THE ARMY.

HL Deb 24 May 1909 vol 1 cc1133-42

* VISCOUNT HARDINGE

My Lords, I rise to move for a Return showing the total (a) combatant (b) non-combatant establishment of the Expeditionary Force; the number of officers and men of the Regular Army at present available included in this force; the number of officers and men who will be drawn from the Special Reserve (a) combatant (b) non-combatant; the number of men, if any, who will be sent abroad under twenty years of age; the number of officers and men over twenty years of age at present on the strength of the Regular Army who will remain in this country to replace the wastage of war after the Expeditionary Force has left (a) combatant (b) non-combatant; the force which could be mobilised at home of men of not less than one year's service after the Expeditionary Force has been despatched, dividing (a) Regulars from (b) Special Reserve, as the existing strength of these forces.

I trust the noble Lord who represents the War Office will understand that, in moving for this Return, I do not wish him to publish any information the disclosing of which may be detrimental to the national interest; but as he stated the other day that a good deal of this information could be derived from official publications, I think we are fully justified in asking the noble Lord to lay this Return on the Table. No one, I think, can fail to appreciate the fact, stated by the noble Lord during the course of the military debate last week, that until the scheme of the Secretary of State had had time to mature there were bound to be certain gaps. I am glad to think that the noble Lord now admits the truth of our contention that there are serious gaps, especially amongst officers. The question is, how soon do the Government anticipate that those gaps are likely to be filled up? Nearly three years have elapsed since the Secretary of State for War said in the House of Commons— As the result of the Government's proposals we shall be in a position to readily mobilise 150,000 officers and men. Of this total, 50,000 will be regulars serving with the Colours, about 70,000 wi11 be Reservists, and about 30,000 men employed and trained on a Militia basis. The right hon. gentleman went on to state that:— An Army so organised would be, in point of numbers, available for taking the field over seas nearly fifty per cent. stronger than any Expeditionary Force which we have ever hitherto attempted to organise in this country. A War Office Return subsequently issued showed an even more encouraging statement—namely, 159,620 officers and men. After the very clear statement made during the course of the debate last week by the Duke of Bedford, which was fully endorsed by the noble and gallant Field-Marshal Lord Roberts, it is difficult for any of us to imagine that that number is ever likely to be forthcoming. I say this for this reason, that neither the noble Lord nor any member on the Government side attempted to discredit or seriously to dispute the many hard facts and proofs produced by my noble friend the Duke of Bedford. In fact, if I may say so, they evaded all these points in every detail, and adopted the somewhat extraordinary attitude of appealing to us on this side as to what alternative scheme we had to suggest for this purpose.

Because the noble Duke, myself, and others have thought fit to criticise the military policy of His Majesty's Government, I fail to understand—I say it with all respect—why the noble Earl the Leader of the House should think that we have imparted unusual animus into our criticisms or that we have been actuated by any party motives. I can assure him that the criticisms we have made have been made purely for the good of the service, and more especially that particular branch of the service to which many of us belong. The noble Lord the Under-Secretary told the House last week that he did not see that any good could accrue from having a special inquiry into the state of the Special Reserve, but that if such a Commission should sit, which he did not anticipate, the result of their deliberations would, he believed, be to ask for the heads of the Ministers in the late Government. I can assure him, whether he thinks that or not, that in asking him for this Return I am not in any way actuated by motives of that kind with respect to himself. I hope, therefore, that the noble Lord will be more responsive than he has been on two former occasions, and will not be content to shelter himself behind the well-known official statement that it is contrary to precedent to give the information.

Moved, That an humble, Address be presented to His Majesty for a return of—

1. 1. The total (a) combatant (b) noncombatant establishment of the Expeditionary Force; the number of officers and men of the Regular Army at present available included in this force;
2. 2. The number of officers and men who will be drawn from the Special Reserve (a) combatant (b) non-combatant;
3. 3. The number of men, if any, who will be sent abroad under 20 years of age;
4. 4. The number of officers and men over twenty years of age at present on the strength of the Regular Army who will remain in this country to replace the wastage of war after the Expeditionary Force has left (a) combatant (b) non-combatant;
5. 5. The force which could be mobilised at home of men of not less than one year's service after the Expeditionary Force has been despatched, dividing (a) Regulars from (b) Special Reserve, as the existing strength of these Forces.—(Viscount Hardinge.)

THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (LORD LUCAS)

My Lords, I should like to express our gratitude to the noble Viscount for his statement that he does not desire anything which it is contrary to the public interest should be published. I can assure him that in all our answers to him we will bear that carefully in mind, and that nothing that is in the least likely to be prejudicial shall be made public. For that reason I am afraid I am unable to give any other answers to these Questions than I have already given on two occasions. But shortly after Whitsuntide we propose to lay Papers on the Table of your Lordships' House showing the full effect of the reforms that we have up to now carried out in the Army. I think there is some need for that, because the debate of last week showed pretty clearly that the result of those reforms is not so well understood as it might be. The Papers that we shall present will show all that can legitimately be made public in the way of elucidating the points upon which the noble Viscount asks for information, and anything beyond what will be contained in the Papers the noble Viscount can only, I am afraid, get by coming to the War Office as I have proposed to him on previous occasions. That is all I have to say on the Motion of the noble Viscount. But there is another Question on the Paper standing in the name of Lord Lovat. I would like to say, with regard to that Question, that it deals entirely with our mobilisation arrangements. It amounts to asking for our mobilisation plans in detail, and therefore——

LORD LOVAT

The noble Lord is proceeding to answer a Question which I have on the Paper, but which I have not yet asked. I should like to inquire if the noble Lord is in order in answering a Question which has not been put.

THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE

My Lords, we may congratulate my noble friend behind me who has moved this Motion that, directly, I think, as the result of his perseverance, we are going to get something out of the Government after Whitsuntide. I think it is a pity that we were not told that when my noble friend asked these Questions the first time. I suppose most of us will be ready to possess ourselves in patience and see what we are going to get from the promised Papers. But I would draw the attention of the Government to the fact that the late Government gave certain particulars to this House which, as regards matters at that time, gave a good deal of the information that my noble friend desires to obtain as regards matters at the present moment. Mr. Arnold-Forster, when he made certain proposals regarding the reorganisation of the Army in 1904, gave a statement showing the composition of a battalion on mobilisation, the number under and over twenty years of age, the number of Reservists required to complete war establishment, and the number in excess. That only gave the figure for one battalion, but obviously a small sum in multiplication would give it for the whole Army. I ask specifically that a similar return should be included among the Papers we are to see. The Secretary of State for War is going round the country almost conducting an election campaign in his own favour, and it is right that we should know the facts about the optimistic statements he is making.

VISCOUNT HARDINGE

I am content to withdraw my Motion and to wait and see what the Return we are promised divulges.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

LORD LOVAT

My Lords, in asking the noble Lord the Under-Secretary of State for War the Question standing in my name [...]the Paper—namely, what is the total number of combatants of all ranks in organised units available for the Central Home Defence Force after the Expeditionary Force and the garrisons of naval bases and defence areas have been deducted—I intend to adopt a rather different method of procedure. I have asked this Question on more than one occasion already and have not had a satisfactory answer. I Propose on this occasion to answer it myself.

It has been clearly stated by Mr. Haldane that the military forces of this country are divided into the Expeditionary Force and the Home Defence Force, and that the Home Defence Force is divided into two definite parts—those troops that are allocated for fixed defences and those which Mr. Haldane has stated are to form the Central Home Defence Force. Now with regard to the Expeditionary Force, we have, I think, passed out of debatable ground. It has been admitted that the Expeditionary Force will consist of 165,000 men, and Mr. Balfour laid down in 1905 that for this force would be required six divisions in certain cases for the defence of India. The Secretary of State for War has more than once stated the number of men required for the Expeditionary Force, and our friends across the water have laid it down in their military reviews that if the entente cordiale is to be worth anything at all we must have a force capable of going over to that side. Every military writer in the French Press says that if there is to be any real understanding there must be a possibility in England of six divisions, or some large number, and a Cavalry division being able, in certain circumstances, to cross the sea. Our Colonies have in no less certain terms declared that the central police force of the Empire must have a real power of mobility to go oversea. Therefore I think I may say that we are agreed that the Expeditionary Force should number something approaching six Infantry divisions and one Cavalry division —167,000 men in all.

