Inter-Governmental Pillars of the European Union: ECC Report

HL Deb 12 April 1994 vol 553 cc1470-506

7.57 p.m.

The Principal Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Boston of Faversham) rose to move, That this House takes note of the Report of the European Communities Committee on the House of Lords Scrutiny of the Inter-Governmental Pillars of the European Union (28th Report, HL Paper 124).

The noble Lord said

Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.

It is—rather remarkably—nearly 20 years since the House first appointed the European Communities Committee and since that committee first made reports to the House on Commission proposals raising important questions of policy or principle. Perhaps I may say that it is a pleasure to see here this evening a number of Members of the House who have made such distinguished contributions to the work of the committee in recent times, such as my predecessor, the noble Baroness, Lady Serota. I think that there would have been more, but for the somewhat advanced hour.

Over the years, of course, the development of the Community —the Single European Act, for example —has led the committee to adapt its methods of work. We took the view in the committee some 12 months ago that potentially ratification of the Maastricht Treaty would involve particularly profound implications for parliamentary scrutiny. Whereas Community legislation (in the form of familiar regulations, directives and so on) would continue under the first pillar—and let me say that at this late hour I will not pursue the rather mystifying architectural analogy of the pillars—the second and third pillars, (concerned respectively with the common foreign and security policy and with co-operation on justice and home affairs), would cover areas which were legally outside Community competence. They would not produce Community law under the familiar legislative procedures. But they would lead to important treaties and agreements—sometimes, though not always, requiring national legislation before implementation and often placing significant constraints on the United Kingdom's right of individual action.

It is true that a declaration was attached to the Maastricht Treaty emphasising the role of national parliaments in the affairs of the Union—for which our own Government were largely responsible. Even so, we were conscious that there was, in fact, no machinery by which Parliament could make its views known to the executive before those treaties and agreements were agreed. And since the procedures leading to their agreement would be inter-governmental, they were bound to be very largely confidential, and conducted behind closed doors.

With those considerations in mind, the committee decided to hold an inquiry into the need for parliamentary scrutiny of the pillars. I take this opportunity to thank members of the committee for their contributions and also those who gave such good evidence to us, notably the Home Secretary and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. The report is the result of our endeavours. I want, too, to thank most warmly our legal adviser, Mrs. Eileen Denza, for her immense help on the inquiry and in preparing this report, and to thank our Clerk, Mr. Michael Pownall, for all his help, and other members of the committee's staff. We are indeed fortunate in the quality of the staff of the House.

The report sets out a good deal of explanatory information which I hope will be of interest and help to the House. Part 3. for example, describes the relevant titles, Titles V and VI, of the treaty while Part 4 gives the views of witnesses on the pillars and on the need for scrutiny. At this hour I shall do no more than sketch out our conclusions and say a word or two about the Government's response to the report.

Our principal recommendation—set out in paragraph 48—is that it is absolutely essential that work under the pillars should be scrutinised by national parliaments. After all, the European Parliament's powers concerning the pillars are distinctly limited, and we see national parliaments as being the central players in this respect. We felt too, that the key to effective scrutiny was to obtain the right documents—that is to say, draft texts and conventions—at the right time—that is to say, before they have been finalised at international level, so giving this House the opportunity to make a constructive input. As in the past, however, we would wish to be selective in our scrutiny—we are rarely short of work or short of paper anyway—and we accordingly set out three criteria to determine whether a document should be provided to Parliament. Those criteria are: its general significance; the eventual need for UK legislation; and the imposition of legal commitments on the UK. We were pleased that in connection with those, our central recommendations, the Government have on the whole responded positively.

The Home Secretary, Mr. Michael Howard, has agreed to provide us with documents more or less in line with our criteria, and I should like to acknowledge the forthcoming way in which he has approached this whole matter—not least in volunteering to provide material before being pressed to do so. Indeed, the first three pillar documents are with us already and have been referred to sub-committees for scrutiny. I hope that the House will not regard that as pre-empting the outcome of this debate.

I have to say, however, that so far as concerns foreign and security policy documents, the Government have emphasised the significant differences between the work of the two pillars and have suggested that very few draft foreign and security policy texts will, in fact, be laid before us. We were a little disappointed by that. After all, as we say, we would not wish to monitor the details of confidential diplomatic negotiations, and we recognised that the need for secrecy would often restrict what could in practice be disclosed. I would ask the noble Baroness, Lady Chalker of Wallasey, to confirm that there will be circumstances when draft texts arising from the common foreign and security policy will be deposited, and perhaps say a word about what those circumstances might be.

At the same time, I welcome the Government's offer to brief the committee through hearings and evidence sessions. And I was much encouraged by the wish of the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Douglas Hurd, to have what he suggested should be a "continuous dialogue" with Parliament. The noble Baroness has already been most helpful in her contacts with the committee, and I have no doubt that we should make such sessions a regular part of our scrutiny procedures.

A brief word, my Lords, about our other recommendations. We took the view that whenever possible our scrutiny of pillar documents should take place in public using our normal procedures for receiving evidence and questioning Ministers.

We were in favour of national parliaments and the European Parliament consulting together and exchanging information (and perhaps even documents) arising from work under the inter-governmental pillars. It is, I suggest, undeniable that we all have the same duty of holding governments to account.

We hoped, too, that the Government would agree to extend to pillar proposals the existing parliamentary scrutiny reserve whereby they undertake not to agree to a proposal until parliamentary scrutiny has been completed, except of course, when special circumstances make that impracticable. The Government have, in effect, rejected that recommendation; and perhaps the noble Baroness could say a word about that. My own view is that the scrutiny reserve works extremely well, very rarely holds up agreement in the Council, and cannot see that the speed of events under the home and justice pillar would prevent a reserve from operating successfully. Perhaps the Government will at least keep an open mind about this and agree to review it in the light of experience. As I shall explain in a moment, we shall be reviewing our procedures again soon; so there is a strong case for reflecting further upon this, and not closing the door. Indeed, the Home Secretary told us that he was, not ready to accept that the Committee should have a formal scrutiny reserve", which plainly implies that he might be ready later.

Finally, we hope that the Government will in due course, agree detailed arrangements for the provision of pillar documents to Parliament, although I recognise that that may need to await further consideration and discussion in another place. For our part—as indicated in the report —we much value current co-operation between the two Houses over European scrutiny and it is important, too, that we should avoid unnecessary duplication of effort.

Increased scrutiny will inevitably have consequences for our own sub-committee structure and we shall need to give this further consideration later in the year, in accordance with our commitment to do so. Noble Lords will have noticed, too, that we have put forward a possible amendment to our terms of reference. That is also something which your Lordships may feel does riot call for immediate decision but could be considered later as well. Perhaps I should also note that there have been some suggestions (though not by the committee itself) that the committee's name should be changed. Those are all notoriously difficult matters upon which I do not intend to detain your Lordships now.

The proposals that we are considering this evening are another example of ways in which your Lordships' House is constantly seeking to develop its procedures and to keep them up-to-date; and they mark, I hope, yet one more instance of the ways in which the House makes a unique, and, one hopes, a significant contribution to the work of our parliament. If this additional step to provide greater vigilance helps to protect the interests of people generally —for that is our prime purpose, after all—it will serve further to enhance and justify the role of your Lordships' House. I beg to move.

Moved, That this House takes note of the Report of the European Communities Committee on the House of Lords Scrutiny of the Inter-Governmental Pillars of the European Union (28th Report, HL Paper 124)—(Lord Boston of Faversham.)

8.10 p.m.

Baroness Elles

My Lords, the report before your Lordships' House contains a mine of useful information and elucidation relating to the provisions of Titles V and VI of the Maastricht Treaty. I join the noble Lord, Lord Boston of Faversham, in thanking most warmly the legal adviser, Mrs. Denza, for her valuable work in preparing the report. I also thank the clerk, Mr. Michael Pownall. Gratitude is owed not least to our chairman, the noble Lord, Lord Boston of Faversham. He was most skilful in eliciting valuable comments and information from witnesses and tonight has given a valuable introduction of the report to your Lordships.

It is not necessary to emphasise to this House the great significance of these two titles dealing with CFSP (common foreign and security policy) and home and justice affairs in relation to sovereignty. Under international law, the two major attributes of a sovereign state are its independent right to conclude treaties with other states and its inherent right to decide and control who enters its territory other than its own citizens. Consequently the two titles touch closely on those two aspects of sovereignty of the United Kingdom. Hence, it is evident that there is a clear need for parliamentary scrutiny.

However, the House could welcome some of the aspects of the treaty. Of course, it is clear that the treaty contains many aspects which are unacceptable to a lot of people; certainly, all of it is unacceptable to some people. What was being carried on in the areas of foreign policy and home affairs and justice under, for instance, the European political co-operation in the first instance and the Trevi group and a multiplicity of working groups in the second has at last to some extent had its shroud of secrecy removed. Again to some extent, it will be subject to parliamentary scrutiny. I am sure that that must be welcomed by all sides of the House.

Secondly, the Home Secretary and his predecessor and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary were most willing to give helpful evidence to the Select Committee and to explain as far as possible the areas in which they are able to co-operate fully. Their recognition of their accountability to Parliament under these two new pillars is also to be welcomed.

Thirdly, the implementation of policies under home and justice affairs must be in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights. That provision firmly exists and links membership of the European Union to the necessity for all applicants to have ratified that convention. Presumably before joining the European Union applicants must become members of the Council of Europe, which is a threshold to entry to the Union. Consequently, they must accept the obligation upon applying member states to implement the provisions of the convention in their internal affairs. Failure to comply would render them obliged to go before the European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg.

Many issues were raised during the taking of evidence and have been touched upon by the noble Lord, Lord Boston of Faversham. I wish to make one or two comments not on points of priority or importance but on points that I want to bring to your Lordships' attention. It was pointed out that under the CFSP new commitments imposed on member states by adoption of common positions and joint actions would be binding in international law—not EC law—and would not be subject to national ratification or approval procedures. Articles J.7 and K.6, which relate to home and justice affairs, make provision for a duty to consult and to inform the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP. The Select Committee would rightly expect to be consulted and informed by our own Government at least to the extent that the United Kingdom is concerned. It would be wrong for the European Parliament to be consulted and informed to an extent that would not apply to our own national Parliament or any other.

