HL Deb 17 May 1909 vol 1 cc897-921
THE EARL OF WEMYSS

My Lords, I rise to move to resolve, "That in the opinion of this House the Territorial Force as at present established totally fails to give practical effect to the Resolution unanimously agreed to by the Lords on July 10,1905; and this House is further of opinion that immediate steps should be taken by the Government to render our land defences at all times such that, in the words of the said Resolution, 'no nation would ever attempt in any form a hostile landing on our shores.'"

I shall not, in submitting this Motion, occupy very much of your Lordships' time, as I do not feel up to making a speech. I wish, in the first place, to read to your Lordships the Resolution agreed to by this House four years ago, as it has a material bearing on the whole question of national defence. The Resolution was adopted on July 10, 1905, and runs as follows:— That it would be a danger to the realm and limit the power of the Navy as an offensive force in war to trust to it alone for home defence; and inasmuch as it is admitted that the Navy cannot guarantee us against so-called hostile 'raids,' it is the more needful that our land defences should at all times be such that no nation would ever attempt, in any form, a hostile landing on our shores. I hold that to be a very valuable asset in our defensive policy. It was very valuable at the time, for your Lordships will recollect that the blue water was then in full flood. Even the Prime Minister plunged into it and told the nation, not only as Prime Minister, but also as head of the Defence Committee, that all that we need be afraid of were raids. The Navy, he said, could defend us against anything short of raids. Therefore the commonsense view of the matter is that it is wise to avoid the element of chance. But there is this other value in the Resolution, that both sides of the House agreed to it. It was accepted without a word of opposition by both Front Benches, and it therefore amounts to an I.O.U. on their part that they should do their best to bring about such a state of things that no nation would ever dream of a hostile landing on our shores.

Now what has been done by Government since this Resolution was adopted? They certainly have done a good deal, for they have revolutionised our whole system of national defence. The Militia has been abolished, and the Volunteers as such have ceased to exist. I know that the Secretary of State for War has said that we Volunteers did not take the matter seriously, that we looked upon it more as a club than anything else. He is welcome to say that. At any rate, the Volunteers are gone. In the place of the Militia we now have the Special Reserve, and in place of the Volunteers we have the Territorial Force. How has this revolution been brought about? It has been brought about in the main by the combined action of the two Front Benches, but also through the colonels of Militia themselves not protesting against the Militia Force, whose name is written on nearly every page of British history, being swept away. If they had put their foot down the Government would have been obliged to let the force alone, and you would still have had the old historic Militia. But that was not done, and the Militia has disappeared.

Let us see what the country has secured in the place of the Militia. The Special Reserve differs toto cœlo from the old Militia. The old Militia was a force specially for home defence, and it served abroad voluntarily. The Special Reserve is not for home defence; it is for over-sea work. The Special Reservist is bound by the terms of his enlistment to serve abroad if required. There is an interesting passage in one of Mr. Haldane's thousand and one speeches—I do not know which—in which he refers to over-sea enlistment. This is what he says— An over-sea Army can only be got on a voluntary basis, and must be recruited from men moved by enthusiasm—men with the virgin mind from a military point of view—which is attracted by a sense of mystery, and would be somewhat damped by preliminary compulsory training. What this exactly means I do not know.

I pass to the question of the Territorials, who, as I have said, stand in the place of the Volunteers. They are specially for home defence. On April 26 I asked the noble Lord the Under-Secretary of State for War some questions, with a view to this Motion, as to the state of the Territorial Force on April 1. Why Mr. Haldane chose April 1 for its birthday I never understood; but this is what the noble Lord the Under-Secretary stated was the condition of the Territorial Force on its natal clay. He said that they had 79 per cent. of the number of officers required, and 84 per cent. of the men; that 107,857 men had engaged to serve for one year only in 1908, and that on April 1 last 56,238 of them had re-engaged for one year or more. should be interesting to know how many of the remaining men have signified their intention of re-engaging? The noble Lord also gave us on the same occasion the important information that out of the total number on the strength of the Territorial Force over 62,000 were under 20 years of age, and that the limit of age for men is 17 and for boys 14. That was the state of affairs when my noble friend spoke on April 26. The numbers may have increased since then. My noble friend will tell us.

I am willing, in dealing with this question, to assume that the 313,000 men have been obtained, that they are all 25 years of age or over, that each man can hit a bull's-eye at 2,000 yards, and that they are drilled as perfectly as any soldier on the Continent. Notwithstanding all that, I maintain that what I say in this Resolution is right, and that they would even then be of practically no avail. I mean that their number is wholly insufficient when it is considered what they would have to do. Read the Duke of Wellington's letter to Sir John Burgoyne written sixty years ago. What does he show? That of your force for home defence you require half in Ireland, that you require 10,000 in the Channel Islands, and 10,000 at every fortified naval base. How many will that leave of your 313,000 men? We have it on the high authority of Lord Roberts, in the patriotic and noble speech that he made in your Lordships' House in December last, that the Territorial Force is absolutely inadequate in numbers for the purposes which it professes to serve and that you require a force of at least 1,000,000.