As to the question of fixed defences, we are also well in agreement. The number was defined by Mr. Balfour as 142,000 men, plus Garrison Artillery. The figure of 168,000 has been repeatedly used throughout the country by our leading military writers as the number to defend our ports, naval arsenals, and other posts which must be held from the purely naval point of view. I am not going to say that 168,000 is the figure to-day, but I say it is not less than that number, because the limited raid theory which held the field until a year ago was definitely abandoned by Lord Crewe in November last; and, in addition, we know that in a few years time the number of ships which a certain Power will have will upset the present proportion.

THE EARL OF CREWE

I do not desire to interrupt the noble Lord, but I rather object to being quoted in that way. I wish the noble Lord would quote my words.

LORD LOVAT

I am afraid I have not the noble Earl's words, but I shall be happy to read what Mr. Haldane said, and he went further than the noble Earl. After all, the force required for the defence of our naval ports is dependent on the number of men who can be brought against us. The Secretary of State for War said on March 8 last in the House of Commons— I have never said that invasion of these islands was impossible, but there is great ambiguity about what is meant by an invasion. A small raid might take place or an invasion upon a considerably larger scale might well be possible. What you have to consider is what is the size of the invading force which the Navy can make sure of intercepting? That is a problem you cannot answer with exactitude, but investigation and consideration make it pretty plain that a force somewhere between 70,000 and 100,000 is the force you must guard against by keeping your home defence army sufficiently strong to prevent the enemy coming in larger numbers than the Navy can deal with with something like certainty. Therefore it is now admitted that invasion by a force of between 70,000 and 100,000 is possible. That brings me back to my point—namely, that as the number of possible invaders is greater the number of the fixed defence force cannot be less. The noble Duke, the Duke of Bedford, pointed out clearly the other day that a portion of the defenders of fixed places—the Special Reserve—were not better for their work than the troops they had succeeded. Consequently the number of men required may be considerably more than 168,000.

From there we go to the question of the Central Home Defence Force, and here there is agreement. May I for a moment show exactly how the train of thought on this particular subject has altered in the last few years? In 1905 we had the limited raid theory—that is to say, a raid by a force of from 5,000 to 10,000; and therefore we had no Central Home Defence Force except the defence force by commands. In 1907 Lord Roberts instituted an inquiry into this matter and brought certain evidence before the Defence Committee, and in 1908 a mobilisation plan was begun for a Central Home Defence Force. In March of this year the Secretary of State made the statement which I have read to the House—that we had to make preparations for a possible invasion by between 70,000 and 100,000 men. This great Central Defence Force then became a thing of vital necessity to the defence of this country. How many men have we to fill these three rôles—the Expeditionary Force, the garrisons of naval bases and defence areas, and the Central Home Defence Force. We require for our Expeditionary Force over seas, as Lord Lucas said, the whole of the men over twenty and the Reservists.

LORD LUCAS

I never said the whole of the men over twenty.

LORD LOVAT

Then I will take back that statement. There are so very few over twenty that it really does not matter. The noble Lord stated that in order to mobilise the home battalions you would require the whole of the Reserves, with a negligible quantity over of a few thousand. That being so, we have, for the mobolisation of the 160,000 men, the whole of the Reserve used up with the exception of these few thousand, all the men over twenty with a few exceptions, and also—this was mentioned in the noble Lord's statement the other day—in order to complete the mobilisation of the ammunition columns and the Army Service Corps, a certain number of men, not specified, from the Special Reserve. On the Expeditionary Force quitting these shores we should be left with a certain number of half-trained Regular soldiers, of whom 30,000 might be recruits under one year's service, a proportion of the Special Reserve, and a negligible quantity of really trained Reserves.

I know it is very often argued that a certain portion of our Expeditionary Force might be left at home in the event of an expedition overseas; but I am unable to follow this argument. I am told by those who have been responsible for making some of our plans for oversea campaigns that it would be inconceivable, if four divisions went abroad and received a reverse, that the other two divisions should not immediately follow; and, in case the four divisions had a success, it is impossible to think that the other two divisions would be refused to the General in command, who would naturally wish to extend the lines of communication and [...] the results of victory. There is no doubt that plans will be made by the General Staff to have the whole of the men who are earmarked [...]the Expeditionary Force ready to be sent abroad if required, and it is no use for Ministers to tell us that only four divisions will be sent out of the country.

