the improvement which the corps would receive by the effect of greater training. But how were these advantages to be obtained? And what, after all, would they produce? Among the difficulties of obtaining part of these advantages, viz. the assistance of regular officers, must be stated, not only the consent of the corps, which did not appear, by what had been said that night, to be quite a thing of course, but the consent of the officers; and when to ensure this latter, it was proposed that rank should attach to these appointments, a most material objection arose on account of the effect which such a system would be likely to have on the character and discipline of the army. A more mischievous thing could not well be conceived, than to let loose, among the army, a wild spirit of speculation, similar to that which was so fatally opened at the beginning of the late war by the measure of raising men for rank, and to put half the officers of the army upon seeking advancement in their profession, not by foreign service, not by professional skill, not by a strict discharge of their regimental duties, nor by the approbation and good will of their commanders, but by interest and recommendation among the colonels, (or committees) of volunteer corps. The evils of such a state of things would reach to a greater extent, and operate in more directions, than might at first be supposed. It would unsettle the minds of officers; it would disturb the discipline of regiments; it would weaken the useful dependence of officers upon their superiors; it would injure the military character; it would relax the zeal and spirit of the army by opening a new channel to advancement independent of service or military merit; it would produce discouragement and discontent, by new examples of men, who had succeeded in reaching the honours, by deserting the duties, of their profession. If this was the view of the measure, in respect to the army, it would not be very promising on the other hand, with respect to the volunteer corps, for whom, certainly, it would not procure that class of officers, (it was to be hoped so at least) who would be likely to render them the greatest service. But when the best was done in procuring aid of this sort, what, after all, could be the effects which it could produce upon corps constituted as those in question must necessarily be? To give opportunity for the exertions of these officers, an augmentation was to be made in the number of days of training: but, besides the insufficiency of the time proposed, great as it might be, to give to men thee pertness, and much more, the general habits and character of soldiers, was it considered, how far the assembling men in this way would be practicable; and what the inconvenience would be, could it be effected? Here came in the great and insurmountable difficulty in the attempting to give to vo- lunteer corps the form and character of regular troops. Without embodying there could be neither discipline nor training: and how was it to be supposed, that men engaged ha the common avocations of life, and who never meant to enter into service as a means of livelihood, could continue long embodied? Every attempt of this sort was an attempt against the nature of things. Ex quo-vis ligno, &c.; or, to take the English version, you could not make a silk purse out of a sow's ear you could not make that hard, cutting instrument called an army, out of a mass of inhabitants, resident, householders, men with families, men with property, men engaged in trades and callings; though for purposes of local defence, and with a view to special services, they might be willing to enrol themselves into volunteer corps. He had wished, therefore, that the attempt should never originally have been made; and upon the same principle was equally adverse to all expedients and contrivances, for the purpose of assisting it; being persuaded, that it never could succeed.—Had the volunteers been willing, or, more properly, had they been advised or permitted, to assume the character of an armed peasantry, and to have trained themselves accordingly, they would not only have been far more useful, but would have been free from the inconvcnicncies now chargeable upon these corps in the form in which they at present subsisted. One of these he had already described to be, the factious tendency which they might discover hereafter, and the general dangers to be apprehended from bodies of armed men, subject to no military controul. But an evil more immediate, and more certain, though somewhat more confined, was to be apprehended from their effects upon the army. These were of several sorts. The first and most obvious was the reduction made in those numbers, from which the militia and army of reserve were to be supplied; the latter body being the only fund from which they could now look to recruit the army. 400,000 men, who, if it was hoped to make soldiers of them, must be considered as men capable of military service, could not all be persons, whom no temptations could induce to enter into the army, or who, if drawn for the militia or army of reserve, would all decline to serve in person. Such a portion, therefore, of the active population of the country could not be withdrawn and set apart, and other services not be the worse for it, The convenience would certainly be augmented, by measures such as those recommended by his right hon. friend, and in general by whatever tended to give to the volunteer corps more of the shape and air of regular troops. Volunteer captains or colonels might not care much at present about restraining their men from entering into other services, nor feel very confident, probably, as; to the powers they possessed for that purpose. But in proportion as the corps improved in appearance and regularity, these powers, if they existed, would be ascertained and exerted; or if taken away, would be followed by the same complaints, which had been heard from militia colonels, that they would not submit to become recruiters for the army. Such could hardly fail to be the effect of the volunteer system in respect to the recruiting the army. But were there no effects which might be apprehended with respect to its discipline and character? The volunteers were, to be sure, and necessarily must be, so inferior to the regular army, that little possibly might be apprehended from