In answer to Question No. 112 on page 141 of the report, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary stated that a convention existed whereby he was summoned in advance of every European summit to appear before the Select Committee of another place. It might be appropriate if a similar arrangement could be made either by requesting my noble friend Lady Chalker to come to the Select Committee on such occasions or, after agreement between the noble Lord, Lord Boston of Faversham, and the relevant authorities, by calling a joint meeting of the two Select Committees of both Houses, either fully or with representatives of each. In view of the pressures on Ministers, it would be unreasonable to expect the Foreign Secretary to come to both Houses. Indeed the noble Lord, Lord Boston, emphasised the need not to duplicate where that is unnecessary. Nevertheless, if this is the most convenient way, this House is justly entitled to have a briefing from the Foreign Secretary or from my noble friend Lady Chalker before each European summit. I hope that my noble friend will reply to that point.

It is appreciated that speed and confidentiality are entailed in negotiating foreign policy. However, several areas of foreign policy could be made open to scrutiny before final decisions are taken. Again, the noble Lord, Lord Boston of Faversham, emphasised, as do I, that, as regards the Government deciding when disclosure is appropriate, timing is of the essence. As the noble Lord so rightly said on page 41, Question No. 123: Our main aim as a committee has always been to seek to influence rather than to bind". That is the spirit in which, under his chairmanship, the committee will continue to act.

While accepting that under CFSP it is in many situations necessary for the 12 member states to stick together—the Foreign Secretary gave the example of the former Yugoslavia — it must also be accepted that it is sometimes necessary not to take action. Sometimes that is just as important as recognising that it is necessary to take action. After all, we might recognise that it was the growth of a need for a foreign policy system that saw the improvement and development under European Political Co-operation from the early 1970s, when it was recognised world-wide that the economic strength of the Community was great but that there was no equal balance in political and foreign relations policy. The economic strength of the EC was not reflected. That is why this new aspect of the treaty is so important for both the United Kingdom and the European Union as a whole.

This approach also reflects the wise words of the noble Lord, Lord Bridges. I hope that I have understood him correctly. He recognised the importance of openness and scrutiny, which could provide parliamentary and political support for Government policy. That aspect has been greatly neglected because the Government have taken a position behind a shroud of secrecy and there has been no preparation of Parliament or any part of it in discussing and reviewing the proposals. The element of surprise would be removed, which could be of great help to the Government.

I wish to refer to the committees of the European Parliament. They too have undertaken positive work in preparing ways of dealing with the presidency of the European Union, obtaining information and being consulted on these aspects of policy, whether foreign or home and justice. We must recognise, perhaps with regret, that the European Parliament has exercised with some effect its powers in relation to international agreements. As far as can be ascertained—and we have some great historians on our Benches—the United Kingdom Parliament has never prevented ratification of an international agreement once an agreement has been signed under the Crown's prerogative. But under provisions introduced in the Single European Act, on at least three occasions, the European Parliament has opposed on human rights grounds and possibly prevented, at least for a time, ratification of separate protocols with Turkey, with Syria and with Israel. So far, the British Parliament has never done that, although in theory it would be possible for it to do so. That emphasises the need for close co-operation with the Government and either the Select Committee or whichever vehicle i s chosen for that consultation.

It must be recognised that Parliament needs to be consulted on issues which may appear to be in the European interest but may not always be in the interests of the United Kingdom. Decisions have to be unanimous, at least for the time being, although the proposals might appear to some European states to be unwise. It is not necessarily that such actions are not in our interests; it may be that they are merely unwise. I can think of one or two recent examples of that; for example, in my view, the recognition of Croatia, which emanated from European Political Co-operation. Parliamentary processes which give a signal to other member states of the government's position may be welcomed. That situation arises in regard not only to the United Kingdom but also to other governments which might object to certain lines being taken.

I turn to scrutiny matters under Title VI, which raise different issues, mainly because the end product of the decision-making process may well include the adoption of conventions which would involve changes in domestic law. Those have an increasing effect on the rights of individuals. I do not consider that it would be appropriate for such conventions to appear suddenly out of the blue without a prior opportunity to discuss the texts. I suggest an arrangement whereby a Select Committee—whether or not in confidence—could consider a draft text before it is negotiated. At that stage one can foresee what may develop and there will not necessarily be any interference with the negotiating powers of the Government. It is extremely important that draft texts should be considered before the: decision-making process is completed.

Many political and legal issues are raised in the report, not least the need for national parliaments, perhaps in co-operation with the European Parliament, to ensure that the measures adopted, mainly under Title VI, are implemented and applied throughout the member states. We must remember that Article 155, which endows the Commission, as guardian of the treaties with the powers to ensure that measures that are adopted are implemented, does not apply to Titles V and VI. Therefore, it is extremely important to work out a system, perhaps through the various committees which the noble Lord, Lord Boston, attends on behalf of this Parliament, to ensure that the right processes are set in place in order that co-operation is available.

It is hoped that this House can look forward to flexible co-operation both with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and with my noble friend Lady Chalker of Wallasey, who speaks on behalf of the Foreign Secretary in this House, so that. Parliament can be informed without hindering or weakening the United Kingdom's position in the various fora of the European union.

8.24 p.m.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill

My Lords, this lucid, vigorous and enlightened report is as important for the citizens of this country and of the European Union as any to have been made to this House. We are all indebted to the noble Lord, Lord Boston of Faversham, to his committee and to the staff for their opinions and recommendations. They consider a crucial question for our times: how can Parliament really influence what Ministers do ever more actively on the international plane, notably within the European Union, especially where what Ministers do may affect the rights and duties of the individual? The report provides practical, workable means of making Ministers more open and accountable to Parliament.

Even before the creation of the European Union, and the greatly increased scope for concerted inter-governmental action, the relevant principles of British constitutional law and government practice did not ensure proper and sufficient accountability to an increasingly marginalised Parliament and to the rule of law. As the noble Lord, Lord Boston of Faversham, has so clearly explained, with the building of the inter-governmental pillars of the European Union in Maastricht the problems of effective accountability will become still greater unless national legislatures can enhance their scrutiny and supervision.

With the permission of your Lordships, I should like to give a few examples in the international human rights field of the conduct of successive governments to show the pressing need to heed the moderate and proportionate recommendations in the committee's report in the face of what I can only describe as the Government's narrow and unenthusiastic response. These examples illustrate the need to make the Government's activities under the CFSP pillar as accountable to Parliament as under the justice and home affairs pillar, in accordance with the committee's three criteria, and by laying draft rather than final texts before Parliament.

The noble Baroness, Lady Elles, rightly referred to the relevance and importance of the European Convention on Human Rights. I shall take that as one of my main examples. After the Attlee Government had signed that convention in November 1950, it was formally laid on the Table of both Houses of Parliament, but in breach of the so-called Ponsonby rule, and despite the convention's great importance, the Government did not submit the convention to Parliament for discussion. The same was true when the first Wilson Government took the momentous step, in December 1965, of accepting the right of individuals to complain to the European Commission of Human Rights of breaches of the European convention by the Executive, the courts or Parliament itself. Parliament was not consulted at all and did not discuss the implications of ratification or of acceptance of the right of individual petition.

Those implications are of obvious importance to individuals and to public authorities alike. Increasingly, our own courts, understandably restive at having their decisions reviewed by the European Commission and Court of Human Rights, without being empowered by Parliament to give direct effect to the convention in this country, use the convention to interpret ambiguous legislation and to develop the common law. This is a most welcome approach by our senior enlightened judges because it reduces avoidable inconsistencies between our law and European convention law. But it means that UK ratification of the convention and acceptance of the right of individual petition are more and more affecting existing law and private rights without parliamentary authority; that is, without incorporation of the convention. That position is contrary to well-established British constitutional principles because Parliament is being bypassed by the Government and the courts, but there is no sign that the Government intend to seek a legislative mandate for the use of the convention by our courts.

There is also a lamentable absence of parliamentary debate or scrutiny about the Government's periodic reports to the various international monitoring bodies under the international human rights treaties to which the United Kingdom is party; for example, bodies such as the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, the UN Human Rights Committee, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.

These periodic reports by the Government affect our rights and duties, for through them the Government seek to persuade the international bodies that the public authorities of the UK are fully complying with the international obligations imposed by the human rights treaties—and so to shield the Government from the need to introduce legislative or administrative measures to give better domestic effect to those obligations.

When they make these reports, the Government inform the international agencies of such matters as Parliament's likely attitude towards the incorporation of the European convention or the international convenant into our law; but they do not seek the views of Parliament, whether before or afterwards.

The periodic reports are argumentative as well as factual. They tend to give only half of the picture—the half that reflects the Government's policy and British law and practice in a favourable light. In the knowing words of Mr. William Waldegrave, the "Minister for Open Government", to the inquiry of Lord Justice Scott: Much of government policy is much more like playing poker than playing chess. You don't put all your cards up at one time". That is certainly true of the poker-faced government reports to the international human rights agencies.

But my point is not that the Government are playing poker in dealing cards to these international agencies but that they do not put their cards up at all for Parliament, and that Parliament has no proper opportunity to participate as a significant player in the international dialogue, which is dominated by the Home Office and the other home departments. The Government do not show drafts of these reports to the relevant specialist statutory bodies such as the Commission for Racial Equality and the two Equal Opportunities Commissions. Apart from their recent first report to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, the Government's reports are not published by HMSO; nor in the past have they or the international bodies' responses to them even been routinely placed in the Libraries of both Houses. Moreover, they are never submitted in draft or final form for parliamentary consideration.

Perhaps I may take another example. For the past nine years, the Government have been participating in discussions within the Council of Europe about the reform of the dilatory and inefficient enforcement procedures of the European Convention on Human Rights. For years the Government opposed the creation of a single permanent European Court of Human Rights in place of the present two-tier Commission and Court. When they became isolated, the Government reluctantly agreed, last year, to work on a reforming protocol to the convention. Now, alone among the 32 European Governments—except for Turkey—the Government threaten to block the reform process because of the Home Secretary's objection to creating an automatic right of individual access to the European Court.