I had hoped that the noble and gallant Field-Marshal would have been in his place this evening, but it is his golden wedding, and I am sure your Lordships and everyone in the country will agree in the hope that Lord and Lady Roberts may pass many more happy years together. I saw Lord Roberts last Saturday and I asked him, as he could not be present to-day, to embody his views in a letter; and my main object in speaking to-night is to read to the House the views on this subject of the greatest military authority in this country. Lord Roberts writes— I much regret I cannot be in the House of Lords on Monday next to speak in support of the Resolution you are bringing forward. I therefore write these few lines to tell you that I am entirely in accord with you as to the necessity for im- mediate steps being taken to ensure the security of our land defences. The extraordinary apathy with which the momentous question of home defence is viewed by both Houses of Parliament, and, as a consequence, by the country generally, is not only lamentable but difficult to understand. If the lessons we learnt during the war in South Africa had been taken to heart, some attention would have been paid to the earnest recommendation of the Elgin Commission that in order to provide a sufficient Reserve for carrying on war 'certain powers of expansion' were needed 'outside the limit of the Regular Forces of the Crown.' We have, in addition, the important conclusion arrived at by the Norfolk Commission, 'that a home defence army, capable, in the absence of the whole of the greater portion of the Regular Forces, of protecting this country against invasion, can be raised and maintained only on the principle that it is the duty of every citizen of military age and sound physique to be trained for the national defence, and to take part in it should emergency arise.' It really would seem as if we, as a nation, imagine that we are a peculiar people, exempt from the possibility of war, its dangers, and its consequences; yet less than a year ago Lord Cromer stated in the House of Lords his conviction that there is a possibility of war, and a war of a serious character, at no very distant period. How are we prepared to meet such a crisis? Are you prepared to meet such a crisis? I know that you hive what is called organisation, but your organisation, excellent and perfect though it may be, is like Mrs. Glasse's recipe for hare soup. The first thing is to catch your hare. Have you got your hare? You have not a seventh part of the hare Lord Roberts says you ought to have. Lord Roberts proceeds— We have no Army to speak of, and we have no organisation by which we could replace the losses which must inevitably occur during the first few months of any war on a large scale. On July 10, 1905, the day on which the resolution was carried to which you propose to refer, I said that 'I have no hesitation in stating that our armed forces as a body are as absolutely unfitted and unprepared for war as they were in 1899–1900.' Close upon four years have passed since then, and I have no hesitation in reaffirming my conviction. Moreover, as your Motion deals mainly with the supremely important matter of home defence, I would add that if the expeditionary force, or even the first four divisions of that force, were sent abroad, our land forces are, in my judgment, in such a deplorable condition that we should be at the mercy of any invader who could land any number approaching to 100,000 men on these shores. That is Lord Roberts's opinion, and I am confident that he is supported in that opinion by every one of his brother Field-Marshals and by every soldier of note in this country. Yet we remain in this state, and apparently do nothing. It was with a view of calling attention to this state of things that I placed my Motion on the Paper. Lord Roberts's letter says all that is necessary to be said on the subject, and I will not trespass further on your Lordships' time.

What is the first duty of the Government to the State? It is to make the State safe, to make the Empire safe, and to make our hearths and homes safe. How are you performing that duty? Surely you do not suppose that all these Dreadnoughts in course of construction abroad are being built entirely for defence purposes? The question of invasion enters very largely into the foreign shipbuilding. As a very old man, who may never speak again in this House, I say it is the duty of the two Front Benches to put the safety of the Empire before every other consideration, and to act together to see what can be done. They laid their heads together destructively; I ask them to lay their heads together constructively. If you had the courage, the commonsense, and the justice to the country to do what ought to be done, which is to bring about such a state of things—never mind how it is done—that no nation would ever dream of a hostile landing upon these shores, what would be the first effect? The first effect would be that you would stop rival foreign shipbuilding. I beg to move the Resolution which stands in my name.

Moved, to resolve, "That in the opinion of this House the Territorial Force as at present established totally fails to give practical effect to the Resolution unanimously agreed to by the Lords on July 10, 1905; and this House is further of opinion that immediate steps should be taken by the Government to render our land defences at all times such that, in the words of the said Resolution, 'no nation would ever attempt in any form a hostile landing on our shores.'" —(The Earl of Wemyss.)

THE EARL OF ERROLL

My Lords, I wish to say a word or two in support of what has fallen from the noble Earl who has just sat down. I should like to point out in the first instance, that the whole problem, as I see it, of national defence has entirely altered since the speeches of the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Prime Minister on March 16 in another place. If those speeches did not come as a bombshell, which might seem an exaggerated form of speech, I venture to say that they came as a very unpleasant surprise to all Englishmen. Prior to those speeches our defensive measures were based entirely on the assumption of our absolute supremacy at sea; but in consequence of the admissions of the Government that within the next three or four years the relative strength of the British and German navies would approach much more nearly to equality, I venture to say that the conditions of the defences of this country have entirely changed. Precautions which we considered sufficient as long as the two-Power standard was maintained are no longer, I contend, adequate; and I venture to think it has become essential that we should have a highly-trained and efficient land force as well as a highly-trained and efficient Navy.