their example. Men were not apt to take examples from those whom they did not look up to. But it must be remembered, that what was wanting in authority, might be made up in numbers. Between volunteers and militia, the notion of a regular army had nearly dropped from their minds. They hardly inquired what it was or where it was to be found. It seemed to be the least part of the national defence: Pars minima est ipsa puella sui. It was so enveloped and hid in the force of various kinds that surrounded it, that it might be all withdrawn, and for a long while its removal not be perceived. But was there no danger, that in this state, forgotten by others, it might at last forget itself, and feel by degrees the contagion of that mass under which it was thus concealed and buried? A long communication with troops, who with appearances the same were, in habits, notions, constitution, and practices, so widely at variance with all that was military, might in time produce an effect even on the regular army.—He would not dilate upon this danger; but advert to an effect, which though of a less alarming, perhaps less important nature, was not undeserving of consideration, viz. the immense depreciation which these institutions must produce in the value of military titles and honours; honours which were, heretofore, confined to military men, but were now lavished among persons, having no pretensions to that character. It would hardly be said, that this could be of no consequence, for that after all, every man knew his own value, and that the difference between regular and irregular service would still be the same, however external distinctions might be confounded. He should be glad to try this with respect to other honours. He should be glad to know from his right hon. friend, or from the hon. gentleman opposite to him, whether the candidates for peerages, and baronetcies, for red and blue ribands, would be satisfied on being told, that these distinctions could be no object to them, as they would neither make them richer nor wiser, nor more powerful, nor confer or declare any quality that was not equally possessed and equally known, at the moment of their application? Whether the present holders of these honours, would be perfectly well pleased, or were perfectly well pleased, at seeing them become as cheap and common as most of them, it must be confessed, had of late years been made? Yet the complaint in this case would be far less reasonable than j in the other. It was much more easy to conceive, why an officer, with only his pay to live on, with no place perhaps in society but what his commission gave, and with nothing to announce his commission but the riband in his hat, or the title by which he was addressed, should be tenacious of these distinctions; distinctions earned through many a hard day's service; than why men, possessed apparently of all that fortune could give, should be pining after honours, which to the eyes of ordinary observers could add so little either to their happiness or consequence. A great peer, it might be thought, could better dispense with a riband, or a great commoner with a peerage, so far as distinction was concerned, than a soldier of fortune with those tokens and titles, which were to distinguish him in the eyes of strangers, and which being withdrawn or confounded, left him without distinction of any kind. But these things were not only relatively great, great to the officer, who had probably nothing else either to supply their place or to console him for the want of diem: they were in themselves distinctions, which all mankind would agree to value, and of which it would be much easier to explain the value, than of many of those which were more eagerly pursued. Formerly, he who bore the title of captain or colonel, could be no other than a man belonging to an honourable profession, who, if not in the prime of life, must probably, have been an actor in scenes, which every one would be glad to have shared in; and have displayed qualities, which those who most felt to possess them, would still be happy to have evinced by trial. His title afforded presumption of a character, which the common feelings of mankind would never suffer to be regarded but with respect. Could the same be said of every other honour? Of which, nevertheless, the exten- sion and depreciation, would be considered as a ground of complaint. No one certainly could look down upon an honour, which implied that the person attaining it had been accepted on the part of his Sovereign. But, since in this as in other instances, the Sovereign would not act but by advice, nothing was really proved in these cases but the protection and favour of the minister, which might evince the political power of the party, but neither was, nor pretended to be, an evidence of any thing else. Jet it not be said, therefore, that those who reduced 'he value of military distinctions, took from officers, and from the army, nothing but what they ought to part with, with indifference. If this were so, every title order, medal, decoration of whatever sort, was a mere toy and plaything, which none but trifling minds could value, and which might be dispensed from henceforth to whoever would take it, without the least regret on the part of those, by whom, till then, it had been enjoyed—Whether the loss of this distinction had excited any regret on the part of the army, was more than he could pretend to say. Very possibly it bad not; though the effects in time would not be the less felt. But that the distinction was in fact lost, could be no longer matter of dispute. A witty lady of the last age, the mother of a venerable marquis equally distinguished for his talents, was reported to have said, upon some great creation of peers, that she was afraid to spit out of her window, lest what fell at the moment should happen to light upon a peer. A similar apprehension might be felt in the present circumstances respecting officers. There could not be a company assembled of half a dozen persons, in which, the chance was not, that one of the number was an officer. He himself was a captain: it was probable, that before long he should be a colonel. When such was the facility of creating officers, the numbers could not fail to be considerable, He would net revert again to the feelings of those, (if they happened to have any care upon the subject) who having embraced the army as a profession, and served in every quarter of the world, should find themselves suddenly lost in a could of officers, who had never seen, or were likely to see a day's service, and who, like himself, had nothing military but the name.