The Government must decide whether to sign the Eleventh Protocol at the meeting of the Committee of Ministers next month. The outcome of that decision will be of very great practical importance to everyone in this country and to the European reform process as a whole. Yet at no time have the Government ever consulted Parliament about the issues that I mentioned or, still less, sought a negotiating mandate; nor will they do so before signing and ratifying or refusing to sign and ratify the Eleventh Protocol. So much, if I may say so, for a commitment to real and effective accountability to Parliament.

I suggest that those examples show that the Foreign Secretary was much too complacent when he told the European Communities Committee that existing arrangements for influencing and controlling the way in which Ministers conduct foreign policy are "about right". They may be about right for Ministers and their advisers, but they are far from adequate in terms of parliamentary accountability. Unless they are strengthened in the manner recommended by the European Communities Committee, these loose procedures will continue to cede far too much power to our Government and to the other governments of the European Union to act in our name without real parliamentary scrutiny and supervision, just as they now do when the Government negotiate within the Council of Europe and beyond.

The Committee is surely right in asserting that work under the inter-governmental pillars must be supervised by national Parliaments; that the committee intend to be vigilant in holding Ministers to account in these areas; and that the key to effective supervision is to obtain the right documents, and to obtain them in time to influence the outcome. That means, as the committee indicates, that it is essential to see the texts in draft. The committee is also surely right in calling for documents to be provided for Parliament not only where there will eventually be a need for primary legislation but also where they are significant —particularly where the rights or duties of individuals are affected—and where they might require secondary legislation or the imposition of legally-binding commitments on the UK. Further, the committee is surely right to recommend that national Parliaments and the European Parliament should consult and exchange information. Greater inter-governmental co-operation must also be matched by greater inter-parliamentary co-operation—an important subject not, I am afraid, mentioned in the Government's response.

Despite the narrow and largely negative response by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and to a lesser extent by the Home Secretary, I very much hope that the committee's recommendations will be implemented in their entirety. They are measured, appropriate and necessary measures to tackle the democratic deficit in this country and elsewhere within the European Union. The time is ripe—over-ripe—for much needed reforms to ensure that, except for good reasons in exceptional cases, government will consult with Parliament, and when government do consult Parliament they will do so with the cards face upwards on the table. Unless and until that happens, we have a duty to be sceptical about the Government's commitment to effective accountability to Parliament for decisions taken under the inter-governmental pillars of the European Union or, indeed, elsewhere in concert with other governments.

8.36 p.m.

Lord Bridges

My Lords, I was a co-opted member of the Select Committee when it prepared its report.I speak to support the conclusions and recommendations that the committee made as outlined by our chairman the noble Lord, Lord Boston of Faversham. My comments relate mainly to the common foreign and security policy (CFSP); that is, Title V of the Maastricht Treaty.

There are two aspects to the subject: the procedure to be followed, and the substance to be discussed. My suggestion is that we need, first, to look at the issues to be discussed, examining briefly the kind of topics that are likely to arise before forming a judgment about the best procedure to put in place.

The common starting point is that we have had the benefit of an excellent procedure in past years for dealing with proposals emerging from the Commission. Of course, that will remain in place for the same type of business in future. What we have to do now is to build upon that past success so as to create an equally effective method of scrutiny for the new matters to be discussed under the two inter-governmental pillars. It is indispensable that we do so with the agreement of the Government and of all sides of the House. It is an important debate. I hope that we may emerge from it with a common understanding of what is required.

The memorandum provided by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office said that the CFSP will evolve from the existing work on European political co-operation. While I agree that evolution is a helpful way of looking at the new CFSP, I note that there is some difference between the views of the Select Committee and those of the Government about the category of documents on Title V work which we would like to see. Members of the Committee had hoped that the three tests which are mentioned and spelt out in paragraph 53 of the report would apply to both pillars, but the Government evidently do not believe that that would be appropriate as a general rule. As I believe there may be some misunderstanding here, it is worth looking at that point in rather more detail.

Up to the present the large majority of texts emerging from political co-operation have not required scrutiny either because they related to current international business often of an urgent or transitory character, or because there was often no time, and perhaps sometimes little need, for the Government to inform the House of discussion between member states about, for example, the exact wording of an imminent Security Council resolution. The same could be said of many other declarations made by the Community in the past, for example expressing moral solidarity with groups whose human rights are being threatened, as they are today in Rwanda, or urging states involved in conflict to settle their dispute by peaceful means.

I do not think that Members of the Select Committee were looking for procedures to scrutinise activities of this kind. They would not meet the criteria set out in paragraph 53. If, exceptionally, they were significant, no doubt means could be found to cover them, although I would not expect this to occur in the ordinary course. I think that we have adequate means of asking questions and arranging debates about business of this sort. I believe, however, that Members of the Committee were looking ahead to other types of activity which we suppose may engage the European Union in the future. To illustrate this I wish to refer to three areas of foreign policy where the European Union could have a significant role and where a form of scrutiny in Parliament would seem to me to be appropriate.

First—this is becoming a current political issue—there is the problem of security in Eastern Europe. There are now six states in that region without any adequate form of collective security since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Some of these states are to take part in a loose, non-binding relationship with NATO. It is not clear at present whether this will meet their needs or indeed ours. The European Union, or its arm the Western European Union, could seek to play a more direct role in this area, or become obliged to do so. The French Prime Minister made an interesting suggestion last year that a new security treaty might be negotiated between the states of both East and West Europe and I can see the attractions of that. I suggest that this whole subject may become more active and when it does, and preferably before that happens, it would be appropriate for the Government to inform Parliament of their intentions in good time rather than to wait until a treaty is worked out and ready for ratification. I had this in mind when I suggested at one of the meetings of the Select Committee—in the words that the noble Baroness, Lady Elles, used just now—that scrutiny could provide a means of securing a degree of understanding of government policy and political support for it.

A second issue which may well involve us in future years concerns the policy of the Union in the Mediterranean. Members of the Union in Southern Europe feel the need for such a policy as they have close political and economic ties with the states of North Africa whose citizens have emigrated in large numbers to France and Italy in particular. We ourselves have policies of a pragmatic nature with each of the North African nations individually, but we do not now, I think, have a Mediterranean policy as such. Historically we have had in the past such a broad policy when we were worried about Russian expansion in the area at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, when we needed sea routes to India and when the southern flank of the Soviet empire needed to be contained. A European Mediterranean policy now would involve considerable expense and costly trade concessions although it could also provide member states with some important benefits. If a negotiation of this kind is likely—I think it may occur before very long—it would be wise for Parliament to be informed and for its opinion to be sought before new and permanent obligations were entered into.

My third illustration is, I admit, more speculative and concerns the Far East. The relationships between the four major states in that area are, I suspect, due for a change to reflect the very different strategic situation and the decline in the economic strength of Russia. I believe that this could prove to be an important test of the new European Union in world affairs. If the Union is to fulfil its responsibilities as a major unit of political strength, it will need to reach a fresh, broader understanding and deeper co-operation with both China and Japan, and to do that without damaging our essential relationships with the United States and with Russia.

I mention these issues simply as illustrations of the kind of topics in which I expect the Union to become involved in the future. The matter that we are discussing goes a good deal wider than the simple transfer to Title V of questions previously handled in political co-operation. The existence of the Union in the form that we have created by the Maastricht Treaty will itself generate new areas of activity in foreign affairs that will be wider in scope, longer in range and which will have more significant consequences. Of course this will not all happen at once but we need, I suggest, to recognise the likely scale of change which is about to occur. It was this recognition which I did not readily perceive in the Government's response to our report.

I am not suggesting that the Government should be involved in numerous seminar-type discussions about hypothetical future events, nor do I propose anything resembling a full-blown foreign affairs committee. But I do see the need to enlarge somewhat the present area of scrutiny to cover the work of the CFSP as it develops. There is a case, I believe, for the Government to look again at the three tests listed in paragraph 53 to see whether they could not be applied to both pillars. The test of significance listed there is of real relevance and could be used to confine scrutiny to matters of importance. What we do need is an instrument for informed discussion in a relatively small group, on the basis of a document and supplemented by oral evidence as appropriate. Some minor adaptation of the existing procedure seems to me to be ideal for that purpose. If we could do this, we could make full use of the knowledge and experience available to this House and continue the invaluable contribution made by the Select Committee in the enlarged area of activity before us.

8.48 p.m.

Baroness Serota

My Lords, like other noble Lords who have spoken this evening, I warmly welcome the important report which my noble friend Lord Boston of Faversham has presented on the scrutiny by this House of the two new inter-governmental pillars of the European Union which were established in the Maastricht Treaty. I congratulate him and his colleagues on the Select Committee on their clear account and careful analysis of the complex issues that these profound changes will involve.

I was also glad to see in the Government's response to the report that they are committed to national parliaments playing a pre-eminent role in accountability in these two areas of inter-governmental activity. Indeed as my noble friend Lord Boston of Faversham reminded us, it was to the great credit of the British Government that they took the initiative in writing the need for improved scrutiny by national parliaments into the Maastricht Treaty through the declaration on the role of national parliaments. There is therefore no argument, as I see it, that there must be effective parliamentary scrutiny of inter-governmental activity both under the CFSP and the justice and home affairs pillar of the European Union. So the question before us and before the Select Committee is, I submit, not whether but how and in what depth.

On any reading of the Select Committee's report and the oral and written evidence it received, it is clear that both pillars present difficult and sometimes awkward problems for timely and effective parliamentary scrutiny both at national and at European level. The report also rightly reminds us of the need for co-operation between the two Houses of this Parliament to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort. The long-established machinery of scrutiny in this House is relatively straightforward in that the responsibility for systematic scrutiny is delegated to a single Select Committee with broad and flexible terms of reference acting in concert with its five sub-committees with their competence over particular aspects of Community activity.

In the other place there are at least three Select Committees and two new Special Standing Committees with interests in these new areas of inter-governmental activity. The Foreign Affairs Committee has recommended to the other place in the report Europe after Maastricht that the Government make it their policy to consult the House before important decisions under the CFSP and the home affairs and justice pillar are made. The Legislation Committee, having produced a valuable report on the new co-decision procedure under the Community pillar, is now preparing to bring forward proposals for the scrutiny of the two new flanking pillars.