The value of the curiously mixed mass of men to whom I referred a moment ago and who would be left over I put down as not more than 70,000 fighting men. They will have no junior officers, and the men, according to the Duke of Bedford, will not be as efficient as the old Militia. They will be jammed together in cadres of which they have no knowledge; they will be serving, many of them, in works of which they have no previous knowledge, and I think if there is one thing which the South African war proved to the hilt it was that mixed details who do not know their officers are not more than a third the value of other troops. As I say, I put down the total value of these men as not more than 70,000 fighting men. That means that we must have another 100,000 men to fill the fixed defences. Where are these to be obtained? They will obviously have to be found from the Territorial Army. To-day the Territorial Army is 260,000 strong. In the near future we may have 313,000 in that force, but this will not mean 313,000 men capable of taking the field. A large number of them will never have shot their musketry course, and it would not be possible to take them out against trained Continental soldiers over twenty years of age and of two years service.

There is also the point that the whole of our ammunition column and other subsidiary corps are not even armed with a rifle. You must, therefore, make an allowance of 250 per 1,000—in other words, you must deduct one-fourth before beginning to count the fighting strength. I think from 200,000 to 220,000 men would be the outside number of really efficient men. That gives you 100,000 for the fixed de- fences and 120,000 to take into the field as the great Central Defence Force. These men might have to face 100,000 trained conscripts. Are you, therefore, not asking the Territorial Army to carry out work which they are incapable of doing? I think one has a right, as a Territorial officer, to put this question. I do not think it is fair to ask troops to do work which they certainly could not do. Therefore I make this protest. I have been driven to bring up this question by the Secretary of State going about the country making absurdly optimistic speeches about the state of our defences.

The statement of the number of men available for the defence of the country is greatly exaggerated, because the ammunition corps and the Army Service Corps are not only not trained to the use of the rifle, but do not possess rifles; whereas it is laid down in the latest German regulations that the men in these branches are to be thoroughly trained in their arms in every particular and made efficient as soldiers, as upon them will largely devolve the duties of adequately protecting convoys. I take another point. Lord Roberts stated, in your Lordships' House, that the Central Defence Force would not exceed 40,000 men, and the Secretary of state, referring to that statement, said— Lord Roberts, in the House of Lords, thought 200,000 men would be locked up in the defence of ports, and only 40,000 would be available. That was really absurd, because the men relegated for port defence, if their number were 200,000, would still be available to draw upon. We could not afford the destruction of one single Dreadnought slip anywhere. How is it possible, therefore, to draw upon the men who are responsible for these local defences? How could they be taken sway and sent to the South of Scotland, it may be, to join the great Central Defence Force? The statement is not less than absurd. I feel that this matter is one which it is very necessary for us to consider at the present time. There are many here who wish for the continuance of the voluntary system and who wish to get the full amount out of the magnificent work Mr. Haldane has done in organising our forces but who are driven into the other camp because Mr. Haldane claims at the same time to have provided the men and the training. I beg to ask the Question standing in my name.

LORD LUCAS

My Lords, the noble Lord has asked a Question which he knew perfectly well at the time he put it down was one which it was impossible for the Government to answer. The Question goes to the very heart of the whole of our mobilisation arrangements, and would be impossible to answer without practically explaining in detail what those arrangements are. Therefore, the noble Lord knew the answer would be a definite refusal to give any information on the subject. Nor am I going to follow Lord Lovat into the fantastic figures which he has given to-night. I cannot see what good raising this question and making speeches of this kind can possibly do. These figures, which the Government are debarred from answering, and debarred from correcting where they are wrong, as they are in most cases, can only create a false impression upon the minds of people who read these debates in the newspapers. If such a false impression has been created, it has been created by noble Lords opposite, and it is beyond the power of the Government to correct it, for we do not intend to give the information.

THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE

I think it right to point out that the Under-Secretary has used extremely strong language, and has applied the word "fantastic" to the figures given by Lord Lovat.

LORD LUCAS

Hear, hear.

THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE

Let us accept that word, for the figures were all taken out of the speeches of the Government.