—These were some of the objections to the volunteer system, as it respected the army. But its effects on the community at large were far from inconsiderable. It was attended with great expense: it created much individual embarrassment; it mixed in a manner by no means desirable, the several ranks and Orders of society: it disturbed, to a degree highly incommodious, many of the functions of common life; and would do so yet further, if the plan was pursued of giving to these corps a still more regular consistency. He would not pursue these topics severally and in detail: but to one he could not but I advert, as it was connected more immediately with the suggestions which had been made that night. It was a great mistake to suppose that in withdrawing men from their avocations and employments it was easier and better to take the labour of many partially, than of a few altogether. The contrary was in general the fact. Men removed altogether were replaced by others, who filled up the void which they had left; and society after a while went on as usual. A man who enlisted, was like a man dead. It was rare that his place remained long unoccupied; that the opening made was not soon closed. But not so with the man, whose employment was only suspended, who was to be called away for awhile, as in the plan proposed, and then to go back to his occupation, with all the inconvenience of having left it, and all the difficulty possibly of resuming it at his return. If he was an artisan or small I tradesman, his neighbour had run away with his business: if he was a journeyman or farmer's servant, his master had provided himself with a new man: his employers and customers if the meanwhile had been wanting his labour: there would be a period, during which, they could not either have had him to Work or to deal with; nor have been able to supply his place by another. He would himself at the end of this have his livelihood to seek; for he would not like the soldier have found a provision in his new profession. Nothing would, therefore, be found for the most part to answer less in practice, than this notion of taking part of the labour and leaving the remainder, of employing the man during part of his time in learning the business of a soldier, and leaving him at the end to return to his ordinary occupations. It was as impossible to take half the man, as to kill half a sheep. When it came to the question of an embodied force, or any thing beyond armed peasantry, it seemed infinitely better, both for the individual and the public, that the man should be either entirely a soldier or not at all; and should not be left in that mixed intermediate state, in which he would be lit for neither capacity, would be just enough of a soldier to be spoiled for a peasant or artisan, and so much of a peasant or artisan (or whatever else he happened if be,) to admit of his becoming a valuable or well-trained soldier. As to the expense of a force thus composed, it could not be better illustrated than by what had been said by an hon. gentleman (Mr. Rose; of the provision to be made for the families of these men during; their time of exercise. His idea that in. virtue of this training, they would, if employed as light infantry, be as well qualified to encounter the enemy as any troops in his Majesty's service, was a little contrary to received opinions, and very contrary to the opinion of his right hon. friend near him (Mr. Pitt), who had described the service of light infantry, and in many respects truly, as that which required more training than, any other. If zeal and courage were all in all, as in some parts of his speech the hon. gentleman seemed to think, no training at ail would be necessary. And this was in some degree his (Mr. Windham's) opinion. He thought that so little, after all, could be done by the sort of training now attempted to be given to the volunteers, and that the evils and inconveniencies attending the attempt were so great, that he wished this species of training to be fore borne altogether; and that the country should content itself with that, which, while it contained what was by far the most essential, would be attended, comparatively, with no expense, so loss of time, no interruption to the common business and avocations of life. Such a course of proceeding was, as he conceived, better both upon the whole, and certainly so, with a view to the crisis of the moment, which could not wait the slow return of any long and circuitous me hon. The illustration used by an hon. gentleman, the other night (Mr. Fox,) was so happy, that it might seem almost to be conclusive. If the question was of instructing a person thoroughly in the knowledge of any language, you would begin, of course, by the usual methods, and as the first step, ground him well in his accidence. But if the call was pressing, and the time limited, and the occasion such as required no profound or critical knowledge, but so much acquaintance only with the current language as might suffice for the purposes of a journey or a short tour, you would be intent upon teaching first the most necessary words and phrases, and proceed to other things as time and opportunity might allow. In the present instance he was satisfied, that not merely on account of the urgency of the occasion, but from tile nature of the subject, another and more simple kind of training, was that which ought to have been adopted. But at all events, and under whatever mode of training, the form and constitution of the corps should have been such, as not to interfere with the supply of other more regular and mere important services. If it was too late to provide entirely against the continuance of the evil at that time incurred, care should at least be taken that it was not increased in future. Whatever was due to the volunteers in point of good faith must be strictly fulfilled. To what extent that went he was not prepared to say. But nothing certainly could require, that exemptions should be extended to those who might enter from that time forwards, and no such exemptions, therefore, ought on any account to be granted.