Since their inception in 1974 the scrutiny systems in both Houses, although they have operated in different ways, have been designed to give Parliament the opportunity to influence Ministers before they participate in decisions which by treaty have passed from Parliament to Ministers and from national to Community level. That principle of parliamentary reserve has rested on an undertaking given by government and embodied in a House of Commons resolution that, except in special circumstances, Ministers would not agree to any proposals in the Council until parliamentary scrutiny had been completed and the reserve lifted. Adapting that long-standing and well-tried principle to the work of the new pillars is no easy task. However, in my view i.: is fundamental to the objective of timely and effective scrutiny.

The Select Committee recognises in paragraph 62 of its report that there may well be situations when the need for speed or secrecy, particularly in the case of the CFSP pillar, could make it necessary to restrict what may be disclosed to Parliament or to override the scrutiny reserve, provided an explanation is given once the matter has become public knowledge.

We must also remember that this is but one of 12, and possibly in the not too distant future 16, national parliaments and that other governments may well disclose to their parliaments documents and proposals which have not been made available by cur Government to the British Parliament. I well recall the situation in the spring of 1991 during the Luxembourg presidency when that Government passed the first working text of the draft Maastricht Treaty to the European Parliament but the Foreign Office did not disclose it to our Select: Committee until after we had managed to convince the, Foreign Office that it was already in the public domain. In the event, disclosure at that stage enabled Our Sub-Committee E to undertake a speedy and systematic study of the proposed law-making powers and procedures which was then welcomed by everyone concerned, including the Foreign Office.

In the case of the justice and home affairs pillar, where all the decisions must be taken by unanimity and no qualified majority voting will apply, I doubt whether progress will be other than slow. It will probably be much slower than some of the proposals the Select Committee has had to deal with in the past.

After careful study of all the material provided in the report, it seems to me that the three criteria which have already been mentioned in the debate tonight, which are set out in paragraph 53 of the report and which should determine the documents to be deposited are reasonable and practicable for both pillars, given the long experience of the formal and informal relationships which have been built up over time, the expertise which exists among the Members of this House and the flexible working arrangements which the Select Committee has had to develop in recent years to take account of the speeding up of decision-making in the Community.

I therefore support my noble friend Lord Boston of Faversham and urge the Government to reconsider their reservations about depositing documents and applying the traditional scrutiny reserve where possible, as the Select Committee has recommended in the report. If they cannot accept those recommendations they should at the very least agree to review the position after a short period of the working arrangements. I urge the Minister when she replies at the end of the debate to agree to review the position and report back to the House after that short experimental working period

There are several other aspects of the report which I should have liked to comment on, particularly those relating to links with other parliaments, but the hour is late. I shall therefore confine myself briefly to one further point, but nevertheless a very important one. It relates to the Select Committee structure and its staffing. My noble friend Lord Boston touched on that subject in his opening remarks.

Noble Lords who are present in the Chamber tonight may well recall the rather unique occasion in December 1992 when the Motion by the noble Lord, Lord Aldington, on the first report of the new liaison committee failed, but only on a tied vote of 106 to 106, to allow the Select Committee to reappoint its then existing six sub-committees instead of the five sub-committees recommended by the liaison committee. As a result, Sub-Committee C on social policy and Sub-Committee F on the environment were amalgamated under the able chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Lewis of Newnham. The committee now has to cope with an extremely wide range of post-Maastricht topics. Although the Select Committee itself could well decide to undertake the work arising from the CFSP pillar, the scrutiny resulting from the justice and home affairs pillar would undoubtedly be too heavy an additional workload for the present Sub-Committee C, even if, as is likely, some of the subject matter would fall within the remit of Sub-Committee F on law and institutions.

There are also bound to be consequential implications for the staffing of the Committee Office, on which so much of the quality and quantity of the Select Committees' work depends. I see from the report—and my noble friend Lord Boston has confirmed tonight—that the Select Committee intends to review these matters after a short period of operating the new procedure. I hope that the review will be completed in good time for the liaison committee's forthcoming review of its sub-committee structure.

I conclude by once again by thanking my noble friend Lord Boston and his colleagues for this valuable report which I believe will have considerable and long-term implications for the future scrutiny work of the House.

8.57 p.m.

Lord Beloff

My Lords, the noble Baroness who has just spoken is the fifth speaker on our list this evening, and the first not to be a member of the committee that drafted the report. That is not uncommon. She is a member of what one might call our European family in this Chamber. As someone who does not belong to that family, I propose to take a rather different view of the report and what it teaches us.

It seems to me that we must call into question at some point the value of having a European Communities Committee at all. It does a great deal of work. It takes up the time of a great many useful, active and important Members of your Lordships' House. But what is its effect? Looking over the past 20 years, its main effect has been to help to disguise from Parliament and from the country the major changes that have taken place in Britain's position in Europe and in the world. We have witnessed, and are still witnessing, a continued erosion of this country's capacity to make laws for itself or to raise funds for its needs through its own procedures of taxation. That is to some extent slid over by the assumption that in the last resort there are parliamentary controls on that process.

Therefore, there are continually debates about procedure and suggestions for improvements in procedures such as the noble Baroness has just referred to, which seem to be an exact parallel to what is very common in other aspects of the British constitutional process. For example, as is manifest at the end of every Session and sometimes more often, we still have the necessity for Royal Assent to Acts of Parliament. For about 300 years that has been a pure affectation: no Clerk of the Parliaments has ever had the courage to say, "La Reine s'avisera", instead of, "La Reine le veult". However, what it has enabled the country to do is to go from a monarchical to a parliamentary system of government, without noticing it or without the pain which has accompanied similar events in other countries.

It seems to me that the accent on procedure rather than content—and here I was glad that the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, referred to some content of possible problems—is quite dangerous. It is not as though we had reached a terminus in the process or that we could say, "Well, we've given away much, a lot of sovereignty has been removed in one field or another. But now there is a stop and anything which is added to the competence of the European Union will be wholly inter-governmental and therefore naturally it will be under our Parliament's control".

That seems to me to be doubtful and one of the most interesting pages in the report is the evidence of Mr. Amédée Turner, MEP. He said that all this inter-governmental stuff where the justice and home affairs secretaries are concerned is merely transitional, it is cumbersome, wasteful. We must as soon as possible devolve it all into the sphere of the Commission or the Community because that is a proper functioning machine. If that is held by MEPs of this country, I suspect that it is held even more powerfully by MEPs in the European Parliament. Therefore, we must regard the present stage, in that respect at any rate, as precarious. We ought perhaps to be giving more thought to what it would imply.

However, I would rather concentrate in my few remaining minutes on the even more difficult problem of foreign policy. The whole notion of a common foreign and security policy of the present membership of the Union or of that membership when expanded is—as anyone thinking about it or reflecting on recent events knows—the most arrant nonsense. There is an admirable document in the report by Mr. Philip Allott of Trinity College, Cambridge. He points out that we are enmeshed in a whole range, an alphabet soup, of international organisations of various kinds which command us to do this or insist that we do that or enable us to do the other. None of it is logical, none of the memberships is identical and we can, therefore, see that there is a great problem merely from the fact of trying to find what is the European core at which we might look.

The other point which I think is brought out by Mr. Allott and to some extent in the other evidence is the absurdity that for the foreign policy and security policy pillar we do not even rely on—not my favourite body, but it is a body which can be discovered in one place—the Commission, but on whichever member happens to be the president for six months. At the moment, as noble Lords will be aware, the presidency is held by Greece. That is a country which has embarked on the blockade of a friendly government—a blockade denounced by the other 11 members of the European Union—taking no more notice of that than it normally does of the activities of the European Union, except when it comes to extracting money from it. The Greek Government are now in charge of our foreign policy. That seems to me to exhibit an element of farce, if not of tragedy.

There have been various suggestions about rotating the presidency less frequently, making it more likely that some responsible government will be president. But fundamentally, it is difficult to believe that we would ever have arrived by any process of logic at a system which states that every six months some new government will be in charge of deciding how we cope with such problems of foreign policy as we identify as common to us.

Indeed, in his important and interesting evidence, my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary pointed out that, in trying to frame such a common policy, the foreign ministers lacked all the sustenance which they would have in their own countries. They have no apparatus for assessing reports as to what is happening in the part of the world to which their attention is being directed, let alone access to similar secrets. None of even the ordinary analysis which is provided in the Foreign Office by its senior staff is available. So the ministers are framing foreign policy—in so far as they are framing it—in a material, intellectual void.

That again is difficult to take seriously and it is difficult to see how improved scrutiny by committees, either in this House or another place, could possibly improve it. There are things which are incapable of improvement.

I do not wish to deprive the noble Lord, Lord Boston, and his cohorts of valuable work. I am sure they wish to occupy their energies and their talents. I suggest that the European Communities Committee could usefully—and this takes up a point which was briefly touched on, the recognition of Croatia—investigate what Europe has done in the sphere of common foreign policy as regards the Visegrad 4 and ex-Yugoslavia. Let us find out how they came to their decisions and what those decisions were. It is only by giving this House some feel of the reality that we can escape from what otherwise seems to me a somewhat academic—I use the word advisedly; we have been talking about academic matters all day—pursuit of proper procedures, instead of acting, as I think this House should, as a beacon to the rest of the country about where the pro-European policy of successive governments has landed it.

9.8 p.m.

Lord Bruce of Donington

My Lords, it is always a very great pleasure to be able to follow the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, when he discusses European Community matters. I cannot forbear from informing the House that in the course of the remarks that I shall venture to make I may occasionally dissent from the attitude of both Front Benches to this vital question.

Before I embark on a controversial theme, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Boston, for the report that the committee has produced. The noble Lord has invariably been most courteous to me, in spite of the fact that if frequently expressed my convictions with some extra emphasis with which many noble Lords may be accustomed. I regret that owing to the consideration by the House of the Maastricht Treaty last July, I was unfortunately unable to be present at most of the committee meetings that took place arid examine the witnesses concerned.

I am in no doubt that the proposals in regard to scrutiny made by the committee are absolutely first-class. I am in no doubt either, having read through the Government's response to the committee's, proposals that—save in one particular instance that I shall mention later—that response is equally satisfactory to me. But as the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, has already indicated, what we have been through is a ritual dance. We made all the right noises. I am quite sure that no noble Lord who gave evidence gave the slightest offence to the European Commission. Indeed, that would be most controversial. The sentiments that were expressed were most admirable; and the Government replied accordingly.