The Territorial Force as now organised does not, I think, supply this want either in numbers, in training, or in organisation. They have no horses with which to mobilise, no stores, and no reserve ammunition. If they ever reached their number of 313,000, I venture to say they would be absolutely insufficient, as it would take 200,000 men, by a calculation which Lord Roberts, I think it was, gave us, to garrison the naval bases. With regard to horses, I would like to give as an illustration the case of the London Yeomanry. There are three regiments horsed by Mr. Tilling, and I believe it is one of his conditions that these regiments should not go out at the same time, because he has only enough horses ready to mount one regiment out of the three. What, my Lords, would the result be if, in the case of a sudden surprise, the Yeomanry were ordered quickly down to the coast for reconnaissance? One regiment would be able to ride; the second, I suppose, would go down in motors or taxi-cabs, and when they got there would have to do their scouting on foot; and the third regiment would probably have to walk all the way.

I am not saying this in any spirit of hostility to the Territorial Force. On the contrary, I have the highest admiration for the spirit in which the men have come forward voluntarily and cheerfully to do the work which should be incumbent on all men of suitable age and suitable physique. The Territorial Force, if they ever have to fight, will have to fight the very best picked troops of the Continent, and I do not think that anybody would maintain that as at present organised they are equal to the task. As long as the Regulars are at home I admit that there is no fear of invasion, but when the Expeditionary Force goes out of the country I think that danger may arise. Your Lordships probably may remember that towards the close of the Boer War this country was very nearly entirely denuded of Regular troops. If my memory serves me, there were something like 17,000 troops only in this country, and most of those were recruits in the depôts. There were no guns at all, until we bought six batteries, I think, from Germany. I leave it to your Lordships to consider whether in the future that source of supply will be open to us. These conditions may recur in the future, but with this very important difference, that at that time we had the absolute command of the sea. Our position at sea at that time was so assured that it was absolutely unassailable and unchallenged.

In case of foreign complications, it seems to me that one of two things would happen. Either public opinion in this country would be so strong that the Expeditionary Force would not be allowed to go abroad, or, if it did go abroad, the country would be in great danger from the want of numbers and training of the troops that were left behind. We could not rely on the Army Reserve to be of any assistance, because it is impossible for the Expeditionary Force to mobilise without absorbing the whole of the Army Reserve. The question as it appears to me then is, When is an Expeditionary Force not an Expeditionary Force? and the answer seems to be, When the sense of insecurity in the country would not allow it to go on expeditions. India might be urgently needing troops, or a force might be wanted to act in conjunction with the Fleet and to carry a war into an enemy's country. That is the raison d'étre of an expeditionary force. I think that the suggestion of training the Territorial Force for six months after war has been declared is very dangerous. It means, in the first instance, keeping the Expeditionary Force at home when everything might depend on its being elsewhere. It must be remembered that when the Expeditionary Force had left the safety of the country would then be entrusted to the Territorial Force, who are 2,500 short in their officers, and many of whose officers have a very small amount of military experience. In addition, the noble Lord has told us that of the force 62,000 are under twenty years of age. It is for these reasons that I venture to support the Motion of the noble Earl.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (LORD LUCAS)

My Lords, I am in some difficulty in replying to this Motion, for the reason that it reproduces the discussion which took place in your Lordships' House last session, inaugurated by Lord Roberts, whose absence to-day I should like to join in deploring, although the cause is one on which he is to be entirely congratulated. On that occasion my noble friend Lord Crewe dealt exhaustively with the proposals then put forward, and which, of course, had not come to his notice then for the first time; and he stated the views of the Government regarding the opinions as to the possibility of invasion which Lord Roberts then laid down. I do not think it is for me to repeat the views Lord Crewe then expressed. I do not propose, therefore, to take up your Lordships' time by discussing how far our preparations for home defence are adequate against invasion on the scale then suggested and repeated by the mover of the Motion now before the House and by the noble Earl who spoke last.

It is, of course, impossible for me to detail what the exact nature of our mobilisation plans is. It has been the invariable rule that mobilisation plans should never be disclosed in detail, and I do not propose to depart from that rule. But I would point out that this scheme was not produced by Mr. Haldane until he had been for a considerable time at the War Office. Mr. Haldane had at his disposal what no other Secretary of State for War in this country has ever had at his disposal—a General Staff to assist him in forming his plan. The fact that there was a General Staff, composed of some of the most capable officers in the British Army, enabled the Secretary of State to go into this plan in the most detailed manner, to consider it from every point of view, to consider the possibility of invasion and how far his plans would meet any possible invasion: and that was done in a far more minute and thoroughgoing manner than ever before in the history of the British Army. On that basis our schemes for home defence have been drawn up. They have satisfied, not only the General Staff and the Army Council, but they have also satisfied the Committee of Imperial Defence. It would be impos- sible for me to reopen that whole question, and I do not propose to take up your Lordships' time by doing so.

There is, however, one direction in which the situation has considerably changed since the discussion of last autumn. I refer to the condition of the Territorial Force as it was then and its condition now. As your Lordships are doubtless aware, the Territorial Force has improved both in size and in efficiency at an astonishing rate. The numbers have increased very largely lately. Our latest return gives the number at 254,000 men, and, with officers, about 263,000. That makes it in numbers far more formidable than was the old Force, and owing to the extraordinarily keen way in which the men have undertaken their duties during the winter it has become a far more efficient Force. It is now emerging as a Force, quite up to the standard of efficiency that we expected of it. In fact, I may say that it is far more efficient than we ever had any reason to expect it would be. With regard to the number of one-year men—a question which was considered to be one of danger to the Territorial Force—I am glad to say that our returns show that we are in no danger of losing any considerable number of these men. They are re-engaging in very large numbers. April was, of course, the month during which the term of most of these one-year men expired, and we had reason to believe that the total strength of the Force would drop; but during the past month, I am glad to say, this has not been the case. So few one-year men have gone out that they have been roughly counterbalanced by the number of recruits who have come in. That shows that the danger of the Force being very much depleted by the loss of one-year men was exaggerated.