Mr. Erskine

—I have listened, Sir, to the right hen. gent, under the gallery (Mr. Pitt) with much attention; to most of his sentiments respecting the volunteers with perfect satisfaction, and certainly if ever there was a subject which more than another claims the attentive consideration of Parliament, it is that which now forms the matter in discussion, and which involves the means of providing for the defence of the empire. At the same time, I cannot help observing, that to a mind less enlightened than that of the right hon. gent, on the lower bench (Mr. Windham), it ought to have occurred, that this was a subject which ought to be discussed with moderation and temper; that the House was called upon to deliberate upon measures for the security of the country; and that it was net quite becoming in any member, under such circumstances, to enter into vain and splenetic criticisms on the past. Whatever may have been the imperfections of the volunteers, it cannot be maintained, by any sober thinking mind, that this is a moment at which they ought to be disbanded. Does the right hon. gent, mean to recommend that these valuable troops should be dismissed, and that our defence should be left entirely to the care of the regular army? Is it possible that he can seriously urge any thing so exceptionable, so absurd? and yet, if such are net his views, why persevere in depreciating the volunteers, in endeavouring to make them think little of themselves, and to make the enemy despise them. Whatever the object of the right hon. gent, may be, certain it is, that the tendency of his language is to encourage the attempt of invasion, and to depress the spirit of those who are ready to oppose it. Really it is difficult to understand the views of the right hon. gent. Does he reflect upon the probable consequences of his conduct? or does he mean to utter opinions in that House, in order to encourage others to publish out of it the same opinions, and write in support of them?

Mr. Windbam

here called the hon. gent. to order, and told him, that before he ventured to state any thing in that House as a fact applying to any member, he ought to have taken care to ascertain how far it was well founded.