The whole trouble is that, although the exercise was carried out with diligence, it has had very little effect in practice. Indeed, the Government know that. With the patriotic fervour with which one often associates Her Majesty's Government in office, they have taken good care that this debate takes place very late at night, after the papers have gone to bed and after the media have closed down, and indeed are not represented here tonight, leaving the population to pay some £4.20 for tomorrow's Hansard (which in 1975 cost 45p) or alternatively to extend their extremely lush incomes after tax on paying some £16.60 for the report itself. Unfortunately therefore, tonight we can be quite (if I may say so) "palsy-walsy" about this matter. We can talk it over all together in the complete assurance that the public will never know about it. That is of course the way things go. I can quite understand the Government finding it convenient.

I made the statement that, in spite of all the scrutiny and all the good wishes and affirmations of the Government in regard to the recommendations that were made to them, there have been one or two difficulties. Those may be exemplified, and perhaps the House will bear with me while I give a specific example to prove my point. The difficulties are nowhere more obvious than in the Select Committee's attitude, for example, towards the European budget and the Government's response to the Select Committee's requests after scrutiny. Some might almost say "demands", but that would be asking too much of the Select Committee—it never "demands" anything; it merely "requests" and puts it in very polite terms.

Perhaps I may give your Lordships an example of the slippage that takes place. I shall give it only in regard to the European Community budget. Some little time back—in November last—I asked the Government a Question on whether they would provide to Parliament copies of the preliminary draft budget in good time for it to be properly scrutinised by the Scrutiny Committee. The Government were most forthcoming. Indeed, at the time, the noble Lord, Lord Henley, said: The Government will continue to press the Commission and the Council Secretariat to produce English language versions … as quickly as possible".—[Official Report, 23/11/93; col. 132.] He gathered that his reply did not meet with a good response and after consultation gave a formal undertaking by the Government in the following terms: All I can do is to repeat the assurances given by my noble friend Lord Caithness that in future these documents will be put in front of the House in adequate time to allow the House and the noble Lord to scrutinise them".—[Official Report, 23/11/93; col. 134.] That was such a firm undertaking that I could barely believe my ears. However, my optimism was speedily dissipated. There was a slight slippage.

I come to the Government's response to the Select Committee's report in February. The Government said that: it is the Government's intention to deposit it quickly and to supply an explanatory memorandum as soon as possible. The Government propose that this should be on the same timescale as for deposited EC documents, ie within ten working days of deposit". I regarded that as a further considerable advance. But on 23rd March, in reply to exactly the same questions that I put in November, all that the noble Lord, Lord Henley, could say was that the Government would do: all that we possibly can to ensure that all the documentation is made available to this Parliament, so that it can exercise adequate scrutiny as early as possible".—[Official Report, 21/3/94; col. 494.] So the firm date shifted and shifted imperceptibly until we are left with the situation that they have no obligation at all to do anything other than try to ensure that the information is supplied to us as soon as possible.

We are not talking of something trivial; we are talking of the European budget which comprises one of the most important proposals made by the Commission every year to all the powers. It is of particular importance to us because in the foreseeable future it will at least involve a net contribution from our taxpayers' pockets of £2,200 million —according to the figures which have only recently been supplied by the Government in their Expenditure Estimates. So already there is a slippage.

The fact of the matter is that the Government cannot deliver. They would like to do so. They will continue to affirm that they wish to do this or that. What they cannot or apparently dare not do is follow that up in the council itself. They decline to do that. They say that they will do it, but they do not do it. Therefore, all the existing arrangements in regard to scrutiny will merely record a ritual dance.

Exactly the same considerations apply to the European Parliament. From 1962 right through to 1986 the European Parliament was officially the European Assembly. From 1962 onwards it called itself the European Parliament, clearly with one eye on the future of enlarging its own share of responsibility.

The Commission is responsible for the interpretation of the treaties and the enforcement of their provisions. Was there a squeak heard from the Commission, refusing to acknowledge the European Assembly's new title that it had assumed for itself? There was not a squeak out of the Commission. Likewise, the British Government made no squeak at all. They did not like to feel that they were being anti-communautaire. So they went along with that. At the time when I was in the European Parliament, I had a European passport which, strictly speaking, in European law was illegal because it was an assembly rather than a parliament. It was an assembly until 1986, when the change was officially made by the Single European Act.

I fear—and I am afraid that I shall be held to be right—that all the steps that are being taken are merely a prelude to the 1996 inter-governmental conference, by which time the European Parliament and the Commission will have manoeuvred themselves—with our consent, because no effective and enforceable scrutiny has taken place—into a position whereby in 1996 they will try to install verbally a federal Europe, whether we say yes or no. All the interim steps being taken by Parliament and the Commission are designed to that end.

It is not as though the second of the two pillars is any longer on its own. I am talking now of the home affairs and justice pillar. There was a time—indeed it has been treated so by my noble friend Lord Boston—when it was a completely separate branch of European Union activity under Article K of the new treaty. But we know already that the treaty provisions in relation to fraud have now become entangled with and will shortly become indistinguishable from action taken under Article K as announced by the Home Secretary recently in connection with the enforcement of the various fraud provisions in member states.

So already there is a merge between Article K dealing with home and justice and the ordinary provisions of the treaty, notably under Articles 188 and 109. Exactly the same is happening under the foreign affairs treaty. Under the CFSP provisions a new committee has been established. The Commission also has an interest which is established, and before long the personnel of that new committee dealing with common security problems will be merged with COREPER. Once again COREPER, which has no responsibility for reporting publicly on anything, will do exactly what it is doing today: is ruling the Community in so far as the existing provisions permit.

Those are the prospects and they are all part of the drive towards a federal Europe to which the Government are officially opposed but to which, by their acquiescence in the Council of Ministers and their tolerance of the various events that take place in the member states, they are contributing. When I first came to this place 20 years ago it never occurred to me that probably the most undemocratic assembly in the world—to wit your Lordships' House—should have as its principal task the defence of the liberties, rights and responsibilities of another place. It is your Lordships' House which is trying to rescue the other place from the results of its own indifference to what is happening in Europe and the powers that are being taken away from it.

That is an agreeable role, but I shall not pursue it further at this stage in case I cause a ripple of dissent, and I would not wish to do that. But I give your Lordships this assurance. When I repeat what I have said today—on the assumption that I am spared to repeat it—in years to come, it will be seen that it shows a greater approximation to the truth than the alibis put forward on behalf of the European Union.

9.24 p.m.

Lord Bonham-Carter

My Lords, this has been an interesting debate and ended with a fine climax in the two speeches of the noble Lords, Lord Beloff and Lord Bruce of Donington. I agree with much of what they say, though I find that from what they say I draw exactly the opposite conclusions.

Before embarking on my remarks I should like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Boston of Faversham, for the way in which he chaired our Select Committee and for his introduction to our debate this evening. I thank also our legal adviser, the clerk and, almost above all, the witnesses, who gave extremely interesting evidence which in itself justifies the work of the committee. In particular, I should like to agree with the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, that Mr. Améedée Turner's evidence was extremely significant and the written evidence of Mr. Allott of Trinity College, Cambridge was something which should not be forgotten.

The job of the committee primarily was to inquire into the nature of decision-making under the two inter-governmental pillars. It seems to me that the committee, either deliberately or just in the ordinary course of its investigations, has given an extremely vivid example of how that decision-making takes place and, in my view, how deeply unsatisfactory it is. What we have at the moment is a quasi-federal state. It is said that we are moving towards one without it being recognised that we have a centre with powers and we have other parts with other powers. That is the definition of a federal state. We have a quasi-federal state already. But what we have is an extremely undemocratic one in which a large number of the decisions are taken in secret. That is one of the most significant points about the report in indicating just how those secret decisions are taken.

What we are discussing today, or should be discussing, is how we can keep tabs on the European Union, which was created at Maastricht, and what part national parliaments can play in that process, bearing in mind—a point which has not been mentioned so far—that the European Union is about to be enlarged. What we are talking about is what is popularly known as the democratic deficit. Central to that —this point is discussed far too little in your Lordships' House—is the decision-making process of the Council of Ministers.

Ministers giving evidence to your Lordships' Select Committee or to its sub-committee constantly reiterate and emphasise their accountability to Parliament. But Ministers who serve on the Council of Ministers meet in private. Since we do not know what they say, or how they said it, or even how they voted, that kind of accountability to Parliament is of a rather tenuous nature. Again and again in the evidence which was submitted to your Lordships' Select Committee, the secret way in which decisions were reached is emphasised.

Like the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, I would draw your Lordships' attention to the evidence of Mr. Amédée Turner, a Conservative MEP, chairman of the committee on civil liberties and internal affairs, talking about the role of his committee in supervising the legislative work of the inter-governmental council responsible for the third pillar. Mr. Turner tells us that his committee will know of the legislative agenda coming before Ministers. It will discuss it. But what it will not know is the nature of the ministerial debate or the position adopted by individual Ministers or individual countries. I quote Mr. Turner: It is a very tenuous form of legislative democracy". Nor indeed is there any reason that either he, or for that matter I, can see why deliberations about legislative matters should be in private. Indeed, at Edinburgh we. were delighted to learn that it was decided that the proceedings of the Council should be published. But, says Mr. Turner, and I quote him on page 28: these councils"— under the inter-governmental arrangements and the two. Pillars— are not within the Treaty of Rome, they are the Union, so no doubt", said Mr. Turner, they will say: 'Oh, no, that is quite different here' If Mr. Turner is right, then Maastricht, far from marking an advance towards greater transparency, openness and less secrecy, will in fact be a retreat from the position adopted at Edinburgh. It will be a retrograde step, making oversight by this Parliament, other national parliaments or the European Parliament more rather than less difficult.

As regards the third pillar, the justice arid home affairs pillar, as my noble friend Lord Lester pointed out, we are dealing with issues which touch on the daily lives, rights and liberties of citizens, where transparency, openness and democratic control are absolutely essential but where under the present arrangements they are absent. The fact is that the inter-governmental system, the adoption of which is the pride of the British Government as one of their great achievements at Maastricht, in the words of Mr. Turner, has, a good deal of all the sins of an inter-governmental system. that bureaucracy, secrecy and administrative discretion which is also a good description of the home offices". That is the truth about the inter-governmental system. He went on to indicate that he thought that there must be a better way of doing things.