The noble Earl, Lord Erroll,

spoke of the difficulty of mobilising the Territorial Force. Mobilisation is a difficult thing. It cannot be worked out in a hurry. We are engaged at the present moment working out the mobilisation requirements of the Territorial Force, and we hope that we shall be able to say before a very long time has elapsed that the Territorial Force is capable of being mobilised immediately. One of the most important things, as the noble Earl said, is the question of horses. The number of horses available for training purposes—that is to say, the number you can hire for 5l. for the fortnight—is one thing, and the number of horses available in the country is another and a very different thing; and the fact that during peace time two or three different regiments of Yeomanry train with the same horses does not in the least imply that those regiments will be expected to ride the same horses or no horses at all on mobilisation.

LORD SALTOUN

An untrained horse for a cavalryman is absolutely useless.

LORD LUCAS

The noble Lord knows what is done in the Yeomanry every year. The great majority of horses go into camp absolutely untrained, and if the men upon them know how to ride they learn their duties in a comparatively short space of time. An untrained horse for cavalry purposes is a less serious drawback than is supposed. We are making rapid progress with the horse census, which is being taken for the purpose of enabling us to lay our hands on all the required horses upon mobilisation. The census has only been taken in a certain number of counties up to the present, but we have good grounds for stating that there will be no difficulty when the time comes in securing sufficient horses for mobilising the whole of the Territorial Force, as well as the Regular Army.

As to the number of men under twenty, I do not think that is a consideration of the first importance when you remember that this is a question of home defence. The age of twenty was laid down as the age under which a soldier should not be sent to India because of the danger to his health, and it has been taken as the age below which a soldier should not be sent on foreign service in any dangerous climate. But there is nothing whatever to prevent a man being a perfectly efficient soldier for war in this country under the age of twenty. Therefore the fact that there are a large number of men in the Territorial Force under the age of twenty does not necessarily impair its efficiency.

THE EARL OF ERROLL

May I inform the noble Lord that in foreign Armies they take no one at all under twenty?

LORD LUCAS

If your Lordships adopt the Resolution which has been moved by the noble Earl it will be inconsistent with the action of your Lordships' House two years ago in passing the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act. On that occasion the whole of the schemes of the Government with regard to the Army were before your Lordships. Our proposals with regard to the Regular Army, the reductions that have taken place in the Regular Army, the proposal to convert the Militia into the Special Reserve, and the use we were going to make of it—all those matters, as well as the composition of the new Territorial Force, were before your Lordships; and, as far as we can tell at the present time, the reorganisations that have taken place have been carried out with success. The predictions of failure with regard to the Special Reserve and the Territorial Force have not been fulfilled. What we believed at the time would take place if our schemes were carried through has occurred; and therefore, having approved the reorganisation and having allowed the Territorial and Reserve Forces Bill to become law, it would be inconsistent on the part of your Lordships to adopt a Resolution such as that on the Paper.

LORD LOVAT

My Lords, I rise to make two protests, one as a Member of your Lordships' House and the other as a member of the Territorial Force. I protest, in the first place, against the charge of inconsistency, on which we have been ridden off on several occasions already. Surely because this House passed the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act it is not responsible for all the follies committed in the name of that measure. The inconsistency is entirely on the other side. We were definitely promised certain things, but we have not got them. We were definitely promised that we should have our mobilisation arrangements immediately. I ask, What mobilisation scheme for the Territorial Force has yet been arranged? I think the greatest credit is due to Mr. Haldane for the work he has done in giving us a thorough organisation of the British Army. This is undoubtedly an advance on anything done before. But the point is that Mr. Haldane has not got sufficient men, nor men with adequate training, to face the duties that may have to be performed in the event of invasion. I protest against the idea that the new Territorials are so much better than the Auxiliaries used to be. Take the Yeomanry. The Yeomanry as units have not improved because the training in many commands has been reduced while the officers' schools have been abolished. This is a direct violation of what is in the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act and of what we were promised. Then take the question of musketry. The new musketry regulations are such that a man has only to fire at a miniature target, or in a thirty-yards range, or on the open range on three occasions to figure in the Parliamentary sense as an efficient shot. This is in order to pretend that you have a larger number of efficient defenders of the country than you really have; and to state that these men are more efficient than the old Auxiliaries is to state a thing which is not necessarily true. The preliminary mobilisation arrangements are by no means completed. I do not say that we have not made an advance, but to say, as has been stated in the country by Mr. Haldane, that we have advanced to anything near thorough mobilisation, and that we are in any sense ready to take the field as a mobilised Army to-day, is to state what is not absolutely a matter of fact.