Mr. Erskine

continued:—I assert, Sir that the sentiments of the right hon. gent, are likely to be productive of great mischief, and hold out an encouragement to the licenser of the press Indeed, from what I have heard of the right hon. gentleman's observations, I apprehend that any man who should dare to print what the right hon. gentleman said, would be guilty of a misdemeanour. I apprehend that the man who would disparage the whole military force of his country, who would consider it as in a state of the greatest danger, and who would maintain that all we have done for our country is only likely to involve us in ruin, and is founded on a system so mistaken in its principles as to lead to destruction rather than to safety—such a man, I say, is a fit object for animadversion and censure. I do not mean to say, that the right hon. gentleman's sentiments in that House are cognizable in a court of law, but that the repetition of such remarks out of doors would be subject to reprehension. The first matter I take into consideration is this:—we are to see what the situation of the country was when war was declared against France. Our military force was not then sufficient to put the country in a state of security; considering the immense armies of France, and the determination of the person at the head of the French government to use means for our destruction which never were carried so nearly into effect as those that now threaten the country. At the time when the war commenced it was necessary, as we could not foresee whether the attempt would be made, that we should receive the voluntary offers of persons coming forward for the general defence. The right hon. gent. says he considers this as an armed democracy. I cannot conceive how it is an armed democracy when it consists of all ranks of men, and some of the greatest and most opulent men in the country, all of whom receive commissions from the crown. When compulsory measures are resorted to, the men may desert; when you take men by force into-the field, you cannot have the same reliance upon them as when their efforts are spontaneous and free. By the present system all the influence of society are bound up toge- ther; each man is as much pledged to his companions in arms as he is to his King and Country; each man feels he would dishonour himself, if, after having volunteered his services, he should depart from the sacred pledge he had given. On the contrary, if led out by force, he might say. I gave no pledge, I was dragged to the standard; bet coming forward of his own accord, his honour, character, and consistency are interested, and impel him to conduct himself in such a manner as his pledge demands. With regard to the situation of volunteer corps, no man can say that a system which extends to the whole population of the country is not necessarily attended with some difficulty. No man can say, we are not in a choice of difficulties; but the question is this, and I feel myself much in unison with the light hon. gent, over the way (Mr. Pitt), at least with a very small shadow of difference. The right hon. gent, is a friend to the volunteer system, and he has furnished a proof himself, and by his own example, that it is not necessary to do what he recommends. I understand he has acquired considerable military knowledge, and has conducted his corps to a high state of perfection. I apprehend, it does not require so much military skill for the inferior situations of the army as many seem to imagine; you must have persons accustomed 10 the forms and manoeuvres so as to be able to teach the duty of a soldier. You must lake care in the choice of officers, not to appoint those who consider the distinction as a matter of vanity, and not as a pledge of duty; but it does not appear to me that it requires such a degree of military skill in the lower orders of the army as to call on government to put itself to such an expense as is proposed. It is supposed, that peasantry, if armed, would do all that is necessary for the light infantry service. Though I do not profess much knowledge of a military life, having been at an early period only in a subaltern capacity, yet I do know you cannot acquire and put in execution those manœuvres which constitute the excellency of light infantry, without being acquainted with the manœuvres of the line. It is a system by which you learn to throw yourself into apparent irregularity, which shall be perfect regularity. It is supposed the minutiae of regularity is unnecessary. I deny that there is any thing the volunteers are invited to do, for the purpose of being brigaded and formed, which is not absolutely essential in the practice of war. I would ask any gentleman who is a soldier, whether it would be possible to lead a corps into action, unless it was able, with precision, and without confusion, to form lines into columns, to make it increase or diminish, change front, and alter the position in any way which might be necessary for actual service. All this knowledge lies in a narrow compass, it is easily learnt by degrees, it may be taught by serjeants, and when it is taught, every thing must depend on the competency of the person. I have no reason to think that the volunteer corps are not capable of performing the most essential service, if they are kept up with the respect due to them, and if they are treated with the regard to which their exertions entitle them. I, for one, should have no objection to receiving any field officer; but there is this difficulty, it is said, the commanding should invite the appointment of the field officer. Now it ought to be considered that he has no authority to do so, without submitting the proposition to his men, who have the choice of all the officers. If you introduce a field officer, by the invitation of the colonel, without consulting the corps, you break in upon the choice which the men, originally had. However, as there is no proposition of this sort, I forbear commenting on it. We are here on the volunteer system itself. The question is, whether we are to abandon it or limit it? Whether we are to admit we are wrong; and that all our efforts have not benefited the country.—With regard to another point, it docs not strike me that the military profession will be at all injured by this system. The officers of volunteer corps have no permanent rank; though they have the titles of colonel, lieutenant colonel, captain, and lieutenant, they are merely to give respect, and confer no rank. I should think, that so far from thee titles giving offence to gentlemen of the profession, the army must feel the greatest satisfaction at the idea, that in stead of not being well supported, instead of having their front to the enemy and disaffection in their rear, they are surrounded by the whole country, affording I hem every assistance they can require; for let me ask, what would at army, brave as it is, do, if columns of the enemy were to land in Devonshire, Sussex, Hampshire, and other counties at the same time? Could a regular army stop their progress without infinite I mischief? Is it not then of advantage to I have the inhabitants of the country, not a low rabble, but in all their gradations, voluntarily armed in aid of the army, their officers accepting their commission from the crown, and much of this force acting without receiving any emolument whatever. I am ready to admit that great evils may attend this system, but while you have such an enemy, with such a population, with such arms, and with such a determination to destroy this country, it is the best means of defence that can be reported to. The great object of the volunteer system is, that the men may acquire, not the same discipline as the regular army, not the same steadiness, not the same experience, not the same firmness, but at least to the spirit and feeling of soldiers, that regularity acquired by constant habits of discipline, which is necessary to enable them to give efficient support to the army. If we desired you to discourage the army, and to look to the volunteer system only, then I admit that many of the arguments opposed to the volunteer system would be properly opposed; but the question is, whether it is not a most fortunate circumstance for the country, that of she people, by a glorious and spontaneous effort, coming forward as one man, arid submitting to every privation for the purpose of giving that protection for which they have been appealed to? The question is, whether it would have been prudent in his Majesty's government not to have received the offers of the volunteer corps, and whether they would have been justified had they not limited the system in the manner they have done. It would have been dangerous to have accepted every offer, as it would have prevented that force from being Supplied which is indispensably necessary; but with regard to those which have been accepted, I think it would be the greatest calamity if the volunteers were to relax their diligence, and not do every thing to accomplish themselves for the important duties they have undertaken to perform. I shall be glad to hear any proposition that will enable them more effectually to perform it. However, what I rose principally for, was to state to the House, that I apprehend we are not here to consider what would have been better; but whether, in the state the country is, it is prudent to discharge the volunteer force, to consider it as dangerous, inefficacious, and useless, and to infer, that after all our exertions the country is in no degree delivered from its danger. For my own part, I consider the country as impregnable; I lock upon the volunteer force as that which has given pause to France. I admit we must net relax our vigilance; we must advance in discipline, and give to our system all the improvement of which it is capable; we must avail ourselves of that force which we derive from the spontaneous efforts of the people, which is not dictated to, but lakes its own course. We are here to determine, whether we are altogether of a wrong system, and instead of putting the country in a state of security, whether we have not exposed it to other dangers; finally, whether we had not better trust to an armed peasantry to resist an enemy, that every moment is acquiring additional vigour and strength. I repeat, I do not profess the skill and knowledge of an officer, but I do not think there is that mystery in the military service which may not be learned by men determined to he instructed and improved under the discipline of general officers, with the assistance of being inspected and brigaded. What has already been done? Was there any power in any officer to bring the volunteers in the field to be brigaded at all? Yet we have seen with what readiness they have come forward. As there was nothing in the formation of the corps that entitled any one to call out a single volunteer, with his musket on his shoulder, except his own officer, what reason is there to suppose that they will not all shew the same alacrity they have done, if they should feel that it would he for their advantage? I have only o add, that if government give proper directions to those small bodies of men, who have no field officers at the public expense, I see of reason why the system may not he improved. The question is, whether we are to retard our steps, repent of what we have done, make a new system of defence, and disparage the efforts of our volunteers by the adoption of such language in Parliament as has been used this night?