Perhaps I may point out to those who are critical of the Commission's bureaucracy that the bureaucracy under the inter-governmental system which will control all matters, if one looks at Article K4, will be the bureaucracy of the national governments.

Baroness Elles

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. Is he quite accurate not as regards what Mr. Turner says but in connection with the previous system? Under the European political co-operation nothing came out at all either to the Parliament or to national parliaments. Similarly, as regards justice and home affairs and issues raised in the Trevi group and the multiplicity of working groups, nothing was known outside. Does the noble Lord agree that there is a slight improvement under the new system of pillars—that something will come out which hitherto has been completely shrouded both from Parliament and the public?

Lord Bonham-Carter

My Lords, there may be something in what the noble Baroness has said, as there often is. But what we have gained is very little. I believe that we put at risk a great number of other things by the inter-governmental arrangement—to which I shall return.

The weakness of the inter-governmental approach in foreign affairs is even more obvious, as has been made apparent in response to events in Yugoslavia. What it has demonstrated is weakness, lack of leadership and procrastination and then settling for the lowest common denominator.

Once again I quote from the evidence which we received, this time from Mr. Mcmillan-Scott, a member of the European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security. He described the failure of the European Parliament to get in on the Yugoslav business, having been told by the Council of Ministers that this was strictly an inter-governmental matter and nothing to do with it. He said: the diplomatic process was done on a traditional basis and if I may say to you the League of Nations is a good model". Indeed, the League of Nations results are very like the kind of results which it seems at times this process was achieving. It was said that it was very difficult for a group of 12 nations acting on the unanimity principle to show any particular leadership unless, as is the case in NATO, there is a dominant partner. It is here that the matter of enlargement—which has played a very small part in our debate this evening—comes in.

The weaknesses in the decision-making process devised at Maastricht will, when the Union is enlarged from 12 to 16 or 17, become even more acute. As Mr. Allott of Trinity College, Cambridge, demonstrates in his written evidence to the committee, the European Union as constituted at Maastricht is a kind of legal and constitutional mess of almost unrivalled proportions. If one wants an example of that, I suggest that noble Lords look at page 51, paragraph 9(1), which I shall not quote, about the various structures in European foreign policy at the moment, the enormous number of organisations involved and the cats-cradle of complication which has been created.

During and ever since the Maastricht debates, noble Lords have commented on its institutional consequences. The institutional consequences of enlargement demand urgent and serious study. One of the virtues of the report is that it makes that obvious. The fiasco over voting and the blocking veto before Easter made that point even more obvious, and enlargement emphasises it even more. If it is difficult to get 12 countries acting on a unanimity principle to show any practical leadership in a difficult situation, surely it is even more difficult to get 16 or 17 countries to do so. It is difficult not to conclude that as a consequence there will be increased pressure for greater majority voting.

However, the report does not seem to recognise or face up to the problem that, if there is increased majority voting, the authority and power of the national parliaments is automatically diminished. Not surprisingly, the report attaches great importance to the role of the national parliaments in supervising the two pillars. That is evident in the conclusions given in paragraphs 65 and 71. However, might not 16 parliaments make the old Polish Diet look like a model of parliamentary efficiency?

One of the most important things about the report is that it raises issues which are moving towards us at very high speed and which it seems to me that the Government refuse to face up to, to consider or to consult on. The IGC in 1996 must face up to those major problems and reach some conclusions about them. Although people will not like to say so, that IGC will be a kind of constitutional convention. It is important that before it meets our Government should know where they stand and where they want to go and that they should consult the people and Parliament of this country. However, the Government show no signs of having taken these matters into consideration or of having taken any steps to deal with them.

9.37 p.m.

Lord Clinton-Davis

My Lords, like all noble Lords, even the critics, I begin by complimenting my noble friend Lord Boston of Faversham and his colleagues on their work.

I do not share the view of the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, that it is all very nice and academic, but essentially a waste of time. I should like to deal with that point initially because, as a former member of the European Commission, I can tell the House that the noble Lord's belief that such reports are simply ignored and have no notice taken of them is palpably wrong. I cite three cases. The recent debate on a report on the enforcement of competition law followed other reports on exactly the same topic. Not only did the Commission note many of the issues that had been raised, but it actually took firm action on them. There have been other reports on questions affecting the environment. As a former Environment Commissioner, I can tell the House that those reports were carefully read, perused and, in many respects, acted on also.

Although the Commission has not, by any manner of means, satisfied my noble friend Lord Bruce of Donington on the question of fraud, a number of propositions that have been advanced in reports from your Lordships' House have also been acted on—but, as I have said, not, I know, to the total satisfaction of my noble friend. It is as well to record that such reports are not mere academic exercises.

I noted with some interest the speech of my noble friend Lord Bruce of Donington, as always, extremely entertaining, and of course he put forward his view with great force and good humour. I am sure that he is right to assert that too few people take note of the proceedings in Parliament generally, let alone this House. One can scarcely find a reference to the proceedings in another place, even in the quality newspapers these days. Perhaps if someone had the temerity, Heseltine-like, to seize the Mace tonight, the press would come swarming in and something would happen; but it would take that sort of thing to cultivate any great interest in this debate, and yet it is an important debate. The speeches, even those that have criticised the debate, appear to have come from people with a great wealth of experience.

The criticisms are worth making because they enable us to concentrate perhaps a little less complacently upon some of the issues which have emerged. I agree with the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Bonham-Carter, about some of the dangers of inter-governmental control, because much of that inter-governmental control is based upon secrecy, a point to which I shall return in a moment. I am mostly disappointed with the Government's response to the propositions that have been advanced by the report. Yes, I know that they pay lip service to the value of the report, but, in truth, they have moved scarcely at all from the position that they adopted in the evidence of Ministers and civil servants, which is scarcely a good augury of parliamentary scrutiny committees on the deliberation of Ministers at the Council of Ministers.

I believe that the committee was right to repeat a preliminary point which had been made in an earlier report on the draft treaty, which is as germane to the considerations of today as they were then. It said: The Community is not yet based on 'open covenants, openly arrived at—"'. That of course is the democratic deficit. There are issues which give rise to great confidentiality; but I am convinced that what the European Union requires is far fewer assertions about the need for secrecy and confidentiality and far greater transparency; less hostility by governments to effective parliamentary scrutiny and better supervision by and accountability to Parliament as a whole.

We are living in dangerous times. It is the first time since the end of the war that neo-fascists are likely to secure a hand on the levers of government in one of our member states—Italy. I believe that that arises in substantial measure from cynicism about politicians, political institutions and decision-making that is not related only to Italy. Then, the four countries seeking accession to the European Union will have to undergo referenda. The opinion polls show that the people of those countries are worried about that very issue. Who are we to talk about parliamentary control being effective in relation to European Union issues when less and less parliamentary control is effected over so many elements in our domestic political life?

I believe that openness and effective parliamentary control must be part of the essential weaponry against these catastrophic inclinations—certainly potentially so —which flow from the democratic deficit. That is especially true of the functions of the Council of Ministers and most emphatically in relation to issues which lie at the heart of this report.

As I said in previous debates—it may be anecdotal but it is worth repeating—I attended many meetings of the Council of Ministers. I also attended many meetings which followed the council meetings when Ministers addressed the press. I am not talking only about British Ministers, but I certainly include them. Frankly, representations were made about what had happened that were somewhat different from what had transpired in the secret conclave of the council. That is not good for democracy.

There can be no question that in effectively scrutinising an ever increasing body of European Union legislation which emerges from the council Parliament is put to even greater tests. Those burdens will become increasingly heavy. In essence, the response from government should be to appreciate the problems in all their complexities and to resolve to co-operate to mitigate those problems and, as far as possible, to remove obstacles which stand in the way of Parliament in carrying out these functions. In my view, that has riot been the measure of the Government's response as far as reality is concerned. Yes, my Lords, the words may be there, but the spirit is not always willing.

Where has there been any recognition that inadequate resources are available to this House and to the other place to undertake the tasks which are increasingly burdensome? If it is critical to parliamentary democracy, which Ministers in which departments of state have suggested that we need more not fewer Select Committees or sub-committees to do the job? That point was made most eloquently by my noble friend Lady Serota. Why do the Government take such a dismissive view of the role of the European Parliament? Why, if their bona fides are intact, do the Government not recognise that parliamentary scrutiny can best be achieved without duplication by the European Parliament playing a complementary role to that of national parliaments in carrying out these necessary functions? My noble friend Lord Bruce of Donington characteristically laughed; he has no belief in the European Parliament. But, of course, things have changed since he was there in 1979, which is a long time ago—

Lord Bruce of Donington

They have changed for the worst!

Lord Clinton-Davis

My Lords, how does he know? He has not been there!

Lord Bruce of Donington

My Lords, yes, I have.

Lord Clinton-Davis

My Lords, if he has been there, he has not studied it very well. But as I must be the arbiter on this occasion, I shall call an end to this. Essentially, what was said in 1985—

Lord Bruce of Donington

My Lords, I hesitate to correct my noble friend, but he has mentioned me. However, I was in Brussels for two days in the middle of February. I rejoined my old committee, the Budget Committee, which I can assure him has not improved in the slightest.

Lord Clinton-Davis

My Lords, I hope that he enjoyed the food while he was there. I shall not enlarge on the matter. I happen to believe that the European Parliament does a lot of invaluable work. Its scrutiny of many issues, in particular those relating to judicial and home affairs, has been extremely good.

In 1985 the committee reported on the external competence of the European Communities. It concluded: the current machinery for parliamentary scrutiny is inadequate in relation to treaty making by the European Community. There is no effective democratic control. The influence which Parliament can bring to bear is less than that which it has on international negotiations undertaken by the Government and the opportunities for scrutiny afforded to Parliament are less than those offered to the European Parliament". I believe that remains true, and it will apply with equal, if not greater, force to scrutiny of the inter-governmental pillars of the European Union, unless governments are more accommodating to those requirements for a more democratic process.