LORD RIBBLESDALE

My Lords, before my noble friend the Leader of the House replies I should like to say a word on the question of horses. If I heard the noble Lord the Under-Secretary aright, we must take it that he is perfectly satisfied that on mobilisation there would be plenty of horses available and sufficient to meet the wastage which would have to be provided for. I am also willing to take it from the noble Lord that it does not matter very much whether the horses are trained or untrained. The old exercises have been done away with, and where horses have only to do the duties of scouting, or to cover an advancing Army or things of that sort in an enclosed country where they must more or less stick to roads or by-roads, the soldier, it he can ride at all, can probably get along as well on a horse that had not been through the riding school as on one that had. But though horses need not be trained in any sense in the old idea, they must, at all events, be in condition. It is no us taking one-year old or two-year old horses, or horses off grass, to do cavalry work. The noble Lord told us that some sort of registration was taking place—I believe in compliance with an undertaking given in your Lordships' House at the instance of Lord Lovat—and that we should very soon know what number of horses were available. We are told that, by some law of the Medes and Persians, nothing is ever to be revealed concerning mobilisation. I do not know whether that is right or not; but I should like to ask the noble Earl the Leader of the House whether the secrecy regarding mobilisation is to apply to the question of horse supply. I take some interest in the question of horses, and I was asked by the remount authorities to endeavour in my part of the country to open up a supply of Government horses, but if we are only to be told that when the time comes sufficient horses will be forthcoming the interest of people who are trying to do their best in the matter will disappear. I think we should be told what is the number of horses really available.

VISCOUNT MIDLETON

My Lords, as my noble friend Lord Lansdowne is unfortunately still unable to be present, perhaps I may be allowed to say a few words as to the feeling on this Bench regarding the noble Earl's Motion. I confess that many of us have felt sorry that it has been necessary at so early a moment to review the position since the passing of the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act. I believe there is hardly a man on this side of the House who has not done something to press forward the operation of the Act in his own county, and I hope we shall all continue to take that step. I feel that a premature condemnation of the Territorial Force is greatly to be deprecated; on the other hand, I confess that the attitude which the noble Lord the Under-Secretary feels himself constrained to take on these occasions makes it extremely difficult for us to give that blind confidence to the Government which he requires from us.

This is the second or even the third occasion on which the noble Lord has excused himself, I admit in the most courteous manner, from giving us information, for which it seems to us reasonable to ask, and he has done so on the ground that to give the information would be to divulge mobilisation plans. I hope I may be pardoned if, having had to deal with this question in different capacities for more than twelve years in another place, I ask your Lordships to consider for a moment whether the information which is refused is secret mobilisation information or whether it is not information which has been repeatedly given by successive Governments to successive Parliaments. Take, for instance, the question of numbers. The numbers are given in the Estimates. All the strengths are known, and are given in answer to Questions. The organisation of the Field Force has been even laid down by Act of Parliament, I believe; at all events, it has been laid on the Table. We merely ask, after the Regular troops have gone abroad, what organised force will remain in this country. That is a fair question. The information has been repeatedly given before, even in We do not ask for any secret information as to where those forces are to be employed. We do not ask what Ireland will absorb, we do not ask what time it will take to mobilise them, we do not ask anything which has been understood hitherto to be secret information on mobilisation. But we do ask for plain facts.

I am loath to go further into this matter because to-morrow evening the Duke of Bedford has a Motion on the Paper which it is our desire to press seriously on the attention of His Majesty's Government. When the noble Lord asks us to place our whole faith and confidence in the ipse dixit of the Secretary of State, and when he tells us that all that has to do with mobilisation and with defence has been the subject of minute and thorough-going investigation and that the General Staff have satisfied themselves, and also, I think he said, have satisfied the Government, that they have a sufficient force to resist any possible invasion, I would remind him that two or three years ago the Secretary of State stated, I think in the House of Commons, that he desired a Territorial Force of 900,000 men.

LORD LUCAS

That statement is not correct. What my right hon. friend said was this —that he was setting up machinery for a Territorial force which could, if necessary, provide 300,000 or 600,000 or 900,000 men, but he never said that we required in this country 900,000 men.

THE EARL OF WEMYSS

He prayed for them.

LORD LUCAS

No.

VISCOUNT MIDLETON

I accept the noble Lord's statement that the Secretary of State did not ask for 900,000 men, but we known that Lord Roberts has expressed a strong opinion that 1,000,000 were necessary. I am not endorsing that or criticising it, but we have yet to hear from the Government what their opinion is upon that statement by the first military authority in your Lordships' House. We have never heard from the Government since that opinion was given whether they have seen any necessity to revise their Estimates, and I cannot help pressing on the Government this point. When they ask us to accept military opinion, which they do not quote, in opposition to the strong military view which has been quoted here with all the authority of Lord Roberts, I cannot help pointing out that on half a dozen different occasions within the last three years we have been assured that the opinion of the military advisers of the Secretary of State was in one direction, yet that opinion has since been revised.

Take the question of the Artillery. In 1906 the Government announced that, contrary to all the opinion which had been given in and outside this House, they were going to reduce forty-two batteries of Royal Artillery and to substitute for them a Militia Artillery—persons trained, as the Secretary of State phrased it, on a Militia basis, who were to fill up the larger portion of those forty-two batteries. We protested by every means in our power against that change. Your Lordships were asked over and over again to discuss it, and, speaking in this House this time last year, I implored the Government to reconsider the position. The noble Lord met me by telling me that the military advisers of the Government we absolutely satisfied with these forty-two batteries on a Militia basis. We pressed and pressed again, and obtained a promise that the Artillerymen should not be disbanded until the men trained on a Militia basis were ready to succeed them; but we were told that it was unnecessary from a military standpoint to retain those batteries. Now, after this lapse of time, the Secretary of State comes forward this year and says he is satisfied that it is necessary to reverse that policy, and to keep the forty-two batteries on a Regular basis. We have yet to learn whether in that the Secretary of State was acting upon military opinion.