Mr. Pitt

rose in explanation: he did not mean, he said, that the field officers whom he proposed to add to volunteer corps, should be placed over the commanders, but should be subordinate to them.—As to the circumstance of a commanding officer's applying to his corps for their consent, it never entered into his contemplation. He had heard that night, for the first time, of a committee for the regulation and management of corps, and he had heard it with regret, as he conceived that such corps could never be well disciplined, and could never be made either useful or energetic. With respect to the corps which he had the honour to command, the fact was, that whatever superiority of discipline it had acquired, it went in support of his suggestion, as it was entirely to be attributed to the assistance of regular officers of ability, whose exertions had been unremitting in bringing the corps to that state of discipline.

Mr. Courtenay

declared that, he never heard such an extravagant speech from the right hon. gent. (Mr. Windham), even when he was a minister, as he had delivered this evening; men seldom improved in extra vagance after they had been deprived of power; but such seemed to be the case with the right hot. gent.; however, with respect to the right hon. gentleman's sentiments upon the subject of the volunteers, it appeared that after a great variety of distinctions and super-distinctions, his object was to depreciate that force, of whom two of the most skilful and gallant officers in the British service, had spoken in the highest terms of praise; the one. Lord Hutchinson, stating his opinion, that they would overwhelm a French army, if directed to a vigorous and prompt attack, similar to that which the suddenly raised levies of the his made upon the first detachment of the French troops: this noble lord said, that if invaded, the contest with the invader must be short, and he would slake his life upon the sue of such an assault; the observation of Ford Moira to the Scotch volunteers, was well known. Indeed, the opinions of these two celebrated generals, were those of all experienced men in the country who had any opportunity of judging. The right hon. gent, stood alone; his sentiment was complete singular. He decided, however, from theory, for had he seen the 28.000 men who assembled in Hyde Park, he must hove changed his opinion. But at that time he was seeking the distinction of a command in a volunteer corps in Norfolk—a distinction he argued against this evening as to mischievous. But as to democracy, he could net help saying, that this Was the queerest part of the right hon. gentleman's charge upon the volunteers, for he appealed to the House whether there was one other man in the country, except himself, who would accuse the right hon. gent, or ministers, of being likely to favour democracy. What, he would ask, would the right hon. gent, propose to do with the volunteers? Would he have them quit being volunteers in order to make peasantry pf them? and how would he provide a force for the defence of the country? But really the right hon. gent., who was himself an officer in a volunteer corps, and aspiring to the rank of colonel, could not be serious in the objections he made to the volunteer institution. If he was, instead of applying to him the quotation "His own example strengthened all his laws;" It should be "His own example weakened all his laws.—"But no doubt, as a military man, he would soon have to change his position," which he had contrived to do as a politician. "However," observed the hon. member, "let the right hon. gent change as he may, I shall con- tinue to esteem the volunteers, among whom I should be happy to enrol myself; and, as 'the right hon. gent, under the gallery (Mr. Pitt) has so well trained a corps under his command, I would be glad to enter into his service. I have served for many years as a private in the ranks against him, and now am ready, if the French should attend to approach our shores, to offer him my services, and hope he will accept of them.

Dr. Laurence

supported Mr. Windham's arguments. On the subject of charging sides and doctrines, no person he said, had varied so much as his hon. and learned friend (Mr. Erkine) who spoke now quite in an opposite strain from that which he held in the last war. He condemned the ideas of military obedience which the volunteer corps had formed. Some of them engaged to obey all lawful commands of their officers, reserving of course to themselves the right of judging the legality, than which nothing could be more to reign to the character of a soldier. He did not distrust English valour, but he thought half discipline a dangerous doing. He could not be thoroughly satisfied with a force which required so much to be done to keep it in good humour. All that had been said went to prove, that we should have in the volunteers, good-humoured soldiers, and aimable captains. If the great talents of the right hon. gent, opposite (Mr. Pitt) were not sufficient to make him an officer without experience, what was to be expected from others? The present enormous bounties were a grievous evil; and to this they were to be imputed. The learned doctor concluded with again impressing the arguments of his right hon. friend Mr. Windham.