Inter-governmental co-operation in the justice and home affairs field has been put, for the first time, on a firm treaty basis following Maastricht. Many of those issues, including asylum policy and immigration, vitally affect civil liberties and human rights.

As regards the Trevi and Schengen groups and the ad hoc group dealing with inter-governmental affairs on immigration, my view is—and I speak as the chairman of the Refugee Council—that Parliament has not been adequately informed of the detailed work carried out by those committees. Previous international agreements on human rights have not been given proper weight. There has been no judicial authority competent to ensure the uniform application of the new obligations which are to be undertaken.

The basic reason for that is that those groups operated in virtually total secrecy. Secrecy is tantamount to amounting to the exclusion to the views of people who should have a role in decision making. Experts in different fields of immigration law and practice, consultants in various fields, non-governmental organisations and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees have all been effectively excluded from the processes of thought of those various inter-governmental groups.

It may be highly convenient for governments to behave in that way and to exclude outside interference or pressures, including the attention of the public. However, that is not good for human rights, civil liberties or democracy. I very much applaud the point taken by the noble Lord, Lord Lester, in his contribution.

Rather than brushing aside the role of the European Parliament—and that is how it was put by the noble Lord, Lord Allen of Abbeydale, when the Home Secretary was giving evidence—it would be more appropriate to compliment the capacity of the European Parliament to do extremely useful work in many of the fields that it has undertaken. It has a committee on civil liberties and internal affairs which was established under the chairmanship of Mr. Amédée Turner in 1992 to afford some prospect—albeit limited; and that is not the fault of the European Parliament—of democratic scrutiny of those matters.

The European Commission does keep the European Parliament informed, and the European Parliament does interrogate a Minister representing the presidency, for the time being, in office. The European Parliament does receive final texts of resolutions and recommendations from the presidency of the Council. Naturally, therefore, that work should be taken on board and not simply overlooked as if of no consequence by our own parliamentary scrutiny in this country and elsewhere.

I believe that it would be appropriate to look at the German experience in this regard. In the Bundesrat (the Senate) Members of the European Parliament join in the deliberations with senators in the work of scrutiny and other committees without, of course, having a vote. That might be looked at with some approbation for our own parliamentary procedures; but that has not figured in the report's conclusions which we are now considering.

The work that has been done by this committee has been extremely useful. It should have received a more generous and positive response from the Government. That would have been the best way in which to ensure that the Government really believe that the role of parliamentary scrutiny is vital to our democratic processes. I believe, as was said by the noble Lord, Lord Bonham-Carter, who made such a forceful and intelligent speech, that we have much more to fear from the secret and furtive nature of decision making that has characterised so much of the work of ministerial councils than there is to fear from the widening of the possibilities of proper scrutiny and invigilation of what happens in our name.

9.55 p.m.

The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Baroness Chalker of Wallasey)

My Lords, perhaps I may first thank the noble Lord, Lord Boston of Faversham, for his introduction to the debate, and the European Communities Committee as a whole for the thorough report that it produced on the role that the House should play in the scrutiny of the inter-governmental pillars of the European Union. I should also like to thank all speakers for their contributions to tonight's interesting and very wide debate, which has ranged a good deal further than the scrutiny report—and that is no bad thing.

There was one moment a short while ago when I thought that I might have to rush to the defence of the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Donington. He has been absolutely vigilant in seeking to find out what committees are really doing in the European Parliament. While the noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, talks of an. ideal world of people working together, it is sad to find that very often the reality is quite some distance from what the noble Lord is saying and, sometimes, a little nearer to the criticisms that are made by the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Donington. Of course, neither noble Lord is right in his condemnation of the situation; but there is an element of truth in what each of them says.

Perhaps I may make a few scene-setting remarks and then respond briefly to some of the points raised, as the hour is late. The Foreign Secretary and the Home Secretary made absolutely clear in their observations submitted in response to the committee's report that we are fully aware of the great interest of both Houses of Parliament in the work of the two inter-governmental pillars of the European Union. The Government have made a clear commitment to find arrangements for parliamentary supervision which are appropriate for the work carried out under each of the inter-governmental pillars and their accountability to the British Parliament in those areas.

I should emphasise that it is accountability to Westminster that we are talking about tonight. However, in the future, there may be ways in which members of the European Parliament can work better in the scrutiny with Members of the Westminster Parliament. Certainly, the German experience is not a bad one. Indeed, I well remember when we were in the presidency some eight years ago going before a committee of the German Parliament made up of MEPs and members of the Bundestag. It was a remarkable experience—partly because it had to be done in German —but it was also very interesting to see that many of the same misconceptions that prevail here were also, at least at that time, prevalent in Germany.

As the Government emphasised in their observations on the committee's report, we believe that the arrangements for the involvement of Parliament should take account of the substantively different nature of the work conducted under the two separate pillars—the common foreign and security policy and justice and home affairs. I turn first to the CFSP. I realise that there is a difference of opinion here, but I believe that there is a very good reason for it. We believe that the arrangements for parliamentary involvement in CFSP should broadly follow the model of involvement in other areas of foreign policy. The Government are committed to pursuing an open and substantive dialogue with Parliament on foreign policy issues, including on CFSP. That must be reflected in the arrangements. There are regular opportunities for Parliament to debate foreign affairs issues and to question Ministers on particular aspects of government policy. Those general policy debates set the framework within which the negotiations on CFSP will take place.

As the noble Lord, Lord Boston of Faversham, said, I believe that it is right and proper that Parliament should monitor closely the development of CFSP, which is an important element in our national foreign policy. After all, we are contributing to CFSP and I can say that we have frequently been in the lead in getting initiatives adopted by our fellow member states which have been all the stronger for the support of 12 than they would have been simply with our support and, perhaps, that of one or two other member states.

We believe it right and proper that Ministers should work closely with your Lordships and with Members in another place to ensure that we achieve satisfactory arrangements. However, this has to be balanced against the flexibility and discretion which every government needs in order to conduct diplomatic negotiations on detailed policy, which often require both confidentiality and speed. I can assure your Lordships that this is in no way an attempt to keep from noble Lords that which they feel they should know but it is absolutely vital in these negotiations to have room for manoeuvre and also to have confidentiality because on many occasions we are dealing with a third country or with another international body. It can be exceedingly difficult if the total mandate has had to be discussed in advance openly and without any confidentiality.

I disagree profoundly with the noble Lords, Lord Clinton-Davis and Lord Bonham-Carter, as regards the following matter. In non-CFSP areas of foreign policy Parliament has worked out how it will relate to its Select Committees. Here we have a slightly different situation, particularly where we are moving towards discussions and agreements. However, I believe we can work this out. We may not have got it right at the first response. The noble Lord, Lord Boston of Faversham, asked me to review the matter. We will certainly monitor our practice most carefully and it could well be that within a few months both sides will find a better way of working. However, I believe we should give the initial arrangements at least a chance and then review them as the noble Lord has suggested.

Unlike business under the Community pillar and the justice and home affairs pillar, not only does CFSP discussion often involve third countries but it often involves other bodies whose papers are kept confidential. That is one of the reasons why I believe that probably the majority of draft documents produced under CFSP, although not all of them, will need to be kept confidential. I am convinced that our national interests are as secure in CFSP as they are in other areas of foreign policy such as NATO and the United Nations where the Government have to enter into negotiations. That is the reason why the Government do not believe that substantially new arrangements are necessary for parliamentary involvement. We should try to build on our existing arrangements which were developed for European political co-operation but which will be much more open—as my noble friend Lady Elles said—than they were in the days of ETC, when discussions were held behind closed doors. Certainly common foreign and security policy is not in the same league as that and it will be more open.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office memorandum to the committee included the Government's decision that Ministers should offer to give briefings to the relevant Select Committees in both Houses. The noble Lords, Lord Boston of Faversham and Lord Bridges, and my noble friend Lady Elles referred to that matter. We are open to suggestions from the relevant Select Committee as to how often this should occur. However, we do not believe that we should tie ourselves to some inflexible specific dates but rather that the dialogue should be regular. The Government view such Select Committee briefings as valuable opportunities not only for informed discussion but also for two-way dialogue, because there is much that can be learned. I hope that these briefings will constitute open sessions because I believe that to be the most useful format. However, there may be occasions when, if the subject matter is particularly delicate, it would be better for the sessions to be held in confidence. I anticipate that sessions held in confidence would be the exception rather than the rule.

I hope that that shows the Government's recognition of the vital interest which the Select Committees will take in CFSP. I also hope that when we come to work through such sessions we can look ahead a little so that issues are not taken simply because it is anticipated that they may arise in the Foreign Affairs Committee in a month or so but because they may come up in the months or years ahead, since there is a need to look forward in this debate.

The work under the justice and home affairs pillar is important and touches on many aspects of justice and law enforcement. These are at the core of the citizen's relations with the state. They are intimately linked with the question of national sovereignty. In the Government's view, the duty of holding the Executive accountable for the way this form of co-operation is carried out naturally and rightly falls to national parliaments.

The Government believe that their proposals for the conduct of parliamentary scrutiny of work under the justice and home affairs pillar provide the right kind of framework and balance of information to secure effective supervision of this important and sensitive area. Clearly it is essential for the purpose of constructive parliamentary oversight that the right documents are identified and deposited at as early a stage as possible. The wide nature of the work envisaged under the justice and home affairs pillar means that there will be a broad selection of documents for Parliament to see, and the Government's proposals are framed with that objective in mind.

The Government intend that Parliament should receive the first full text of any convention or proposal which would, if accepted, require primary legislation in this country, as well as other documents which are judged to be of significant importance. Noble Lords will appreciate that that is a broad undertaking, and from time to time it may be necessary to qualify it to meet the demands of security and confidentiality. However, again, we hope that that will be very much the exception.

The Government intend to interpret the criteria in an open way conducive to dialogue with Parliament. We do not anticipate that security and confidentiality considerations will apply frequently. We accept the need to give the term "significant importance" a wide interpretation to include the type of document identified in the committee's report. For example, proposals which might require secondary legislation or would otherwise impose legal commitments on the UK would certainly be judged to be of significant importance, as would other documents which helped to provide an overview of the work—for example, work programmes or progress reports.