But what are we to the link of that nebulous body the Army Council, who gave such strong support to the Secretary of State in reference to this reduction, which we believed to be fatal and which was against the opinion of Lord Roberts, Lord Wolseley, Sir Evelyn Wood, and every soldier who had been at the War Office—what are we to think of the Army Council if, having given that advice, they now come forward and say that it is necessary to overthrow the opinion they so confidently expressed for the space of three years? I have given that solitary instance, though I could give others, why I do feel that the Government are expecting your Lordships to exercise a degree of self-restraint and a degree of confidence which is unusual when they ask us to be content with the bare assurance that the General Staff are satisfied. I therefore feel that we are in a very grave difficulty in regard to the Motion of the noble Earl.

We feel most strongly that it is necessary that there should be further inquiry into this matter. We believe that the state of the Special Reserve and the want of officers should be the subject of further inquiry, and that it is impossible to allow the matter to rest where it is at present. We press that view on the Government. If they tell us that a Royal Commission would be unacceptable, as I believe is the case, we would not press for it. We would not even press for a public inquiry. There is at this moment a private inquiry by the Defence Committee going on into the condition of the new construction for the Navy. I urge the Government to consider whether they cannot in some way allay the doubt and uncertainty which exist on these Benches and throughout the country. I have no desire to impede the Secretary of State's efforts to improve the Territorial Force, but we want to know the military value of what would remain in this country after the Regular Army had been shipped to take part in operations abroad. The mere fact that the War Office say they are satisfied is not, I submit, a sufficient argument to advance. What I urge upon the Government is this, that they should allow some outside military opinion to be brought to bear. You have men in this country who may he past the age for service but who are not past the age to enable them to give a valuable opinion. You would not find the slightest difficulty in calling to the aid of the Secretary of State three men of the highest rank, who would tell you whether what is left behind is of military value and could be placed in the forefront in an engagement against picked Continental troops. Therefore we wish to give the Government further time to consider the matter, and we would hope that the noble Earl would see his way not to divide the House on his Motion. I confess that, personally, I should feel great difficulty in going into the Lobby against him. On the other hand, I think it is a most serious thing for your Lordships to declare, as the noble Earl asks, that the Territorial Force as at present established fails to give practical effect to the Resolution of July 10, 1905—that is, in other words, to say that our position is absolutely unsafe.

THE EARL OF WEMYSS

Hear, hear.

VISCOUNT MIDLETON

That we should be unwilling to say so long as it is in the power of the Government to satisfy us on this absolutely vital matter by giving us an inquiry.

THE LORD PRIVY SEAL AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (THE EARL OF CREWE)

My Lords, it is not altogether an easy task to reply on this debate, because, as always seems to happen when the Army is under discussion, the criticism levelled at His Majesty's Government, although unusually animated, is also unusually elusive. Every noble Lord who has taken part in this debate has apparently spoken from a different standpoint, and if the secrets of their hearts could be revealed I think each wants something different. I am particularly sorry that my noble and gallant friend Lord Roberts, who, of course, speaks with such unrivalled authority, is not here to-night; and I desire to join in the congratulations which have been expressed towards him on the happy event of his golden wedding, for I think we are all moved and touched when we think of the happy domestic life of one who has given so many years to the service of the country.

I say that the criticism was elusive because the noble Earl who moved the Motion devoted himself to the shortcomings of the Territorial Army, whereas the noble Viscount who has just sat down said very little about the Territorial Army, but spoke almost entirely to the Motion of the noble Duke which is on the Paper for to-morrow. He asked for a military inquiry, saying, very truly, that there are many eminent men who might conduct an inquiry and who are not beyond the age of criticism. With that I heartily concur, because nobody, I think, ever passes the age at which criticism is possible. But I do not propose to touch on that matter now, if the noble Viscount will excuse me, because it is really relevant to the Motion which appears on the Paper for debate to-morrow.

We have been told that the Territorial Force is insufficient. The noble Earl .said that, even though it reached its full complement of 315,000 men, and they were all active men of twenty-five years of age, yet he would not consider that the country was safe; and he quoted the opinion of the noble and gallant Field-Marshal, Lord Roberts, as to the necessity of there being 1,000,000 men. The noble Viscount has complained that we have never expressed any opinion as to the necessity of 1,000,000 men. We have never been told, when 1,000,000 is spoken of, what the 1,000,000 is to consist of. Is it to be an Army of 1,000,000 with a full complement of cavalry and guns? How many batteries of artillery go to an army of 1,000,000 men? I suppose something approaching 500 batteries. Is that what is intended? Or did Lord Roberts mean, what my impression is that he meant, that there should be at one time in the country 1,000,000 men who had undergone some form of military training in some period of their youth? Lord Roberts has always taken up the line that he is not in favour of any kind of compulsory service, but that he is in favour of compulsory military training—that is to say, I conclude, that at some period every man in the country, or, at any rate, a very large proportion of the men in the country, should have gone through some kind of training, always, I take it, purely infantry training, and that, therefore, there would be a very large reserve for any national emergency of men who had had some sort of training to arms.