Lord Castlcreagh

wished merely to state the fact as to the charge that the present military system destroyed the ordinary recruiting.—Fie ventured, on the general impression he had, to deny the fact. The ordinary recruiting was impaired in some little degree, but it was stated beyond what the fact would wan ant. Seven thousand five hundred men had been received into die line from the Army of Reserve; the ordinary recruiting in the same period had produced 6,791 men. The gross amount of recruits for the line was, therefore 14,291 men. This was enough to remove the impression that the recruiting of the line was confined to the army of reserve. The recruiting, compared with any former period, would be found not deficient. Last year, there was no recruiting for the militia, none for the army of reserve, and all the disbanded men and Scotch fencibles were open, and there was no competition, yet no more had been obtained for general service last year than 7,294 men. From May to December this year, there were 6,791 of course the difference was only 503, which was one-fourteenth of t he whole.

Dr. Laurence

was not satisfied with this comparison, because it did not take exclusively the months of August, Sept. Oct. and Nov. in each of the years compared; because those were the months in which the Army of Reset be Bill was ballotted for, and when of coarse the high bounties for substitutes to serve in it operated.

The Attorney General

said, he should not make many observations on the speech of the right hon. gent. (Mr. Windham), although he should certainly make some. He did not mean to cast any censure on that right hon. gent., or say thing as if any speech could be intended by him to give any advantage lo the enemy over us.—He was persuaded, that the right hon. gent was one of the last in the House, who weald use any curious expressions in argument for the sake of an advantage or for an apparent advantage in debate. He was persuaded, that the right hon. gent, did not wish to give our enemies any such, or any other advantage what ever; but he had frequently had occasion to feel, that the views which the right hon. gent had of things that came under his consideration, and the consequent manner in which he expressed himself, had, although not so intended by him a tendency to the great disadvantage of the country; for what he thought most useful, what he so thought, or he would not say it, the Attorney-General thought, in many instances, most disadvantageous to the country. If the question, now before the House, was a new question whether we should or should not, adopt a mode of defence by volunteer corps, there were hardly any limits of criticism, to which we should wish to stop the right hon. gent from entering 3 but when the volunteer system had been adopted to such an extent as it hid been, so that it must be in vain for any man to hope, that any observations could induce the House to abandon the system; then it did seem to him to be not a very useful practice to dwell upon the de facts of such a system, but on the contrary, it appeared to him, that some mischief might result such a practice. If the volunteers were not such a force as the House could desire which he did not say was their description, but if, for the sake of argument, they were so allowed to be, could this sort of language respecting them be useful? On the contrary, he would ask, if is was not most prejudicial? The condition of the volunteers should be attended to, many suggestions had been made concerning them, and they were most valuable suggestions, highly deserving of great consideration, as every thing must be that tended to ameliorate the condition of three or four hundred thousand men armed and associated in defence of their country. But the effect of the argument of the right hon. gent, was to degrade the volunteers in their own eyes.—He did not say it was the intention of the right hon. gent, so to do, but it was the tendency, and if assented to, would be the effect of his observations.—No man could hear or read the words of the right, hon. gent, but must, if he gave credit to the observations, look upon the volunteer corps as a body of a very low estimation. But was that ail? Let any one who heard the hon. gent, to night, or indeed at any time this session, ask himself, whether, if the volunteers had that respect for the opinion of the right hon. gent., which his opinions in some other matters were entitled to, they would have confidence in themselves?—Could they have any such confidence, if the language of Parliament, of these who had encouraged them to come out for the service of their country, was to be on the model of the right hon. gent., and Parliament were to say to them—"At best you will be little better than a rabble—you may depend upon it, no useful service can be expected of you."—Now, as to the corruption of which the right hon. gent, spoke, as being found in the volunteer corps, the right hon. gent., in his predilection to finding fault with all volunteer corps, might have been able to find out some of them who had behaved improperly. But was it fair to argue against the whole of such an immense body as this, on account of the conduct of a few who might have disgraced themselves? The persons to whom the right hon. gent alluded, had been a disgrace—to whom?—to themselves; but not to the whole corps of volunteers, who were as unconnected with those persons as possible, and stood as distinct from them, as they did from their faults. If the right hon. gent, took the character of the volunteer corps from the character of those who disgraced them, there was an end of every thing like reasoning upon human affairs: as well might the right hon. gent, go to the goal of New gate, and insist upon taking out of the cells there, characters from which to form a general opinion of human nature. This was only an error of the right hon. gent., in his predilection to finding fault with the volunteer system—not that he himself would make a bad conductor of a volunteer system; on the contrary, he was persuaded, that if the right hon. gent. were to set his mind to it, no man would be more active, or heartily employed in forming a good volunteer corps than he would. But if he went and told them, "You have made me a captain, and you are going to make me