If the Government conclude that a document produced under the justice and home affairs pillar meets the criteria for submission to Parliament, it is the Government's intention to deposit it quickly, together with the explanatory note to help Parliament's consideration of it.

My noble friend Lady Elles asked what would happen once the Select Committees have received draft justice and home affairs proposals. Clearly it will be for the committees themselves to decide how they exercise their responsibility. However, I believe that, as in the case of EC scrutiny, the committees will be able to examine the nature of what is being proposed, call for further evidence from the Government or elsewhere, and recommend debates to make Parliament's views on the matter well known. That will be a real step forward.

Perhaps I may now deal with the difficult matter of those draft CFSP documents not to be submitted to Parliament. We noted very carefully the suggestion in your Lordships' European Communities Committee report that documents under both inter-governmental pillars which fulfil one of the three criteria set out in paragraph 53 of the committee's report should in principle be provided to Parliament. The Government will continue to make available to both Houses of Parliament the text of CFSP statements, declarations, common positions and joint actions once they are agreed. However, as I hinted in my earlier remarks, we think it may not be appropriate in a large number of cases to lay drafts of CFSP texts before Parliament because of the need for speed and confidentiality. I have noted the strong comments that have been made during the debate tonight and I shall bring them to the attention of my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary.

Perhaps I may further assure noble Lords that if certain CFSP documents fall within existing scrutiny guidelines, there is no question that they should be deposited. Where any CFSP documents are not subject to confidentiality considerations and meet at least one of the criteria set out in paragraph 53 of the report, the Government will consider making those available to Parliament at an early stage. It may be that we should work out some long-term guidelines, but I believe that we need to keep the matter under review and perhaps return to it some time in the future.

One of the things I should hate to see happen is that in those cases where CFSP documents had not been laid before the committee we could not proceed because of the scrutiny reserve. I think that that is something on which we need to work in a little more detail and I shall be in contact with the noble Lord, Lord Boston, about it.

I noted the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Bonham-Carter, in regard to his wishes for the future. Of course, we have all read the Euro-manifesto of his party which states that inter-governmental arrangements among member states should be incorporated into the European Community framework. Because I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Donington, should be reassured, I say that the Government oppose the view put forward by the party of the noble Lord, Lord Bonham-Carter. We particularly wanted common foreign and security policy and justice and home affairs to be under the separate pillars because they should be the responsibility of the member states of the Union. They should not come under the aegis of the European Commission. Perhaps I may turn to the examples of the noble Lord, Lord Lester.

Lord Bruce of Donington

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for giving way. While she is dealing again with the question of a common foreign policy and security considerations, will she tell the House whether any documents that come under that heading deal with the question raised by the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, in relation to the activities of the Greek Government and the Greek presidency in recent weeks?

Baroness Chalker of Wallasey

My Lords, I speak from memory, but I do not think that anything that has happened under the CFSP has come up under the Greek presidency. If I am in error, I shall write to the noble Lord, but I am fairly certain that there has been nothing of the nature to which he refers.

I turn now to the examples of the noble Lord, Lord Lester, in the debate. They were understandably taken from the field in which he is so distinguished a practitioner, human rights. Perhaps I may point out to him that subjects dealt with under CFSP are certainly not of that character and, if I may use the noble Lord's words, which I think I noted correctly, they are not likely to affect the rights and duties of individuals, particularly under our domestic law. Human rights questions are matters of traditional foreign policy. On the other hand, we have said that where activity under the pillars is likely to lead to changes directly affecting individuals—which will almost certainly be the case under the justice and home affairs pillar—draft documents will be supplied so that scrutiny can take place. That has already begun to happen. For example, the draft Europol convention documents have already been deposited with the committee of the noble Lord, Lord Boston. I do not think that the question of incorporation into domestic law of the European Convention on Human Rights and the right of individual petition, important though they are, is directly relevant to the present issues. However, when I read the debate I shall go carefully over what the noble Lord said.

The noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Donington, as he normally does in our debates, referred to the European Community budget. I know that he has been extremely concerned that documents should come to this House and to another place as soon as possible. He knows also that I happen to agree with him on this matter. Just as he does, I sometimes get frustrated at the timing of the delivery of documents. But I say to him that we really will try to ensure that the Commission's overview as regards the preliminary draft budget is made available to Parliament, provided that we can get our hands on it. We also intend to try to get it well in advance of the publication of the preliminary draft budget in mid-June. If I have any more news for the noble Lord I will convey it to him directly. I understand his concern.

The noble Lord also spoke of the future and made prophecies that the pillars would collapse. I assure him that under a Conservative Government the pillars will not collapse. But I warn the noble Lord, given that his noble friend Lord Clinton-Davis said that he agreed with much of what the noble Lord, Lord Bonham-Carter, had said, which included bringing the pillars under the European Commission, that he needs to be extremely careful about the way he is going to vote in the future. There is no merger between the political committee and COREPER, and we do not intend there to be one. There is no merger of action on fraud under Title VI and under the EC treaty. In both cases, action under the pillars and action under the EC treaties is complementary, but it is separate. We intend that it should remain that way. We certainly do not feel that there should be any—

Noble Lords

Order.

Lord Beloff

My Lords, will my noble friend the Minister give way? Since she has said positively that she rejects the idea of the pillars merging into the Community arrangements as suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Bonham-Carter, does that mean that Mr. Améedéee Turner will not be supported by the Conservative Party for re-election to the European Parliament?

Baroness Chalker of Wallasey

My Lords, I had understood that he was not even to be a candidate. But perhaps that may have something to do with it.

The other point that I wanted to make on the question of merging the pillars—it is an important point to get absolutely clear—concerns the justice and home affairs pillar and the Community. I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Donington, that the Home Secretary's initiative is for a joint action under the third pillar. No Community legislation is proposed, and the action is intended to be implemented under the national law of each member state, not in any other way. 'That is why we have the pillared arrangement: in order to maintain those matters of justice arid home affairs under our national law.

We have had a long debate, and there is yet another debate to come. So perhaps I may finally say this to your Lordships' House. The conclusion in the Select Committee's report is that, wherever possible, a proposal made under the inter-governmental pillars should not be agreed until parliamentary scrutiny is complete. Such a scrutiny has up to now been exercised only in the context of proposals for Community legislation. We hope that it will not be necessary to replicate this procedure in the area covered by the two inter-governmental pillars. No Community legislation will arise under either inter-governmental pillar. In the event that domestic legislation is required as the result of an agreement negotiated under the justice arid home affairs pillar, then Parliament will, of course, have the opportunity to consider the issue in full during the requisite national legislative process. I believe that by proceeding with the committee as far as we can, we can incorporate into our considerations the very points for which the noble Lord's committee has asked.

The provision of a scrutiny reserve would not enhance parliamentary accountability. But the Government's principal objective is to ensure that Parliament has sufficient time in which to consider and respond to proposals before any decisions are taken in the Council. There may be times when decisions have to be made quickly. But that should not be the rule. In those cases the Government do not believe that it would be justified that outstanding scrutiny requirements should preclude us from signalling agreement where it would be appropriate to do so. That is something that we should monitor as the months go by.

The Government wish to co-operate fully with both Houses in ensuring arrangements for appropriate and effective supervision of the CFSP and justice and home affairs pillars. We will keep under review all the arrangements that have been discussed so far and will try to respond to the needs of Parliament.

I thank your Lordships for an interesting debate. I look forward to future debates on CFSP and on justice and home affairs issues, to which I am sure that this House will make a valuable contribution. Maybe in future debates we should take those matters separately. The issues are so wide and the arrangements complex that I believe they deserve more time than your Lordships' House has been able to give them tonight.

10.20 p.m.

Lord Boston of Faversham

My Lords, we have been debating at a late hour what my noble friend Lord Clinton-Davis called an important matter. But at least one can say about the timing that such has been the quality of the contributions from all parts of your Lordships' House—contributions which have been critical and those which have been not critical and in other ways positive—this has been a debate well worth waiting for.

It would be imposition upon your Lordships at this hour, especially with another debate to come, if I were to embark upon a detailed survey of what has been said. So I shall confine myself to a few remarks. First, I should like to thank all noble Lords who have taken part in the debate for their kind words about the committee as well as personally. In particular, I want to thank the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Chalker of Wallasey, for her contribution to our debate. Perhaps she will forgive me if I do not go over all the various suggestions that she made tonight.

I should like to seize upon one of them that she touched on early in her remarks and to which she returned to a certain extent in her closing remarks; namely, her suggestion that the procedures for examining what are in many cases most momentous matters affecting people individually and generally are to be monitored—that is a significant word which she used. Another part of her very helpful undertaking tonight was her assurance to your Lordships that the procedures will be reviewed in the light of experience. I noted her words that there may well come out of the discussions that will take place between Her Majesty's Government and your Lordships' Select Committee the possibility of a meeting of minds. That is promising.

I realise that the noble Baroness can go no further in her commitments this evening. But, after all, it depends on how the practice works out and how we believe that we can obtain what she has described as a commitment by the Government to finding the most appropriate method of examining these matters and scrutinising them properly. As I said, all the contributions tonight have been significant. The point was made by the noble Baroness, Lady Elles, about draft texts to be seen. That was also one of the points taken up by the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, in his powerful speech and persuasive arguments. Again, that matter was touched on in another way by the noble Lord, Lord Bridges.

The noble Baroness, Lady Chalker, indicated her anxiety to ensure that what she described as the powerful points made in the debate are taken into account. One of those points was on scrutiny reserve, made by my noble friend Lady Serota, who has a great deal of experience in this field. As with so many discussions and debates in your Lordships' House, there were differences on all sides. But there is almost always common ground; and there is common ground between what my noble friend Lord Bruce of Donington and the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, had to say about keeping watch on the effectiveness of the committee. The committee does that itself and, as the committee said, it also needs to be done by this House generally.

Again, other important matters relating to effectiveness were touched on my by noble friend Lord Clinton-Davis, who also referred to the democratic deficit and the part that this scrutiny plays in offsetting it. That is a point to which the noble Lord, Lord Bonham-Carter, too, referred.

We have had a wide-ranging debate and we in the Select Committee can draw some comfort, as I said earlier, from the observations and pointers given by the noble Baroness.

On Question, Motion agreed to.