VISCOUNT MIDLETON

I do not like to interrupt my noble friend, but I think the opinion Lord Roberts expressed was that there should be 1,000,000 men with some kind of military organisation, not merely training—men who were capable of being used in the military organisation at the shortest notice.

THE EARL OF CREWE

If that is to include an Army of 1,000,000 men on the Continental model—I do not say neces- sarily with the full Continental training, but an Army divisible into Army corps and divisions, with full proportions of cavalry, mounted infantry, and guns—if that is the programme, then you are embarking on a very large proposition indeed. What does that mean? If that is what you are to have, it means that we are the most unfortunately situated country, not merely in Europe, but in the world. We are bound by our insular position, which, under those circumstances, seems to be an unmitigated misfortune, to maintain a Navy upon a standard of the necessity of which we are, I understand, all agreed. In addition we are obliged to have what no other country, in the world has—a very highly-trained Expeditionary Army, more highly trained, I suppose, than any troops in the world; and then, in addition to that, we are to have all the youth of the country under arms to resist invasion. We have always believed until now that our insular position was an advantage to us. All the poets of past ages and all the politicians of past ages have dwelt with pride and also with great comfort to themselves upon our insular position; but now it appears to be, as I say, an almost unmitigated misfortune if it compels us to maintain a Navy on a scale which nobody else does, and at the same time to maintain an Army which is to be, at any rate to a very great extent, modelled on that of the great military Powers of Europe.

Does that really represent the position, and are we to understand that that is the position which noble Lords opposite take up? If it is so, I want to know what has happened within the last few years to create such a complete change of attitude and of policy from that which they followed when they were in office. We never had an inkling of anything of the kind. The party of noble Lords opposite went on with various schemes for remodelling and, as, of course, they believed, improving the Regular Forces. They never thought out, so far as I know, any special scheme of home defence. They did their best, no doubt, to maintain the efficiency of the Militia, the Yeomanry, and the Volunteers. But it is very hard to believe—I should be very unwilling to believe it of them myself —that they were so entirely devoid of foresight as not to have contemplated the possibility, supposing they believe it now to be necessary, of this stupendous change in our system of national defence. Reference is made to 100,000 and even 300,000 men landing on these shores. I quite admit that our organisation is not based on the possibility of an invasion of that kind, and certainly not so when the Expeditionary Army is withdrawn. Therefore if that risk does exist—a risk which the noble Earl will admit we do not believe to be a real risk—it is certainly true that we are working on the wrong lines, and, whatever the sacrifice, we should have to go to something entirely different.

THE EARL OF WEMYSS

Hear, hear. The sooner you do it the better.

THE EARL of CREWE

Then the noble Lord, Lord Lovat, and also the noble Viscount, Lord Midleton, spoke on the question of mobilisation. I am certain that it is not the desire of my right hon. friend or of my noble friend behind me to keep back from the House or from the country any facts and figures of a kind which have usually been publicly stated, and which can be so stated without detriment to the public interests. What my right hon. friend does not want to do is to give figures which, although they might seem harmless to give in themselves, would yet tell more than he thinks ought to be told in the public interest of his mobilisation schemes. I cannot help thinking that there must be some misunderstanding on this point between noble Lords opposite and my noble friend behind me, and I cannot help also thinking that if they would communicate with the Department which my noble friend represents here, they would have very good reasons given to them—satisfactory reasons—why certain information for which they ask cannot be given. I am sure that my noble friend will go as far as possible to meet them in giving such information as can properly be given.

My noble friend behind me asked about horses. He, if he will allow me to say so, put the matter very well when he pointed out that for the purposes of the Territorial Army horses if in reasonable good condition could be used without any very great amount of riding school or previous training. I remember very well when I was in the Yeomanry myself, and when practically the whole business consisted of parade movements, it was astonishing to see how, even within the compass of a week or ten days, quite green horses would take their places in the line and become like seasoned troopers. But now that parade movements have given way to a more useful form of drill the lessons to be learned by horses are fewer. I am quite certain that my noble friend desires to make no mystery whatever of this question of horses, and I entirely agree that it is desirable, in order to keep up the public interest in the horse supply throughout the country, that the War Office should, as far as possible, take those in the country districts into their confidence as to the number of horses available and the number which will be required. I think that noble Lords opposite have been hardly fair to my right hon. friend on the question of mobilisation. So far as I know, up to the time that my right hon. friend went to the War Office there was no scheme of any kind to mobilise the Auxiliary Forces, or, if there was, it was of the—

VISCOUNT MIDLETON

I beg the noble Earl's pardon for interrupting him. The noble Earl said just now that while we were in office there was no sort of scheme, he believed, for the defence of the country. I can assure the noble Earl that there was a scheme in which every regiment was placed in the division in which it was to fight. The scheme was well known and could have been put in force in twenty-four hours.