a colonel; but if you ask me my opinion, I am of DO use to you, nor have I any opinion of you. I know, indeed, that I am an Englishman, and that I will run against a bayonet certainly. You must run too against a bayonet, but that is all we can do; we have no skill to meet the enemy, we can only be destroyed." Why, if that was to be the language of the right hon. gent., it would not be wonderful if the corps were to say, "We do not like tills gentleman;" for if a man became an officer of such a corps, he ought not to endeavour to make them think meanly of themselves, but to inspire them with spirit and with confidence, and that he could only do by she wing them that they were equal to what they had undertaken, and therefore this doctrine of the right hon. gent, was as injurious to the corps to which he was attached as it was to the general system of the volunteer service. For the right hon. gent, said, that they were not only unfit now for what they are intended for, but that they are totally incapable of becoming of any utility whatever; this, he said, arose from the democratic nature of their constitution; and, in support of this, he read the articles of one of these bodies. The learned gent, said, he really did not know exactly to what corps the right hon. gent, alluded; but, he said, he himself had been an unworthy member of a volunteer corps, to whom he did believe the right hon. gent, intended his observation to apply, but to which it did not apply with justice, namely, that not only the officers were chosen by the corps, but also that the whole of the military concerns of the corps were under the controul and management of a committee. If there was any strong objection to the formation or to the regulation of that corps, and if the constitution of it was upon a false or an improper foundation, that was not the fault of the present ministers, because that corps was approved of under the: administration of the right hon. gent, himself; but this was an observation, that occurred so frequently on the objection which that right hon. gent, had been in the habit of making since he was out of administration, that he should not insist much upon it. But he must take the liberty of refuting the assertion of the right hon. gent., that these committees controled the military concerns of the corps. The tact was, that these committees had nothing upon earth, to do with the military affairs of the corps. They were a body who conduct their own expenses, and all they had to do was of a civil nature entirely. They did not, in the least degree interfere with the military authority of the officers, nor with any one thing that was of a military nature. With respect to the idea of the right hon. gent., in having what he called an armed peasantry, he would save the regular army nothing by that with regard to officers of experience, for the armed peasantry would as much require officers of experience as the volunteer corps. And as to the objection of the right hon. gent, to the volunteers, on account of their corrupting the regulars, because the volunteers would not be under martial law, that was an error in the right hon. gentleman's assertion, for the moment they joined the regular army they would be under martial law. The objection that the volunteer system tended to confusion of rank, was ill-founded; for, generally speaking, men of rank and character were the objects of choice with the corps. The impediments this system threw in the way of recruiting, his noble friend had answered by a statement of facts. If there was any doubt whether a volunteer would enter into the regular service, the practice was in the affirmative; but if any doubt existed upon that matter, it was proper to remove such doubt by the bill which was now in the House, and stood for a second reading to-night upon the subject of Exemptions of Volunteers. But what he wished to submit to the House most of all was this—Did any gentleman really think that these armed peasantry ought to be reasoned to, instead of the volunteers? Did the right hon. gent, himself mean to say, that if he could persuade the House of Commons and the other House of Parliament, and his Majesty to consent, that we should now abandon the volunteer corps, that he himself would propose the peasantry instead of that system, or had he any other system in his mind instead of it? If we had no volunteer corps there must be a compulsory levy, and that would be very difficult in comparison to this system. If a ballot were to take place, it should be remembered, that great numbers of the volunteer corps would find deputies, and that would impede the army as much as the present system can do. Now, if the right hon. gent, had no plan instead of this system of the volunteer corps, he would, upon reflection, perhaps, doubt the wisdom of the opposition he gave it.

Mr. Windham

denied that he had meant an armed democracy, to the extent alleged, He only spoke of the mixture which might take place during the time when the volunteers were not under martial law. If he disapproved of the present plan, if it was not necessary, as some had insisted, to propose another as a substitute or amelioration. He did not conceive it always requisite for those who opposed plans, to have others ready for adoption: but were that principle at this time strictly urged against him, those who aid so might, by references to the suggestions of his former speeches in that House, discover a substitute for the present plan. He thus spoke his sentiments, as he did not conceive, the present measure as yet fixed and immutable.

The Secretary

at war, said that in answer to a fact, which had been stated by a learned gentleman, that the operation of the army of reserve had injured recruiting for the regular service during the months it operated, he had to state, that upon a comparative view of the months from July to November, the recruiting for the regular army had been greater than in she year 1802, notwithstanding all the advantages of that year by the recruiting service having the monopoly of it then, and also that the two militia and Scotch fencibles had been discharged, and in the present year the army of reserve had so operated.

The question was then put and carried, and all the resolutions of the Committee were read and agreed to.