THE EARL OF CREWE

I have no doubt that when the noble Viscount was at the War Office it was settled in his own mind and in that of his advisers where each regiment or battalion should be moved to; but as to whether any scheme was thought out by which all the Volunteers and Yeomanry could have been moved with full complements for all purposes of defence, I confess I am somewhat sceptical. On that I should like to say that I think noble Lords opposite pressed my right hon. friend rather unfairly in this matter of mobilisation. I believe that his schemes, which are necessarily of an elaborate character, have been very carefully worked out, and that as much progress has been made as could reasonably be expected to have been made by any Department within the limit of time which has been at the disposal of the Secretary of State for War. I am inclined to challenge contradiction on that point, although, of course, I am not personally acquainted with the details. After all, these things cannot be carried out in a day. The noble Viscount opposite was going to re-organise the Army on a system of Army Corps with short service troops. Well, how long would it have taken to mature the scheme? It would have taken something like ten or twelve years to have brought the scheme into completion; and if, supposing the noble Viscount had had an opportunity of carrying out his scheme, somebody had jumped up in your Lordships' House twice every session and attempted to pull the plant up to see how it was growing and complained that the noble Viscount was neglecting the interests of the country by not having his scheme matured, he would have had some right to complain. Similarly I think my right hon. friend has also some right to complain. It is the advantage which the preponderating strength of noble Lords opposite gives them in this House that they are able, on subjects like this, to raise debates of which I do not wish to deny the importance. When noble Lords opposite sit on this side we are not in a position to do anything of the kind. Our forces are not large enough, and consequently, therefore, we must bear it as best we can. I confess that I do not think it of serious moment whether the noble Earl goes to a Division or not. If he does, we shall, of course, be compelled to vote against him.

THE EARL OF WEMYSS

My Lords, I do not know what my noble friend on this side of the House proposes to do in the event of my pressing my Motion. My noble friend proposes an inquiry. I shall vote against any inquiry. We have had inquiries enough. What we want is action, not inquiry. An inquiry could tell you nothing you do not know. I shall oppose an inquiry whenever it is proposed. Four years ago both sides in this House pledged themselves to what is contained in my Motion—namely, that this country should at all times be in that state of preparation on land, not that you could crush any enemy that came, but in that state of preparation that no enemy would dream of coming. That was the I.O.U. which Lord Crewe and my noble friends on this side of the House put their signatures to four years ago. To-day I present that I.O.U. in the interests of the country, and I ask noble Lords to fulfil the promises they then made. It is necessary to act immediately, so that in six months time the country could be in that state which this House declared four years ago it should be in. I do not criticise in any way the quality of the Territorial Force. I pass that aside. My point is that in numbers it is quite useless as compared with the force required. Does the noble Earl the Leader of the House think that this force, if complete, will fulfil the condition contained in the Resolution of this House to which he agreed four years ago. I await an answer.

THE EARL OF CREWE

So far as my opinion is worth anything, I say "Yes."

THE EARL OF WEMYSS

I hope the rest of the House will say "No." The view of Lord Roberts, and every soldier in this House who has not an axe to grind backs Lord Roberts in that view, is that you require 1,000,000 men to put yourselves in the position referred to in the Resolution which your Lordships accepted four years ago. I desire to see whether your Lordships draw back from the action you then took or not, and if any noble Lord will support me I shall certainly divide the House.

EARL CAWDOR

My Lords, I hope the noble Earl will not divide the House on his Motion. I think your Lordships might be placed in an invidious position if a Division were taken upon it. We have had two distinct opinions expressed. The greatest military authority in your Lordships' House, who unfortunately is not present to-day, has given his opinion very clearly. On the other hand, we have the opinion of His Majesty's Government that they believe that this scheme, which has been passed through Parliament and has received the impress of Parliamentary authority, will be a success. We have many criticisms, and, I am afraid, many doubts, as to the success of the scheme, but we still wish that it should be a success, and we desire to do nothing which may hamper in the slightest degree the operations of His Majesty's Government and the work which the Secretary of State is endeavouring to do. The noble Earl the Leader of the House, in his speech to-night, has given us some ground for hoping that in the future we may get a little more information when questions of importance are asked than has been vouchsafed to us in the past. The noble Viscount behind me, Lord Hardinge, asked some questions the other day as to which he got no information at all I think, however, from the statement by the noble Earl the Leader of the House, that we are entitled to hope that when these questions are again asked we shall certainly receive a little more information than we have had up to the present time. In those circumstances, and wishing to leave His Majesty's Government free,

CONTENTS.
Bedford, D. Hood, V. Penrhyn, L.
Saltoun, L.[Teller]
Bathurst, E. Calthorpe, L. Saltoun, L.
Cathcart, E. Clinton, L.
Kilmorey, E. Dunboyne, L. Sinclair, L.
Leicester, E. Faber, L. Wemyss, L. (Barrington.)
Lovelace, E. Kilmarnock, L. (E. Erroll.)
Kintore, L. (E. Kintore.) Willoughby de Broke, L.
Falkland, V. Muskerry, L.
Hampden, V. Newton, L.
NON-CONTENTS.
Loreburn, L. (L. Chancellor.) Hereford, L. Bp. Lochee, L.
Wolverhampton, V. Lucas, L.
(L. President.) Airedale, L. Mac Donnell, L.
Crewe, E. (L. Privy Seal.) Allendale, L. Marchamley, L.
Colebrooke, L. [Teller.] Monkswell, L.
Eversley, L. O'Hagan, L.
Buckinghamshire, E. Glantawe, L. Pentland, L.
Carrington, E. Granard, L. (E. Granard.) Ribblesdale, L.
Chichester, E. Hamilton of Dalzell, L. St. Davids, L.
Haversham, L. Saye and Sele, L.
Portman, V. Herschell, L. [Teller.] Weardale, L.
Resolved in the negative.